Index FM 44-100 Air and Missile Defense Operations



This chapter addresses integration of the air and missile defense combat function into planning and operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. ADA forces protect geopolitical assets and accomplish other missions assigned by the National Command Authority (NCA) at the strategic level. At the operational level, ADA forces protect the theater base, the ports of debarkation, and operational lines of communications. And at the tactical level of war, Army ADA supports the scheme of maneuver while protecting corps and division forces according to the maneuver commander's air and missile defense priorities.

Army Air and Missile Defense in Theater Air and Missile Defense Operations

The Army plays a key role in joint counterair and theater missile defense operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Army AD contributes greatly to DCA, OCA, and TMD attack operations, and provides the majority of TMD active defense capabilities. The Anny joins the other services to provide protection for the concentration of critical forces and assets in the theater base and in the combat zone. Unity of effort is achieved through integration and coordination of service component CA and TMD operations by the JFC. The AADC contributes through the development and promulgation of JFC approved ROE and air and missile defense procedures and measures. This joint approach to CA and TMD provide the synchronization necessary to obtain the synergism required for success.

Army air and missile defense requires the integrated application of all combined arms. For OCA and TMD attack operations, the Army uses deep operations, primarily by special operations forces, aviation and field artillery units, to attack the enemy's air and missile assets before they can be launched against the theater. Active DCA and TMD active defense operations conducted by Army forces are in response to immediate enemy air, missile, and surveillance threats. The Army's primary active DCA and TMD active defense force is ADA, which provides dedicated low-, medium-, and high-altitude air and missile defense systems. ADA and the other combined arms forces integrate their fires to protect the force and geopolitical assets and ensure freedom to maneuver.

Air and Missile Defense in Mature and Contingency Theaters

Army forces conduct air and missile defense operations in two greatly different types of theaters. Both mature and contingency theaters require integrated Army air and missile defense planning.


Alliance commitments and in-place multiservice forces are characteristic of mature theaters. The theater typically contains a large number of high-value, fixed assets and a well-known threat. Because of the threat, counterair and theater missile defense forces are typically in place during peacetime for threat deterrence and wartime readiness.


Counterair and theater missile defense activities in contingency theaters differ markedly from those in established theaters. The contingency theater lacks the sophisticated command and control, logistics infrastructure, and in-place forces of the mature theater. In most contingency theaters, the sophistication and quantity of threat weapon systems are generally less than that of a mature theater. However, without adequate air and missile defense, force-projection forces in the initial stages of an operation are susceptible to catastrophic damage from even an unsophisticated enemy.

Ground forces deploying in a force-projection operation may have little air support in the early entry stage of the operation. They may have to depend on the air and missile defense resources that deploy with the force. Force-projection operations are normally short-duration operations, but may transition to protracted war. In the initial stages of the force-projection operation, there will only be a few high-value assets. Counterair and theater missile defense forces must protect those assets to ensure the continued buildup and expansion of the lodgment area.

Air and Missile Defense Objectives

Air and missile defense objectives are similar at each level of war. Army air defense commanders plan their operations to support accomplishment of the maneuver commander's strategic, operational, or tactical objectives by protecting their priority forces and assets from air and missile attack and surveillance.

Strategic Objectives

At the theater strategic level, ADA protects forces or geopolitical and military assets of strategic significance. Such assets or forces are critical to the successful achievement of national objectives. Normally, the requirement to protect strategic assets will be established by the NCA. Strategic missions can be assigned to air and missile defense units at every echelon of command. Strategic assets could include cities, economic facilities, and religious or cultural sites which must be protected in the host nation or other regional power. The protection of such assets may be a precondition for the introduction of US forces into the region, for basing privileges, or to the formation and maintenance of a friendly coalition. Other strategic assets could include production, processing, and transportation facilities for natural resources or other materials which are of vital interest to the United States.

Operational Objectives

Counterair and theater missile defense plans support the joint force commander's intent and concept of the operation. The JFC employs counterair and theater missile defense forces to achieve two primary operational objectives: gain control of the air environment and protect the force and selected assets. Control of the air environment may change with time and range from limited local air superiority in a specific part of the battlefield to air supremacy over the entire AO or theater. At the operational level, the Army contributes to the theater counterair operations and to theater missile defense. Army combined arms forces provide support for OCA, DCA, and TMD active defense and attack operations. ADA units conduct DCA and TMD active defense operations and help integrate contributions to CA and TMD by other members of the combined arms team. They protect priority forces and assets in the theater base according to the JFC's and JFLCC's counterair and theater missile defense priorities.

Tactical Objectives

The objective of air and missile defense operations at the tactical level is to protect corps and division forces as they plan and execute battles and engagements. ADA forces control the air environment over the corps and divisions, protect priority forces and assets from attack and surveillance, provide freedom to maneuver, and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles in the air. Every participant in Army air and missile defense--ADA, maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence--has a role in achieving those objectives, as do the joint forces which support corps and division operations.

Air and missile defense objectives at the tactical level are an extension of the operational-level objectives, but are more specific. Tactical-level air and missile defense operations support the overall objectives of corps and divisions. The emphasis at the tactical level is on protecting the force rather than on gaining control of the air environment or protecting geopolitical assets. The following paragraphs delineate specific tactical objectives for ADA brigades and battalions.

Ensure Freedom to Maneuver

The freedom of friendly forces to maneuver is a fundamental part of Army doctrine. An objective of air and missile defense operations is to ensure that enemy air does not impede maneuver. To achieve this objective, ADA and other combined arms elements must provide integrated air and missile defense for the force. ADA provides protection by synchronizing the fires and operations of ADA units with the fires and operations of combined arms units as well as with the joint and multinational forces. Protection of the force from deployment through redeployment is a key to successful force-projection operations.

Win the Information War

On the fast-paced, modern battlefield, timely information is of paramount importance to get the right force to the right place at the right time. Friendly forces, including ADA, must rapidly collect, process, and disseminate information to permit combat units to operate in depth and maintain initiative, agility, and synchronization. The force's dependence on the prompt flow of information makes battle command centers prime targets for enemy air and missile operations. Therefore, the protection of battle command nodes is a key objective of air and missile defense operations. Denial of RSTA data to the enemy is equally important. By cutting the link between enemy commanders and their eyes, ADA forces the enemy to operate in the blind, to be reactive to US operational initiatives, and to lose offensive potential. In short, denial of RSTA data increases the probability of success of friendly operations and saves lives.

Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information technology systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information Operations capitalize on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology. IO targets information or information systems in order to affect the information dependent process, whether human or automated. Such information dependent processes range from National Command Authorities level decision making to the automated control of key commercial infrastructures such as telecommunications and electric power.

Many different capabilities and activities must be integrated to achieve a coherent IO strategy. Intelligence and communications support are critical to conducting offensive and defensive IO. These assigned and supporting capabilities and activities include operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare(EW), physical attack and/or destruction, and may include computer network attack. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, should be consulted for more information.

Right Force at the Right Place at the Right Time

The ADA commander has a number of different systems and task force organizations that can be employed. In each operation, the commander tailors the ADA force to match the factors of METT-TC. ADA is deployed throughout the depth of the battlefield, but the ADA commander ensures that ADA is where it is needed and can make the biggest impact on operations. Taking advantage of the mobility of ADA systems, the commander employs the force at the critical time and place.

Sustain the Battle

To sustain the battle and force's ability to maneuver, systems engaged in air and missile defense operations must protect vital assets and forces which perform sustainment functions. These include lines of communications, fixed and mobile facilities, and organizations that support the force in deep, close, and rear operations. In the forward areas of the battlefield, ADA protects combat trains and refueling and rearming operations. Air and missile defense of rear sustainment facilities concentrates on POL ammunition, and maintenance areas. Sustaining the battle also includes ensuring continuous employment of ADA and other Army air and missile defense resources.

Kill Enemy Aircraft and Missiles the First Time

Air and missile defense operations must be carried out according to the mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of the operation. Success on the battlefield depends upon the ability of air and missile defense operations to prevent the air threat from returning and repeatedly jeopardizing friendly forces' freedom to maneuver. This prevents further destruction of friendly forces. Preventing air surveillance and losses to attack sustains friendly combat power. Killing threat aircraft and missiles destroys the enemy's ability to synchronize the combat power of coordinated air and land battle efforts. Killing enemy aircraft and missiles the first time sustains friendly combat power by denying aerial RSTA and preventing the destruction of friendly forces and assets. Successful air and missile defense operations also destroy the enemy's will to fight early in the battle. The combination of enemy losses and effective passive measures erodes the enemy's expectation of successful air operations. Deterring enemy air surveillance or attacks or simply nullifying their effectiveness is not enough. Air and missile defense operations must be so overmatching as to make the cost of air operations prohibitive to the enemy. Air and missile defense operations must achieve this objective early while ADA forces still have the capability to rearm, reorganize, and reconstitute.

There will be tactical situations and operations in which commanders restrict weapon systems from engaging enemy air to conserve firepower, prevent fratricide, or support a deception. Such decisions are not arbitrary, but are a function of the assigned mission. However, killing enemy aircraft and missiles the first time remains a primary objective.

Air and Missile Defense Roles and Functions

The commander of the highest echelon Army air defense command in the theater normally participates as the joint force land component commander's theater Army air defense coordinator (TAADCOORD). The TAADCOORD serves as the JFLCC's principal advisor and coordinator for theater counterair and theater missile defense operations. The highest echelon command in the theater may be a battalion, corps brigade, EAC brigade, or the AAMDC, depending on the size of the theater of operations and the joint force. When the AAMDC is in theater the commander may also be designated the deputy area air defense commander (DAADC). The DAADC serves as the AADC's principal advisor and coordinator for theater land-based air defense and TMD operations.

Tactical-level air and missile defense requires the integration of ADA units with other combined arms elements. As discussed in Chapter 1, tactical-level air and missile defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA but maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must participate directly. Logistics provides the means for all air and missile defense operations. Each participant has a specific role in tactical air and missile defense plans and operations. These integrated roles are mutually supporting.

The Joint Force and Component Commanders

The JFC establishes campaign objectives, approves plans, establishes air defense and missile defense priorities, allocates forces, and apportions air power. He assigns overall responsibility for air and missile defense to an area air defense commander, and for airspace control to an airspace control authority. The JFC normally commands his forces through component and functional commanders. See the Joint Force Commander's Air Defense Role illustration 6-1.

Joint Force Land Component Commander

The JFLCC is responsible to the JFC for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and conducting land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. He commands land forces, including Army and Marine air and missile defense forces; assigns missions; establishes air and missile defense priorities for forces assigned to the land component and plans and executes TMD, DCA, and OCA operations within his assigned AO. Depending on the threat, and on the composition of the joint force, the JFLCC (or one of his subordinate land force commanders), may also be assigned responsibilities as the airspace control authority and or area air defense commander.

Joint Force Air Component Commander

The JFACC's responsibilities are assigned by the JFC. Normally these include planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of air assets based on the JFC's apportionment decision. The JFACC allocates air sorties to both offensive and defensive counterair, and TMD attack operations. The JFC usually assigns the JFACC responsibilities as both the airspace control authority and the area air defense commander.

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

The JFMCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish maritime missions and tasks assigned by the JFC. During the early part of force-projection operations, when the preponderance of air assets are provided by the naval forces, the JFMCC (or one of his subordinates) may be designated as the JFACC. He may also be assigned responsibilities as the area air defense commander and the airspace control authority.

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander

The JFSOCC is responsible for planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the JFC. Special operations forces support OCA and TMD attack operations through reconnaissance and direct action operations.

Area Air Defense Commander

The JFC assigns overall responsibility for theater-level defensive counterair and active defense TMD operations to a single commander. The AADC is normally the component commander with the preponderance of air and missile defense capabilities and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air and missile defense operations. His responsibilities will be defined by the JFC. Normally, the AADC performs the following functions:

Airspace Control Authority

The ACA assumes overall responsibility of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. The ACA coordinates and integrates the use of the airspace control area. He develops airspace control procedures and policies, establishes the airspace control system, and coordinates and deconflicts airspace user requirements. The ACA develops the airspace control plan and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the area of operations. Normally, the same commander assigned responsibilities as the AADC will also serve as the ACA.

Figure 6-1. Joint Force Commander's Air Defense Role


Infantry and armor forces with an air defense capability increase the density and effectiveness of air and missile defense across the battlefield. However, the optimum role for these forces is ground combat. The maneuver commander must carefully consider the benefits of combined arms air defense contributions versus the decrease in ground combat effectiveness. Combined arms elements can provide vital self-protection from air threats and contribute to their freedom to maneuver. Although they have a limited capability to engage fixed-wing aircraft, missiles, and UAVs, combined arms members can effectively engage hovering or slow-moving helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. lank main guns, IFVs, antitank weapons, and other direct-fire systems must engage these enemy air platforms when possible. The force commander can assign combined arms resources to protect critical areas or assets from air attack. The ADCOORD recommends to the ground force commander the use of other combat arms in an air defense role. The ADCOORD bases the recommendation on a careful target value analysis and estimate of the air threat.

Fire Support

Fire support enhances tactical-level air and missile defense. Indirect fire weapons can deny enemy helicopters the use of masked, standoff positions. Fire support systems can concentrate their fires on enemy landing zones, pickup zones, launch sites, command and control, assembly areas, and FARPs. Surface-to-surface fire coordination for OCA operations takes place through normal fire support channels. Fire support elements coordinate targets for attack by air forces supporting corps and division operations.

The ADCOORD works closely with the FSCOORD, G3, and G2 to recommend prioritized OCA and TMD targets. The threat's ability to disrupt friendly operations dictates target priority. The ADCOORD makes target recommendations, weighing them against other requirements of the commander's plan competing for the same fire support. Many OCA and TMD targets fall into the category of deep targets. Therefore, long-range fire support assets are the optimal means to attack them.


Army aviation contributes to air defense and joint counterair activities through air combat operations. Air combat provides aviation self-defense, combined arms maneuver forces protection, and air and missile defense forces augmentation. Air combat operations support the force commander's overall concept of operations. The maneuver commander's decision to use aviation in other than a self-protection, air combat role must be weighed against its primary antiarmor mission. Air combat operations are planned to support the ground tactical plan and can be either offensive or defensive.

Aviation can conduct attacks against OCA and TMD targets that cannot be effectively engaged by indirect fire systems. Army aviation also participates in air assault operations against OCA and TMD targets. The force commander plans air security and SEAD missions to support Army aviation deep strike OCA and TMD operations.

Army aviation participates in DCA operations primarily by attacking aerial targets of opportunity and by engaging enemy air targets in self-defense. However, the force commander may give Army aviation forces the mission to screen the force against RSTA UAVs. Other DCA operations conducted by Army aviation occur in response to specific air threats. Army aviation DCA goals are to provide self-defense and augment the ground air and missile defense capability of the combined arms team. Air cavalry squadrons and attack helicopter battalions can fill gaps in the force's air and missile defense when ADA units are redistributing assets and adjusting forces. Helicopters in an air combat role also can provide air defense during screening missions. Early warning provided by screening or attack aviation assets must be integrated into ADA early warning and vice versa.

Coordination between the aviation and ADA commanders is particularly important, as aviation forces must operate in the airspace within the ADA engagement coverage. Prevention of fratricide is a major element of force protection. Identification of on-order air defense missions for aviation occurs during the formulation of the commander's plan. The plan includes command relationships and detailed control measures for the employment of aviation in an air defense role.


Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets contribute to OCA, DCA, and TMD operations. Coordination for the use of IEW systems, including joint assets, against OCA and TMD targets is similar to coordination for fire support and involves the G3, G2, FSCOORD, and ADCOORD. IEW supports air and missile defense through electronic attack and electronic warfare support on air targets. Careful planning and execution of electronic warfare complements surface-to-air fires. IEW can also provide for surveillance, identification, and classification of hostile air targets aiding ADA greatly through early warning.

Following the identification of all PIR and IR during the planning phase, the ADCOORD coordinates with the G2 or S2 to ensure air and missile defense requirements are met. The G2's collection manager then ensures specific orders and requests fully support those requirements. The collection manager also synchronizes collection and reporting to deliver relevant information on time. This process involves the prioritization of scarce resources to meet many IRs. A request for intelligence information is generated when organic assets cannot satisfy an IR. The focus of tactical intelligence could include forward operating bases, FARPs, missile and UAV capabilities, electronic warfare systems, logistics facilities, and C2 nodes. The interface between the ADCOORD and G2 or S2 is essential for many reasons including a coordinated and accurate evaluation of threat air and missile capabilities.

Early Warning

Early Warning (EW) is both an active and a passive defense measure. The JFLCC/Army Forces Commander relies upon ADA for EW in theater. However, passing of EW is an imperative mission conducted by all elements, to include non-ADA forces, within the theater of operations. Because of its dual defensive role and its importance to other units besides ADA units, EW is passed both vertically and horizontally with communication chains among subordinate commands, MACOMs, and other operation centers such as the Rear Area Operation Centers.

Passive EW is when a unit uses EW assets to only identify and track potential targets. This type of EW informs other units of enemy aircraft locations to allow them to implement other passive defense measures in a timely fashion. No personnel or equipment is dedicated to engage those targets in any way. This type of EW is primarily used by units other than Air Defense not engaged in a Combined Arms for Air Defense (CAFADs) role.

Active EW is when assets are dedicated to not only acquire and track targets, but also to provide cueing data to weapons platforms. In active EW, personnel and systems are dedicated to engage and destroy hostile targets. This type of EW is primarily used by Air Defense units and maneuver units engaged in a CAFADs role.

Combined Arms for Air and Missile Defense

Every participant on the battlefield must be capable of firing in self-defense at enemy attack or surveillance aircraft. Small arms and crew-served weapons fire against rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles provides a significant terminal defense. Guns, by their very nature, provide both real and virtual attrition. Combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) is an essential element in this attrition. Individual and crew-served weapons can mass their fires against air threats. The massed use of guns in local air defense causes enemy air to increase their standoff range for surveillance and weapons delivery and increase altitude in transiting to and from targets. These reactions make enemy air more vulnerable to ADA. CAFAD training and tactical SOPs enable units to effectively prepare for self-defense against air attack.

Air and Missile Defense Planning

Joint operations planning is performed according to policies and procedures established in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES supports and integrates joint operations planning activities at the national, theater, and supporting command levels. It interrelates with three other national systems--the National Security Council System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. JOPES is the principal system for translating policy decisions into operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. It is a dynamic system currently evolving through incremental integration and enhancement. JOPES consists of both operational and supporting functions. See Figure 6-2., Jopes Operational And Supporting Tasks.

Figure 6-2. JOPES Operational And Supporting Tasks


Operational Functions

JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework within which joint military planning and execution occurs. The operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order.

Threat Identification and Assessment

This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and then determining capabilities and intentions.

Strategy Determination

This function furnishes direction from the national level for developing courses of action and assists the NCA and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in formulating suitable and feasible options to counter the threat.

Course of Action Development

This function helps the CINC's staff develop and test alternative COAs based upon NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the CINC's strategic concept in deliberate planning or the commander's estimate in crisis action planning (CAP).

Detailed Planning

This function supports rapid preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. Detailed planning results in a CJCS-approved OPLAN or a National Command Authority-approved OPORD.


This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage events during execution. Implementation begins with the CJCS execution order and usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as termination or redirection of operations.

Supporting Functions

The supporting functions relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each.


This function makes current and accurate information concerning friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources available to users.


Simulation and Analysis

This function includes automated techniques that support each of the other JOPES functions.


Theater-strategic planning during peacetime provides the framework for the wartime employment of forces. Theater commanders or CINCs through their planning staffs develop a variety of peacetime assessments and contingency plans that ease transition to a crisis or war. Peacetime intelligence and logistics assessments are essential for rapid transition to force-projection operations.

In time of conflict or war, planners develop strategic end states tailored to the particular situation. The combatant commander modifies existing strategic and contingency plans and alters portions of the theater strategy using crisis-action planning. The theater strategy is written in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources. It provides guidance for a broad range of activities throughout the AO.

The theater commander and staff conduct theater-strategic planning using the JOPES. The assigned planning requirements are formulated into a family of OPLANs to meet strategic and contingency requirements in the theater. The JFLCC develops the supporting plan as part of the family of plans. The theater commander's OPLAN is a theater campaign plan which integrates air, land, and naval operations to accomplish a common objective. All theater OPLANs are designed to achieve strategic goals. The theater commander uses operational art in theater design to influence the strategic intent found in both the theater strategy and campaign plan.


Air and missile defense planning is a tiered process occurring at all echelons. The JFC normally issues planning guidance by phase. The JFC, or if delegated, the JFACC/AADC tasks components to develop detailed priorities. The components conduct wargames to prioritize their defended assets based on phases. The AAMDC commander in the roles of TAADCOORD and DAADC is involved in this process by assisting the ARFOR and AADC in the planning and coordination of the defended asset list (DAL). The JFC or JFACC/AADC with the components, go through an arbitration process to coalesce all priorities into a single list.

Once the DAL is published, planning and task organization occur at all levels to ensure successful accomplishment of the mission. EAC ADA brigades conduct defense planning and task organize forces to protect assigned assets from the DAL. ADA battalions continue to refine these plans and further task organize to execute air and missile defense operations. Also, the TAADCOORD advises the COMAROR/JFLCC on the employment of the Corps ADA brigades to ensure their integration into the theater air and missile defense plan. When necessary, Corps commanders may be tasked to protect theater assets from the DAL located in the corps area using corps ADA forces.

Air and missile defense during deployment and entry operations is essential for force protection due to the vulnerability of deploying forces entering a theater. Forces are flowed into a theater based on the threat and the mission. The JFC may decide to initially deploy a robust air and missile defense capability into theater to protect the force prior to decisive operations. As operations progress the DAL is continually reassessed by all components and recommendations are forwarded to the JFC or JFACC/AADC.

Operational Planning Process

Air and missile defense planning at the operational level is an iterative process. The same type of process would occur if the USN or USMC were providing the majority of the air assets.

Using JFC guidance the AADC develops the air and missile defense concept for the theater. The DAADC assists the AADC with the air and missile defense plan development and in the role of TAADCOORD assists the JFLCC's staff (J3 and J5, with input from the fire support element, and Army airspace command and control cell) in providing recommendations on Army CA priorities, TMD priorities, and resource allocation to support the JFC's air and missile defense concept. The JFLCC, through the AAMDC commander in his DAADC role with a liaison team deployed to the AADC, provides an air and missile defense estimate to the AADC. The BCD may perform this handoff function when the AAMDC is not in theater. With JFC's guidance, the JFACC in coordination with the JFLCC, develops the air operations plan.

The AADC develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates air assets for various missions. The JFLCC's TAADCOORD determines whether the corps has sufficient air and missile defense resources or if the JFLCC should allocate additional theater Army air and missile defense assets for protection of the corps. The TAADCOORD may also recommend that the JFLCC allocate corps air and missile defense resources to protect theater assets. The TAADCOORD recommends to the JFLCC which assets Army ADA units can protect and which assets require other component or multinational coverage. In the absence of the DAADC when the AAMDC is not in theater, the senior ADA commander as the TAADCOORD integrates ADA units into the AADC's DCA planning process. However, this is normally a DAADC function because the AAMDC has the necessary personnel and equipment to deploy to the AADC's location to accomplish air and missile defense integration.

The plan enables the JFLCC to finalize the air and missile defense and fire support portions of the land operation plan. The JFLCC prioritizes the allocated CAS in coordination with fire support plans. The JFLCC's priorities are the foundation for interdiction targeting. The JFLCC's TAADCOORD develops the air and missile defense portion of the land operation plan.

The JFLCC allocates resourcing and assigns tasks to corps which can suballocate assets and assign air and missile defense missions to divisions. In each corps and division main CP, the G3 plans section develops the maneuver plan. Within the G3 plans section, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, A2C2 cell, and FSE, incorporates the air and missile defense mission into this maneuver plan.

The ADCOORD, in conjunction with the G2, develops and recommends OCA and TMD targeting priorities, nominates OCA and TMD targets and TAIs to the FSCOORD, and develops and recommends AD and TMD priorities to the commander for approval. The air liaison officer participates in this process by recommending SEAD targets to the FSCOORD. See the Development of Air and missile defense and Fire Support Annexes illustration 6-5.

The FSCOORD and the ADCOORD incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support and air and missile defense annexes of the maneuver plan. The FSCOORD integrates OCA and TMD targets, targeting priorities, and TAIs into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD includes the DCA and TMD active defense priorities and associated IPB products in the development and coordination of the force's air and missile defense operation.

Coordination between ADCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the OCA, DCA, and TMD portions of the air and missile defense effort are complementary. The integration and synchronization of OCA and TMD attack operations by the ADCOORD and FSCOORD prevents mutual interference and maximizes unity and economy of effort.

The coordination of OCA and TMD targets between the Army and the Air Force occurs at the AOC and the CRC. OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are developed simultaneously and in concert, not as separate, isolated plans.

The OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are integral to the theater campaign plan and to the maneuver plan at each Army echelon.

Air and missile defense in OCA and TMD Attack Operations Planning

Operational-level, counterair and TMD planning requires careful selection and prioritization of OCA and TMD targets. Effective planning enables each level to "decide-detect-deliver-assess" and accelerates the engagement of targets during combat. OCA and TMD attack operation plans should consider the use of all available assets including aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, UAVs, SOF, and EW. The AAMDC has the necessary intelligence tools to provide focus to TMD attack operations for the COMARFOR or the JFLCC. The AAMDC recommends TM targets to the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC) for prosecution. The AAMDC provides liaison teams to the DOCC, analysis and control element (ACE), joint and special operations task force (JSOTF), battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), and air operations center (AOC) to coordinate and assist TMD attack operations within the ARFOR and the joint force attack operations structure. AAMDC does not usurp the traditional mission of the DOCC, BCD, and AOC in prosecuting attack operations.

The ADCOORD is a member of division and corps targeting boards and is represented in the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. He recommends OCA and TMD targets as fire support priorities and contributes to fire support planning. In addition, ADA contributes to TMD and OCA target location and identification through surveillance and back plotting launch locations.

The force commander at each tactical echelon establishes OCA and TMD priorities in support of the concept. OCA and TMD targets are generally beyond the FLOT and include the following:

Air and missile defense in Active Defense Planning

Integration and prioritization permit Army ADA units the flexibility to support the commander's concept of the operation. The AADC integrates lower and upper-tier air and missile defense systems with airborne and sea-based counterair resources to make the defense effective.

Most Army DCA, and all Army TMD, active defense tasks are assigned to ADA units. Army ADA units will be positioned tactically by the appropriate ground force commander in defense of critical assets relative to suspected threat approach avenues or azimuths. Because of their limited numbers, ADA resources are allocated based on specific air and missile defense priorities. The AAMDC provides the air and missile defense plan to the ARFOR or JFLCC plan. In the air and missile defense plan, EAC ADA brigades normally will protect priority assets from the CINC's defended asset list. Corps commanders may be tasked in the theater campaign plan to protect theater assets in the corps area using corps ADA forces. ADA commanders design defenses and task organize forces to protect designated priorities. The air and missile defense employment principles and guidelines in Chapter 5 form the basis for the design of these defenses.

Air and missile defense in Passive Measures Planning

Figure 6-3. Development of Air Defense and Fire Support Annexes

Passive measures are an essential part of air and missile defense planning at all levels. All units conduct passive actions in conjunction with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air threat. Conducting passive operations is a critical task to the survival of every unit. The AAMDC has a TMD passive defense cell with the necessary personnel and equipment to support the TAADCOORD in executing a TMD passive defense mission for the COMARFOR or JFLCC.

At all levels, the ADCOORD evaluates and recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver commander's plans and SOPs. ADCOORDs recommend measures which may deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air and surveillance assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at night, developing an early warning system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing emissions control (EMCON) procedures. Some examples at the tactical level are employing radar scattering camoflauge, utilizing early warning instead of local sensors, and emplacing units on hardened sites.

Integration of ADA into Theater CA and TMD

In most theaters, the majority of air and missile defense coordination of interest to ADA occurs between the AADC and the JFLCC. The JFLCC integrates Army capabilities into joint air and missile defense efforts through close coordination with the AADC. When the AAMDC is in theater the AAMDC commander will normally be designated the DAADC and will be the principal integrator for the JFLCC to the AADC on air and missile defense. An AAMDC liaison team works closely with the AADC and his staff and the BCD to accomplish air and missile defense integration. The AAMDC liaison team may augment the BCD AD section as needed. When the AAMDC is not in theater this coordination is accomplished by the BCD (see the Battlefield Coordination Detachment illustration 6-6 [add AAMDC LNO team to the illustration]) which collocates part of its staff with the AADC's operations center. If the AADC is from the USAF or USN, he plans and conducts operations from the air operations center. If the AADC is from the USMC, the tactical air command center conducts the joint operations. Each component provides a liaison representative to the AADC. The representatives function as the necessary interface among the service component headquarters.

The BCD is the JFLCC's representation in the USAF AOC. The JFLCC will establish a similar liaison arrangement if the JFACC is from the USN or USMC. The JFLCC organizes the BCD based on the type of theater and the AOC organization. In force-projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCD. The BCD provides JFLCC input into the air operations planning process. Army air and missile defense contributions are planned and coordinated through the AAMDC, EAC ADA brigade, corps, and division CPs. Refer to FM 100-103 for a more detailed discussion of the BCD and the control and reporting center.

Joint Interface Coordination Officer

ARFOR or JFLCC coordination with the joint interface control officer (JICO) is essential to the successful integration of ADA forces into theater CA and TMD. The JICO is responsible for managing the multi-data link network from the air operations center. The JICO works for the AADC and establishes the multi-data link network, conducts data registration and fidelity checks, and resolves interoperability problems. The JICO ensures units comply with direction in the OPTASKLINK and TACOPDAT, monitors TADIL and interface unit (IU) status, and resolves joint connectivity and interoperability issues.

The JICO cell supports continuous operations. Each service normally contributes personnel or expertise to the JICO cell to plan and execute joint operations. The AAMDC normally would provide the ARFOR or JFLCC expertise to the JICO cell to ensure integration of ARFOR air and missile defense operations with joint or multinational operations.ARFOR or JFLCC coordination with the joint interface control officer (JICO) is essential to the successful integration of ADA forces into theater CA and TMD.


Successful execution of air and missile defense results from a well-organized air and missile defense plan. The process is continuous. A detailed look at air and missile defense planning and the Integrated Staff Planning Process is contained in Appendix B.

Figure 6-4. The Battlefield Coordination Element


METT-TC is the driving force behind all ADA planning. The type of theater and operation provide the framework for METT-TC analysis.

METT-TC in mature theaters. The type of theater can affect our ability to collect intelligence and targeting information on the enemy. It also has effects on the deployment of friendly forces and the development timeline. The sophistication, lethality, and numerical strength of the threat in the mature theater are generally greater than those in contingency theaters. Pre-positioned in a mature theater is a vast array of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, linked by an extensive battle command system. Depending on their location and echelon, these forces possess a wide variation in mobility and hardness. The threat in a mature theater leaves little time for reaction. The rapid tempo of operations becomes the key factor in the analysis of time.

METT-TC in contingency theaters. Contingency theaters may have no pre-positioned forces. Contingency operations are generally of a smaller scale than those in a mature theater. In contingency theaters, time is critical to the deployment and buildup of the forces. The time required to deploy, establish, and expand a lodgment affects the ability of the force to conduct operations.

METT-TC in close, deep, and rear operations. METT-TC analysis is the foundation for ADA planning at the tactical level. This analysis is a function of position on the modern battlefield. The conduct of the analysis focuses on the type of operation to be conducted, the air threat expected, and the focus of the air threat.

Close operations involve highly mobile, armored forces that are extremely vulnerable to detection because of their proximity to the enemy. The primary air threat in this area is rotary-wing aircraft. ADA support of close operations focuses on the protection of the maneuver force by destroying enemy attack helicopters, UAVs, and CAS aircraft which penetrate the joint counterair force. Highly mobile and hardened systems best accomplish this mission.

Deep operations allow the force commander to shape the battlefield for future close operations. ADA planning for deep operations will be similar to that conducted for close operations. ADA forces are integrated into maneuver forces conducting deep operations and protect deep strike fire support assets. Highly mobile and hardened assets with a self-sustaining capability will best accomplish this mission. A proper mix of systems provides air and missile defense coverage at all altitudes and allows the force conducting deep operations the maximum freedom to maneuver.

The rear area air threat is predominantly UAVs, fixed-wing aircraft, and theater missiles with missions to destroy soft, immobile, high-value targets. These assets, which include aviation, C2, deep strike artillery, and logistics are critical to corps and division operations. ADA planners deploy systems in rear areas which are less mobile, but have greater ranges to allow for early and multiple engagements.

The objective of ADA planning is to establish low- to high-altitude air and missile defense coverage of the maneuver commander's air and missile defense priorities. The ADA commander must ensure horizontal and vertical integration throughout the operational area. ADA operations require synchronization with the supported force and coordination with higher and lower ADA echelons and adjacent ADA units. This often includes the integration of Army ADA plans with joint counterair and TMD operations. METT-TC influences integrated air and missile defense planning from theater through battalion level and reinforces the synchronization process.

Scheme of Maneuver

The corps and division commanders approve a scheme of maneuver developed by their staffs. The approved scheme of maneuver is normally one of several maneuver courses of action. Analysis of METT-TC, IPB, and the commander's intent forms the foundation for the maneuver concept. The commander's intent is provided as general guidance and direction to the staff on how to accomplish the mission. IPB includes the evaluation of both the ground and air threat. ADA and maneuver planning incorporate possible enemy courses of action. Appendix A describes the development of air IPB in greater detail.

The ADCOORD develops an estimate which includes air and missile defense coverage for each maneuver course of action. (See Appendix B.)

Air and missile defense Priorities

The ADA commander considers METT-TC, IPB, and the supported commander's intent and concept of operations as he develops AD priorities. Priorities are based on the factors of criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and the threat as explained in Chapter 4. The ADA commander recommends these priorities to the maneuver commander for approval.

Figure 6-5. Integrated Air and Missile Defense Planning

ADA Concept of Operations

The purpose of the ADA concept of operations is to maximize protection of the force. The ADA commander assesses the factors of METT-TC, the force commander's intent, the IPB, and the approved air and missile defense priorities to determine the numbers and types of air and missile defense resources necessary to protect those priorities. To design that defense, the commander must apply the air and missile defense employment principles and guidelines, and the technical considerations of these resources (see Chapter 4). The ADA concept of operations is the basis of the air and missile defense plan and is synchronized with the higher and adjacent AD plans (see the figure 6-7). Major considerations that impact on the development of the ADA concept of operations are theater characteristics, the type of operation (close, deep, and rear), and passive air and missile defense measures available to the force.

The ADA concept of operation, by integrating active and passive air and missile defense into all operations, not only protects the force but also makes the enemy doubt his ability to conduct successful air operations. The concept of operation outlines the best mix, mass, mobility, and integration of ADA assets required to accomplish each task.

Characteristics of mature theaters. In mature theaters, forces require all-altitude protection from enemy surveillance and attacks. Forces in the mature theater are not homogeneous. At the division level, forces tend to be highly mobile and hardened. Their mission requires a maneuver orientation and highly mobile air defense forces. Divisional forces are particularly vulnerable during offensive missions such as deep operations beyond the FLOT. In cross-FLOT operations, enemy air defense may preclude friendly CAP support. Therefore, the forward-deployed ground forces in the division must depend primarily on ADA. To support the division during offensive missions, the corps commander may reinforce the divisional ADA battalion with high-to medium-altitude systems and, possibly, additional low-altitude systems.

Characteristics of contingency theaters. Contingency theaters require air and missile defense for each stage of the operation. During the predeployment activities, analysis of the air threat identifies the air and missile defense requirements. In the deployment stage, ADA systems require lift to the area of operations to provide early air and missile defense protection of the PODs, LOCs, and lodgment area. ADA systems must deploy rapidly and in sufficient numbers to defeat the threat. During the entry stage, ADA counters enemy RSTA and air and missile attack operations. Long-range DCA is normally the responsibility of Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force air assets, but ADA provides the only protection against TMs, UAVs, and helicopters. This multiservice air and missile defense requires integration of the ADA concept of operations into the joint counterair and TMD plans.

During expansion of the lodgment, ADA must accompany the force, particularly in regions where large distances are traversed in a short period of time. ADA systems must be highly mobile to provide the force the low- and medium-altitude protection required during rapid movement. Counter-RSTA remains an imperative. Employment of additional ADA strengthens the air and missile defenses at the lodgment area and the logistics base.

During the operations stage, ADA shifts emphasis from counter-RSTA to force protection. The operation either terminates successfully or escalates into operations similar to those of an established theater. If escalation occurs, additional ADA must deploy and integrate with the ADA resources previously deployed to sustain air and missile defense operations.

Considerations in close, deep, and rear operations. Whether supporting close, deep, or rear operations, the ADA commander at all levels develops and refines the ADA concept of operations to achieve the objectives of all tactical-level air and missile defense. The ADA commander's objective is to provide the force with sustained, low- to high-altitude air and missile defense of priority forces and assets throughout the battlefield. When developing the concept of operations, the ADA commander considers the specific characteristics of the operation and the approved air and missile defense priorities. The commander also assesses the potential contributions of joint counterair, TMD, and non-ADA Army resources. After considering the individual and combined air and missile defense capabilities of all available resources, the ADA commander effects the necessary coordination to integrate and synchronize their contributions with the supported force's concept of operations.

The focus of the ADA concept of operations in close operations is the protection of maneuver forces and reserves. ADA protection is weighted toward the main effort. In close operations, ADA and other members of the combined arms team focus their air defense efforts on defeating enemy attack helicopters and UAVs while retaining the tactical flexibility to destroy attacking fixed-wing aircraft. The combination of ADA and combined arms fires significantly increases friendly force effectiveness. As a result of this synergistic effect, the force kills more enemy air, loses fewer systems, and gains greater freedom to maneuver.

In deep operations, ADA must maneuver with the force to provide low-altitude protective fires. Overwatching ADA fires may come from supporting longer range ADA resources. As in close operations, maneuver elements may also engage air threats with their organic weapons systems. The ADA commander must integrate supporting Air Force and Army aviation fires whenever possible. Air and missile defense assets may consist of only SHORAD systems and attack helicopters which the commander can employ rapidly against enemy air throughout the depth of operations. If enemy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are expected, then mobile ADA assets that can counter this mixed enemy threat are crucial to the deep operation.

Rear area air and missile defense includes operations by both forward area and high- to medium- altitude air and missile defense throughout the battlefield. The size of the area, however, requires the weighting of air and missile defense resources around those facilities and assets that the commander determines are most critical to the concept of operation. HIMAD forces protect priority forces and assets from attack by TMs and fixed-wing aircraft. Forward-area ADA is added to the highest priority forces and assets to screen against RSTA attempts, destroy cruise missiles or attacking fixed-wing aircraft, and to provide a mix of weapons systems. Major ports, railheads, airfields, assembly areas, and storage areas are assets normally requiring dedicated SHORAD protection. CAFAD employment is also a means of air and missile defense protection in the rear where air and missile defense systems are not available. In these areas, smoke screens can reduce the vulnerability of rear area facilities and might even be used for LZ and PZ denial.

Passive air and missile defense measures. Passive air and missile defense actions reduce the effectiveness of the air threat. The extent of an asset's passive air and missile defense efforts directly impacts on the vulnerability of that asset. Regardless of the type of theater or area of the battlefield, the ADA concept of operations always includes passive air and missile defense measures. Based on the force commander's air and missile defense priorities, not all assets will receive dedicated ADA forces for protection. However, most assets will receive a degree of air and missile defense protection from coverages provided by higher echelon and adjacent ADA units. To enhance the protection available from these air and missile defense coverages, all elements must plan and employ passive air and missile defense measures. Integrated active and passive air and missile defense makes the air threat expend maximum resources with a minimum of success. Based on the threat and scheme of maneuver, assets may need support to enhance their passive air and missile defense posture. All members of the combined arms team must integrate the support requirements for passive air and missile defense into the prioritization of tasks for their forces.

As an example, the threat's air plan may allocate a specific number of air assets to locate and attack battle command assets. The vulnerability of a specific friendly battle command asset depends on the extent of signature reduction, concealment, hardening, and deception employed. Signature reduction makes the battle command asset difficult to locate and less subject to attack. Engineer units can increase the hardness of the battle command asset by constructing field fortifications. Even if the battle command asset is attacked, the site is less vulnerable. Establishing a decoy may result in enemy air threats attacking the wrong location.

Task Organization and Command or Support Relationships

Based on the concept of operations, the ADA commander structures ADA forces unit by unit. The commander considers the status of unit leadership, personnel, equipment, experience, and training to determine the best ADA task organization. In determining task organization, the commander selects the appropriate command or support relationship for each unit.

Four factors for assigning command or support relationships are battle command, unity of command, survivability, and sustainability. The appropriate command or support relationship provides ADA commanders at each echelon the flexibility and authority to vertically and horizontally synchronize their forces. When determining command or support relationships, the ADA commander retains a unified internal chain of command. When considering the factor of survivability, the ADA commander analyzes the degree of risk to the ADA unit versus mission accomplishment. The final factor in determining the command or support relationship is sustainability of the ADA force. The commander must ensure each unit will receive all required logistical support. Failure to consider these four factors when assigning a unit's command or support relationship will degrade the integrated air and missile defense coverage of the force and threaten freedom to maneuver. The finalized ADA plan integrates task organization and command or support relationships with the ADA concept of operations.


Any nation with the will and resources can turn their legitimate nuclear, medical, and chemical industries to weapons production. This threat exists in all regions of the world, from states with long-established programs to those with emerging capabilities. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the downfall of communism in the former Soviet Union, and extensive efforts to negotiate treaties that would reduce the number of nuclear weapons and eliminate chemical and biological weapons from military arsenals, the number of countries pursuing NBC weapons programs continues to increase.

Russia and China currently possess nuclear weapons and there are many other nations of nuclear proliferation concern. As many as 26 countries are developing, or are suspected of developing, chemical weapons.

The principal doctrine for chemical weapons use by threat nations is to maintain the momentum of an attack and to degrade their enemy's capability to fight. Chemical and biological agents can be delivered to target areas virtually anywhere in a theater of operation. Delivery means include TBMs, aircraft bombs or rockets and spray, multiple rocket launchers, mortars, conventional artillery, CMs, UAVs, and or special forces.

Nuclear weapons cause casualties and materiel damage through the effects of blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation. Biological agents, consisting of pathogens and toxins, produce diseases in soldiers, thereby reducing their ability to accomplish their missions. These agents are primarily an inhalation threat. Enemy forces will employ chemical agents to expose soldiers to a respiratory and a percutaneous agent threat by attacking with nonpersistent and persistent agents. Persistent agents will also be used to contaminate personal clothing, equipment, and materiel. This will mandate the diversion of resources to decontaminate personnel and equipment.

Insurgent or terrorist groups could manufacture or acquire chemical and biological weapons to attack ADA and other high-payoff targets. Small laboratories, such as school labs, or the drug labs used for processing cocaine, can produce some chemical and biological warfare agents.

Threat nations will employ NBC weapons to incapacitate or kill personnel. In addition, unit effectiveness decreases while operating in a contaminated environment due to fear, the requirement to wear protective clothing, and the need to decontaminate personnel and equipment. ADA units throughout the theater will be high-priority targets for NBC attack. The air defense commander and staff must, therefore, train their soldiers and units for operations in an NBC environment.


TMD encompasses all measures taken to defeat, destroy, or neutralize enemy missiles employed against the Air and Missile Defense task force (figure 6-8). TMD is a coordinated joint services effort, with the Army's contribution being the focus of this section.

Due to the political and military aspects of the threat, TMD objectives are often strategic in nature. These include deployment for stablility and support operations as explained in Chapter 8 and defense of geopolitical assets. Defense of early entry forces and lodgments can also be strategic objectives since US forces are extremely vulnerable during these stages and US political support for operations must be kept at the highest levels possible.

The combination of the theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems constitutes the Army's active defense against TBMs. In addition, SHORAD participates in TMD, specifically counter-RSTA and counter-CM operations. To accomplish the TMD mission, the defense must provide protection for key military assets and forces during deployment, entry, operations, and postconflict operations. The protection of selected geopolitical assets stabilizes the theater, prevents threat intimidation of allies or coalition members, and may provide for a measure of deterrence by demonstrating national resolve.

Effective employment of these defensive weapon systems must accommodate trends in force structure, advances in technology, and increases in threat capabilities. The limited number of ADA resources mandate prioritized defense of critical theater assets. Effective employment demands decentralized engagement operations at maximum Air and missile defense system ranges to successfully counter the high-threat velocities and extremely short engagement time lines anticipated on the battlefield.


The THAAD, Patriot, and SHORAD systems, possibly augmented by Joint TMD forces, will provide a two-tiered defense for selected high-value theater assets (military and geopolitical). The two tiers will provide near-penetration-proof defense for high-value assets, deny the enemy a preferred attack option, and support the theater and corps campaigns and battles. THAAD will provide the upper tier defense against medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. SHORAD, Patriot, and Joint TMD forces if available, will provide the lower tier defense primarily against short-range ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles. Patriot and SHORAD will also engage the fixed and rotary-wing threat which penetrates the joint defenses.

Figure 6-6. Air and Missile Defense Task Force




The force structure objective is to provide sufficient ADA assets to support two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Current Air and missile defense systems are fielded to protect the upper and lower-tier of assigned battlespace. Additionally, SHORAD units provide enhanced capability to counter Cruise Missiles. In the long term, ADA continues to develop and test systems to augment the TMD team. Additionally, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force all have plans or programs to participate in active missile defense.


A theater missile defense force consisting of SHORAD elements, Patriot battalion(s), and THAAD battery(s) should be employed to provide force protection against missile attack. The theater missile force composition may vary depending on the factors of METT-TC. If the elements must protect priority forces and assets in the littoral, Joint TMD forces may contribute lower-tier protection. Aegis-capable ships may be particularly important for active defense during entry operations involving amphibious assault or port operations. Once the lodgment is established, modular units should be deployed ashore quickly to establish a fully capable air and missile defense. The initial elements of the force should include sufficient upper- and lower-tier and command and control elements to ensure preliminary defense. Follow-on elements will be deployed as lift becomes available. TMD forces will move or reposition as required by the campaign plan and the commander's priorities.

The AAMDC will be deployed as the situation requires to exercise command over TMD forces. The AAMDC task-organizes the TMD force and focuses on allocation and constitution or reconstitution of resources to provide optimum defenses and signal support for multiple defenses. The AAMDC will also plan personnel and logistics support, distribute essential information, establish required data link interfaces with higher headquarters, and provide requisite ADCOORD and liaison personnel.


Defense planning is critical to coordinated execution of the two-tiered defense. The defense will be centrally planned and coordinated. Defense planning consists of two subfunctions--defense design and defense organization. Defense planning software will be resident in all battle command facilities regardless of echelon.

Defense design will consider METT-TC as well as system operational characteristics, enemy attack options, and enemy order of battle. Using the IPB and the force commander's concept of the operation and mission priorities, the ADA commander will develop options for positioning ADA assets and will evaluate the defense design effectiveness.

Defense organization will produce the detailed plan for implementing the chosen defense options including the parameters for the initialization of weapon and surveillance system operational software. The outputs of the defense organization function will include firing doctrine, parameters, and thresholds that will classify, identify, and prioritize targets and control, and optimize the coordinated upper and lower tier missile engagements.

Digital enhancements will increase commanders' ability to design a robust defense and ensure that the defense is viable versus the expected enemy threat. These enhancements will aid each echelon in planning their defense.


Defense planning is centralized, but engagement operations against missiles are decentralized to the lowest level. Air and missile defense commands at all levels will maintain the facilities and equipment for the conduct of battle command. Command posts will be modular and reconfigurable by software or the addition of software and hardware modules. These command posts will be identical, interchangeable, and reconfigurable to ensure full redundancy of critical EO and FO functions.

When conducting active defense operations, Air and missile defense elements operate under the rules of engagement and weapon control procedures promulgated by the AADC. The types of controls and procedures appropriate for the air threat will not apply to the active missile defense battle. There is, for example, no identification or weapon control decision required when tracking an incoming ballistic target with a predicted impact point on or near a defended asset.

Air and missile defense elements will normally receive early warning information directly from national, theater, joint task force intelligence, and sensor systems. The unit will send surveillance data, launch point, and engagement status to higher echelons. Upper-tier surveillance data will be used by the controlling authority to alert and cue lower-tier elements as appropriate.


THAAD, Patriot, and SHORAD will employ redundant means to achieve reliable data and voice communications. Internal EO data will be passed on joint tactical information data system and tactical data information networks while the area common user system will be used for EO voice. It will also be the primary means for both FO data and voice. External communications will be primarily obtained using the area common user system for EO and FO voice and data. The commander's tactical terminal-hybrid will provide the means to participate in theater intelligence networks.


Execution is the final and most critical stage of the decision-making process. Because of the importance of this stage, commanders and staffs must actively supervise the synchronized execution of the plan. During the operation, friendly ADA must have the flexibility to respond to changes in METT-TC. The ability to perform the battlefield tasks provides flexibility to execute the plan and to continuously provide ADA coverage to the force.


All combatants on the battlefield go through the same steps to deliver fire on a target. Every shooter must detect, acquire, identify, and engage targets to destroy them.


ADA systems must discern the presence of an enemy air element which is or may become a threat, or the presence of facilities critical to the support of that enemy air element. Early detection demands continuous surveillance of the battlefield.


ADA systems must obtain data defining the position of the enemy air element. The data must be sufficiently accurate to provide targeting information.


ADA systems must determine if a potential target is friendly or hostile and support target prioritization. Ideally, the identification process would discriminate between real targets and decoys, and even identify the type of enemy unit or element.


Participants in air and missile defense, having detected, acquired, and identified enemy targets, must prioritize them for engagement and destruction. ADA systems must have the capability to attack enemy targets with ordnance or electronic countermeasures.


The immediate goal of every air and missile defense operation must be the destruction of enemy targets. If the target's destruction is not posible, the destruction is not possible, the operation must, as a minimum, prevent the enemy target from fulfilling its mission.


Tactical-level ADA units must have mobility equal to the mobility of the supported force. Movement ensures that tactical-level ADA forces can project their operation into any area required by the maneuver force or indicated by the threat. The ability to move also signifies that ADA weapons systems are not tied to a static support base.


The tactical-level ADA commander at each echelon must make the most effective use of the limited communications and intelligence assets available. The commander does this by integrating the tactical ADA battle command system into that of the maneuver force. Tactical ADA battle command must provide the means for collecting, processing, and disseminating information to conduct a continuous air battle. The communications system also provides the means by which the ADA commander conveys decisions and directives to subordinate units across the battlefield.

Communications systems interface tactical-level ADA units with higher, lower, adjacent, and joint headquarters. These link the detection, acquisition, identification, and destruction or disruption tasks at all echelons. In this manner, communications and intelligence systems enhance integration, decision making, maneuver, and target engagement for ADA operations. The type of theater, location on the battlefield, and the concept of operations determine communications requirements. The total integration of air and missile defense operations in support of close, deep, and rear operations requires timely battle command capable of rapidly collecting critical information and distributing it in concise, usable form to leaders, planners, and weapons systems.


As warfare's intensity and complexity increase, so does the importance of logistics and trained manpower. Sustainment is vital to ADA operations. To meet the challenges of sustainment, ADA commanders require well-thought-out plans. ADA units require a streamlined logistics system. The system must provide continuous support over extended distances. Durable, reliable, and easily maintained weapons must complement the system. ADA commanders must anticipate the sustainment requirements for future operations and integrate those requirements with the corps or division sustainment plan. Sustainment must be continuous throughout the battlefield. Logistics must be responsive and provide quick reaction to ADA demands to maintain combat effectiveness. Should the sustainment operation fall short, the ADA commander must improvise to meet unanticipated situations.

Planning for ADA operations must include six sustainment functions. They are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. The functions center around the care, maintenance, and use of all personnel and equipment essential to the unit in accomplishing its combat mission. These functions include such diverse responsibilities as maintaining the strength and spirit of the fighting force and, when necessary, decontaminating personnel and equipment. Logistics packages integrated into the supported force logistics system is the most common approach to use. Chapter 7 has more detailed discussions on logistics.


ADA limits the freedom of action of enemy forces and, therefore, enhances friendly freedom to maneuver. In developing and executing air and missile defense missions, mission accomplishment is foremost in priority. The ADA commander makes an estimate of the situation and considers the factors of METT-TC. The ADA plan provides battlefield effectiveness and ensures the availability of ADA assets for subsequent operations. Protection of personnel and equipment is vital to preserving the combat power of the maneuver force. The loss of ADA units increases the force's vulnerability to air surveillance and attack.

In close and deep operations, ADA forces take advantage of rapid maneuver, terrain, cover, and concealment to increase their survivability. ADA systems maneuvering with the force derive a certain degree of protection from the maneuver force.

Some ADA systems in the rear can be hardened to increase survivability. Others take advantage of mobility, cover, concealment, terrain features, and collective protection to enhance survivability.