Chapter 3


This chapter describes AAMDC AMD operations and how these operations are planned and executed by the AAMDC staff sections and cells within the tactical operations center (TOC). It also describes the responsibilities of the liaison officers (LNOs) that the AAMDC deploys to critical joint and Army C2 nodes to facilitate coordination of theater AMD operations.


3-1. The AAMDC not only performs a traditional C2 mission for Army theater air defense forces, but also integrates the operational elements of TMD for the Army forces. When the AAMDC deploys into a theater, the TOC plans, integrates, coordinates, synchronizes and executes Army AMD operations. The TOC consists of five functional areas or "cells" that operate under the direction of a battle captain. These cells are derived from the AAMDC staff sections as shown in Figure 3-1. Three of these cells, the active defense (AD), passive defense (PD), and attack operations (AO) cells, perform current AMD operations.

Figure 3-1. TOC Functional Cells and Composition

3-2. The other two cells—the plans/communications and administrative/logistics cells—are composite support cells formed from the AAMDC staff. The plans/communications cell performs operations and communications planning to support the three current operations cells. The administrative/logistics cell provides support for all current and future operations.

3-3. The TOC, shown in Figure 3-2, is 100% mobile with its own organic C4I systems and shelters. The TOC contains an integrated system of hardware and software known as the Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS), which is used to conduct AMD operations and execute the AAMDC mission. The configuration of the TOC can be changed if necessary to satisfy the requirements of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC).

Figure 3-2. TOC Configuration.

3-4. TOC operations are summarized below by functional cell and described in more detail later in the chapter under each TMD operational element.

active defense

3-5. Active air defense functions are performed primarily in the active defense and G3 plans cells, with support from the G2 staff. These functions include:

AMD ipb

3-6. IPB is accomplished by the G2 staff. It is a systematic and continuous process of analyzing enemy AMD forces and the battlefield environment to determine the most probable enemy courses of action (COAs). IPB allows the AAMDC commander and intelligence staff to assess enemy capabilities and intentions and predict when and where the enemy will strike and what assets he will use.

3-7. The IPB process is comprised of four steps: (1) defining the battlefield environment, (2) describing the battlefield’s effects, (3) evaluating the threat and (4) determining threat COAs. The active air defense portion of the IPB process is described below.

Battlefield Environment

3-8. To focus the command’s initial intelligence collection efforts and determine intelligence deficiencies, the staff must define the battlefield environment. This involves identifying characteristics of the battlefield that will influence enemy and friendly operations. The staff must develop a broad understanding of battlefield terrain and climatology, the geopolitical environment and a basic understanding of the enemy’s air and missile capabilities. Of particular interest to active air defense planners are:

The staff obtains this and other pertinent information from intelligence reports (for example, the theater intelligence estimate, intelligence summaries and spot intelligence reports) available via digital sources.

Battlefield Effects

3-9. The staff conducts terrain and weather analyses to understand how these factors will affect friendly and enemy operations.

Threat Evaluation

3-10. In evaluating the threat, the staff examines the enemy’s air and missile capabilities, doctrinal organization and tactics, techniques and procedures likely to be employed in combat operations. Using threat models and doctrinal templates, the staff systematically analyzes the threat, including the enemy’s order of battle, and develops a set of general COAs the enemy is likely to pursue.

Threat COAs

3-11. Each COA is then evaluated and prioritized based on the staff’s understanding of enemy doctrine, the battlefield environment and the enemy’s likely objectives. The intent is to replicate the set of specific COAs the enemy is considering, and determine which COA he is most likely to pursue.


3-12. Planning for active air defense operations involves analyzing the mission, performing a defense laydown, assigning missions to subordinate brigades and performing follow up coordination to ensure that forces and selected geopolitical assets remain adequately protected.

3-13. Planners first review the assigned mission and identify the critical assets to be protected. The assets are identified in the defended asset list (DAL). The DAL is a prioritized listing of assets by phase and is included in the OPLAN and air defense plan. The enemy situation is apprised by reviewing the IPB and recent intelligence information to confirm COAs and determine the types and numbers of missiles and aircraft the enemy is likely to employ, the locations of launch sites and the ranges of these sites from the assets to be defended. Planners must also review the composition and disposition of the AMD resources available to protect critical assets.

3-14. After analyzing the mission, a defense laydown is performed to determine if available AMD resources can adequately protect critical assets. This is accomplished through the use of automated planning tools. The locations of enemy launch sites, protected assets and AMD unit locations are plotted and the automated tools used to determine if the required surveillance and engagement coverages and levels of protection can be achieved. If required coverages or levels of protection cannot be achieved with available AMD resources, additional resources must be requested from the ARFOR commander or he must be advised of the risk to forces or assets.

3-15. Planners task organize the EAC ADA brigades and then assign specific assets to the brigades for protection. The brigades then perform more detailed planning to determine which subordinate battalions and task forces will cover the assets. Throughout operations, active air defense planners coordinate with the brigades to ensure AMD resources are sufficient to accomplish the mission.



3-16. The monitoring effort involves several functions:

3-17. Active defense cell personnel monitor enemy air and missile activity by observing situation displays and processing reports of air and missile events. The AMD displays provide a comprehensive, near-real-time picture of the air situation, displaying tracks from a variety of joint and Army sources. The reports provide information on track locations, identification, classification, the number of missiles launched, launch and predicted impact areas and estimated impact times.

3-18. Active defense cell personnel monitor friendly air and missile operations by observing situation displays and processing tactical orders, reports, and information from higher headquarters, adjacent and subordinate units, and LNOs. The active defense cell AMD displays show the operational control measures currently in effect, unit positions, coverages and PTLs. The reports from subordinate units (normally received digitally) include the commander’s narrative summary, situation reports, and engagement reports. Collectively, these reports provide an updated, comprehensive picture of AMD operations, including:

3-19. All of this information is continuously reviewed and assessed by active defense cell personnel. TM launch events and significant red air movements are immediately reported digitally to the Battle Captain and other cells in the AAMDC. Active defense cell personnel also coordinate with subordinate unit LNOs as required to adjust AMD coverages in accordance with the AMD plan or guidance from the Battle Captain.

attack operations

3-20. The AAMDC is not directly involved in the prosecution and execution of ARFOR deep attack operations. However, the AAMDC supports TM attack operations by performing critical planning, analysis, tracking, and target development of TM targets through its attack operations cell and by having LNOs at key TMD nodes (DOCC, ACE, BCD/JAOC, and JSOTF) that can provide additional TM attack operations expertise. TM attack operations functions are performed primarily in the attack operations and G2/G3 Plans cells. These functions are:


3-21. The IPB process described in the previous section applies also to attack operations; however, the focus is on the TM threat and infrastructure.

Battlefield Environment

3-22. In evaluating the battle area, the staff must consider

Battlefield Effects

3-23. In assessing effects of the battlefield, the staff considers how terrain factors and existing road networks might affect the movement of launcher and support vehicles or impact resupply and transload activities. They assess how changes in the weather may change potential operating areas or otherwise affect the conduct of enemy TM operations. They also assess the impact of terrain and weather on joint and Army attack operations and capabilities.

Threat Evaluation

3-24. In evaluating the threat, the staff analyzes the enemy order of battle (EOB), performs mobility and temporal analyses and examines TM doctrine and tactics with the goal of developing doctrinal templates and identifying high value targets.

Threat COAs

3-25. In this phase, the staff compiles and integrates the information gathered in the previous phases to determine the most likely enemy COA, identify high priority targets and lay the groundwork for intelligence collection requirements. Based on previous analyses of weather, terrain and enemy capabilities, doctrine, tactics and infrastructure, the staff identifies the most likely COAs. They also examine TM vulnerabilities and decisive points and determine which high value targets (HVTs) are likely to become high payoff targets (HPTs). Using doctrinal templates, they assess where the various elements of the TM infrastructure (FOBs, transload sites, hide sites and launch sites) are likely to be located. These become the target areas of interest and drive intelligence collection requirements.


3-26. The AAMDC has a strong supporting role in AMD IPB development, attack strategy, and the target development process. The attack operations cell in coordination with AAMDC intelligence personnel and the ACE provide detailed target intelligence to the DOCC and provide advice in the development of TM attack strategy and plans. AAMDC intelligence personnel assist the ACE in the TM portion of the IPB effort by providing dedicated analysts and subject matter expertise.

3-27. The AAMDC G2 may deploy to the ACE a liaison team equipped with the necessary equipment to establish connectivity to intelligence resources. If deployed, the LNO team collects information for the AAMDC and passes information requirements to the ACE collection manager. Recommendations for collection support for AMD IPB are made to the ACE for incorporation in the joint force collection strategy.

3-28. The G2 analysis section supports the attack operations cell by analyzing launch events, conducting countermobility analyses, refining and validating the IPB, nominating deliberate targets 72-96 hours out, analyzing post-launch events, building tracking profiles and disseminating intelligence products and reports for the ARFOR commander or JFLCC.

3-29. The AAMDC G2 leverages all intelligence sources to develop a comprehensive TM intelligence picture. AAMDC G2 personnel may establish intelligence collaboration efforts with their intelligence counterparts at the JAOC through digital and voice means or the AAMDC LNO team deployed to support the DAADC and AADC. TM analysts in the AAMDC G2 section and the JAOC may collaborate in AMD IPB development and share near real time target intelligence. Intelligence collaboration between component TMD nodes ensures all available TM information is fused, efficient use of limited collection resources, and that operational level decision-makers have the best analysis available.

3-30. The DOCC is responsible for coordinating all ARFOR deep operations and targets outside the AO that might affect ARFOR operations. Once a TM attack strategy is formulated, supporting plans developed, and targeting requirements are identified, the DOCC produces a candidate target list (CTL). The CTL represents targets recommended for attack which support the ARFOR plan within the JFC’s overall campaign plan. The attack operations cell develops pre-planned TM target nominations and submits them to the DOCC for inclusion in the CTL. These TM targets are normally targets that are fixed such as communications nodes, infrastructure, and storage depots.

3-31. Concurrently, the JFACC staff at the JAOC is responsible for turning the overall joint air strategy into air tasking orders (ATOs). Each ATO generally covers a 24-hour period and is planned normally 72 hours in advance of implementation. When established, a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) assists the JFC in establishing targeting priorities for the campaign. The AAMDC commander may be a member of the JTCB and brings a TM focus to the process. Using JFC established targeting priorities the JFACC staff and other component liaison elements at the JAOC integrate all component and multinational target nominations to produce a joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). The ARFOR input to the JIPTL is the CTL, which the DOCC forwards to the BCD for inclusion in the JIPTL development process. The JIPTL serves as a basis for developing the ATO.

3-32. Early and continuous IPB collaboration may expedite the JIPTL process by establishing a common TM intelligence picture to support and justify target nominations. Collaborating before actual target nominations are submitted improves the quality of analysis, prevents unnecessary target duplication, provides the opportunity to discuss priorities in support of strategy, coordinates surveillance area requests, minimizes redundancies, and creates a synergy in TM target development.


3-33. While pre-planned targets are an integral part of an overall TM attack strategy the attack operations cell’s reaction to near real time observations of TM activity will determine success in preemptive TM attack operations. TM IPB does not stop after planning. It is a systemic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment. AAMDC intelligence personnel and the attack operations cell have an ongoing mission to analyze and make recommendations on TM indicators to the battle captain for time sensitive targeting decisions. Attack operations cell time sensitive targets (TSTs) are based on observation of near real time TM intelligence and other intelligence products from numerous external sources provided electronically to the AAMDC TOC. TSTs are any targets that cannot be executed in the ATO process.

3-34. The attack operations cell forwards approved TSTs for TM targets of opportunity to the DOCC for prosecution. The DOCC prioritizes all TSTs and decides whether ARFOR attack assets will execute the mission or whether TSTs should be forwarded to the BCD for possible execution by air attack assets. The AAMDC may have attack operations LNOs deployed at the DOCC and the BCD/JAOC to facilitate TST execution and keep the attack operations cell informed of the status of target nominations and all available attack assets. See Figure 3-3 for TM attack operations connectivity.

Figure 3-3. Attack Operations Connectivity

passive defense

3-35. Passive air defense functions are performed primarily in the passive defense cell. These functions include:


3-36. The passive defense cell plans, coordinates, and executes passive air defense warning operations for the ARFOR to minimize the effectiveness of attacking aircraft and missiles. The passive defense cell normally plans and coordinates operations 72 hours in advance. Passive defense cell plans are created with a firm understanding of the AMD IPB, while passive defense cell planners assist the AAMDC G2 with developing NBC intelligence. The passive defense cell contributes to the development of the AMD plan and plans for a warning architecture that can disseminate both general and specific warnings to the force. General warnings indicate that attacks are imminent or have occurred, while specific warnings signify that only certain units or areas are in danger of attack.

3-37. The passive defense cell must develop and maintain an accurate, coherent, tactical picture of friendly land forces to ensure that these forces can be quickly warned if a TBM is launched or an NBC event occurs. Information technology displays with supporting databases provide the exact locations and the identity of friendly forces. These databases are updated at frequent intervals from various joint sources. Using these databases, the passive defense cell can maintain an accurate friendly picture that includes virtually all of the Army, joint, and multinational forces that the AAMDC must warn.

3-38. Concurrently with developing the friendly picture, passive defense cell planners must decide how air, missile, and NBC warnings will be disseminated. Communications means and procedures will vary with the theater of operations. Warning will normally be data and voice for redundancy. Planners may elect to use existing communications capabilities in the theater to facilitate warning of attack, specifically, the air defense early warning architecture, or use an alternative means such as a pager alert warning system.

3-39. A pager alert warning system may expand the existing data warning architecture, distribute warning directly to the lowest levels of the force, and allow flexibility in warning only affected units. If a pager alert warning system is used, the passive defense cell, after a thorough analysis based on METT-TC, recommends which units will receive the pagers in a pager distribution plan. If the number of available pagers is insufficient to equip all units, the passive defense cell planners will recommend alternate methods of warning the units without pagers.

3-40. The passive defense cell also must conduct vulnerability analyses within the ARFOR area of operations to ensure personnel and equipment will survive an air and missile or NBC attack with minimum casualties and damage. Analyses will focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In conducting vulnerability analyses, planners must consider a number of factors including hardening, redundancy, dispersal, civil authority training, and NBC defense. In order to advise the commander in a timely manner, passive defense cell planners will have information systems to quickly produce vulnerability analyses against various threat courses of action or scenarios.

3-41. Passive defense cell planners will ensure their passive air defense procedures and plans are current and relevant to the theater in which the AAMDC is deployed. They will also assist in developing theater procedures and plans and share information and expertise with other component passive defense cells. Planners may also be called upon to assist in development of theater deception plans.


3-42. The passive defense cell tracks friendly forces and monitors ARFOR or JFLCC ground and AMD operations to assist it performing its primary function of disseminating warnings to the force. The cell also monitors the DAL and AMD operations conducted to protect priority assets. Reports of TM launches are provided digitally by several joint sources in near real time to information workstations within the cell. The workstation displays provide the number of missiles launched, launch locations, and predicted impact areas and times.

3-43. Other workstations receive NBC events and display the type of event, type of burst or agent, area of contamination, downwind hazard, and the units affected. The cell has the ability to predict ground effects of WMD from identified incoming TMs and pass that information immediately to affected units. Passive defense cell personnel also can receive joint force information, intelligence information, and weather data to aid in current operations decisions.

3-44. The passive defense cell disseminates general and specific warnings based on receipt of the above information. This is shown in Figure 3-4.

Figure 3-4. Warning Process

Liaison officer operations

3-45. Liaison teams, commonly referred to as coordination teams, are essential in joint and multinational AMD operations. They facilitate understanding, coordination, synchronization, and mission accomplishment. Liaison personnel must be familiar with the staff and operational organizations, doctrine, and procedures of the headquarters or element with which they will work as well as being subject matter experts on ARFOR and AAMDC air and missile defense capabilities. AAMDC liaison requirements are fulfilled through dedicated liaison personnel and information technology systems.

3-46. AAMDC liaison teams can deploy to all major theater C2 headquarters to include the JFC, JFLCC, JFACC/AADC, JFMCC, and JSOCC, and to the following ARFOR elements---DOCC, BCD, and ACE. In particular, the AAMDC normally deploys a robust liaison team to the AADC location to support the DAADC and the AADC, and integrate with the JAOC and BCD. The liaison team is lead by a senior ADA officer when the DAADC is not present and may consist of active air defense, attack operations, and IPB experienced personnel to execute 24-hour AMD operations. Liaison team equipment and support requirements are described in Appendix A, Figure A-9.


3-47. Force projection operations usually begin as a rapid response to a crisis somewhere in the world. Deployed forces, lines of communication, and geopolitical assets will need protection from air and missile attack. AMD forces must be lethal, modular, versatile, and tactically and strategically mobile to accomplish the mission.


3-48. Military forces are mobilized in response to a situation requiring military intervention. Rapid mobilization of the reserve component piece of the AAMDC is critical during this stage and must be planned and rehearsed in advance. During mobilization and predeployment, the ARFOR commander uses the AAMDC to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and execute AMD within the assigned AO. The AAMDC establishes communications with and sends liaisons to the ARFOR staff and other units, organizations, and agencies as required. Normally, the AAMDC quickly deploys an initial coordination element (ICE) of planners and logistics personnel into theater to start planning and coordination. The ICE is followed by a larger advance party to continue planning and lay the groundwork for the deployment and reception of the main body and the TOC equipment.

3-49. Although planning is an ongoing process, the AAMDC works in coordination with the ARFOR commander and his staff to convert the command’s contingency plan (CONPLAN) to an OPLAN. The AAMDC conducts analysis and assessment activities, participates in the decision making process, and assists in the development of the operations order. The AAMDC will use automated planning capabilities to develop the air and missile defense annex to the ARFOR’s plan and synchronizes it with the joint force and other component OPLAN(s). Planning cells within the AAMDC will conduct detailed planning and assessment activities for entry and follow-on operations.

3-50. During the mobilization and predeployment stage numerous concurrent activities for planning and execution will continue. The ARFOR uses the AAMDC to validate possible air and missile threat scenarios and courses of action. The AMD IPB serves as the basis for determining the most effective deployment strategy, development of the ARFOR’s intelligence plan, and the appropriate mix of weapons, sensors, and capabilities to counter the anticipated TM and air threat for each phase of the operation. During this stage the AAMDC:


3-51. Deployment and entry operations are characterized by rapid deployment of forces into the theater of operations. As part of the Army's initial force projection capability, the AAMDC is deployed to the theater under the command of the ARFOR or the operational control of the JFLCC. This force will include the TOC, command group, LNO teams, and essential staff sections. Upon arrival in theater, the AAMDC establishes connectivity through the Army’s C4I architecture and joint interfaces as required and establish linkages to joint, multinational and national C4I systems.

3-52. The AAMDC represents the ARFOR or JFLCC during joint planning on AMD issues. The AAMDC monitors enemy activities using intelligence provided by available national and theater intelligence sources. The AAMDC continuously processes and reviews intelligence information, collects battle damage assessment (BDA), and assesses the enemy situation. LNO teams continue to deploy as required. During this stage the AAMDC:


3-53. The AAMDC supports the ARFOR or JFLCC by providing effective land-based active air defense to protect maneuver forces and the JFC’s priority assets. The AAMDC assists in implementing passive air defense measures throughout the AO and provides TM attack strategy recommendations to the ARFOR and JFACC staffs for planning and coordinating of pre-planned and immediate missions. The AAMDC plans, coordinates, monitors, integrates and sustains Army AMD operations and recommends adjustments to the DAL. During this stage the AAMDC:



3-54. Post conflict and redeployment operations generally take place after cessation of hostilities and the deployed force has accomplished its primary mission. Reconstitution activities support the redeployment. AAMDC will task organize AMD forces based on reassessed JFC and ARFOR priorities and the DAL. AMD forces may maintain an alert or ready status during this stage to protect the force. Additionally, AAMDC may make recommendations on AMD elements to remain behind for stability and support operations. During this stage the AAMDC:


3-55. Due to the AAMDC’s unique composition of active component and reserve component personnel demobilization for reserve component personnel must be planned in advance. AAMDC will establish procedures, actions, and responsibilities to meet demobilization requirements. Lessons learned must be captured before demobilization is completed.