CPRC96 Section 1

1. Introduction and Overview

1.1 Description and Purpose of the CPRC

This report is the second annual report of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) chartered to report on the activities and programs of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DOE), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and U.S. Intelligence (US INTELL) to enhance the capabilities of the United States to counter the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

1.1.1 The CPRC. Section 1605 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Nonproliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC) and directed DoD to lead an interagency study of nonproliferation activities underway in Executive Branch agencies. The NPRC issued its findings in a May 1994 Report to Congress entitled Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (also known as the "Deutch Report" after the Deputy Secretary of Defense who chaired the NPRC at Secretary of Defense Perry's request). Congress modified the charter of the NPRC in Section 1502 of the FY 1995 NDAA and established the CPRC to replace the NPRC.

Congress specified that the CPRC be composed of the Secretary of Defense (as Chairman), the Secretary of Energy (as Vice Chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Consistent with the CPRC's charter, the Secretary of Defense has designated the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) to perform the duties of the chairman of the CPRC again this year, and the Secretary of Energy has designated the Deputy Secretary of Energy responsible for national security programs to serve as Vice Chairman. Senior level representatives from the JCS and U.S. Intelligence round out this year's CPRC. Excerpts from the congressional language establishing the CPRC are contained in Appendix A of this report, and a listing of the CPRC principals and working level review participants is provided in Appendix B.

Congress directed the CPRC to "identify and review existing and proposed capabilities and technologies for support of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy." This year the CPRC has decided in this report to examine the accomplishments of the various nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs and initiatives established over the past two years. Because several new initiatives have been established since the original 1994 NPRC Report to Congress, now is an appropriate time to evaluate and report on the integrated progress of the interdepartmental response to enhancing the ability of the United States to respond to and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

1.1.2 CPRC Report Requirements. Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress, not later than May 1, 1996, a report of the findings of the CPRC. Congress specified that the report contain the following information:

a complete list, by specific program element, of the existing, planned, or newly proposed capabilities and technologies reviewed by the CPRC;
a complete description of the requirements and priorities established by the CPRC;
a comprehensive discussion of the near-term, mid-term, and long-term programmatic options formulated by the CPRC for meeting the CPRC's requirements and for eliminating identified deficiencies, including the annual funding requirements and completion dates established for each such option;
an explanation of the recommendations made by the CPRC, together with a full discussion of the actions taken to implement them;
a discussion and assessment of the status of each CPRC recommendation during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted;
identification of each specific DOE program that the Secretary of Energy plans to develop to initial operating capability (IOC) and each such program that the Secretary does not plan to develop to IOC; and
for each new technology program scheduled to reach operational capability, a recommendation from the Chairman of the JCS that represents the views of the commanders of the unified and specified commands regarding the utility and requirement of the program.

This report is in response to that request.

1.2 Definitions and Objectives

1.2.1 Definitions. Proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means to deliver them -- commonly referred to as weapons of mass destruction. In this report, the term "WMD" is meant to include NBC weapons. Their supporting infrastructure elements and their delivery systems, in particular cruise and ballistic missiles, are also considered in this report. The report focuses on existing and emerging proliferant states, but also considers the proliferation of WMD from China, the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), and Third World nations.

DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence are responsible for a wide variety of tasks to prevent or counteract proliferation. DoD has specific responsibilities in warfighting and military operations. DoD's specific responsibilities, referred to as "counterproliferation", span the spectrum from military operations to diplomatic efforts and include: support of proliferation prevention and intelligence activities, deterring the use of NBC weapons, defending against NBC weapons, protecting against their effects, and maintaining a robust capability to find and destroy NBC weapon delivery forces and their supporting infrastructure elements with minimum collateral effects, should this become necessary. The DOE's responsibility with regard to the proliferation of WMD primarily includes activities and programs in nuclear proliferation prevention, intelligence support, treaty verification, and technology research and development (R&D) to support these responsibilities. The activities and programs of U.S. Intelligence summarized in this report address the broader intelligence efforts necessary to prevent, detect, and react to the proliferation of WMD.

1.2.2 A Multi-Tiered Response to Countering WMD. Considering the complexities of facing an adversary armed with WMD, the CPRC places a high priority on proliferation prevention activities. Realizing, however, that efforts to halt the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery may not be entirely successful, DoD must prepare U.S. armed forces to fight, survive, and prevail in any conflict involving the use of NBC weapons by an adversary.

The represented Departments have developed a multi-tiered response to counter WMD threats that seeks to devalue their perceived utility and, consequently, to make their acquisition unattractive to a would-be proliferant, while at the same time assuring that U.S. forces can prevail in a Major Regional Contingency involving an adversary's use of WMD. These underpinnings of deterrence are achieved by aggressively pursuing capability improvements in the following seven key functional areas, illustrated in Figure 1.1 and defined below:

Figure 1.1 Countering Proliferation: A Multi-Tiered Approach

Proliferation Prevention -- to deny attempts by would-be proliferants to acquire or expand their WMD capabilities by: providing inspection, verification, and enforcement support for nonproliferation treaties and WMD control regimes; supporting export control activities; assisting in the identification of potential proliferants before they can acquire or expand their WMD capabilities; and, if so directed by the National Command Authority, planning and conducting interdiction missions;

Strategic and Tactical Intelligence -- to provide to policy and operational organizations actionable foreign intelligence on the identity and characterization of activities of existing or emerging proliferant states and groups, in order to support U.S. efforts to prevent the acquisition of weapons and technology, cap or roll back existing programs, deter weapons use, and adapt military forces and emergency assets to respond to threats;

Battlefield Surveillance -- to detect, identify and characterize WMD forces and associated elements (using DoD and intelligence assets) in a timely manner to support combat operations, such as targeting and mission/strike planning activities, and provide timely post-attack and battle damage assessment (BDA);

Counterforce -- to target (using battlefield surveillance and other intelligence assets), plan attacks, deny, interdict or destroy, and rapidly plan restrikes as necessary against hostile WMD forces and their supporting infrastructure elements while minimizing collateral effects;

Active Defense -- to protect U.S., allied and coalition forces, and noncombatants by intercepting and destroying or neutralizing NBC warheads delivered by ballistic and cruise missiles, while minimizing collateral effects that might arise during all phases of intercept;

Passive Defense -- to protect U.S., allied, and coalition forces against NBC effects associated with WMD use, including: measures to detect and identify NBC agents, individual and collective protection equipment for combat use, NBC medical response, and NBC decontamination technologies; and

Countering Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats -- to protect military and civilian personnel, facilities, and logistical/mobilization nodes from this special class of WMD threats both in the United States and abroad.

To the extent possible, the DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence program descriptions provided in Sections 4 - 6 will be grouped according to these seven functional areas.

1.2.3 Operational Objectives. To meet mission objectives for countering proliferation and ensure that related interdepartmental research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities lead to acquisition programs and deployed capabilities that satisfy the requirements of the combatant commanders, operational objectives were identified by the CPRC last year and are listed in Table 1.1 for each counterproliferation functional area. Where shortfalls were identified, NPRC/CPRC-endorsed initiatives have been established to meet these operational objectives in a timely manner by accelerating the fielding of technologies and systems satisfying the operational requirements of the combatant commanders and other customers.

Table 1.1: Countering Proliferation Operational Objectives

Counterproliferation Functional Area	Objectives
Proliferation Prevention	Effective and Cooperative Interagency Support in Export Controls, Treaty Verification and Inspection Support Detection and Tracking of Shipments/Diversions of WMD Materials and Technologies Effective and Timely Data Correlation and Fusion
Strategic and Tactical Intelligence	Provide Accurate, Comprehensive, Timely, and Actionable Foreign Intelligence in Support of National Strategy for Countering Proliferation Effective/Timely Dissemination of Operational Intelligence
Battlefield Surveillance	Accurate WMD Target Identification and Characterization Time Urgent Response Prompt, Reliable Post-Attack Damage Assessment and BDA
WMD Counterforce	Time Urgent Response Prompt Targeting and Strike/Restrike Planning High Kill/Neutralization Probability against WMD Targets Collateral Effects Minimization/Neutralization
Active Defense	Cost-Effective, Wide Area, Low Leakage WMD Active Defenses Collateral Effects Minimization/Neutralization
Passive Defense	Prompt, Accurate NBC Agent Detection, Identification, and Early Warning Individual and Collective Protection and Decontamination that Minimize Performance Degradation, Casualties, and Operational and Logistical Impacts Availability of Effective BW Vaccines
Countering Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats	Joint DoD Readiness against WMD Threats in the U.S. and Overseas Prompt, Effective World-Wide Response

1.3 Scope of Programs Considered by the CPRC

The Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs). This report focuses on identifying and describing those DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence activities and programs which support the counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs) identified last year by the CPRC. The counterproliferation ACEs serve to summarize and prioritize the interdepartmental policy needs and operational requirements for countering proliferation, and in particular, the mission fulfillment needs of the military Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). In fact, the prioritization of the counterproliferation ACEs follows closely that of the CINCs' prioritization of counterproliferation capabilities established last year as part of the Deterrence/ Counterproliferation Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) defined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The CPRC uses the counterproliferation ACEs as the basis for its program reviews and to assess progress in meeting counterproliferation and related nonproliferation mission needs. The fifteen counterproliferation ACEs are listed in Table 1.2. The origin of the counterproliferation ACEs is discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.

Table 1.2: CPRC Counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements

Counterproliferation ACEs
(in priority order)

Detection, Identification, and Characterization of BW/CW Agents
Cruise Missile Defense
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground WMD Facilities
Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence to the Warfighter
Robust Passive Defense to Enable Continued Operations on the NBC Battlefield
BW Vaccine RDT&E and Production to Ensure Availability
Target Planning for WMD Targets
BW/CW Agent Defeat
Detection and Tracking of WMD and WMD-Related Shipments
Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat
Support for Special Operations Forces
Defend Against Paramilitary, Covert Delivery, and Terrorist WMD Threats
Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government
Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Verifiable Arms Control Agreements and Regimes

Programs Strongly Related to Countering Proliferation. The CPRC defines programs "strongly related to countering proliferation" as those programs:

addressing the counterproliferation ACEs; and
that if eliminated, would necessitate significant modification of the NPRC/CPRC endorsed initiatives to achieve the recommended improvements in capabilities outlined in the 1994 NPRC and 1995 CPRC reports.

These include:

DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence initiatives established and implemented consistent with NPRC and CPRC recommendations (e.g., the Counterproliferation Support Program); and
other programs strongly related to countering proliferation which are directly related to the counterproliferation ACEs (e.g., the Chemical and Biological Defense Program).

It should be noted that general purpose defense and defense infrastructure programs, such as development and procurement programs for the various military weapon delivery platforms, are not included because they contribute to the basic capabilities of U.S. forces which underlay all military capabilities, not just countering proliferation. Such acquisition programs would still continue largely unaffected should NBC threats suddenly disappear. Existing and ongoing DoD programs strongly related to countering proliferation include: programs in NBC passive defense; counterforce against fixed and mobile WMD targets and collateral effects mitigation; programs to counter paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist WMD threats; ballistic and cruise missile defense RDT&E (including collateral effects mitigation); export control of military and dual-use technologies; and arms control treaty compliance verification. There are several DOE and U.S. Intelligence programs, described in this report, which are directly related to the counterproliferation ACEs.

In general, the NPRC/CPRC-endorsed initiatives leverage and augment existing and ongoing programs in order to accelerate program deliverables. DoD's Counterproliferation Support Program, established in direct response to a 1994 NPRC recommendation and endorsed by the CPRC, is one example of an NPRC/CPRC initiative designed to accelerate the RDT&E and fielding of several ongoing DoD programs and their deliverables. For example, one of the areas of most concern to the NPRC/CPRC has been the lack of deployed capabilities to detect, identify, and provide timely warning of the presence of biological weapons (BW) agents on the battlefield. In response, the Counterproliferation Support Program is providing enhanced funding and management oversight in conjunction with DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program to accelerate the deployment of critical standoff and remote BW detection and characterization systems. In another area of significant concern to the NPRC/CPRC, the Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting the accelerated development of a new generation of WMD target defeat and collateral effects prediction and mitigation capabilities that are being demonstrated as part of the ongoing Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD).

1.4 Organization of the Report

The remainder of the report is organized as follows.

Section 2 provides an overview of the worldwide WMD proliferation threat.
Section 3 is devoted to a review of the 1995 CPRC findings and recommendations, including a summary of the origin of the Counterproliferation ACEs along with an overview of the DoD, DOE, and U.S. Intelligence investments in addressing them.
Section 4 provides detailed descriptions of the DoD programs and activities which are strongly related to countering proliferation and that directly address the counterproliferation ACEs. Specific program accomplishments are highlighted. DoD policy perspectives, CINC priorities, and Joint Staff activities related to counterproliferation are also discussed in this section, along with new developments since the 1995 CPRC report was issued.
DOE nonproliferation programs related to countering proliferation are described, and their accomplishments discussed, in Section 5.
U.S. Intelligence programs and activities to counter proliferation are briefly described in Section 6, with the details provided in an "Intelligence Annex" to this report (separately bound).
The findings and recommendations of the CPRC are contained in Section 7, which summarizes the integrated interdepartmental response for countering proliferation and discusses both management and programmatic initiatives for continued progress in addressing WMD proliferation threats.

Five appendices are also included in the report:

Appendix A provides excerpts of the congressional language chartering the CPRC and this report;
Appendix B lists the CPRC review participants;
Appendix C provides tabular summaries of DoD programs strongly related to counterproliferation, including key program accomplishments, milestones, and budget profiles for FY 1997;
Appendix D provides DOE's budget profile for programs strongly related to countering proliferation;
and an acronym list is provided in Appendix E.

Finally, a separately bound Intelligence Annex has been prepared by U.S. Intelligence to describe U.S. Intelligence, DoD, and DOE intelligence programs related to countering proliferation.

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