ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE FOR EUROPE (III)
Rome, 20th-21st April 1993
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE FOR EUROPE (III)
Rome, 20th-21st April 1993
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU
Wednesday, 21st April 1993
Current state of industrial studies on anti-missile systems in Europe (continued)
Mr. MINICUCCI (Amministratore Delegato, Telespazio, Italy).
The defence of Europe, initially localised, specific and directed towards a given threat, has changed into a sort of global, scattered defence against a whole range of sources of risk. Only more judicious use of satellite means and the corresponding ground sectors can provide the information and communications that are essential for carrying out operations in the new security scenario.
Obviously, the more uncertain the situation, the more essential it is for accurate information to be transmitted to users in time.
The existence of optical (infrared) and radar observation satellites, i.e. IMINT (Image Intelligence), and the relevant electronics, ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) and COMINT (Communication Intelligence), is an essential factor in carrying out the operations envisaged. Otherwise, such operations would have "no eyes or ears".
In telecommunications, the use of satellite stations relieves intervention forces of the need for ground infrastructure which - in the case of distant operations - generally does not exist; when it exists, it is more fragile, prone to interception and vulnerable to direct attack than space stations. Satellites may act as command centres located in space and allow forces widely dispersed over the theatre of operations, sometimes very far from home territory and faced with scattered hostilities, e.g. guerrillas, to be operational immediately. Proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and even weapons of mass destruction in the third world can only be delayed by multilateral verifications carried out by the industrialised countries; it cannot be completely and permanently avoided. What action should be taken in view of such proliferation? This is the fundamental question that is becoming increasingly urgent. The necessary measures and arrangements in this connection will inevitably have to include a combination of defensive and offensive/deterrent systems. At present, only the latter exist. However, in the future they will not be enough.
There will have to be a capability to destroy enemy missiles in flight, in particular because their preventive elimination, apart from the fact that it is not certain (as was seen in the case of attacks against Iraqi Scuds), will always present political problems and requirements that are hard to overcome.
Paradoxically, success in the Gulf war stimulated proliferation because it showed that it was impossible for third world states to withstand the West's high technology conventional megasystems, particularly those of the United States, whatever the scale of conventional weapons held by the third world.
The only possibility still open to trouble-makers, apart from the choice of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, is to impose restrictions on the massive use of the West's high technology military power. The only means of doing this is to threaten western territories and peoples with direct retaliation and to limit operational and logistic concentrations of intervention forces by threatening to use missile-borne weapons of mass destruction.
After giving a strategic reason for the possibility of threatening the West with the use of missiles (in particular as a means of carrying nuclear or biological weapons) it should be underlined that it is technically possible for the countries which are potential enemies to put such a threat into practice.
The number of third world countries with rudimentary types of ballistic missiles, generally derived from Soviet Scuds and modified locally, such as the Al Hussein and Al Abbas missiles produced by Iraq, is increasing rapidly.
There are now eighteen such countries and this figure will probably rise to twenty-four by the end of the century. Furthermore, the new missiles are now switching from liquid fuel to solid fuel and are consequently acquiring a far longer range than before. According to certain scenarios, it is believed that about ten countries that may be considered potential enemies will have missiles with a range of 1 000 to 2 500 km at the beginning of the next century. The area that might be threatened will therefore extend from the southern shore of the Mediterranean to a large part of Europe.
As said earlier, it will be difficult to stop this proliferation of missiles. Basic technology is the same as for civil space programmes from which it will be practically impossible to exclude third world states.
Moreover, such technology is very widespread, especially because it is fairly similar to that of any other type of anti- aircraft missile. It will certainly be possible to master the necessary technology in order to increase the accuracy of launchings and the technology for penetrating anti-missile defences.
However, the lack of accuracy is of importance only if missiles are used against concentrated military targets while lack of progress in means of penetration is obviously of little consequence if there is no effective anti-missile system.
This scenario becomes still more complicated if it is borne in mind that there is a real possibility of cruise missiles being used, too. Although less sophisticated than the West's, they allow a better-adapted, more advanced anti-missile defence.
Possible recourse to such threats, associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is a choice wihin the reach of our potential enemies for influencing the policy of the industrialised states should the latter be without a credible anti-missile defence and hence the means to protect Western Europe's large urban areas.
The elements of the scenario described above may be summed up as follows: - proliferation can be delayed but not eliminated;
- the threat does not concern southern Europe alone but the whole of the European Community; - retaliation will therefore have to be effected jointly, at European level; - probably the United States will not finance an overall European anti-missile and space defence system. It is also probable that NATO will be able to supply the offensive components for this defence but not the anti-missile component proper;
- Europeans must therefore solve the problem of whether to acquire, by their own means, an anti-missile and space defence system (TABM + EDI: Tactical Anti-Ballistic Missile and European Defence Initiative) that can be linked to American systems for the components if they are unable to produce them independently.
The architecture of the European system should include: A. specialised reconnaissance and warning systems (IMINT, ELINT, etc.);
B. systems for the command and conduct of operations; C. high-altitude anti-missile systems (e.g. Arrow or Thaad) and close defence systems (e.g. PAC 3 or ERINT and modified versions of Aster 45, etc.).
For component A, it would initially be necessary to resort to American systems, as for high-altitude anti-missile defence.
Component B can and must be produced independently, as must close anti-missile defence systems.
In this architecture, which would guarantee relative European independence, the production of DRS satellite networks (for transmitting data) for continuous liaison with American satellite networks and the GPALS system is crucial.
Systems for the command and conduct of operations must be the same in Turkey as in Portugal and the same in Sicily as in Denmark. The C2 element (command and conduct of operations) must therefore be developed on the basis of satellite platforms. In short, this must be a combined Euro-American system that allows Europe some degree of autonomy, because the present situation does not allow it, technologically and financially, to act in a completely independent manner.
It should be added that, if such a system is not produced, Europe will lose its strategic flexibility, thus becoming more dependent and vulnerable to blackmail. Common ground must therefore be found between Europe and the United States and, although difficult, this does not seem impossible.
I do not think Europe's problem is to realise that it is necessary to have more sophisticated space backing for its entire military arsenal and in particular for anti-missile defence. The problem is rather one of finding the necessary financial resources.
Only the United States, which spends some $18 to 20 000 million each year on the military aspects of space, can envisage covering all sectors.
Europe, for its part, is in no position to do so: this year, it has earmarked only just over $1 000 million for military space purposes. Nevertheless, France and Germany are planning a considerable increase in their investments in space in the next decade, not only in percentage terms but also in absolute figures.
The European space industry, including that of Italy, has reached an excellent level of technology but it is mainly pursuing civil scientific or commercial programmes whose annual financing represents about 55% of that of American programmes ($7 000 million compared with $13 500 million for NASA), whereas European orders in the military sector amount, as has just been said, to a total of just over 5% of those for the United States. This lack of symmetry between Europe and the United States, between the military and civil sectors of space, immediately brings us to the following conclusion: bearing in mind the present attribution of financing, it is possible to achieve greater European autonomy by using civil space means for military purposes.
This should encourage us to resort to a dual use of space and to draw up integrated civil and military programmes right from the stage when technical specifications are defined. This is, moreover, the aim pursued by the United States, as underlined on several occasions in the 1993 annual report of the Department of Defence to the President and Congress. The United States has made provision for a special programme to use all existing national means at operational level, for instance that of an expeditionary corps intervening abroad. This is the TENCAP programme (Tactical Exploitation of National Capability Programme), which is certainly an example that might be referred to.
In regard to European space policy as a whole, priority should therefore be given to dual-purpose programmes - ensuring greater integration between civil and military systems - as compared with specialised systems for which it would be very difficult to find the necessary funds. Such integration has already been achieved in part, for instance: - the Helios satellite, launched by Ariane and using the Spot platform; - the French Syracuse and British Skynet military communication systems which do not use special satellites but military installations on board civil space platforms.
During the Gulf war, the Americans themselves made widespread use of civil satellites, whether for remote sensing or communications purposes. The GPS-NAVSTAR system also has widespread civil applications.
Dual-purpose systems are especially easy to set up since provisions in the civil area are steadily moving closer to those of the military area; however, this obviously does not apply to all sectors, including warning, ELINT, COMINT and anti-missile defence, the main topic of our symposium. Nevertheless, a large number of components of specialised military systems (and associated systems) can be put in place thanks to the military use of civil means. Civil space programmes, be they for detection or communications purposes, have interesting possibilities of which optimum use should be made thanks to appropriate agreements for permanent military use or in the light of requirements in order to have additional means available. Merging data gathered by civil and military sensors offers particularly promising prospects.
These possibilities cannot be exploited to the full without common management of ground sectors.
This might be effected by service contracts including special provisions meeting specific military requirements, for instance relating to the continuity of the supply of services in time of crisis. It will always be more difficult to achieve the integration of separate bodies; this would also lead to duplication of costly equipment and specialised staff. Problems relating to the security of information and military secrecy can always be solved with appropriate regulations governing the distribution of data. The solution I have outlined offers the greatest flexibility since, on a case-by-case basis, it allows all available space resources to be pooled to meet priority national or European requirements.
If military requirements have to be met, available civil resources can be used by requisitioning them, as is customarily the case for air or maritime transport. There are clearly sectors in which it will not be possible to meet specifically military needs solely through the use of civil space resources.
Here I believe a distinction should be drawn between the qualititative and quantitative aspects of these specific needs.
On the first aspect, we have already spoken of warning satellites where the United States is now making remarkable efforts at modernisation with the FEWS (Follow-on Early Warning System) which is to replace the DSP (Defence Support Programme), and with the COMINT and ELINT systems and those relating to anti-missile defence.
Furthermore, military requirements call for a higher resolution capability for satellite sensors, greater resistance to electronic counter-measures and channels with a broader band width to allow signals to be coded, etc.
From the quantitative standpoint, military requirements include far more continuous cover than is needed for civil applications and, in the event of crises, they increase unforeseeably and significantly.
Ideally, at military level, there should clearly be a permanent availability of specialised space means to cope with peak needs in times of crisis, but this is not a realistic aim. Even in the most optimistic hypothesis, the necessary resources will never be available, particularly in Europe. However, it is not acceptable to opt for a contrary course, either. A via media must be found between all or nothing.
Conversely, it seems logical, in a European framework, to provide for the use of the civil satellite network as a basis for military space means in normal times by integrating it in satellites earmarked for specific applications such as Osiris or Zircon, now planned by France. In the event of an emergency, existing capacity in the remote sensing or communications sector would be integrated and increased by launching mini-satellites to allow a quantitative increase in the frequency of observation, number of communications channels, etc., deemed necessary.
Thanks to the present sophistication of mini-satellites, it is possible, inter alia, to satisfy tactical operational requirements for better resolution and greater frequency of cover than needed for politico-strategic purposes. For more sophisticated needs, e.g. anti-missile warning or the space sectors of anti-missile defence, including the theatre sector, American means will have to be relied upon for at least the next fifteen years.
It will also be necessary to turn to the United States to respond to military needs beyond those of conflicts of low or medium intensity, particularly against technologically developed enemies able to jam inadequately protected civil satellites.
This is an objective limit for European autonomy, but it should be noted with realism, at least in the short and medium term.
Furthermore, in the event of a major crisis, Europe could certainly not manage without United States support, even in the long term. It would thus be pointless and even impossible to draw up programmes that would duplicate the worldwide capability of the United States itself. Moreover, such a capability would be out of proportion with Europe's independent politico- strategic action capability.
Conversely, resources, including financial resources, should be concentrated so as to meet requirements better adapted to Europe by adopting an approach complementary to that of the United States potential and, through complementarity, greater European autonomy should be obtained.
In this context, very special attention should be paid to the ground sector and the effective possibility of armed forces making full use of resources offered by civil satellites which it would be possible to increase in the event of an emergency by launching mini-satellites and by complementary means supplied by the Americans; consideration might also be given to linking European ground sectors direct to American networks by means of the DRS (data relay system). With this in mind, co-operation in a European framework between the military and civil sectors would be not only expedient but necessary in order to co-ordinate the requirements of all users and to define jointly the technical specifications of the various projects. Only by this means will it be possible to make optimum use of the technological and industrial capabilities existing in Europe.
From the advanced multi-purpose standpoint, major programmes launched in a European framework should be reviewed, ranging from the WEU observation satellite network to EUMILSATCOM, in order to meet civil and military needs in a co-ordinated manner. After starting as simple projects based on very uncertain financial prospects, such programmes will thus become more definite and more reliable.
In the medium term, co-ordination will inevitably have to concern ESA, if only because of the importance of space research in a large number of sectors of advanced technology which are the very ones on which the Community is concentrating with programmes such as Eureka, Brite, Esprit, Race, etc., and Euclid in the framework of the IEPG.
In this connection, a convention might be signed between the EEC, WEU and ESA similar to the one concluded in France in August 1991 between the DGA and CNES. As I have said many times today, the standards necessary for carrying out anti-missile missions exceed the possibilities of civil satellite systems.
However, the need for economy encourages a search to be made among civil systems for the best possible support for specialised military missions. In other words, the situation in Europe is forcing us to think about how to reorganise civil means so that they may become a factor in reducing the cost of dedicated military systems.
We have already pointed out that certain military missions could, without insuperable difficulties, benefit from the backing of civil satellites if less stringent standards were accepted although these would be adequate in face of the potential enemy.
In anti-missile defence, it obviously seems more difficult to entertain this possibility. In spite of this objective limit, Telespazio is now conducting initial exploratory studies to determine which civil components might be integrated as auxiliary - but financially important - elements in specialised military systems and what modifications would have to be made. First, to some extent it seems possible to make significant economies by reorganising the tasks of the ground sectors of space systems.
For instance, Fucino, Telespazio's operational space station, can, subject to minor adaptations, carry out support missions for anti-missile surveillance and strategic alert tasks in general, as follows:
- in-orbit monitoring of satellites in normal and peak situations; - auxiliary system for the military data transmission system; - accelerated pre-processing station for image data.
Telespazio's systems capability also allows it to define dual-use systems that can be integrated in military surveillance networks, e.g.:
- aerostat platforms equipped with military and civil apparatus that can be completed by satellite and airborne means;
- auxiliary optical and communications mini-satellites to increase the density of surveillance and communications networks;
- observation by SAR (Synthetic Aparture Radar) for military surveillance purposes.
Our research work is still at an early stage, particularly in respect of support systems for anti-missile defence. For these reasons and so as not to make too many demands on this prestigious audience by embarking upon a promotional operation, I will not dwell on the details. Just allow me to affirm that there is certainly a possibility of intelligent integration of technology; such integration will allow Europe to draw on its vast reserves of experience of civil systems in order to reduce the cost of building specialised military systems; it is these which, in future, will allow Europe to be more autonomous in managing its own security and that of the West.
Impact of ballistic missile defence on European military space programmes
Mr. RODOTA (General Manager, Alenia Spazia SpA).
The international scenario
In the early seventies, the United States developed a defence architecture designed to detect nuclear explosions and ballistic missile launches, primarily from the former USSR territory. The space segment of that architecture was based on early warning (EW) satellites, developed under the defence support programme (DSP), and on air force and navy communications satellites, required to route raw data to processing and decision centres and to broadcast the related missile launch warnings to missile batteries.
To meet the increasing communications demand, it was necessary to use during the Gulf war, in addition to the mentioned communications assets, the NASA tracking data relay satellite (TDRS), which has a specific capability of relaying high volumes of traffic.
Pushed by the Gulf war experience, the United States initiated the design of the next generation of early warning satellites, the follow-on early warning system (FEWS) and gave consideration to the advantages of the Brilliant Eyes satellites (an early warning low orbiting satellite constellation), designed in the past under the strategic defence initiative programme. A large number and variety of ballistic missiles are now in the inventories of several developing nations which continue to procure ballistic missiles for their increasing offensive effectiveness: longer range, shorter flight time and flexible payloads, which can vary from conventional to nuclear. All of Europe can be considered under threat of the medium- /long-range ballistic missiles in the inventories of neighbouring potentially hostile developing countries. The southern European nations are particularly threatened because they are within the ranges of the short-range ballistic missiles also.
At present in Europe, some nations and the European Space Agency (ESA) are developing military communications, data relay and surveillance satellites which could be the components of a ballistic missile defence architecture.
Space components of the ballistic missile defence architecture For their capability to detect missile launches from the hostile territory, the Gulf war demonstrated that early warning satellites are the capstone of a ballistic missile defence architecture.
The related processing and decision centre and the communication satellites performing, respectively, the analysis of the data received and ensuring the timely flow of data collected and the subsequent distribution of warnings to missile batteries are both of vital importance to the ballistic missile defence architecture.
In addition, the role that can be played by surveillance and imagery satellites is of crucial importance as they can provide the intelligence information necessary to prevent or neutralise the missile before its launch.
The ballistic missile defence requirement is surfacing in a European scenario where many military and civilian national and international space programmes have been launched (no one of which appears dedicated to ballistic missile defence) and where a full co-ordination of space activities is yet to be achieved.
The design of the European ballistic missile defence architecture
For the high cost and for the technological capability required, no European nation has the possibility to field individually a credible ballistic missile defence system at the moment. Such a system could, in fact, be implemented only through a joint European effort. To achieve that, the Assembly of Western European Union should take the lead, establish co-operative strategies and initiate the carrying out of joint European studies. Under the WEU aegis, European nations' designers, developers and operators have to meet with the aim of:
- Establishing the performances of the early warning satellite system. Based on United States experience, the group should identify the coverage required, the missile booster plume detection probability and the unavoidable false alarm percentage, the unacceptable delay in detecting the missile launches, the missile speed and the launch position. The group should, moreover, determine the volume of data transferred from the early warning system to the processing and decision centre and the communications capacity required to broadcast warnings to missile batteries. The group should identify also the most suitable and the most cost-effective orbital positions for the early warning satellites considering the geostationary and the low orbit approach, indicating the size of the constellation needed to meet the European early warning requirements.
- Identifying the components required to complete the ballistic missile defence architecture. The WEU group should, moreover, study the remaining aspects of the ballistic missile defence, namely:
. the most suitable location for the processing and decision centre, which could be collocated with the data relay satellite centre;
. the information and the algorithm required to discriminate missile launchers from false alarms;
. the data relay and communications capacity required by the system; . the format of warning signals required to permit their rapid distribution down to tactical forces for their possible self-defence actions;
. weapon systems able to neutralise the incoming missile as far as possible from the European territory and their most suitable locations;
. the surveillance and intelligence information and actions required to neutralise the ballistic missile before its launch.
- Harmonising European national and international space programmes incorporating the early warning satellites and the related communications requirements. It appears that the various space programmes could contribute to ballistic missile defence although in most cases the programmes are designed to fulfil specific national or small group of nations requirements. A credible ballistic missile defence system, beyond its early warning dedicated satellite, should rely also on other space assets like imagery, surveillance, data relay and communications satellites. The problem of neutralising an incoming ballistic missile cannot be relegated to the detection of the ballistic missile launch and to the subsequent weapon reaction. Its solution requires the availability and the possibility of exploiting the capabilities of the other parent satellites.
The group should therefore draft a survey of European military and civilian space programmes and consider, in particular, the benefits that can be brought to the ballistic missile defence system by the availability of intelligence information collected by remote sensing satellites and the communications capability available to the system on national, European and ESA data relay satellites. If the intelligence information obtainable and the capacity on communications and data relay satellites is not considered sufficient, the group, under the WEU aegis, should be able to request the appropriate modifications to accommodate the European ballistic missile defence requirements.
- Exploring the possibility of carrying out co-operative efforts with the United States on the development of new enhanced systems and the way to achieve interoperability.
The early warning satellites will probably have technological challenges that could be faced only with strong Euro-American co-operation. A European policy which would limit its research and development activities to Europe should, in fact, be refused.
The group should therefore consider co-operative efforts with the United States on system components identified at technological risk and assess the convenience of participating, if invited, in the United States advanced programme, Brilliant Eyes, addressing the defence against the ballistic missiles of almost the entire world, particularly necessary when European armed forces are deployed outside the usual area of operations.
To avoid overlapping between ballistic missile defence systems, the group should, moreover, act in co-ordination with United States and NATO groups addressing the same subject and carry out the actions required to achieve the system's interoperability.
In conclusion, the space component of a reliable and fast- reacting ballistic missile defence system, beyond the dedicated early warning satellites (in a geostationary position or low orbit), should rely on the information provided by deployed imagery and surveillance satellites and on communications capacity available on communications and data relay satellites. To provide Europe with such a system, WEU should take the lead and convene working groups formed by military and industrial experts tasked to address the abovementioned issues with the aim of designing, or jointly developing with the United States, a credible European ballistic missile defence system. For the programmes now under study and in-house development; namely, the surveillance satellite, Helios, the WEU remote- sensing satellite, the data relay satellite, Artemis, and the communications satellite, Sicral, Alenio Spazio is fully qualified and willing to contribute to the development of a ballistic missile defence system for Europe.
That concludes my presentation and I thank you for your attention. Are there any questions?
General STAINIER (Commandant of the Institut superieur de defense, Belgium) in response to interesting and convincing statements about European anti-ballistic missile systems, recalled that the United States was urging Europeans, particularly through NATO and the defence ministries, to join a worldwide system. The United States also believed that its solution was the only one which would help Europe. He therefore wondered what arguments that morning's speakers would put to the European ministers who would have to decide on the best system for Europe.
Lord FINSBERG (Vice-President of the WEU Assembly) recalled that the first speaker had said that it would be possible to identify the starting point of a missile attack to within a few kilometres and this would allow the launching-site and, possibly, the command centre to be destroyed. As a politician, he wished to know what was meant by a few kilometres since this could be anything from three to fifty kilometres and this could mean that perhaps 100000 people might be killed.
Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense Espace, France) answered that the number of kilometres was in fact very few since with two stereoscopic positioned satellites, the launching-point could be determined from between three to five kilometres. The impact point depended mainly on the distance of the flight, be it 70, 100, 300 or 3 000 kilometres. To take an average Scud, with a range of 300 kilometres, the point of impact could be determined to within 40 to 60 kilometres.
To make a counter-attack on the launching-site which was determined to within a few kilometres, it would be necessary to deploy tactical sensors such as airborne radar or Orchidee that was being built by Thomson-CSF in France or perhaps ground radars. The counter-attack would have to be launched as quickly as possible because mobile launchers could be moved. In answer to General Stainer, he said that co-operation with the United States should be made as simple as possible. The United States had spent 20 years modernising and developing their global system. The defence support programme already existed. One did not have to be extreme in the sense of procuring everything from the United States or doing everything oneself in Europe. The wisest course would be to do a minimum in Europe and have a maximum that was interoperational with the United States system. It was not essential to have a totally- integrated system and to have to always pass through that system. Each country could have its own part and other parts would be interoperational so that each country could retain political freedom to take the decision regarding interoperability between the national, European and United States systems. Europe had all the technology for its own early warning system. Spot, and Helios next year, provided the observation technology necessary for detecting launches and vast areas could be covered, although Europe did not need to survey the whole earth. Observation and surveillance could be conducted in specific areas near to Europe with a very high degree of precision and the Americans could draw upon our information input. Co-operation was necessary at all levels and while one partner might have a more complex and ambitious system than others, all participants should be able to benefit from all contributions.
Dr. PAYNE (Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University, President of the National Instutute for Public Policy, United States) wished to specify the United States' position towards co-operation in a global protection system. It encouraged a very flexible approach to co-operation including the possibility of having an indigenously developed European system, interoperable with United States components, even including the provision of DSP data to indigenously developed European systems. Unless the United States' position had changed very recently, it was very compatible with the flexible interoperable approach to common western defence presented this morning.
Mr. NATIVI (Editing Director, Rivista Italiana di Difesa (RID)) believed the industrial attitude to Europe's true ability to raise the necessary financial resources was rather optimistic. Did Europe have anything like $14 billion for a European anti-ballistic missile defence programme at a time when defence budgets were being reduced everywhere? He had hoped that industry would have been more realistic in terms of the present economic situation. Was there any point in duplicating what had already been done in the United States or in the Soviet Union? A comprehensive programme should be developed to achieve short-term low-cost results to meet the real threat that existed, rather than thinking about duplicating on a smaller scale what had already been done in the United States and the Soviet Union.
Mr. RODOTA (General Manager, Alenia Spazio SpA, Italy) agreed with Mr. Nativi and felt that it was not right to launch a major programme from the very start. Present industrial capability and the programmes already under way had to be examined in terms of the existing threat and the serious budgetary problems of all European countries. Money had to be spent wisely. Defence budgets had to be concentrated on current threats rather than on nebulous threats. To be flexible, maximum investment was not necessary immediately but some funds should be made available so that industry could make a careful analysis of the situation.
Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense Espace, France) wished to clarify the figures he had given. The sequence of investment should be progressive and the sum necessary for early warning, communications and detection would initially be only $240 million, not $10 billion. He could provide the technical characteristics if necessary. The latter figure related to global protection for the whole of Europe which he thought was totally unrealistic. There was a whole range of possibilities between the maximum and minimum figures for developing counter- attack systems and this would cost about $400 or $500 million. To develop local theatre protection would depend on how much money each country wished to invest. Industry was realistic because it had to pay its way. It was always ready, however, to provide the necessary technical, scientific and financial information regarding its research.
Mr. MINICUCCI (Amministratore Delegato, Telespazio, Italy) in view of all the budgetary difficulties in Europe Italy was advocating greater integration of investment in outer space for civilian purposes. Although Europe invested over 50% for civilian purposes, this was less than half the figure for the United States with which co-operation should be developed. Since European investment was only 5% of United States investment, Europe could never reach that level. Not even the Soviet Union had been able to do so. All such matters had become global as illustrated by the problem of Yugoslavia. All aspects of defence should therefore be integrated.
(Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee, took the Chair)