In the subsections that follow, DoD activities and programs deemed by the CPRC to be strongly related to counterproliferation are discussed. Section 4.1 is devoted to a discussion of the various activities and key developments affecting DoD's overall Counterproliferation Initiative. This includes discussions of new DoD initiatives scheduled for enactment in FY 1997, DoD policy perspectives, CINC priorities and Joint Staff counterproliferation related activities, and a summary of the current status of the Counterproliferation Support Program. DoD program descriptions are provided in sections 4.2 - 4.8 and organized in terms of the seven counterproliferation functional areas: proliferation prevention, strategic and tactical intelligence, battlefield surveillance, WMD counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and countering paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats. Key program accomplishments are described, and FY 1997 budgetary data is provided for each program. Additional programmatic details, including key program accomplishments and milestones, are provided in Appendix C. Finally, Section 4.9 summarizes how these programs and their accomplishments directly address the counterproliferation ACEs.

It should be noted that the CPRC review process is ongoing, as is the DoD-wide counterproliferation program review being conducted by OSD, the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs. (See Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.4.) The DoD programs described in this section are included based on the CPRC's judgment of their relevance to the counterproliferation ACEs at this time. The exact composition of which programs and projects constitute DoD's overall investment in counterproliferation capabilities is still evolving. This is due to the fact that many programs, especially R&D programs, may have dual applicability (e.g., both to general purpose warfighting and counterproliferation-related missions). As the review and study processes continue and as programs change and mature, those programs identified as strongly related to counterproliferation may need to be redefined.

4.1 Introduction and New Developments

4.1.1 DoD Directive on Counterproliferation Implementation. DoD has made significant progress in rising to the challenges presented by the proliferation of WMD. While the advances have been positive, the Secretary of Defense recognized the necessity to blend together these widespread efforts to form a more robust campaign-level approach to address this formidable task. He directed that a DoD Directive be developed to normalize established policy, assign responsibilities, and formalize relationships among DoD organizations for the continued implementation of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative. This Directive, which is in final review within the Department, establishes counterproliferation terms of reference to ensure uniform application of the Directive among the DoD components. More importantly, the Directive enacts the membership, functions, and authorities of the DoD Counterproliferation Council.

DoD policy to counter proliferation underlies strengthened efforts to prevent proliferation and to protect U.S. forces, interests, and allies in the face of proliferation where it occurs. It applies to the development of requisite U.S. military capabilities and requires U.S. forces to be prepared to execute offensive and defensive military operations to counter the deployment and employment of NBC weapons. The major objectives of DoD policy are:

• Support overall U.S. Government efforts to prevent the acquisition of NBC weapons and missile capabilities;

• Support overall U.S. Government efforts to roll back proliferation where it has occurred;

• Deter and prevent the effective use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems against the U.S., its allies, and U.S. and allied forces; and

• Adapt U.S. military forces, planning, doctrine, and training to operate effectively against the threats posed by NBC weapons and their delivery systems.

To achieve these counterproliferation policy objectives, U.S. forces must possess a spectrum of capabilities. The research, development, and acquisition programs designed to bring these capabilities to fruition are discussed in the program descriptions provided in Sections 4.2 through 4.8 below.

Establishment of the CP Council. To ensure that DoD's implementation of counterproliferation objectives continue to be adequately integrated and focused, a DoD Counterproliferation Council (i.e., the "CP Council") has been established. The CP Council is composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (as Chairman), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Vice Chiefs of the Military Services, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff. The CP Council is scheduled to meet later this year, and the agendas for the first four meetings have been established. They are: 1) comprehend the NBC and missile threats, and their implications, in two Major Regional Contingency scenarios; 2) discuss how U.S. ground, air, and naval forces train and exercise to operate in NBC contaminated environments; 3) consider the status of efforts to establish and test Joint Doctrine for operating in an NBC environment; and 4) review the status of interagency and allied work on counterproliferation issues.

While the CP Council's charter is still being defined and coordinated within the Department, the CP Council is designed to provide high level management oversight to review DoD's progress in coordinating counterproliferation-related programs and activities, resolve counterproliferation-related issues, and work closely with the JCS and Services to develop appropriate acquisition and force planning strategies that will ensure the effective implementation of counterproliferation objectives. The CP Council will also oversee DoD counterproliferation activities in interagency and international fora. In executing its function, the CP Council will: 1) advise the Secretary of Defense on counterproliferation matters; 2) make recommendations regarding decisions on responsibilities for the implementation of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative; 3) oversee implementation of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative and review and make recommendations on those elements of the defense guidance that deal with counterproliferation issues; and 4) develop DoD positions and views on matters relating to counterproliferation for presentation and discussion outside the DoD, to include preparations for participation in senior interagency discussions and interaction with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies.

4.1.2 CINC Counterproliferation Priorities and Planning Activities. The counterproliferation activities of DoD includes the application of military force, when necessary. Deriving the CINCs' formal warfighting plans follows a deliberate and formalized "national objective-to-task" process that proceeds from top-level Presidential guidance and instructions down to specific military operational plans and activities. The National Security Strategy, Presidential Decision Directive-13 (PDD-13), and the Counterproliferation Policy Guidance of the Secretary of Defense have already provided the framework for counterproliferation planning. Three joint documents that have evolved from these broad guidance documents are the Missions and Functions Study, the Counterproliferation Charter, and the CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN (concept plan). These are the key documents that are the prerequisites for beginning the CINCs' formal counterproliferation planning process to execute U.S. counterproliferation policy.

Because the challenges of counterproliferation involve new policy considerations, the Missions and Functions Study was a special effort chartered by the Secretary of Defense and aimed at facilitating future DoD counterproliferation planning. The study was a combined effort by the Joint Staff, Services, CINC representatives, and the OSD. Its key findings were: 1) each geographic CINC would be responsible for executing U.S. counterproliferation policy within his area of responsibility (AOR); and 2) implementation of counterproliferation policy within each AOR would be executed via each CINC's standard deliberate planning process. This planning process included the development of the overarching CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN, prior to each CINC developing an AOR-specific counterproliferation CONPLAN.

The findings of the Missions and Functions Study were approved by the Secretary of Defense in May 1995, and he further directed that a Counterproliferation Charter be written prior to the development of the CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN. The Counterproliferation Charter was developed as a supplement to the top-level guidance documents delineated above, providing more of a military focus with respect to the counterproliferation mission. The Counterproliferation Charter has been approved by the CJCS and is currently awaiting final approval by the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN further defines national level counterproliferation policy and guidance in terms of three national counterproliferation operational objectives, and six counterproliferation operational tasks. The three national counterproliferation operational objectives and six counterproliferation operational tasks evolved from an in-depth analysis of the intentions of multiple top-level U.S. policy documents relevant to the counterproliferation mission. The ensuing objectives and tasks have been fully coordinated throughout the Commands and OSD. These counterproliferation objectives and tasks will guide the CINCs through the development of the AOR-specific CONPLANs. The CJCS's Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN is in final coordination in the Joint Staff; after which it will be officially given to the CINCs so that they may then initiate their own AOR-specific counterproliferation planning. The reader is referred to the Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN for additional details.

The CINCs' Counterproliferation Priorities. The current CINCs' listing of 14 counterproliferation priorities, considered necessary to conduct the counterproliferation mission from a military warfighting perspective, was developed by the Deterrence/Counterproliferation JWCA team and was presented to the JROC for approval in July 1994. The CINCs' counterproliferation priorities are listed in Table 4.1. The prioritized list evolved from an information base established by the Services and acquisition strategy working groups using the 16 Areas for Progress identified by the NPRC and summarized in its May 1994 Report to Congress. They have since been presented and revalidated by the CINCs during each of four semiannual JROC meetings with the CINCs. The priorities were also reviewed and endorsed by the CPRC in their May 1995 Report to Congress to serve as a basis for the counterproliferation ACEs and for further programmatic reviews.

Ongoing Review of Joint NBC Defense and Counterproliferation Programs. During the FY 1997 - 2001 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) budget review, a detailed assessment of all counterproliferation programs within the Joint NBC Defense POM and the Counterproliferation Support Program was conducted. As a result of this review, the JROC provided counterproliferation program recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in an effort to balance limited fiscal resources across multiple warfighting needs. Following a subsequent assessment of counterproliferation and joint NBC defense programs by OSD's Program Review Group, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a joint review of all DoD counterproliferation programs to assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts, CINC requirements, and management alternatives. The goal of this study, which is underway, is to define a restructured program that meets the CINCs' counterproliferation needs. The study is being performed in cooperation with the OSD's Director of PA&E and is scheduled to be completed by 30 June 1996.

The Deterrence/Counterproliferation JWCA is in the process of conducting counterproliferation mission analyses and operational planning workshops with each of the geographic CINCs. This comprehensive effort will serve multiple purposes. The enabling tasks and capabilities required to execute the counterproliferation mission identified during the operational planning workshops will be used by the CINC planners as a point of departure to assist in the development of their AOR counterproliferation CONPLANs. Also, the mission analyses and results of the operational planning workshops will serve to update and further refine the CINCs' military needs to execute the counterproliferation mission, and could result in a revised set of CINC counterproliferation priorities. Lastly, the operational planning workshops will assist in the joint review of all DoD counterproliferation programs by ensuring the CINCs' counterproliferation capability requirements are accurately addressed.

4.1.3 Overview of DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative and the Counterprolifera-tion Support Program. DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative is the Department-wide effort to meet the challenges posed by the proliferation of WMD. It was established to ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to conduct successful military operations in an NBC environment. For FY 1997, DoD, through its Counterproliferation Initiative, will invest approximately $4.3 billion in programs strongly related to counterproliferation. At the heart of DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative is the Counterproliferation Support Program.

The Counterproliferation Support Program was established to address DoD's responsibilities in responding to the 1994 NPRC Areas for Progress. It was instituted in August 1994 by a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM-1, dated 16 August 1994) from the Deputy Secretary of Defense which directed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (recently redesignated as ATSD for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, ATSD(NCB)) to develop a Program Execution Plan and a Program Management Plan for implementing the program. The Counterproliferation Support Program was developed in close consultation and coordination with the NPRC/CPRC, the Joint Staff and JROC, the CINCs, the Services, DoD executing agencies, and cognizant components of OSD. This cooperation is ongoing and continuing.

ATSD(NCB) and his Deputy for Counterproliferation (DATSD(NCB)(CP)) are responsible for managing the Counterproliferation Support Program and serve as the central point of contact for DoD counterproliferation programs. The DATSD(NCB)(CP)'s charter is to: 1) provide management oversight for DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative to ensure it fully supports the President's policy to limit the spread of and contain the threat from WMD; 2) manage the Counterproliferation Support Program; and 3) ensure coordination of DoD counterproliferation RDT&E and acquisition efforts with DOE, U.S. Intelligence, and other federal agencies. Oversight of the Counterproliferation Initiative is accomplished by: 1) participating in POM and Programming, Planning and Budgeting System reviews, Departmental planning and policy development, and acquisition oversight activities; 2) serving as facilitator across individual program boundaries; and 3) interacting with the Joint Staff, JROC, the Deterrence/Counterproliferation JWCA, and the CINCs to ensure that their counterproliferation priorities are adequately addressed. In its role as interagency integrator and coordinator of programs related to counterproliferation, the Counterproliferation Support Program seeks to maximize the payoff from the national investment in counterproliferation-related activities, facilitate interactions between the DoD RDT&E and acquisition communities and other U.S. Government Agencies, and identify non-DoD programs to meet CINC and other DoD user needs.

The goal of the Counterproliferation Support Program is to improve specific military counterproliferation capabilities by: 1) building on ongoing programs in the Services, DoD agencies, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence; 2) focusing on the most critical counterproliferation shortfalls to address major gaps in deployed capabilities (as reflected in the CINC priorities and the ACEs); 3) leveraging existing program funding to more rapidly field capabilities by accelerating the deliverables of DoD programs (i.e., seek the 70% solution, leave the 100% solution to longer term R&D); 4) identifying and enhancing the development of high payoff technologies to accelerate capabilities to the warfighter; 5) identifying and promoting key non-materiel initiatives which complement technological advances; and 6) transitioning Counterproliferation Support Program projects to the Services as soon as practicable. By leveraging sponsor funding and funding efforts with a strong and high level military component or CINC support, the Counterproliferation Support Program can expedite the transition of project development and acquisition responsibilities to the Services. The expedited acquisition process embodied in the ACTD process is ideal for achieving these objectives, and the Counterproliferation Support Program seeks to use ACTDs as the vehicle for rapid demonstration and fielding of new and enhanced military capabilities.

The Counterproliferation Support Program budget request for FY 1997 is $93.7 million, compared to $108.2 million requested for FY 1996. For FY 1997, the Counterproliferation Support Program budget represents less than 3% of DoD's total investment in counterproliferation. Table 4.2 maps Counterproliferation Support Program investments into 8 of the 15 counterproliferation ACEs and compares them with the overall DoD investment in counterproliferation. Approximately two-thirds of its FY 1997 budget is allocated in the areas of remote detection and characterization of BW agents (ACE priority 1) and detection and defeat of underground WMD facilities (ACE priority 4). By focusing its budget on high payoff areas and leveraging existing programs by adding funding to accelerate project schedules and deliverables, modest enhancements in counterproliferation capabilities are being achieved in the near term, and, by the end of the decade, significant advancements in operational capabilities in most of the counterproliferation ACEs will have been attained.

Key management and oversight accomplishments of the Counterproliferation Support Program include: 1) signing an MoU with DOE to draw upon the extensive scientific and technical expertise of the National Laboratories in technology R&D and prototype development; 2) finalizing agreements with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) to facilitate closer cooperation among the organizations and to streamline the process of responding to the requirements of CINC USSOCOM (CINCSOC), DoD, and interagency organizations to counter threats from WMD-armed terrorists and covert and paramilitary forces; 3) reoptimizing Counterproliferation Support Program and Chemical and Biological Defense Program oversight responsibilities in passive defense projects to streamline and improve management practices; and 4) working closer with the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD) to improve efforts to expedite the rapid fielding of remote BW detection capabilities, including close cooperation in developing a battlefield BW Remote Detection and Early Warning ACTD. These efforts are described in more detail in the descriptions of the Counterproliferation Support Program projects provided in Sections 4.2 - 4.8 below.

New project starts in FY 1996 implemented since last year's CPRC report include: 1) participating in the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP), a Congressional Special Interest Program; 2) enhanced efforts to adapt technologies and equipment to meet the special needs of SOF units in countering WMD threats; and 3) implementation of the effort to integrate a mature Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) system into the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft to improve mobile WMD target detection and tracking.

4.1.4 Other Key Activities Affecting DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative. Several other activities and developments impacting DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative have occurred since the CPRC's May 1995 report. They are discussed below.

Ongoing Assessment of Counterproliferation Programs. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that FY 1997 funding for the Counterproliferation Support Program and the Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program be reduced by $33.4 million and $11.2 million, respectively. He further directed that the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, USD(A&T), the Joint Staff, PA&E, the Military Departments, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to complete a program review of the Counterproliferation Support Program by June 30, 1996. The review will assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts, and CINC requirements and will include a reassessment of reductions called for in the memorandum and an identification of opportunities for devolving program responsibility and funding to the Military Departments. The goal of the study is to define a restructured program that meets the needs of the CINCs in countering proliferation in their AORs in accordance with the overall intent of DoD's Counterproliferation Initiative. The results of this study will be incorporated during the FY 1998 - FY 2003 program budget review process.

Science and Technology Strategic Planning for Counterproliferation. The strategic planning process for the DoDís science and technology (S&T) program was enhanced this year to include a new planning document, the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan (JWSTP). This plan provides a joint S&T perspective across the Services and Defense Agencies for the purpose of assuring that the DoD S&T program adequately supports high-priority Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs). These JWCOs are not all inclusive, but they are validated by the JROC as being important to the CINCs. The JWSTP emphasizes Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and ACTDs that transition innovative concepts and mature technologies to the warfighter faster and more cost effectively than traditional acquisition mechanisms. The JWSTP will be issued annually as Defense Guidance, and JWCO-supportive elements of the DoD S&T program will receive funding priority in the Presidentís Budget and accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). BW/CW detection and, more generally, counterproliferation are two of the twelve JWCOs that are addressed in the 1996 JWSTP. With regard to BW agent detection, the JWSTP highlights technological efforts to provide U.S. and friendly forces with as much threat warning time as possible, allowing them to either adopt an appropriate protective posture or avoid contamination completely. Counterproliferation technology demonstrations in the areas of passive defense and counterforce are also described in the JWSTP.

4.2 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in Proliferation Prevention

4.2.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. DoD's role in proliferation prevention involves working with U.S. Intelligence to identify candidate proliferants before they can acquire or expand their WMD capabilities (ACE priorities 5 and 10); supporting U.S. Government export control activities (ACE priority 14); providing inspection, verification and implementation support for nonproliferation treaties and NBC weapons control regimes (ACE priority 15); and, if so directed by the National Command Authority, planning and conducting interdiction missions to thwart proliferation activities (ACE priorities 4, 8, 12 and 13).

4.2.2 New DoD Initiatives in Proliferation Prevention.

Preparations for CTBT Implementation. To prepare for the future implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the ATSD(NCB), at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, established in March 1996 a new Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs (DATSD(NCB)(NTPO)) reporting to the ATSD(NCB). This position was established in anticipation of completing negotiations and signing the CTBT in the Fall of 1996. The broad mission of the DATSD(NCB)(NTPO) is to oversee the implementation of DoD programs and activities to implement and support compliance and verification of the CTBT. More specifically, the Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs is directed to: 1) establish and chair a DoD CTBT Implementation Working Group and coordinate with cognizant OSD offices, the CJCS, and the DoD Comptroller to provide guidance to ensure that all DoD components adequately prepare operationally, financially, and administratively for implementation and support of the CTBT; 2) establish and chair a DoD CTBT Compliance Review Group to coordinate guidance on compliance issues; and 3) provide guidance and oversight to integrated DoD R&D efforts to support compliance and verification of the CTBT. In addition to activities related specifically to the CTBT, the DATSD(NCB)(NTPO) is responsible for executing future DoD tasks that support nuclear limitations treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and international fissile materials control agreements. The Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs is also responsible for coordination and management of DoD RDT&E activities related to international efforts to improve nuclear monitoring capabilities. Finally, to support CTBT implementation, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is initiating preparation and planning activities in FY 1997 to provide escort, security assistance, and training functions in support of the CTBT. OSIA activities are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.4 below.

Reorganization of The Militarily Critical Technologies List. The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), the primary source document identifying leading edge military and dual-use technologies for proliferation control, is being divided into three parts starting in 1996. Part 2, entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction, will provide a detailed listing, with defined technical performance parameters, of those technologies required for the production of WMD. This volume explicitly treats those technologies of a form and quantity sufficient to threaten vital security interests of the U.S. A summary assessment of foreign capabilities in each of the documented technologies will also be included. Part 3 of the MCTL, entitled Critical Emerging Technologies, will provide a listing, with technical parameters, of emerging technologies including those having the greatest promise to provide advanced capabilities for U.S. counterproliferation activities. Part 1, entitled Weapons Systems Technology, deals with the basic problem of general weapons technology proliferation.

4.2.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Proliferation Prevention. The Counterproliferation Support Program, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, has been successful in deploying the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) prototype system to improve its capabilities to identify and track ships at sea suspected of transporting WMD and WMD-related materials. Deployment of the SEI system began in April 1995, six months ahead of schedule, and 20 units will be deployed by the end of FY 1996. A total of 32 units will be deployed by the end of FY 1997. The program will transition to the Navy in FY 1998, and the Navy intends to continue SEI system procurement, including the implementation of system upgrades. The Counterproliferation Support Program is continuing to support the joint DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) effort to assess the threat of organized crime activities within the FSU involving WMD smuggling and determine how DoD technologies, operational capabilities, and training programs can benefit the FBI. A joint DoD/FBI report describing the outline of this program will be submitted to Congress later this year after completing a full interagency coordination process within the Executive Branch. Key accomplishments include development of a basic WMD training program and a pilot WMD training course. The Counterproliferation Support Program is also supporting, beginning in FY 1997, the ATSD(NCB)'s Deputy for Nuclear Matters in his continuing efforts to support DoD's oversight of DOE's nuclear stockpile stewardship responsibilities, the Nuclear Weapons Council and other senior advisory groups, policy formulation for operational nuclear weapons safety and control, and management activities associated with DoD nuclear stockpile responsibilities. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C.1).

4.2.4 Proliferation Prevention Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation. Several DoD agency and Service programs are also addressing counterproliferation ACEs in proliferation prevention. These programs are described below and in Appendix C which provides additional details on program accomplishments and milestones. Joint DoD and U.S. Intelligence activities in proliferation prevention are discussed in the Intelligence Annex.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs. Several ongoing projects managed by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) or Nunn-Lugar Program play a major role in proliferation prevention. Under the CTR Program, DoD assists states of the FSU to destroy, transport, store, disable, and safeguard WMD; establish verifiable safeguards against their proliferation; facilitate the demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military technologies and capabilities to civilian purposes; expand military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and FSU states; and support International Science and Technology Centers to aid in transitioning former FSU weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. The Deputy for CTR Programs works closely with DOE in these matters. (See Section 5.2.4.) Key accomplishments include: 1) removing all nuclear warheads from Kazakstan and returning them to Russia; 2) securing the withdrawal of 63 of 81 SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and launchers from Belarus to Russia; 3) early deactivation of SS-24 ICBMs and half of the SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine; 4) successful completion of an evaluation of the Russian 2-step CW destruction process; 5) completion of an automated inventory control and management system for FSU nuclear weapons; 6) establishment of 17 joint businesses between U.S. companies and the Newly Independent States (NIS) defense enterprises formerly associated with WMD production; 7) involving over 11,500 former Soviet weapons scientist and engineers, once engaged in WMD projects, in peaceful civilian research; and 8) continuing to establish defense and military-to-military contacts focusing on the exchange of professional ideas and practices. Additional details for these programs are provided in Table 4.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C.10).

OSIA Programs. OSIA is responsible for several activities associated with proliferation prevention. OSIA is a joint Service DoD organization responsible for implementing inspection, escort, and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of several U.S. international arms control treaties and confidence-building agreements involving nuclear and chemical weapons. Key accomplishments in nuclear and chemical weapons arms control treaties and agreements include: 1) providing technical advisory support activities for the CTBT Interagency Backstopping Group and the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament; 2) supporting the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, now in its eighth year; 3) supporting the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), now entering its second year; 4) planning and preparation for verification operations in support of START II ratification; 5) maintaining a capability to monitor Russian nuclear tests under the auspices of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty; 6) completion of mock inspection and escort missions in preparation for the entry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) planned for June 1996; and 7) in support of the Open Skies Treaty, conducting a trial flight with Germany, hosting U.S. mock inspections, participating in mock certifications with Ukraine, and conducting sensor-related technical talks with Russia.

OSIA's Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) Program focuses on inspection and escort support for anticipated international agreements involving Mutual Reciprocal Inspection measurements related to plutonium stockpile and plutonium production reactor monitoring. OSIA is supporting DoD and DOE in STI talks with the Russian Federation and will escort a Russian inspection team visit to Rocky Flats in late 1996. OSIA also serves as the executive agent for DoD in support of the UN Special Commission on Iraq and for operations to identify and destroy Iraq's WMD infrastructure in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715. Additional OSIA project details are provided in Table 4.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C.11).

DTSA Export Control Programs. Several ongoing projects managed by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) play a major role in proliferation prevention. DTSA's mission is to ensure that international transfers of defense-related technologies, goods, services, and munitions are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. DTSA reviews export licenses for their potential to contribute to the proliferation of WMD, missile delivery systems, and other significant military capabilities. Key accomplishments include: 1) revision of U.S. Export Administration Regulations to keep up with technology and proliferation trends; 2) establishing a new multinational export control system under the Wassenaar Arrangement; and 3) expansion of U.S. export control assistance programs with other nations. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 below and in Appendix C (Table C.12).

OSD Critical Technology Support Program. This program develops and publishes the congressionally-mandated MCTL; Part 2 of which is the primary source document identifying technologies required for proliferation control of WMD and their means of delivery. This document, its supporting rationale, and the technical experts supporting the process feed technical analyses directly into the treaty and export control programs which act internationally to constrain the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. The MCTL is reviewed and updated regularly to ensure that key WMD and delivery system technologies that could assist in or facilitate WMD proliferation are included. This program is managed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Programs through the Deputy Director for Technology, Plans, and Export Controls. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 and in Appendix C (Table C.9).

CTBT Verification Readiness Program. This program is being administered by the Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs in the Office of the ATSD(NCB). It focuses on demonstrating the capabilities of seismic and non-seismic monitoring systems to be used in verifying the CTBT and providing general technical support to CTBT negotiations. Key accomplishments include the development and integration of a global continuous threshold monitoring network, a seismic event identification and automated signal processing system, and expansion of the global CTBT data fusion knowledge base, including seismic, hydroacoustic, atmospheric acoustic and radionuclide data. Technology transfer to Air Force is continuing and transfer to the international CTBT organization is beginning. For FY 1997, this program is supported by the Air Force's Treaty Verification Support Program. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 and in Appendix C (Table C.5).

DNA Treaty Verification Technology RDT&E Programs. DNA is responsible for the CWC Verification Technology program, which focuses on developing technologies for verification of the CWC. Key accomplishments include the development of instrumentation for characterizing the contents of CW containers without the need for direct sampling, development of a modular laboratory for conducting on-site analyses, and development of inspector training courses. DNA is also responsible for the START I and II Verification Technology program, which develops technologies to enable verification of nuclear weapons treaties, including non-intrusive detection of nuclear weapon reentry bodies. Key accomplishments include achieving an initial operating capability of the START Central Data System and development of a fieldable prototype gravity gradiometer for use in arms control treaty verification. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 and in Appendix C (Table C.8).

Air Force Treaty Verification Support and Nuclear Detonation Detection Programs. The Air Force has two procurement programs in this area: the Treaty Verification Support program, which supports ongoing arms control implementation and compliance, and the Nuclear Detonation Detection System, which is aimed at improving capabilities to detect nuclear detonations. In the Treaty Verification Support Program, work is continuing to develop improved seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic detection systems. Key accomplishments include completing the development and transfer of an International Data Center for the CTBT and modification of the Open Skies Treaty aircraft. New nuclear detonation detection sensors have been integrated onto the Global Positioning System (GPS) Block 2R satellite, and new and more capable ground segment software and display systems have been built and tested. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 and in Appendix C (Table C.5).

Navy SEI Support Program. The Navy is working with the Counterproliferation Support Program to expedite the deployment of the SEI system by: providing operations and maintenance (O&M) and procurement support; accelerating and upgrading system development; and providing testing, procurement, and fleet integration. Fleet integration of the SEI system is scheduled for FY 1999. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.3 and in Appendix C (Table C.4).

4.3 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence

4.3.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. The principal focus of DoD intelligence activities is to provide proliferation-related information that is clear, accurate, and timely enough to support, first and foremost, the needs of the military commanders (ACE priority 5). These activities include DoD support to the national strategic intelligence effort down to providing the soldier in the field tactical intelligence specifically related to his immediate situation. DoD works closely with U.S. Intelligence to perform these activities. The Counterproliferation Support Program is also making a contribution in this area as well. These projects are summarized in Table 4.4 below and in Appendix C. A more thorough description of how DoD intelligence activities support counterproliferation policies may be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

4.3.2 New DoD Initiatives in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence. See the Intelligence Annex to this report.

4.3.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Strategic and Tactical Intelligence. Several Counterproliferation Support Program projects in the proliferation prevention and battlefield surveillance functional areas are relevant to the strategic and tactical intelligence area, including: 1) the SEI system to track WMD-related shipments at sea; 2) the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor (TUGS), the airborne tactical Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor, and the Weapon Borne Sensor (WBS) systems being developed for underground WMD facility surveillance, characterization, and BDA; and 3) the incorporation of a mature ATR system into the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. These projects are briefly described in Section 4.2 (SEI) and Section 4.4 (sensors and ATR). A new start this year for the Counterproliferation Support Program is the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Project (HAARP) which is exploring the use of low frequency (i.e., ULF, ELF, and VLF) radio waves for detecting and imaging underground structures and tunnels. At the direction of Congress, the Counterproliferation Support Program is working with the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory to expedite the determination of the viability and military utility of the HAARP concept. A demonstration of the viability of the approach is scheduled for 1996 with field experiments to image known underground structures scheduled for FY 1997. No FY 1997 funding is currently scheduled for this Congressional Special Interest Program. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.4 and in Appendix C (Tables C.1 and C.5).

4.3.4 Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation. The Air Force's Phillips Laboratory also supports the HAARP project in conjunction with the Counterproliferation Support Program as a Congressional Special Interest Program. No funding is currently scheduled for this program in FY 1997. The Air Force is also developing an airborne lidar system for long range remote sensing applications, including the detection and characterization of BW and CW agent production signatures. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.4 and in Appendix C (Table C.5). Additional DoD strategic and tactical intelligence programs strongly related to countering proliferation are described in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

4.4 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in Battlefield Surveillance

4.4.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. In the battlefield surveillance area, DoD is improving capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize WMD forces and associated infrastructure elements in a timely manner to support targeting, mission/strike planning, WMD counterforce operations, and prompt, post-strike BDA activities. Emphasis is being placed on: detection and characterization of underground and surface WMD facilities (ACE priorities 4 and 5); improving BDA capabilities against WMD targets (ACE priorities 4 and 5); continuous wide-area surveillance to support focused target planning activities for WMD targets (ACE priority 8 and 11); and detecting mobile targets, particularly WMD-armed mobile missile launchers (ACE priority 11). (Programs involving the detection and identification of NBC agents on the battlefield are discussed under the passive defense functional area, Section 4.7.) This effort is being coordinated with U.S. Intelligence; the details of which are provided in the Intelligence Annex.

4.4.2 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Battlefield Surveillance. The Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting several projects in this area, including: 1) developing enhanced sensor technologies, including the TUGS, airborne tactical FLIR, and WBS systems, for WMD target surveillance, characterization, BDA, and collateral effects monitoring; 2) development of data fusion techniques and signature collection to support underground target characterization; 3) incorporation of a mature ATR algorithm and processor system, being developed by Sandia National Laboratory, into JSTARS to provide near real-time detection and attack of time critical targets; and 4) integrated operational testing of these systems, as part of the Counterproliferation ACTD, to support the rapid fielding of integrated battlefield surveillance and counterforce capabilities. The DOE National Laboratories are also providing technology R&D and technical support for the TUGS, WBS, and ATR projects. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.5 and in Appendix C (Table C.1).

Key accomplishments include: 1) successful testing of the tactical FLIR during the DIPOLE PRIDE test series to assess improved BDA capabilities as part of Phase I of the Counterproliferation ACTD; 2) data collection to evaluate TUGS performance; 3) completion of the design of a prototype TUGS data acquisition system; 4) initial design of the antenna line payout system for the WBS; and 5) successful flight testing and capability demonstration of the ATR system on JSTARS test assets.

4.4.3 Battlefield Surveillance Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation. These programs are described in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

4.5 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in WMD Counterforce

4.5.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. In the WMD counterforce area, DoD is working to improve capabilities to defeat WMD threats before they can be used against U.S., allied, and coalition forces. Service resources are being devoted to maintaining U.S. forces at the highest state of readiness to enable a quick and effective response in regional contingencies throughout the world. Resources are targeted on improving battlefield surveillance and counterforce capabilities to find and destroy WMD forces and their supporting infrastructure elements while minimizing collateral effects. Emphasis is on defeating hardened underground WMD facilities (ACE priorities 4 and 8) while minimizing associated collateral effects (ACE priorities 8 and 9). Projects involving advanced weapons for WMD target defeat that minimize or mitigate collateral effects are underway as are programs to better understand WMD target vulnerabilities/response and collateral effects phenomenology (ACE priority 8). Sensors under development provide enhanced target characterization, improved BDA, and more efficient restrike planning (ACE priorities 4 and 5).

4.5.2 New DoD Initiatives in WMD Counterforce.

Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability (HDBTDC) Integrated Product Team. The HDBTDC Integrated Product Team (IPT) is an USD(A&T) approved Phase 0 (i.e., Concept Exploration and Definition) acquisition effort that aims to demonstrate the existence of concepts to defeat hard and/or deeply buried targets. It is a joint Service effort, with the Air Force designated as the lead Service. The IPT uses Mission Need Statements, originally written by the U.S. Air Combat Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, as the point of entry for developing the capability to hold hard and/or deeply buried targets at risk. These targets are usually heavily defended, fixed, unitary, high-value facilities or functions to which a potential adversary has: 1) applied considerable structural reinforcement (i.e., "hardening"); 2) constructed under the earth's surface (e.g., tunnels); or 3) subsequently covered with materials such as soil, gravel, rock, "burster slabs", and the like in order to frustrate attacks and intelligence collection efforts. Organizationally, the IPT includes an Oversight IPT, a Core IPT, and Working IPTs for Targets/Military Operations, Concepts, Measures, Analysis, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) Planning.

The Concept Exploration and Definition effort is divided into two parts: 1) the Concept Call and Mission and Concept Assessment and 2) the Analysis of Alternatives. The HDBTDC IPT initiated a Request for Information in March 1996 and hosted an Industry Day in April to start the concept collection process. The IPT will formally receive industry concept proposals in May and begin assessing them over a two month period beginning in June. The central result of part 1 will be the "proof of existence" of a defeat capability and, potentially, identification of ancillary requirements for supporting intelligence, surveillance, and target defeat assessments. Part 2 should begin in the Fall of 1996 to start the process of preparing the prerequisites for an acquisition Milestone I (MS I) decision. The primary products of the Analysis of Alternatives process are tailored to display the results of sensitivity and system trade studies for the selected target defeat missions and concepts from part 1 with respect to the appropriate measures of effectiveness, provisional performance requirements, projected threat uncertainties, and operational requirements documents. This program is supported by the Services and DNA's Hard Target Defeat Program described in Section 4.5.4 below.

4.5.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in WMD Counterforce. The Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting several projects in this area, including: 1) developing sensors for target identification, BDA, and collateral effects monitoring (including the TUGS, FLIR, and WBS systems described in Section 4.4); 2) improving the understanding of collateral effects release phenomenology and transport; 3) improving the state of knowledge in weapons effects and target vulnerability/response; 4) developing an advanced penetrating weapon, the Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), for underground target defeat; 5) developing a Hard Target Smart Fuze (HTSF) for enhanced lethality of penetrating weapons against underground targets; 6) developing advanced warheads/payloads for enhanced lethality and functional kill against WMD targets; 7) developing BW/CW agent defeat mechanisms; 8) developing the inertial terrain-aided guidance (ITAG) all-weather weapon guidance package designed to be compatible with existing munitions; 9) developing the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) and the Integrated MEA (IMEA) targeting tools to assist in targeting, weaponeering, and strike planning against WMD targets; and 10) integrated operational testing, as part of the Counterproliferation ACTD, to support the rapid fielding of these new capabilities. The DOE National Laboratories are also providing technology R&D and technical support to the ITAG project. Counterproliferation Support Program projects in WMD counterforce are further summarized in Table 4.6 below and in Appendix C (Table C.1).

Key accomplishments in WMD counterforce projects include: 1) accurate prediction of atmospheric transport of hazard plumes during ACTD Phase I demonstrations and successful completion of a U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)-sponsored field demonstration of integrated hazard prediction tools in support of collateral effects assessment; 2) conducted sled and flight tests of the HTSF and initiated design and penetration studies in support of AUP development; 3) completed initial design of the line payout system for the weapon borne sensor; 4) selected the GBU-15 airframe for the ITAG system; 5) validated computer simulation of the High Temperature Incendiary (HTI) enhanced payload; 6) fielded MEA/IMEA and delivered initial target planning tools to USEUCOM users, including for current use in Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor; 7) conducted field tests to assess stored BW/CW agent response and plume development in support of agent neutralization and collateral effects analyses; and 8) under the Phase I ACTD test regime, completed static detonation and live weapon drops on a simulated BW storage facility to demonstrate the capabilities of target planning tools and Phase I technologies.

4.5.4 WMD Counterforce Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation. Service and DoD Agency programs are also addressing counterproliferation ACEs in WMD counterforce. These programs are described below.

Service Programs. The joint Service Hard and/or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability acquisition program, described in Section 4.5.2, is a new start for FY 1996. The Air Force is also funding an Agent Defeat Weapons Study initiated in response to a Combat Air Forces Mission Need Statement. The objectives of the current Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition, acquisition activity are to evaluate means to defeat BW and CW agents and deny access or freedom of use for the delivery platforms associated with BW/CW warheads. All concepts are to minimize collateral effects and be deliverable with current Air Force platforms. Additional information is provided in Table 4.6 and in Appendix C (Table C.5).

DNA Hard Target Defeat Program. DNA initiated the Hard Target Defeat Program in FY 1996 to: 1) evaluate the hard target defeat problem end-to-end, from detection through attack to BDA; and 2) develop improved tactics and technologies to defeat hard targets, especially tunnels. This program supports the OSD/Defense Acquisition Board HDBTDC acquisition program (described above) with weapon-target interaction analyses for defeating those classes of targets that are difficult to counter because of physical hardness and/or the risk of collateral effects associated with the release of hazardous materials. This program employs existing analysis tools and data bases to determine the physical and functional vulnerability of high value/high risk targets and provides quantitative results to support COEAs. This effort also complements and supplements the WMD counterforce activities supported by the Counterproliferation Support Program, including the Counterproliferation ACTD. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.6 and in Appendix C (Table C.8).

DNA Weapons Systems Lethality Program. The Weapons Systems Lethality Program focuses on the development and validation of methodologies and research tools for applied analysis performed under the Hard Target Defeat Program and the Counterproliferation Support Program. The program also maintains a core competency in nuclear phenomenology and provides direct support to the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Space Command to ensure optimum effectiveness of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in a nuclear conflict. The program includes development of advanced numerical methods and precision subscale testing to develop and validate methodologies associated with weapon - target interaction, transport and dispersal of hazardous (collateral effects) materials, and nuclear weapons effects phenomenology. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.6 and in Appendix C (Table C.8).

DARPA Sensor, Exploitation, and Information Integration Systems Programs. These RDT&E programs are designed to improve capabilities to detect, identify, and track high value, time critical fixed and mobile targets, including mobile WMD-armed missile launchers and WMD facilities, by focusing on: 1) developing sensors to defeat camouflage, concealment, and deception practices; 2) providing near real-time exploitation of wide area imagery; and 3) developing an integrated, all-source, geographically referenced battlefield knowledge base and information distribution system to enhance situational awareness. Key accomplishments include: 1) test data collection using ultra-wide band synthetic aperture radars to support the design of a foliage penetrating (FOPEN) radar; 2) demonstration of a new suite of target recognition algorithms that achieve high detection probabilities with low false alarm rates; 3) integration of a single intelligence source correlator; and 4) functionality demonstration of a global broadcast service and information servers for rapid dissemination of imagery products to the users. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.6 and in Appendix C (Table C.7).

4.6 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in Active Defense

4.6.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. An important role of active defense is to protect U.S., allied and coalition forces, and noncombatants from WMD by intercepting and destroying WMD-armed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Active defense, particularly theater ballistic missile (ACE priority 3) and cruise missile defense (ACE priority 2), continues to be a top DoD counterproliferation-related priority.

To achieve an active defense capability against missiles armed with WMD in a theater, DoD is developing a theater missile defense (TMD) "family of systems" designed to be a flexible configuration of interoperable systems capable of joint or autonomous operation. This family of systems uses a "plug and play" architecture that the CINCs can select and deploy in a way that best meets their theater-unique needs. This family of systems starts with the current operationally fielded systems of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) HAWK and Patriot Advanced Capability - 2 (PAC-2) system which has a limited capability against ballistic and cruise missiles armed with WMD. In the near term, when systems such as the PAC-3 and the Navy Area Defense System (NADS, formerly Navy Lower Tier) are operationally fielded they will enhance the flexibility and capability to counter WMD threats. In the far term, the Navy Theater Wide System (NTWS, formerly Navy Upper Tier), the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and boost phase intercept (BPI) systems will complete the "family of systems" capability necessary to counter both today's and future WMD threats.

TMD command, control, and communications (C3) programs will incorporate several important capability upgrades in early warning/dissemination, command and control (C2), and communications interoperability. Early warning/dissemination systems provide improved threat missile launch and impact point accuracy determinations and reduced information flow timelines to the warfighter. Upgrades in C2 will facilitate the passing of timely intelligence data into advanced decision and planning aids for the joint TMD operation centers. Attack operations and passive defense operations will be integrated by linking active defense C2 into the Global Command and Control System. Communications interoperability will be enhanced with the incorporation of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). JTIDS will provide a shared situational awareness among the joint mission commanders enabling a joint/allied interoperability with seamless warning, cueing, and weapon coordination. This is especially critical when countering and interdicting mobile, WMD capable, theater ballistic missile (TBM) launch systems and their supporting infrastructure.

Effective boost phase defense, where intercept occurs over the launching country, may serve to minimize the impact of collateral NBC effects on U.S. forces, allied and coalition forces, and civilian populations that may result from the intercept of WMD warheads. It also serves to reduce the effectiveness of various missile countermeasures. The technologies necessary to destroy enemy ballistic missiles during boost phase soon after launch are still being developed. These include advanced kinetic kill vehicle and high-power airborne laser technologies. Additional efforts are aimed at gaining a better understanding of the dispersion of BW/CW agents in flight and methods for neutralizing them to reduce collateral effects associated with ballistic and cruise missile engagements.

The Operational Requirements Document for Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, and NADS call for the ability to defend against both ballistic and cruise missiles (as well as against other air breathing threats). While the specific technical requirements may be different, the operational planning, concept of operations, and interoperability requirements with other force elements are expected to be common for ballistic and cruise missile defense. For example, the design and development requirements for battle management/C3 (BM/C3), radar/sensor target acquisition and tracking, and the interceptor missile for ballistic missile defense are significantly applicable and transferable to cruise missile defense requirements.

Several Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) programs involving international cooperation, consultation, and, in some cases, joint development are underway with the governments of several U.S. allies and friendly nations. These international programs serve to enhance the credibility of both the U.S. and our allies to deter WMD use and may serve to dissuade rogue nations from pursuing the acquisition of WMD. One program, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) has a Statement of Intent from the Governments of Germany and Italy to negotiate agreements for cooperation in the project definition, validation, design, development, and production phases of a point defense missile system protecting vital assets and maneuver forces against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other air breathing threats.

The National Missile Defense (NMD) program has shifted from a technology readiness program to a three year acquisition category 1D deployment readiness program to shorten to three years the time to achieve IOC following authorization to proceed with deployment. In summary, several active defense programs support the objectives of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative and the associated counterproliferation ACEs. These programs are summarized below and in Appendix C.

4.6.2 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Active Defense. The Counterproliferation Support Program currently has no projects in the area of active defense.

4.6.3 Active Defense Programs Strongly Related to Counterproliferation. DoD Agency and Air Force programs are addressing counterproliferation ACEs in active defense. These programs are described below.

BMDO Programs. BMDO is currently conducting several TMD programs that are related to countering proliferation, including: 1) demonstration and validation (DEM/VAL), including flight testing, of the THAAD system; 2) engineering development and planning for NTWS; 3) system development, test, and deployment planning for NMD; 4) continuing Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) for Patriot PAC-3; 5) modifying the Navy Standard Missile (SM-2 Block IV) and the AEGIS Combat System (ACS) for endoatmospheric engagement of TBMs as part of NADS; 6) supporting international teaming and project definition and validation of the MEADS short range TBM and advanced air defense system; 7) TMD BM/C3 integration, network testing and development; 8) data collection, validation, and analysis for demonstration and evaluation of TMD technologies, components, systems, and programs; and 9) development of supporting technologies and exploratory and advanced development of innovative active defense-related technologies.

Key accomplishments include: 1) flight qualification of 23 sensor and detector technologies for space applications; 2) completion of four THAAD flight tests; 3) completion of the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP) flight tests under the NTWS program; 4) completion of a Statement of Intent with Germany and Italy to develop and produce MEADS; 5) validation of flight performance, measurements of flight environments, initiation of fabrication of flight configured seekers, and development of concept of operations (CONOPS) for KKV BPI concepts; 6) shifting of the NMD program from technology readiness to a three year deployment readiness in order to shorten IOC time to three years; and 7) completion of the initial design of ACS modifications and initial lethality testing and analysis for NADS. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.7 below and in Appendix C (Table C.6).

DARPA Air Defense Initiative. In its Air Defense Initiative, DARPA is developing the Mountain Top radar to defend against manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and TBMs. Key accomplishments include development and hardware delivery of surveillance radars in support of the Mountain Top Cruise Missile Defense demonstration. BMDO and the Navy are also participating in this technology demonstration. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.7 and in Appendix C (Table C.7).

Air Force Active Defense Programs. The Air Force is managing four programs in this area: 1) the Theater Missile Defense program which is concentrating on C4I enhancements, improving existing attack operations systems, and performing cost-effectiveness analyses of the Airborne Laser (ABL); 2) the ABL Technology Program which is demonstrating laser beam control technologies and effectiveness against missiles; 3) the ABL DEM/VAL Program which is responsible for developing the integrated ABL system for boost phase defense against TBMs and studying adjunct missions such as cruise missile defense and air defense of high value airborne assets (e.g., AWACS and JSTARS); and 4) the Space Sensor and Satellite Communication Technology program which is developing technologies required to support TMD. Key accomplishments include: 1) completion of software upgrades and an initial prototype expert TMD tracker, a TMD country study for Syria, and a TMD JTIDS message set for AWACS; 2) demonstration of a device to enhance ABL laser power and completion of high altitude measurements of optical turbulence parameters; 3) maintaining ABL on track for transition to DEM/VAL; and 4) completion of a large format focal plane array design for IR space sensor applications. Additional project details are provided in Table 4.7 and in Appendix C (Table C.5).

4.7 Status and Accomplishments of DoD Programs in Passive Defense

4.7.1 Introduction and Summary of Relevant Counterproliferation ACEs. DoD supports an extensive NBC passive defense infrastructure to enable U.S. military forces to survive, fight, and win in CW/BW contaminated environments. The DoD Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program oversees and coordinates all DoD efforts in passive defense. An integrated, balanced program is essential to achieve this objective. U.S. forces must have aggressive, realistic training and defensive equipment that allows them to avoid contamination, and, where contamination cannot be avoided, they must be able to protect, decontaminate, and sustain operations throughout the battlespace environment. They must also have the capability to provide effective medical casualty treatment and management. To address these problems, DoD is funding research, development, and acquisition of: systems to detect, identify, characterize, and provide warning of CW/BW agents (ACE priorities 1 and 6); individual and collective protection gear (ACE Priority 6); methods to advance the speed and efficiency of CW/BW agent decontamination (ACE priority 6); and a broad array of CW/BW medical defense RDT&E activities (ACE priority 6). In addition to these efforts, DoD is pursuing, through the CBD Program, efforts to increase its BW vaccine production capacity and vaccine supplies, and to develop a broader spectrum of new and improved medical countermeasures for CW/BW agents (ACE Priority 7). In cooperation with the CBD Program, the Counterproliferation Support Program is continuing to leverage ongoing CBD programs to accelerate the fielding of critical systems and technologies.

4.7.2 New DoD Initiatives in Passive Defense. Since the CPRC's May 1995 report to Congress, management of passive defense programs under ATSD(NCB) has been restructured. Starting in FY 1997, Counterproliferation Support Program projects leveraging CBD Programs in individual and collective protection and advanced BW/CW point detection technology will be transferred to CBD Program oversight. CBD Program advanced development and DEM/VAL projects in long range standoff BW detection, specifically the Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System (LR-BSDS), the Short Range Biological Standoff Detection System (SR-BSDS), and the BW Remote Detection/Early Warning ACTD, will be transferred to Counterproliferation Support Program oversight. This restructuring will streamline OSD oversight responsibilities and enhance the development and deployment of improved passive defense measures to counter CW/BW battlefield threats. The CBD Program and the Counterproliferation Support Program are continuing to work together to ensure coordination of oversight between the programs.

4.7.3 Counterproliferation Support Program Projects in Passive Defense. With the restructuring of the passive defense programs between the CBD Program and the Counterproliferation Support Program, the Counterproliferation Support Program will now focus its activities on developing and deploying standoff BW detection capabilities and conducting a BW Remote Detection/Early Warning ACTD (field demonstrations will commence in FY 1998). This ACTD is designed to expedite the fielding of remote BW battlefield detection and early warning systems and will act as a bridge to provide an interim capability until the Joint Biological Remote and Early Warning System (JBREWS) can be deployed. JBREWS production is scheduled to start in FY 2003. To these ends, the Counterproliferation Support Program continues to support projects designed to: 1) accelerate (by 5 years) the fielding of an advanced eye safe infrared (IR) lidar, i.e., an improved LR-BSDS, to provide long range battlefield warning of BW use; 2)

determine the effectiveness and military utility of multifrequency ultraviolet (UV) lasers for standoff battlefield detection and identification of BW agents, i.e., an improved SR-BSDS; and 3) as part of the Integrated Biodetection ATD, develop miniaturized BW/CW point detectors with increased sensitivity that are amenable to installation on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other delivery platforms to enable remote BW detection and characterization. The Integrated Biodetection ATD will contribute selected technologies to the BW Remote Detection/Early Warning ACTD. The DOE National Laboratories are also involved in passive defense RDT&E under the sponsorship of the Counterproliferation Support Program.

Key accomplishments include: 1) restructuring of the LR-BSDS P3I eye safe lidar development project to reduce overall technical risk and consolidate it with complementary efforts; 2) initiation of prototype production of the eye safe LR-BSDS; 3) feasibility demonstration of a miniaturized UV laser system for the SR-BSDS, along with continuing measurements of UV spectral backgrounds, demonstration of pollen and mold discrimination and bacteriological classification, and initial development of discrimination recognition algorithms; 4) continued development and testing of miniaturized BW detectors in preparation for technology downselects in FY 1997; and 5) development of a miniature air sampler and wind tunnel and flight testing on a research UAV. Additional details of the Counterproliferation Support Program passive defense projects are provided in Table 4.8 below and in Appendix C (Table C.1).

4.7.4 DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law No. 103­160, Section 1703, mandates the consolidation of all DoD NBC defense programs under a single office within OSD. The ATSD(NCB) is the designated focal point within OSD for the CBD Program. This law has been a critical tool for ensuring the elimination of redundant programs, focusing funds on program priorities, and enhancing readiness. To date, there has been a consolidation of the research, development, and acquisition organizations for NBC defense, including the consolidation of all RDT&E and procurement funds. There has been significant progress in the development of joint training, doctrine development, and requirements generation. Modernization and technology plans have been developed which should begin to show real savings and true consolidation of efforts among the Services. Detailed descriptions of the management, plans, accomplishments, and systems under the CBD Program can be found in the Department of Defense Nuclear/Biological/ Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense Annual Report to Congress, published in April 1996.

All RDT&E projects within the CBD Program are structured within the six Program Elements (PE) for: Basic Research, Exploratory Development, Advanced Development, DEM/VAL, EMD, and RDT&E management support. Procurement funds have also been consolidated. Highlights of key programs strongly related to counterproliferation within each of these programs elements are described below. Additional details, including FY 1997 budget profiles, are provided in Table 4.8 below and in Appendix C (Table C.2).

Chemical and biological defenses are conducted within the framework of three principles: 1) contamination avoidance, 2) force protection, and 3) decontamination. These principles provide the basis for an integrated and balanced CW/BW defense program. Contamination avoidance is the highest priority area and consists of capabilities and procedures to detect, identify, and warn forces of CW/BW threats in order for commanders to determine the appropriate protective posture to assume and provide the necessary information to avoid contamination. When contamination cannot be avoided, force protection provides capabilities to survive, fight, and win in an NBC contaminated environment. Force protection consists of three elements: individual protection, collective protection, and medical programs. Finally, decontamination provides critical capabilities to allow the sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. Key accomplishments in each commodity area are described in what follows.

Contamination Avoidance. Multiple systems are either under development, in production, or have been fielded for early warning, point detection, and warning and reporting of CW/BW threats. Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in contamination avoidance research, development, and acquisition programs.

Science and Technology Base - Basic Research, Exploratory Development, and Advanced Development. Basic research efforts included obtaining fundamental information in support of advanced systems for the detection of chemical, biological, and toxin agents, including examination of surface adhesions, construction of the single particle scattering instrument, and measurement of the fluorescence of biological particles in the natural background. Exploratory Development efforts included: 1) projects to reduce the size, complexity, false alarm rate, and power requirements of CW/BW agent detectors; 2) defining the interaction of agent clouds with complex structures; 3) evaluating BW agent point detection technologies; 4) evaluating bio simulant field trials of BW agents along with a passive IR standoff detector; 5) field testing a developmental tunable UV laser standoff detector; 6) completing antibody development concepts for detector kits and sensors; 7) testing, in realistic field trials, a small, lightweight (< 1 lb) prototype Individual Soldier Chemical Detector; and 8) expanding incorporation of CW/BW environments, equipment, and effects into advanced wargames and enhanced resolution Distributed Interactive Simulation scenarios. The key Advanced Development project was the Integrated Biodetection ATD, which is developing advanced point biodetection sensors to meet a variety of warfighting needs and enhance protection against BW agents. In addition, concepts for the Lightweight NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) were approved for the Marines.

Demonstration/Validation. Key programs in DEM/VAL include: 1) the Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (LSCAD) which provides chemical agent detection and mapping for chemical agent clouds; 2) the Chemical/Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS) which detects a wide variety of CW/BW agents and is planned to become a component of the XM93E1 FOX NBCRS and the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS); and 3) the BW Remote Detection/Early Warning ACTD, a new start in FY 1996 to provide U.S. forces with the earliest possible warning of BW attack and provide a bridge between current capabilities and the objective JBREWS and for which concept evaluation studies are already underway. BIDS integrates a full BW agent detection and identification system into a single High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or "Hum Vee") shelter and is currently the Army's primary system for BW detection in an operational theater. The FOX NBCRS is a dedicated system of NBC detection, warning, and sampling equipment integrated into a high speed, wheeled, high mobility armored vehicle capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, and cross country routes throughout the battlefield and in support of armored maneuver forces.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. There are several key programs in EMD that promise to offer greatly improved capabilities in the near term for contamination avoidance. Key programs include: 1) the Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (ACADA) which is more sensitive and responsive than current detectors and is capable of concurrent nerve and blister agent detection; 2) the Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector (MICAD) which automates NBC warning and reporting throughout the battlefield and links digital data into the Army's C3 system; 3) the XM93E1 FOX NBCRS for battlefield NBC detection; 4) the AN/UDR-13 Pocket Radiac Set which provides ground troops with a lightweight, user friendly tactical device for measuring and detecting radiation; 5) the Advanced Airborne Radiac System (AARS) to provide rapid, accurate, and safe measurement of radiation from the air and for correlating airborne readings to ground radiation readings and positions; 6) the CBMS mass spectrometer to identify CW/BW agents; 7) BIDS Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) which will detect a greater number of BW agents more quickly, with greater sensitivity, and offer better connectivity with C3 systems than the BIDS nondevelopmental item (NDI); 8) the Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD) which will give the Navy an interim point detection capability aboard ships and is part of their theater protection strategy (25 detector systems will be fielded in FY 1996); 9) the eye safe P3I LR-BSDS which will identify the presence of particulate aerosols at long range with greater sensitivity and safety to the user than the predecessor NDI system currently being procured; 10) the Air Base and Port Biodetection ACTD which will provide comprehensive BW protection for CINC-identified critical assets including everything from a networked BW agent detector array to medical treatments; and 11) the Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD) which will provide the capability to detect liquid chemical agents in a naval environment.

Procurement. Several systems are being fielded to provide new capabilities or improvements over previous systems in BW agent detection and identification. Key systems include the BIDS NDI and the LR-BSDS NDI system. A contingency BIDS platoon has been activated during FY 1996 and is mission ready. The first unit equipped with the LR-BSDS NDI will also occur in 1996, providing U.S. forces for the first time with a significant standoff BW detection capability.

Force Protection. Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in all phases of the research, development, and acquisition of individual protection programs.

Science and Technology Base - Exploratory Development. Key tech base efforts to improve force protection include: 1) developing technologies that reduce the severe heat burden created by the protective overgarment; 2) simplifying the extensive and expensive carbon filter change out procedures and disposal required by current collective protection systems; 3) improving communications and operations in protective ensembles; 4) enhancing protection systems for masks; 5) integrating advanced mask concepts into 21st century soldier systems; 6) continued development of models to assess performance degradation; 7) continued development of bio-protection test methods; and 8) updating performance rating tables.

Demonstration/Validation. The key DEM/VAL project for improving force protection is the Advanced Integrated Collective Protective System (AICPS) which will integrate new NBC filtration technologies with environmental controls and power source components for tactical and combat systems. AICPS is designed to be integrated into multiple configurations to provide protection for a variety of tactical systems.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Key EMD projects for improving force protection include development of the XM45 Aircrew Protective Mask (ACPM) which provides rotary-wing air crews with a less burdensome respiratory protection system, the AICPS, the M40 P3I Mask, and the M20 Collective Protection System P3I. One of the major programs which promises to be fielded in the near-term is the Joint Service Lightweight Suit Technology (JSLIST) individual protective garment. JSLIST is a joint Service effort to field a common chemical protective ensemble (suit, boots, and gloves). The program objectives are to provide adequate chemical protection, reduced heat stress, full compatibility with all interfacing equipment, longer wear, launderability, a single technical data package and manual, a split issue feature to improve fit and reduce inventory, and flame retardancy. JSLIST promotes commonality and standardization to maximize the effectiveness of resources and eliminate redundancy among the Services.

Procurement. The key procurement program for FY 1997 is the fielding of the M40/M42 protective masks.

Medical Programs. Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in the development of medical countermeasures against CW/BW agents. Medical countermeasures fall into three basic categories: prophylactic (preventative), therapeutic (post-exposure), and diagnostic. Key accomplishments of prophylactic countermeasures include the continued development of advanced vaccines for anthrax, botulinal toxoids, ricin toxoid, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), and plague; studies of biological scavengers for nerve agents; and cyanide pretreatment. Key accomplishments of therapeutic countermeasures development include: further development of a reactive topical skin protectant for protection against nerve and mustard agents; development of a nerve agent multi-chambered auto-injector (to replace the multiple injections currently required); and the institutionalization of two courses for military medical personnel: Medical Management of Biological Casualties and Medical Management of Chemical Casualties. The key accomplishments for diagnostic countermeasures are the continued development of a forward deployable diagnostic kit which will allow immediate diagnosis of BW-related casualties in the field. This kit includes technologies, still in development, which will provide rapid identification of BW agents.

DoD's Biological Defense BW Vaccine Acquisition Program. DoD has made significant progress in the BW vaccine acquisition program during the past several years. DoD now has a solid acquisition strategy that is based on comprehensive analyses, and a Request for Proposals (RFP) will be released to industry this fiscal year. Anthrax vaccine production is currently underway.

The U.S. Army conducted several studies that addressed acquisition alternatives for establishing an adequate vaccine production industrial base, and in 1994 a cost/benefit analysis concluded that a contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) production facility approach was the best. In 1995 a draft RFP for BW vaccine production was released for industry comment, and responses indicated the need for a broad, long term commitment from DoD to ensure success in such a unique medical product program. A 1995 economic study highlighted the risks of taking the dozen vaccine products developed by DoD through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensing process and into production. The greatest risks were the instability of DoD requirements for the products and the capability of the manufacturer to accrue the appropriate scientific and manufacturing data to support the FDA licensing process. While there may be some deficiency in manufacturing capacity for botulinum vaccine, most vaccine production requirements could be met with existing facilities.

Based on industry responses and the economic study, a revised acquisition strategy was developed, this time for a prime systems contractor approach. The prime contractor would serve as an integrator for all of the processes associated with licensing, producing, storing, and testing biological defense medical products developed under DoD programs. This approach promises to provide a much more efficient management approach than the COCO approach, allowing subcontractors access to commonly needed resources. Equally important, the contractor/ manufacturer would serve as the agent responsible to the FDA for product licensure, a role that DoD cannot assume. The USD(A&T) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum on May 2, 1995 directing the use of a prime systems contractor for the acquisition of biological defense medical products. This Acquisition Decision Memorandum also directed that the Vaccine Acquisition Program be included in the POM funding submission for FY 1997 through FY 2001. This approach was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

A licensed anthrax vaccine is available from the Michigan Department of Public Health for use in those individuals considered at risk of exposure. Production for this licensed vaccine is ongoing to meet DoD's required stockpile needs. Efforts to seek FDA licensing for a limited supply of botulinum vaccine are also ongoing. Once the prime systems contract is awarded in the first quarter of FY 1997, priority will be given for the development and production of the botulinum vaccine to meet stockpile requirements and for the development and production of other medical products to protect against other validated BW threat agents.

Decontamination. Over the past year, there have been several accomplishments in decontamination development programs.

Science and Technology Base - Exploratory Development. Research continues into various methods and technologies for the decontamination of the full spectrum of CW/BW agents using non-aqueous, non-corrosive decontaminants. Efforts also focus on the decontamination of sensitive equipment and the development of concepts to decontaminate large areas, such as air bases or ports.

Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The key EMD projects are the Modular Decontamination Systems (MDS) and development of a sorbent decontaminant, which may provide a non-aqueous replacement to the current decontaminant (denoted as DS2) and, by reducing the need for water, considerably reduce the logistics burden associated with current decontamination methods.

Chemical and Biological Defense - Management and Support. The primary program supported within this element is the Joint Chemical/Biological Contact Point and Test Program located at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. This program provides assessments, laboratory analyses, and field tests on a wide variety of equipment that has been fielded or is in production. The results of these efforts provide input to the Services for development of doctrine, policy, training procedures, and feedback into the RDT&E cycle. Accomplishments include completion of a Source Book on a variety of chemical, biological, and toxic agents, and the evaluation of protection provided by existing defensive equipment against emerging CW/BW threat agents. In addition, funding has been provided for management support for the overall integration and coordination of the DoD NBC Defense Program. Activities include: joint requirements, training, and doctrine development by the Joint Service Integration Group; joint modernization planning; development of a joint POM; and joint research, development, and acquisition planning by the Joint Service Materiel Group.

The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD). The JPO-BD was established to provide centralized management of specified BW defense acquisition programs. JPO-BD managed projects include procurement of the BIDS NDI and P3I systems, the LR-BSDS NDI and P3I systems, the BW Vaccine Acquisition Program, and developing a Port and Airbase BW Defense ACTD. The JPO-BD is supporting the Counterproliferation Support Program in developing improved capabilities for early warning of BW agent attack, including development of the eye safe LR-BSDS P3I upgrade, improving and adapting point BW agent detectors for remote detection applications, and conducting the BW Remote Detection/Early Warning ACTD to expedite the fielding of these systems.

CBD Program FY 1997 Procurement Plans. The FY 1997 procurement plan continues to field new CBD equipment and initiates procurement of additional improved CBD equipment.

Within the contamination avoidance mission area a number of procurement activities are planned. Procurement for the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) a radically improved version of the already-fie