Index FM 44-100 Air and Missile Defense Operations



This chapter describes the air and missile defense (AMD) combat function, relates the tenets of Army operations to air and missile defense, and defines the mission of air defense artillery (ADA). It also presents an overview of the manual and summarizes two successful air and missile defense operations.


The Army must be ready to fight enemies whose air, missile, and surveillance capabilities vary widely throughout the range of military operations. Successful air and missile defense operations begin with a thorough understanding of the enemy's air capabilities, doctrine, and operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing and future air threats.

Air superiority is crucial for success on the battlefield. Army air and missile defense operations participate in joint counterair and TMD operations. They protect the force from air and missile attack, aerial surveillance, and support the attainment of air superiority. Chapter 3 establishes the doctrinal foundation for discussion of Army air and missile defense operations and their relationship to joint and multinational theater missile defense and counterair operations.

Chapter 4 describes the fundamental principles for the employment of Army air and missile defense to include contributions from all battlefield operating systems. Battle command is the art of decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. As with every component of combat power, the direction and control of ADA operations maximize their contribution to the effectiveness of the force. Chapter 5 details Army air and missile defense battle command doctrine and tactics.

Army air and missile defense plans and conducts operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Chapter 6 addresses ADA planning and execution at each echelon of command.

Chapter 7 addresses ADA logistics. The main theme is that ADA logistics follow standard Army doctrine, procedures, and organization.

Chapter 8 covers ADA's role in stability and support operations (SASO). Special emphasis is placed on the versatility of ADA forces and those circumstances where successful stability and support operations require the contributions of air and missile defense forces.


This field manual provides the doctrinal foundation for Army air and missile defense operations in joint and multinational operations. Air and missile defense is one of the seven battlefield operating systems, which also include intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility and survivability, combat service support, and command and control. Air and missile defense operations provide the force with protection from enemy air and missile attack. They prevent the enemy from separating friendly forces while freeing the commander to fully synchronize maneuver and firepower.

The air and missile defense combat function contributes to joint theater counterair operations and to joint theater missile defense. Theater counterair operations protect the force and critical assets from attack by enemy fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Theater missile defense protects the force and critical assets from attack by theater missiles, which include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles (CMs), and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Air and missile defense includes both offensive and defensive actions.

The airspace of a theater is as important a dimension of joint operations as the terrain itself. Friendly forces use airspace for critical purposes including maneuver, delivery of fires, reconnaissance and surveillance, transportation, and battle command. Effective control and use of airspace directly influence the outcome of campaigns and battles. Commanders consider airspace and the apportionment of air power in planning and supporting their operations. They expect the enemy to contest their use of the airspace and must protect their forces from enemy observation and attack. Air and missile defense operations contribute to gaining and maintaining the desired degree of air superiority, provide force protection, and help win the information war.

Synchronization of ground operations with air operations is fundamental to the conduct of successful campaigns and battles. Friendly air forces, through such missions as counterair, air interdiction, and close air support, directly support the land campaign.

The Army's part in the theater campaign is diverse and requires a combined arms force. Air and missile defense forces protect the combined arms team, and other priority forces and assets by preventing enemy aircraft, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles from locating, striking, and destroying them.


The mission of US Army ADA is to protect the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance. This mission statement expands both the types of elements which require protection and the types of aerial threats air defense forces must destroy.


ADA commanders allocate assets, active and reserve component, based on the supported commander's priorities. In addition, the mission is broadly written to include protection of critical assets, installations, and facilities along with joint and multinational forces when required.


Geopolitical assets are nonmilitary assets that US, allied, or host nation civil authorities nominate for air and missile defense protection. These assets could be political, religious, ethnic, historical, or territorial in nature. Since protection of geopolitical assets may not directly support military operations, integration of geopolitical assets into the air and missile defense priorities list must be done at the highest levels. Geopolitical assets may include the territory of the USA.


The threat is not limited to attack aircraft, helicopters, and tactical ballistic missiles. The threat includes all aircraft, indirect fire surface-launched missiles, aerial surveillance platforms, and theater missiles. Chapter 2 provides more detail and information on the threat.


Successful air and missile defense is key to generating and sustaining combat power in force-projection operations. The AD contribution to friendly efforts to counter enemy reconnaissance, intelligence surveillance, and target acquisition efforts has gained greater emphasis. Current and future Army ADA capabilities, both active and reserve component, must synergistically combine with the AD assets of other services to defeat the multifaceted threat. Army ADA forces participate in operations at all levels of war. While capabilities do not currently exist to meet the full spectrum of ADA mission requirements, the mission statement provides ADA a clear vision for the 21st century.


National Missile Defense is a joint service program to develop a fixed, land-based system to protect the United States against limited, long-range ballistic missile attacks. The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) has responsibility for publishing NMD doctrine. Concepts and operational requirements for national missile defense are in the developmental stage.


Air and missile defense operations are inherently joint, multi-component, and embody Army doctrine. ADA forces are versatile, agile, and fight throughout the depth of the battlefield. Through aggressive planning and fully orchestrated execution, ADA allows the commander at any level to seize and maintain the initiative. Commanders integrate air and missile defense operations into campaigns fought at the operational level, and battles and engagements fought at the tactical level.


ADA units take the initiative by participating in planning for both offensive and defensive counterair and theater missile defense operations. Air and missile defense commanders recommend enemy airfields, missile launch sites, command and control nodes, and logistics for deep attack. They contribute to winning the information war by destroying enemy aerial reconnaissance platforms. ADA units engage air threats from directions and in ways that the enemy does not expect.


ADA units anticipate and counter enemy actions and react rapidly to changes in the situation. Agility is as much a mental quality as a physical one. ADA must quickly change from offense to defense, entry to decisive operations, and counterair to theater missile defense. Concentrating coverage and fires, or screening the flanks from attack and surveillance, are tasks routinely accomplished by ADA units.


ADA units are among the first units to deploy during force-projection operations and the last units to depart during redeployment operations. They conduct operations throughout the width and depth of the theater. ADA units achieve defense in depth using a system of systems approach, which gives multiple opportunities to defeat the enemy aerial threat. ADA systems see deep into enemy airspace to contribute to the commander's situational awareness and defeat air, missile, and surveillance threats at maximum range. Depth also includes staying power, which is the access to adequate resources to continue the fight. Army air and missile defense includes contributions from all battlefield operating systems and units.



Air and missile defense units see beyond their immediate tasks and objectives to recognize how their efforts fit within the concept of the operation. Orchestration requires controlling the tempo of operations as well as weighting and shifting air and missile defense efforts. ADA units counter the entire aerial threat spectrum by integrating a system of systems. Air and missile defense commanders integrate their operations horizontally with all battlefield operating systems and vertically with both higher and lower echelon air and missile defense units. Deep, close, and rear operations require simultaneous support.


ADA units meet diverse mission requirements. They require discipline, high standards, and thorough preparation. Commanders need to shift focus, task-organize, and move from one role or mission to another quickly and efficiently. ADA units are multifunctional--able to defeat several different air threats while operating at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.


Commanders seek to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory with minimum casualties to their forces and assets. Combat power combines the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Overwhelming combat power is the ability to focus sufficient force to ensure success and deny the enemy any chance of escape or effective retaliation. Commanders apply overwhelming combat power by bringing all combat elements to bear at the optimum time and place, giving the enemy no opportunity to respond effectively. Commanders integrate and coordinate a variety of functions with the elements of combat power. As a result, they convert the potential of forces, resources, and opportunities into actual capability through violent, coordinated action at the decisive time and place. They attempt to defeat the enemy's combat power by interfering with its ability to conduct reconnaissance, maneuver, and apply firepower.

While contributing to all four elements of combat power, air and missile defense makes its greatest contribution to force protection. Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. It includes all the active and passive actions units take to preserve combat power and deny the enemy the ability to successfully attack the force.

Air and missile defense operations are important active force protection measures. Offensive counterair and TMD attack operations attempt to defeat or suppress enemy capabilities to launch air and missile attacks. Defensive counterair and TMD active defense destroy enemy aircraft and missiles that threaten the force. Besides air and missile defense, force protection has four components.

The first component of protection combines operations security (OPSEC) and deception operations, to help keep the enemy from locating friendly units. Proper dispersion helps reduce losses from enemy fires as does the use of camouflage, discipline, counterreconnaissance, security operations, and fortified fighting positions. Air and missile defense contributes to counterreconnaissance by destroying UAVs and aircraft conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations against the force. Frequent moves disrupt the enemy command and control cycle. These measures help commanders protect their force from enemy observation throughout the conduct of operations. The second component of protection keeps soldiers healthy and maintains their fighting morale. Commanders and leaders at all levels take care of their soldiers' basic health needs. They consider the welfare, morale, and spirit of soldiers as they build cohesion and unit esprit de corps.

Safety is the third component of protection and is part of all operations. Commanders and leaders embrace safety as a principal element in all they do. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful operations and the preservation of combat power.

The fourth component of protection is the avoidance of fratricide. ADA forces use both technical and procedural means to identify friendly aircraft. Compliance with airspace control procedures by all friendly airspace users is essential. The primary mechanisms to reduce fratricide are air and missile defense and airspace control measures, detailed situational awareness, strong leadership, disciplined operations, and anticipation of risks.

A related imperative for air and missile defense is the issuance of early warning (EW) throughout the theater of operations. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of EW.


Air and missile defense is one of the seven combat functions. The combat functions--intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air and missile defense, mobility and survivability, CSS, and battle command--provide a structure for integrating and synchronizing critical combat activities in time, space, and purpose. At every echelon, commanders use the available battle command system to visualize, plan, direct, coordinate, adjust, and control the combat functions.

The combat functions exist at all echelons of command from echelons above corps through battalion. Successful operations occur when the combat functions interact horizontally and vertically. Horizontal interaction occurs when all combat functions interact at the same echelon to maximize combat power. Vertical integration occurs when higher and lower echelons within each combat function interact to synchronize operations. Air and missile defense commanders synchronize their operations by integrating them horizontally with other combat functions and vertically within the air and missile defense combat function.


Theater missile defense and theater counterair (theater air defense) operations are separate but highly related mission areas. As discussed earlier, air targets are manned aircraft and UAVs, while TMD targets are comprised of ballistic, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles. Operations to protect the force from theater missiles differ fundamentally from those actions taken to defend against the air threat.

Manned aircraft demand extensive infrastructure support and generate great demands in terms of manpower and training. Aircraft require runways and sophisticated maintenance and support facilities to sustain operations. These static, lucrative targets are highly vulnerable to attack by the joint force. Mobile missile launchers are much less vulnerable, and are manned by fewer soldiers requiring significantly less training.

The aircraft threat is relatively cooperative when compared to missile threats. In addition to the fixed nature of aircraft-related support facilities, the operational battlespace (opportunities to engage) is much greater. While aircraft conducting operations against the force are exposed to defensive fires for tens of minutes, missile engagement opportunities are measured in seconds.

Though there are some areas where counterair and TMD operations overlap (for example, sensors, weapons, communications, et cetera), TMD and counterair command and control (C2) relationships differ. The unique challenges posed by theater missiles require a highly responsive C2 structure which decentralizes engagement operations to the lowest level. By comparison, the requirement to avoid fratricide of friendly aircraft mandates strict, highly centralized control of counterair engagement operations. As a result of these conflicting demands, the joint force adopts separate C2 approaches which optimize TMD and counterair operations to best protect the force from each type of threat.


World War II offered lessons about modern warfare that remain relevant 50 years later. Army divisions joined both joint and allied forces in the conduct of combined arms, force-projection operations supported by modern fighter aircraft and bombers. Enemy air forces were large, and highly capable, and had the potential to deliver both conventional and chemical munitions. They held US and allied forces at risk throughout the duration of the war. In addition to the air threat, the allies faced attack by surface-to-surface and cruise missiles. To counter the introduction of sizeable enemy air forces, the Army developed and fielded equally capable air defense forces. Early experiences at Kasserine Pass and in the Pacific taught the importance of air defense to force protection. By 1944, commanders routinely integrated air defense forces into Army operations at all echelons.

The Normandy campaign of June 1944, and the subsequent breakout, provide excellent examples of air defense operations in a force-projection scenario. Eleven battalions of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) supported the assaulting US divisions. As the beachhead expanded, additional AAA groups and brigades joined the assault forces to form a near-leak-proof defense. Though the Luftwaffe flew thousands of sorties against the forces and assets concentrated in the beachhead, the allies suffered no significant damage due to air attack. American antiaircraft artillery met the challenge by destroying more than 300 enemy aircraft.

Following bloody hedgerow fighting, American forces conducted a breakout in July 1944. The plan fully integrated and synchronized AAA with ground force operations. AAA again successfully protected the maneuver forces as they swept across France, destroying more than 300 German aircraft. As units moved forward, the allies captured new ports for use as forward logistics centers. The Germans made a determined effort to destroy the major port, Antwerp, using V-1 pilotless aircraft, the first cruise missiles. American air defenders rose to the challenge, destroying more than 70 percent of the missiles and keeping the port open throughout the five-month attack.

Operation OVERLORD is illustrative of the steps taken in a forced entry, force-projection operation. Air defense protected the force in the points of embarkation and throughout entry operations, expansion of the lodgment, and conduct of decisive operations. The threat posed by enemy aircraft and missiles, potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction, presaged the situation faced by US forces during a more modern force-projection operation.

Fifty years after the end of World War II, American forces once again were called upon to conduct force-projection operations against a modern mechanized army supported by large numbers of technologically advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles. As during World War II, air defense forces were fully integrated into operations at all echelons.

Seven days after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Stinger teams and Vulcan squads from 2-52 ADA and 3-4 ADA were on the ground in Saudi Arabia, protecting the advance elements of XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division. They were quickly followed by a Patriot battery from 2-7 ADA which provided air and missile protection for the aerial port of debarkation at Dhahran. During the buildup preceding the ground war, elements of 21 Army air defense battalions were deployed to protect US and coalition forces and assets in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel.

11th ADA Brigade's Patriot batteries made history the night of January 18, 1991, when Alpha Battery, 2-7 ADA, protecting forces in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, recorded the first intercept of a tactical ballistic missile in combat. As indicated by the debris from the TBM which fell to the ground, the missile would have struck a village housing soldiers from VII Corps. Scud intercepts became a nightly event for the Patriot soldiers protecting coalition forces and the cities of Saudi Arabia and Israel. The fiery collisions of Patriot and Scud missiles were captured live by network television, and telecast worldwide to prime viewing audiences. The morale of the soldiers of the coalition, and the citizens of the United States, soared with each successful intercept.

Air defense units protected the divisions and corps in their tactical assembly areas, and were fully integrated into the maneuver units as they conducted breaching operations and attacked Iraqi divisions in Kuwait and Iraq. Patriot and Hawk batteries of TF 8-43 ADA and TF 2-1 ADA protected VII and XVIII Corps breach sites, and joined division ADA units in protecting the maneuver forces, fire support, logistics, and command and control elements throughout the attack. Stinger sections from 2-44 ADA participated in history's largest air assault on February 24th, when the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) attacked 150 miles into Iraq to seize Forward Operating Base Cobra. Vulcan crews from the mechanized and armored divisions destroyed numerous enemy infantry fighting vehicles, killed and captured hundreds of Iraqi infantry, and reduced fortifications to piles of rubble. As a fitting end to the war, TF 8-43 ADA was given the honor of protecting Safwan Airfield, where coalition commanders received the surrender of the Iraqi armed forces on March 12, 1991.


The Air and Missile Defense (AMD) modernization strategy is a focused effort to replace aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies into the force. The strategy emphasizes the need to maintain an affordable, capabilities-based AMD force to execute missions in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the Defense Planning Guidance. The strategy focuses on Information Dominance and Combat Overmatch and provides a direction for science and technology initiatives required for future operational capabilities.


In the next 25 years, the Armyís warfighting concept will evolve from Force XXI to Army Vision 2010 to Army After Next (AAN). Force XXI is the process to advance into the 21st century. The Army executes Force XXI operations through a deliberate set of patterns of operation that serve to focus the many tasks performed in war and other military operations. The patterns are gain information dominance, project the force, protect the force, shape the battlespace, decisive operations, and sustain the force.

Gain Information Dominance

Gain Information Dominance encompasses defensive efforts to attain and protect friendly force information and offensive efforts to deny information to threat forces. Gain Information Dominance magnifies the advantages provided by high-quality U.S. forces, enabling them to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. AMD systems are critical components in information warfare.

Defensive information warfare to protect U.S. information operations will be one of the biggest challenges. Fixed sites, within the United States and in forward-deployed areas, will be potential targets for aggression. In deployed areas, Army AMD planning to protect vital information systems from attack begins in the AMDPCS. The AMDPCS will integrate AMD weapons, sensors, and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) capabilities with those of the joint force into a cohesive system capable of protecting assigned information systems. AMD weapon systems will defend information system assets at theater (THAAD, PATRIOT), corps (MEADS, Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)), and divisional (Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)) levels.

Offensive information warfare operations will neutralize an adversaryís ability to collect information. The ability to remove the threatís "eyes" or his communications flow and to degrade his continuity of operations is fundamental to the attainment of information superiority. The AMDPCS is the focal point for AMD offensive information warfare, integrating with joint and other Army systems to synchronize the actions of all AMD elements. In conjunction with offensive air and deep attack strikes against command, control, and communications complexes, AMD forces will engage UAV RSTA platforms, denying them aerial intelligence data on friendly force locations, movements, and intentions. Warnings of threat aerial activity will trigger passive defense measures, further preventing threat situational awareness. Throughout the operation, corps and divisional AMD systems (e.g., Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)) will position forward of defended assets - given considerations of mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather - time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC), security, and systems availability - to limit or deny observation by RSTA UAVs. While highly effective against the low-altitude UAV threat, these systems and sensor capabilities are further enhanced when integrated with MEADS units.

The AMD information systems participate in the JDN and collect, process, and disseminate common airspace and C2 information to support information warfare operations. Long-range air picture information, provided by the consortium of national sensors and satellites, and joint sources (e.g., airborne warning and control systems [AWACS] and JTAGS) contribute to the consistent tactical picture and assist in creating early warning intelligence for the force commanders. The Army AMD sensor/data network - with inputs from JTAGS, JLENS, Sentinel, and AMD weapon system radars - contribute to the SIAP and provide a real-time or near-real-time air picture of the AMD battlespace to the force commander. Sentinel and JLENS provide added critical intelligence on low-level, smaller signature threats (CMs, UAVs, and helicopters) that are "invisible" to other sensors. The synergy of capabilities allows for the creation and distribution of a common, consistent, and accurate air picture. Interoperable C2 centers throughout the joint force, linked by assured connectivity, provide responsive, integrated battle management and execution. The AMDPCS is employed with the AAMDC, in support of the Joint Force Land Component Commander, and with AMD units on the battlefield to support ground forces from maneuver brigade to theater level. In addition, the AAMDC develops an integrated air, sea, and ground common operating picture, shares this picture with deploying forces, refines and updates the IPB, monitors friendly and threat air operations, and recommends defense designs and AMD priorities in coordination with maneuver plans.

AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Gain Information Dominance objectives are as follows:

Project the Force

The focus of AMD operations during Project the Force encompasses mission planning and deployment preparation actions in the continental United States (CONUS), or other staging bases, to early entry and initial buildup in the theater of operations. Mission planning is a continuous process, addressing pre-deployment, en route, and post-deployment actions. Key considerations are what are needed, when, and where. Threat, strategic transport availability, force and system capabilities, and interoperability needs are driving factors. Simulation, analysis, and rehearsal are major contributors to force readiness prior to employment.

Protection of the force projection base is of paramount importance. The threatís ability to threaten that base, whether real or perceived, significantly influences deployment flow. AMD forces must be alerted to and prepared for any possibilities of threat aerial actions.

The U.S.-based power projection capability and infrastructure must be protected prior to the initial entry, throughout any operation, and after the end of hostilities. The Army will contribute to the strategic defense of the United States. The Army, integrated into a detection and C2 architecture with air- and sea-based components, will provide the teeth of the missile engagement capability to protect the United States against its most serious external threat - missile attack. When deployed, the Armyís fixed land-based National Missile Defense (NMD) system will protect the U.S.-based force projection capability and the U.S. population, industrial base, and infrastructure against limited ICBM attacks.

The initial AMD force deployed must be modular, tailorable, versatile, interoperable, and lethal. In scenarios with littoral operations, it is likely that the Navy Aegis will provide initial theater missile defense (TMD) of the deploying forces. Airlifted Army AMD forces will be among the first deployed Army elements and, with Navy (and perhaps Marine) AMD systems, will operate in task-organized forces to establish the multilayered protection to counter the threat spectrum.

Army AMD forces will be interoperable with the Navy elements for C2 and for common, shared situational awareness, synchronization of operations, sensor resource sharing, and, potentially, mutual engagement support. At a given point in the operations, based on mission, threat, and requirements, Navy AMD forces will likely withdraw or reposition to protect the sea lines of communications for the deployed force. Army, Air Force, and Marine forces and C2 elements will assume Navy functions and missions and maintain the full dimensional defense of the later arriving deployers into aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) as buildup of forces and equipment continues. Additional Army AMD forces, most likely the highest percentage of committed AMD assets in theater, will expand defenses of critical assets and the deployed force commensurate with, and in response to, the Joint Force Commanderís directives.

In deployments where the threat of air and missile strikes exists, AMD units deploy with the initial force. The AMD deployers consist of a mix of systems tailored to meet mission and threat considerations. With airlift requirements at a premium, the lighter, multithreat-capable systems such as MEADS, Avenger, and the advanced weapon system(s) are attractive deployment options. However, where a significant longer range TBM threat exists, the more airlift-intensive THAAD and PAC-3 systems assume higher movement priority by strategic airlift. Theater AMD systems (THAAD and PATRIOT) provide a high-altitude, long-range defense of the lodgment APODs and SPODs, and the initial force concentrations. Corps AMD assets (e.g., Avenger, MEADS, advanced weapon system(s)) are task organized for composite and complementary defense against the other aerial threats.

An element of the AAMDC will deploy early in the force projection phase if the air or missile threat requires employment of theater or corps AMD forces. As the senior Army command for AMD, the AAMDC supports the centralized planning, coordination, integration, and execution for the Army Force Commander/Joint Force Land Component Commander. The AAMDC is the focus for the coordinated employment and integration of Army AMD (including corps AMD forces) into JTAMD plans and C4I architectures.

The AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Project the Force objectives are as follows:

Protect the Force

Protect the Force is arguably the most joint of the patterns of operation. From initial entry through redeployment, Protect the Force encompasses the host of AMD weapons and C2 systems. Each serviceís systems bring unique capabilities to the overall defense. Virtually all may participate during the course of the operation, some from the start and others not until well into the buildup. Sustained interoperability is key to ensuring maximum engagement opportunities and mission success.

Defense in depth is achieved by the synergy of JTAMD weapon systems and the integrating C4I architecture. Critical C2 centers, logistical complexes, and troop assembly areas are prime targets for missile attacks. Synchronized JTAMD forces minimize threat aerial operations and maximize friendly force freedom of action in the air and on the ground. Upper-tier systems (i.e., Army THAAD and/or Navy Theater-Wide TBM Defense) and lower-tier systems (i.e., PATRIOT, MEADS, Navy Area TBM Defense) provide defense of the designated assets. Army divisional and corps AMD and Marine air defense units may also be integrated to increase defense capabilities. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters add capabilities against threat aircraft. The air picture and engagement support provided by JLENS, Sentinel, JTAGS, and other service sensors enhances engagement timelines and force survivability.

Defense in depth extends to the forward areas of the battlefield and throughout the battlespace. The Land Component Commanderís AMD units move with and support the maneuvering forces and their sustainment organizations and facilities. Overwatch by the longer range systems (i.e., PATRIOT and MEADS) expands defense in depth and altitude and against TBMs.

Army AMD units position to optimize defense of the Joint Force Commanderís priority assets. A task-organized AMD task force, consisting of a PATRIOT (or MEADS) battalion augmented with a THAAD battery, will provide a two-tiered defense. A two-tiered defense results when the AMD task force is fully integrated with automated engagement operations and provides TBM coverage and assured, near-leakproof protection of the high-value assets, denying the enemy a preferred attack option. The upper-tier THAAD system protects defended assets against attack by MRBMs and SRBMs. Lower-tier systems, such as PATRIOT and MEADS, defend against SRBMs and the other aerial threats (CMs, TASMs, and fixed-wing aircraft). They generally employ in close proximity to defended assets. Deployed JTAGS will report on TBMs using satellite data. JTAGS interfaces with theater communications networks to transmit warning, alerting, and cueing information on launched TBMs. This will support AMD active defense measures, passive defense measures, and attack operations. During entry, corps and divisional AMD systems - Avenger, Bradley Linebacker, and the advanced weapon system(s) - integrate with MEADS and PATRIOT for defense against CMs, UAVs, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The advanced weapon system(s) will provide a "deep magazine" capability to counter saturation raids throughout the battlespace. Corps and divisional AMD systems position forward of defended assets and orient toward the anticipated directions of approach. The Sentinel is integrated into the overall surveillance plan. Positioned forward of defended assets, Sentinel provides increased detection and cueing and extends engagement ranges against low-altitude threats.

JLENS is also integrated into the AMD architecture. JLENS complements other joint airborne sensors. Its primary missions are to detect the low-altitude LACM threat and to provide a surveillance umbrella, denying terrain sanctuary to low-flying aerial platforms. JLENS also supports ADSAM engagements, detects and shares ground target information with other Army and joint C2 nodes, and supports Army and joint active defense, passive defense, attack operations, and C4I operations.

As forces continue to build up and expand in the theater, additional PATRIOT and MEADS systems arrive to augment the initial defenses, extending AMD coverage to provide protection of maneuvering forces. Arriving PATRIOT battalions replace MEADS elements that have been employed in theater-level, lower-tier missions. THAAD, PATRIOT, and corps AMD units continue to defend APODs, SPODs, and selected geopolitical assets designated by the Joint Force Commander. The replaced MEADS units assume the mission of protecting maneuver forces moving to or within assembly areas, in conjunction with other corps and divisional AMD units. Divisional AMD resources generally defend their organic divisions in staging and assembly areas. The corps AMD battalions are task organized (MEADS battle elements and Avenger/advanced weapon system(s) batteries) to leverage the synergy provided by combining individual systemsí firepower and surveillance capabilities. The AMD role in Protect the Force continues through the Decisive Operations and Sustain the Force phases of the operation as described below.

The AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Protect the Force objectives are as follows:

Shape the Battlespace

Shape the Battlespace creates an environment that affords mobile and quick-reacting friendly forces flexibility of actions while constricting threat options and actions. Defense of forces against threat missiles is gained through a common, integrated C2 architecture, shared air intelligence, and timely synchronized engagements of threat platforms by capable, lethal AMD forces. The fusion of air and space intelligence results in a common air picture and precise calculations and targeting data for the location of TBM launch points. Conversely, threat aerial observation is denied or restricted, thereby reducing his targeting capabilities and visualization of the battlefield.

AMD forces are essential contributors to the Armyís decide, detect, and deliver imperatives of Shape the Battlespace. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine air defense and air control elements contribute to the understanding of the friendly and threat aerial activities and the potential threat to the commanderís concept of operations. AMD sensors provide early warning of threat observation and attack platforms, permitting force dispersal and concealment and preparing AMD and other force weapons for engagements. The detailed, common air picture allows unambiguous situational awareness. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine systems defend against missile attacks, provide long-range fires, and conduct deep attack missions to limit threat capabilities and isolate the battlefield.

AMD shaping of the battlespace focuses on protecting the force and denying or limiting the threatís understanding of friendly intentions. Divisional and corps AMD systems will protect maneuver forces, while moving and in assembly areas, and other critical assets against RSTA UAVs, CMs, TBMs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and rockets. Systems such as Avenger and the advanced weapon system(s) generally position out from the defended route of movement or asset, in depth, and orient toward likely directions of approach. MEADS units complement these systems, providing protection against short-range TBMs and CMs and extending the defense against threat aerial platforms that attempt to overfly or stand off from the shorter range, shorter altitude systems. Sentinel, employed in conjunction with the MEADS sensors, orients on low-altitude targets, covers gaps, and extends the MEADSí surveillance forward. When augmented with JLENS, Sentinel sensors negate terrain sanctuary to low-altitude aerial platforms. PATRIOT, THAAD, and Avenger/advanced weapon system(s) units continue their protection of critical theater assets, generally in rear areas.

The AAMDC and brigade and battalion AMDPCSs will review and process intelligence data, provided via space-based, aerial and ground sensor platforms, and reassess threat situations. Data from JTAGS, PATRIOT, THAAD, and MEADS may assist in determining TBM launch points and may be transmitted to deep attack systems to facilitate engagements.

The AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Shape the Battlespace objectives are as follows:

Decisive Operations

In Decisive Operations, concentrated combat power successfully overwhelms the threat. While operations continue throughout the theater, the focus of Decisive Operations is the forward area. The maneuvering forces must retain flexibility of action and overwhelming superiority in tempo to defeat the threat. Integrated fires from air and ground systems continuously support maneuvering forces.

The JTAMD force extends protection throughout the battlespace. Air Force aircraft provide air superiority against threat aircraft and attack threat artillery, missile, and C2 sites. Marine low-altitude air defense systems defend their forces and may complement or extend defense of Army forces. Army AMD in rear areas of the corps and theater maintain protection of critical C2 and logistical nodes and move forward, as directed, to extend an overarching layer of defense. Survivable, agile, mobile Army AMD forces move with the force and provide close-in defense against the low-flying attackers. Interoperable C2 and operations centers are continuously aware of activities on the battlefield and in the battlespace. They maintain an unambiguous picture of the airspace and are capable of expeditiously positioning or repositioning AMD assets to maximize responsiveness to threat activities.

The AMD mission focus is the defeat of threat air and missile strikes against maneuver forces and theater assets and denial of threat UAV RSTA efforts. While PATRIOT, THAAD, and Avengers and advanced weapon systems maintain their defense of the APODs, SPODs, and priority geopolitical assets throughout the theater, Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, advanced weapon system(s), and MEADS units provide AMD coverage of the corps maneuvering units and such critical assets as forward refueling and ammunition points, aviation forward operating bases, and potential choke- points. PATRIOT units may move forward and position to augment coverage of the corps logistical concentrations, particularly against SRBMs.

Divisional and corps AMD systems will position both in the maneuvering force formations and along routes of advance. Bradley Linebackers and advanced weapon systems accompany the maneuver units as they advance to counter the threatís close battle air support platforms - helicopters and attack UAVs. The Bradley Linebackers and advanced weapon systems generally position immediately behind the lead maneuvering elements, weighted toward the flanks of the formations. Avengers and other advanced weapon systems deploy along the routes of advance to protect the force against helicopters, CMs, attack UAVs, and RSTA UAVs. Sentinel and JLENS data, integrated with those of the MEADS sensors and other Army and JTAMD sensors, enhance the forward air picture.

MEADS employs forward to provide overwatch protection of maneuvering forces against TBMs, CMs, and low-altitude air-breathing threats, in conjunction with Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, and advanced weapon system(s) units. Sensors position to extend surveillance forward of the close combat area, permitting engagement of aircraft, standoff helicopters, and UAVs deployed beyond Avenger, Bradley Linebacker, and advanced weapon system(s) capabilities.

The AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Decisive Operations objectives are as follows:

Sustain the Force

Sustain the Force is a continuing operation from deployment to redeployment. Significant planning, however, must precede deployment. The aircraft loading designs must maximize capabilities with minimum equipment and transportation assets. Units are tailored to fit the mission. Logistics are defined to meet demands at the right time. Continuous interoperability between the various elements of the force is key to facilitating resupply efforts in the most efficient, effective, and timely manner.

Logistical complexes, embarkation and debarkation ports, and resupply points - all critical force assets - require protection from air and missile attacks. The greatest threat periods are during the initial buildup, the early hours and days of the operation, and during reconstitution and redeployment. During these times, large concentrations of personnel, equipment, and supplies in relatively small areas become lucrative targets for threat missiles. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine AMD components will provide the requisite warning, counterattack, and synergistic defense of logistical facilities to ensure the unimpeded flow of operations.

AMD units throughout the force, integrated via modular, tailored AMDPCSs, focus on the defense of the logistical facilities and deploying or reconstituting forces. PATRIOT and THAAD maintain protection of the air and seaports and staging areas against TBMs. MEADS adds capabilities against TBM and CM attacks and complements divisional and other corps AMD systems. Bradley Linebackers, Avengers, and advanced weapons systems focus on countering potential threat RSTA or attack UAVs and providing a low altitude "gap-filling" capability against CMs, thereby preventing surprise attacks and enhancing force security.

The AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Sustain the Force objectives are as follows: