6.1 Introduction and Summary

U.S. Intelligence has received clear and concise policy guidance for conducting its intelligence activities. This guidance begins with Presidential Decision Directives that address weapons and related technology proliferation, including, for example, nuclear smuggling. Additional guidance comes from annual Congressional Defense and Intelligence Authorization and Appropriation Acts, reports to Congress by U.S. Agencies on countering proliferation activities, and DoD counterproliferation policy and military missions objectives. These outline a national nonproliferation strategy centered around four key aspects: 1) prevent the acquisition of WMD, 2) roll back existing WMD capabilities, 3) deter WMD use, and 4) adapt military forces and emergency assets to respond to WMD threats.

A focused set of enduring intelligence needs has been developed in response to the policy guidance reflected in the four aspects of our nonproliferation strategy. These enduring intelligence needs are used to chart the progress of U.S. Intelligence in making use of existing capabilities and in defining and developing areas for new investments.

U.S. Intelligence and the Counterproliferation ACEs. Fifteen critical counterproliferation investment areas were identified last year by the CPRC (see Table 1.2). Intelligence activities and programs are an integral part of each of these investment ACEs. The reader is referred to the Intelligence Annex for details of the overall U.S. Intelligence program to counter proliferation.

In addition to the counterproliferation ACEs, U.S. Intelligence is working to provide accurate, comprehensive, timely, and actionable foreign intelligence on a broad policy and enforcement front. This has included:

• Support to policy makers responsible for extending and implementing the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, wherein the U.S. and other signatories have expressed their nonproliferation commitments;

• Examining the entire Russian nuclear weapons cycle to identify areas where transparency measures would be most effective; and

• Maintaining a surge capability to quickly deploy specialists outside the U.S. to the scene of a terrorist nuclear or radiological threat to provide the U.S. Mission and host government advice and guidance on dealing with the threat. During such an incident, the specialists would coordinate fully with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies, keeping them informed and drawing upon their expertise should follow-up action be required.

Strategic Planning Process. U.S. Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic planning and evaluation process to support efforts to counter proliferation. This process contributes to the Intelligence Community's National Needs Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program and Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the placement of a significant number of DoD personnel within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC). This has helped integrate intelligence support to DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. U.S. Intelligence also has expanded its relations with the law enforcement community. The U.S. Customs Service, for example, has assigned a senior Customs agent to the NPC to assist in developing joint initiatives to counter proliferation activities. The NPC is also working to enhance information sharing technologies and resources in support of the law enforcement community's nonproliferation efforts.

As the threat of proliferation has increased, U.S. Intelligence capabilities to support nonproliferation efforts have been redirected or expanded and now include:

• Assessing the intentions and plans of proliferating nations;

• Identifying WMD programs and clandestine transfer networks set up to obtain controlled materials or launder money;

• Supporting diplomatic, law enforcement, and military efforts to counter proliferation;

• Providing direct support for multilateral initiatives and security regimes; and

• Overcoming denial and deception practices established by proliferators to conceal their programs.

U.S. Intelligence has taken or participated in actions to address the overall challenges facing U.S. nonproliferation efforts, including:

• Identifying funds to maintain technical intelligence collection programs related to WMD tests;

• Fostering the development of new technologies with the potential to improve the ability to detect WMD activities at significantly longer ranges than possible today;

• Establishing a relationship to enhance cooperation between U.S. Intelligence and R&D components;

• Redirecting and reorganizing intelligence activities to increase and sharpen the focus of nonproliferation-related efforts, both analytically and operationally; and

• Redirecting programs to assist the FBI and U.S. Customs Service efforts to identify, target, and apprehend individuals engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of nuclear materials worldwide.

Operational Planning Process. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is linking counterproliferation intelligence production more directly to the Deliberate Planning Process. DIA is taking guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and direction from the Commands' J-2s (Intelligence), J-3s (Operations), and J-5s (Plans and Policy) to allow U.S. Intelligence to more clearly define and satisfy the intelligence needed to support CINC counterproliferation contingency planning and operations.

Intelligence Successes to Date. U.S. efforts to counter WMD proliferation have enjoyed some successes over the past several years. The DCI noted in his March 20, 1995 statement before the Senate: "I think a tremendous amount of progress has been done . . . to build a serious, post-Cold War, nonproliferation intelligence capability." For obvious reasons, many of U.S. Intelligence's successes cannot be described in this unclassified report. However, some that can be described include:

• Supporting Department of State efforts to provide actionable intelligence to the UNSCOM inspection and monitoring effort in Iraq;

• Supporting U.S. diplomatic discussions with South Africa concerning Pretoria's adherence to the NPT;

• Developing a list of collection indicators to alert collectors and analysts prior to the use of chemical and biological weapons. Similar initiatives are also underway to provide early warning for the possible diversion of nuclear materials;

• Establishing a Southern Tier Study Group designed to focus on all WMD-related proliferation issues in the southern tier of the former Soviet Union; and

• Providing Congressional committees with a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the NFIP FY 1996 budget submission.

But even if all of the intelligence accomplishments could be listed, we would be the first to say there is more to do. Over the next year, U.S. Intelligence will seek to:

• Strengthen and focus our integrated collection strategy;

• Work to enhance the Community's information processing capabilities;

• Implement unified and standardized information systems, to include shared access by intelligence and consumer organizations;

• Strengthen and broaden foreign language training and support tools;

• Continue to review and evaluate new methodologies and technologies; and,

• As part of the DCI and Secretary of Defense joint program and budget reviews, continue to evaluate intelligence resources and capabilities for optimal support for actions to counter proliferation.

U.S. Intelligence takes seriously the danger of the use of WMD. It has been just over one year now since the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Press reporting in the U.S. focused on the possibility of a similar attack happening here. U.S. Intelligence fully recognizes that after-the-fact efforts are not adequate we need to stop WMD attacks before they occur. Intelligence is the key. U.S. Intelligence has added resources to its efforts over the last few years as the threat has increased, and it will continue to do all it can to meet the needs of its policy, defense, and enforcement customers and to protect the American public at home and abroad.

6.2 New U.S. Intelligence Initiatives to Counter Proliferation

Details of new U.S. Intelligence initiatives to counter proliferation can be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

6.3 Status and Accomplishments of U.S. Intelligence Programs to Counter Proliferation

More detailed descriptions of the status and accomplishments of U.S. Intelligence programs to counter proliferation can be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

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