Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
CPRC Annual Report To Congress 1997
3. The Continuing Threat of NBC/ M Proliferation and NBC Terrorism
This section is devoted to a description by U. S. Intelligence of NBC/ M proliferation and
NBC terrorist threats. These threats drive the policy, strategy, and R& D and acquisition program
responses discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Topics discussed in this section
include the global scope of the problem, the threat of nuclear diversion, the CW/ BW terrorist
threat, the military threat of CW/ BW and their means of delivery. A brief country study of Iraq's
BW and CW programs is also provided.
3.1 Introduction: Scope of the Problem
At least 20 countries - some of them hostile to the United States - already have or may be
developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or their missile delivery systems. Others are
heavily engaged in the sale or transfer of NBC/ M technology. Chemical and/ or biological weapons
are believed to have been used in recent conflicts (e. g., the Iran - Iraq War), and, as the 1995
Tokyo subway incident shows, terrorist attacks using CW agents have become a reality. The
NBC/ M problem is serious and growing, and, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, it is global ¾ politically,
economically, militarily, and technologically.
The Cold War, and the period of stability which accompanied global deterrence, is over.
Unstable regimes, shifting regional power balances, and terrorism dominate the landscape today.
The potential for catastrophic use of NBC weapons is greater than it has been in many decades.
Intelligence on the potential use of NBC/ M is crucial in efforts to control emerging NBC/ M crises
or avoid imminent disasters.
In the event that the use of force becomes necessary, military forces are being equipped and
trained to operate in an NBC environment. The success of such efforts depends heavily on
intelligence to identify the specific threats forces will face at a given location and time. The
potential for rapid proliferation of sophisticated biological and chemical capabilities makes this
problem even more urgent today. In order to combat the NBC/ M threat, U. S. and allied forces
must know the characteristics of that threat very well. Military intelligence needs are specific and
detailed, with a high premium on rapid delivery of analytical products in an operational
In recognition of the serious threat posed by NBC/ M proliferation, U. S. Intelligence has
developed, and is implementing, a strategic plan which draws on the resources of the entire
Intelligence Community. These intelligence activities are closely coordinated with activities in the
policy, defense, and law enforcement communities. In many cases, the activities are joint. The goal
is to provide policy makers with the intelligence support they need to:
Prevent the acquisition of NBC/ M - and of related technology and technical insight - by countries and terrorist organizations seeking such capabilities;
Roll back existing programs and capabilities worldwide;
Deter the use of these weapons; and
Adapt military forces and emergency assets to respond to the threat posed by these weapons.
The following sections examine various facets of the NBC/ M proliferation threat, including:
the threat of nuclear diversion from the FSU; the CW/ BW terrorist threat; and the military threat
posed by CW/ BW, ballistic and cruise missiles, and underground and hardened NBC facilities. In
addition, a brief study of Iraq's CW/ BW programs is also provided. For additional information on
proliferation threats, the reader is referred to the April 1996 OSD report entitled Proliferation:
Threat and Response.
3.2 The Threat of Nuclear Diversion
Although the threat of a massive nuclear attack involving hundreds or even thousands of
nuclear weapons from the FSU has diminished, other threats have arisen: the potential acquisition
of nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons by states hostile to the United States or by terrorists
intent on staging incidents harmful to U. S. interests.
The chilling reality is that nuclear materials, technologies, and expertise are more accessible
now than at any other time in history - due in part to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
region's worsened economic conditions and political instabilities. This problem is exacerbated by
the increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth of the world market, making it
harder to detect illicit diversions of materials and technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons
U. S. Intelligence is taking all possible measures to support aggressively U. S. Government
efforts to ensure the security of nuclear materials and technologies. There are several reasons why
U. S. Intelligence is concerned about the security of nuclear materials.
Russia and the other states of the FSU are not the only potential sources of nuclear weapons or materials. The reported theft of approximately 130 barrels of enriched uranium
waste from a storage facility in South Africa, which was covered in the press in August
1994, demonstrates that this problem can begin in any state where there are nuclear
materials, reactors, or fuel cycle facilities.
A few countries whose interests are inimical to the U. S. are attempting to acquire nuclear
weapons - Iraq and Iran being two of the greatest concerns. Should one of these countries,
or a terrorist group, acquire one or more nuclear weapons, they could enormously
complicate U. S. political or military activity, threaten or attack deployed U. S. or allied
forces, or even threaten to conduct an attack against the U. S. itself.
The effort required to become a nuclear power is being reduced. Years ago there were two impediments to would- be proliferators: the technical know- how for building a bomb and the
acquisition of the fissile material. While it is by no means easy to make a nuclear weapon,
knowledge of weapons design is sufficiently widespread so that a concerted effort could
succeed in at least developing a workable, albeit crude, design. The single greatest
impediment to a nation acquiring a nuclear capability is the acquisition of fissile material.
Nuclear weapons require fissile material in the form of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium, both of which require large multi- billion dollar development programs to
produce independently. Today, fissile material is more susceptible than ever to being
purchased, stolen, or otherwise acquired.
The protection of fissile material in the FSU has thus become more critical at the same time
that it has become more difficult. Many of the institutional mechanisms that once curtailed the
spread of nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge no longer exist or are present only in a
weakened capacity. Effective new methods of control have yet to be fully implemented for a large
portion of the world's nuclear related materials, technology, and information.
The list of potential proliferators is not limited to states with nuclear weapons ambitions.
There are many non- state actors, such as separatists and terrorist groups, criminal organizations,
and individual thieves who could choose to further their cause by using fissile or non- fissile (but
radioactive) nuclear materials. Despite press articles claiming numerous instances of nuclear
trafficking worldwide, U. S. Intelligence has no evidence that any fissile materials have been
acquired by terrorist organizations. There are no indications of state sponsored attempts to arm
terrorist organizations with nuclear material, fissile or non- fissile. Furthermore, conventional
weapons such as improvised explosives remain the most likely option for terrorist groups because
they are much easier to use and can be effective as tools of terror. Unfortunately, this does not
preclude the possibility that a terrorist group could acquire enough nuclear material, potentially
through illicit trades, to conduct an operation, especially one specifically designed to incite panic.
A non- state actor does not necessarily need fissile material - which is more difficult to
acquire - for its purposes. Depending upon the group's objectives, any radioactive material could
suffice, but the use of non- fissile materials would likely result in low levels of contamination with
very little physical damage. But non- fissile radioactive materials dispersed by a conventional
explosive or even released accidentally could cause damage to property and the environment, and
cause social, political, and economic disruption. Examples of non- fissionable, radioactive materials
seen in press reports are cesium- 137, strontium- 90, and cobalt- 60. These cannot be used in nuclear
weapons but could be used to contaminate water supplies, business centers, government facilities,
or transportation networks. Although it is unlikely they would cause significant numbers of
casualties, they could cause physical disruption, interruption of economic activity, and
psychological trauma to the work force and general populace, and require some measure of post-incident
clean- up. Non- state actors already have attempted to use radioactive materials in recent
operations. For example:
In November 1995, a Chechen insurgent leader threatened to turn Moscow into an "eternal desert" with radioactive waste, according to press reports. The Chechens
directed a Russian news agency to a small amount of cesium- 137 in a shielded container
in a Moscow park which the Chechens claimed to have placed there. Government
spokesmen told the press that the material was not a threat, and would have to have been
dispersed by explosives to be dangerous. According to DoD assessments, there was only
a very small quantity of cesium- 137 in the container. If it had been dispersed with a
bomb, an area of the park could have been contaminated with low levels of radiation.
This could have caused disruption to the populace, but would have posed a minimal
health hazard for anyone outside the immediate blast area.
The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which twice attacked Japanese civilians with deadly sarin nerve agent, also tried to mine its own uranium in Australia and to buy Russian
Traditional terrorist groups with established sponsors probably will remain hesitant to use a
nuclear weapon, for fear of provoking a worldwide crackdown and alienating their supporters. In
contrast, a new breed of multinational terrorists, exemplified by the Islamic extremists involved in
the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, might be more likely to consider such a weapon if
it were available. These groups are part of a loose association of politically committed, mixed
nationality militants, apparently motivated by revenge, political grievances, or a general hatred for
3.3 The Terrorist Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons
The danger that a terrorist organization like the Aum Shinrikyo could acquire the capability
to launch an attack using CW or BW continues to exist. U. S. Intelligence continues to assess and
analyze the threat of a terrorist CW or BW attack, a threat that remains ever present. The Aum
Shinrikyo attacks in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan, which killed seven and injured 500, and on
the Tokyo subway in March 1995, which killed 12 and injured 5,500, were the first instances of
large- scale terrorist use of CW agents, but a variety of incidents and reports over the last two years
indicate continuing terrorist interest in these weapons. These incidents include, but are not limited
In February 1996, German police confiscated from a Neo- Nazi group a coded diskette that contained information on how to produce the CW agent mustard gas. German police
have stated that there are no indications yet of intent or effort to manufacture the agent.
Tajik opposition members laced champagne with cyanide at a New Year's celebration in January 1995, killing six Russian soldiers and the wife of another, and sickening other
Press reports indicate that the Kurdistan Worker's Party (a guerrilla group that opposes Turkish rule of historically Kurdish regions) poisoned water supplies in southeast Turkey
Terrorist interest in CW and BW is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some
of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, the large number of casualties they can
cause, and the residual disruption of infrastructure they can precipitate. Although popular fiction
and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, CW and BW are more
likely choices for such groups.
In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production of BW requires only a small quantity of equipment.
Even very small amounts of BW and CW can cause massive casualties. The fact that only 12 Japanese died in the Tokyo subway attack has tended to mask the significance of the
5,500 people who were treated or examined at medical facilities. Such a massive influx
of injured - many critically - has the potential to overwhelm emergency medical facilities,
even in a large metropolitan area.
Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them "weapons of mass destruction" because of the necessity to decontaminate affected areas before the public will be able to begin
feeling safe again.
Although the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that terrorists can produce CW, they also
may be able to directly acquire these weapons via other means, including: theft of agents from
research labs, acquisition of commercially available poisons, theft of CW munitions held by the
military, black market activity, and receipt of ready- made CW agents or munitions from a state
sponsor. It is unlikely that all such acquisition attempts will be discovered and investigated.
Detection of the acquisition of BW is especially troublesome. There is no doubt that the use of BW
could be devastating, possibly causing thousands of deaths, and, at the very least, seriously disrupt
the daily lives and business activities of Americans and U. S. allies. Consequently, BW agents
represent a serious threat to U. S. national security.
The continued existence of states such as Iran, Libya, and Syria, which remain on the State
Department's terrorist list, highlights the danger of potential state sponsorship of a terrorist's CW
or BW program, although there is no evidence of state sponsors providing CW or BW or the
technologies to produce them to terrorist groups.
The Aum Shinrikyo. The investigation of Aum leader Shoko Asahara has resulted in a
number of revelations about the cult's activities. Press reports allege that:
Asahara ordered the capability to produce sarin beginning in 1993; a large agent production complex was not operational until March 1994.
Some evidence suggests that the group may have tested sarin on sheep in Australia. Press reports claim that examination of some 30 sheep carcasses at an abandoned Aum
site in Australia revealed the presence of sarin and other pesticides of similar structure.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Aum expanded its activities in Russia, claiming some 30,000 followers there in addition to the 10,000 in Japan.
Aum's Russian element broadcasts religious radio programs into Japan from the Russian Far East.
Video news footage indicates that a Russian- made GSP- 11 toxic gas detector was found at the Aum compound in Japan. Designed to be used on the battlefield, the Russian
detector can also be used in a nerve agent production and handling facility.
Asahara intended the simultaneous chemical strike on 10 locations in the Tokyo subway to be a massive mystery attack that would divert attention from the cult.
In February 1996, the Thai police were informed by the Japanese embassy that members of Aum Shinrikyo had arrived in Thailand possibly to carry out terrorist activities. One
individual was arrested and later identified as an Aum member; however, there is no
information indicating that terrorist activity was planned or conducted in Thailand.
3.4 The Military Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons
The military threat from CW/ BW is greater today than it has ever been - particularly in
regions where religious, ethnic, and/ or economic strife are feeding the roots of conflict.
Exacerbating the problem is the worldwide proliferation of knowledge and technology related to
CW/ BW and weapon development. Ready access to international computer networks and
databases provides a would- be proliferant with unparalleled access to information that can greatly
accelerate the development of a CW/ BW weaponization program (i. e., turning a stockpile of
CW/ BW agents into a militarily significant weapon). Not only must U. S. forces be prepared for
these threats; they must be prepared now.
The costs of nuclear weapons, the requirement for large supporting infrastructures, and the
need to acquire the many different technologies necessary for weaponization are limiting factors in
achieving a nuclear weapons capability. On the other hand, initiating a CW agent production
capability is a rather straightforward adaptation of basic industrial chemical processes. Similarly,
BW agents can be produced by countries possessing a pharmaceutical, veterinary, or medical
infrastructure. For such countries, CW and BW production is technically feasible and can become a
reality with the acquisition of some specialized equipment, cooperation of appropriate scientists and
engineers, and the political will to do so. The military effectiveness of CW/ BW weaponization will
depend on the overall support available from the country's military infrastructure and the training
and doctrine development it can provide. However, with only modest investments a credible and
effective CW/ BW weaponization program can be established.
Aimed at certain critical nodes in the military infrastructure of the U. S., either domestically
or abroad, CW and BW could seriously disrupt the execution and tempo of military operations.
Contamination of mobilization/ logistics nodes, ports, and other choke points created during force
projection (e. g., the ports at Al Jubyal and Ad Dammam during the Gulf War) could delay the
initiation of military campaigns, increase the exposure and vulnerability of troops, and threaten the
very success of military operations. It is imperative, therefore, that U. S. forces be prepared to
operate effectively in CW/ BW contaminated environments while simultaneously being able to
detect and identify threat agents, treat casualties, and remediate contaminated areas.
The Soviet Union may have had the most advanced CW and BW programs in the world; at
the very least, it certainly had the largest. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the current
economic and unemployment problems of the states of the FSU may have a significant impact in the
coming years on the direction and pace of CW and BW development throughout the world. While
not sanctioned by the standing governments of FSU states, individuals and organizations may be
tempted to sell related knowledge and materiel for hard currency just to survive. Certainly, the
scientists and engineers formerly employed in the Soviet CW/ BW weapons complex could be
vulnerable to this temptation. Just as the level of protection and control of nuclear materials has
declined since the fall of the Soviet Union, so too could CW and BW knowledge and material
become vulnerable to pilfering by entrepreneurs looking to turn a quick profit in the international
Press reports indicate that the Soviet Union may also have developed CW agents which are
harder to detect, protect against, and treat than standard nerve and other conventional CW agents.
Proliferation of knowledge and material associated with these CW agents to regions of instability or
by rogue nations could severely impact U. S. national interests, national policy, and military
strategy. The prospect of facing a country, such as Iraq, equipped not just with CW, but with CW
for which we do not possess adequate means of protection or detection is a sobering thought,
Another, less well understood, CW threat is the potential for a Bhopal- like event resulting
from deliberate targeting of industrial facilities in populated areas. U. S. forces operating in
industrial areas could face a combined threat of conventional CW agents and exposure to industrial
chemicals released either deliberately by saboteurs or as a result of collateral effects associated with
military attack operations (i. e., by friend or foe).
Currently there are some 20 countries that possess or are seeking to acquire CW and BW
capabilities. Some of these programs are relics from the Cold War, others are the result of current
tensions and instabilities, and still others defy any reasonable explanation (at least by Western
standards). Whatever the rationale for the existence of these programs, they all have the potential
to pose a serious threat to U. S. military forces operating in or near these countries. The
importance and gravity of these issues are underscored by noting that the countries which are the
greatest concern to the U. S. as potential CW/ BW weapons proliferants are also in regions where
the U. S. has well defined national security interests (e. g., the Middle East). Therefore, it is of
paramount importance that U. S. forces continue to maintain a credible capability to operate
effectively in a CW/ BW contaminated environment, and that the U. S. continue to play a leadership
role in CW and BW arms control efforts to establish enforceable international norms and control
mechanisms for these weapons, like those embodied in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Ballistic Missile NBC Weapon Delivery Systems. Ballistic missiles offer potential
proliferators several advantages in delivering NBC weapons. This is evidenced by the fact that
many of the states thought to possess or seeking to possess NBC weapons also have programs to
develop or acquire ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are less expensive to acquire and sustain than
a modern air force. They have a relatively low profile infrastructure, and the use of mobile
launchers makes them far less vulnerable to U. S. offensive operations than, for example, manned
aircraft with ties to fixed air bases. The U. S. experience in the Gulf War demonstrated the
exceptional challenge posed by mobile ballistic missile launchers to counterforce operations.
Perhaps the greatest attraction of ballistic missiles is the difficulty in defending against them.
The potential for coercion is, perhaps, the long- range ballistic missile's greatest value to
proliferators and the greatest challenge for those seeking to restrain them. Beyond their coercive
value in threatening distant cities and their ability to distract and tie up military resources seeking to
counter them, ballistic missiles - if sufficiently accurate and/ or lethal - can pose a direct military
threat as well. During the Gulf War, 25 percent of U. S. combat fatalities resulted from a single
SCUD missile strike on a makeshift barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Whether as a terror
weapon against civilian populations or as a means to threaten the rear of U. S. and coalition forces,
ballistic missiles can be an effective offensive weapon, even in the midst of U. S. air superiority.
This is particularly the case with NBC- armed ballistic missiles. Because of their ability to spread
lethal effects over wide areas, arming ballistic missiles with NBC weapons can, to some extent,
compensate for a lack of missile accuracy. An inaccurate ballistic missile armed with conventional
high explosives can be transformed from a militarily ineffective terror weapon to a militarily
significant weapon by adding an NBC warhead. Hence, those who seek to develop or acquire NBC
weapons will likely seek to develop or acquire ballistic missiles as well, and sometimes,
unfortunately, vice versa.
Cruise Missile NBC Weapon Delivery Systems. Article 2 of the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty provides a useful definition: "A cruise missile is an unmanned, self-propelled
vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight."
Cruise missiles may be even less expensive and more accurate than ballistic missiles, and their
smaller size may make them an even more elusive target for counterforce operations. Furthermore,
they may also be more difficult to defend against than manned aircraft because of their lower radar
cross- section and flight characteristics. Cruise missiles tend to be small, easy to hide, capable of
being launched from a variety of mobile launch platforms (air, ground, and sea based) without
significant modifications to the missile, relatively hard to detect in flight, and potentially accurate to
a few tens of meters (e. g., via the Global Positioning System). Even unsophisticated general
aviation aircraft and commercially available remotely piloted vehicles could be turned into an
unmanned cruise missile of sorts and configured to accomplish a variety of militarily significant
missions. Such aircraft are widely available and inexpensive to purchase, support, and operate.
Even though short- range anti- ship cruise missiles are already widely available, there are only a few
countries that possess long- range, land- attack cruise missiles. However, there are no technological
barriers preventing even developing nations from developing or purchasing these relatively
inexpensive, potentially very accurate NBC weapon delivery systems. Although they can be
designed to deliver their payloads to great distances (both the U. S. and the FSU built cruise missiles
with range capabilities of more than 3,000 km), the majority of currently available cruise- type
missiles have ranges typically less than about 500 km.
Underground and Hardened NBC/ M Facilities. Some countries are concealing NBC/ M
facilities and protecting them from attack by constructing underground and other hardened
facilities. Placing an NBC/ M capability - a weapon, a delivery system, or an NBC weapon
production complex - within an underground facility enhances a country's ability to conceal the
facility's location, in addition to providing considerable protection against attack. Outer perimeter
protection in such facilities may involve concrete and steel roofs with earth cover. Other options
include the use of tunnels, including existing coal and salt mine complexes and natural caves that
can be both deep and extensive. Within a hardened complex such measures as blast doors, barriers,
turns in tunnels, and expansion chambers can channel and deflect blast waves to mitigate their
destructive effects. Modern excavating equipment has speeded the process of constructing such
facilities while also reducing construction costs.
The Iraqi shallow buried and hardened facilities attacked during the Gulf War were for the
most part remnants of an earlier generation of protective facilities construction. Because of the
success achieved by U. S. weapons against these facilities, a new trend has been observed: the
increased use of deep underground structures, such as abandoned mines or tunnels, to protect high
value military assets. A proliferant state's NBC/ M forces and supporting infrastructure elements
are one such high value military asset. Libya's construction of the Tarhunah tunnel complex, a
suspected large scale CW production facility, is an example of this trend recently reported in the
press. This complex is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3.5 Iraq: A Country Study
This country study examines the magnitude of Iraq's CW and BW programs and
underscores the complexity faced by international efforts to curb the spread of these weapons.
Details about the breadth of Iraq's past CW and BW programs are presented to demonstrate the
broad range of weapons that a state sponsor of terrorism has available and could provide to
terrorists if it so chooses.
The unprecedented inspections conducted in Iraq by the United Nations (UN) have revealed
much about Iraqi NBC/ M programs. In the wake of the August 1995 defection of two high- level
Iraqis, the Baghdad government turned over to the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a large cache of NBC/ M- related
documents and have revealed even more information in extensive discussions with both UN
organizations. The sudden revelation of new information underscored the long- standing judgment
that the Iraqis had made efforts to deceive UNSCOM and the IAEA. Such behavior resulted in
UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus's delivery of a strongly worded report to the UN Security Council that
was critical of Iraq's progress in fulfilling its obligations under the UN resolutions imposed
following the Gulf War. Despite severe war damage and over four years of UN inspections, Iraq
retains some infrastructure to resurrect many of its NBC/ M programs.
Iraq's Biological Warfare Program. Following the August 1995 defections of high level
Iraqi officials, Iraq revealed substantial additional information about its extensive BW program.
The Iraqi Government adopted a policy to acquire additional BW in 1974. R& D began in 1975,
but went into hiatus in 1978. In 1985, Iraq restarted BW R& D. Initial work focused on literature
studies, until bacterial strains were received from overseas in April 1986. Additionally, Iraq's
revelations to the UN included the following information on the production and weaponization of
its BW agents:
A total of 6,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax were produced at Al Hakam during 1990. An additional 5,400 liters of concentrated botulinum
toxin were produced at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute during the period of
November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin was
produced at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated anthrax were produced at Salman Pak.
Production of clostridium perfringens (a biological agent that causes gas gangrene and, when aerosolized, can cause severe gastric effects) began in August 1990. A total of 340
liters of concentrated agent was produced.
Static field trials of anthrax simulant and botulinum toxin were conducted using aerial bombs as early as March 1988. Effects were observed on test animals. Additional
weaponization tests took place in November 1989 with 122 mm rockets. Live firings of
122 mm rockets filled with agents were conducted in May 1990.
Large- scale weaponization of BW agents began in 1990. Iraq filled more than 150 bombs and 25 missile warheads with agent. Some of the bombs were dispersed to military
Iraq worked to adapt a modified aircraft drop tank for BW agent spray operations beginning in December 1990. The tank could be attached either to a piloted fighter or to
an unmanned aircraft that would be guided to the target by a piloted aircraft. The tank
was designed to spray up to 2,000 liters of anthrax on a target. Iraq claims the test was a
failure, but three additional drop tanks were modified and stored, ready for use.
Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program. These revelations further demonstrated the ability of a
determined proliferator to hide some information about its CW/ BW programs even when subjected
to systematic and continued scrutiny and included:
The Iraqi program to develop the nerve agent VX actually began as early as May 1985 and continued until December 1990 without interruption; Iraq claimed previously that its
program spanned only the period April 1987 to September 1988.
Iraq produced 65 tons of chlorine, intended for the production of VX, and had more than 200 tons each of the precursor chemicals phosphorous pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine.
Together, these three precursors would have been sufficient to produce
almost 500 tons of VX.
Iraq developed a true binary sarin- filled artillery shell, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs in quantities beyond prototype level. An Al Husayn missile with a chemical warhead was
flight- tested in April 1990.
Iraq received significant assistance from outside suppliers. Figure 3.3 shows some of the CW
munitions (unfueld and defused LD- 250 chemical bombs) recovered by UNSCOM inspectors after
Response to the Threat. Additional information on the NBC/ M proliferation and NBC
terrorist threats may be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report. DoD, DOE, and U. S.
Intelligence policy and strategy objectives which provide a framework in which to deal with
NBC/ M proliferation and NBC terrorism threats are summarized in the next Section. DoD's
military response to counter NBC/ M threats is discussed in Section 5. DOE's programs in
proliferation prevention are described in Section 6, and U. S. Intelligence's response to countering
proliferation is summarized in Section 7. The integrated DoD, DOE, and U. S. Intelligence,
response to countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats is discussed in Section 8. Details of
U. S. Intelligence's response, including new initiatives, activities, and programs which address
shortfalls in efforts to counter proliferation, may be found in the Intelligence Annex.