FAS | Space | Star Wars | Doctrine & Ops |||| Index | Search |


Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War
Jeremiah D. Sullivan, Dan Fenstermacher, Daniel Fisher, Ruth Howes, O'Dean Judd, Roger Speed Science and Global Security Volume 8 (1999), pp.40-97 -- There is an absolute contradiction between the Army scores for Patriot performance during Gulf War for all engagements and the scores based on the video data.

The Patriot Missile: Performance in the Gulf War Reviewed
Alexander Simon, Center for Defense Information, 15 July 1996 "The Patriot missile has been hailed by some military advocates as the great defender of American troops (in Saudi Arabia) and Israeli civilians during the Gulf War. Furthermore the Patriot's Gulf War performance has been pointed to as a reason to pursue national missile defense as well as theater missile defense. Others claim that the Patriot was ineffective in stopping Iraqi Scuds (particularly in Israel) and is a perfect example of why BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense ) or "Star wars" as its detractors refer to it will not work. Five years after the Gulf War, the debate still continues."

Previous Experiences With Ballistic Missile Attacks and Defenses
George Lewis Symposium on Theater Ballistic Missiles: What Is the Threat? What Can Be Done? American Physical Society Physics and Society Volume 23, Number 4 October 1994. "In considering the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation and possible responses, it is useful to begin by reviewing previous ballistic (and cruise) missile attacks. Here I will focus on the best documented cases: the German attacks on Britain and the Iraqi attacks on Israel."

U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War
A Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session May 25, 1994, notably Chapter 1. Iraqi Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability "Of particular concern were the chemical warheads of Al-Hussein modified SCUD missiles, each filled with five gallons of Sarin. Twenty-eight of these warheads have been drained and destroyed by the U.S. inspectors."

  • A Review of the Postol and Lewis Evaluation of the White Sands Missile Range Evaluation of the Suitability of TV Video Tapes to Evaluate Patriot Performance During the Gulf War INSIDE THE ARMY - November 16, 1992, pages 7-9 by Peter D. Zimmerman

  • Desert Storm 2000: A Preliminary Look at The Impact of Desert Storm Upon Strategic Defenses On 31 January 1991, SDIO/PTI asked 16 defense experts to address the impact of the current Iraqi war upon strategic defenses and, as an excursion, to examine the conflict in the time frame 2000-2010, under the assumption that an Iraqi-type enemy then possessed several ballistic missile nuclear warheads.

  • PATRIOT'S SUCCESS WILL NOT SPIN-OFF TO SDI PROGRAM Congressman Charles E. Bennett (D-Fla.) - 30 January 1991

    "Patriot works ... what has taken place here is a triumph of American technology ... we are witnessing a revolution in modern warfare -- a revolution that will shape the way that we defend ourselves for decades to come. For years, we've heard that anti-missile defenses won't work; that shooting down a ballistic missile is impossible -- like trying to "hit a bullet with a bullet." some people called it impossible -- you called it your job. They were wrong -- and you were right. Thank God you were right. (Applause.) The critics said that this system was plagued with problems ... You knew they were wrong -- those critics -- all along. And now the world knows it, too. Beginning with the first Scud launched in Saudi Arabia, right on to Saudi Arabia -- and the Patriot that struck it down -- and with the arrival of Patriot battalions in Israel: All told, Patriot is 41 for 42 -- 42 Scuds engaged -- 41 intercepted. (Applause.) ... Patriot is proof positive that missile defense works. "

  • Letter to the President from Reps. Robert K. Dornan, Jon Kyl, et al March 7, 1991

    Patriot and SDI
    16 April 1991 - House Committee on Armed Services

    • RICHARD PERLE Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
    • Albert Carnesale Professor of Public Policy and Administration, John P. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

    Statement by Robert A. Skelly Vice President Public and Financial Relations Raytheon Company
    On April 25, 1991 Raytheon Company released a statement concerning the effectiveness of its Patriot air defense missile system during the recent Middle East war. The company took this action in response to contrary testimony before Congressional committees, editorials in several major newspapers, and wire service and news articles
    Recent attempts to discredit tha performance of the Patriot defense system in both Saudi Arabia and Israel are inaccurate and do great disservice to the system and to the men and women of the United States Army who operated the system in combat.

  • Results of Review of Investigation of Scud attack against Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on February 25, 1991. DoD Memorandum to Correspondents No. 275-M, June 5, 1991

  • Failed at Time of Test: The U.S. Administration and the Patriot's manufacturer presented a deceptive picture of the performance of the Patriot during the war - Article from Ha'aretz, October 24, 1991, by Reuven Pedatzur

    Defense For A New Era / Lessons of the Gulf War
    House Committee on Armed Services, March 30,1992. Ballistic missile defense related excerpts. The full contents of this report are hosted by Poli 378 - American National Security Policy at Rice University. These extracts are rehosted here with their kind permission.

    Improper Use of the Classification System to Suppress Public Debate on the Gulf War Performance of the Patriot Air-Defense System
    18 March 1992 - House Government Operations Committee
    Legislation and National Security Subcommittee

    • Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    7 April 1992 - House Government Operations Committee
    Legislation and National Security Subcommittee

  • Patriot Missile Software Problem GAO Report IMTEC-92-26 February 4, 1992
  • OPERATION DESERT STORM Project Manager's Assessment of Patriot Missile's Overall Performance Is Not Supported GAO Report, T/NSIAD-92-27, April 7, 1992.

  • Postol/Lewis Review of Army's Study on Patriot Effectiveness - September 8, 1992
  • Performance of the Patriot Missiles System
    Activities of the House Committee on Governmental Operations
    One Hundred Second Congress - First and Second Sessions, 1991 - 1992 Report 102-1086, pages 179-188


    Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War CHAPTER VI - THE AIR CAMPAIGN
    Ballistic missile defense related excerpts. The full contents of this chapter is hosted by Poli 378 - American National Security Policy at Rice University. These extracts are rehosted here with their kind permission.

    Performance of the Patriot Missiles System
    Activities of the House Committee on Governmental Operations, One Hundred Second Congress First and Second Sessions, 1991 - 1992, Report 102-1086, pages 179- 188 "The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even these engagements. The public and the Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war."
    Israeli Responses to the Threat of Chemical Warfare
    James Steinberg, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 20., No. 1 Fall 1993, pp.85-101 "Israel became the first country since World War II to provide its entire population with gas masks and protection kits. In addition, during the war, Israel operated active defenses, in the form of Patriot missiles. "

    Appendix A of The Whirlwind War [Center of Military History United States Army - 1995] "Of all the weapons the U.S. Army used during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, none became more instantly recognizable than the boxy Patriot air defense missile-system. Sometimes described as a dumpster on hydraulic lifters, it contributed to the coalition's victory in the war in the Persian Gulf on several levels. Lauding the Patriot's military and diplomatic achievements, General Schwarzkopf predicted that "when the history of DESERT STORM is written, the Patriot system will be singled out as the key" and that the "Patriot's success has ensured [U.N.] coalition solidarity." Despite its achievements, the Patriot had its weaknesses, and as a weapon system it was almost not available in time."

    Patriot in Desert Storm
    FRONTLINE The Gulf War 9-10 January 1996 Throughout the Gulf War there were continuing military and news reports of the Patriot's success in intercepting and destroying Iraqi Scuds. The Army initially said the Patriot achieved an 80 percent success rate in Saudi Arabia and 50 percent in Israel. Those claims later were scaled back to 70 percent and 40 percent. However, not long after the war's end, analysts began to question the Patriot's performance. The Army and Patriot's manufacturer, Raytheon Company, vigorously defended the system and said it was a Gulf War success story.

    Raytheon's Response to WGBH FRONTLINE "Gulf War"
    "The segments on the Patriot missile system's performance in Israel during the Gulf War included in the WGBH World Wide Web site (Internet) FRONTLINE material are inaccurate, incomplete and misleading. This type of inaccurate and unbalanced reporting is not what the viewing public should expect from WGBH."

    FAS | Space | Star Wars | Doctrine & Ops |||| Index | Search |

    Maintained by Webmaster

    Updated Monday, November 29, 1999 5:29:26 PM