Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
CPRC Annual Report To Congress 1997
Congress directed, in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) be established to review activities and
programs related to countering proliferation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
Department of Energy (DOE), U. S. Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The high level
national commitment to counter proliferation threats is reflected in the CPRC's membership. It is
chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and composed of the Secretary of Energy (as Vice Chairman),
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).
The CPRC is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental
activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
their means of delivery. In the 1997 NDAA, Congress broadened the CPRC's responsibilities and
specified that the CPRC also review activities and programs of the CPRC- represented
organizations related to countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. The findings and
recommendations of the CPRC's annual review for 1997 are presented in this its fourth annual
report to Congress.
Over the past year, several organizational changes have occurred in the CPRC. In the 1997
NDAA, Congress extended the authority of the CPRC until the year 2000 and designated the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
(ATSD( NCB)) as the Executive Secretary of the CPRC. The Secretary of Defense designated,
consistent with the CPRC's charter, the Deputy Secretary of Defense to perform the duties of
CPRC Chairman, replacing the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(USD( A& T)), who had served in that capacity for the past two years. The CPRC also established
a Standing Committee to take a more proactive approach to fulfilling its responsibilities under the
law. The CPRC Standing Committee meets regularly and is actively working to perform the duties
and implement the recommendations of the CPRC. The Standing Committee is composed of the
ATSD( NCB) (as Chairman); the Director, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, DOE
(as Vice Chairman); the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation; the Deputy Director for
Strategy and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Plans and Policy, J- 5); and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/ Low- Intensity Conflict (ASD( SO/ LIC)).
To guide its program review process, the CPRC established the Areas for Capability
Enhancements (ACEs) to characterize those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the
warfighting capabilities of the Combatant Commanders, including the Commanders- in- Chief
(CINCs), and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U. S. nonproliferation and
counterproliferation policy. The ACEs define those priority areas where additional capabilities are
required to meet the challenges posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of
delivery (NBC/ M), including paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. They also serve as a basis to
assess progress in meeting the mission needs of the CPRC- represented organizations for countering
proliferation. At the direction of the CPRC, the ACEs were reviewed, modified, and reprioritized
to ensure that they continue to reflect the integration of the warfighting needs of the CINCs and the
overarching national security objectives they support.
The counterproliferation ACEs for 1997 are listed in Table 1. They reflect the newly
developed and prioritized CINC counterproliferation required capabilities, results of recent
counterproliferation- related studies and analyses conducted in support of the budget development
processes of the CPRC- represented organizations, and the growing government- wide concern
about the potential for NBC terrorist threats. The ACEs reflect evolving needs and shortfalls that
change as threats evolve and become better understood and as research and development (R& D)
and acquisition programs mature, enabling new operational capabilities. Updated and current
ACEs will serve to improve the focus of future programmatic and managerial efforts to counter
NBC/ M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats. This year, each CPRC- represented organization
individually prioritized the ACEs in accordance with their own departmental mission needs to more
accurately reflect each organization's response to countering proliferation.
Table 1: The New Counterproliferation ACEs for 1997
DoD* ||DOE ||US |
| Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs)
1|| 3|| 1 ||Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW Agents
2 ||6 ||3 ||Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of NBC/ M Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects
3|| 8 ||4 ||Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects
4|| - ||2|| Theater Ballistic Missile Active Defense**
5|| 2|| 5|| Support for Special Operations Forces and Defense Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist NBC Threats
6|| 4|| 6|| Provide Consequence Management
7 ||-|| 7|| Cruise Missile Defense
8 ||7|| 8 ||Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to Counter Proliferation
9 ||-|| 13|| Robust Passive Defense to Enable Sustained Operations on the NBC Battlefield
10|| -|| 9 ||BW Vaccine RDT& E and Production to Ensure Stockpile Availability
11|| -|| 14|| Target Planning for NBC/ M Targets
12|| -|| 11 ||Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat
13|| 1|| 15|| Detection, Tracking, and Protection of NBC/ M and NBC/ M-Related Materials and Components
14 ||9|| 12|| Support Export Control Activities of the U. S. Government
15|| 5 ||10|| Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Arms Control Agreements and Regimes
* includes both the OSD and the JCS|
** National Missile Defense is associated with this ACE.
The CPRC focused its review activities on key R& D and acquisition program
accomplishments and milestones to illuminate near-, mid-, and long- term capability improvements.
The CPRC has found that a prudent, time- phased response to the challenges posed by NBC/ M
proliferation and terrorist threats is in place and solidly under way. Although it will take several
years to achieve the goals and objectives of the numerous programs responding to the challenges of
countering proliferation, the CPRC can report that progress continues to be made in many ACE
priority areas. This progress has strengthened U. S. capabilities for countering proliferation and
includes the rapid fielding of essential capabilities, focusing interorganizational R& D activities, and
improving integration, management, and oversight of programs related to countering proliferation.
Commensurate with the seriousness of the threat, the Department of Defense (which
includes OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs), DOE, and U. S. Intelligence have each made
serious commitments to enhance national capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC/ M and
NBC terrorist threats. The combined Department of Defense (DoD) and DOE investment in
countering these threats is nearly $5.4 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 (a 15% increase from FY
1997). DoD's investment in areas strongly related to counterproliferation totals almost $4.9 billion
in FY 1998, of which approximately $3.2 billion is for air and missile defense. This investment
compares favorably with last year's investment of just under $4.3 billion, reflecting DoD's steady
commitment in the face of continuing budget constraints. It must be emphasized that
counterproliferation efforts leverage the substantial investments made in maintaining the requisite
military forces and defense infrastructure necessary to provide for the basic common defense of the
United States. DoD budgets the bulk of its counterproliferation investment in air and missile
defense (DoD ACE priorities 4 and 7); detection and characterization of biological warfare (BW)
agents (DoD ACE priority 1); maintaining a robust NBC passive defense capability (DoD ACE
priority 9); prompt mobile target detection and defeat (DoD ACE priority 12); and supporting
inspection, monitoring, and verification activities of arms control agreements (DoD ACE priority
DOE continues to increase its investment in nonproliferation activities with $489.4 million
requested for FY 1998, up 19% over last year and up 25% over FY 1996. As part of its core
national nonproliferation program, DOE focuses on the tracking and control of nuclear weapons
related materials and components (DOE ACE priorities 1 and 9), supporting the inspection and
monitoring of arms control agreements (DOE ACE priority 5), and defending against and managing
the consequences of covert delivery and terrorist threats (DOE ACE priorities 2 and 4). In
addition, at the direction of Congress (based on a CPRC recommendation) and in coordination with
DoD and U. S. Intelligence, DOE has begun technology development efforts in detection,
identification, and characterization of BW and chemical warfare (CW) agents (DOE ACE priority
3). U. S. Intelligence's investments in programs to counter proliferation are discussed in a
separately bound "Intelligence Annex" to this report.
Since the May 1996 CPRC report was submitted, the following key activities have been
undertaken and accomplishments achieved by DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence to enhance the
interdepartmental response to countering NBC/ M proliferation and terrorist threats.
Summary of Key DoD Activities
DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative and the Counterproliferation Council. The Counterproliferation Initiative is the DoD- wide effort to meet the military challenges posed by
the proliferation of NBC/ M. To ensure that DoD's broad counterproliferation policy objectives
are met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and
focused, the Secretary of Defense established the Counterproliferation Council in April 1996.
The "CP Council" is composed of senior DoD officials and meets on a regular basis, focusing on
the potential impact of NBC proliferation on the Department's ability to fight two nearly
simultaneous major regional contingencies, as well as on Joint and Service doctrine, training, and
exercising for integrated operations in an NBC contaminated environment.
DoD's Counterproliferation Support Program. At the heart of DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative is the Counterproliferation Support Program, established in 1994 specifically by the
CPRC to address DoD shortfalls in counterproliferation capabilities. This program, managed by
ATSD( NCB), uses its budget to leverage DoD R& D and acquisition programs to meet the
counterproliferation priorities of the CINCs and accelerate the deployment of enhanced
capabilities to the field. Currently, the Counterproliferation Support Program is targeting 8 of
the 15 ACEs where leveraged support can be decisive. The Counterproliferation Support
Program also conducts technology development activities with the DOE National Laboratories,
U. S. Intelligence, and several DoD agencies and organizations.
The Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN and the CINCs' Counterproliferation Required Capabilities. The CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN (concept plan), which directs
CINC planning to implement national level counterproliferation policy in terms of operational
objectives and supporting tasks, has been coordinated by the Joint Staff and is being used by each
of the CINCs to develop their own area- specific counterproliferation CONPLANs. As part of
this process, the CINCs have developed a new prioritized listing of counterproliferation required
capabilities necessary to conduct the counterproliferation mission from a military warfighting
The 1996 Counterproliferation Study. This Joint Service, multi- organizational DoD study, performed in support of a Deputy Secretary of Defense- directed review of counterproliferation-related
programs, provided senior DoD leadership with estimates of quantitative returns on
counterproliferation investments over the FY 1998 - 2003 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
The study found that investments in NBC/ M passive defense, active defense, and counterforce
capabilities have positive and synergistic effects on enhancing the effectiveness of ground
combat, air base, and port facility operations in an NBC contaminated environment.
Furthermore, it found that adapting NBC passive defense technologies to counterterrorism
activities can have a positive impact on reducing casualties and disruptions from terrorist
CW/ BW threats. As a result of these findings, an increase of $225 million over the FYDP was
budgeted to improve BW detection and warning capabilities of U. S. forces, NBC target defeat
and counterterrorism capabilities of the U. S. Special Operations Command, and DoD's
consequence management capabilities.
Ongoing Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). To accelerate the fielding of advanced technologies and capabilities to counter NBC/ M threats, two ACTDs are currently
under way: i) the Counterproliferation ACTD to enhance capabilities for defeating hard and
buried NBC/ M targets with minimal collateral effects; and ii) the Air Base/ Port Bio Detection
ACTD to improve capabilities to detect and provide warning of BW attacks at fixed facilities.
Field demonstrations of these ACTDs will be completed in FY 1998 and prototype equipment
will then be turned over to their CINC sponsors for operational integration and deployment.
Initiation of New Counterproliferation- Related ACTDs. To continue the accelerated fielding of enhanced capabilities to counter NBC/ M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats, three new
counterproliferation- related ACTDs have been initiated: i) the Counterproliferation Counterforce
ACTD (a follow- on to the ongoing Counterproliferation ACTD and denoted as the "CP2
ACTD") to provide expanded options for characterizing and defeating hardened and
underground NBC/ M targets while minimizing collateral effects; ii) the Joint Biological Remote
Early Warning System (JBREWS) ACTD to provide enhanced capabilities for early warning of
BW attacks; and iii) the Consequence Management "911- BIO" ACTD to improve the
interagency emergency response to the consequences of terrorist BW attacks.
The Hard and/ or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability Program. This Joint Service acquisition effort reviewed over 60 concepts submitted by industry and DoD/ DOE laboratories
(including concepts from 17 foreign countries) to improve capabilities to defeat hard and/ or
deeply buried targets - a key ACE priority. An integrated product team is now working with the
Counterproliferation Support Program to develop plans for participating in the CP2 ACTD.
The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). The JTAMDO has been established as the single organization within DoD responsible for coordinating, planning, and
providing oversight for Joint integrated theater air and missile defense requirements, operational
concept definition, and architecture development. It coordinates theater defense activities with
the CINCs, Services, and Defense Agencies.
Reprioritized Funding for U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Counter-proliferation is a principal mission of USSOCOM. Special Operations Forces (SOF) may be
called upon to enforce U. S. counterproliferation policy long before the authorization of direct
military action. SOF can carry out measures to interdict sea or land shipments of NBC weapon-related
materials, provide deep reconnaissance to locate NBC/ M, and conduct precision strikes
to capture or neutralize them. In recognition of these capabilities, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense directed additional funding to supplement SOF operations and maintenance,
procurement, and R& D budgets over the FYDP.
The Force Protection Initiative. Several DoD organizations are responding to the call of the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS to review the force protection capabilities of U. S. forces
worldwide. Activities under way include fielding near- term improvements in physical security
equipment, conducting facility inspections to rectify force protection shortfalls, and developing
an R& D plan to address longer term force protection needs.
The Domestic Preparedness Initiative. In response to congressional direction, DoD is playing a key role in interagency activities to enhance capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist
incidents involving NBC weapons. DoD is working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to make improved technologies and
training available to federal, state, and local emergency response authorities. DoD, led by
ASD( SO/ LIC), is implementing the following activities in response to this initiative: establishing
a Chemical Biological Quick Reaction Force (CBQRF) subordinate to the DoD Response Task
Force Headquarters; fielding the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, an
element of the CBQRF; supporting the establishment of Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams;
supporting the 911- BIO ACTD and other R& D activities to improve consequence management
capabilities; and working closely with state and local authorities to transfer DoD- unique NBC
response capabilities and expertise to improve the overall intergovernmental emergency response
to NBC incidents.
The Air Force Counterproliferation Integrated Process Team (CIPT). The CIPT has been established to plan and coordinate all Air Force counterproliferation activities, including the
preparation of an Air Force Counterproliferation Master Plan and the implementation of
recommendations derived from the recently completed Air Force study, The Effects of Chemical
and Biological Warfare on Air Base Combat Operations. This comprehensive study identified
the need for improvements in individual and collective protection, training standards and field
exercises, automated CW/ BW detectors, base- level contamination assessment, and education for
senior leadership and new policies and procedures for sustaining operations in CW/ BW
contaminated environments. It led to the creation of the "Air Force NBC Ability- to- Survive- and-Operate"
IPT to oversee passive defense activities in coordination with the CIPT.
The Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program for Biological Defense. The need to produce vaccines at a pace rapid enough to match any anticipated battlefield demand is a high CPRC and CINC
priority. Significant progress has been made in developing a BW vaccine production program,
and a solid acquisition strategy based on comprehensive analyses is in place. A Request for
Proposals for a prime systems contractor was released to industry last year, and proposals have
been received and are under review. Contract award is expected by the end of FY 1997.
The Chemical Biological Arms Control Technology Program. The Defense Special Weapons Agency, through this program, has been established as the DoD lead for developing technologies
required for the implementation, verification, monitoring, and inspection activities associated
with chemical and biological arms control treaties and agreements, including the Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, while protecting U. S. national
Responding to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Signature. With the signing of the CTBT in September 1996, DoD, through its Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs, has intensified
its efforts to prepare for CTBT implementation by enhancing R& D activities to fulfill the
President's CTBT Safeguards program, operationally implementing the International Monitoring
System, beginning the transition of the International Data Center to the CTBT Organization, and
continuing to provide technical support to the CTBT's Preparatory Commission and the
Provisional Technical Secretariat.
Science and Technology Strategic Planning for Counterproliferation. The strategic planning process for DoD's science and technology (S& T) program was enhanced again this year with the
issuance of DoD's second Joint Warfighting S& T Plan. "Countering WMD" and "Chemical/
Biological Warfare Defense" are two of the 10 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives identified
in the plan. The Joint Warfighting S& T Plan is incorporated into the Defense Planning
Guidance, and its Joint Warfare Capability Objectives receive funding priority in DoD's FYDP.
Key Programmatic Accomplishments. Well over 100 DoD programs are strongly supporting national efforts to counter NBC/ M proliferation and terrorist threats. Over the past three years,
substantial progress has been made in these programs to improve fielded counterproliferation,
nonproliferation, and NBC counterterrorism capabilities and to establish the necessary
groundwork for continuing advances. A few, selected programmatic accomplishments are
summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2: DoD's Programmatic Response to the Counterproliferation ACEs
DoD ACE Priority Selected Accomplishments in DoD Counterproliferation Programs
1. Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW Agents Activated an Army Company equipped with the Biological Integrated Detection System Interim Biological Agent Detector fielded on selected surface ships deployed to high threat areas
Accelerated development of advanced early warning BW agent detection systems, including the Long Range Biological Standoff Detection and the Joint Biological Point Detection systems
Continuing the Air Base/ Port Bio Detection ACTD and initiation of the JBREWS ACTD
2. Detection, Characterization, and
Defeat of NBC/ M Facilities with Conducted integrated sensor, weapon, and targeting tool field tests for NBC/ M and underground facility defeat and collateral effects mitigation as part of the Counterproliferation CP1 ACTD Initiated the follow- on Counterproliferation Counterforce CP2 ACTD Agent defeat weapons system concepts collected from industry and DoD/ DOE labs for evaluation
3. Detection, Characterization, and
Defeat of Underground Facilities with Minimal Collateral Effects Technical evaluation of hard and deeply buried target defeat/ neutralization concepts submitted by industry and the DoD/ DOE labs See ACE #2 entries above
4. Theater Ballistic Missile Active Defense Theater ballistic missile defense procurement transitioned to the Services; JTAMDO established Successful flight tests for PATRIOT PAC- 3/ Guidance Enhanced Missile, Hawk, Navy Area
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Israeli/ BMDO Arrow programs Completed 7 Theater High Altitude Area Defense system flight tests
Airborne Laser boost phase defense system entered Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase; contract issued to industry team to initiate system Dem/ Val
Completed MoU with European partners for MEADS project definition and validation National Missile Defense elevated to deployment readiness program, RFP for lead systems
integrator released, and an Integrated Deployment Plan being drafted
5. Support for Special Operations Forces and Defense Against
Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist NBC Threats
Continued development of specialized technologies and equipment prototypes to assist SOF and Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams in countering CW/ BW threats
Continued forward deployment of specialized equipment to enhance readiness sustainment Enhanced coordination of Joint Service exercises and readiness sustainment activities
Formed organizational structure and initiated facility assessments to enhance U. S. force protection
6. Provide Consequence Management Established the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force Initiated planning and development of the Consequence Management 911- BIO ACTD
Integrated consequence management training for state and local First Responders
7. Cruise Missile Defense Demonstration of Mountain Top surveillance radar technology and transfer to the Navy for
further development; initiation of low cost cruise missile defense studies Technology sharing and synergy with ballistic missile defense programs
8. Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence
to Counter Proliferation
See the Intelligence Annex to this report
9. Robust Passive Defense to Enable Sustained Operations on
the NBC Battlefield
Continued deployment of critical NBC detection and warning, individual and collective protection, and decontamination systems for use throughout the battlespace
Continuing advances in CW/ BW medical defense RDT& E
10. BW Vaccine RDT& E and Production to Ensure Stockpile
Contract proposals for prime systems contractor being evaluated; award expected in FY 1997 Continued production of anthrax vaccine to meet DoD stockpile needs in FY 1997; screened
several BW vaccines for safety and efficacy; extensive vaccine RDT& E activities under way
11. Target Planning for NBC/ M Targets User acceptance of integrated target planning and weaponeering tools by CINC USEUCOM for use in Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor
12. Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat Development of a foliage penetrating radar and other sensors to defeat camouflage, concealment and deception; new capabilities for near real- time exploitation of wide area imagery
Target recognition algorithm demonstration as part of DARPA's Semi- Automated Imagery Processing ACTD
Demonstrated operational utility of C4I systems for rapid dissemination of intelligence to users
13. Detection, Tracking, and Protection of NBC/ M and NBC/ M- Related Materials and Components Deployment of prototype Specific Emitter Identification System for identifying ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC/ M or related materials; fleet integration under way
14. Support Export Control Activities of the U. S. Government Reviewed over 18,000 export license application for military and dual- use technologies Enhanced the "Wassenaar Arrangement", a new multinational export control framework
15. Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Arms
Control Agreements and Regimes
Continued inspection, monitoring, and escort support for nuclear weapons arms control treaties Helping Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to become non- nuclear weapons states
Eliminated 64 SLBM launchers, dismantled 81 ICBMs, dismantled 20 heavy bombers, and sealed 59 nuclear weapons test tunnels and bore holes in FSU states
Transitioned over 15,000 FSU scientists and engineers formerly employed in NBC weapon production to more peaceful civilian employment
Streamlined management of R& D programs under DSWA to improve CTBT implementation Continued development of a global continuous threshold monitoring network and data fusion
knowledge base for CTBT verification Technology R& D for CW/ BW arms control treaty implementation, monitoring, and verification
Summary of Key DOE Activities
The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program. This program has been established in conjunction with DoD and U.S. Intelligence to leverage DOE's extensive expertise in the
chemical and biological sciences resident in the National Laboratories. Several R& D projects
have been funded based on their ability to expedite the fielding of advanced CW/ BW defense
capabilities by leveraging and filling gaps in ongoing DoD and U. S. Intelligence programs.
Detecting and Characterizing Worldwide Production of Nuclear Materials and Weapons. DOE continued development of complementary remote and on- site tools to detect and
characterize foreign nuclear materials production activities. Acquisition of special nuclear
materials is the most important step in nuclear weapons proliferation. Therefore, the ability to
detect the production of special nuclear materials is a critical proliferation prevention capability,
and the ability to detect such production remotely is a powerful deterrent. A highlight during the
past year was the demonstration of a ground- based second generation differential absorption lidar
system to detect and identify proliferation- related effluents.
Monitoring Worldwide Nuclear Testing. DOE has continued to develop ground- based technical methods specifically intended for the CTBT International Monitoring System.
Radionuclide monitoring techniques offer an important tool by providing unequivocal proof of a
nuclear detonation and critical forensic data to support CTBT verification. DOE has developed
an automated radionuclide particulate detector, as well as a prototype automated xenon gas
detector for commercialization and use by the International Monitoring System.
Securing Nuclear Materials in Russia and States of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Material protection, control, and accounting (MPC& A) cooperation is now underway at over 40
locations in Russia and seven other FSU states, providing improved security for tens of tons of
weapons- useable nuclear materials. This represents more than 75% of the known locations
possessing such materials. Negotiations are currently under way (scheduled to be completed this
year) to expand MPC& A cooperation to include all weapons- useable nuclear material at all
known facilities in the FSU. However, full implementation of MPC& A upgrades will take
several years to complete.
Initiative for Proliferation Prevention with Russia and FSU States. Under this program, cooperative projects between a coalition of 75 U. S. laboratories, corporations and universities,
and the nuclear inheritor states of the FSU have engaged more than 2,700 former weapons
personnel in the FSU in projects ranging from MPC& A and nuclear safety to materials science,
biotechnology, and instrumentation - avoiding potential "brain drain" to proliferants and
providing long term employment in non- weapons work.
Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. DOE's efforts have helped to promote adherence to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and increase the effectiveness and efficiency
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Successes, in part due to work associated
with this program, included the negotiation and signing of the CTBT, the facilitation of IAEA
inspections of excess fissile materials, and the canning of over 50 percent of the spent fuel
cannisters at the North Korean nuclear reactor. Canning of the remaining spent fuel canisters is
expected to be completed during the summer of 1997. Support for IAEA inspections of spent
fuel stored in North Korea will continue.
Summary of Key U. S. Intelligence Activities
Many of U. S. Intelligence's activities cannot be described in this unclassified setting. The
classified Intelligence Annex to this report contains a more thorough discussion of the activities and
successes of U. S. Intelligence.
Intelligence Community Support for Counterproliferation. In response to the CJCS's Missions and Functions Study and the Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN, U. S. Intelligence
continues to work closely with the Joint Staff in support of the CINCs. The Defense Intelligence
Agency's (DIA) Office of Counterproliferation, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Assessments,
the Joint Staff's (J- 2, Intelligence) Executive Agent for counterproliferation issues, continues to
implement its CJCS- approved Military Intelligence Action Plan.
Strategic Planning Process. U. S. Intelligence, through its corporate strategic and evaluation planning process, continues to support efforts to counter proliferation. This ongoing process
contributes to the National Needs Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the
Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program
and Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the placement of a significant
number of DoD personnel within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. This has helped integrate
intelligence support into DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. U. S. Intelligence also has
expanded its relations with law enforcement officials. The FBI and U. S. Customs Service, for
example, have assigned senior agents to the Nonproliferation Center to assist in developing
initiatives to counter proliferation.
Operational Planning Process. DIA is linking counterproliferation intelligence production more directly to the CINCs' deliberate planning process. DIA is taking guidance from the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan and direction from the CINCs' J- 2s, J- 3s (Operations), and J- 5s which
are enabling U. S. Intelligence to more clearly define and satisfy the intelligence requirements
necessary to support CINC counterproliferation contingency planning and operations.
Intelligence Successes. Some intelligence successes that can be described in this setting include:
- Support to State Department efforts providing actionable intelligence to the United Nations Special Commission's inspection and monitoring activities in Iraq;
- Development of a list of indicators to alert collectors and analysts that CW and BW are about to be used; similar initiatives are also under way to provide early warning alerts for
the possible diversion of nuclear materials;
- Support to congressional committees, including a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the National Foreign Intelligence Program FY 1998 budget
- Development of a detailed set of information needs to guide intelligence collection and analysis, known as Nonproliferation: Compendium of Country- Specific Priority Intelligence Needs and Actions.
CPRC Findings and Recommendations
The CPRC finds, as evidenced by the numerous program and activity accomplishments cited
above and in the main body of the report, that the seriousness of NBC/ M proliferation and NBC
terrorist threats, and the need to enhance capabilities to counter them, are recognized throughout
DoD (including OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs), DOE, and U. S. Intelligence. Indeed,
"countering proliferation" is an established and institutionalized priority within each of the CPRC-represented
organizations. These efforts reflect the President's firm commitment to stem NBC/ M
proliferation and counter NBC terrorism. Much has been done, but much remains to do.
Moreover, as decision makers, policy makers, and warfighters continue to reprioritize their
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism policy and strategy objectives, the
CPRC will continue to review related DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence activities and programs to
ensure that they continue to meet evolving needs. The CPRC's recommendations for 1997 are
summarized in Figure 1 and discussed below.
The FY 1998 President's budget addresses priority programs for countering NBC/ M
proliferation and NBC terrorism. Therefore, the CPRC recommends that the FY 1998 President's
budget for each of the CPRC- represented organizations be authorized and appropriated by the
Although the activities and programs proposed in the FY 1998 President's budget will
continue to produce substantial progress in national capabilities to counter NBC/ M proliferation
and NBC terrorism, areas of capability shortfall will remain. Therefore, the CPRC directs each
represented organization to continue to address the needs and requirements for countering
proliferation and NBC terrorism as high priority items in their FY 1999 and out- year budgets. In
light of the CPRC's finding that the need to enhance U.S. national capabilities to counter
proliferation has become established and institutionalized within the DoD, DOE, and U. S.
Intelligence, the CPRC has not identified specific programmatic options for FY 1999. The CPRC
expects the normal budget development processes of each CPRC- represented organization to be
adequate to ensure a robust, integrated program for countering proliferation. However, key areas
for progress addressing certain specific aspects of the ACE priorities have been identified for
special consideration during budget development activities.
Approve the President's FY 1998 Budget for the CPRC- Represented Organizations Addressing Key Priorities in Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism
Continue to Address the Needs and Requirements for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism as High Priority Items in Annual Budget Development Processes
Continue Close Coordination of R& D and Acquisition Activities and Programs among DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence, including establishing:
Recommendations of the CPRC 1997
Improve Coordination with the NPAC TWG
Increase International Cooperative Efforts by Expanding Existing Activities to Counter Global NBC/ M Proliferation and Terrorist Threats
Review and Reprioritize the Counterproliferation ACEs to Reflect Progress and Newly Emerging Priorities
- validation standards for NBC hazard prediction models
- an integrated R& D plan for advanced hyper-/ ultra- spectral CW/ BW detectors
- an integrated R& D and acquisition plan for unattended ground sensors to improve developer coordination and user acceptance
To continue the record of interdepartmental achievement through an integrated response to
meeting the counterproliferation ACE priorities, the CPRC recommends a continuation of the close
coordination of counterproliferation- related R& D and acquisition activities and programs among
DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence. To this end, the CPRC has identified three specific areas where
improved interorganizational coordination can improve the efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and
responsiveness of R& D and acquisition activities:
Establish "validation standards" for nuclear, biological, and chemical dispersion and hazard prediction models and designate a lead agency for implementation;
Establish an integrated cooperative R& D plan for advanced state- of- the- art hyper-/ ultra- spectral sensors for chemical and biological detection to improve coordination and
synergize the efforts of various ongoing R& D activities; and
Establish an integrated R& D and acquisition plan for unattended ground sensors to improve cooperation within the developer community and enhance prospects for user
acceptance and "buy-in" of this maturing technology.
Because the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC
TWG) and the CPRC share similar goals and objectives for reducing the threat of NBC/ M
proliferation and terrorism, the CPRC directs the CPRC Standing Committee to improve
coordination and information sharing between its activities and those of the NPAC TWG and
explore the possibility of joint cooperative efforts.
Recognizing the global nature of NBC/ M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats, the CPRC
recommends increasing international cooperative efforts to counter these threats by expanding
existing cooperative activities in R& D, proliferation prevention, and counterterrorism being
conducted by DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence. To expedite and more efficiently and effectively
meet the challenges posed by these global problems, the CPRC continues to encourage and endorse
cooperation with our international partners through joint activities, programs, and conferences.
The CPRC, through its Standing Committee, will continue to review and update the
counterproliferation ACEs, reprioritizing them as required. This process is central to ensure that
the ACEs continue to reflect the integration of CINC warfighting priorities and the overarching
national security policy and strategy objectives they support. Updated and relevant ACEs assist the
CPRC in meeting its program review responsibilities, while improving the focus of future
programmatic and managerial efforts among the CPRC- represented organizations to counter
NBC/ M proliferation and NBC terrorist threats.