Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
CPRC Annual Report To Congress 1997
7. U. S. Intelligence Programs to Counter Proliferation
In this section, U. S. Intelligence activities and programs to counter proliferation, including
strategic and operational planning processes, are briefly described, along with some intelligence
successes achieved to date. Additional, more detailed information may be found in the Intelligence
Annex to this report.
7.1 Introduction: Relevant ACEs and U. S. Intelligence Strategy Objectives
U. S. Intelligence has received clear and concise policy guidance for conducting its
intelligence activities. This guidance begins with Presidential Decision Directives that address
weapons and related technology proliferation, including, for example, nuclear smuggling.
Additional guidance comes from annual congressional Defense and Intelligence Authorization and
Appropriation Acts, reports to Congress by U. S. Government agencies on countering proliferation
activities, and DoD counterproliferation policy and military mission objectives. These outline a
national nonproliferation strategy centered around four key aspects: i) prevent the acquisition of
NBC/ M; ii) roll back existing NBC/ M capabilities; iii) deter NBC/ M use; and iv) adapt military
forces and emergency assets to respond to NBC/ M threats.
A focused set of enduring intelligence needs has been developed in response to the policy
guidance reflected in the four aspects of U. S. nonproliferation strategy cited above. These
enduring intelligence needs are used to chart the progress of U. S. Intelligence in making use of
existing capabilities and in defining and developing areas for new investments.
U. S. Intelligence is working to provide accurate, comprehensive, timely, and actionable
foreign intelligence on a broad policy and enforcement front. This has included:
Support to policy makers responsible for extending and implementing nonproliferation regimes;
Support to DoD efforts to counter the threat posed by biological and chemical weapons; and
Maintaining a surge capability to quickly deploy specialists outside the U. S. to the scene of a terrorist nuclear or radiological threat to provide the U. S. Mission and host
government advice and guidance on dealing with the threat. (During such an incident, the
specialists would coordinate fully with the appropriate U. S. Government agencies,
keeping them informed and drawing upon their expertise should follow- up action be
Strategic Planning Process. U. S. Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic planning
and evaluation process to support efforts to counter proliferation. This process contributes to the
Intelligence Community's National Needs Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program
(NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities (TIARA) Program and Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the
placement of a significant number of DoD personnel within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center
(NPC). This has helped integrate intelligence support to DoD counterproliferation needs and
actions. U. S. Intelligence also has expanded its relations with the law enforcement community.
Both the FBI and the U. S. Customs Service have assigned senior agents to the NPC to assist in
developing initiatives to counter proliferation activities. The NPC is also working to enhance
information sharing technologies and resources in support of the law enforcement community's
As the threat of proliferation has increased, U. S. Intelligence capabilities to support
nonproliferation efforts have been redirected or expanded and now include:
Assessing the intentions and plans of proliferating nations;
Identifying NBC/ M programs and clandestine transfer networks set up to obtain controlled materials or launder money;
Supporting diplomatic, law enforcement, and military efforts to counter proliferation;
Providing direct support for multilateral initiatives and security regimes; and
Overcoming denial and deception practices established by proliferators to conceal their programs.
U. S. Intelligence has taken or participated in actions to address the overall challenges facing
U. S. nonproliferation efforts, including:
Identifying funds to maintain technical intelligence collection programs related to NBC/ M tests;
Fostering the development of new technologies with the potential to improve the ability to detect NBC/ M activities at significantly longer ranges than possible today;
Establishing relationships to enhance cooperation between U. S. Intelligence and R& D components;
Redirecting and reorganizing intelligence activities to increase and sharpen the focus of nonproliferation- related efforts, both analytically and operationally; and
Redirecting programs to assist the FBI and U. S. Customs Service efforts to identify, target, and apprehend individuals engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of nuclear
Operational Planning Process. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is linking
counterproliferation intelligence production more directly to the CINCs' Deliberate Planning
Process. DIA is taking guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and direction from the
Commands' J- 2s (Intelligence), J- 3s (Operations), and J- 5s (Plans and Policy) to allow U. S.
Intelligence to more clearly define and satisfy the intelligence needed to support CINC
counterproliferation contingency planning and operations.
Intelligence Successes to Date. Many of U. S. Intelligence's successes cannot be described
in this unclassified setting. The Intelligence Annex to this report contains a more thorough
discussion of the activities and successes of U. S. Intelligence. However, some that can be
described here include:
Support to efforts of the Department of State to provide actionable intelligence to the UN Special Commission's inspection and monitoring efforts in Iraq;
Development of a list of indicators to alert collectors and analysts that CW and BW are about to be used; similar initiatives are also underway to provide early warning alerts for
the possible diversion of nuclear materials;
Support to Congressional committees, including a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the NFIP FY 1998 budget submission; and
Development of a detailed set of information needs to guide intelligence collection and analysis, known as Nonproliferation: Compendium of Country- Specific Priority
Intelligence Needs and Actions.
But even if all of the intelligence accomplishments could be listed, the intelligence
community recognizes that there is more to do. Over the next year, U. S. Intelligence will continue
Strengthen and focus its integrated collection strategy;
Work to enhance the intelligence community's information processing capabilities;
Implement unified and standardized information systems, to include shared access by intelligence and consumer organizations;
Strengthen and broaden foreign language training and support tools;
Continue to review and evaluate new methodologies and technologies; and
As part of the DCI and Secretary of Defense joint program and budget reviews, continue to evaluate intelligence resources and capabilities for optimal support for actions to
The danger of NBC use is taken seriously by U. S. Intelligence. It has not been long since
the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Press reporting in the U. S. focused on the possibility
of a similar attack happening here. U. S. Intelligence fully recognizes that after- the- fact efforts are
not adequate - it is necessary to stop NBC attacks before they occur. Intelligence is the key. U. S.
Intelligence has added resources to its efforts over the last few years as the threat has increased,
and it will continue to do all it can to meet the needs of its policy, defense, and enforcement
customers and to protect the American public at home and abroad.
7.2 Status and Accomplishments of U. S. Intelligence Programs to Counter Proliferation
Descriptions of the status and accomplishments of U. S. Intelligence programs to counter
proliferation, including details of new initiatives and an overview of capability shortfalls and areas
for progress, can be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.