ARMY AIR and MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND OPERATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
ASSETS REQUIRING PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . 4-7
ARMY AIR DEFENSE IN THEATER AIR . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
DEFENSE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
JOINT & MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 4-10
AAMDC FORCE PROJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RETROGRADE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The focus of Army operations is no longer forward deployment. The new doctrine is focused on force projection into major regional contingencies in support of war or SASO. The Commanding General, AAMDC supports the foundation of Army operations by implementation of the principles of war. Therefore, the expertise in joint and multinational operations that served the US Army and ADA in Europe will be the basis of a new and expanded CONUS-based AAMDC mission.
The AAMDC is responsible to integrate the active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) into fully ready and deployable assets. The AAMDC ensures that the C4I organizations required for battle management are available for war and SASO. The AAMDC is required to meet the complex air defense threat of the future. This must be done in terms of preparedness to counter the proliferation of air threat and missile capabilities throughout the world. The rationale for this decision is given below:
· The requirement for an AAMDC is embedded in the joint nature of AD operations.
· The Army, Navy, Air Force and US Marine Corps participate in the AD Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) through interlocking missions and complementary capabilities.
· The AAMDC's role is to horizontally/vertically integrate and synchronize army AD operations across service and allied lines.
The AAMDC must be flexible to operate throughout the full range of military operations. During peace, the AAMDC must train to meet AD operational requirements. This training includes exercises in tactics, techniques and procedures with joint and multi-national forces for deployment by land, sea, and air assets. The ability to project U.S. forces to and from theater bases worldwide in a rapid, timely, and organized manner will be key measures of the AAMDC’s effectiveness, efficiency, and readiness. The size of the force to deploy is based on the needs identified in intelligence and operational planning. This planning will be in accordance with the strategic principles that guide the deployment of military forces and is applicable to war and support and stability operations.
The AAMDC is an administrative and operational headquarters. The mission of this headquarters is the worldwide planning, operation and execution of Army ADA requirements. It provides the single point of contact for ADA operations in support of all major regional contingencies. Since air defense operations are inherently joint, the AAMDC plays a key role in joint and multinational operations. The roles required to support the AAMDC mission are listed below.
· The use of national and theater level assets to collect, fuse, and disseminate information.
· Integration of sensors and weapons systems.
· Lead service for the implementation and integration of theater missile defense.
· Coordination of space-based resources to support Army AD operations.
· Planning of third dimension counter RISTA activities.
· Plan, coordinate and implement passive AD measures.
· Integrate the use of space in war and SASO.
· Establish continuous surveillance.
· Train to support joint and multinational operations.
· Standardize air defense training for flexibility.
· Evaluate the readiness of organizations, units and individuals using the MTP/ARTEP.
· Provide sensor to shooter connectivity through battlefield digitization.
· Recommend prioritization of logistics support of ADA requirements to the logistics managers.
b. Roles of AAMDC
The AAMDC's evolving roles are designed to take air and missile defense into the next century. These roles support the spirit and intent of joint operations, effective and efficient use of new technologies and the limited equipment and personnel resources. The AAMDC is resourced and designed by the active and reserve components to plan, train, coordinate, standardize, integrate and project the ADA forces. See Figure 4-1 (2-4). The roles are specified below.
(1) Passive AD operations. The AAMDC will perform early warning operations in support of national strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. It includes counter RISTA operations for countering RPVs and UAVs. It will leverage space-based satellites and systems supporting battle management and surveillance to include C4I.
(2) Plan and project theater missile defense. The TMD is a joint service effort to leverage the system capabilities of all systems necessary for the successful defense of a theater. All contributors (Army, Navy, Air force and Marines) provide vital portions of this complicated structure.
(3) Execute, train and plan joint and multinational operations. The requirement to train and plan joint and multinational operations is not new but has become more complex and has heightened importance in the post cold war world. The projection of US forces from CONUS requires ongoing, dynamic, long reaching, in-depth training and planning to support force projection operations worldwide (see Figure 4-5(2-8))
(4) Integration of C2, sensors and weapon systems. This role is absolutely necessary to operate timely, efficient and effective AD operations. Reaction time, speed and distance greatly affect AD operations in a TMD scenario. The speed of enemy delivery systems makes it absolutely imperative that ADA systems get information as quickly as possible to effectively engage any and all air threats.
c. Concurrent Missions
The possibility of concurrent major regional conflicts requires that the AAMDC support worldwide requirements for ADA forces. The AAMDC organization is designed to be mobile, tailorable and responsive. The AAMDC supports the CINC FORSCOM in both peace and war. The AAMDC also supports the unified commands (see Figure 4-7(2-10)) through AD planning cells with emphasis on unified commands experiencing active turbulence in a major regional area.
(1) Peacetime Operations
The AAMDC commander must continually plan and keep abreast of possible areas of conflict throughout the world. AAMDC preparedness is essential to forecasting involvement in MRCs, LRCs or SASO. The AAMDC must remain ready to project the TAADE into a theater to support force projection operations regardless of location. During peacetime the AAMDC participates in the following activities:
· Joint training · Mitigates BM/C4I issues
· Prepares operations plans · Coordination/liaison with other services and allies
· Area/threat analysis
(2) Wartime Operations
During wartime the scope of operations will require the movement of the AAMDC to a major regional conflict location. If this projection occurred an AAMDC rear headquarters is still needed in CONUS to provide command and control to ADA worldwide commitments. Normally, the CG, AAMDC would deploy a TAADE into the major regional area. Additionally, the ASCC will be provided a force planning cell. During wartime the AAMDC participates in the following activities:
· Integrates AD protection · Coordinates TMD
· Establishes Army BM/C4I · Task organizes ADA
· Implements passive defense · Disseminates JTAGS data
The AAMDC commander exercises his responsibilities to the projected force's commander through his TAADE. This team can be expanded to meet evolving operational and tactical requirements. See Wartime Operational Connectivity illustration (Figure 4-9(2-12)).
Increasingly, US military operations will support internationally sanctioned action against one or more nations or non-nation state forces. The AAMDC has a worldwide operational mission. The services must continue to improve their capabilities to conduct joint and multinational operations.
The air threat can approach at high speeds from any direction and deliver a wide variety of ordnance. This will require air defense operations to be instantaneous, premeditated and effective. Successful air defense operations are key to generating and sustaining combat power in force projection operations.
ADA tasks encompass the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. ADA capabilities must be synergistic with the capabilities of other services and multinational forces. Offensive air operations contribute to air defense with fighter aircraft, countering most of the fixed-wing threat. ADA will focus on defeating ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs and helicopters. Any fixed-wing aircraft which penetrate the joint and multinational fighter engagement zones must be destroyed by ADA.
ADA units must be rapidly deployable and highly lethal against the expected threat, and mobile on a level commensurate with that of the protected force. They must be fully capable of integrating with applicable Army, joint, and multinational units and headquarters, and capable of battlefield survival and sustainment. ADA units must be capable of full-dimensional operations. They must train to fight as part of a joint, multinational, or interagency force.
To counter the spectrum of aerial threats, current doctrinal initiatives are built on the premise that a seamless defense must be the overall goal of the air defense efforts. Air threats confronting US forces today and in the future are divided into those best countered by manned aircraft and surface-based systems. Air- and surface-based air defenses seek efficiency by avoiding duplication.
The Army is leveraging the synergy of joint capabilities to the maximum extent by requiring ADA to counter ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, helicopters, and to defeat any fixed-wing aircraft that avoids destruction by joint and combined fighter aircraft. Synergy in the joint arena results from sound doctrine, proper training, and a common understanding of joint force relationships and procedures.
Air defense fights within the framework of the Army's warfighting doctrine which has the goal of land force dominance to achieve decisive victory. To ensure that the goal is achieved, the US Army has integrated all Army Universal Task List (AUTL) into doctrine. The mission has expanded to a theater missile and air defense focus..
The AAMDC doctrine provides for standardization of ADA organizations training and operations (joint and multinational). This permits flexibility to meet worldwide ADA force projection requirements. The complexity of the air defense mission mandates that an AAMDC must be organized, staffed and equipped to provide the following:
· Command and control responsibilities to Forces Command.
· Command and control leadership over EAC ADA brigades.
· Exercise command and control through the TAADE.
· Joint training exercises.
· Joint and combined planning.
· Preparation of operation plans for the major regional conflict area.
· Preparation of area/threat analysis.
· Coordination of ADA force status with the ASCC of each unified command as approved by CINC, FORSCOM.
· Providing liaison with each ASCC unified command, as approved by CINC, FORSCOM.
· Force projection exercises.
· Recommendation for approval of MTO&E requests submitted by EAC ADA brigade organizations and units.
· Implementation of Defensive operations such as active defense and passive defense.
· Integration with the Army's digitized architecture to provide sensor to shooter conductivity.
a. AAMDC Doctrine
The worldwide mission for the AAMDC must meet the following organization guidelines or organizational rules:
· Lean force structure.
· Modular in design.
· Representative mix of the active component and reserve component personnel and systems.
· Provides for coordination and liaison with unified commands for planning and joint/combined training cell (PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, USACOM and SOUTHCOM).
· Tailorable to the scope of the threat and size of the MRC.
· Ensures state-of-the-art BM/C4I equipment and personnel to operate in a joint or combined
environment to include operations and maintenance.
· Participates in coordination of AAMDC activities with Space Command.
· Participates in US Army in digitization of the battlefield.
b. TAADE Doctrine
The TAADE commander is the direct representative of the Commanding General, AAMDC. Doctrinal guidelines for employment of the regional team forward included:
· Modular projection by section.
· Recommends to the CG, AAMDC and applicable ASCC task organization of ADA to AD force.
· Establishes horizontal and vertical integration of ADA to AD force.
· Coordinates space support for ADA to AD force.
· Plans TMD coverage.
· Implements passive defense measures.
· Establishes Army BM/C4I architecture to provide continuous surveillance and support attack operations.
· Disseminates information using JTAGS.
· Coordinates airborne counter RISTA operations, strategic, operational and tactical level.
· Coordinates counter UAV/RPV operations, strategic, operational and tactical level.
· Ensures the defense design for employment of EAC ADA brigade protects the ASCC priorities.
· Evaluates ADA defense design of EAC ADA brigade units to ensure kill probability desired can be achieved by missiles available at the point of engagement.
· Cross-levels missiles, as required.
4-3 ASSETS REQUIRING ADA PROTECTION
Various assets located in theaters of operation require ADA protection. These assets fall into three categories: first, theater strategic geopolitical assets; second, theater rear area assets; third, high and medium altitude protection of assets positioned/located in the corps area. See AAMDC Contribution to Integrated Theater Air Defense illustration (Figure 4-6).
a. Geopolitical Assets
Geopolitical assets are critical to the stability of allied or friendly nations. Protection of these assets requires a high probability of kill to preclude lethal effects and collateral damage on the ground which might damage geopolitical assets. Geopolitical assets are typically population centers, airports, seaports and national historical monuments. Geo-political centers normally contain several key assets in a specific geographical area. The defense design required to protect geopolitical assets shall be a joint or combined force effort to provide overwhelming force projection and decisive victory.
b. Echelons Above Corps Assets
The AD protection of EAC assets is a joint responsibility of defensive counter-air forces which include friendly joint or multinational air forces and the theater AAMDC. The protection of these assets ensures successful force projection stages of mobilization, predeployment, deployment, entry operations, operations, and postconflict operations. EAC assets are generally static and typically consist of facilities, (e.g., Supply depots, Theater Army Area Command, Communication facilities, POL depots, etc.) APODs, and SPODs. The JFC will prioritize defended assets.
Figure 4-6. AAMDC contribution to integrated air defense.
c. Corps Assets
Corps assets that require protection are C2 nodes, corps support command (COSCOM) activities, and designated maneuver elements. The AAMDC commander may position EAC ADA elements to provide overwatch of corps assets or reinforce corps ADA units.
4-4 Operational Capabilities
To successfully perform AD and TMD operations, the AAMDC must have multiple operational capabilities. These capabilities are described within the context of the Force XXI patterns of operations. The Force XXI patterns of operations consist of six separate areas: Force Projection, Force Protection, Gain Information Dominance, Shape the Battlespace, Decisive Operations, and Sustain and transition the Force.
a. Force Projection. Initially, Army forces are deployed by air or naval transport. The force commander seeks to maximize firepower, lethality, and survivability of this force while minimizing its lift requirements. Land forces capable of conducting effective TMD operations may rapidly deploy into the theater of operations to neutralize TMs and associated infrastructure, with the goal of allowing no TMs launched against friendly forces or assets. If IPB indicates TMs are employed in a theater of operations, the Army will deploy the AAMDC to support the ARFOR / JFLCC. This command performs critical AD and TMD planning activities to support Army forces entering the theater. In theater, it interfaces with the joint TMD architecture. The AAMDC coordinates with elements of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
b. Force Protection. The deploying forces are most vulnerable and at risk during force projection operations. Force Protection requires the AAMDC to have the capability to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and support the ARFOR / JFLCC throughout force projection operations. It will plan, coordinate, and recommend CSS support for EAC ADA brigades throughout the theater. By serving as the TAADCOORD / DAADC, the AAMDC is responsible for planning, coordinating and de-conflicting and integrated active defense throughout the ARFOR / JFLCC’s AO. The AAMDC will provide force warning to all forces. This tactical warning requires effective, interoperable sensors and intelligence processors, to ensure critical time sensitive intelligence is disseminated rapidly to units and locations.
c. Gain Information Dominance. The AAMDC monitors friendly and enemy air operations, monitors air defense unit locations and status, and recommends defense designs and AD and TMD priorities. Communications capabilities required to support AD and TMD operations must include a global information network accessible to all units and activities participating in AD and TMD operations. This network must be accessible from strategic locations in CONUS, operational C2 nodes throughout the theater of operations, tactical war headquarters, and the soldiers. The AAMDC specific system capabilities must support:
· Interoperability with national, joint, and multinational systems for effective data and voice communications;
· Use of broadcast communications to provide intelligence, attack warning information, and NBC hazard warning to all recipients simultaneously, or selectively by sensor-to-soldier links;
· Reliable, high capacity, long distance communications to include aerial, satellite, or surrogate satellite capabilities;
· Integrate joint automated air / ground space management;
· Employ embedded interactive simulations / applications for operator training;
· Efficient user / operator interface with the system for purposes of control and monitoring the systems.
d. Shape the Battlespace. Once initial entry into the theater of operations has begun, buildup and expansion continues and the battlefield takes shape. Sustaining the tempo of expansion operations while retaining the element of surprise, is crucial to success. In theater, the AAMDC will monitor enemy activities using intelligence provided by available space, aerial and ground based sensor platforms, as well as deployed SOF teams. These sensors will provide Intelligence and weather information tracking enemy movements. They will also assess intentions, bolster passive defense measures, and assist in developing plans for conducting AD and TMD operations. The AAMDC continuously processes and reviews intelligence information and reassesses the enemy situation based on this intelligence.
e. Decisive Operations. The objective of the force commander during decisive operations is to achieve decisive victory quickly and with minimal casualties. Maintaining freedom of maneuver for the force is imperative. The AAMDC must continue to plan, coordinate, monitor, deconflict and sustain AD and TMD operations and recommend adjustments to the TM defense based on joint and Army requirements.
f. Sustain and Transition the Force. At the close of the decisive battle, friendly forces are required to prepare for follow-on operations. They must rearm, refuel, and reconstitute personnel and equipment. The AAMDC recommends theater-wide ADA logistics support to ensure proper allocation of ADA peculiar supplies.
4-5 Intelligence Requirements/Capabilities
The AAMDC intelligence requirements are worldwide. The means to conduct surveillance, process data, and perform successful battle management are dependent on the adequacy of C4I facilities and equipment being made available to the AAMDC to execute planning for force projection, protection and sustainment. This includes the development of the AD architecture requirements for digitization of the battlefield to enhance battle management.
The AAMDC is capable of integrating advanced sensors and processors (space, aerial, and ground-based) capable of rapidly collecting, integrating, and fusing intelligence information for use by commanders at all echelons. Databases are capable of update in near real time, and must be readily accessible to users and tailorable. The AAMDC intelligence system will:
· Receive intelligence information on the enemy air and missile infrastructure, with an accuracy sufficient to support the targeting capability of all deep attack weapon systems;
· Provide reliable and timely TM launch detection, target recognition, and tracking information;
· Provide information at multiple levels of security;
· Automatically sanitize information, when appropriate, to facilitate the planning and execution of AD and TMD operations;
· Provide accurate, detailed, and timely weather information (current and predicted).
Intelligence is used to gather critical information for planning, organizing, training, mobilizing, projecting, and sustaining subordinate ADA organizations.
a. Intelligence Information Data Base
The intelligence information data base requires that priority intelligence requirements (PIR) be generated for automated processing. High speed processing, reduction, correlating, and prioritizing is required. Processed data is used by the leaders or decision makers. Therefore, communications must be used to integrate force level C2, and support the AAMDC operations or battle plan. It also must synchronize and sustain force operations.
b. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
IPB is the product of the intelligence cycle that guides national, strategic, and tactical decisions. Because the AAMDC and its subordinate units deal with real-time high speed targets, the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence is even more critical. In ADA, both force and engagement operations are dependent on intelligence (see Appendix B).
4-6 Theater Missile Defense Operations
TMD encompasses all measures taken to defeat, destroy, or neutralize enemy missiles employed against friendly forces and assets. The purpose of TMD is to counter the TM threat by coordinating and integrating the four operational elements of TMD into cohesive and coherent combat operations. Air and Missile Defense functions are accomplished under one or a mix of the operational elements of Attack Operations, Active Defense (Current and future Ops), Passive Defense and Command, Control, Communications, Commuters and Intelligence (C4I).
a. Attack Operations apply to operations initiated to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize TM launch platforms and their supporting command, control, and communications (C3); logistic structures; and reconnaissance, intelligence surveillance, and target acquisition platforms. The objective is to prevent the launch of TMs.
Systems used to support attack operations may include rotary and fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-surface and air-to-air operations, surface-to-surface fires, naval missile forces, special operations forces, antisubmarine forces, EW systems, and maneuver forces. Attack operations utilize all sensor and intelligence data available to locate and attack enemy theater missile systems, their components and infrastructure. Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive and developed intelligence. Attack operations require a fully integrated architecture for acquisition, processing attacks and attack assessment of these critical, time-sensitive, mobile targets.
b. Active Defense applies to operations initiated to protect against a TM attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and / or destroying TMs in flight. Active defense includes multi-tiered defense in depth via multiple engagements, using air, land, sea based TMD assets. Defense in depth provides multiple opportunities to negate the TMs with differing capabilities, increases probability of kill, and prohibits the enemy from being able to counter the defensive system with a single technique. It also includes those actions that mitigate the effectiveness of targeting and delivery systems through electronic warfare (EW) against enemy remote or on board guidance systems.
c. Passive Defense applies to measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to minimize the damage caused by TM attacks. Passive defense includes: TM early warning and NBC protection, countersurveillance, deception, camouflage and concealment, hardening, electronic protection, mobility, dispersal, redundancy, recovery, and reconstitution. Planning for passive defense is conducted at all levels. Executing passive defense is the responsibility of unit commanders at all echelons. Passive defense is necessary to provide essential individual and collective protection for friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets.
d. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) missions must be accomplished using existing joint and service C4I systems and resources efficiently to ensure integration with other operational functions to optimize the use of resources. The C4I systems link passive defense, active defense, and attack operations to provide timely assessment of the threat (to include IPB); rapid dissemination of tactical warning; and mission assignment, targeting data, and poststrike assessment to the appropriate JTMD element. For each operational element, the C4I system must provide rapid communications among intelligence assets, the fusion and decision making facilities, warning systems, and weapons systems, to include a capability for rapid coordination with supporting combatant commanders.
4-7 ARMY AIR DEFENSE IN THEATER AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS
The Army plays a key role in joint counterair operations through the AAMDC. Army AD contributes greatly to DCA and TMD attack operations. The Army joins the other services to provide protection for the concentration of critical forces and assets in the theater base. Unity of effort is achieved through integration and coordination of service component CA operations by the JFC. The AADC contributes through the development and promulgation of JFC approved ROE and air defense procedures and measures. This joint approach to CA provides the synchronization necessary to obtain the synergism required for battlefield success.
Army air defense requires the integrated application of all combined arms. For OCA operations, the Army uses deep operations, primarily by special operations forces, aviation and field artillery units, to attack the enemy's air and missile assets before they can be launched against the theater. Active DCA operations conducted by Army forces are in response to immediate enemy air, missile, and surveillance threats. The Army's primary active DCA force is ADA, which provides dedicated low, medium, and high-altitude air defense systems to each level of war. ADA and the other combined arms forces integrate their fires to defend the force and geopolitical assets and ensure freedom to maneuver.
a. Air Defense in Developed and Undeveloped Theaters
Army forces conduct air defense operations in two greatly different types of theaters. Both developed and undeveloped theaters require detailed and integrated Army air defense planning. The theaters illustration at Figure 3-22 provides a comparison of the different characteristics of developed and undeveloped theaters.
DEVELOPED THEATER UNDEVELOPED THEATER
· Forces in place · Insufficient forces in place
· Large contribution of air force for · Fewer Aircraft for CA and TMD
CA and TMD
· Large number of high-value fixed assets · Fewer high-value fixed assets - initially
· Corps are capable of immediate employment · Fighting capability requires rapid build - up
· Known threat capability sophistication · Diverse threat capability quantity sophistication quantity
· Reduced knowledge of threat
Figure 4-22. Comparison of the developed theater with the undeveloped theater.
b. Air Defense Objectives and Roles
Air defense objectives are similar for mature theaters and immature theaters. The roles of Army air defense forces and the other service contributors to joint counterair and theater missile defense are defined by joint doctrine and the JFC's guidance. See JP3-01
The AAMDC participates directly in the development of plans to satisfy the ARFOR CDR and JFC’s objectives. Counterair plans support the strategic objectives of the campaign. They support the joint force commander's intent and concept of the operation. The JFC employs counterair forces to achieve two primary operational objectives: gain control of the air environment and protect the force and selected geopolitical assets. Control of the air environment may change with time and range from limited local air superiority in a specific part of the battlefield to air supremacy over the entire AO or theater.
At the operational level, the Army contributes to the theater counterair campaign. Army combined arms forces provide support for OCA and DCA. ADA units conduct DCA operations and integrate other combined arms contributions to CA. Every participant in Army air defense--ADA, maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence--has a role in achieving the following objectives:
· Ensure combined arms teams retain the freedom to maneuver
· Win the information war
· Place the right force at the right place at the right time
· Sustain the battle, battalion through corps
· Kill enemy air threat(s) the first time
In theater level counterair operations, the primary participants are the joint force and component commanders. The AAMDC commander participates as the ARFOR commander's principal advisor and coordinator on air defense in the theater. The AAMDC commander also commands all EAC ADA brigades. The AAMDC commander coordinates and synchronizes all ADA in the theater to provide for seamless air defense coverage throughout the battlespace. The EAC ADA brigade commander is a key participant in force projection operations in which the brigade is the senior ADA headquarters for a field Army.
(a) The Joint Force and Component Commanders
The JFC establishes campaign objectives, approves plans, and apportions air power. The JFC commands forces through the Air Force, Army, Marine, and Naval component commanders. The JFC may appoint a JFLCC if necessary. The JFC may designate a JFACC who is normally the service component commander controlling the majority of air assets in the theater. The JFACC may be assigned the responsible of the ACA and also the AADC. However, this is not always the case and each entails interrelated but distinct responsibilities. Even if a JFACC is not designated, an AADC and ACA will be appointed. The AAMDC participates in the AD role through the JFLCC/ARFOR Commander. See the following illustration (Figure 3-23).
Figure 4-23. Joint force commander's air defense role.
The key responsibility of the ACA is to provide the flexibility needed within the airspace control system. Detailed responsibilities of the ACA are specified in JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control in the C2. The AADC, plans, coordinates, and integrates theater air defense operations. The AADC promulgates the air defense procedures, rules of engagement, and airspace control measures which facilitate the integration and synchronization of all air defense operations. For a detailed discussion of the AADC, see Joint Publication in the 3-01 series.
In most theaters, the majority of air defense coordination of interest to ADA occurs between the JFACC or AADC and the JFLCC. The JFLCC integrates Army capabilities into the joint air defense effort through the AADC's agency for planning, executing, and synchronizing the air campaign. If the AADC is from the USAF or USN, this agency is called the air operations center. If the AADC is from the USMC, the tactical air command center conducts the joint air defense activities. Each component provides a liaison representative to this AADC agency. The representatives function as the necessary interface among the service component headquarters.
The BCD is the ARFOR/JFLCC’s representation in the USAF AOC. The ASCC or LCC will establish a similar liaison arrangement if the JFACC is from the USN or USMC. The ASCC or LCC organizes the BCD based on the type of theater and the AOC organization. Corps and AAMDC commanders will both have representatives in the BCD as illustrated in Figure 3-24. In force projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCD. The BCD provides ASCC or LCC input into the air campaign planning process. Army air defense contributions are planned and coordinated through Army, AAMDC, corps, and division CPs. The AADC delegates execution of DCA operations to one or more control and reporting centers, which direct air defense for an assigned region or sector. Refer to FM 100-13 for a more detailed discussion of the BCD and the control and reporting center. See the following illustration (Figure 4-24).
Figure 4-24. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment.
(b) The AAMDC Commander
In an established theater, the AAMDC commander performs several functions. The AAMDC commander is the theater ADA commander and the air defense coordinator to the ARFOR/JFLCC and the JFACC or AADC. The AAMDC commander ensures that the Army is an integral part of joint air and missile defense operations and planning. The AAMDC is an operational instrument of the theater commander with missions to defend geopolitical assets and protect forces. The AAMDC provides the majority of the theater Army DCA force. Figure 4-25 illustrates the AAMDC Commander's Air Defense Roles.
Figure 4-25. The AAMDC commander's air defense roles.
The AAMDC commander assigns missions to subordinate forces, task organizes the command, and coordinates the efforts of subordinate units. The AAMDC commander deploys resources in both the combat and communications zones and influences tactical operations by shifting the ADA force between these two areas, based on the concept of the operation.
As the ADCOORD to the ASCC or the LCC, the AAMDC commander is a special staff officer who participates in the G3 or DCSOPS planning cell and assists in developing Army OCA and DCA input to the air campaign plan. He is the integrator for all Army TMD operations, as illustrated by Figure 3-26. The AAMDC commander also participates in the AADC's DCA planning as ADCOORD and Army AD representative to the JFACC. In addition, the AAMDC commander includes corps air and missile defense requirements during planning.
Figure 4-26. AAMDC contributions to theater missile defense.
(c) The EAC ADA Brigade Commander
The EAC ADA brigade commander assumes the missions of the AAMDC commander if the TAADE is not initially deployed. Normally, the brigade will be augmented by teams from the RCE to perform those missions unique to the AAMDC. If the TAADE does deploy, the EAC ADA brigade commander interfaces directly for operational reasons with major subordinate elements of the ARFOR, AFFOR, NAVFOR, and MCFOR which are deployed in the theater rear area.
(d) The Corps ADA Brigade Commander
Since the corps can operate at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, the corps ADA brigade commander has a unique role in air and missile defense planning. The commander ensures that corps air and missile defense requirements are integrated into the theater counterair plans. The commander also coordinates the air and missile defense planning with the AAMDC, adjacent corps, and subordinate divisions. In force projection operations involving only one corps, the corps ADA brigade commander may perform the joint tasks and functions normally accomplished by the AAMDC commander. The role of the corps ADA brigade commander is discussed further in Section IV.
Effective battle command enables AD forces to perform their combat missions and support overall force objectives. The following three fundamental principles form the basis for AD engagement operations--
1. Centralized control with decentralized execution.
2. Air battle management.
3. Management by exception.
Although these principles apply to both offensive and defensive activities, they particularly relate the management of air defense systems in active air defense operations to the conduct of the overall battle.
c. Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution
Centralized control with decentralized execution permits the full exploitation of the combat effectiveness of AD operations at each level of command. Centralized control ensures unity of effort. Decentralized execution provides subordinate commanders the flexibility to achieve the tenet of agility.
(1) Centralized Control
Centralized control is essential to ensure integration and coordination of all AD assets from the AADC down to the ADA fire unit to maximize their collective effect on the battlefield. Centralized control also facilitates the synchronization of offensive and defensive operations within the Army and among participants in joint or multinational operations. In the case of corps and division ADA, centralized control is executed through compliance with theater ROE and air defense weapon control procedures. Data integration and operational coordination complete the synchronization.
(2) Decentralized Execution
Decentralized execution is necessary because the number of activities associated with air defense operations prevents any one commander from effectively controlling all air defense forces and actions. Decentralized execution also enables air defense assets to maximize their individual capabilities and meet the extreme engagement time lines of air and missile threats. Thorough planning and coordination link centralized control and decentralized execution.
d. Air Battle Management
The related functions of airspace control and air defense engagement operations are coordinated through the principle of air battle management that maximizes both offensive and defensive effectiveness. Air battle management is essential in an air environment that has large quantities of both threat and friendly air users. Current weapon systems, although highly sophisticated, do not possess infallible identification technology. Therefore, the goal of air battle management is to control the engagement of air targets, ensuring the destruction of enemy air targets while preventing fratricide and unnecessary multiple engagements.
The ADCOORD at each level of command ensures close coordination among all airspace users. Management of the air battle employs a mix of positive and procedural control measures.
e. Management by Exception
The principle of management by exception indicates the difficulty of one commander directing the overall air battle on a real-time basis. The AADC must supplement positive control with procedural techniques to ensure coordination and provide unified direction to the battle. Tactical situations may arise in which procedural or positive control rules and directives do not address. In these instances, the commander will make exceptions to the control rules.
Figure 4-27. TMD command and control structure.
f. Air Defense Planning
Air defense planning at the operational level is an interactive process. The planning process integrates Army and Air Force resources into a plan based on the JFC's priorities. The same type of process would occur if the USN or USMC were providing the majority of the air assets. For the purpose of this discussion, counterair includes theater missile defense. See Appendix D for detailed planning process.
(1) Area Air Defense Commander Actions
The AADC develops the air defense concept. The JFLCC's staff (G3 or DCSOPS, with input from the TAADCOORD, the fire support element, and Army airspace command and control cell) recommends Army OCA priorities, DCA priorities, and resource allocation to support the AADC air defense concept. The JFLCC, through the BCD, provides an air defense estimate to the AADC. The JFACC, in coordination with the JFLCC, recommends the apportionment of Army and Air Force air defense assets to the JFC. Once the JFC makes the apportionment decision, the JFACC, in coordination with the JFLCC, develops the air campaign plan. The JFACC allocates and tasks apportioned assets through the air tasking order. The TAADCOORD determines which theater CA tasks the Army can accomplish and, in conjunction with BCD, ensures that Army air defense is incorporated in the AADC defensive counterair plan.
(2) Joint Force Air Component Commander Actions
The JFACC, as the AADC, develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates Air Force assets for various missions. The ASCC's ADCOORD determines whether the corps have sufficient air defense resources or if theater air and missile defense should protect some corps assets. Through the AOC, the AAMDC commander recommends which units protect what assets. Either with AAMDC units or Air Force coverage. The AAMDC commander integrates ADA units into the AADC's DCA planning process.
(3) ARFOR/JFLCC Actions
The plan enables the ASCC to finalize the air defense and fire support portions of the Army plan. The ASCC prioritizes the allocated CAS in coordination with fire support plans. The ASCC's priorities are the foundation for interdiction targeting. The ASCC also designates Army assets for OCA, DCA, and SEAD tasks. The ASCC's ADCOORD develops the air defense portion of the G3 plan.
The ASCC allocates resourcing and assigns tasks to corps which can sub-allocate assets and assign air defense missions to divisions. In each corps and division main CP, the G3 plans section develops the maneuver plan. Within the G3 plans section, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, A2C2 cell, and FSE, incorporates the air defense mission into this maneuver plan.
(4) Air Defense Coordinator Actions
The ADCOORD, in conjunction with the G2, develops and recommends OCA targeting priorities, nominates OCA targets and TAIs to the FSCOORD, and develops and recommends AD priorities to the commander for approval. The air liaison officer participates in this process by recommending SEAD targets to the FSCOORD.
(5) Fire Support Coordinator Actions
The FSCOORD and the ADCOORD incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support and air defense annexes of the maneuver plan. The FSCOORD integrates OCA targets, targeting priorities, and TAIs into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD includes the DCA priorities and associated IPB products in the development and coordination of the force's air defense operation.
Coordination between ADCOORD and FSCOORD (shown in the Figure 4-28) ensures that the OCA and DCA portions of the air defense effort are complementary. The integration and synchronization of OCA operations by the ADCOORD and FSCOORD prevents mutual interference and maximizes unity and economy of effort.
The coordination of OCA targets between the Army and the Air Force occurs at the AOC. OCA, DCA, and SEAD plans are developed simultaneously and in concert, not as separate, isolated plans. The OCA, DCA, and SEAD plans are integral to the theater campaign plan and to the maneuver plan at each Army echelon.
(6) Air Defense in OCA Planning
Operational level, counterair planning requires careful selection and prioritization of OCA targets. Effective planning enables each level to "decide-detect-deliver and access" (D3A) and accelerates the engagement of targets during combat. OCA plans should consider the use of all available assets including aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, UAVs, SOF, and EW. The ADCOORD serves as the integrator for all Army OCA targets. ADA contributes to target location and identification through surveillance and back plotting launch locations.
Figure 4-28. Development of air defense and fire support annexes.
The force commander at each tactical echelon establishes OCA priorities in support of the concept. OCA targets are generally beyond the FLOT and include the following:
· Vehicles. OCA operations attack and destroy rotary and fixed-wing aircraft on the ground and in flight. Prior to launch, tactical missiles, UAVs, and cruise missiles are also OCA targets.
· Support facilities. All facilities supporting enemy air and missile operations are OCA targets. These facilities include airfields, launch sites, logistics support facilities, technical support facilities, FARPS, and navigational aids.
· C2 facilities. The enemy depends upon C2 facilities to maintain centralized control of air assets. Early warning, acquisition, tracking, and other air operation support systems are OCA targets. Targeting these facilities supports information warfare by interfering with the enemy's decision-making cycle and disrupting his ability to synchronize operations.
· EW systems. Destroying EW capabilities increases the operational effectiveness of friendly counterair and battle command communications and intelligence systems. EW targets include air- and land-based jamming systems and their control elements. Attacking these systems supports information warfare operations.
· Air defense systems. Enemy air defense systems and forces possess the capability to thwart our attainment of air campaign objectives.
(7) Air Defense in Active DCA Planning
Integration and prioritization permit Army ADA units the flexibility to support the commander's concept of the operation. The AADC integrates low, medium, and high-altitude air defense systems with airborne counterair resources to make the defense effective.
Combat air patrols consist of aircraft designated to intercept and destroy hostile aircraft over a critical area or force. The AADC, with Air Force and ADCOORD input, incorporates combat air patrols into DCA plans. Most Army DCA tasks are assigned to ADA units. Corps ADA units will be positioned tactically by the appropriate ground force commander. Because of their limited numbers, ADA resources are allocated based on specific air defense priorities. In the air defense plan, AAMDC ADA brigades may protect maneuver forces and other theater assets. Corps commanders may be tasked in the theater campaign plan to protect theater assets in the corps area using corps ADA forces. ADA commanders design defenses to protect designated priorities. A command and control support relationship does exist between EAC ADA and the JFACC.
(8) Air Defense Planning Measures
Passive measures are an essential part of air defense planning at all levels. All units conduct passive actions in conjunction with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air threat. Conducting passive operations is an implied task critical to the survival of every unit.
At all levels, the ADCOORD incorporates passive measures into the maneuver commander's plans and SOPs. ADCOORDs recommend measures which may deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at night, developing an early warning system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing EMCON procedures. The following illustration (Figure 3-29) summarizes the benefits of passive air defense.
Figure 4-29. Passive air defense.
g. AD Objectives and roles at the tactical level
The AAMDC supports tactical level air defense operations through integration and synchronization efforts. These efforts provide horizontal and vertical integration of positive and procedural controls. At the tactical level of war, air defense participants also have specific objectives and roles in planning and executing air defense operations. ADA commanders consider the factors of METT-T for different types of theaters and operations to plan and execute air and missile defense. ADA planning and operations at the tactical level focus on air and missile defense of corps and divisions. To provide air defense force protection, ADA units fight as members of the combined arms team. Every participant in Army air defense--ADA, maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence--has a role in achieving those objectives.
Air defense objectives at the tactical level are an extension of the operational-level objectives, but are more specific. Tactical-level air defense operations support the overall objectives of corps and divisions. The emphasis at the tactical level is on protecting the force rather than on gaining control of the air environment or protecting geopolitical assets. Detailed information on ADA objectives is described in Appendix D.
Tactical-level air defense requires the integration of ADA units with other combined arms elements. As discussed in Chapter 1, tactical-level air defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA; but maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must participate directly. Logistics provides the means for all air defense operations. Each participant has a specific role in tactical air defense plans and operations. These integrated roles are mutually supporting. The participants and their specific roles follow.
(a) Air Defense Artillery
Corps and divisional ADA units accomplish the majority of tactical air defense missions. The corps ADA brigade and the divisional ADA battalion, respectively, are the corps and division commanders' primary air defense resources. The corps commander's requirement to provide air defense resources to forces is no different from the requirement to provide maneuver and fire support resources. The corps commander must ensure that forces at all levels have air defense and must reinforce those defenses when necessary. The corps commander's requirement to provide high to medium-altitude ADA protection to divisions, with specific emphasis on supporting offensive operations, is particularly important. The division commanders, who have only low-altitude ADA weapon systems, require corps support for high to medium-altitude air and missile defense and any additional low-altitude weapons needed for mission accomplishment. The integration of ADA weapons denies the enemy a preferred attack option. At each level, the ADA commander has two roles; the commander of ADA forces and the ADCOORD of that echelon. The following illustration (Figure 4-30) provides an example of how the corps ADA brigade commander accomplishes these roles.
Figure 4-30. The corps ADA brigade commander's air defense roles.
· ADA commander. The ADA commander is the proponent for integrating the air defense AUTL functions at each echelon. The ADA commander has total responsibility for air defense planning at the tactical level. This includes recommending air defense missions for other members of the combined arms team. The ADA commander ensures that organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish tactical-level AD objectives in support of the ground commander's concept of operations. The corps ADA brigade commander develops the air defense plan for corps ADA units. The divisional ADA battalion commander conducts air defense planning and operations in support of the division plan. Subordinate ADA commanders plan and direct all active and passive DCA tasks for their units.
· Air defense coordinator. As ADCOORD, the ADA commander and representatives in the corps or division CP are responsible for planning air defense operations to support the force commander's concept of the operation. The ADCOORD is an integral member of the maneuver commander's staff planning process. To develop TMD, OCA and DCA priorities for recommendation, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, assesses the air and missile threat and the commander's intent. The ADCOORD assists the FSCOORD to integrate OCA and TMD attack operations priorities into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD recommends active, passive, and other combined arms air and missile defense measures in the air defense estimate. After staff coordination and approval of the air defense estimate, the ADCOORD develops the air defense annex to the operation plan. Appendix C provides a more detailed description of the air defense estimate and annex.
The ADCOORD also coordinates with ADA elements at higher and lower echelons, as well as with adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal integration of air defense coverage throughout the battlefield. For example, the corps ADCOORD integrates corps ADA with theater, division, and adjacent corps ADA forces. In contingency operations, this may include integration with joint counterair and TMD participants. The division ADCOORD ensures the air defense plan interfaces with the corps and adjacent division air defense plans.
Infantry and armor forces with an air defense capability increase the density and effectiveness of air defense across the battlefield. However, the optimum role for these forces is ground combat. The maneuver commander must carefully consider the benefits of combined arms air defense contributions versus the decrease in ground combat effectiveness. Combined arms elements can provide vital self-protection from air threats and contribute to their freedom to maneuver. Although they have a limited capability to engage fixed-wing aircraft, missiles, and UAVs, combined arms members can effectively engage hovering or slow-moving helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. Tank main guns, IFVs, antitank weapons, and other direct-fire systems must engage these enemy air platforms when possible. The force commander can assign combined arms resources to protect critical areas or assets from air attack. The ADCOORD recommends to the ground force commander the use of other combat arms in an air defense role. The ADCOORD bases the recommendation on a careful target value analysis and estimate of the air threat.
(c) Fire Support
Fire support enhances tactical-level air defense. Indirect fire weapons can deny enemy helicopters the use of masked, standoff positions. Fire support systems can concentrate their fires on enemy landing zones, pickup zones, launch sites, command and control, assembly areas, and FARPs. Surface-to-surface fire coordination for OCA operations takes place through normal fire support channels. Fire support elements coordinate targets for attack by air forces supporting corps and division operations.
The ADCOORD works closely with the FSCOORD, G3, and G2 to recommend prioritized OCA targets. OCA targets are approved as a part of the JFACC's counterair plan. OCA targets become a target set for target value analysis. The threat's ability to disrupt friendly operations dictates target priority. The ADCOORD makes target recommendations, weighing them against other requirements of the commander's plan competing for the same fire support. Many OCA targets fall into the category of deep targets. Therefore, long-range fire support assets are the optimal means to attack them.
Army aviation contributes to air defense and joint counterair activities through air combat operations. Air combat provides aviation self-defense, combined arms maneuver forces protection, and air defense forces augmentation. Air combat operations support the force commander's overall concept of operations. The maneuver commander's decision to use aviation in other than a self-protection, air combat role must be weighed against its primary anti-armor mission. Air combat operations are planned to support the ground tactical plan and can be either offensive or defensive.
Aviation OCA operations consist of attacks against OCA and TMD targets that cannot be effectively engaged by indirect fire systems. Army aviation also participates in air assault operations against OCA and TMD targets. The force commander plans air security and SEAD missions to support Army aviation deep strike OCA and TMD operations.
Army aviation participates in DCA operations primarily by attacking aerial targets of opportunity and by engaging enemy air targets in self-defense. However, the force commander may give Army aviation forces the mission to screen the force against RISTA UAVs. Other DCA operations conducted by Army aviation occur in response to specific air threats. Army aviation DCA goals are to provide self-defense and augment the ground air defense capability of the combined arms team. Air cavalry squadrons and attack helicopter battalions can fill gaps in the force's air defense when ADA units are redistributing assets and adjusting forces. Helicopters in an air combat role also can provide air defense during screening missions. Early warning provided by screening or attack aviation assets must be integrated into ADA early warning and vice versa.
Coordination between the aviation and ADA commanders is particularly important, as aviation forces must operate in the airspace within the ADA engagement coverage. Prevention of fratricide is a major element of force protection. Identification of on-order air defense missions for aviation occurs during the formulation of the commander's plan. The plan includes command relationships and detailed control measures for the employment of aviation in an air defense role.
Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets contribute to both OCA and DCA operations. Coordination for the use of IEW systems, including joint assets, against OCA targets is similar to coordination for fire support and involves the G3, G2, FSCOORD, and ADCOORD. IEW systems also perform in an air defense role against individual air targets to degrade their targeting and avionics. Careful planning and execution of electronic warfare complements surface-to-air fires. IEW can also provide for surveillance, identification, and classification of hostile air targets aiding ADA greatly through early warning.
The ADCOORD coordinates with the G2 or S2 to ensure surveillance and intelligence assets are tasked to locate air support targets. This process involves prioritization of scarce intelligence resources. The focus of tactical-level intelligence collection efforts is on enemy forward operating bases, FARPs, missile and UAV launch systems, electronic warfare systems, logistics facilities, and C2 nodes. The interface between the ADCOORD and the G2 or S2 is essential for accurate assessment of the air and missile threat.
(f) Combined Arms for Air Defense
Every participant on the battlefield must be capable of firing in self-defense at enemy attack or surveillance aircraft. Small arms and crew-served weapons fire against rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles provides a significant terminal defense. Guns, by their very nature, provide both real and virtual attrition. CAFAD is an essential element in this attrition. Individual and crew-served weapons can mass their fires against air threats. The massed use of guns in local air defense causes enemy air to increase their standoff range for surveillance and weapons delivery and increase altitude in transiting to and from targets. These reactions make enemy air more vulnerable to ADA. CAFAD training and tactical SOPs enable units to effectively prepare for self-defense against air attack.
4-8 JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
This doctrine applies to Joint counterair and may be applicable to multinational missile defense at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. US forces participating in multinational operations use US joint doctrine as an initial negotiation position. (See JP3-01) Counterair Operations seeks to counter the theater missile (TM) threat posed by air-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and surface-to-surface missiles.
The AAMDC, a component of the United States Army, plays an integral part in joint and multinational operations. The AAMDC is the source of ground-based defensive counterair operations. Therefore, the AAMDC plays a key role in the joint level force's capabilities and missions in space operations, space control, space use, and air operations.
a. Counterair Operations
Counterair operations apply integration and synergism to a high level of effectiveness and efficiency. The focus of CA is to counter threats and associated C4I, targeting, and logistical support systems. In addition, CA requires systems that are capable of rapid strategic deployability and tactical mobility. The objectives of CA with regards to countering TMs are:
· To prevent the launch of TMs against US forces, US allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest.
· To protect US forces, US allies, other important countries, and areas of vital interest from TMs
launched against them.
· To reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by a TM attack.
· To detect and target TM platforms; to detect, warn of, and report TM launches; and to coordinate a multifaceted response to a TM attack and to integrate it with other combat operations.
Emerging AD systems must build on and extend existing capabilities, doctrine, and procedures. Integration of existing systems and the various interfaces among operational elements require continuous interaction to ensure the seamless application of needed capabilities.
(1) Joint Operations
Joint operations are conducted in war or Military operations other than war (MOOTW) and are described in both cases by the organizational structures tailored for the mission; by geographical and political considerations; by activity; and the use of control measures defining the scope of a joint operation.
The AAMDC operates within the context of two chains of command in the joint environment. First, the AAMDC must support the operational chain of command with regard to the mission. Second, the AAMDC must support and comply with the administrative and logistical requirements of the service, functional element, or Army component.
The command relationships and types of commands that control the AAMDC in each joint level force projection is critical to the AAMDC commander’s ability to support the joint operations command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I) to accomplish the joint force mission. See Chapter 3.
The initial projection of AAMDC assets into a theater of operations could be portions or all of a command and control network and EAC ADA brigade to include active and reserve components. This is required in the mission against theater missiles (TMs). (See JP3-0)
There are three different types of Joint Operations: War Operations, Support and stability operations, and multinational operations. Specific details of SASO operations are provided in Chapter 6.
b. Multinational Operations
The AAMDC provides ground-based theater missile and air defense (defensive counterair) for the multinational force. This places the AAMDC in a force protection role and supports the theater missile defense objectives of deterrence, prevention, reduction, detection, warning, and reporting to the multinational command.
The AAMDC is required to integrate theater missile and air defense with the multinational or coalition forces for the Army services component commander (ASCC). Host nations may provide air and missile defense early until AAMDC forces arrive in theater. Strategic, operational, and tactical considerations apply to both joint and multinational operations. The AAMDC must train to integrate with multinational forces. This includes supporting ADA brigades resident or projected into multinational operations.
Air defense and TMD operations are required within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement. Within this context, the JFC is either subordinate to or may be the combined CINC. In either event, the JFC must consider those areas peculiar to multinational operations which may influence the ability to achieve combined unity of effort. Combined CINCs and their subordinates identify the requirements and implications of multinational operations, organize their forces, train for success, and conduct multinational operations as necessary.
Requirements, responsibilities, and organizational considerations for conducting air defense and TMD in a multinational operations environment are similar to joint operations. However, special considerations and areas of emphasis are needed to ensure unity of effort with other nation's forces. Each theater and each country are unique. Even within formal alliances, there are varying national interests which should be identified and considered. Differences in doctrine, training, equipment, and organization must be identified and considered when determining alliance interoperability requirements for employing forces. The combined CINC is responsible to both national and allied or coalition leaders. Leaders of the alliance or coalition must approve command relationships among the elements of the alliance or coalition.
(2) Organizational Considerations
When national forces of the combined force are not uniformly capable of actively defending against enemy air or missile capabilities, provisions must be made to ensure that air defense and TMD assets are provided for defense within JFC established priorities. This may entail introducing air defense and TMD assets from another theater. For this reason, air defense and TMD units and support organizations must train, orient, and exercise to operate in the total spectrum of potential operational environments. As in joint operations, combined CINCs may choose to organize on an area or functional basis, or a combination of the two. In either case, combined national force capability must be considered.
(3) Multinational Force War Operations
The principles of war also apply to multinational operations. The two principles especially important to successful to multinational operations are objective and unity of command (effort). There are six key considerations that must be addressed in multinational force operations. The AAMDC commander must include these considerations in planning and execution because they contribute to the force projection, protection, and sustainment requirements.
(a) Goals and objectives. Goals and objectives set the context for the multinational force. It is important to recognize that each member nation of the multinational force could have similar or dissimilar goals or objectives.
· Recognize the driver is national interest. · Commonalties must be emphasized.
· Accept common goals. · perceptions must be addressed.
· Contributions must be balanced. · Unity of effort must be achieved.
· Cohesion must be developed and maintained.
(b) Military doctrine and training. Each nation brings different military doctrine or training capabilities to the multinational force. Listed below are some key concerns.
· Nations have different vital interests.
· Nations have different strategic goals.
· Nations have different military capabilities.
· Nations have different doctrine (defensive or offensive).
· Some nations have many services and some only one.
· Some nations are prepared for "state-of-the- art" military operations; others are not.
· Some nations have highly trained forces; others do not.
· Some nations have adequate defensive counterair forces; others do not.
· Some nations have adequate intelligence gathering systems; others do not.
· Some nations have adequate joint operations capabilities; others do not.
· Some nations have adequate command, control, communications and intelligence systems; others do not.
(c) Equipment. The types of equipment provided to the multinational force could reflect a difference in type and modernization. Key concerns in this area are:
· Identify the equipment quantities available from allies.
· Identify the equipment capabilities available from allies.
· Identify the equipment limitations available from allies.
· Identify the maintenance standards of allies.
· Identify the equipment mobility of allies (land, air, and sea).
· Identify the degree of equipment interoperability of allies.
· Identify the personnel and logistics support systems of allies to man, arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain their units and equipment.
· Identify the technological disparity of allied equipment.
· Identify the value of positioning like allied equipment in the adjacent battlefield or in support roles.
· Identify allied/enemy equipment similarities.
· Identify measures to preclude fratricide.
· Identify rules of engagement that fit the weapons mix.
· Identify incompatibility of communications equipment supporting C4I.
· Identify employment doctrine, tactics, and techniques of allies for compatibility with joint or multinational forces to ensure mission success.
· Seek solutions to equipment problems not contributing to unity of effort and mission accomplishment.
(d) Cultural differences. The need to identify cultural differences among nations during multinational force operations is paramount in developing teamwork. Negating these differences is accomplished by the development of mutual respect.
· Recognize each allied nation’s unique cultural identity.
· Recognize religious systems of each allied partner.
· Recognize the social systems of each allied partner.
· Recognize that nations with similar cultures could have similar aspirations.
· Recognize that nations with dissimilar cultures might have dissimilar aspirations.
· Respect these differences and learn to build consensus in the environment.
(e) Language. Language is the most common method of expression and transmitting a message. Language barriers represent a significant challenge.
· Realize the implications of language as a possible barrier to communication.
· Encourage personnel to develop a second language and or seek foreign area specialists to be assigned to the command.
· Specify the official coalition language.
· Recognize that the specifications of the official coalition language are a sensitive issue.
· Recognize that all written documents must be translated into the coalition language.
· Seek and encourage development of computer architecture and software to simultaneously print separate written documents in the languages of the coalition nations.
· Recognize that document translation is time consuming.
· Prepare a publication of doctrinal, tactical, and specialized equipment terms for printing in the coalition language.
· Recognize that information translation losses are generally high.
(f) Teamwork and trust. The AAMDC must develop teamwork and trust among member nations of a multinational force to successfully accomplish the ADA mission.
· Recognize the professionalism of coalition soldiers.
· Demonstrate respect for coalition units and soldiers.
· Cultivate similarities.
· Seek contributions of coalition soldiers during the planning activity.
· Praise cooperative efforts of coalition soldiers.
· Accept criticisms of the US point of view.
· Develop mutual goals and objectives.
· Accept that the objectives of the coalition may require US forces to play a lesser role.
· Understand different points of view.
(4) Multinational Operations Planning and Execution
There are six key planning and execution concerns in multinational operations that the AAMDC must consider to ensure mission accomplishment. The sustainment of the force is affected by these concerns.
(a) Command. The multinational force command including the AAMDC could be commanded by an allied nation. Regardless of who is in command these concerns must be addressed.
· Seek unity of effort.
· Recognize that nations normally retain command of their own forces.
· Ensure missions are equitable in terms of burden, risk, and recognition.
· Structure the combined command to integrate coalition command structures.
· Ensure ROE are clear and understood.
(b) Maneuver. The art of maneuver could be different for member nations of the multinational force. To ensure maneuverability the following considerations must be addressed.
· Plan for and utilize the special capabilities of each
· Capitalize on each national contingents’ resources (troop, materiel, funds, and or political power) contributed to the maneuver concern.
· Ensure that the organization structure is known and completely understood.
· Establish liaison to gain synchronization.
(c) Fires. The development of standard fire plans supports synchronization, resource allocation, and effective fire. The AAMDC must ensure the following concerns are addressed.
· Develop fire plans at the appropriate levels to support maneuver.
· Integrate space and operational battle fires within ROEs.
· Ensure ammunition is available.
· Plan to eliminate fratricide.
(d) Intelligence. The need to gather and process intelligence from all sources applicable to the mission is required to gain decisive victory. Accurate and timely transmission of intelligence is difficult but must be accomplished in a multinational operation.
· Develop intelligence from all sources.
· Ensure that intelligence is disseminated in a timely manner.
· Provide command and control nodes for accurate assessment.
· Not all intelligence gathered is releasable to non-US partners.
(e) Logistics. The logistics functions indicated below must be accomplished by all multinational forces and requires standardization. This includes providing for all allied requirements.
· Man - Provide manpower to the force to complete the mission.
· Arm - Provide ammunition, missiles and weapons to the force to complete the mission.
· Fuel - Provide fuel to the force for transportation.
· Fix - Provide repair capability to support mission equipment for mission completion.
· Move - Provide transports to the force to complete force projection.
· Sustain - Provide sustainment to soldiers and their systems to obtain decisive victory.
(f) Liaison and multinational staffs. Liaison and multinational staffs are essential in enhancing multinational operations. Liaison and multinational staff operations provide integration for mission accomplishment.
· Ensure liaison is achieved.
· Ensure liaison is equipped.
· Establish a combined staff for unity of effort.
c. Battle Management And C4I
BM/C4I functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, databases, and procedures. They are designed for planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces to accomplish the mission.
The BM/C4I system must use its resources efficiently to support management of operations without significant loss to other operational capabilities. The BM/C4I system links passive and active missile defense and attack capabilities to provide timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of tactical warning, targeting data, mission assignment, and post strike assessments to the appropriate element. For each operational element, the BM/C4I system must provide rapid communications among intelligence assets, the fusion and decision-making process, warning systems, and weapon systems, to include a capability for rapid coordination with supporting commander in chief. BM/C4I capabilities should also support the principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, and coordinated efforts.
Inherent in effective operations is an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural interoperability. This is especially true for the BM/C4I operational elements. BM/C4I systems, facilities, procedures, and organizations integrate applicable joint and multinational capabilities. The JFC must exercise BM/C4I interoperability among all components during peacetime joint force and combined exercises. BM/C4I must fulfill the following requirements:
· Passive defense measures require predicting and detecting a launch, predicting the launch and impact points, providing threat identification (chemical, biological, nuclear, or conventional) and timely warning.
· Active defense requires early detection of missiles in flight to permit cueing, acquisition,
tracking, identification, and destruction as soon as possible after launch.
· Attack operations require accurate identification and location of launch platforms and support systems and timely transmission of targeting data to attack systems.
(3) BM/C4I Planning
BM/C4I planning begins with the JFC's estimate of the situation, objectives, and overall concept of operations based on the commander's guidance and priorities, appropriate subordinate commanders task forces and resources. To ensure complementary efforts and to achieve synergism, BM/C4I planning for passive defense, active defense, and attack operations must be coordinated among all components of the force on a continual basis. Planning considerations for BM/C4I of operations must consider both joint and combined relationships when addressing the need for near-real-time response to the threat.
During operations, the BM/C4I system must rapidly disseminate intelligence to the components and support air, naval, and ground attack operations requirements with a rapid targeting capability. BM/C4I must be integrated into the overall theater communications network and yet be capable of decentralized control or autonomous operations. Service organizations must maintain an interface with and be interoperable with the other components' organizations.
Some theaters may have offensive constraints or limitations, requiring a reactive BM/C4I process. A reactive mode demands extensive preparation and preplanning using continuous IPB to provide critical targeting data. The preparation and planning process within the BM/C4I framework focuses sensor, surveillance, and intelligence management to allow target acquisition and tracking of the enemy TM systems and their supporting operations. Intelligence preparation must provide near-real-time data on enemy TM, operating bases, missile launch, load, and hide sites, EW systems, C4I facilities, surveillance and control systems, and logistical support and infrastructure. The BM/C4I process must support decision making, detection, delivery of air defense fire support, and disseminate prelaunch signatures that indicate enemy missile launch preparations which requires initiation of attack operations. The BM/C4I must pass the enemy's launch warning to friendly units to initiate defense operations to include passive and active defense, see Figure 4-34.
Figure 4-34. Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess.
Launch warnings provide for the alert and increased readiness of friendly defensive assets and the employment of offensive and passive countermeasures. Increasing the readiness posture includes performing the vital operating functions which prepare weapon systems, RISTA assets, and command and control nodes for the level of enemy activity anticipated. Once a launch is observed, the preparation and planning measures provide a capability for concurrent and simultaneous defensive and offensive response.
An observed and identified enemy missile launch through sensor and surveillance systems keys the C4I process which uses communication interfaces to provide near-real-time defensive and offensive attack response.
In-flight enemy missile trajectory data are passed in near-real-time directly to interceptors, point defense, and self-protection systems. Simultaneously, while enemy missiles are in flight, updated enemy launch locations, predicted impact areas, and target data base information are passed to the appropriate command and control centers and offensive systems. Concurrently, launch warnings are provided to all units and commands within the theater. Depending on the capabilities of the sensor and surveillance systems, and the sources and quality of the intelligence, cueing of additional systems may be necessary to provide more refined enemy missile data to ensure target accuracy. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may detect, footprint, or search areas which will then require more refined RISTA activities by theater and tactical assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, and other intelligence assets requiring cueing are focused rapidly to achieve the necessary accuracy for IPB targeting objectives.
4-9 AAMDC’s FORCE PROJECTION
Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world. Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation or a rapid response to a crisis. The AAMDC and ADA brigades participate in force projection in both war and SASO.
During Operation Just Cause, the armed forces of the United States rapidly assembled, deployed, and conducted an opposed entry operation with ADA units participating. Operation Desert Shield/Storm dramatically demonstrated the capability of US forces to synchronize assets at all levels of war and to respond to crises by rapidly projecting forces. AD units were vital to its success by providing ADA protection. The following key considerations apply to the AAMDC for planning purposes.
· Lethality: The rapid insertion of highly lethal forces can convince a potential adversary that further aggression is too costly.
· Anticipation: Expect to be alerted and deployed. The key is continuous force tracking which is based on continuous strategic and tactical intelligence gathering.
· Force Tailoring and Teamwork: Determining the right mix and sequence of units. The AAMDC commander must tailor the ADA assets to support packaged force projection. Follow-on ADA forces must be tailored to meet the specific concerns of the long-term mission.
· Intelligence: Both force and engagement operations are based on accurate real-time intelligence. Survivability depends on winning the information war.
· Battle Command: Wargame and rehearse possible deviations from plans caused by deployment problems or enemy action. The AAMDC must ensure that each tailored ADA projection package deploys with appropriate command structure.
· Logistics: The ADA brigades deploying to a theater of operations must ensure that coordination with the AAMDC expedites the supply of logistical requirements necessary for effective, efficient, and timely ADA operations.
· Training: The AAMDC’s METL must focus on integrated training. It must also train in force projection techniques relative to sea, rail, land, or air movement.
· Multinational Operations: Measures taken to achieve unity of effort and mutual trust, such as, interoperability; well-understood C2 structures; liaison; and interpreters; greatly facilitate multinational operations.
· Media Impact: Providing early and continuous access to the press enhances operations and strengthens public support. Within the AAMDC and ADA brigade, an effective internal information program enhances morale, reinforces training and safety, and corroborates media reports for both soldiers and their families.
· Postconflict Considerations: The AAMDC must be prepared to assume postconflict SASO missions. At every level, analysis of the strategic objectives for the operation should always include considerations of the anticipated consequences of the war to help smooth the transition from active combat to postconflict operations.
a. Mobilization / Pre-deployment.
(1) Mobilization / pre-deployment stages are initiated in response to a situation as required. The Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) uses the AAMDC to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and execute AD within his AO. Communications and liaisons are established with the ASCC staff and other units, organizations, agencies as required. Personnel are taken through the soldier deployment readiness process, equipment is prepared for movement, and initial planning and coordination is conducted. Although planning is an ongoing process, the AAMDC works in coordination with the ASCC and his staff to convert the command’s contingency plan (CONPLAN) to an operational plan (OPLAN). The AAMDC conducts analysis / assessment activities, participates in the decision making process, and assists in the development of the operations order. The AAMDC will use automated planning capabilities to develop an AD annex for the ASCC to synchronize the CINCs OPLAN(s). Planning cells within the AAMDC will conduct detailed planning and assessment activities required to prepare for entry and follow-on operations. These activities include:
· Conducting Intelligence preparation of the battlespace
· Participating in theater AD planning
· Planning AD operations to include OPLANS / OPORDS
· Assessing AD design
· Developing force packages for force projection operations
· Assessing unit readiness status
· Planning for liaison officers (LNOs) as required
· Assessing personnel fill status
· Planning communications links
· Assessing passive defense capabilities
· Planning for follow-on operations
· Planning for logistic support operations (sustainment requirements)
· Planning for movement operations
(2) During the mobilization / predeployment, numerous, concurrent activities in planning and execution continue. The AAMDC is used to validate possible scenarios and operational plans. IPB is used to determine the most effective deployment strategy, development of the ASCC’s intelligence plan, and the appropriate mix of TMD weapons / sensors / capabilities to counter the TM and air threat during each phase of the operation. Continued training and mobilization-activities are conducted until deployment commences.
b. Deployment / Entry Operations
(1) Deployment / entry operations are characterized by rapid deployment of forces into the theater of operations. There are three types of entry operations: unopposed, opposed, and forcible entry. As part of the Army’s initial force projection capability, the first module of the AAMDC is deployed to the theater under the operational control of the ARFOR / JFLCC. The remaining CONUS based AAMDC is the TADCOORD, and, if designated by the JFC, the DAADC. Upon arrival in theater, the AAMDC / TAADE establishes communications / sensor connectivity through the Army’s C4I architecture and joint interfaces as required. It will link with joint, multinational and national C4I systems. It will:
· Participate in the JFLCC J-3 planning cell developing AD input to the air operations plan
· Integrate intelligence from deployed sensors to provide the ARFOR / JFLCC situational awareness
· Refine and update IPB
· Conduct Criticality, Vulnerability, Recuperability, and Threat (CVRT) analysis
· Recommend changes to improve passive defense
· Monitor operations security (OPSEC)
· Monitor friendly and enemy air operations
· Recommend AD defense design and priorities in coordination with maneuver plans
· Execute logistic support functions
· Coordinate with the JFACC
· Recommend and coordinate AD attack warning procedures
· Assist in coordination of TMD targets and targeting priorities
· Provide theater AD expertise
· Monitor ADA unit locations and status
· Task organize and assign missions to EAC ADA units as required
(2) The AAMDC will typically represent the JFLCC during joint planning operations to assist in coordinating AD and TMD targets and AD and TMD priorities in theater. Once in theater, the AAMDC will monitor enemy activities using intelligence provided by available space intelligence sources. Sensor systems are capable of disseminating AD and TMD intelligence to the AAMDC timely. The AAMDC will continuously process and review intelligence information, collect Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), and assess the enemy situation based on this intelligence. LNOs are provided to key C2 nodes such as the JFC, JFACC, Air Operations Center (AOC) / Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), EAC ADA BDE, Control Reporting Center (CRC) / Combat Integration Center (CIC), and others as required. The G-4 section within the AAMDC interfaces with the theater for logistics support. It provides oversight for AD specific logistic requirements in theater.
(1) The AAMDC supports the JFLCC by: providing effective ground based active defense to protect the JFC’s priority assets and maneuver forces; implementing passive defense measures throughout the AO; providing attack operations recommendations to the JFLCC / JFACC for planning and coordinating of pre-planned missions; assisting other components as required, and integrating their facilities and forces into passive defense measures as required. The AAMDC plans, coordinates, monitors, deconflicts and sustains AD and TMD operations and recommends adjustments. The AAMDC will:
· Provide the TAADCOORD to the JFLCC
· Integrate Army AD operations
· Provide LNO representative to the JFACC
· Provide the DADC if designated
· Monitor theater wide CSS support for ADA units including allocation of missile and repair parts to Corps and EAC ADA Brigade according to the JFLCC’s priorities
· Provide attack warning according to warning release criteria
(2) Intelligence information will be collected and disseminated by the AAMDC and other C2 nodes at echelons above corps (EAC), corps, and division areas. The AAMDC supports the ARFOR / JFLCC by processing, disseminating and sending AD information as required. The AAMDC will:
· Provide accurate air and ground situational awareness and the latest information on those activities and vulnerabilities
· Receive TM track updates throughout flight
· Cue active defense units for engagements of TMs
· Warn applicable units
· Conduct continuous vulnerability assessments
· Synchronize countermeasures with attack operations
· Disseminate TM impact information to an expert analysis and warning system
c. Planning And The Stages Of Force Projection
The AAMDC’s contributions to warfighting operations are based on the ability to project ADA forces during decisive combat operations and the ability to quickly reconstitute forces. ADA forces are integral members of the Army joint force. ADA operations are fully synchronized with the CINC's campaign plan. To implement the force projection doctrine there are four distinct planning categories that the AAMDC must follow and review. The ADA planning sequence is at Appendix B. The four planning categories are:
1. Category I is preparation for war and includes the first two stages (mobilization and predeployment) of force projection operations.
2. Category II is transition to war and includes three stages of force projection operations (deployment, unopposed early entry, and unopposed expansion and build-up).
3. Category III is war operations and includes three stages (opposed entry operations, opposed expansion and build-up, and decisive operations).
4. Category IV is cessation of war. This category includes war termination and postconflict operations, redeployment and reconstitution, and demobilization.
4-10 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Offensive operations are supported by force projection doctrine. Inherent to offensive operations is the need to defend. It is out of the foundations of a strong defense that the victory of a great offense is launched. The AAMDC shares in the offensive operation through force engagement planning, joint training and allocation of ADA forces. The AAMDC supports offensive operations in worldwide, joint or combined environments. The theater missile and air defense offensive operations must respond to the fast pace of maneuver forces. It is the preplanning and detailed preparation that provides the flexibility of ADA to support offensive operations.
a. Characteristics of Offensive Operations
The characteristics listed below require the AAMDC to support the offensive operations in support of a theater missile and air defense force projection activity are in parallel with the CINC's concept of operations. The theater missile and air defense complement the CINC's concept of operation. This includes the need to surprise the enemy with a concentration of force through decisive operations. This concentration of forces must receive theater missile and air defense protection. This includes the use of offensive tempo to destroy the enemy before the enemy can destroy our forces. The ADA units must be in synchronization with the offense tempo to deny the destruction of the threat from the air. It includes audacity in planning and execution of the battle plan.
b. Forms of the Tactical Offense
The AAMDC must ensure that in the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war ADA forces are organized, equipped, trained and supported. This support must directly support the movement to contact, attack, exploitation and pursuit forms of tactical offense.
c. Forms of Maneuver
The AAMDC must ensure that the strategic, operational and tactical levels for the ADA forces are trained in the envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration and frontal attack forms of maneuver. This includes the follow-on ADA theater and air defense adjustments necessary to the offensive operation.
d. Operations in Depth
Operations in depth is a primary concern of the AAMDC commander. It is through the doctrine of providing a seamless and continuous ADA defense design that ADA provides the strongest contribution to the AD battle. This includes the synchronization and integration of ADA in the joint and combined operation. This synchronization and integration is also part of the deep, close and rear operation.
4-11 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Defensive operations in the future continues to be the springboard to offensive operations. The AAMDC must plan to support defensive ADA operations worldwide. It could be that two major regional conflicts could occur concurrently, especially if our surveillance and intelligence gathering was deceived or unable to detect the signs of possible offensive threat intentions. An adequate defense must reflect preparedness for offense. This preparedness must not consume all of our resources to defense. The AAMDC must support defensive operations meeting the requirements of the characteristics of defensive operations, ground maneuver defensive patterns, and defensive operations in depth.
a. Characteristics of Defensive Operations
The characteristics of the defense requires the AAMDC to support the defensive operations in support of the theater missile and air defense force projection operation. The AAMDC’s battle command and battle management activities provide ADA forces to support AD operations. This extends from force projection to force protection to sustainment.
The AAMDC’s contribution to defensive operations begins long before hostilities. A victory-oriented defense is the goal. Therefore, extensive preparations are required prior to war. The defense is based on active and continuous surveillance and intelligence gathering. It continues with realistic joint and combined forces training. It deals with adequate preparation of the battlefield based on the doctrine of initial preparation of the battlefield.
The AAMDC by its very name is a force tasked to defend forces and to provide security. The AAMDC commander is charged with the defense of ground forces and critical geopolitical assets. This security responsibility is directly to the ASCC. This security must be integrated with the joint and combined operation to provide security to land operations and maneuvering forces. A key component is the RISTA defensive activities.
It is through surveillance and intelligence gathering activities that the AAMDC commander can participate in A2C2, plan force operations, thereby enhancing the subordinate EAC ADA brigade's engagement operations. Again RISTA plays a key role and all enemy operations are nullified or destroyed. Each and every of the attacker's options are eliminated and the attacker's tempo becomes random and uncoordinated leading to failure.
(4) Mass and Concentration
The AAMDC commander's role in providing mass and concentration is pivotal to gaining "land dominance". The greatest combat multiplier that the AAMDC can add to defensive operations are equipped ADA units trained in the doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (DTTP) necessary to gain decisive victory. This training in a joint or combined defensive operation will allocate the forces to mass and concentrate fires to successfully engage enemy missile or airframes. This not only means having the ADA units at the right place at the right time, but to also have the necessary missiles or bullets at the right place too. Launchers without missiles or guns without bullets in sufficient numbers to kill the anticipated enemy threat does not serve the principle of mass and concentration.
(5) Defense Patterns
The AAMDC must ensure that the dynamics of the linear and nonlinear battlefield are addressed by available assets. It is at the AAMDC level that the far sightedness of required ADA assets must be determined to meet the far-flung deployment of a nonlinear defense. While both the mobile and air defenses are applicable in modern warfare, other non-land dominance warfare could become a possible means. To hold a nation captive with a nuclear threat does not require land dominance, if the aggression is economic or religiously oriented.
(a) Mobile defense. The mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy forces by employing a combination of fire, maneuver, offense, defense and delay to defeat the enemy's attack. Commanders conducting a mobile defense takes advantage of terrain in depth, obstacles and mines while employing firepower and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker.
(b) Area defense. Commanders conduct an area defense to deny the enemy access to designated terrain or facilities for a specified time. Commanders organize the defense around a static framework provided by a defensive position, seeking to destroy the enemy with interlocking fires.
(6) Defense Operations in Depth
The defense operations in depth requires the CG, AAMDC to integrate, synchronize and fuse the air defense artillery coverage into a seamless, impenetrable and invincible shield over the joint or combined operation. This doctrine is covered in Appendix D.
The AAMDC commander exercises flexibility of assigned forces through the proper allocation of ADA units to the joint or combined command. Since ADA doctrine does not recognize the role on the battlefield of ADA forces their greatest flexibility is a very vigilant chain of command. This starts with the AAMDC Commanding General who ensures that the joint and or combined commander receive the best ADA possible. The Commanding General, AAMDC is the pinnacle of ensuring that integration, synchronization and utilization of ADA resources fully support the joint AD effort.
4-12 RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
The AAMDC’s role in retrograde operations within a theater missile and air defense operation supports the ASCC as the battlefield is compressed. The retrograde ADA activities must provide protection to forces as the forces retrograde over key assets (i.e. bridges, road networks, railroad yards and track, forward bases and through geopolitical targets).
A retrograde operation is an organized movement to the rear away from the enemy. It is a part of a larger scheme of maneuver to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. A corps retrograde operation usually is a combination of the delay and withdrawal, and retirement. Its objectives are to gain time, preserve forces, avoid contact or maneuver the enemy into an unfavorable position. FM 100-5 discusses these operations in detail. The corps ADA brigade is essential to these types of operations depending on the situation. It facilitates repositioning forces, shortening LOCs, or permitting unit withdrawals for employment elsewhere.
a. Delay Operation
A delay operation is conducted when there are insufficient forces to attack or defend, or when the defensive plan requires drawing the enemy into a vulnerable position. Delay operations are conducted by withdrawing to successive battle positions each time the enemy conducts an attack. The corps ADA brigade must support the delay by defending maneuver units when crossing choke points such as bridges and canalized road networks. Other assets requiring air defense include the reserve and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). The corps ADA brigade commander may assign Chaparral battalions to support these assets during the delay. The most critical air defense mission in the delay may be protecting a river crossing. Failure to provide adequate support could result in the loss of the entire force. The corps ADA brigade commander will usually weight Hawk coverage forward to the holding line of the delay, and assign Chaparral units to protect individual crossing sites. Delays can involve echelons up to entire corps or divisions. The delay ends when enemy forces halt their attack or when the delaying force completes its mission and passes through another force.
Whether withdrawing locally or as part of a general withdrawal, committed force voluntarily disengage from the enemy and move to the rear. Normally withdrawals are free from enemy pressure and do not require the assistance of other friendly units. The corps ADA commander will conduct a withdrawal to remove subordinate units from combat, adjust defensive positions, or relocate the entire force.
Generally the withdrawing forces will be more vulnerable to detection and interdiction by enemy air forces. The corps ADA brigade units are even more critical during a withdrawal of the protected force. Normally the ADA brigade commander will support the withdrawal in the same manner he supports a delay with special priority to C2 elements and reserves. These assets are vital to the successful execution of a withdrawal.
Retirements are rearward movements away from the enemy by a force not in contact. It is administrative in nature and execution. The corps ADA brigade commander may conduct a retirement to realign his forces on the battlefield. Normally a division conducting a retirement would not receive any dedicated air defense from the corps ADA brigade. The division would have to rely on its organic air defense assets and passive air defense means. It may however, receive incidental Hawk coverage based on its battlefield location. Security and speed are important considerations for ADA units conducting a retirement. Movement should be done at night when possible. When the enemy controls the air or can otherwise interdict friendly movement in depth, a retiring force moves by infiltration.