3. Review of the 1995 CPRC Findings and Recommendations

3.1 Summary of the Findings and Recommendations of the 1995 CPRC

The CPRC reported last year in its May 1995 Report to Congress that progress had been made in many areas leading to a strengthening of U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation. This strengthening includes implementing initiatives that will lead to rapid fielding of essential capabilities and improved integration, management, and oversight of programs related to countering proliferation. The CPRC also found that:

• Planning, coordination, and oversight activities expanded significantly, providing a range of vehicles to facilitate sound program management.

• Substantial progress has been made in addressing many of the high priority shortfalls identified in the 1994 NPRC Report. The CPRC supported and endorsed the DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence organizational initiatives, programs, and FY 1996 budgets. The CPRC also urged Congress to support the initiatives and programs budgeted for FY 1996.

Within the context of the NPRC-identified Areas for Progress, the CPRC identified capability shortfalls that required either new or additional emphasis for FY 1997 in missile defense, responding to paramilitary and terrorist WMD threats, and in developing low collateral damage, non-nuclear weapons for WMD target defeat.

The CPRC recommended that FY 1997 and out-year funding for Department and Agency counterproliferation initiatives be evaluated against other pressing priorities within the normal Department and Agency budgeting processes. The CPRC also recommended continuing the joint DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence CPRC process after the Congressional mandate ends this year. This will ensure ongoing interdepartmental coordination by top management of programs related to countering proliferation. The CPRC endorsed the 1994 NPRC Areas for Progress and the CINC counterproliferation priorities and combined them to form the counterproliferation ACEs. The counterproliferation ACEs were established to serve as the basis for further program reviews and to assess future progress in meeting counterproliferation and related nonproliferation mission needs.

Key Accomplishments in Planning, Coordination, and Oversight of Programs for Countering Proliferation. The CPRC cited several accomplishments made in inter- and intra-departmental coordination and oversight since the establishment of the NPRC and recommended the continuation of interagency efforts to coordinate programs related to countering proliferation. These accomplishments included:

• Signing a DoD/DOE Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) establishing a joint DoD/DOE Senior Management Advisory Group to coordinate and foster joint R&D activities in countering proliferation.

• Continuing joint DoD/U.S. Intelligence cooperation through the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC), the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program and Planning Guidance issued by the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

• Establishing a new DOE/U.S. Intelligence partnership effort for R&D in new technology areas related to countering proliferation, which takes advantage of the technical talent and expertise in the DOE laboratories talent and expertise applicable to work against BW and CW threats as well as those of nuclear threats.

• Creating an interagency Technology Working Group within the National Security Council structure to review technology efforts underway in the various U.S. Government Agencies that pertain to nonproliferation, and, subsequently, establishing the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, co-chaired by DoD, DOE, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as the mechanism for coordinating arms control and nonproliferation R&D.

• Establishing a single point of contact for counterproliferation programs within the DoD. This responsibility has been assigned to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (ATSD) for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (formerly the ATSD for Atomic Energy).

• Establishing the Counterproliferation Support Program to leverage core DoD counterproliferation-related programs to accelerate the fielding of enhanced capabilities.

• Establishing and maintaining close coordination and cooperation through the CPRC review process and by direct interaction between the Counterproliferation Support Program manager and the Joint Staff/JROC to ensure that DoD's RDT&E and acquisition programs are responsive to the CINCs' evolving counterproliferation priorities and needs.

• Designation, by the CJCS, of a counterproliferation JWCA and completion of a Missions and Functions Study led by the Joint Staff that defined the counterproliferation mission and associated operational concepts; this activity lead to the development of the CJCS's concept plan, the Counterproliferation 0400 CONPLAN, now being coordinated.

• Establishing new and enhanced DOE programs for Material Protection, Control, and Accounting for the physical protection of Russian nuclear materials, expansion of support to the International Atomic Energy Agency, strengthening of support to U.S. and international efforts aimed at minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium in international fuel cycle commerce, preventing a black market in nuclear materials, and providing additional intelligence products in support of U.S. Intelligence.

• Establishing several U.S. Intelligence programs and initiatives which are described in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

3.2 Origin of the Counterproliferation ACEs

Last year, the CPRC endorsed both the NPRC Nonproliferation/Counterproliferation Areas for Progress and the CINC counterproliferation priorities. These two lists were combined to form the Counterproliferation ACEs. Figure 3.1 summarizes this process. The Areas for Progress are described in the NPRC's 1994 Report to Congress entitled Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs. The counterproliferation ACEs were established by the CPRC using the CINC counterproliferation priorities as a baseline and were broadened to include the NPRC Areas for Progress. The counterproliferation ACEs are used to characterize those areas where progress is needed to enhance both the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs and the overall ability to satisfy the demands of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy. The counterproliferation ACEs serve as a unified basis for reviewing and assessing future progress in meeting counterproliferation and related nonproliferation mission needs. The historical context of the counterproliferation ACEs is described briefly in what follows.

Figure 3.1. Areas for Progress and CINC Priorities: Origin of the Counterproliferation ACEs

In 1994, the NPRC determined that each of sixteen "Areas for Progress" represented an opportunity for significant improvements in operational capabilities related to countering proliferation and judged that increased investment in them would lead to the greatest progress in addressing the priority capability shortfalls identified by the committee.

The Joint Staff planners are continuing the process of working with the CINCs to refine counterproliferation priorities and required capability enhancements applicable across multiple warfighting mission areas. The CINCs put the highest priority on those areas where the most leverage could be exercised for getting enhanced capabilities out to the field quickly. This process resulted in a prioritization of capabilities required by the CINCs for meeting WMD proliferation threats. The Joint Staff and CINCs, through a JWCA team on counterproliferation, also determined that some shortfalls existed in areas that were not included in the NPRC's Areas for Progress. For example, while both the JWCA team and the NPRC assigned a high priority to defeating buried targets, the JWCA team added a priority area in "planning and targeting for above ground infrastructure." This reflects a recognition that many proliferation threats reside in surface locations, in addition to underground locations, and also would require enhanced capabilities to accurately target and attack while producing only minimal collateral effects.

In establishing their priorities, the CINCs concentrated on those warfighting capabilities related to counterproliferation which could be effectively leveraged to achieve rapid fielding. Cruise missile defense was judged by the CINCs to be one such area based on recent developments in various sensor technologies related to detecting cruise missiles. Areas judged by the CINCs to require significant RDT&E, like ballistic missile boost phase defense, were not considered a priority area by the CINCs because of the relatively long lead times to achieve an operational capability. DoD's peacetime responsibility to support Special Operations Forces (SOF) and WMD antiterrorist operations was also judged a high priority by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. While these activities were assigned a lower priority by the CINCs in a warfighting context, this relative standing may change as the CINCs become more fully engaged in the counterproliferation mission via their deliberative planning process.

3.3 Progress in Addressing the Counterproliferation ACEs

DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence have each made serious commitments to address the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD. Table 3.1 summarizes the FY 1997 investments planned by DoD and DOE for each ACE priority. U.S. Intelligence's FY 1997 investments are discussed in the Intelligence Annex. The combined DoD/DOE investment for FY 1997 is nearly $4.7 billion. DoD's investment for FY 1997 is just under $4.3 billion, which compares favorably with last year's investment of $3.8 billion. DoD budgets the bulk of its counterproliferation investment in the areas of theater and national missile defense (ACE priorities 2 and 3); detection and characterization of BW/CW agents (ACE priority 1); maintaining a robust passive defense to enable continued operations on the NBC battlefield (ACE priority 6); prompt mobile target detection and defeat (ACE priority 11); and supporting the inspection and monitoring of verifiable arms control agreements (ACE priority 15). DOE's investment for FY 1997 is $411.5 billion, up 5.5% from last year. DOE's nonproliferation focus results in concentration of its investment in supporting inspection and monitoring activities of verifiable arms control agreements (ACE priority 15); defending against paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats (ACE priority 13); tracking nuclear material shipments (ACE priority 10); and supporting export control activities (ACE priority 14). In addition, DOE is planning to invest $130.0 million in its core nonproliferation programs (See Section 5).

Table 3.1: Investments in the Counterproliferation ACEs

* Please see the Intelligence Annex to this report.

While the higher priority ACEs generally receive greater investment, the distribution of investments among the ACEs shows some variability. This is due to a variety of factors, including variation in the state-of-the-art and maturity of key enabling technologies, differing development stages of program evolution, unequal opportunities for near-term (versus longer term) payoffs, and due to the fact that some ACEs simply will require greater investment than others (e.g., those requiring extensive R&D). Consequently, it is difficult to judge progress in the counterproliferation ACEs simply by looking at the numbers. It requires a closer look at the specific accomplishments achieved by the programs addressing each ACE (discussed in Sections 4 - 6).

It must also be noted that several DoD and DOE programs related to countering proliferation respond to multiple ACE priorities. In these cases, budget values listed in Table 3.1 are included under the ACE priority corresponding to the primary thrust of the program. (In the program descriptions provided in Sections 4 - 6 and in Appendices C and D, the ACE priority listed first in the tabular summaries represents the primary thrust of the program.) For example, while programs developing BW/CW detection systems clearly support robust passive defense capabilities (i.e., ACE priority 6), their primary thrust is addressing ACE priority 1. Likewise, several active defense systems under development have some capability to defend against cruise missiles, but, since their primary focus is ballistic missile defense, they are included under ACE priority 3. National Missile Defense programs (which is not strictly an ACE priority) also contribute to theater ballistic missile and cruise missile defense (via technology sharing/synergy). Finally, since SOF units have important responsibilities within DoD to respond to paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats, contributions in ACE priorities 12 and 13 for DoD are difficult to distinguish. The CPRC acknowledges that the investment breakout represented in Table 3.1 is necessarily subjective. It, nevertheless, provides a useful means, in broad terms, to characterize the commitments of DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence in meeting the challenges posed by the counterproliferation ACEs.

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