Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Doctrine
This chapter addresses doctrine for joint theater air and missile defense (JTAMD) operations. It is based on joint publications. Joint operations are the integrated military activities of two or more service components of the US military. Unless stated otherwise, multinational procedures for alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are the same as provided in joint doctrine.
JTAMD operations DOCTRINE
3-1. Joint theater air and missile defense operations doctrine is outlined in this section. Joint Pub 3-01 and Joint Pub 3-01.5 provide more detailed discussion. JTAMD includes all measures and means designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of surveillance and attacks against the joint force by air and missile threats. Air defense operations represent the Army's contribution to JTAMD operations.
3-2, JTAMD is conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy air and missile forces. JTAMD operations include such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface to surface and surface-to-air missiles, air-to surface missiles, elements of information operations (IO), and electronic countermeasures to destroy the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures that are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air actions are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility. Both offensive and defensive actions are involved. Offensive operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. Defensive operations are normally conducted near or over friendly forces and are generally in reaction to enemy air activity.
3-3. The purpose of the joint theater air and missile defense mission is to attain a desired degree of air superiority to allow freedom of action and protect the joint force and selected geopolitical assets. At the start of force projection operations, control of the air environment may range from complete domination by hostile forces to air supremacy by the joint force. It may also range from temporary, local air superiority in a specific part of the area of operations to control over the entire area of operations or theater. Control may also vary over time. The degree of control required depends on the situation. The joint force commander (JFC) must ensure that his forces are capable of achieving sufficient air superiority to ensure protection of key assets and forces and freedom of action for critical operations. When enemy air power threatens friendly operations, the requirement for friendly JTAMD must be a major consideration in the joint planning for those operations.
3-4. Air superiority, at the critical time and place, provides friendly forces a more favorable environment in which to perform air, land, sea and space operations. Limiting the enemy's use of its air power increases our potential for success and conserves the fighting force so commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. Because offensive and defensive operations must often rely on the same airspace and resources, they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The emphasis on either offensive or defensive JTAMD operations will depend on the overall situation and the joint force commander's concept of operations. JTAMD operations affect air, land, and maritime battles, and often cross the boundaries between them.
3-5. The ultimate goal of JTAMD operations is to control the airspace to allow commanders to execute their plans. The two types of complementary and mutually supportive JTAMD operations are offensive operations and defensive operations. Offensive operations are conducted to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and supporting structures and systems as close to their source as possible. They are conducted at a time and place of friendly force choosing rather than in reaction to enemy initiatives. Defensive operations are those defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Defensive operations are conducted primarily in reaction to enemy air offensive initiatives.
Joint Theater Air Defense
3-6. Joint Theater air defense operational elements are active air defense and passive air defense. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in the air defense role, and electronic warfare. Passive air defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and warning systems, and the use of protective construction.
Joint Theater Missile Defense
3-7. Objectives of joint theater missile defense (JTMD) are:
3-8. JTMD is composed of four operational elements: passive missile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) (figure 3-1). Because of the continual advancement and proliferation of TMs, the threat cannot currently be countered by any single technical solution, nor will it likely be in the future. The threat can only be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations.
Passive missile defense
3-9. Passive missile defense applies to measures initiated to reduce vulnerability to TM attack and to minimize the effect of damage caused by TM attack. Passive missile defense includes TM early warning and NBC protection, counter-surveillance, deception, camouflage and concealment, hardening, electronic warfare, mobility, dispersal, redundancy, recovery, and reconstitution.
Active missile defense
3-10. Active missile defense applies to operations initiated to protect against a TM attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or destroying TMs in flight. Active missile defense includes a multilayered defense in depth via multiple engagements using air, land, and sea assets. It also includes active electronic warfare to disrupt remote or onboard guidance systems.
3-11. Attack operations destroy, disrupt, or neutralize TM launch platforms and supporting command, control, and communications (C3) nodes, logistic structures, and RSTA platforms. Attack operations include offensive action by air, land, sea, and special operations forces.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
3-12. TMD C4I is an integrated system of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, facilities, communications, computers, and supporting intelligence. It includes missile warning and cueing of defense systems by sensors and ground stations. C4I provides command authorities timely and accurate data and systems to plan, monitor, direct, control, and report TMD operations.
airspace control and air defense integration
3-13. Airspace control. Airspace control increases operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Detailed guidance for airspace control is provided in Joint Pub 3-52. The joint force commander normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate and integrate use of the airspace. Airspace control is vital to all air operations and must include procedures to facilitate routing and recognition of friendly aircraft. Establishment of identification and weapon engagement zones and routing of non-combat air traffic are planned to permit maximum use of air defense resources while minimizing restrictions on other operations. Airspace control measures can decrease the possibility of fratricide and enable the rapid identification of approaching air threats.
3-14. Air defense integration. Conduct of the JTAMD battle requires the integrated operation of all available air defense weapon systems. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the JFC will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander designated the area air defense commander (AADC). Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air and missile defense operations. Air and missile defense operations must be coordinated with air, land, sea, and space resources and operations.
rules of engagement
3-15. Effective use of air and missile defense forces requires the establishment and understanding of common rules of engagement (ROE). Engagement operations must be controlled in order to avoid fratricide and to ensure the force is protected by a seamless air defense. This requires the delegation of engagement authority to the appropriate AD commanders and the establishment of weapon control procedures and rules of engagement. Rules of engagement must include hostile criteria. The optimum employment of air defense weapon systems requires early identification of friend and foe to maximize beyond visual range engagement while avoiding fratricide.
3-16. Unless already established by higher authority or an existing plan, the joint force commander (JFC) shall establish the appropriate ROE for both air and missile threats. Cruise missiles and UAVs present ROE challenges due to the fact that they have radar characteristics similar to manned aircraft. ROE for ballistic missiles should be as permissive as possible in order to facilitate rapid engagement of hostile missiles. Capabilities dictate that ADA units engage threatening ballistic missiles and ASMs based on classification, not identification. The component and supporting commanders are responsible for ensuring compliance with the established rules of engagement.
3-17. ROE must be delineated, published, disseminated to, and exercised by, alliance or coalition members for compliance and as a planning consideration for future operations. Any national ROE that differ from the multinational commanderís ROE must be identified, published, and understood by all commands.
3-18. Because there will never be sufficient specialized air defense assets to provide force protection for all units and vital assets, all units must be capable of using their organic weapons for self-defense against air attack. Self-defense is never denied.
3-19. Conduct of JTAMD operations by US forces fighting alone or as a member of an alliance or coalition is complex. It requires the contributions of ground, sea, air, and space forces of all components and allied or coalition forces, centrally controlled at the highest levels of command. Execution should be decentralized but closely coordinated by components and allies or coalition forces. The following paragraphs set forth the responsibilities and command relationships of the various commanders, staff elements, and components involved in conducting JTAMD operations in both joint and multinational operations environments.
Commander in Chief
3-20. The commander in chief (CINC) of a geographic combatant command, as the JFC, establishes theater guidance and objectives for JTAMD. He has combatant command (COCOM) of all assigned forces. The CINC uses joint staff elements and component commanders and their staffs to plan, monitor, give advice, coordinate, and execute joint operations. The CINC delegates command authority to assigned or attached subordinate commanders.
Joint Force Commander
3-21. The JFC has operational control of assigned forces. The JFC has the authority to delegate operational control, assign tasks, and direct coordination among subordinate component commanders. The JFC also redirects and reorganizes forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the mission.
3-22. The JFC establishes guidance and objectives for JTAMD. He uses component commanders, component staff, and joint staff elements to plan, monitor, give advice, coordinate, and execute the overall JTAMD operation. The JFC must define and implement a methodology for joint planning, prioritization of missions and targets, friendly asset protection, and apportionment and allocation of resources. The JFC's concept of operations specifies the objectives and provides guidance for the employment of targeting, attack, and defense forces to conduct JTAMD. Component commanders conduct JTAMD operations under the guidance and in support of the objectives of the JFC.
3-23. The JFC uses the joint staff to plan, to monitor, to give advice, and to coordinate overall operations. The joint staff develops and issues the JFC-approved concept of operations, which includes the following:
3-24. Component commanders plan and execute all JTAMD operations within their assigned AOs as directed by the JFC. Component commanders are responsible for planning and executing combat operations and for jointly coordinating and prioritizing their operations and needs with the JFC and with other component commanders. Inside their AOs, component commanders are normally designated as supported commanders for attack operations. Beyond surface AOs, the JFACC is normally designated supported commander for attack operations. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Component commanders will normally retain operational control of their active defense assets. The JFC may designate certain key forces or assets that the component commanders must protect with their assigned active defense forces.
3-25. Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC (if designated) is necessary to employ the most appropriate resources and measures to execute JTAMD operations and to ensure a synergistic effort. Component-to-component coordination may be required in some situations as a result of the compressed timeline and short reaction times inherent in joint theater missile defense (JTMD) operations.
command, control, communications, computers
3-26. General requirements for C4I are contained in joint publications. More specific, Army-oriented information is contained in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this field manual.
Command and Control
3-27. All air and missile defense operations are integrated through weapons control procedures, coordination with adjacent AD units, coordination between service components, and through shared knowledge of the enemy and friendly situation. Components exercise both positive and procedural control of their assigned AD forces. An integrated air and missile defense requires the provision and exchange of essential near real time information. This information must include air defense warnings that allow commanders to implement the appropriate active and passive air defense measures. The exchange of near real time information requires the presence of adequate track capacity within systems that shares and correlates tracks using data processing systems and space-based and ground-based secure communications assets. When secure communications are not operational, enemy track information from airborne and ground-based sensors may be passed by non-secure data or voice broadcast.
3-28. Air defense sensors are normally optimized to perform specific surveillance or control functions. To provide the spectrum of coverage required for air and missile defense operations, a number of complementary systems are necessary. These systems range from a mix of static and mobile equipment to strategic warning systems. Systems are netted to enable the gathering and dissemination of information to all ADA forces under all operational conditions.
Command and Control Systems
3-29. Command and control systems should be survivable and redundant and may include:
Contributing Command and Control Systems
3-30. Contributing systems may include military and civilian assets. Depending on the situation, all may be integrated with the air defense system.
3-31. Airborne Early Warning. Airborne sensors serve to overcome range and low-level detection limitations inherent in a surface-based sensor system and are integrated with surface systems. The use of airborne early warning systems will extend detection ranges and consequently increase the time available for reaction. At the same time, friendly positions will not be compromised, and the threats from low-level surprise attacks will be significantly reduced.
3-32. Space Based Warning Systems. Space platforms provide warning of ballistic missile attack and other intelligence information to either national or theater warning systems. Spaced-based systems can provide longer-range warning than airborne or surface-based sensors.
3-33. Intelligence Sources. These may provide indications of imminent hostile activity, potential early warning, and positive hostile identification before detection by the air defense system. The maximum possible use of this information is essential. Host nation intelligence sources may significantly augment US intelligence efforts.
3-34. Logistics and Support Agencies. These provide the continuity and sustainability required to enable the air and missile defense force to accomplish its mission. Adequate and timely support must be planned, coordinated, and executed.
3-35. Civilian and Military Air Control Facilities. Air traffic control facilities in the area of operations may contribute vital information to air and missile defense forces. These capabilities are exploited and, where possible, netted into the command and control system.
Command and Control Relationships
3-36. Command relationships for all operations shall be per Joint Pub 0-2. The joint force commander normally assigns responsibility for overall AD operations to a single area air defense commander. With respect to the conduct of JTAMD operations, the following principles normally apply:
Active Air Defense Command and Control
3-37. The JFC exercises control of active air defense operations by integration of JTAMD systems and forces into the C4I systems supporting theater operations. Component commanders retain command of their active defense forces and conduct operations within their areas of operations per AADC-developed, JFC-approved ROE, DAL, and airspace control measures to protect their forces and the JFC's air and missile defense priorities. Corps commanders employ their organic active air defense forces similarly.
Joint Theater Missile Defense Command and Control
3-38. Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) C4I functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, databases, and procedures. They are designed for planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces to accomplish JTMD. Effective control requires continuous surveillance of likely missile launch areas. A confirmed launch triggers reaction by a pre-planned selection of appropriate defensive systems, according to established ROE. Short missile flight times require that all applicable air-, land-, sea-, and space-based sensor and surveillance assets be linked to provide a complete and current air picture. US Commander in Chief, Space Command (USCINCSPACE) ensures that space-based systems are responsive to the joint or multinational force commander.
3-39. Attack operations. Designation of engagement areas, assignment of areas of operations (AO) and coordination of JTMD attack operations are prescribed by the JFC. The JFC will normally task component commanders for conduct of attack operations against TMs within their assigned AOs. Subordinate commanders control attack resources and coordinate and conduct their operations according to joint doctrine and procedures. The JFACC is normally the supported commander to plan and conduct attack operations against theater missiles that are outside the other component commanders' AOs.
3-40. Effective attack operations require real-time coordination between all component commanders as well as continuous wide-area surveillance over the entire area of responsibility. Coordination of attack operations involves the detection, acquisition, classification, and identification of enemy TMs and the dissemination of the targeting information to the designated attack system for execution.
3-41. Linkages. The C4I system links passive and active missile defense and attack capabilities to provide timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of tactical warning, targeting data, mission assignment, and post-strike assessments to the appropriate JTMD element. The C4I system must provide rapid communications among intelligence assets, fusion and decision-making nodes, warning systems, and weapon systems, to include a capability for rapid coordination with supporting commanders in chief. C4I capabilities should also support the principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, and coordinated efforts by units assigned JTMD tasks.
3-42. Resources. Inherent in effective JTMD operations is an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural interoperability. This is especially true for the C4I operational elements. JTMD C4I systems, facilities, procedures, and organizations integrate applicable joint and multinational capabilities. The JFC must exercise JTMD C4I interoperability among all components during peacetime joint force and multinational exercises. C4I must fulfill the following requirements:
3-43. Planning. C4I planning begins with the JFC 's estimate of the situation, objectives, and overall concept of operations. Subordinate commanders plan the tasking of their forces and resources based on the commander's guidance and priorities. C4I planning for passive missile defense, active missile defense, and attack operations must be coordinated among all components of the force on a continual basis to ensure complementary efforts and to achieve synergism.
3-44. Planning considerations for C4I of JTMD operations must consider both joint and multinational relationships when addressing the need for near real time response to the threat. The wide range of operations that may be appropriate, the diverse nature of the JTMD elements that must complement each other, and the possible impact of JTMD on other missions and tasks, are all considerations.
Communications and computers
3-45. Effective control of diverse systems requires the capability to collect, process, display, and communicate vast amounts of information while denying the enemy access to the information. Communications systems, including space-based resources, must be capable of providing secure near real time exchange of essential information between the joint force commander and subordinate commanders and forces. The systems must be sufficiently flexible and responsive to allow timely redirection of forces. Communications systems must have sufficient capacity, electronic protection, and flexibility to accommodate information exchange among all levels of command, even when an intermediate level has been disabled.
3-46. To speed the exchange of essential information, it may be necessary to delineate the extent and type of information given to specific command and control levels. Data transferred between command and control levels to exercise JTAMD tasks calls for automated data processing. The systems should have redundancy and must have a backup capability and procedures to maintain continuity of operations should the primary system fail.
3-47. The intelligence system must provide current, accurate, and timely all-source information of enemy capabilities and activities. These systems must be integrated and synchronized to ensure responsiveness to operational needs. The intelligence system must accommodate a variety of different armed forces (national, allied, or coalition) communications systems. The intelligence system is vital to the decision-making cycle and must support the status, assessment, planning, warning, and IPB functions, as well as target prioritization recommendations.
3-48. C4I systems must rapidly disseminate intelligence to the components and support air, sea, and ground attack operations requirements with a rapid targeting capability. C4I for JTAMD actions must be integrated into the overall theater communications network and yet be capable of decentralized control or autonomous operations. Service organizations conducting JTAMD actions must maintain an interface with and be interoperable with the other components' organizations.
3-49. Theaters may have offensive constraints or limitations, requiring a reactive C4I process. A reactive mode demands extensive preparation and preplanning using continuous IPB to provide critical targeting data. The preparation and planning process within the C4I framework focuses sensor, surveillance, and intelligence management to allow target acquisition and tracking of the enemy air and theater missile systems and supporting operations.
Theater Missile Intelligence
3-50. Intelligence preparation must provide near real time data on enemy TM forward operating bases, missile launch, load, and hide sites, EW systems, C4I facilities, surveillance and control systems, and logistical support and infrastructure. The C4I process must detect and disseminate prelaunch signatures that indicate enemy missile launch preparations, and pass the launch warning to friendly units.
3-51. Launch warnings provide the means to alert and increase the readiness of friendly defensive assets, and for the employment of offensive and passive countermeasures. Increasing the readiness posture includes weapon systems, ISR assets, and command and control nodes for the level of threat activity anticipated.
3-52. Once a launch is observed, the preparation and planning measures provide a capability for concurrent and simultaneous defensive and offensive response.
3-53. An identified enemy missile launch through sensor and surveillance systems keys the C4I process, which uses communications interfaces to provide near real time defensive and offensive attack responses. In-flight threat missile trajectory data are passed in near real time directly to interceptors, point defense, and self-protection systems. Simultaneously, while enemy missiles are in flight, updated enemy launch locations, predicted impact areas, and target data base information are passed to the appropriate command and control centers and offensive systems. Concurrently, launch warnings are provided to all units and commands within the theater.
3-54. Depending on the capabilities of the sensor and surveillance systems, and the sources and quality of the intelligence, cueing of additional systems may be necessary to provide more refined and accurate threat missile data. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may search areas that will then require more refined ISR by theater and tactical assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, and other intelligence assets are rapidly cued to achieve the necessary accuracy for IPB targeting objectives.
3-55. Intelligence requirements in support of multinational JTAMD operations must be determined and prioritized to plan the collection and analytical effort and to allocate appropriate resources to these functions. Some designated national intelligence systems will augment organic systems of US forces that are part of multinational commands. These systems must be integrated and synchronized to ensure responsiveness to operational needs.
3-56. Defensive air and missile defense operations provide a secure area from which all elements of the joint force can operate. To accomplish this, defensive air and missile defense operations protect friendly land and naval forces, bases, lines of communications, and other assets while denying the enemy the freedom to carry out offensive air operations. Defensive operations employ both active and passive air and missile defense measures.
active air defense operations
3-57. Active air defense protects friendly forces and geopolitical assets by destroying attacking aircraft, missiles, and UAVs. Active air defense operations use aircraft, ADA, maritime AD, space-based systems and sensors, and electronic warfare support measures, along with signals intelligence. Active air defense operations are supported by dedicated, secure, and highly responsive communications to detect, classify, identify, track, engage, intercept, and destroy hostile or potentially hostile airborne targets. Integrated employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air systems through coordinated detection, classification, identification, assessment, and engagement is necessary to prevent enemy surveillance and attack. Airspace control in an active air defense environment is difficult but is crucial to successful friendly air operations and effective air and missile defense. Positive control and procedural measures may be implemented to ensure that friendly aircraft can safely transit the airspace without inhibiting air and missile defense or other friendly operations. Regardless of other controls and measures imposed within defended airspace, all air and missile defense forces must readily identify all aircraft in the area by electronic, visual, or procedural means. Rapid, reliable, and secure means of identification are critical to the effectiveness of air defense as well as to the survival of friendly aircraft.
Active Air Defense Resources
3-58. Air defense assets may be provided by all service components and may include support by space-based assets. Resources of the active air defense system may include weapon systems, command and control systems and additional contributing systems.
Active Air Defense Weapon Systems
3-59. All systems have limitations such as reaction time, range, identification capability, and flexibility of operation. However, limitations of one type of system are often offset or mitigated by the capabilities of another type of system. Therefore, an effective active air defense requires a mix of weapon types and systems. This balance is required between aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and the specific types of aircraft, missiles, and guns.
Execution of Active Air Defense Operations
3-60. Execution of active air defense operations requires surveillance and reporting systems capable of near real time production and dissemination of tracking data, which is necessary for the effective engagement of targets. As a track is detected, it must be classified and/or identified. This information then must be disseminated as rapidly as possible. The detailed and timely track data allows the command and control and integrated weapon systems to evaluate the track, determine the significance of the threat, and either designate air and missile defense forces for engagement or advise units of the passage of friendly aircraft.
Employment of Active Air Defense
3-61. Early warning of enemy air attack is vital if early engagement and defense in depth are to be achieved. Active air defense is developed to permit the interception of intruding threat aircraft as early as possible and as far forward as feasible. Engagement should continue through weapons release, departure from the target area, and return to base. Firing doctrine should address the allocation of available weapons to inbound threats before any allocation to outbound aircraft. The following paragraphs address how weapon systems may be employed.
3-62. Fighter-interceptor. Fighter aircraft may fly three basic missions:
3-63. Armed Helicopters. Aerial combat is an integral part of the ground commander's scheme of maneuver and may be controlled by either the aviation or ground maneuver force commander. Although it is a self-defense mission, air combat can occur during both offensive and defensive operations. Air combat is inherent in aviation's maneuver role in the reconnaissance and security, attack, and air assault missions and must be linked to the aviation command and control system.
3-64. Surface-to-Air Weapons. Surface-to-air weapons are employed to protect the force. These weapons offer large amounts of firepower and instant responsiveness. For maximum effect, a mix of types of surface-to-air weapons should be employed in an integrated air defense since the optimal capabilities of each weapon system occur at different ranges and altitudes. Surface-to-air systems provide the best overall coverage when their operations are both integrated and coordinated. Integration and coordination ensures both a minimum-risk passage for friendly aircraft and a means to deconflict employment of surface-to-air weapons and fighters.
passive defense operations
3-65. Passive defense is all measures, other than active defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. Passive defense improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of being detected and targeted from the air and by mitigating the potential effects of air surveillance and attack. It includes measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to minimize the effect of damage caused by TM attack. It does not involve the employment of lethal weapons. Passive defense measures by all elements of the joint force are essential to force protection.
3-66. Depending on the situation and time available in the area of operations, a variety of actions can be taken to improve the joint force's passive defense posture. These actions include:
3-67. Theater Commanders-in-Chief, with support from USSPACECOM, are responsible for establishing theater event reporting systems to acquire, process, and disseminate warning information to joint force components and host-nation civil authorities. They are also responsible for implementing tactical event system architectures that are integrated with operations and intelligence communications nets. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Tactical warning initiates passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas are in danger of attack). The Commander-in-Chiefís tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence and warning systems.
3-68. The tactical event system (TES) and the joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) are of primary importance for tactical warning of ballistic missile attack. Both are US Space Command (USSPACECOM) assets which support theater tactical warning requirements with near real time warning of ballistic missile launches within the CINC's area of interest.
joint theater missile defense operations
3-69. A single measure cannot provide complete protection against a determined TM attack. A combination of passive defense, active defense, and attack operations, all fully integrated and coordinated by a robust and efficient C4I architecture, is required to meet the stringent performance requirements demanded of JTMD. Such a mix must provide for the survivability of combat forces, minimize the impact on friendly combat operations, create uncertainty in enemy planning, and deter or deny enemy effective use of TMs. The following paragraphs discuss the planning and preparation for JTMD, the process of transition to JTMD operations, and the active missile defense element of JTMD.
JTMD Preparation for War
3-70. Successful JTMD operations are highly dependent on the simultaneous and sequential execution of a wide spectrum of tasks and activities, some of which occur or begin prior to the initiation of the use of force. Significant among these is intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), JTMD preparation and training, and planning and development of the JFC approved defended asset list (DAL). During operations planning, forces are organized and enemy TM and TM-related targets are prioritized and assigned and ROE are established. The plan should include passive defense measures, along with a concept of operations for active defense and attack operations. As discussed in the following paragraphs, requirements and planning considerations for a contingency theater are different than those for a mature theater.
3-71. Mature Theater. Well-rehearsed TM defense plans and preparations allow forces in a mature theater to transition swiftly from peace to war. TM defense systems must provide timely C4I and target acquisition before hostilities commence. Preparatory activities include IPB, detection of launch platform preparations, and transmission of timely warnings to alert responsible commanders. Passive missile defense preparation should be conducted.
3-72. Forces are organized, threat targets prioritized and assigned, and ROE established to protect assets and provide freedom of maneuver for friendly forces during the peacetime phase. Passive and active missile defense measures are planned.
3-73. Contingency Theater. The availability of TMD active defense from the initiation of the operation in an immature or contingency theater will depend on whether the force must conduct opposed or unopposed force entry operations. During an opposed forced entry, land force TMD efforts may initially be limited to passive defense and attack operations until sufficient active defense assets can be deployed into the lodgment area(s). Naval forces may provide limited active defense of forces and assets in the littoral. Counter-ISR operations are essential to passive defense. Early, detailed advanced planning is fundamental to establishing a credible JTMD capability as quickly as possible. If entry is unopposed, Army TMD active defense forces must be deployed during early entry to protect the ports of debarkation and initial force and logistics concentrations. JTMD requirements are very similar to those of a mature theater. The principal differences are the time to deploy JTMD forces and available JTMD resources.
3-74. Forced entry operations may employ airborne, amphibious, or a combination of air, sea, and land insertion means, supported by space-based systems. Whatever the situation, the TM threat must be addressed and an appropriate defense provided early to counter the threat. During initial phases of amphibious operations the Navy component may have the primary role for providing the defense. As assault forces deploy ashore, land-based systems must be employed and integrated into the TMD. Upon agreement, the primary responsibility for JTMD operations may be passed to forces ashore. During situations in which the Naval forces are in support of land operations, Naval and land-based JTMD operations must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort.
3-75. Since JTMD assets available to the JFC will generally be limited, especially in opposed entry operations, special emphasis should be placed on providing physical security for critical JTMD assets against terrorist and similar threats.
JTMD Transition to War
3-76. The first indication of an impending act of war may be the detection of fixed or mobile TM launch platform preparations. Tactical warnings alert commanders and associated weapon systems, sensors, fusion centers, command and control nodes, military forces, and, in some cases, civil authorities to prepare for the expected attack. Once a launch is observed, a launch warning is passed to commands, units, and civil authorities to trigger passive and active defensive actions. Target flight data are passed by the C4I system to active missile defense units, and launch point estimates are passed to attack systems.
3-77. Air Defense commanders at all echelons plan and monitor execution of TMD activities. Air defense commanders are responsible for the active defense operational element of TMD. Additionally, they are directly involved in passive defense, by providing warning of missile attack within the land component, and possibly the joint force. ADA commanders perform active air and missile IPB, recommend air and TMD intelligence priorities, and recommend TMD attack operations targets.
JTMD Active Missile Defense
3-78. Active missile defense applies to operations initiated to protect against a TM attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and or destroying TMs in flight. Active missile defense includes multilayered defense in depth via multiple engagements using air, land, and sea assets. It also includes electronic warfare to disrupt remote or onboard guidance systems.
3-79. A role of active missile defense is to destroy incoming TMs in flight in order to protect selected assets and forces. This includes destroying ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, anti-ship missiles, and cruise missiles as early as possible during their flight trajectory, and enemy aircraft armed with ASMs or CMs before they can be launched. Defensive measures also include those actions that mitigate the effectiveness of targeting and delivery systems through electronic and electronic-optical attack of remote or onboard guidance systems. To create a coherent TM defense, active missile defense operations must complement passive missile defense and attack operations.
3-80. Some appropriate detection and attack systems include space-, air-, land-, and sea-based systems. Space-based data and components must be directly downlinked and integrated with theater assets for such things as IPB, launch warning, launch point prediction, threat classification, impact point prediction, weapons system cueing, communications, damage assessment.
3-81. Incoming missiles are destroyed by surface-to-air missiles during the latter phases of a missile's trajectory. Because an enemy attack may integrate aircraft and missiles, active missile defense must be coordinated with active air defense operations.
3-82. The ability to destroy missiles in flight must be coupled with dynamic and imaginative deployment of defensive systems to prevent the enemy from knowing what is defended. This causes uncertainty and reduces the enemy's expectation of a successful attack. Due to resource limitations, active missile defense operations defend those assets deemed the most important and critical by the JFC and component commanders. The JFC, component commanders, and intermediate commanders establish priorities for TMD and accept risk that the enemy could attack lower priority assets that are not defended. The principal contributors to active missile defense operations include surface-to-air missile systems and aircraft that engage enemy airborne launch platforms.
3-83. Offensive air and missile defense operations, including JTMD attack operations, must be considered for integration into tactical operations at all echelons wherever hostile air power has the potential to threaten friendly operations. Allocation of forces to theater-level offensive operations will be based on the joint force commander's assessment of the threat, the mission, and the forces available. Component commanders and their subordinates consider the same factors as they integrate offensive targets into their fire support priorities.
Types of Targets
3-84. Offensive air and missile defense operations will attack enemy targets in the air and on the surface and as close to their sources as possible. The following potential targets should be considered in the conduct of offensive operations:
3-85. The manner in which the offensive battle is prosecuted will depend on the forces and systems available and on their general capabilities. Various forces and systems are discussed in the following paragraphs.
3-86. Aircraft. Aircraft conduct attack-strike operations against targets on the ground or on/in the sea. They also conduct fighter sweeps and air escort missions to destroy enemy aircraft in flight. Aircraft equipped for antisubmarine operations, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, and surveillance, warning, and control activities also support offensive operations.
3-87. Surface Firepower. Artillery and naval gunfire may be employed against targets. Land-attack cruise missiles may be effective against stationary, soft targets such as unsheltered aircraft or command and control facilities. Surface-to-surface guided missiles, such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), cruise missiles, and unguided rockets, such as Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), may also be used.
3-88. UAVs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles may be used for attack, surveillance, deception, jamming, decoy, or harassment operations. They can be used against targets or in support of other forces conducting offensive operations.
3-89. SOF. Special operations forces (SOF) normally conduct direct action strikes and collect intelligence. They can also provide terminal guidance for air attacks against enemy airfields, operating bases, and other facilities that support enemy air operations.
3-90. Maneuver Forces. Though the majority of offensive AMD tasks require the use of air and fire support assets, maneuver forces may also contribute. Mechanized or armored units, airborne and air-assault infantry, US Marine amphibious forces, and attack aviation may all be used to attack airfields, forward operating bases, and other offensive AMD targets.
Conduct of JTMD Attack Operations
3-91. Attack operations are characterized by offensive actions to destroy and disrupt enemy TM capabilities before, during, and after launch. The objective of attack operations is to prevent the launch of TMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch platforms, RSTA platforms, C2 nodes, and missile stocks and infrastructure. The preferred method of countering enemy TM operations is to attack and destroy or disrupt TMs prior to their launch.
3-92. Attack operations can be preemptive or reactive. A sustained effort is required to reduce the enemy's TM capability and involves the execution of mutually supporting tasks. The detection, acquisition, classification, identification, tracking, and attack tasks are highly dependent on a near real time C4I process and rapid targeting capability. Attack operations use all-source intelligence, missile-warning systems, and air defense radar to locate and target enemy TM systems, their components, and supporting nodes.
3-93. Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive and developed intelligence. Because it is difficult to detect highly mobile launch systems, a C4I capability should exist to support near real time targeting and attack operations. National sensor systems will normally augment theater air- and ground-based systems to provide warning, impact prediction, and launch point determination. Additionally, intelligence products collected by national sensor systems can assist theater forces to anticipate TM operations and to determine enemy TM unit locations. SOF involvement may be through attack of TM targets by direct action operations or through conduct of special reconnaissance.
3-94. Planning for attack operations begins with the IPB process. The IPB process includes surveillance of likely TM launch areas and prediction of likely enemy TM activities. ADA planners must coordinate with the S2 for IPB development. Upon completing the initial analysis, the JFC issues guidance on the concept and priorities for TM attack operations. Based upon the JFC staff and component commander recommendations, the JFC assigns missions to the component commanders and provides guidance for JTMD attack operations. Component commanders then plan attack operations based on the assignment of attack responsibilities, the JFC's concept, priorities, and allocation of attack resources.
3-95. Effective JTMD attack operations requires the integration and coordination of all joint force plans. The JFC may task an organization within his joint staff to integrate component commanders' plans or may delegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander. If established, the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) may be an integration center for this effort or serve as a JFC-level review mechanism. Because of the mobility of TM systems, the time to acquire, target, and attack TM elements may be very short. Thus, an accelerated execution cycle using the decide-detect-deliver-assess process is required. Based upon pre-established JFC approved priorities and ROE, enemy TM targets are attacked by the most appropriate attack system as soon as detected.
3-96. Commanders continually reassess friendly and enemy dispositions throughout the planning cycle. They use all available intelligence to anticipate enemy attack plans, predict TM system dispositions, and plan appropriate attack responses.
3-97. Conduct of attack operations is reliant on sensor systems, a responsive near real time sensor management and communications network, and highly responsive, long-range attack weapon systems. At the tactical level, responsive intelligence and operations interfaces are required for rapid targeting and engagement of mobile TM launchers and support assets. Execution of air and ground JTMD attack operations is centrally planned, executed in a decentralized manner, and governed by applicable joint policies, doctrine, and procedures.
MULTINATIONAL TAMD OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS
3-98. TAMD operations are required within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement. Within this context, the JFC is subordinate to the CINC or may be the multinational CINC. In either event, the JFC must consider those areas peculiar to multinational operations that may influence the ability to achieve multinational unity of effort. Multinational CINCs and their subordinates identify the requirements and implications of multinational operations, organize their forces, train for success, and conduct multinational operations as necessary.
3-99. Requirements, responsibilities, and organizational considerations for conducting TAMD operations in a multinational environment are similar to joint operations. However, special considerations and areas of emphasis are needed to ensure unity of effort with other nation's forces. Each theater and each country is unique. Even within formal alliances, there are varying national interests that should be identified and considered. Differences in doctrine, training, equipment, and organization must be identified and considered when determining alliance interoperability requirements for employing forces. The multinational CINC is responsible to both national and allied or coalition leaders. Leaders of the alliance or coalition must approve command relationships among the elements of the alliance or coalition.
3-100. When national forces of the multinational force are not uniformly capable of actively defending against enemy air or missile capabilities, provisions must be made to ensure that TAMD assets are provided for defense within JFC-established priorities. This may entail introducing TAMD assets from another theater. For this reason, TAMD units and support organizations must train, orient, and exercise to operate in the total spectrum of potential operational environments. As in joint operations, multinational CINCs may choose to organize on an area or functional basis, or a combination of the two. In either case, multinational force capabilities must be considered.
3-101. Consensus on the threat, a clearly defined chain of command, and a responsive, interoperable command and control structure are crucial to successful multinational TAMD operations. Particular care must be taken to ensure that national forces and selected geopolitical assets are provided requisite protection from the effects of the threat. A multinational commander may also consider assisting host nation or civil authorities in establishing passive defense measures for the civilian population and host nation assets consistent with the overall mission.
3-102. Threats to the total multinational force, to include rear areas, must be considered. Consensus on the threat will facilitate the integration of national and alliance or coalition intelligence collection efforts, allocation of collection resources, and threat evaluation.
3-103. National forces are assigned TAMD missions that will produce, in concert with other forces, more significant effects than if employed alone. Tasks to national forces are assigned commensurate with their equipment and capabilities.
3-104. C4I systems must be sufficiently interoperable to respond to the needs of the multinational command. Information critical to TAMD needs is identified and systems are established to speed the flow of critical information throughout the multinational chain of command.
3-105. Multinational commanders must plan and disseminate warning and attack predictions to civil authorities. They must establish simple, effective systems.
3-106. Key to establishing and refining sound procedures is multinational exercises with full participation of C4I assets. Exercises provide an excellent environment for the simultaneous practice of multiechelon responsibilities to evaluate and to sustain the requisite skills and procedures for effective TAMD operations. Exercises are particularly helpful in adapting a unit to a new environment, subsequent to deployment from one geographic area to another. Exercises may also provide a deterrent effect.