This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB) and Defense Policy Board (DPB). The DSB/DPB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB)/Defense Policy Board (DPB) Task Force on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)
We are pleased to forward the final report of the DSB/DPB Task Force on TMD, co-chaired by Ted Gold and Dave Jeremiah. The Task Force had a broad charter to review DoD's TMD policies, plans and programs, and its comprehensive report addresses threat issues, arms control considerations, organizational options and program priorities.
The report highlights the progress that the Task Force found in TMD since the Gulf War, but also raises concerns about current deficiencies. The Task Force addressed the problem of coping with uncertainties about the future threat. Its sensible recommendations about threat modeling, red teaming and hedging are not limited to TMD, but applicable to much of DoD's development activities.
The Task Force also tackled the controversial subject of the ABM Treaty and its effect on missile defenses. Subsequent to its interim report, which expressed strong concerns about the demarcation path the US was on, the US has modified its course which now may be closer to the Task Force's recommendations. The Task Force remains concerned, and recommends energetic involvement by Policy and Acquisition leadership to overcome the tendencies to establish unnecessary ceilings on TMD system performance.
A particularly serious deficiency identified by the Task Force is the lack of a strong and knowledgeable joint voice in the TMD development process. The Task Force also noted the absence of a joint TMD architect integrating both cruise and ballistic missile defenscs. The Task Force's recommendations to redress these deficiencies include making USACOM a major player in the development of the TMD architecture. We endorse the Task Force's vision of the objective for TMD: to provide some protection of diverse assets against a variety of threats rather than aiming for perfect protection against one (or a few) threats. We also share its concern about the COEA; massive studies obscure rather than illuminate.
The Task Force was concerned that there will not be sufficient funds to field all the systems as proposed, but, at least in the near term, resources can be rearranged to fund their legacy systems and adequate development for the longer term. A more robust threat will generate future resource shifts if necessary.
We support the findings of the Task Force and believe that its recommendations deserve favorable consideration. We also believe that this effort confirms the value of joint DSB/DPB studies (it was only the second such effort). We would thus be pleased to collaborate in other areas where policy and technology intersect.
Dr. Craig Fields
Chairman, Defense Science Board
Dr. Harold Brown
Chairman, Defense Policy Board
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY BOARD SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB)/Defense Policy Board (DPB) Joint Task Force on Theater Missile Defense
Attached is the final report of the DSB/DPB Task Force on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Significant TMD policy, budget and program initiatives were undertaken during our deliberations, and thus we make no pretense at having kept up with these moving targets. The report, reflecting guidance the Task Force received when we delivered an interim report last year, focuses on four topics: coping with uncertainties about futures paths of the theater missile threat, demarcation between theater and strategic missile defenses, meeting the challenge of developing joint TMD, and lastly, setting priorities for specific TMD programs and projects.
The term theater missile belies its import. They are not just another combined arms battlefield weapon. The motives of potential adversaries to possess these weapons are decidedly strategic. They offer a relatively low cost way to threaten population centers and critical military targets like ports and other points of entry in order to coerce neighbors, breakup coalitions and deter US military involvement in their region. They can raise the stakes even higher when they carry chemical, biological or nuclear payloads. The gravity of this threat requires that continued special attention be given to efforts to counter it.
First the good news. The Task Force found much progress since the Gulf War: some improvements already in the field, much more in development, greater involvement by the warfighters, more joint exercises, a comprehensive doctrine for joint TMD.
One feature of the new security landscape -- greater uncertainty about future threats - presents a great challenge to planning and executing acquisition programs. To meet this challenge, (not unique to the theater missile threat), the Task Force recommends that the intelligence and acquisition communities modify the current threat "validation" process. We prescribe a much greater role for threat modeling and red teaming including an expansion of the sort of skunk works red team that BMDO has underway at the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory. We also reconunend more use of hedge programs and other means designed explicitly to deal with uncertainty and surprise.
Compliance criteria for the ABM Treaty, which itself does not limit TMD systems, nevertheless presents the issue of distinguishing theater from strategic ballistic missile defenses. The Task Force expressed strong concern in our interim report that the US was proceeding down a demarcation path that would severely restrict TMD performance. Our concerns included restraints and inhibitions imposed against the use of external sensors and a compliance mentality that resulted in unnecessarily severe restrictions on TMD performance. Subsequent events, including initiatives by the DoD and the May 1995 Clinton/Yelstin Summit Statement, provide a framework to allow much more effective TM defenses consistent with the principles of the ABM treaty. Policy and Acquisition leadership will be needed to make this happen since implied limitations on performance and the use of extemal sensors remain.
TMD is inherently a joint mission. The Task Force found a vision of joint TMD promulgated by the joint Staff (in Joint Pub 3 - 01.5) but no joint TMD CONOPS nor complementary comprehensive approach on the developer's side. We did not find a joint architecture which integrates defenses against both ballistic and cruise missiles (nor integrates both into theater air defense). Future CINCs will need such an architecture and we should not count on their being able to kluge one together during a crisis.
To remedy this situation we recommend several steps. Some of these may be controversial, for example, making USACOM a central player in the creation of an overall joint TMD architecture and assigning BMDO additional responsibilities for the development of active defenses against land attack cruise missiles. However, any attempt to strengthen the joint voice will likely engender opposition and in any case there will eventually be a high price to pay for continuing the current arrangement. We recognize that TMD is a complex undertaking with each service promoting its own programs and policies. The key to creating and maintaining effective capabilities is to have a single overall vision for TMD, a vision that is grounded in the joint environment and designed for joint (and coalition) warfighting conditions.
The report includes a discussion on how much defense is enough (we conclude that practical and far less than perfect defenses offer considerable value) and raises our concern about the affordability of all the active defense systems in development. The Task Force is also concerned about advanced submunitions and other countermeasures to descent phase ballistic missile defense systems but did not find a coherent and implementable boost phase program in place to counter these threats. The Task Force is particularly enthused about the potential of the advanced airborne radar sensors under development in ARPA to contribute to much more effective cruise and ballistic missile defenses and we also recommend more attention to joint C3 and passive defenses. The report includes other findings and recommendations regarding testing, intelligence collection against real targets, attack operations and the COEA process.
We greatly appreciate the time and effort put in by Task Force members, government advisors and support staff. It has been a pleasure to work with this talented group.
David E. Jeremiah
Tasking..................................................................1 General Observations.....................................................3 Findings and Recommendations.....................................9 Threat Projections and Dealing with Uncertainty.................11 The ABM Treaty and TMD..........................................21 Organizing for Joint TMD........................................27 TMD Programs/Activities.........................................35 Summary Of Findings and Recommendations.................................59 Appendices: A - Membership.................................................A-1 B - Terms of Reference.........................................B-1 C - Acronyms...................................................C-1
Findings and Recommendations
The Defense Science Board/Defense Policy Board (DSB/DPB) Task Force had a broad charter to review US theater missile defense (TMD), including purpose, threat, plans and programs. The Terms of Reference are shown in Appendix B. Deliberations began in February 1995.
The Task Force, after delivering its interim report in March 1995, received additional guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to focus on:
The Task Force was not asked for recommendations on national missile defense.
Findings and Recommendations
This report focuses on problems and deficiencies in the TMD program. However, the Task Force also found that the TMD program has made substantial progress in the past several years. We begin by citing examples of this progress before turning to the problems.
1. There has been considerable progress in the TMD program since the Gulf War (also since the last DSB/DPB TMD study in 1991)
2. In Spite of the Progress We Have Concerns About What Is Missing
3. We Also Have Concerns About What Is Amiss
Findings and Recommendations
The dimensions of today's theater missile (TM) threat appear to be understood at the senior levels in DOD. Therefore, we will not detail the threat specifics (developers, possessors, characteristics), but instead only briefly touch on the nature of the TM threat, including both it's ballistic and cruise missile variants, and the future paths it may take.
We then focus on the problem and process of projecting threats to guide acquisition efforts in these uncertain times and offer several recommendations, some broadly applicable to DoD.
TMs pose a growing danger to US ability to project military power and deal with major regional contingencies
TMs appeal to regional and 'wannabe' powers as strategic weapons to:
For these purposes, TMs are less expensive, more survivable and penetration capable than manned aircraft.
TMs can be effective terror weapons against cities, even if inaccurate and armed only with conventional warheads. TMs become more dangerous yet with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warheads often categorized collectively as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In fact these warhead types pose quite different threats, with the chemical warhead being far less dangerous than the other two.
Military targets in theater vulnerable to missile attack include sea and air points of debarkation (PODs), and other large fixed logistic nodes:
We include Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) along with ballistic and cruise missiles, as part of the theater missile threat. UAVs can be used:
SCUD type TBMs and anti-ship cruise missiles are widely proliferated.
Longer-range TBMs have been shipped from China to the Middle East and more are under development (e.g., by North Korea).
There is considerable uncertainty about the future path of the TM threat but there are several possibilities for which we must prepare.
The land attack cruise missile threat - including low observables - could emerge rapidly
A major regional adversary could afford thousands of TMS
While the characteristics of future TM threats can be broadly sketched, the uncertainties, particularly questions of 'when is the threat?' pose daunting challenges to program planning.
Everyone acknowledges that the threat is more uncertain and threat projection more difficult in the Post-Cold War world. Instead of a single threat following familiar acquisition Practices, we must now worry about a diverse set of nations and motives, possibly on steep (and thus rapidly changing) learning and acquisition curves for military technologies, using nonstandard acquisition practices, and we must do this with fewer intelligence resources.
This situation affects the roles of evidence and model-based threat projections
Goal should be to improve our ability to anticipate - not merely observe -serious threats, in order to:
Directives (DIA Regulation 55-3) are in place which call for identifying reactive and technologically feasible threats along with the evidence based or observed threat projections
A greater role for model-based threat projections must be embodied in a more disciplined process to avoid their own set of dangers: threat exaggeration and multiplicity (the latter can lead to a "threat of the month" environment and prograrn disruption).
A Red Team Skunk Works effort was:
The Red Team effort (including Skunk Works) has begun to work with respect to advanced submunitions
Uncertainty and surprise are inevitable
Ways to reduce uncertainties
Strengthen collection efforts against real targets and effect a closer coupling between intelligence collection, especially Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and system design. Design more robustness and graceful degradation into systems -- to stay farther away from "known" performance "cliffs" and to hedge against uncertainties, both in where cliffs are and other unknowns.
Test over a wider range of threat possibilities, environments and system performance parameters.
Dealing with surprises from inevitable remaining uncertainties
Systematically assess possible surprises and develop hedges and responses/adaptatinos, ranging from Pre-planned Product Improvement (P3I) to pre-planned near-real-time adaptation during war.
Pursue ACTDs specifically as hedges against threat uncertainties.
Develop approaches for near-real-time adaptation during missile-defense campaings, which may last days or weeks (or longer). For example:
Pay for more robustness and pre-planned adaptation features by accepting (somewhat) less performance in the nominal design regime.
Define a new process and framework for managing threat projections to avoid the problems of too much dependence on either evidence- or model-based projections. As illustrated in Figure 1, a range of potential threats should be identified:
Findings and Recommendations
The ABM Treaty does not restrict TMD systems per se. The problem is distinguishing theater defenses from ABM systems, which are constrained by the Treaty. We have been concerned that the US was proceeding down a demarcation path which would severely restrict TMD performance.
Subsequent events have changed that course, including the May 1995 Clinton/Yeltsin Summit Statement, which provides basic principles for a less restrictive approach to TMD consistent with the ABM Treaty.
Subsequent to the March Interim Report, DoD initiated actions which led to the May 10, 1995, Clinton/Yeltsin joint statement of principles which provided in part:
"Theater Missile Defenses may be deployed by each side which will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to give such systems that capability."
Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis and Deputy Minister Georgy Mamedov have developed a framework to guide the Standing Consultative Commission.
By establishing "realistic threats" and the "strategic nuclear force" as the standards, the joint statement provides a basis to develop and deploy more effective TMD consistent with the principles of the ABM Treaty. The Task Force also believes that the Davis/ Mamedov framework is useful in that it endorses a demonstrated test for determining whether TMD systems had ABM capability (i.e., demonstrated against targets with velocity greater than 5 km/second or ranges in excess of 3,500 km) as recommended by the Task Force. This will be helpful in dealing with the US "compliance community" issues which have dominated internal debate over the last several years. We remain concerned, however, that limits negotiated either with the Russians or derived from compliance decisions taken by the US Government will continue to be imposed on other TMD systems that have not demonstrated this capability.
As the Task Force understands the current situation, two concerns (higher velocity TMD systems such as Navy Theater-wide and external sensors) remain which can place significant limitations upon the continued development of TMD. Although the policy community is attempting to provide better definition which will permit development and deployment of highly effective TMD systems, the Task Force still sees evidence of a disconnect between policy objectives and compliance criteria. Parameter thresholds established for the sole purpose of triggering reviews of potentially ambiguous situations too often become performance ceilings as program managers strive to avoid perceived treaty boundaries in order to protect their programs. These actions by both program managers and the "compliance community" will continue to unnecessarily constrain effective TMD development until such time as either external or internal policy statements and directives make clearer which issues are outside the ABM limitations.
All members of the Task Force agree that the specific restrictions placed on intercept systems that have been historically imposed by the ABM Treaty can and should change as the overall security situation changes. All members also agree on the desirability of gaining the collaboration of Russia and China in restraining the proliferation of offensive missile capabilities. Some members argued further, that because of the legal and political role of the ABM Treaty as a condition for offensive constraint, and because all TBMD systems have some capability against strategic missiles, the broad conditions of TBMD deployments will have to be worked out with both Russia and China.
Findings and Recommendations
TMD is inherently a joint mission, the success of which requires coordinated and integrated exploitation of active and passive defense and attack operations. This vision of JTMD is promulgated in a recent Joint Staff publication on JTMD Doctrine.
In this section, we identify institutional obstacles impeding the realization of this vision and offer recommendations on strengthening the joint voice in the TMD requirements and development processes.
The Joint Pub identifies TMD as inherently a joint mission including possible (we would say probable) operations within an Alliance or coalition arrangement.
Defines TMD as the '...integration ofjoint force capabilities to destroy enemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive:
Assigns the JFC the responsibility for planning a multi-service integrated JTMD campaign to minimize the effect of theater missile attacks.
JCS Pub 3 - 01.5 outlines what ought to be accomplished for effective TMD. However, it does not institutionalize or provide a basis for developing the means to execute TMD nor for integrating the various systems into a joint capability for successful missile defense.
RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBLE AGENT Establish policies, priorities OSD, JCS Develop concept, doctrine, needs JCS, Services Establish operational architecture CINCs, Services Develop engineering architecture Services, BMDO, role for designated CINC Execute programs, train, equip, Services, OSD Employ, and operate CINCs, Service Component
The above chart identifies the actors and actions needed to develop and field effective joint theater missile defenses.
Missing items or unassigned responsibilities are:
The operational architecture is generally defined as the concept for joint operations elaborated through descriptions of tactics, techniques, and procedures. The engineering architecture can be described as the translation of operational requirements into descriptions of systems, their desired characteristics, and connectivity.
The two activities - development of operational and engineering architectures - must be closely coupled. New technology enables new CONOPS; new CONOPS create opportunities for technical solutions. Indeed, at the broad collection of systems level we are addressing - joint theater missile defense - the distinction is artificial. An overall JTMD architecture must describe the systems, how they should be used and how they must connect together and to the rest of the world to provide effective TMD.
The JTMD architecture - to be useful to the acquisition process - must also provide a road map showing how fielded capabilities can change over time. The road map should not be limited to showing paths to a single "objective system" only. Instead, it should account for the very real uncertainties and multiple plausible futures we face by identifying hedges and providing options that can deal with these alternative futures. However, the current requirements and objective-system-driven acquisition process does not foster such a perspective.
Although TMD is inherently joint - requiring the right mix of multi-service capabilities to prevent launch, shoot down missiles, and protect against their effects - the joint voice in development activities is much weaker than that of individual Services
A future JFC may be able to meld together an adequate JTMD system from the separate pieces being developed, but we should not count on it. Why should we wait until a war is upon us to create an effective joint capability?
US capabilities (current and in development) are not being integrated across the "seams" of National and Service systems. There are no joint operational or engineering TMD architectures to identify the appropriate mix of JTMD elements to guide development activities and no mechanism to ensure their integration.
On a more positive note, the CINCs are getting more involved and sponsoring exercises (JTF 95 by USACOM, Roving Sands by CENTCOM) and other relevant JTMD activities ("TMD in a Box" by EUCOM).
Designate USACOM to be the focal point for JTMD
The Task Force recognizes the formidable Service opposition to establishing a stronger joint presence in acquisition affairs. While some may suggest Service opposition may be self-serving, there may also be legitimate concem about creating more bureaucracy and split responsibilities. This, however, is a unique joint task which requires unique solutions; problems raised by the Services can be mitigated by assembling a first rate staff, giving them the levers to get things done and creating an environment of mutual trust and cooperative problem solving (in the spirit of Integrated Process Teams (IPTs)).
We also recognize that giving this responsibility to a CINC represents a significant change from past practice. We considered alternatives within the development community - e.g., BMDO or lead Service - but concluded these are ill-suited to bring the joint perspective to the broad TMD challenge. Getting the CINC to look beyond today's problems will require strong direction from the Chairman and OSD, close cooperation with the developers, and sufficient resources. USACOM wfll also face the challenge of working with the other combatant CINCs to ensure their inputs are considered and integrated into the TMD architecture.
Additional resources are essential. We realize we are calling for additional tasks to be placed on the already full plate of a new command still staking out new responsibilities.
Findings and Recommendations
Summary of Findings and Recommendations
We begin by discussing requirements for TMD (How much is enough?) and then offer observations or recommendations on:
Performance goals and thresholds and program schedules and deliverables for active defense against TMs should be established in the context of:
There is a tendency in the TMD community, more so than other defense areas, to search for "perfect" or "complete" solutions.
Very low leakage (<10 percent), while a desirable goal, will likely not be a practical overall objective for TMD except against small-scale attacks
Very low leakage is not necessary to reduce effectiveness of conventionally armed TMB as either a military or terror weapon.
Against WMD, particularly nuclear or biological payloads, very low leakage is necessary to negate these weapons, but less than perfect active defense can still contribute though not 'solve' the TM/WMD threat. Raising the price to an adversary, whfle clearly not as satisfactory as denying delivery, is a worthy and practical objective for today's investment decisions.
In spite of the persuasiveness of the multi-tier paradigm, the rationale for the curtent multi-system TMD program has more to do with providing some defense in situations where otherwise there would be none, rather than contributing to a multi-tier low-leakage defense. The psychological factor of having some defense can be very important (e.g., SCUD attacks against Israel).
The elements of TMD are themselves part of larger non- and counter-proliferation contexts to address the theater missile and WMD threats. For example, international diplomatic suasion (backed by military capabilities) could play an important role in heading off the threat of a regional adversary acquiring thousands of missiles.
Defensive systems - PAC-3, THAAD, Navy Area and Theater Wide, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), and Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) - complement each other by:
Thus the problem is not redundant systems, but rather choosing among alternative objectives.
Affordability is a valid issue. Extensive deployment of all these systems would eventually require substantial increased funding for TMD. However, investments in TMD serve as a hedge against an uncertain future. If the missile threat continues to grow, then the importance of missile defense could well justify increased future funding for substantial deployments. On the other hand, a significant level of current investment may have a dissuasive effect and contribute to a preferred future with a curtailed missile threat.
The affordability challenge in the long term could also be mitigated through new architectures based on distributed sensors shared by different shooters. The advanced airborne radar system under development by Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), for example, could be the prime sensor for BPI (Airborne Intercept [ABI]), MEADS, Patriot, and SM-2 againgt cruise missiles. A space based mid-course tracking system (Brilliant Eyes), if deployed for National Missile Defense (NMD), could also be the prime sensor for THAAD. Other savings could be acbieved by the use of a common kill vehicle for several interceptors, e.g., a variant of the Advanced Interceptor Technology (AIT) kill vehicle might be used for THAAD, Navy Theater-Wide and ABI. We recommend that BMDO be tasked to explore these and similar options.
Choices among the systems mainly depend on policy preferences and judgments about the likelihood of threats and scenarios
These choices will not necessarily be illuminated by a requirements-driven analysis (which assumes the exsistence of a commonly agreed upon set of requirements) that relies on complex, many-on-many engagement simulations to evaluate the performance of alternative "objective system" TMD architectures.
The TMD COEA was briefed several times to the Task Force.
We believe the basic approach is inappropriate
At best, it is an inefficient use of resources - create a huge pile, then see if there is a pony inside - that could be better employed.
In our interim report, we recommended that the COEA group be tasked to provide an initial cut at key issues to senior decision-makers and tailor subsequent analysis based on feedback. This does not appear to have been done, but we still believe it worthwhile to constitute a small group to address the critical issues. They should be tasked to evaluate program and investment options in terms of their contributions to the risks associated with future uncertainties (instead of, or at least, in addition to meeting objective system requirements).
Patriot PAC-3 continues the evolution of the Patriot system.
THAAD - the first dedicated TBM defender - promises to be a much more capable TBM defender than PAC-3.
However, potentially achievable defended footprints are being severely constrained (especially against longer-range TBMs) by ABM Treaty compliance findings that prohibit THAAD's use of external sensors. It does not contribute to low-altitude CM defense and is most expensive TBMD program (accounts for more than 30 percent of the TMD budget over the next 6 years).
Navy Area System will give TBMD a capability to widely deployed Aegis family
Hit-to-kill systems provide substantial advantages, but there are dangers of their being fragile performers. It is important to learn all we can about the flight characteristics of threat missiles and to test our systems in a realistic environment, including both observed and anticipated countermeasures (See pg. 15-17). Intercept environments are challenging even in the absence of deliberate countermeasures. (As evidenced by problems Patriot faced due to the break up and corkscrewing of the Iraqi Scuds during reentry.) As one program manager cautioned, "debris happens."
The three "competing" concepts address very different problems
The three concepts are discussed in the following pages.
The Army and Marines want a theater missile defense capability when operating out of range of theater missile defense systems. An issue is the vulnerability of mobile ground forces to missile attack. Mobile ground forces are actually moving only a small percentage of time when in combat and do present targets (e.g., forward area assembly areas and helicopter logistics nodes) for missile attack.
However, camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) and other passive defense measures, suppression of enemy Reconnaissance, Surveillance Target Acquisition (RSTA) and attack operations, can play important roles in mitigating the short range missile threat to our mobile ground forces. (Attack operations have a better chance against the short range missiles because more sensors and shooters can be brought to bear against much smaller and closer operating areas these missiles must launch from.) Furthermore, while missiles pose perhaps the dominant threat to rear areas, mobile ground forces must contend with artillery, rockets and other threats. For these reasons, the missile threat to our mobile ground forces is unlikely to be the show stopper that it could be when targeted against PODs and populations.
Emerging concepts and technology, using airborne sensors to direct SAMS, will allow rearward-based SAMs to defend forward forces even against low flyers. (The concept will be demonstrated in the Mountain Top ACTD.) We recommend that such architectures be seriously considered, in conjunction with, and as a part of, the MEADS program. Using existing and already under development SAMs (e.g., ERINT) in this manner can reduce the demands (capability and quantity) and thus the cost of equipment that has to be made agile and survivable enough to keep up with maneuver forces.
Deployment flexibility - ships can be close to launch area and between launch area and defended area - allows defense of very large regions
It is more important for the program to develop properly rather than rush to deploy.
The lightest front end (kill vehicle) and therefore the largest theoretical defended footprint (against the longer-range TBMS) are achieved if intercept capabilities are limited to the exo-atmosphere.
However, a capability to intercept in the high endo-atmosphere (e.g., above 30-50 km altitude) as well as above the atmosphere (which could be achieved with a THAAD-like or AIT front end) provides more resilience against countermeasures and can defend against shorter range TBMS.
Instead of a coherent plan, we found advocacy of particular concepts and an absence of serious CONOPS.
So-called "complete" solutions are chimerical since our adversaries will have other ways to deliver WMD and explosive payloads including Special Operation Forces (SOF), covert means and cruise missiles.
Less-than-perfect BPI capabilities can help deter WMD use, e.g., by causing payload to fall on launcher's own territory.
A key issue is when is BPI needed
Because advanced submunitions and other serious threats to US descent phase defense are potential and not yet real, BPI activities should be structured as a hedge program, rather than as a formal acquisition program. The objectives should be to:
Lower priority is the Air Borne Laser (ABL):
However, the ABL:
Space-Based Laser is an option only in the much longer term:
Off-board airborne radar sensors would greatly enhance ABI effectiveness.
Without them, the performance of ABI on fighters will be limited by the small "search light" surveillance patterns of on-board radars. Likewise, without them, the performance of ABI on UAVs with IR surveillance sensors will be very dependent on weather conditions. Off-board radar sensors, by eliminating ABI's dependence on the small search light surveillance patterns or clear weather, can increase the all weather area coverage (the launch area that a single ABI platform can defend against) by a factor of 25 - 50 or more. Thus, the area covered per platform, instead of being less than a few thousand km2 (limited by the on-board sensor), could be as much as 50,000 km2 (depending on interceptor velocity and threat type).
The number of platforms required to provide high levels of effectiveness in all scenarios would be prohibitive. Rather than asking how many are "required" for coverage, a more useful question is: what capabilities can be achieved with affordable quantities? Analyses indicate that substantial effectiveness can be achieved in many scenarios with aircraft resources on the order of, or even less than, that assigned to SCUD hunting, during the Gulf War.
The timelines for boost phase kinetic intercept are stressful (representative TBMs complete booster burn within 60 - 90 seconds). Furthermore, platforms must overfly hostile territory to achieve substantial effectiveness in most scenarios. However, preliminary modeling and simulation efforts indicate that the short timelines are not a
show stopper and that the requisite detection, track, and launch functions can be accomplished in sufficient time to support useful intercept ranges.
Higher interceptor velocities compensate to some extent for the short timelines. Very high velocities (e.g., 5 km/sec) could even increase standoff sufficiently to allow some BPI capability without having to fly over hostile territory (especially against relatively small size countries like North Korea). However, limiting ABI to only such a standoff mode would severely, and unnecessarily, limit its effectiveness. Furthermore, the advantages of very high velocity may be outweighed by its price: fewer missiles per platform, reduced deployment flexibility due to fewer types of platforms that can carry the ABI and delayed availability due to the greater development challenges (e.g., window cooling).
A capability for post-boost (ascent phase) as well as boost phase intercepts also helps deal with the stressful timelines and would substantially increase the coverage and robustness of ABI concepts.
The opportunity costs of the fighter-based ABI might be substantially reduced if this mission can be made compatible with other air missions rather than dedicating a sizable number of aircraft exclusively to BPI. Some missions, SEAD, for example, may not be good multi-mission candidates. Defensive counter-air (DCA) and other air superiority missions as well as transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) hunting (aircraft need to be in the same neighborhood for both BPI and counter-TEL missions) offer more potential for multi-mission compatibility. We did not find evidence of a serious attempt to explore multi-mission opportunities and we recommend that such an effort be made.
The value of fighter-based systems would also be enhanced if both Air Force and Navy aircraft (which may be the first on the scene) can be equipped to carry out the ABI mission.
Successful pursuit of ABI needs a warfighter sponsor and committed developer, neither of which exists today. We beheve that fighter-based ABI offers the earliest available BPI capacity and a program can be configured to support later carriage on UAVs. However, given the Air Force's apparent lack of interest in such use of fighters, an initial focus on UAV-based ABI concepts may be more bureaucratically practical.
For the UAV option, we recommend:
We realize that there are questions about ABI feasibility. There are strong advocates for both the ABL (the Air Force) and SBL (within BMDO). On the other hand, there appears to be little advocacy for ABI (the proposed ABI ACTD collapsed in part due to lack of Air Force interest).
Still, there remains a real danger of rapidly emerging countermeasures to descent phase TBMD and land attack cruise missile threats. ABR helps with both ballistic and cruise missile threats, ABL and SBL likely won't, while ABI offers the least costly, earliest available path to achieve at least some BPI capability. Far less than perfect BPI capabilities could be important in future conflicts with TBM wielding adversaries.
Advanced Airbome Radar Systems, currently an ARPA technology program, can be a major contributor to TMD (especially as part of a CEC-type network)
We exammed the role of an Aerostat as a platform for these advanced sensors and reviewed a proposed ACTD for an Aerostat surveillance system. Could an Aerostat substitute for an aircraft, thus avoiding the need for aircraft? If the aircraft is needed, would the Aerostat provide sufficient additional value to warrant the additional cost?
Compared to manned aircraft, the Aerostat offers the potential of lower cost, longer time on station, no air crew at risk, and a shorter time to operational capability.
A suitable Aerostat should be able to operate above 20K feet both to rise above the most turbulent conditions and to achieve adequate coverage. Since the estimated payload is about 25K pounds, a large Aerostat is required. The largest existing Aerostats are about 71 meters in length. ARPA estimates that a 91 meter Aerostat would be needed to satisfy requirements.
A substantial ground facility is required to inflate and manage the Aerostat on the ground and to provide for the ground crew and operations. The ground facility, as well as the Aerostat itself, is subject to attack. Although the Aerostat would presumably be well behind the expanded danger zone and protected by SAMs and fighter aircraft, it is unable to duck or fly away and could be vulnerable to a determined enemy.
Aerostats have limited mobility. A ground site must be prepared consisting of a mooring tower, a vehicle of some sort to hold the tail, and enough space to allow the mooring vehicle to move, keeping the Aerostat facing into the wind. If not already there, these would have to be moved to the theater and set up, requiring some days as well as a safe place far enough from the enemy to be protected. Moving the ground site to keep up with troop movements also takes time, requiring several Aerostats to maintain continual coverage.
In our opinion an Aerostat is not an adequate substitute for an aircraft and thus an aircraft is needed in any event
The best role for the Aerostat would be to provide coverage before hostilities begin and under benign conditions, saving wear and tear on aircraft and crews, and either reducing the number of aircraft needed or improving their staying power
The Aerostat should be viewed as a complement, not a substitute, for aircraft:
The Proposed Aerostat ACTD briefed to the Task Force was directed toward developing and demonstrating a war-fighting capability (including size, altitude, both surveillance and fire control radars, low down time, and rapid mobility). This capability would be costly and involve a number of parallel developments with considerable risk of meeting schedule and budget.
There does not appear to be much work on improving Aerostats
Architecture goal for JTMD should be CEC-like capability
Offers substantial advantages for JTMD
CEC-like, rather than CEC, because not every participant in the network needs or can afford a full CEC capability
Although we note some interest by the other Services in CEC-like capabilities, e.g., the Air Force for AWACS, we saw little evidence of a serious commitment to extend this capability into JTMD.
There are many passive defense avenues to pursue; we highlight three of these:
Improve the readiness of reserve forces to operate in CBW environment
Devote more attention to operating air and sea PODs in face of CBW attack
Pursue new ways to deploy and project force to theaters without creating targets like the huge logistics nodes of Desert Shield
By comprehensive, we mean including SOF, as well as air operations, to locate and attack:
Cruise missiles deny or reduce some of these opportunities (e.g., they can be launched from "warehouses").
Given the dismal past performance, what are the expectations for future improvements?
In summary, attack operations can be an important adjunct but cannot replace the need for active defense. But, if the US faces missile attacks in future conflicts, we will undoubtedly again devote substantial resources to TMD attack operations
Findings and Recommendations
We found substantial progress in the TMD program since the Gulf War (also since the last DSB/DPB TMD Task Force in 1991). The progress includes enhancement to fielded capabilities, investment in major new development programs and technology efforts, greater involvement by the CINCs, more joint exercises and the publication of doctrine for JTMD. We also found some problems and deficiencies which are highlighted in the following two pages along with our primary recommendations.
We found over emphasis on evidence based projections and recommend that:
We found TMD capabilities being constrained by the Treaty demarcation path the US had been pursuing and recommend a different approach:
We found a comprehensive vision of JTMD promulgated by the Joint Staff, but no Joint CONOPS nor complementary comprehensive approach on the developers' side. To organize more effectively for JTMD, we recommend several steps including:
There are reasonable rationales for each of the six TBMD programs. However, substantially increased budgets for TBMD will be required to produce and deploy all of these systems. We are concerned that the massive Capstone TMD COEA effort will not produce the desired illumination of critical investment decisions.
We conclude that very low leakage, while desirable, is unlikely to be a practical TMD goal except against very small attacks. Raising the price to an adversary, while clearly not as satisfactory as denying delivery, is a worthy and practical objective for today's investment decisions.
There is insufficient attention to architectures based on distributed sensors supporting several interceptor systems.
We are concerned about the fragility of hit-to-kill systems in combat and recommend more testing in realistic environments and more intelligence data collection against real targets.
We are concerned about countermeasures to descent phase TBMD and recommend more attention to boost phase intercept, with the highest priority to airborne intercept concepts.
We did not find a coherent, integrated effort to improve attack operations against mobile theater missiles. While we remain skeptical about achieving sufficient effectiveness to substitute for active defense, there are opportunities to improve on dismal past performances. We recommend the development of a comprehensive attack operations architecture and implementation road map that makes better use of new surveillance and C3 capabilities being fielded for other purposes.
We find that passive defenses continue to be undervalued and suggest several areas for additional attention.
Dr. Ted Gold and Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (Ret)
Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret)
Dr. William Graham
General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret)
Hon Sidney Graybeal
General Glenn Otis, USA (Ret)
Glenn Lamartin Maj Tim Linehan
Lt Col Keith Larson
Lt Col Clay Stewart
Dr. Frank Dellermann
Col Roger Graves
COL William Knox
LTC Michael Lloyd
Col Tony Ryan
Maj Michael Vela
COL Alan Hammond
CAPT John Kelly
CDR Craig Langman
Dr. Bruce Pierce
Dr. David Whelan
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY BOARD
SUBJECT: Terms of Reference--Defense Science Board/Defense Policy Board Task Force on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)
You are requested to form a joint Defense Science Board/Defense Policy Board Task Force to review the purposes of the U.S. theater missile defense effort, including the nature of the threat (types and quantities of missiles and payloads); how it might evolve; the degree of defense we should seek; what we should defend; under what circumstances; and to what levels.
The Task Force evaluation should also include, but is not limited to the following issues:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, OUSD(A&T) will co-sponsor this Task Force and provide the necessary funding and support contractor arrangements as may be necessary. Dr. Theodore S. Gold and Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (Ret.) will serve as co-chairmen of the Task Force. Mr. Glenn Lamartin, OUSD(A&T), will serve as Executive Secretary, and Dr. Frank Dellermann, OASD(ISP) will serve as the point of contact and representative from OASD(ISP). Lieutenant Colonel Keith Larson, USAF, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative and Lieutenant Colonel Clay Stewart, USAF, will serve as the Defense Policy Board Secretariat representative.
It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official. The Task Force should submit an interim report by early April, and a final report in September 1995.
ABBREVIATIONS MEANINGA&T Acquisition & Technology A/C Aircraft AADC Area Air Defense Commander ABI Airborne Intercept ABL Air Borne Laser ABR Airborne Radar ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADSAM Air Defense Surface to Air Missile AIT Advanced Interceptor Technology AO Area of Operations API Ascent Phase Intercept ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense AWAC Airborne Warning and Control BM Ballistic Missile BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BPI Boost Phase Intercept BW Biological Warfare C2 Command and Control C3 Command, Control and Communications C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence C4 Command, Control, Communications, Computers C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence CBW Chemical/Biological Warfare CD Camouflage, Concealment & Deception CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability CENTCOM Central Command CID Combat Identification CINC Commander in Chief CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff CM Cruise Missile COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis CONOPS Concept of Operations CONUS Continental United States CSS Combat Service Support DCA Defensive Counterair DepSecDef Deputy Secretary of Defense DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DoD Department of Defense DPB Defense Policy Board DSB Defense Science Board DSP Defense Satellite Program ESM Electronic Surveillance Measures EUCOM European Command
C-3IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield IPT Integrated Process Team JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander JFC Joint Force Commander JTC Joint Theater Commander JTF Joint Task Force JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System JTMD Joint Theater Missile Defense JWCA Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment KKV Kinetic Kill Vehicle LEAP Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile LO Low Observable MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System NBC Nuclear/Biological/Chemical NTM National Technical Means OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense PAC-2 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 PM Program Manager POD Point of Debarkation POE Point of Embarkation Pub Publication RCS Radar Cross Section RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance Target Acquisition S&T Science and Technology SAM Surface to Air Missile SBL Spaced Based Laser SCC Standing Consultative Commission SecDef Secretary of Defense SM-2 BLK IV A Standard Missile 2 Block IV A SOF Special Operations Forces STAR System Threat Assessment Report T&E Test and Evaluation TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense TEL Transporter, Erector, Launcher THAAD Theater High Altitude Area Defense TM Theater Missile TMD Theater Missile Defense UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle UOES User Operational Evaluation System USACOM United States Atlantic Command V-1 German WW II Cruise Missile V-2 German WW II Ballistic Missile C-4VHF Very High Frequency VLO Very Low Observable WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction C-5