REPORT ⁽¹⁾

Part 1 (3 parts)

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

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The Assembly,

1. Recalling the need it has repeatedly expressed for the creation of a space-based surveillance and early-warning system, on the basis of which it would be possible to consider the option of a European anti-missile defence system;
2. Bearing in mind that steps, albeit modest, taken within our own Organisation to develop a European space-based observation system, nevertheless represent progress;
3. Noting that there has been no progress whatsoever as far as European early-warning and anti-missile defence systems are concerned;
4. Considering the reality of the threat from theatre missiles and also the emergent threat from medium-range missiles;
5. Taking account, moreover, of the existing threat from missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads and of the fact that a nuclear threat is foreseeable in the medium term;
6. Bearing in mind other emergent threats such as, for example, that of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs);
7. Welcoming the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies which, together with other existing regimes, can provide for genuine control over behaviour that represents or might come to represent a proliferation threat and a danger to security;
8. Noting, however, that all such regimes unfortunately cannot completely eradicate the risks and threats they are intended to counter;
9. Welcoming the existence of the Franco-Italian FSAF (Future Surface-to-Air Family) programme, known as Aster, for which approval has just been given for the industrialisation and production stage;
10. Noting, furthermore, work carried out by the United States and Canada in the anti-missile defence field;
11. Welcoming also the MEADS (Medium Extended Air-Defence System) programme involving the United States, Germany and Italy;
12. Considering the studies carried out by NATO in the areas of Extended Air Defence and Theatre Missile Defence;
13. Recalling, finally, Recommendation 571 on transatlantic cooperation on European anti-missile defence,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pursue with far greater urgency than is currently the case its discussions on the development of a common anti-ballistic missile defence system;
2. Keep the Assembly informed of progress on the study on European anti-missile defence entrusted to the Special Working Group;
3. Bring together studies on anti-missile defence being conducted at national level by various member countries of the Organisation;
4. Examine the possibility of cooperation between the United States and Europe over anti-missile defence, especially theatre missile defence;
5. Urge France to rejoin the MEADS project and the United Kingdom to consider joining it under its Strategic Defence Review;
6. Keep the Assembly informed of progress on studies on the development of a European space-based observation system;
7. Inform the Assembly whether, in accordance with paragraph 38 of the Noordwiijk Declaration, an independent early-warning capability has been studied and, if so, what conclusions have been reached;
8. Establish contact between WEU and the BMDO forthwith, so that all the above matters can be studied jointly.

The present report is intended as a follow-up to the research undertaken by our Committee, starting in 1992, on Europeís need to acquire an anti-missile defence system.

Assembly Document 1339 (6 November 1992, "Anti-ballistic Missile Defence", Rapporteur: Mr Lenzer) and the Symposium on Anti-missile Defence for Europe (Rome, April 1993) highlighted the need to create a space-based surveillance and early-warning system on the basis of which it would be possible to consider the option of an anti-missile defence system.

Such a system will need to take account, first, of European requirements and also research already undertaken in this field by the United States.

The first part of the present report (Assembly Document 1435, 9 November 1994), dealing with transatlantic cooperation on anti-missile defence, was drafted by your Rapporteur, after a visit by our Committee to the United States, where contacts of significant interest were made with the political and military authorities and with the US defence industry.

In the ensuing Recommendation 571 on "Transatlantic cooperation on European anti-missile defence", the Assembly first asked to be kept informed by the WEU Council about progress made on the study on European anti-missile defence being conducted by the Special Working Group.

In its Reply, the Council stated that the study, entitled "A preliminary analysis of the risks of missile technology proliferation on the southern flanks of western Europe", had been temporarily suspended.

The Council moreover recalled paragraph 25 of the "Preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common defence policy", which stated that "WEU should strengthen its operational capability and develop military and operational aspects of security such as ... the question of European anti-missile defence".

Lastly, the Council expressed confidence that work on the subject would soon be resumed by the Special Working Group. As far as your Rapporteur is aware, three years on, there has been no change whatsoever in the position.

The replies to the other recommendations made by the Assembly in Recommendation 571 were hardly more encouraging. Thus in relation to the request for contacts to be established between WEU and the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) the Council replied that it would consider the issue once discussions on the possibilities of cooperation between the United States and Europe on anti-missile defence had been finalised.

Our colleague, Mr Blaauw, in his address to the 10th International Conference on Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) at Eilat on 23 June 1997, stated that "no ballistic missile risk analysis has yet been made and the WEU Councilís Special Working Group has not conducted the study on European anti-missile defence which had been asked for. Neither has any serious study taken place regarding a European early-warning system".

In the meantime, our US allies have continued to make progress in terms of both theory and practice. Recently, Mr Kaminsky, Defence Under-Secretary for Acquisition and Technology at the US Department of Defence, addressed the House Committee on National Securityís Military Research and Development Subcommittee on the subject of ballistic missile defence (6 March, 1997).

He noted that the in-theatre threat to the allies and for deployed US forces abroad was real and increasing. In his view thousands of short-range missiles were at present deployed on hundreds of missile launchers in at least 30 countries, some of which might be considered hostile. The threat was here and now, widespread and should be taken very seriously.

In parallel, there was another emergent threat from medium-range missiles. According to Mr Kaminsky, some countries were developing their own medium-range missiles (he referred particularly to North Korea and its No Dong missile); others, among them Iran, had already bought this missile or were intending to do so.

There was also the further threat of missiles armed with chemical and biological warheads. In Mr Kaminskyís opinion, this could come from North Korea, Iran and Libya, countries with extensive chemical weapons programmes.

A nuclear threat was also predictable in the medium term; Iraq and North Korea were in fact close to acquiring nuclear capability although the Gulf War, in the case of the first, and the Framework Agreement, as far as the second was concerned, had called a halt to those programmes. Iran was working towards the same end, but would not achieve it for many years to come.

Moreover, Russia had a major capacity for supplying strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (land-based, submarine-launch-ed missiles and long-range aircraft). China, too, was in the same position.

Another emergent threat was land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). LACMs were at present deployed in the United States, France and Russia but these capabilities were being developed in a dozen or so countries. According to Mr Kaminsky, the nations giving rise to the greatest concern in this regard were at present working on

short-range ballistic missiles, hence wide proliferation of high-technology LACMs was unlikely till some 10 to 15 years hence.

However, there was a real threat here and now from anti-ship cruise missiles in over 70 countries, which could be modified to include ground attack capability in a year or twoís time.

The overall situation, undoubtedly worrying, does not appear however to concern the WEU Council unduly, as noted above, or the majority of European governments, since only three of them: those of Germany, France and Italy, have taken the threat seriously, as is clear from their involvement in the work on the medium extended air-defence system (MEADS) (France withdrew in 1996). MEADS will be discussed extensively in a later chapter.

In the chapters that follow, your Rapporteur will attempt to describe the present position as regards anti-missile defence in Europe and North America (the United States and Canada) and transatlantic cooperation in this field.

The table below shows existing anti-missile defence programmes worldwide. To them should be added the bilateral Japan-US study that will enable the Japanese Government to take a decision on possible ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities in the context of wider Japanese defence policy.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has already been studied by our Committee on two previous occasions: the first in April 1992, in Document 1305 ("Arms export policy", Rapporteur: Mr Aarts) and subsequently, in 1994, in the first part of the present report (Document 1435: "Transatlantic cooperation on European anti-missile defence") by the present Rapporteur.

Little that is new can be added to what has already been said and your Rapporteur will therefore confine himself to recalling very briefly the philosophy underlying this informal arrangement.

The MTCR deals with transfers of equipment and technology connected with missiles. All requests for such transfers must take the following set of considerations into account:

• prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
• the capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programmes of the recipient state;
• the significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of systems for producing weapons of mass destruction;
• an assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the assurance of the recipient state that they are to be used only for the purpose stated, that neither such use nor the items transferred will be modified or dup-licated without the prior consent of the supplier government and that neither the items, nor any replicas nor derivatives, will be re-transferred without the consent of the supplier government.

The MTCR further provides that these principles will form part of the respective legislations of the signatory countries.

The demise of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) in early 1994 led to the start of discussions on the creation of a successor organisation adapted to the new international situation.

Differences emerged from the outset between the former COCOM members (NATO countries excepting Iceland, plus Australia and Japan) over the intrinsic objectives of export controls and particularly as to which countries represented or could represent a strategic threat.

Such disagreements can be attributed to differing American and European perceptions. The list of products subject to control was another area of dispute.

In Document 1435, it was suggested that the new successor body to COCOM should cover conventional weapons and any relevant technology and should also concentrate on countries that constituted a threat in proliferation terms and a danger to regional stability: in other words, as far as the US was concerned, countries such as Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

This was the spirit in which the so-called Wassenaar Arrangement was concluded. On 18-19 December 1995, the representatives of 28 countries ⁽³⁾, meeting in Wassenaar (Netherlands) agreed to set up the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Technologies.

Thus, for the first time, a multilateral global regime was created, covering both armaments and dual-use goods and technologies, in order to counter the new threats to security in the post-cold war world, by offering greater transparency and sharing information on armaments and technology transfer across the world.

The 28 original countries were joined by Argentina, Romania and South Korea. Bulgaria and Ukraine were to join some months later. As indicated earlier, COCOM membership was confined to NATO members, apart from Iceland, and with the addition of Australia and Japan. Membership of the new regime was open on a general, non-discriminatory basis to all countries accepting the criteria laid down.

These stated that member countries should:

• be producers or exporters of armaments or technology and dual-use goods relating to armaments;
• have appropriate national policies such as, for example, not selling arms or sensitive dual-use items to countries whose behaviour was a source of concern;
• comply with international laws and standards on non-proliferation, and
• implement 100% effective export controls.

For all the member countries and in particular the United States, the Gulf War was a determining factor in the establishment of the criteria and in the negotiations leading to the Wassenaar Arrangement.

The arrangement was intended as a reminder of the dangers to international peace and security arising from the destabilising accumulation of conventional weaponry and indiscriminate exportation of armaments and sensitive dual-use technology.

The fault lay, as was generally acknowledged, both with eastern and western countries, which, by supplying arms to Iraq, had made possible the build-up of the military machine Saddam Hussein used to invade Kuwait.

To prevent future Iraqs, governments are to exchange information on potential threats to peace and international and regional stability, paying particular attention to undercover projects and dubious procurement methods.

There will also be regular information exchange on transfers of certain sensitive dual-use technologies and goods to countries not party to the Wassenaar Arrangement. A list of over one hundred such products, including machine-tools, computers and telecommunications, has been prepared wth a view to this exchange.

Such transparency in the transfer of sensitive technology and dual-use goods will help identify procurement that might threaten international or regional peace.

Similarly there will be transparency as far as armaments are concerned. Information on arms transfers will be provided on the basis of a weapons list (in principle comprising categories of major weapons systems) already used for the CFE Treaty and the UN arms register. The wish to redefine and extend this list to cover the latest weapons has also been expressed.

Finally it is worth pointing out that the Wassenaar Arrangement is based on national controls, as is the MTCR, and that it is not directed against any country or group of countries. Furthermore the arrangement will not prevent bona fide transactions going ahead, nor interfere with the right of states to acquire legitimate means of self defence. Rather it focuses on behaviour, particularly dangerous behaviour.

Thus one of the declared aims is strengthening cooperation to prevent procurement of arms and dual-use products for military purposes if the regional situation or conduct of the state is, or could become, a cause of serious concern to states party to the arrangement.

The first plenary session of the Wassenaar Arrangement was held in Vienna on 11-12 July 1996. There, the 31 member countries ⁽⁴⁾, with the approval of their respective governments, reached agreement on the proposals originally drawn up in Wassenaar.

The participant countries will control all the items referred to on the List of Dual-use Goods and Technologies and on the new munitions list, with a view to preventing non-authorised transfers or re-transfers of those items.

This list has two appendices, one containing sensitive items and the other a limited number of very sensitive items.

Finally, the list will be revised regularly to take account of technological development and reflect experience gained. It should be noted that missiles and the various components thereof are part of the list.

The Wassenaar Arrangement represents substantial changes in objectives and procedures as compared with its predecessor, COCOM. It should be recalled that the latter was established during the cold-war period in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. Through it the West sought to maintain its qualitative battlefield superiority by virtual prohibition of arms sales to communist countries and through export controls on strategic products and technical data.

Now the threat of the cold war has receded, other new threats have emerged ñ among them that of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This has led to the development of non-proliferation regimes such as the MTCR, referred to earlier, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Australia Group.

The Wassenaar Arrangement extends and complements such regimes, but it should be noted that it is not as yet to the entire satisfaction of every country. A case in point is the United States, which complains of being alone in supporting advance notification of transfers. Nor has the United States managed to prevail as regards its wish to concentrate information exchange on unstable regions where security risks are greatest, as other participants have raised objections to targeting specific regions or countries. The very nature of the Wassenaar Arrangement will in future make it possible to modify criteria and procedures.

In any event, the Wassenaar Arrangement provides a suitable framework, and one that can be improved on, for countering threats to security in todayís world. It provides an appropriate instrument in the fight against proliferation, although one which clearly cannot completely eradicate the risks and threats it endeavours to combat. Both the Arrangement and the MTCR are tools suited to combating missile proliferation.

In a study prepared by Lieutenant-Colonels Schmidt of the German Air Force and Verschuur of the Royal Netherlands Air Force for the Air War College of the Air University (Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama) in April of this year, entitled "the European theatre missile defence programme ñ a field for international cooperation", it was suggested that the very considerable extent to which Europe lags behind with regard to a future anti-missile defence is fundamentally due to budgetary causes.

While these are of major importance, your Rapporteur nevertheless regards reasons of a political order as the main ones preventing this issue being tackled in an in-depth and resolute fashion.

Terence Taylor, Assistant Director at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes ⁽⁵⁾ that "there is a confused situation about what is the real threat and what we would defend in Europe and who is European" adding that "the threat is there and if it becomes more obvious the pitch could then change. But you canít just switch on a missile defence programme in a short time".

The WEU Councilís Reply to Recommendation 571 from the Assembly, to which we referred in the introduction to this report, stating that a preliminary analysis of the risks of missile technology proliferation on the southern flanks of Western Europe had been temporarily suspended is merely the result of a lack of political will in Europe, compounded by cuts in the defence budgets of practically all of our countries.

Alongside the transatlantic cooperation programmes, which we will consider later, or the work carried out by NATO, which will also be discussed in a later chapter of this report, and apart from the studies undertaken by France on early-warning and anti-missile defence (EPAMINONDAS) and those being carried out by the United Kingdom, the only tangible reality in Europe as regards anti-missile defence is Aster.

What initially began as a Franco-Italian anti-aircraft defence eventually turned into an anti-missile defence system in view of the fact that while the earlier system was being developed, it became clear that here was an intrinsic capability which could be extended to anti-missile defence. Germany was also involved in the initial studies but withdrew from the project to concentrate primarily on the MEADS system.

In 1989 the Eurosam consortium was formed to manage the Future Surface-to-Air Family (FSAF) also known as Aster. The consortium members are Aerospatiale, Alenia and Thomson CSF.

FSAF was designed for anti-aircraft, anti-air-to-surface missile, anti-surface-to-surface missile and anti-cruise missile defence to attack ship targets and there is a possibility of its being developed for short range anti-ballistic missile defence. For the moment four versions of FSAF missiles are planned, the SAAM (Naval surface-to-air anti-missile system) which will use the Aster 15 missile; the SAMP/T (land-based medium-range surface-to-air missile) and the SAMP/N (ship-based medium-range surface-to-air missile), both of which will use the Aster 30, and a fourth version capable of intercepting tactical ballistic missile targets. The SAMP, both in the land-based and ship-based versions, will carry extra sensors to increase its ARABEL radar capability which means that the system can work in a medium where jamming devices are being used.

FSAF is a bilateral programme, as an anti-aircraft system, capable of possible ABM extension, which implies some practical advantages such as VAT exemption.

In 1988, a full development contract was signed covering ARABEL radars ⁽⁶⁾ and EMPAR, the fire control system and the Aster 15 (SAAM). A second contract, in 1990, covered the Aster 30 SAMP/T and the ARABEL radar systems. The French and Italian Governments envisage procuring the SAAM, SAMP/T and SAMP/N systems and in 1993 the British Government reached agreement with the French and Italian governments on the Principal Anti-air Missile System (PAAMS), based on an upgrade of the Aster 30 to be installed on frigates in the Horizon programme, which is itself a joint programme involving the same three countries.

To complete development of this system a new consortium was set up which included the three original Eurosam contractors, plus British Aerospace Dynamics, GEC-Marconi and Siemens Plessey, the new consortium being known as EUROPAAMS. A Spanish consortium made a bid to join FSAF in 1991 but the attempt failed to due to lack of financial support from the Spanish Government.

The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle will be equipped with SAAM Aster 15 missiles, complete with ARABEL (SAAM) radar. The Italian Garibaldi SAAM/F cruisers will also carry the SAAM Aster 15 fitted with EMPAR radar (SAAM-I).

Lastly, in early June 1997 good news on Aster was mounting ⁽⁷⁾. First the award was announced of an export contract for Saudi Arabia to fit out three SAWARI II frigates with anti-aircraft weapons. Secondly PAAMS was validated by the authorities of the three countries, hence the formation of the EUROPAAMS group referred to above, and lastly, the French and Italian Governments have definitely agreed to the industrialisation and production stage of the Aster system. Aster has already proved its efficiency. On 8 April 1997 at the French DGAís Landes Test Centre, the Aster 15 intercepted a simulated Sea Skimmer (anti-ship missile flying at the surface of the water). The Aster 15 intercepted the target, a C22 travelling at a speed of 1 000 kilometres per hour and at a height of 10 metres above the surface.

In June of the same year another Aster 15 intercepted an anti-ship Exocet missile MM38 flying at an approximate speed of Mach 1 launched from the French frigate Tourville. The French daily Le Monde ⁽⁸⁾ stated that the cost of the research and development phase was approximately FF 10 billion between 1990 and 2000 and the industrialisation and initial production stage estimated originally at FF 8 billion had been reduced to FF 5 billion after an agreement with the producers in both countries. Costs are to be shared equally between France and Italy, and according to Aerospatiale, the programme will impact on a market which until now has been a United States monopoly and whose value can be estimated at some FF 50 billion, systems, munitions and environment included.

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