REPORT ⁽¹⁾

Part 2 (3 parts)

Within the United States there are two principal operational areas of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The first is national missile defence (NMD) which mainly encompasses the 50 states of the US. The second is theatre missile defence (TMD) relating to weapons and other systems that support US military forces, the US Allies, coalition partners and friendly nations outside the boundaries of the United States itself.

Assembly Document 1435 refers mainly to the NMD programmes and the purpose of this chapter is to examine how the situation has developed, analyse new projects and assess cooperation with Canada. To this end, two areas will be taken into consideration: early warning (land and space-based) and missile defence (land, sea, air and space-based).

First of all, it is important to understand why the United States feels the need for a BMD and why it pushes its allies in this direction by offering final products and cooperation programmes. The ballistic missile threat emanates from different regions of the world.

For example, Russia retains the capability to threaten the United States, despite the end of the cold war. The Russian Government is not considered to be hostile any longer but at the same time its military and economic instability gives rise to concerns about the possibility of accidental launches or the seizure of one or more missiles by a group of rogue officers. It is not feasible to consider the possibility of the US and Russia agreeing to re-target intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because Russia can re-target its missiles against the US in about 30 seconds and the time the Americans require is almost the same. In addition, it is important to stress that such an agreement could not be verified. Moreover, the Russian Government is selling its technologies to Third World buyers.

Despite its commercial partnership with the United States and the good relations both countries enjoy, China is nonetheless considered as a threat because of its technological capabilities. In fact, it is estimated that it has more than a dozen ICBMs and the Chinese Government is looking towards independently targeted re-entry vehicles, which, from a military point of view, allow multiple warheads to be carried on a single missile. Finally, it is also acquiring components of the core Russian missiles arsenal. Chinaís main strategic objective is probably not the US but should rather be envisaged as being directed at other Asian regions. In any event, it is part of US policy to be ready to take action if necessary.

Other countries may also represent a strategic and tactical threat to the US because of their ICBM capabilities and their rogue politics: among the Third World countries, North Korea is believed to present the greatest danger because of its efforts to develop long-range missiles and carry out nuclear, chemical and biological armaments programmes. However, it is thought that it will not have the capability required to strike the United States until after the first decade of the next century.

According to some US sources, Iran is a country that poses a great threat to regional stability in the Middle East, not only because it has already used ballistic and cruise missiles as well as chemical weapons, but mainly because its logic is different from Western logic in that it is based on the principles of jihad, the Muslim holy war. Iraq too represents a regional threat, mainly as a result of the Gulf War. It is important to remember that the Persian Gulf is a region rich in oil, a very important strategic resource both from an economic and a political point of view. It is in the American interest for the region to be stable and its business partners there to be secure because the essence of US resources policy is that it tries to save its own resources by importing the same raw materials from abroad.

In conclusion, the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East does not constitute a direct threat from a territorial point of view but rather a threat to the economic and political interests of the United States in that region. The situation might change in the future but at this stage it is the main reason why the US is also interested in a theatre missile defence system that could be deployed in the area.

The same concepts may also be valid for Libya, even though that country could be seen as a potential threat mainly because it already tried to launch a missile against Italy about a decade ago. Moreover, it has programmes for the development of biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles, even if such programmes are proceeding at a slow pace.

Other countries that have ballistic missile capabilities are Japan, Israel and India but the first two are close allies of the US, and moreover have cooperation programmes with the Americans in the field of ballistic missile defence. India might be considered a threat to the US on account of its technological capabilities. But in any case, in the field of international politics todayís friends could easily turn into tomorrowís enemies and it is difficult to foresee how the international environment will develop in the long term, particularly as far as a possible world power like India is concerned.

There are several reasons why the US Government is pushing its allies towards cooperation programmes in this field. First of all, from an economic point of view, cooperating means sharing costs as well as risks. For those allies, cooperating with the US means having access to American technology and know-how. The Americans, for their part, can assess their alliesí technological and financial capabilities.

It is important to remember that US strategic needs are different from European strategic needs and in this sense it is only logical that the United States should be developing its own systems and trying to sell them to its allies, partly because it is in its economic interest to do so and partly because European countries are also seeking to develop specific technologies in this field.

As far as NMD is concerned, the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) has defined an architecture that could defend all the states in the US from a single site located in North Dakota. This system is able to handle only a small number of warheads and it is the Americansí response to the new risks that are emerging in the wake of the end of the cold war. In fact, the US Government and military had to live with the threat of multiple warheads being used by the other superpower during the cold war, but the situation has changed and the risk is now spread among several small rogue nations, so the United States has had to adapt the cold-war standards of its defence architecture.

The current NMD architecture as proposed is based on a system that relies on existing space-based assets, upgrades existing early-warning and X-band radar facilities, and foresees the deployment of an initial capability of 20 ground-based interceptor missiles tipped with exoatmospheric kill vehicles and based at Grand Forks, North Dakota. These elements will be combined with the battle management command, control and communications (BM/C3) system. The architecture will be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of US Space Command (CINC Space), which means he will also have the authority to release a ground-based interceptor missile. The estimated cost of developing such a system is US $2.5 billion.

The architecture of any ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is divided into two main segments: early warning and operational defence. In the next section they will be analysed from a mainly political point of view.

In order to destroy a target, it is important to be able to see and track it, and that is what the early-warning segment does. In fact, its main purpose in the BMD architecture is to give the alert that a missile has been launched and specify its direction. This makes it possible to take countermeasures or strike back. This kind of activity entails the use of ground-based radar and telescopes, airborne systems and space-based technology.

As far as North American aerospace defence is concerned, responsibility for aerospace warning and control lies with a bi-national (United States and Canadian) organisation: the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Aerospace warning includes the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of an attack against North America whether by aircraft, missile, or space vehicles, utilising mutual support arrangements with the other commands.

The commander in chief (CINC) of NORAD is appointed by, and is also responsible to, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada. His headquarters are located at Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado) which also accommodates the 21st Space Wing of the 14th Air Force that is responsible for operating satellites and ground-based missile sensors world-wide in order to provide data to NORAD for assessment of threats to North America, and the US Space Command for assessment of threats to US and Allied troops deployed worldwide. Finally, the command and control centre is not far away, at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, Cheyenne Mountain (Colorado) and serves as a central collection and coordination facility for a world-wide system of sensors designed to provide the CINC and the National Command Authorities of the United States and Canada with an accurate picture of any aerospace threat.

In conclusion, CINCNORAD is responsible for providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) but information is needed in order to accomplish this mission. The system architecture consists of several segments: one is under the control of CINCNORAD and the others are operated by commands supporting NORAD, such as the US space command. For the purpose of ensuring a timely flow of warning information, CINCNORAD and CINC Space are one and the same person.

The US Space Command supports NORADís activity by providing missile warning and space surveillance. It is the duty of the Space Defence Operations Centre (SPADOC), located in the Colorado Springs area, to receive information from the Space Surveillance Centre (SSC) that is based on a world-wide network of active and passive sensors used to track anything that overflies or might overfly North American territory at an altitude lower than that of deep space. This international network is called the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) and each day it makes about 30 000 observations, all of which are transmitted to the SSCís computers. Once the data arrives in Colorado, it is analysed and particular attention is of course paid to any unknown objects.

The space-based early warning system is also managed by the US Space Command and comprises several constellations of satellites in high orbit. In fact, high resolution technology is not necessary to accomplish an early-warning mission but a wide field of view is extremely important. Since missiles are boosted by hot gases, infrared (IR) camera are the best tools to use. Early warning satellite payloads are typically IR camera programmed for the specific wavelengths of heat emitted by combustion elements. Backup payloads are also provided in order to avoid false warnings.

In the event of a missile attack against the US, the alert takes about five minutes to arrive in Washington. That does not leave enough time to organise a defence or move the population into safe shelters but it does provide sufficient warning for the purposes of striking back. This kind of strategy was possible during the cold war since Soviet logic was in many respects similar to Western logic. In contrast, the phenomenon of religious fanaticism makes the logic of a second strike completely useless since the adversary is not afraid of death and devastation. In this sense the architecture of the US ballistic missile defence system must change and when it comes to developing such a system in Europe, consideration should be given to the fact that European countries are not far away from rogue nations in which this phenomenon is rife.

One example of a US Department of Defence (DoD) early-warning programme is the DSP-647s (Defence Support Programme series 647) which is so important that the DoD has financed the establishment of the ground station of Nurrungar (Australia). Another example is the Buckley Air National Guard Base (Colorado) where the 821st Space Group of the 14th Air Force is stationed. The 21st Space Wing of the Peterson Air Force Base also has units that operate early-warning satellites and report warning information.

The early-warning programme had in the 1960s been called MIDAS; its mission objective was the detection of nuclear experiments and it also had meteorological capabilities, but after some information had been unintentionally released, the programmeís name was changed to DSP-647 and some of its characteristics were modified.

In 1969, the Pentagon provided the following information about the system: the weight of the satellite was between 800 and 1300 kg depending on what payload was chosen, its sensors were similar to the VELA satellite sensors and therefore consisted of particle-detection sensors, electromagnetic radiation-detection sensors, equipment capable of X-ray and gamma-ray measurements ñ i.e. able to detect a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere as well as underground ñ a secondary payload with the mission of avoiding confusion between solar radiation refraction and the launch of a missile or a laser attack against its early-warning sensors, and so on.

The core of the DSP-647 is an IR telescope and the satellites orbit at about 35 000-36 000 km from the earthís surface, inclined at an angle of 0ƒ with respect to the equatorial plane. Usually the constellation is composed of three satellites: one located over the Indian Ocean, the second over the Pacific Ocean and the third over the Atlantic Ocean. Naturally, their positions may vary depending on the strategic, operational and tactical needs of the United States.

All the US remote-sensing satellites are called "Keyhole" and one of the latest ideas for early-warning space-based architecture consists of an unmanned and multi-function space station called KH-13, able to observe the earth constantly. It is possible to imagine that a number of the characteristics of the Strategic Defence Initiative technology of the mid-1980s could be included in this project. Up till now, the KH-13 has existed on paper only and given the financial problems affecting several defence programmes in the US, it will probably go on existing in that form for some time to come.

Since the DSP-647 programme is on the verge of becoming obsolete, the DoD is planning a new architecture for an early-warning capability that would also be able to carry out its mission in a post-cold war environment where it is crucial to reduce the timeframe from a launch to an alert to action since, as has already been observed, enemies may be closer and not scared by a second strike. The programme that is supposed to replace the DSP-647 is the space-based infrared system (SBIRS). Its space architecture consists of two satellites in a highly elliptical orbit or Molnya orbit and four satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) for the purpose of providing early warning capabilities. The first delivery is planned for 2001. It is also planned to put a constellation of satellites called the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) Brilliant Eyes into low earth orbit (LEO) to track missiles once launched. Initial delivery of this system is planned for 2004. For the SBIRS in GEO, an application as a satellite-tracking system is also planned in addition to the ground-based system currently deployed world-wide by the US Space Command.

In the field of theatre ballistic missile defence, it is important not only to have an early-warning capability regarding a missile launch but also to make such information available at operational level. To this end the US Army and Navy have created Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) units to provide any operations theatre with information from the DSP satellites. In fact, their mission is to give attack warnings so that fighter aircraft and ground artillery can attack the transporter erector launchers (TELs). These stations had been planned before the Gulf War and the only reason why they were not deployed at that time was that they were not available.

In conclusion, it is important to underline that the space-based and ground-based early-warning systems are not the only ones available. Airborne sensors can also provide inputs in this field even if their usefulness is confined to the theatre area. The use of laser remote-sensing is quite interesting because in these sensors because it represents a new application of laser technology.

Laser remote-sensing is based on the principles of optical absorption spectroscopy that involves passing the light of known spectral characteristics through a target medium and observing which wavelengths are absorbed by the medium. Particular molecules will resonate at specific wavelengths and in doing so they absorb light at those wavelengths, since each chemical compound may emit characteristic spectra if suitably excited.

The reason why this technology is not space-based is because the atmosphere, together with dust and vapour, influences the performance of such systems. If the architecture were space-based it would require an enormous amount of power, which would pose management problems. However, this technology can be used for atmospheric studies, for damage assessment in the event of strikes and also for early-warning for TMD, since some missiles produced by rogue countries are still using liquid fuel that partially evaporates when the missile is prepared for launch.

Once a missile launch has been detected and its trajectory tracked, the only thing that remains to be done is to destroy it and move the population into safe shelters. The focus here is on neutralising the incoming missile but it is also important to remember that bunkers for people can be a form of ABM defence, although the main problem is how to prevent missiles from destroying the infrastructure as well.

This section contains a description of US choices in the field of ABM defence, taking into consideration the fact that it is possible to choose between two kinds of architecture: endoatmospheric defence architecture (i.e. within the atmosphere) and exoatmospheric defence architecture (i.e. outside the atmosphere). In general, it is possible to say that the US programmes are mostly based on exoatmospheric architecture. The reasons are numerous and include the fact that in order to attack the US with a missile, the adversary must use an intercontinental missile. The US Government is no doubt doing everything possible to avert a threat from a hostile country possessing ballistic missile capabilities within the American continent. In fact, part of the trajectory of an intercontinental missile lies in the upper atmosphere or beginning of outer space. Moreover, the advantage of intercepting missiles there is that atmospheric drag will destroy all the pieces of a missile that has been attacked, which means that even a low-precision interceptor can accomplish the mission. Also, because interception of a weapon of mass destruction (fitted with a nuclear or other warhead) takes place in space, it is probably sufficiently far away to prevent much damage on earth.

It is also possible to use a kinetic kill vehicle, or a high-energy beam, to destroy a missile and electronic support measures (ESM) can be taken to misguide the missile but there are no specific programmes for this particular purpose.

As well as having its own programmes, the United States is involved in various ABM programmes in cooperation with Europe, through the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS) and Israel, through Arrow. It also conducts joint studies with Japan. Its own programmes focus on US self-defence against the ballistic missile threat. It could well be the case that Canada relies on American defence proficiency, since the extent of its involvement in ABM defence programmes is not known, other than its joint early-warning capabilities with the US.

These programmes began in the mid-1980s under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), also nicknamed Star Wars. The main architecture of the system consisted in constellations of early-warning satellites, which could also destroy ICBMs in their exoatmospheric trajectory before they released their multiple warheads. The rationale and architecture of the SDI was described in Assembly Document 1435. It is worth repeating here that the architecture of the SDI was developed in response to cold war threats and to promote an American economic effort that the Soviet Union could not afford.

One of the elements of the SDI architecture was the use of lasers to counteract the ballistic missile threat. In fact, the usefulness of lasers for air defence has been under investigation since the 1970s. Work on such systems continued through the 1980s with the Airborne Laser Laboratory, which completed the first test laser intercepts above the earth. The space-based laser (SBL) programme will build on a wide variety of technologies developed by the Strategic Defence Initiative Organisation (SDIO) in the 1980s. The SBL platform achieves missile interception by focusing and maintaining a high-powered laser on a target until it is destroyed. The energy necessary to perform this mission is generated by a chemical reaction of the hydrogen fluoride molecule.

Research on the large optics demonstration experiment (LODE), completed in 1987, provided scientists with the means to control the beams of large, high-powered lasers, and under the large advanced mirror programme (LAMP) a 4-metre diameter space mirror with the required optical figure and surface quality was designed and built.

In this context, the satellite relay mirror experiment (RME) was launched in 1990 with the purpose of experimenting with the targeting techniques of space laser mirrors. Its mirror intercepted a laser beam from Mount Haleakaia in 1991 before the satellite was deactivated.

In the same year, the Alpha laser achieved megawatt power at the requisite operating level in a low-pressure environment and numerous acquisition tracking and pointing/fire control (ATP/FC) experiments are taking place in order to provide the SBL platform with stable aimpoints. In 1995, trials conducted under the space pointing integrated control experiment demonstrated a performance close to weapons level.

Future projects concerning the SBL include the SBL readiness demonstrator (SBLRD) to test all the components of the system together in their planned working environment. The SBLRD satellite will comprise four major subsystems:

• the ATP system, which will provide not only acquisition, tracking and targeting capabilities but also stabilisation and assessment capabilities;
• the laser device;
• the optics and beam control systems to enhance the capabilities of the laser device;
• the space system to provide a stable platform and furnish electrical power (other than for the laser) and so on.

Current SBL planning is based on a 20-satellite constellation since it is estimated that a 12-satellite constellation with the same characteristics, i.e. kill times per missile ranging from one to ten seconds and re-targeting times as low as 0.5 seconds, can negate 94% of all missile threats in most theatre scenarios.

As far as kinetic weapons are concerned, the development of ground-based interceptors (GBIs) is the main component of the American NMD programme. The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) is expected to undergo intercept flights in 1998 and, at the moment, work is focused on the technical aspects of the interceptor seeker.

It is possible that the architecture of the EKV system will consist of a ground-based interceptor guided by a space-based seeker, or by a ground-based or airborne missile launched outside the atmosphere in order to destroy a missile before it releases its multiple warheads. Current international law prohibits the use of missile-armed satellites even though the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and subsequent treaties do no more than prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction. In any case such systems are too costly and the same performances can be obtained using ground-based and airborne technology.

Still in the field of exoatmospheric kinetic kill vehicles, the theatre high altitude area defence (THAAD) system is designed to become a land-based upper tier TMD system and is also described in Assembly Document 1435. For this reason, the discussion here will be limited to a brief reminder of the basis of this programme and its development since 1994. Three initial phase tests took place in 1995 and two in 1996 but unfortunately the results were not satisfactory.

The THAAD is an army programme whose architecture consists of four major segments:

• truck-mounted launchers to protect and transport the interceptors;
• interceptors which consist of a single-stage booster and a kinetic kill vehicle;
• the THAAD radar system which supports the full range of surveillance, target tracking and fire control functions, and provides a communication link with the interceptor in flight;
• the battle management command, control, communications, computer and intelligence system (BM/C4I) which manages and integrates all the architecture segments by providing instructions and communications and by processing data gathered by sensors.

In 1996, the Department of Defence (DoD) restructured the programme by militarising the user operational evaluation system (UOES) and upgrading certain components, such as the infrared seeker, and the remaining segments. Moreover, a UOES capability that includes two THAAD radars, four launchers, two BM/C4I systems, 40 missiles, and 295 soldiers is planned to be available for developmental testing by Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 and the first unit equipped (FUE) date for THAAD is scheduled for FY 2006.

In addition, the navy is also carrying out a theatre-wide defence programme, with the aim of providing the US forces with an upper-tier ballistic missile defence capability without the need for land bases. This is the second evolutionary stage of the navy area defence programme, and it is planned to use an interceptor with an exoatmospheric capability, such as the lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP). During intercepting tests against targets outside the earthís atmosphere, LEAP technology components performed well, which probably means that technical demonstration flights will be possible by 2000.

As far as endoatmospheric programmes are concerned, the devices used for ABMD purposes can be divided into two categories: energy weapons and kinetic weapons. As has already been explained, energy weapons are characterised by the fact that energy concentrated into beams is used to destroy missiles. With kinetic weapons on the other hand, the same goal is achieved using an object that explodes near the missile and destroys it. It is important to underline the difficulties involved in such kinds of missions because destroying a missile amounts to launching one projectile against another while trying to intercept the first. However, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to do this, even if the failure rate is usually high; it is therefore worth listing the kind of programmes being carried out in the United States.

In the field of energy weapons there is just one programme: the airborne laser system. Its mission architecture is composed of a ground segment for command, control and communication (C3) purposes and an aeroplane, the Boeing 747 that carries the laser device.

The purpose of the ABL programme is to design and develop concepts to minimise engineering risks for airborne, high-energy laser weapons capable of acquiring, tracking and killing theatre ballistic missiles in boost phase. This system is developed by the USAF Phillips Laboratory and the final user is the Air Combat Command (ACC). Boeing and Rockwell International proposed competing engineering design concepts. The system architecture is composed of a nose-mounted turret, a chemical oxygen-iodine laser, and a 747 aircraft. The contract to build the laser was awarded to the Boeing-led contractor, which also includes TRW and Lockheed Martin, last November.

One milestone has been the successful demonstration of the active tracking system built on a ground-based illuminator tested against a navy F-14D. In addition, a demonstration of the full-power flight-weighted laser module will take place in April 1998..

It is planned that the ABL mission will comprise the following phases:

• the target is visualised by nine infrared search and tracking sensors situated on the aeroplane;
• a tracker/illuminator laser is fired from the turret of the ABL to illuminate the nose of the target booster;
• a beacon/illuminator is activated to mark a narrow spot on the target fuel tank in order to provide the path for the lethal shoot;
• the signal of distortion due to the atmosphere is sensed by wavefront sensors that send the signal to deformable mirrors;
• the deformable mirrors pre-distort the high-energy laser beam so that it is refocused by the atmosphere to become lethal once it hits its target;
• the high-energy laser beam is activated against the target.

All information concerning ranges and missions is classified but it is known that it is planned that the aircraft will fly at 12 000 m because, nominally, the laser must attack the missile within about 40 seconds if the nominal burnout is 80 seconds for a 90-km range missile. The ABL will be just one of the components of the NMD architecture and of the theatre missile defence architecture.

Still in the field of laser weapons, the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL), which is a deuterium fluoride chemical laser, is the highest average power laser in the US. It can be used against any object that passes within its field of view both inside and outside the atmosphere. TRW has built the MIRACL for the navy, which will test it against cruise and ballistic missiles. At the time of writing, a test of its anti-satellite capabilities was scheduled for October 1997.

The United States and Israel are also cooperating on a tactical high-energy laser system THEL) which this year received US$ 15 million. It is planned that this system will be a key component of the integrated air defence system (IADS) where the United States Marine Corps (USMC) doctrinally employs an IADS for all active defence based upon multi-role fighter aircraft and the Hawk missile. In this scenario the THEL will perform the role of detecting, acquiring, identifying, and destroying short and medium-range targets, in addition to operating in a conventional and electronic warfare environment.

Where kinetic weapons are concerned, the improved Hawk provides an excellent TBM core defence for marine ground forces. The new Hawk system will consist of three major components:

• the TPS-59 radar that provides target detection, discrimination, and tracking;
• the Hawk launcher that transports, protects and launches the missiles, and the Hawk missile;
• the air defence communication platform (ADCP) that connects the TPS-59 with the Hawk and the remainder of the theatre missile defence architecture in order to create missile defence in depth.

The Navy and the BMDO have been working together to develop a sea-based area defence capability which builds on the existing Aegis/Standard missile air defence system, in order to extend its anti-air capabilities to enable the detection, tracking and engagement of TBM.

The main advantages of the navy area BMD programme include:

• conflict deterrence;
• protection of US forces deployed to crisis areas;
• in-depth defence to reassure allies;
• a reduction in the demand for sea and airlift, since a sea-based ABM will enable the theatre commander to concentrate available lift capabilities on anti-armour tanks, troops, ammunition and other operations in order to stop the enemy advance.

The US armyís endoatmospheric kinetic weapon ABM programme is the famous Patriot missile, now upgraded to advanced capabilities in the PAC-3 version. Today it is considered to be the core of the TMD programmes, and also has one of the highest priorities in the development of BMD systems within the US.

The PAC-3 version presents a number of improvements, especially in the field of BM/C4I, and incorporates the guidance enhancement missile (GEM). The first unit was equipped with configuration 1 in December 1995.

In 1997 the army began to field configuration 2 which features further improvements and modifications to the radar, communications and other systems. In February 1997, the PAC-3 configuration 2 system successfully engaged a theatre-class ballistic missile.

The PAC-3 architecture is based upon four basic segments:

• the radar set that provides warning and tracking of incoming threats;
• the engagement control station (ECS) that computes fire solutions for the interceptor, and provides fire control and communication links with the other units;
• the launch stations which transport, protect and launch the missiles. Each of them can be equipped with four GEMs or earlier missiles and selected stations are able to carry 16 PAC-3 missiles;
• the interceptors that are highly man-oeuvrable and are considered efficient on the basis of the tests that have been conducted.

Compared with the Patriot, the PAC-3 version is smaller but characterised by an enhanced radar, improved survivability, increased range and a launch point determination capability, resulting in increased firepower and lethality.

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