Index FM 44-100, Air And Missile Defense Operations


Chapter 4

Fundamentals of
Army Air and Missile Defense Operations

This chapter describes the principles and fundamentals for the employment of the air defense combat function, and the integration of air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities into joint and combined arms operations.

Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations

4-1. The campaign is a joint and multinational series of battles. The services and national forces coordinate and synchronize their efforts to bring combat operations to a successful conclusion. The Army, through the air defense combat function, participates in joint counterair and theater missile defense operations. Moreover, the Army provides a wide spectrum of air defense-capable systems and forces

4-2. Combatant commanders seek the synergy inherent in joint operations by synchronizing the complementary combat capabilities of all the components and supporting commands into a unified effort. Participation in joint training exercises and understanding joint doctrine is a prerequisite to joint capability. Commanders must train leaders and units to operate as part of the joint team. Liaison is a vital part of this cohesiveness.

4-3. Forward area based ADA forces support collective security arrangements and operate as part of multinational formations. Additionally, ADA units enhance relationships with regional partners through combined exercises, continual contacts, and liaison.

4-4. ADA forces must be prepared to conduct a number of operations that integrate warfighting and stability and support operations. Robust liaison will facilitate understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.

Integration of Army Air defense Capabilities

4-5. The air defense capabilities of the US Army are best realized through the integration of its many combat functions and tactical units. Army ADA works in concert with joint and multinational air and missile defense forces.


4-6. ADA conducts operations as a total force of Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and civilians. ADA brigades are task-organized with a mix of active and reserve component battalions. Multi-component units, such as the army air and missile defense command (AAMDC), leverage the advantages of AC and RC personnel creating more capable and cost effective units. In a multi-component unit, AC soldiers perform the day to day and perishable skill duties. The AC soldiers are available to respond to immediate small-scale contingencies and pre-mobilization requirements. RC soldiers are integrated within the unit, train with the unit, and are available to fully man the unit in crisis situations. Planning for the integration of reserve components and civilians is essential to the successful conduct of ADA operations.


4-7. ADA has a wide mix of forces available to accomplish the mission. ADA units can be long range or short range, high or low altitude, and mobile or semi-mobile. Individual systems may have widely varying capabilities against different threat classes. The commander task organizes the force to defeat the threat and protect the force. The commander must also integrate the efforts of combat support and combat service support forces.


4-8. Components of combat power can be joined in multiple ways based upon METT-TC. These combinations change over time and may be different in deep, close, and rear operations. Balance and a wide choice of employment options are key to success. Denial of threat RSTA activities is essential to protect friendly forces and assets, and to maintain surprise and the freedom to maneuver.


4-9. As the military prefers to fight as a joint team, the Army prefers to fight as a combined arms team. ADA is part of the simultaneous application of the combat functions in every operation. These arms and services are integrated horizontally at each command level, normally battalion through corps, and vertically between command echelons. Combined arms teams strive to conduct fully integrated operations in the dimensions of time, space, purpose, and resources. Combined arms forces operate over increasingly large areas of the battlefield with less force density than in the past. Modern combined arms warfare puts added stress on maintaining dispersed and noncontiguous formations. The application of combined arms is complex and demanding. It requires detailed planning and violent execution by highly trained soldiers and units that have been thoroughly rehearsed.

4-10. At operational and tactical levels of war, freedom to maneuver is crucial to achieving superior combat power. Freedom to maneuver facilitates the ability of land and air forces to shape the battlefield, achieve advantage, set the terms for combat and future operations, and exploit success. Freedom to maneuver is the catalyst that permits land, air, and sea forces to reach their full destructive potential. Combined with the synergistic effect of synchronized surface and air operations, freedom to maneuver ultimately leads to success on the battlefield.

4-11. The ability of any unit at any echelon to maneuver freely on the battlefield centers around reliable logistical support and effective battle command. Friendly forces must anticipate enemy efforts to deny or disrupt freedom to maneuver. Enemy air power represents the most flexible, far-reaching, and destructive threat to friendly operations.

4-12. To retain the freedom to maneuver and to protect critical assets, the joint and multinational forces must not only prevent attacks but also destroy the enemy's ability to attack. The rapid destruction of the enemy's air capability enhances friendly force flexibility and contributes to early victory. Therefore, the counterair and theater missile defense forces must kill enemy air platforms and missiles at the earliest opportunity, consistent with the force's mission. The results are protection of the force from the immediate air threat and reduction of the air and missile threat to future operations.

4-13. All members of the combined arms team must contribute to air and missile defense to achieve success. ADA is the only Army force dedicated to execute air and missile defense operations. Other members of the combined arms team, supported by an accurate and timely air and missile defense early warning and intelligence capability, can support the ADA effort.

4-14. Field artillery units can attack theater missile (TM) launch sites, critical air operation support facilities, and enemy ground-based air defenses. Army aviation, with air combat capabilities, can engage enemy aircraft in self-defense or when the ground force commander determines the need to use aviation in an air defense role. Combined arms elements can also strike deep against air operations support facilities and enemy air defenses. Special operations forces can perform deep offensive and reconnaissance operations to cripple and disrupt missile and air operation facilities. Other combined arms units can use organic weapons in self-defense against selected air targets. Smoke units can conceal large areas or restrict contour flight approaches.

4-15. Combat arms, combat support, and combat service support branches participate in the air and missile defense mission directly or indirectly. Combat service support units provide the personnel and material to carry out the mission. Engineer units provide terrain analysis, fortification construction, and assistance in rapid displacement and emplacement of ADA units.

4-16. The US Army focuses on the counterair and theater missile defense missions from a different perspective than other services. Within the Army, each echelon of command views the focus of these missions differently. At echelons above corps, the focus tends toward theater-level counterair and TMD objectives. At division and below, the focus shifts increasingly toward providing freedom to maneuver by protecting the force. These perspectives relate directly to the different battlefield characteristics and requirements at each command level.

4-17. At theater level the commander must control the airspace to protect strategic forces and geopolitical assets, the loss of which would imperil the conduct of the campaign. Corps commanders exercise control over most of the ground forces in the theater. Objectives of air and missile defense at the corps level are protecting the force, providing freedom to maneuver, controlling the air environment, and destroying enemy air and missile power on the ground and in flight.

4-18. Because the division commander is primarily concerned with tactical-level operations, the requirement for divisional air defense focuses on protecting the force. The division must be free to maneuver to shape the battlefield and destroy the enemy.


4-19. Advances in electronics, communications, automation, surveillance, precision-guided weapons, and the exploitation of space-based capabilities have increased the lethality, range, accuracy, and reliability of ADA weapons. ADA can best use technology in future conflicts when it is integrated according to joint and Army doctrine.


4-20. Levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Each level is defined by the outcome intended, not by the level of command or size of the unit. The levels of war apply to combat as well as stability and support operations.


4-21. Strategy involves the art and science of employing armed forces with instruments of national power to secure strategic goals. At the strategic level of war, the US, acting alone or as a member of a group of nations, uses national interests to determine a strategy to ensure an effective, responsive national power-projection capability. The National Command Authority and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff translate strategy into military policy and requirements. These are the starting points for developing theater campaign plans.

4-22. Theater commanders participate in national, alliance, and coalition discussions as the theater military experts. They design the theater campaign plan so that it relates to both national strategies and operational activities. The theater campaign plan sets the desired end state and theater-strategic goals and is the basis for operational-level planning. Combatant and subordinate commanders usually plan and execute campaigns. Combatant commanders have strategic intents, concepts, and objectives.

4-23. National missile defense (NMD) is inherently a strategic operation. Satellite defense, depending on the expected outcome, may also be a strategic operation conducted by U.S. Space Command. Defense against air and missile attacks that originate outside the CINC's battlespace may be theater-strategic operations.

4-24. Defense of theater-strategic forces and geopolitical assets may also fall into the strategic level of war. Many stability and support operations are strategic-level. Since casualties may be a critical vulnerability that could impact on national resolve, ADA units are just as critical then as they are during war.

4-25. Echelons above corps (EAC) air defense commands such as the Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) may participate in strategic or theater-strategic planning and execution. Depending on the nature of the operation, corps ADA brigades and divisional battalions may also become involved in strategic or theater-strategic planning and execution.


4-26. The focus at the operational level is on conducting joint or multinational operations and employing military forces to attain theater-strategic objectives in a theater of war and operational objectives in a theater of operations. This is achieved through the design, organization, and execution of subordinate operations and major operations. The operational level is the vital link between national and theater-strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces. Service component or subordinate joint commanders have operational intents, concepts, and objectives. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. In its simplest form, operational art determines when, where, and for what purposes major forces will fight. It governs the deployment, commitment, withdrawal of forces, and sequencing of successive battles and major operations. Air and missile defense of military forces in a theater of war or operations is an operational-level task.

4-27. Army air and missile defense commands, EAC ADA brigades, and corps ADA brigades usually plan and execute at the operational level of war. In some situations, ADA battalions are employed to protect operational forces and assets.


4-28. War at the tactical level is concerned with the execution of battles and engagements. Activities at the tactical level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the threat. Battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives. Tactics is battlefield problem solving that is usually rapid and dynamic in nature. ADA brigades and battalions conduct operations at the tactical level.


4-29. Planning is a continuous process that begins with the receipt of a mission and the commanderís guidance, and continues concurrently with combat operations. Planning and fighting are often conducted concurrently. Planning is done as thoroughly as time allows. Successful planning requires an appreciation of the simultaneous nature of operations, awareness of the total mission, anticipation of future events, and an understanding of the operational framework and battlefield organization.


4-30. Multiple types of operations go on simultaneously throughout the commander's battlespace. A wide variety of combat and non-combat operations require synchronization to achieve designated objectives.

4-31. The combatant commanderís single unifying campaign plan synchronizes actions taken at each level of war against the threat. The intent is to destroy or disrupt the enemy's key capabilities and functions and exploit the resulting advantage before the enemy can react. Commanders at all levels require vision to fight simultaneously and to respond to contingency requirements. Subordinate service and functional commanders prepare operations plans with supporting actions and operational and tactical objectives that embody the strategic objectives given in the CINCís campaign plan.


4-32. From receipt of the mission to its accomplishment, commanders at all levels consider everything that may affect their operation. Awareness is thinking beyond the current moment and throughout the dimensions of the commander's battlespace. By having total mission awareness, the commander thinks about immediate tasks to accomplish and about activities before and after the immediate tasks.


4-33. An effective fighting force requires teamwork that is based on individual trust and unit cohesion. In many cases of force-projection operations, deploying units will find themselves assigned to an organization that has not previously trained or worked with them. Additionally, many Army units may be operating in a joint, multinational, or interagency environment for the first time. Forging a team is one of the early challenges facing commanders. Team-building techniques should include commanders' meetings, leader reconnaissance, and liaison team exchanges.


4-34. Army planning requires a complete definition of the mission, expression of the commander's intent, development of a concept of operations and completion of commander and staff estimates, if time allows. These items form the basis for a plan or order and set the conditions for decisive victory. The initial plan establishes the commander's intent, concept of operations, and tasks for subordinate units. It allows the greatest possible latitude for subordinate leaders. It is flexible enough to permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent with the commander's intent. The plan sets the stage for future operations. The best mission orders are those that specify what the subordinate commanders are to do without directing them how they must do it.


4-35. Army commanders determine the best sequence of operations to set a tempo and shape the battlespace so that forces will reach the desired objective. Commanders consider a variety of factors that affect sequencing decisions. Force projection operations are complicated by a rapidly changing threat situation. The sequence of operations that commanders choose should be flexible enough to accommodate change.


4-36. The sequence of major operations or battles relates directly to the commander's decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a number of forces are involved in similar activities. A transition to another phase indicates a shift in emphasis. During planning, commanders establish conditions for moving into each phase. Actions by the enemy can determine conditions for phases. Combat service support (CSS) is crucial to phasing. Operational planners must consider establishing logistics bases, lines of communications, priorities for services and support, and protection of logistics. CSS is key to sequencing the major operations of a campaign; and air and missile defense is critical to protection of all CSS activities.

Branches and Sequels

4-37. No plan of operations survives intact after first contact with the enemy. The commander builds flexibility into the plan to preserve freedom of action under rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or operation plan.

4-38. Branches are contingency plans or options built into the basic plan for changing the disposition, orientation, or direction of movement, and for accepting or declining battle. They give commanders flexibility by anticipating enemy reactions that could alter the basic plan.

4-39. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation. Executing a sequel will normally mean beginning another phase of the campaign. This is a continuous process during an operation so that the commander always has options.


4-40. Deception operations are designed to mislead enemy decision-makers by distorting, concealing, and falsifying friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions. The deception target is the enemy commander. The objective is to mislead the opposing military commander, which supports the goal of inducing the enemy to conduct activities that unwittingly serve friendly purposes.

4-41. Deception operations can be planned at all levels and must support the higher headquarters deception plan. In some cases, strategic and operational plans may include the employment of operational and tactical forces without their commanders being aware of the deception effort. Tactical deception may relate to smaller or more localized areas or forces where actions indirectly deceive the enemy as to exactly when, where, how, or who will accomplish the missions.

4-42. Many ADA units have unique and powerful signatures. Since ADA units are vital to force protection, they may be frequently deployed and employed in support of deception operations. Equally important, whenever possible ADA units should take actions that deceive threat RSTA as to their own locations and capabilities.


4-43. A rehearsal is the process of practicing a plan before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Rehearsals assist units in orienting themselves to their environment and to other units during execution. Rehearsals provide an opportunity for subordinate leaders to analyze and understand the plan. Rehearsals also provide a forum to "proof" the plan, which validates its feasibility, logic, and adequacy of battle command measures. Rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, while operational level headquarters can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises. Even if time does not permit a complete rehearsal with a full complement of troops and equipment, some form of rehearsal must take place with all key leaders.

4-44. ADA commanders and leaders must conduct some form of rehearsal with their units. They must also participate in the rehearsal of the supported units. Time management must be utilized to accomplish both tasks.


4-45. The use of weapons of mass destruction can have an enormous impact on the conduct of all operations. Not only does their sheer killing and destructive power redefine the tactical battlefield, but the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use affect campaign designs. The effects of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in tactical objectives, phases, and courses of action at all levels. Planning for the possibility of their use against friendly forces is critical to campaign design.

4-46. A swift end to the conflict will partially negate the opportunity to employ these weapons. Still, force protection is an imperative in this environment. Effective air and missile defense is crucial. Commanders implement defensive principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination. Commanders also take offensive preventive measures such as raids, air attacks, and operations designed to locate and neutralize such weapons.

4-47. ADA units provide for the protection of the force and geopolitical assets from many forms of chemical or biological air or missile attack. In order to provide such protection, ADA soldiers must be prepared to survive, fight, and win under conditions produced by weapons of mass destruction.

operational FRAMEWORK and BATTLEFIELD organization

4-48. An operational framework helps commanders relate their forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. This framework establishes an area of geopolitical and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how to employ forces against the enemy. To understand this framework is to understand the relationship among the area of operations (AO), battlespace, and the battlefield organization. Proper relationships allow for simultaneous operations and massing of effects against the enemy.

4-49. US joint doctrine establishes a framework wherein joint forces can apply combat power simultaneously throughout the land, sea, air, and space dimensions of the theater. US Army doctrine also prefers such a framework. Selecting choices to comply with that framework is the business of tactical- and operational-level commanders and staffs. See FM 100-5 for a detailed discussion of the operational framework and battlefield organization concepts.


4-50. The CINC achieves theater focus by structuring the theater through the application of operational art. Theater structure is a product of the CINC's strategic objective, forces allocated for the theater, strategy for employing the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), and the presence of alliance or coalition structures.

4-51. During stability and support operations commanders-in-chief can focus their efforts through the designation of an AO. If required, the AO may be further subdivided by delineating a joint operations area (JOA), joint zone (JZ), or joint special operations area (JSOA).

4-52. During war a commander-in-chief achieves focus through the designation of theaters-of-war (figure 4-1). Within that theater, single or multiple theaters of operation can be formed. Multiple theaters of operation are formed when there are multiple major threats. A JSOA can also be designated. The JSOA within the theater of war can overlap into the theater of operations.

4-53. A theater of war does not normally encompass the theater commander's entire area of responsibility (AOR). The theater commander may thus conduct combat operations within a theater of war and react to a separate contingency in a theater of operations or JSOA elsewhere in his AOR. The theater commander would continue normal peacetime activities throughout the remainder of the AOR.

4-54. Nation assistance and similar activities do not cease when higher levels of violence begin. The theater environment is often one of simultaneous activities across the full range of military operations.

4-55. The theater commander could also establish a combat zone (CZ) and communications zone (COMMZ). The CZ is an area required by combat forces to conduct operations. It normally extends forward from the corps rear boundary. The COMMZ constitutes the rear portion of a theater of operations, reaching back to the CONUS base or perhaps to another combatant commander's AOR. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOC), and other agencies required to support forces in the field. The COMMZ includes air and seaports that support the flow of forces and material into the theater. It is usually contiguous to the CZ but may be separate and connected only by a thin LOC.


4-56. Battlefield success requires a combined arms effort that is well-integrated into joint and multinational operations. Weapons of increased complexity and lethality characterize the battlefield. The air battle is an integral part of the joint battle, and the US Army contributes to the air battle through air and missile defense operations.

4-57. Army doctrine describes the structure of modern warfare and recognizes its inherent three-dimensional nature. Synchronizing ground operations with air operations is the bedrock on which this doctrine is based.


4-58. The principal task of theater commanders and their subordinates is to plan and execute campaigns. The goal of campaigns is to achieve strategic military objectives through the concentration of superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities at the decisive time and place. Participating services work in concert toward common goals and synchronize their efforts.

The Campaign Plan

4-59. The theater campaign plan originates with broad, strategic guidance from the National Command Authority, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or multinational command authority. Based on this guidance, the JFC and staff complete an estimate of the situation, decide upon a course of action, and direct the preparation of the theater campaign plan.

4-60. A campaign plan reflects the JFC's translation of national and alliance or coalition strategies into a theater military strategy. The campaign plan expresses operational military objectives that support the theater strategy, and it defines those objectives in terms of desired results of combat operations. The campaign plan also expresses the commander's mission priorities and decisions regarding apportionment of the resources of component air, land, and sea forces. Through the theater campaign plan, the JFC states the intent and provides a blueprint for conducting the early phases of the campaign. The plan also provides a general concept for follow-on campaign operations and contains campaign sustainment guidance.

4-61. Component commanders assist in preparing theater campaign plans and develop mutually supporting and synchronized air, land, and sea operations plans. Their plans implement the theater commander's guidance as it affects the employment of their respective forces. The JFC ensures the supporting plans embody the theater campaign objectives and provide for maximum combat power at the right place and time. Synchronization and unity of effort are the principal benefits of the JFC's review and integration of the supporting operations plans into the theater campaign plan.

Roles of the Components in the Campaign

4-62. The US Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as multinational forces, support the theater campaign through interlocking missions and combat functions. The joint and multinational air forces contribute to the air operations. Through their participation in air interdiction, counterair, and close air support, the joint air forces directly support the theater commander's land operations. Due to the land, sea, and air capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps, the JFC integrates them into all aspects of the theater campaign plan.

4-63. The Army's role in the theater campaign is also multidimensional and requires combined arms. The Army's combat functions directly support land operations and also support air operations. For example, the air defense combat function, for which ADA is both the proponent and principal contributor, is the Army's primary means to integrate Army contributions to joint counterair and theater missile defense operations. The campaign planning linkages depicts an example of integrated Army and Air Force support that is required to conduct the theater campaign (figure 4-2).


4-64. Army doctrine stresses the importance of the relationship between air and ground operations. The airspace of a theater is as important a dimension of ground operations as the terrain itself. To ensure maximum benefit from air operations, the theater commander may designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFACC is responsible for air operations planning, coordination, allocation, tasking, and execution of air operations.

Joint Air Operations

4-65. Normally, the forces under the JFACC's control perform the air operations combat missions concurrently. The missions are mutually supporting and include, but are not limited to, air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), counterair (CA), strategic attack, tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and support of maritime operations. Air operations influence all other combat operations. Air operations may be independent of land and sea activities and can achieve certain independent results. However, they normally combine with other combat operations to produce interrelated results that support the theater commander's objectives. Each element of the air operation is important to the successful completion of the theater campaign; but strategic attack, AI, CAS, and counterair components are the primary contributors to land operations. TMD attack operations do not ordinarily receive their own air apportionment category. Rather, TMD attack operations are a part of strategic attack and offensive counterair.

Counterair and Theater Missile Defense Operations

4-66. Airspace provides an added dimension to maneuver. Forces use the air environment for maneuver, delivery of fires, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, battle command, and transportation. The commander who best exploits the full potential of airspace will more effectively exercise freedom to maneuver forces at the right place and time. Air superiority enables commanders to better optimize their tactical flexibility and their freedom to execute attacks to neutralize or destroy an enemy's potential to wage war. Counterair and theater missile defense operations protect friendly forces, enable friendly forces to use airspace, and deny use of airspace to the enemy. Thus, counterair and theater missile defense operations are an integral part of planning, fighting, and winning the campaign.

Operational Elements of Counterair and Theater Missile Defense

4-67. The operational elements of counterair operations are offensive counterair (OCA), and defensive counterair (DCA). The four operational elements of theater missile defense (TMD) are active missile defense, passive missile defense, attack operations, and TMD C4I.

General Requirements of Counterair and Defense Operations

4-68. Operations require coordination of each service's capabilities. A fully coordinated battle command system facilitates inter-service synchronization of activities. The proper mix and synchronization of surface-based and aerial platforms provide the commander with flexible and agile forces that complement each other and deny the enemy a preferred attack option. Similarly, flexible offensive forces must simultaneously engage the threat by performing attack, OCA, AI, SEAD, and CAS operations to degrade the enemy's capability to bring combat power to bear and to exploit every possible enemy weakness.


4-69. Contributions by Army assets, particularly ADA and FA, to the joint theater air and missile defense mission is important to overall air and ground operations. The Army air defense contribution to the counterair and theater missile defense operation is a major factor in providing ground-force commanders greater combat air power to achieve their objectives. Army contributions directly influence the JFC's apportionment of the total air effort. The JFC determines the allocation of capabilities and forces, made available by components, necessary to support his goals. The JFC normally apportions the available capabilities and forces for each of the mission areas of strategic attack, interdiction, CAS, counterair, and maritime support by percent, priority of effort, or weight of effort.

4-70. Attack operations may be factored into OCA, but can be accomplished in other mission areas such as interdiction. After joint and Army AMD forces have established air superiority, the JFC can reduce the apportionment of capabilities and forces to counterair. These assets can then be tasked in support of other air, sea, and ground operations.


4-71. Force projection is the military component of power projection. Force projection operations usually begin as a rapid response to a crisis somewhere in the world. Force projection operations challenge ADA leaders. Early critical decisions are required at every level in war and stability operations and support operations. ADA commanders will routinely be required to plan and execute multiple concurrent activities.

4-72. Projecting the force anywhere in the world is a joint mission and total Army mission that involves active and reserve component units, the mobilization base, and Department of the Army civilians. It includes the mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of the employed force; and the redeployment and demobilization of the force in preparation for future missions. ADA units should not expect to move smoothly from one stage to the next stage of force projection operations.

4-73. Force projection is a complex process in which each action affects many others. Deployed forces and lines of communications require protection. The intelligence community may only have general information about a contingency area. Host nation support may be unknown. Missions might change at any point. Despite the complexity of force-projection operations, ADA units must execute them successfully.


4-74. Credible, robust and lethal forces must be introduced early in force-projection operations. Sufficient combat power to resolve a crisis on favorable terms must be deployed. These forces must be interoperable and flexible to take into account unforeseen circumstances. The early entry air and missile defense force must possess the lethality to protect the force the moment it arrives in theater. Commanders cannot depend on having the time to build up lethal forces in a theater. An air and missile defense task force with enough assets and access to joint and multinational counterair, theater missile defense, and intelligence assets might even be able to deter the enemy from attacking critical functions such as battle command, logistics, and maneuver.


4-75. ADA commanders and units everywhere in the Army must expect to be alerted and deployed with little prior warning. If units have been assigned a region of focus, planning must begin long before alerting. Continuous force tracking (total asset visibility) and intelligence readiness are important elements of anticipation. Plans must be simple, deployment options redundant, and deployment flow sufficiently versatile to generate alternative options. Early deploying air and missile defense forces must have the combat capability to protect lodgments from the moment of arrival since hostilities can begin at any time.


4-76. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units. Crisis response ADA forces on quick alert may have little time to tailor forces. Their force packages should include sufficient combat power to sustain them for the short term. Tailoring includes force refinement, which is the continuous process of adjustment conducted by the supported and supporting commanders. The resulting force represents the best compromise between mission, optimum force, actual force available, time, lift available, and theater supportability. Initial and follow-on ADA reinforcement forces can then be tailored to meet the specific concerns of the long-term mission.

4-77. Commanders find they may need to substitute one type of ADA unit for another or to add ADA units that have never trained together. This places a premium on early and continuous teamwork that builds the cohesion that is essential for mission success. Units must standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance teamwork and total force integration. ADA commanders must select a force composition appropriate for the mission, build the team, and plan for simultaneous deployment and rapid employment of the ADA force.


4-78. The intelligence combat function must provide timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive all-source intelligence on threat capabilities and activities. The enemyísí mobility operations entering the theater include advanced conventional weaponry, WMDs, and various types of sea mines. Today's enemies possess the motives and means to interrupt the deployment of multinational forces and US forces. Ports of debarkation (PODs) are particularly attractive targets since they are likely to be bottlenecks where people and materiel pile up.


4-79. The following principles are critical to Intelligence and Electronic Warfare operations:

4-80. Intelligence must support the air defense commander during all phases of the decision-making process. During planning the commander at each level drives the intelligence effort. They initially drive intelligence through the identification of priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Each commander must broker subordinate commanders' intelligence requirements, after which, intelligence assets are tasked to meet those requirements.


4-81. Force-projection operations will challenge ADA battle command. Two or more phases may be conducted concurrently. The deployment phase may result in the physical separation of units in space and time. The enemy may attack unexpectedly before deployment is complete. Simplicity and the ability to adapt and adjust are key considerations. ADA commanders must adapt to the nature of the deployment flow and prepare plans that rapidly build combat power, provide protection of the force, and facilitate future operations.

4-82. ADA commanders must have robust battle command means during force projection. They must accurately track friendly forces and forecast their arrival in theater. Space-based systems can greatly facilitate the commander's near-real-time knowledge of unit status and other key assets, as well as connecting into joint and multinational counterair and theater missile defenses. Establishing adequate communications networks will require innovation. Communications must be secure, reliable, timely, and compatible with the mix of supporting, supported, and adjacent forces and services. ADA units must rapidly establish communications with other organizations and services in the operation.


4-83. Successful ADA force projection requires flexible and modular logistics. The nature of logistical projection depends on the factors of METT-TC. Force projection may require the development of forward support bases, intermediate staging bases, and lodgments in theater. Contracted logistics may provide some initial support. Direct contractor support may be provided to ADA units throughout the campaign. Split-based logistical operations (part in theater and part in the US) reduce the burden on the deployment flow and preclude unnecessary stock in theater. A split-based logistics concept relies on assured communications systems.


4-84. Realistic ADA mission training is important. Units build on home-station training by focusing on missions and conditions they expect to encounter during force projection operations. Although training begins at home stations, ADA units continue to train to standard and to rehearse following arrival in theater and throughout the conduct of operations as time, the threat, and other conditions permit. Units should regularly review soldier and equipment readiness and perform emergency deployment readiness exercises to ensure preparedness for deployment. Lessons learned should be passed up the chain of command, from unit to unit and from early deploying units to follow-on forces. Training continues after combat ceases.


4-85. Force-projection operations will almost always involve operations with other nations. Measures taken to achieve unity of effort and mutual trust greatly facilitate operations with host nations. Commanders and soldiers should be sensitive to cultural differences that may impact on operations.

4-86. Multinational counterair and missile defense requirements must be incorporated into the overall plan. Likewise, multinational capabilities must be maximized during operations.


4-87. The impact of the media on the conduct of air and missile defense operations is substantially greater today than in any previous era. Providing early and continuous access to the press throughout force projection enhances operations and strengthens public support. However, misuse of the media can endanger units; provide the enemy vital target, combat damage, and friendly force deployment data; and weaken public support. ADA commanders must take the presence of the media and its potential impacts into account during all phases of force projection operations.


4-88. At all stages of force-projection operations, commanders at all levels must consider issues related to the end of hostilities and the transition to peace. At every level, analysis of the objectives for the operation should always include consideration of the anticipated consequences of the war to help smooth the transition from active combat to post conflict operations.


4-89. Force projection is the military's ability to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements. It is fundamental to Army doctrine. The eight stages of force-projection operations follow a general sequence, although these stages often overlap in time and space. Activities of one stage will often blend with another.

4-90. ADA commanders should assume no set arrangement of events. They should be prepared to deal with many concurrent activities. They should conceptualize a logical flow through the stages but be prepared to make adjustments. The stages of force projection include the following:


4-91. Current strategy places an enormous premium on the ability to rapidly generate the forces (units), manpower (individuals), and logistics support required to support the commander in achieving his mission. Mobilization is a phased, concurrent, and continuous process designed to rapidly expand and enhance the mission capability of the Army in support of a military response to crisis or natural disaster. The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or the Congress.

4-92. Mobilization includes five levels, which support mobilization for specific or limited contingencies up to the full mobilization necessary to support large, protracted wars. The mobilization flow for an RC unit consists of planning, alert, activities at home station, activities at mobilization station, and activities at the port of embarkation. ADA commanders anticipating augmentation by RC units or individuals must be involved in providing training guidance and mobilization planning during the planning and alert phases. During the remaining phases, commanders must be prepared to receive units and/or individuals, organize personnel, supplies, and materiel, certify the proficiency of individuals and units and deploy the units into theater.

4-93. ADA commanders must be involved in the mobilization process because of the current reliance on the RC. In nearly every contingency, RC units and individuals are relied upon to accomplish the mission. Details of the mobilization process are in FM 100-17.


4-94. Since all units are an integral part of the force-projection strategy, unit mission-essential task lists must reflect appropriate mobilization and deployment tasks. AC commanders anticipating augmentation by RC units should involve themselves in the RC unit's training program to insure that RC training is relevant to the AC unit's mission and training program. ADA unit training must emphasize all critical aspects of force projection.

4-95. Task organization is conducted based on the mission and resources available. The theater campaign plan will specify command, intelligence, logistics, and any multinational operations relationships, if known. The G2 or S2 must begin a detailed IPB as early as possible to support planning. Anticipatory logistics planning during this stage is key to successful execution of later stages. Operations security is critical during this stage. The combatant or joint force commander will establish the sequence in which Army units should deploy relative to the movement of forces of the other services. ADA commanders must prioritize deployment sequences consistent with METT-TC. ADA commanders use available time to complete training and certification as well as building team cohesion. For forward presence forces, it may be necessary to provide air defense force protection and counter-RSTA during this stage.

stage three -- DEPLOYMENT

4-96. ADA units are trained, structured, and postured for rapid deployment. Deployment planning tools, described in FM 55-65, allow commanders to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Lift assets are limited, but critical to the successful projection of the force. ADA commanders make every effort to integrate the capabilities of the host nation, joint and multinational forces, and forward presence forces with those of the deploying force. Commanders must balance the factors of METT-TC against available lift assets to determine the composition of the initial response force. Each crisis will have unique demands, causing commanders to balance requirements against lift. In deployment, commanders must maintain versatility and agility in force mix, their combat capability, sustainment, and lift, along with the need to forecast future events that call for decisions early in the deployment stage.

4-97. ADA commanders are responsible to provide forces protection during deployment. They must tailor the force to accomplish the mission against the threat developed during IPB. They may have to sacrifice mobility, redundant communications, and sustainability to bring in sufficient firepower to protect the force and designated assets during the initial phases of the deployment. Counter-RSTA will also be a significant part of the responsibilities of the ADA commanders, especially with respect to UAVs. Protection of joint air and missile defense priorities may outweigh defense of service priorities.

stage four -- ENTRY OPERATIONS

4-98. The requirements of entry operations will vary. Each operation will be different. Entry may be either opposed or unopposed. Forces are most vulnerable and the success of the operation at greatest risk during initial entry. This vulnerability is most acute when the enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction. Defensive and offensive operations to counter these weapons will affect ADA, Army, joint, and multinational planning. Protecting the entry force will be critical to the success of this phase of the operation.

4-99, Continuous intelligence support is critical. Entry force commanders will have in-flight intelligence during deployment and entry operations. Once on the ground, a deployable intelligence support element (DISE) will provide split-based intelligence operations by bringing together communications capabilities, automated intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast downlinks in a scalable, deployable package.


4-100. Even as entry operations are beginning, the commander shifts focus to building up capabilities in preparation for operations. Entry operations include rapid buildup and expansion that may require the following:

4-101. ADA forces provide the requisite force protection, in coordination with other joint and multinational air and missile defense elements. Early deployment of counter-missile and counter-RSTA ADA units is crucial to the success of entry operations. Even in an apparently benign entry operation, protection of the force remains a critical command consideration. Theater missile defense operations protect the lodgment, geopolitical assets, and debarking forces. Counter-RSTA operations deny the enemy targeting information, which is key to the enemy sustaining an effective air or missile attack. Units conducting counter-RSTA operations may need to be deployed away from the force to achieve early engagement. As the joint force expands the lodgment, ADA units continue to protect the force and geopolitical assets and deny threat RSTA throughout the AO. This is particularly critical to deceiving the enemy on the US intended course of action.

Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement and Integration

4-102. As forces enter the theater of operations they will undergo reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) processing. These terms are defined as follows:

4-103. Six imperatives must be achieved in order for units to successfully conduct RSOI operations. The six RSOI Imperatives are as follows:

4-104. RSOI requires home-station training to be successful and is imperative to effective force projection operations. RSOI is the means by which commanders shape and expedite force closure in the theater of operations. Effective, well-conceived RSOI operations greatly speed force closure; conversely, an ineffective RSOI delays force closure and compromises the CINCís ability to implement the concept of operations.

stage five -- decisive OPERATIONS

4-105. At some point in time, the joint force commander will decide to move against the enemy. The ground commander might reposition forces to facilitate the imminent start of combat. ADA units will be required to cover the force from the enemy while it moves. ADA units may be involved in deception operations related to repositioning the force.

4-106. Army commanders normally seek to engage threat forces simultaneously throughout the depth of the AO. The commander weights the main effort with sufficient, sustained combat power to win the decisive battles and allocates enough combat power to supporting efforts to ensure overall victory. Force agility, initiative, and synchronized operations throughout the width and depth of the battlefield characterizes ADA operations. Counter-RSTA and force protection remains crucial to the multinational, joint, and Army commanders' plans. Commanders conduct their operations with a sound logistical foundation integrated with their concept of combat operations. Countering helicopters increases in importance during the operations phase. Ensuring freedom to maneuver and minimizing casualties for the force are two of the primary objectives of air defense.

4-107. ADA commanders must use the same types of planning processes used by the supported force. This facilitates understanding and synchronization. Naturally the factors which go into the planning process for ADA units will be task organized to their mission and capabilities. ADA commanders use employment principles and guidelines to design air and missile defenses. When applying these principles and guidelines, planners must consider the tactical and technical capabilities of each weapon and sensor system as well as the relevant factors of METT-TC, IPB, and the air and missile defense priorities.

Air Defense Artillery Employment Principles

4-108. Commanders apply four principles when planning active air and missile defense operations. These principles are mass, mix, mobility, and integration.

4-109. Mass is the concentration of air and missile defense combat power. It is achieved by assigning enough firepower to successfully defend the force or the asset against air and missile attack or surveillance. To mass air and missile defense combat power, commanders may have to accept risks in other areas of the battlefield.

4-110. Mix is the employment of a combination of weapon and sensor systems to protect the force and assets from the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another and complicates the situation for the attacker. All joint and multinational arms resources are considered when applying this principle. Proper mix causes the enemy to adjust their tactics. Enemy tactics designed to defeat one system may make the enemy vulnerable to another friendly system.

4-111. Mobility is the capability to move from place to place while retaining the ability to perform the air defense mission. The mobility of air and missile defense resources must be equivalent to the mobility of the supported force. First priority for mobility should be planning moves that support accomplishment of the mission. Tactical situations may dictate additional moves to enhance survivability. Strategic mobility is essential to support force-projection operations.

4-112. Integration is the close coordination of effort and unity of action, which maximizes operational effectiveness. It is applicable, regardless of command relationships established. Active air and missile defense operations must be integrated into the supported commander's concept of the operation. The AD plan describes vertical and horizontal integration of air defense systems across the width and depth of the battlefield and includes integration with joint and multinational forces.

Air Defense Artillery Employment Guidelines

4-113. Planning and positioning ADA resources involves applying six employment guidelines. The guidelines are mutual support, overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth (figure 4-3).

4-114. Mutual support is achieved by positioning weapons so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon system. For gun systems, this dead zone is usually small. For missile systems, the dead zone can be large and the need for mutual support is great. Mutual support can also be used to cover non-operational units or units at lower states of readiness.

4-115. Overlapping fires are achieved by positioning weapons so their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct RSTA operations, the defense planner must apply mutual support or overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

4-116. Balanced fires are achieved by positioning weapons to deliver an equal volume of fire in all directions. This may be necessary when air defense is used in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy, or when the air avenue of approach is not predictable.

4-117. Weighted coverage is achieved by combining and concentrating fires toward the most likely threat air avenues of approach or direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage toward another direction.

4-118. Early engagement is achieved by positioning sensors and weapons so they can engage the threat before ordnance release or target acquisition. Ideally, ADA should engage and destroy the enemy before it can fire on or acquire the defended asset or force.

4-119. Defense in depth is achieved by positioning sensors and weapons so the air threat will come under an increasing volume of fire as it approaches the protected asset or force. Defense in depth lowers the probability that the enemy will reach the defended asset or force.

Air and Missile Defense Priorities

4-120. The ADA commander considers METT-TC, IPB, and the supported commander's intent and concept of operations before recommending air and missile defense priorities. The ADA commander develops these priorities based on the factors of criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and the threat. The ADA commander recommends these priorities to the supported commander for approval.

4-121. Criticality. Criticality is the degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission accomplishment. Determination of the criticality of an asset or force is made by assessing the impact on the conduct of the operation that would result from damage to the asset or force. The degree of criticality is based on whether damage to the asset or force prevents, seriously interferes with, or causes only limited interference with the execution of the plan.

4-122. Vulnerability. Vulnerability is the degree to which an asset or force is susceptible to surveillance and attack or to damage if attacked. When assessing vulnerability consideration should be given to the following factors about the asset or force:

4-123. Recuperability. Recuperability is the degree to which an asset or force can recover from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and available manpower to continue its mission. The ADA commander considers the time to replace soldiers, equipment, or entire units, as well as whether a different element can perform the same mission. Assessment of geopolitical assets is provided by coordination with civil authorities.

4-124. Threat. The probability of an asset or force being targeted for surveillance or attack by enemy air must be assessed as part of the threat. The use of threat information to develop AD priorities is a reverse IPB process--what we expect enemy air to survey and attack, based on IPB. Targeting information provided by intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack methods, and threat doctrine is useful in evaluating air and missile defense priorities. To determine the relative importance of assets and forces, the ADA commander considers certain characteristics that make an asset or force a lucrative target for the enemy. In effect, this is reverse target value analysis.


4-125. Deployed forces transition to a period of post-conflict operations after hostility has ceased or a truce is declared. This transition can occur in one part of a theater while combat operations are still underway in other parts. Post-conflict operations focus on restoring order, minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing host nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing a presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims. Post-conflict operations place demands on every level of command. ADA units may be called upon to conduct humanitarian assistance and population control. ADA personnel may be required to control prisoners, handle refugees, and perform other related humanitarian assistance and control activities.

4-126. However, the post-conflict stage may be interrupted by the resumption of hostilities. Thus, units must rapidly consolidate, reconstitute, train, and prepare to remain in theater should the fighting resume. During this time, force protection is vital to prevent isolated attacks. ADA forces concentrate on providing force security and preventing surprise, permitting unimpeded reconstitution and facilitating unopposed embarkation of forces that are no longer needed in theater. Air and missile defense forces may remain in theater after the end of hostilities to perform stability and support operations.

stage seven -- REDEPLOYMENT

4-127. The objective of this stage is to return to home station the forces that are no longer needed. Post-conflict requirements have a direct effect on the redeployment flow. Commanders contend with the same challenge as in deployment, which is balancing the factors of METT-TC against available lift assets. Forces not required for subsequent operations will return to home station and prepare for future missions.

4-128. Protection of the force during redeployment is as critical as during deployment or any other stage of the operation. While the most significant aerial attack capabilities may have been eliminated, air and missile defense forces must be prepared to counter desperation or retaliatory air and missile attacks.

4-129. Reconstitution activities can begin in theater prior to redeployment. They include rebuilding unit integrity and accounting for soldiers and equipment. If the force has been exposed to nuclear, chemical, or biological contaminants, reconstitution activities may include thorough decontamination of personnel and equipment. These activities continue after arrival at home station with the focus on the rebuilding of units back to pre-mobilization levels of readiness, regeneration of logistics stockpiles, and the accountability of mobilized equipment and supplies.

stage eight -- DEMOBILIZATION

4-130. Demobilization is the process by which units, individuals, and materiel transfer from active to a pre-mobilization posture. Although the overall focus is generally on units and individuals, the demobilization of logistics also requires significant resources. The unique requirements of RC soldiers (e.g., re-employment rights, etc.) and RC units demand the attention of the commander. Lessons learned must be captured before demobilization is completed.