PLANNING AND CONDUCTING AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS
PLANNING AND CONDUCTING AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS
The Army plays a key role in joint counterair and theater missile defense operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Army AD contributes greatly to DCA, OCA, and TMD attack operations, and provides the majority of TMD active defense capabilities. The Anny joins the other services to provide protection for the concentration of critical forces and assets in the theater base and in the combat zone. Unity of effort is achieved through integration and coordination of service component CA and TMD operations by the JFC. The AADC contributes through the development and promulgation of JFC approved ROE and air defense procedures and measures. This joint approach to CA and TMD provide the synchronization necessary to obtain the synergism required for success.
Army air defense requires the integrated application of all combined arms. For OCA and TMD attack operations, the Army uses deep operations, primarily by special operations forces, aviation and field artillery units, to attack the enemy's air and missile assets before they can be launched against the theater. Active DCA and TMD active defense operations conducted by Army forces are in response to immediate enemy air, missile, and surveillance threats. The Army's primary active DCA and TMD active defense force is ADA, which provides dedicated low-, medium-, and high-altitude air defense systems. ADA and the other combined arms forces integrate their fires to protect the force and geopolitical assets and ensure freedom to maneuver.
Army forces conduct air defense operations in two greatly different types of theaters. Both mature and contingency theaters require integrated Army air defense planning.
Alliance commitments and in-place multiservice forces are characteristic of mature theaters. The theater typically contains a large number of high-value, fixed assets and a well-known threat. Because of the threat, counterair and theater missile defense forces are typically in place during peacetime for threat deterrence and wartime readiness.
Counterair and theater missile defense activities in contingency theaters differ markedly from those in established theaters. The contingency theater lacks the sophisticated command and control, logistics infrastructure, and in-place forces of the mature theater. In most contingency theaters, the sophistication and quantity of threat weapon systems are generally less than that of a mature theater. However, without adequate air defense, force-projection forces in the initial stages of an operation are susceptible to catastrophic damage from even an unsophisticated enemy.
Ground forces deploying in a force-projection operation may have little air support in the early entry stage of the operation. They may have to depend on the air defense resources that deploy with the force. Force-projection operations are normally short-duration operations, but may transition to protracted war. In the initial stages of the force-projection operation, there will only be a few high-value assets. Counterair and theater missile defense forces must protect those assets to ensure the continued buildup and expansion of the lodgment area.
Air defense objectives are similar at each level of war. Army air defense commanders plan their operations to support accomplishment of the maneuver commander's strategic, operational, or tactical objectives by protecting their priority forces and assets from air and missile attack and surveillance.
At the theater strategic level, ADA protects forces or geopolitical and military assets of strategic significance. Such assets or forces are critical to the successful achievement of national objectives. Normally, the requirement to protect strategic assets will be established by the NCA. Strategic missions can be assigned to air defense units at every echelon of command. Strategic assets could include cities, economic facilities, and religious or cultural sites which must be protected in the host nation or other regional power. The protection of such assets may be a precondition for the introduction of US forces into the region, for basing privileges, or to the formation and maintenance of a friendly coalition. Other strategic assets could include production, processing, and transportation facilities for natural resources or other materials which are of vital interest to the United States.
Counterair and theater missile defense plans support the joint force commander's intent and concept of the operation. The JFC employs counterair and theater missile defense forces to achieve two primary operational objectives: gain control of the air environment and protect the force and selected assets. Control of the air environment may change with time and range from limited local air superiority in a specific part of the battlefield to air supremacy over the entire AO or theater. At the operational level, the Army contributes to the theater counterair operations and to theater missile defense. Army combined arms forces provide support for OCA, DCA, and TMD active defense and attack operations. ADA units conduct DCA and TMD active defense operations and help integrate contributions to CA and TMD by other members of the combined arms team. They protect priority forces and assets in the theater base according to the JFC's and JFLCC's counterair and theater missile defense priorities.
The objective of air defense operations at the tactical level is to protect corps and division forces as they plan and execute battles and engagements. ADA forces control the air environment over the corps and divisions, protect priority forces and assets from attack and surveillance, provide freedom to maneuver, and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles in the air. Every participant in Army air defense--ADA, maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence--has a role in achieving those objectives, as do the joint forces which support corps and division operations.
Air defense objectives at the tactical level are an extension of the operational-level objectives, but are more specific. Tactical-level air defense operations support the overall objectives of corps and divisions. The emphasis at the tactical level is on protecting the force rather than on gaining control of the air environment or protecting geopolitical assets. The following paragraphs delineate specific tactical objectives for ADA brigades and battalions.
The freedom of friendly forces to maneuver is a fundamental part of Army doctrine. An objective of air defense operations is to ensure that enemy air does not impede maneuver. To achieve this objective, ADA and other combined arms elements must provide integrated air defense for the force. ADA provides protection by synchronizing the fires and operations of ADA units with the fires and operations of combined arms units as well as with the joint and multinational forces. Protection of the force from deployment through redeployment is a key to successful force-projection operations.
On the fast-paced, modern battlefield, timely information is of paramount importance to get the right force to the right place at the right time. Friendly forces, including ADA, must rapidly collect, process, and disseminate information to permit combat units to operate in depth and maintain initiative, agility, and synchronization. The force's dependence on the prompt flow of information makes battle command centers prime targets for enemy air and missile operations. Therefore, the protection of battle command nodes is a key objective of air defense operations. Denial of RISTA data to the enemy is equally important. By cutting the link between enemy commanders and their eyes, ADA forces the enemy to operate in the blind, to be reactive to US operational initiatives, and to lose offensive potential. In short, denial of RISTA data increases the probability of success of friendly operations and saves lives.
The ADA commander has a number of different systems and task force organizations that can be employed. In each operation, the commander tailors the ADA force to match the factors of METT-T. ADA is deployed throughout the depth of the battlefield, but the ADA commander ensures that ADA is where it is needed and can make the biggest impact on operations. Taking advantage of the mobility of ADA systems, the commander employs the force at the critical time and place.
To sustain the battle and force's ability to maneuver, systems engaged in air defense operations must protect vital assets and forces which perform sustainment functions. These include lines of communications, fixed and mobile facilities, and organizations that support the force in deep, close, and rear operations. In the forward areas of the battlefield, ADA protects combat trains and refueling and rearming operations. Air defense of rear sustainment facilities concentrates on POL ammunition, and maintenance areas. Sustaining the battle also includes ensuring continuous employment of ADA and other Army air defense resources.
Air defense operations must be carried out according to the mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of the operation. Success on the battlefield depends upon the ability of air defense operations to prevent the air threat from returning and repeatedly jeopardizing friendly forces' freedom to maneuver. This prevents further destruction of friendly forces. Preventing air surveillance and losses to attack sustains friendly combat power. Killing threat aircraft and missiles destroys the enemy's ability to synchronize the combat power of coordinated air and land battle efforts. Killing enemy aircraft and missiles the first time sustains friendly combat power by denying aerial RISTA and preventing the destruction of friendly forces and assets. Successful air defense operations also destroy the enemy's will to fight early in the battle. The combination of enemy losses and effective passive measures erodes the enemy's expectation of successful air operations. Deterring enemy air surveillance or attacks or simply nullifying their effectiveness is not enough. Air defense operations must be so overmatching as to make the cost of air operations prohibitive to the enemy. Air defense operations must achieve this objective early while ADA forces still have the capability to rearm, reorganize, and reconstitute.
There will be tactical situations and operations in which commanders restrict weapon systems from engaging enemy air to conserve firepower, prevent fratricide, or support a deception. Such decisions are not arbitrary, but are a function of the assigned mission. However, killing enemy aircraft and missiles the first time remains a primary objective.
The commander of the highest echelon Army air defense command in the theater normally participates as the joint force land component commander's theater Army air defense coordinator (TAADCOORD). The TAADCOORD serves as the JFLCC's principal advisor and coordinator for theater counterair and theater missile defense operations. The highest echelon command in the theater may be a battalion, corps brigade, EAC brigade, or higher command, depending on the size of the theater of operations and the joint force.
Tactical-level air defense requires the integration of ADA units with other combined arms elements. As discussed in Chapter 1, tactical-level air defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA but maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must participate directly. Logistics provides the means for all air defense operations. Each participant has a specific role in tactical air defense plans and operations. These integrated roles are mutually supporting.
The JFC establishes campaign objectives, approves plans, establishes air defense and missile defense priorities, allocates forces, and apportions air power. He assigns overall responsibility for air defense to an area air defense commander, and for airspace control to an airspace control authority. The JFC normally commands his forces through component and functional commanders. See the Joint Force Commander's Air Defense Role illustration 6-1.
The JFLCC is responsible to the JFC for making recommendations on the proper employment of land forces, planning and conducting land operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. He commands land forces, including Army and Marine air defense forces; assigns missions; establishes air and missile defense priorities for forces assigned to the land component and plans and executes TMD, DCA, and OCA operations within his assigned AO. Depending on the threat, and on the composition of the joint force, the JFLCC (or one of his subordinate land force commanders), may also be assigned responsibilities as the airspace control authority and or area air defense commander.
The JFACC's responsibilities are assigned by the JFC. Normally these include planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of air assets based on the JFC's apportionment decision. The JFACC allocates air sorties to both offensive and defensive counterair, and TMD attack operations. The JFC usually assigns the JFACC responsibilities as both the airspace control authority and the area air defense commander.
The JFMCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish maritime missions and tasks assigned by the JFC. During the early part of force-projection operations, when the preponderance of air assets are provided by the naval forces, the JFMCC (or one of his subordinates) may be designated as the JFACC. He may also be assigned responsibilities as the area air defense commander and the airspace control authority.
The JFSOCC is responsible for planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the JFC. Special operations forces support OCA and TMD attack operations through reconnaissance and direct action operations.
The JFC assigns overall responsibility for theater-level defensive counterair and active defense TMD operations to a single commander. The AADC is normally the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capabilities and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. His responsibilities will be defined by the JFC. Normally, the AADC performs the following functions:
The ACA assumes overall responsibility of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. The ACA coordinates and integrates the use of the airspace control area. He develops airspace control procedures and policies, establishes the airspace control system, and coordinates and deconflicts airspace user requirements. The ACA develops the airspace control plan and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the area of operations. Normally, the same commander assigned responsibilities as the AADC will also serve as the ACA.
The TAADCOORD performs several functions. He is the Army air defense coordinator to the JFLCC, the JFACC, and the AADC. The TAADCOORD ensures that the Army is an integral part of joint counterair and active missile defense operations and planning at the theater level. The TAADCOORD, as a special staff officer to the JFLCC, participates in the J3 or DCSOPS planning cells and assists in developing Army OCA and DCA input to the air operations plan. He participates in the integration of Army TMD operations. The TAADCOORD also participates in the AADC's DCA planning as ADCOORD and Army AD representative to the JFACC. In addition, the TAADCOORD ensures that corps air and missile defense requirements are integrated into joint counterair and TMD planning.
As the commander of the highest echelon air defense command in the theater, the TAADCOORD also contributes the majority of the joint forces surface-to-air missile forces. He deploys resources in both the combat and communications zones and influences tactical operations by shifting the ADA force between these two areas, based on the concept of the operation.
Figure 6-1. Joint Force Commander's Air Defense Role.
Figure 6-2. TAADCOORD FUNCTIONS.
At each level, the ADA commander has two roles. He is both the commander of the ADA forces assigned to him, and the air defense coordinator to the commander of the maneuver unit he protects.
The ADA commander is the proponent for the air defense combat function at each echelon. The ADA commander has total responsibility for active air defense and missile planning, within the Army component, and possibly for the entire land force. These responsibilities include recommending air and missile defense missions for other members of the combined arms team, and integration with the AADC and other components. The ADA commander ensures that organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish AD objectives in support of the ground commander's concept of operations. The EAC and corps ADA brigade commanders, and divisional ADA battalion commanders develop counterair and theater missile defense plans for protection of their supported commander's air and missile defense priorities, and prepare the air defense and missile defense annexes to division and corps OPLANs and the JFLCC's operation plan.
Corps and divisional ADA units accomplish the majority of tactical air defense missions. The corps ADA brigade and the divisional ADA battalion, respectively, are the corps and division commanders' primary air defense resources. See the Brigade Commander's Functions illustration 6-3. The corps commander's requirement to provide air defense resources to forces is no different from the requirement to provide maneuver and fire support resources. The corps commander must ensure that forces at all levels have air defense and must reinforce those defenses when necessary. The corps commander's requirement to provide high- to medium-altitude ADA protection to divisions, with specific emphasis on supporting offensive operations, is particularly important. The division commanders, who have only low-altitude ADA weapon systems, require corps support for high-to medium-altitude air and missile defense and any additional low-altitude weapons needed for mission accomplishment.
As ADCOORD, the ADA commander and representatives in the corps or division CP are responsible for planning air and missile defense operations to support the force commander's concept of the operation. The ADCOORD is an integral member of the maneuver commander's staff planning team. To develop TMD, OCA, and DCA priorities for recommendation, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, assesses the air and missile threat and the commander's intent. The ADCOORD assists the FSCOORD to integrate OCA and TMD attack operations priorities into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD recommends active, passive, and other combined arms air and missile defense measures in the air defense estimate. After staff coordination and approval of the air defense estimate, the ADCOORD develops the air defense annex to the operation plan. Appendix B provides a more detailed description of the air defense estimate and annex.
The ADCOORD also coordinates with ADA elements at higher and lower echelons, as well as with adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal integration of air defense coverage throughout the battlefield. For example, the corps ADCOORD integrates corps ADA with theater, division, and adjacent corps ADA forces. In contingency operations, this may include integration with joint counterair and TMD participants. The division ADCOORD ensures the air defense plan interfaces with the corps and adjacent division air defense plans.
The maneuver commander at any echelon may appoint a TMD coordinator to focus the force's TMD planning and integration functions. The TMD coordinator may be the ADCOORD or another staff officer or commander. When the commander appoints a separate TMD coordinator, the ADCOORD actively participates in TMD planning, and closely coordinates ADA contributions to the overall TMD effort. If a TMD coordinator is not appointed, the ADCOORD assumes responsibility for TMD planning and integration.
Infantry and armor forces with an air defense capability increase the density and effectiveness of air defense across the battlefield. However, the optimum role for these forces is ground combat. The maneuver commander must carefully consider the benefits of combined arms air defense contributions versus the decrease in ground combat effectiveness. Combined arms elements can provide vital self-protection from air threats and contribute to their freedom to maneuver. Although they have a limited capability to engage fixed-wing aircraft, missiles, and UAVs, combined arms members can effectively engage hovering or slow-moving helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. lank main guns, IFVs, antitank weapons, and other direct-fire systems must engage these enemy air platforms when possible. The force commander can assign combined arms resources to protect critical areas or assets from air attack. The ADCOORD recommends to the ground force commander the use of other combat arms in an air defense role. The ADCOORD bases the recommendation on a careful target value analysis and estimate of the air threat.
Fire support enhances tactical-level air defense. Indirect fire weapons can deny enemy helicopters the use of masked, standoff positions. Fire support systems can concentrate their fires on enemy landing zones, pickup zones, launch sites, command and control, assembly areas, and FARPs. Surface-to-surface fire coordination for OCA operations takes place through normal fire support channels. Fire support elements coordinate targets for attack by air forces supporting corps and division operations.
The ADCOORD works closely with the FSCOORD, G3, and G2 to recommend prioritized OCA and TMD targets. The threat's ability to disrupt friendly operations dictates target priority. The ADCOORD makes target recommendations, weighing them against other requirements of the commander's plan competing for the same fire support. Many OCA and TMD targets fall into the category of deep targets. Therefore, long-range fire support assets are the optimal means to attack them.
Army aviation contributes to air defense and joint counterair activities through air combat operations. Air combat provides aviation self-defense, combined arms maneuver forces protection, and air defense forces augmentation. Air combat operations support the force commander's overall concept of operations. The maneuver commander's decision to use aviation in other than a self-protection, air combat role must be weighed against its primary antiarmor mission. Air combat operations are planned to support the ground tactical plan and can be either offensive or defensive.
Aviation can conduct attacks against OCA and TMD targets that cannot be effectively engaged by indirect fire systems. Army aviation also participates in air assault operations against OCA and TMD targets. The force commander plans air security and SEAD missions to support Army aviation deep strike OCA and TMD operations.
Army aviation participates in DCA operations primarily by attacking aerial targets of opportunity and by engaging enemy air targets in self-defense. However, the force commander may give Army aviation forces the mission to screen the force against RISTA UAVs. Other DCA operations conducted by Army aviation occur in response to specific air threats. Army aviation DCA goals are to provide self-defense and augment the ground air defense capability of the combined arms team. Air cavalry squadrons and attack helicopter battalions can fill gaps in the force's air defense when ADA units are redistributing assets and adjusting forces. Helicopters in an air combat role also can provide air defense during screening missions. Early warning provided by screening or attack aviation assets must be integrated into ADA early warning and vice versa.
Coordination between the aviation and ADA commanders is particularly important, as aviation forces must operate in the airspace within the ADA engagement coverage. Prevention of fratricide is a major element of force protection. Identification of on-order air defense missions for aviation occurs during the formulation of the commander's plan. The plan includes command relationships and detailed control measures for the employment of aviation in an air defense role.
Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets contribute to OCA, DCA, and TMD operations. Coordination for the use of IEW systems, including joint assets, against OCA and TMD targets is similar to coordination for fire support and involves the G3, G2, FSCOORD, and ADCOORD. IEW supports air defense through electronic attack and electronic warfare support on air targets. Careful planning and execution of electronic warfare complements surface-to-air fires. IEW can also provide for surveillance, identification, and classification of hostile air targets aiding ADA greatly through early warning.
Following the identification of all PIR and IR during the planning phase, the ADCOORD coordinates with the G2 or S2 to ensure air defense requirements are met. The G2's collection manager then ensures specific orders and requests fully support those requirements. The collection manager also synchronizes collection and reporting to deliver relevant information on time. This process involves the prioritization of scarce resources to meet many IRs. A request for intelligence information is generated when organic assets cannot satisfy an IR. The focus of tactical intelligence could include forward operating bases, FARPs, missile and UAV launch systems, electronic warfare systems, logistics facilities, and C2 nodes. The interface between the ADCOORD and G2 or S2 is essential for many reasons including a coordinated and accurate evaluation of threat air and missile capabilities.
Every participant on the battlefield must be capable of firing in self-defense at enemy attack or surveillance aircraft. Small arms and crew-served weapons fire against rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles provides a significant terminal defense. Guns, by their very nature, provide both real and virtual attrition. Combined arms for air defense (CAFAD) is an essential element in this attrition. Individual and crew-served weapons can mass their fires against air threats. The massed use of guns in local air defense causes enemy air to increase their standoff range for surveillance and weapons delivery and increase altitude in transiting to and from targets. These reactions make enemy air more vulnerable to ADA. CAFAD training and tactical SOPs enable units to effectively prepare for self-defense against air attack.
Figure 6-3. BRIGADE COMMANDER'S FUNCTIONS
Joint operations planning is performed according to policies and procedures established in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES supports and integrates joint operations planning activities at the national, theater, and supporting command levels. It interrelates with three other national systems--the National Security Council System; the Joint Strategic Planning System; and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. JOPES is the principal system for translating policy decisions into operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. It is a dynamic system currently evolving through incremental integration and enhancement. JOPES consists of both operational and supporting functions. See Figure 6-4., Jopes Operational And Supporting Tasks.
JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework within which joint military planning and execution occurs. The operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order.
This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decision makers, and then determining capabilities and intentions.
This function furnishes direction from the national level for developing courses of action and assists the NCA and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in formulating suitable and feasible options to counter the threat.
This function helps the CINC's staff develop and test alternative COAs based upon NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the CINC's strategic concept in deliberate planning or the commander's estimate in crisis action planning (CAP).
This function supports rapid preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. Detailed planning results in a CJCS-approved OPLAN or a National Command Authority-approved OPORD.
This function gives decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage events during execution. Implementation begins with the CJCS execution order and usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as termination or redirection of operations.
The supporting functions relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each.
This function makes current and accurate information concerning friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources available to users.
This function includes automated techniques that support each of the other JOPES functions.
Theater-strategic planning during peacetime provides the framework for the wartime employment of forces. Theater commanders or CINCs through their planning staffs develop a variety of peacetime assessments and contingency plans that ease transition to a crisis or war. Peacetime intelligence and logistics assessments are essential for rapid transition to force-projection operations.
In time of conflict or war, planners develop strategic end states tailored to the particular situation. The combatant commander modifies existing strategic and contingency plans and alters portions of the theater strategy using crisis-action planning. The theater strategy is written in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources. It provides guidance for a broad range of activities throughout the AO.
The theater commander and staff conduct theater-strategic planning using the JOPES. The assigned planning requirements are formulated into a family of OPLANs to meet strategic and contingency requirements in the theater. The JFLCC develops the supporting plan as part of the family of plans. The theater commander's OPLAN is a theater campaign plan which integrates air, land, and naval operations to accomplish a common objective. All theater OPLANs are designed to achieve strategic goals. The theater commander uses operational art in theater design to influence the strategic intent found in both the theater strategy and campaign plan.
The focus of air and missile defense planning at the operational level is on protection of forces and assets in the theater base and joint rear area. The JFLCC develops air and missile defense priorities, which include the JFC's priorities, and tasks his subordinate commanders to protect those priorities. He allocates ADA units to EAC ADA brigades and to the corps based upon his air and missile defense priorities, and the concept of operations for land operations. While planning for air and missile defense of his AO, the JFLCC also considers the contributions of the AADC and other components to protection of force from air and missile attack.
In the JFLCC's air and missile defense plan, the EAC ADA brigades may be tasked to protect theater assets such as airbases, logistics facilities, seaports, and geopolitical assets, as well as maneuver forces in assembly areas. Corps commanders may also be tasked to protect theater assets located in the corps area using corps ADA forces.
Air defense planning at the operational level is an iterative process. The same type of process would occur if the USN or USMC were providing the majority of the air assets.
The AADC develops the air defense concept for the theater. The JFLCC's staff (J3 or DCSOPS, with input from the TAADCOORD, the fire support element, and Army airspace command and control cell) recommends Army CA priorities, TMD priorities, and resource allocation to support the JFC's air defense concept. The JFLCC, through the BCE, provides an air defense estimate to the AADC. With JFC's guidance, the JFACC in coordination with the JFLCC, develops the air operations plan.
The AADC develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates air assets for various missions. The JFLCC's TAADCOORD determines whether the corps has sufficient air and missile defense resources or if the JFLCC should allocate additional theater Army air and missile defense assets for protection of the corps. The TAADCOORD recommends which assets Army ADA units can protect and which assets require Air Force or Navy coverage. The TAADCOORD integrates ADA units into the AADC's DCA planning process.
The plan enables the JFLCC to finalize the air and missile defense and fire support portions of the land operation plan. The JFLCC prioritizes the allocated CAS in coordination with fire support plans. The JFLCC's priorities are the foundation for interdiction targeting. The JFLCC's TAADCOORD develops the air and missile defense portion of the land operation plan.
The JFLCC allocates resourcing and assigns tasks to corps which can suballocate assets and assign air and missile defense missions to divisions. In each corps and division main CP, the G3 plans section develops the maneuver plan. Within the G3 plans section, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, A2C2 cell, and FSE, incorporates the air defense mission into this maneuver plan.
The ADCOORD, in conjunction with the G2, develops and recommends OCA and TMD targeting priorities, nominates OCA and TMD targets and TAIs to the FSCOORD, and develops and recommends AD and TMD priorities to the commander for approval. The air liaison officer participates in this process by recommending SEAD targets to the FSCOORD. See the Development of Air Defense and Fire Support Annexes illustration 6-5.
The FSCOORD and the ADCOORD incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support and air defense annexes of the maneuver plan. The FSCOORD integrates OCA and TMD targets, targeting priorities, and TAIs into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD includes the DCA and TMD active defense priorities and associated IPB products in the development and coordination of the force's air defense operation.
Coordination between ADCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the OCA, DCA, and TMD portions of the air defense effort are complementary. The integration and synchronization of OCA and TMD attack operations by the ADCOORD and FSCOORD prevents mutual interference and maximizes unity and economy of effort.
The coordination of OCA and TMD targets between the Army and the Air Force occurs at the AOC and the CRC. OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are developed simultaneously and in concert, not as separate, isolated plans.
The OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are integral to the theater campaign plan and to the maneuver plan at each Army echelon.
Operational-level, counterair and TMD planning requires careful selection and prioritization of OCA and TMD targets. Effective planning enables each level to "decide-detect-deliver-assess" and accelerates the engagement of targets during combat. OCA and TMD attack operation plans should consider the use of all available assets including aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, UAVs, SOF, and EW. The ADCOORD is a member of division and corps targeting boards and is represented in the Deep Operations Coordination Cell. He recommends OCA and TMD targets as fire support priorities and contributes to fire support planning. In addition, ADA contributes to TMD and OCA target location and identification through surveillance and back plotting launch locations.
The force commander at each tactical echelon establishes OCA and TMD priorities in support of the concept. OCA and TMD targets are generally beyond the FLOT and include the following:
Integration and prioritization permit Army ADA units the flexibility to support the commander's concept of the operation. The AADC integrates low-, medium-, and high-altitude air defense systems with airborne counterair resources to make the defense effective.
Combat air patrols consist of aircraft designated to intercept and destroy hostile aircraft over a critical area or force. The AADC, with JFACC, JFLCC, and TAADCOORD input, incorporates combat air patrols into DCA plans. Most Army DCA, and all Army TMD, active defense tasks are assigned to ADA units. Army ADA units will be positioned tactically by the appropriate ground force commander. Because of their limited numbers, ADA resources are allocated based on specific air and missile defense priorities. In the air and missile defense plan, EAC ADA brigades may protect maneuver forces and other theater assets. Corps commanders may be tasked in the theater campaign plan to protect theater assets in the corps area using corps ADA forces. ADA commanders design defenses to protect designated priorities. The air defense employment principles and guidelines in Chapter 5 form the basis for the design of these defenses.
Passive measures are an essential part of air and missile defense planning at all levels. All units conduct passive actions in conjunction with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air threat. Conducting passive operations is an implied task critical to the survival of every unit.
At all levels, the ADCOORD evaluates and recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver commander's plans and SOPs. ADCOORDs recommend measures which may deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air and surveillance assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at night, developing an early warning system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing emissions control (EMCON) procedures.
Figure 6-5. DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DEFENSE AND FIRE SUPPORT ANNEXES
In most theaters, the majority of air defense coordination of interest to ADA occurs between the AADC and the JFLCC. The JFLCC integrates Army capabilities into joint air and missile defense efforts through close coordination with the AADC. This coordination is accomplished by the BCE (see the Battlefield Coordination Element illustration 6-6) which collocates part of its staff with the AADC's operations center. If the AADC is from the USAF or USN, he plans and conducts operations from the air operations center. If the AADC is from the USMC, the tactical air command center conducts the joint air defense activities. Each component provides a liaison representative to the AADC. The representatives function as the necessary interface among the service component headquarters.
The BCE is the JFLCC's representation in the USAF AOC. The JFLCC will establish a similar liaison arrangement if the JFACC is from the USN or USMC. The JFLCC organizes the BCE based on the type of theater and the AOC organization. In force-projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCE. The BCE provides JFLCC input into the air operations planning process. Army air defense contributions are planned and coordinated through EAC ADA brigade, corps, and division CPs. Refer to FM 100-103 for a more detailed discussion of the BCE and the control and reporting center.
Successful execution of air defense results from a well-organized air defense plan. The process is continuous.
METT-T is the driving force behind all ADA planning. The type of theater and operation provide the framework for METT-T analysis.
METT-T in mature theaters. The type of theater can affect our ability to collect intelligence and targeting information on the enemy. It also has effects on the deployment of friendly forces and the development timeline. The sophistication, lethality, and numerical strength of the threat in the mature theater are generally greater than those in contingency theaters. Pre-positioned in a mature theater is a vast array of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, linked by an extensive battle command system. Depending on their location and echelon, these forces possess a wide variation in mobility and hardness. The threat in a mature theater leaves little time for reaction. The rapid tempo of operations becomes the key factor in the analysis of time.
Figure 6-6. THE BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION ELEMENT
METT-T in contingency theaters. Contingency theaters may have no pre-positioned forces. Contingency operations are generally of a smaller scale than those in a mature theater. In contingency theaters, time is critical to the deployment and buildup of the forces. The time required to deploy, establish, and expand a lodgment affects the ability of the force to conduct operations.
METT-T in close, deep, and rear operations. METT-T analysis is the foundation for ADA planning at the tactical level. This analysis is a function of position on the modern battlefield. The conduct of the analysis focuses on the type of operation to be conducted, the air threat expected, and the focus of the air threat.
Close operations involve highly mobile, armored forces that are extremely vulnerable to detection because of their proximity to the enemy. The primary air threat in this area is rotary-wing aircraft. ADA support of close operations focuses on the protection of the maneuver force by destroying enemy attack helicopters, UAVs, and CAS aircraft which penetrate the joint counterair force. Highly mobile and hardened systems best accomplish this mission.
Deep operations allow the force commander to shape the battlefield for future close operations. ADA planning for deep operations will be similar to that conducted for close operations. ADA forces are integrated into maneuver forces conducting deep operations and protect deep strike fire support assets. Highly mobile and hardened assets with a self-sustaining capability will best accomplish this mission. A proper mix of systems provides air defense coverage at all altitudes and allows the force conducting deep operations the maximum freedom to maneuver.
The rear area air threat is predominantly UAVs, fixed-wing aircraft, and theater missiles with missions to destroy soft, immobile, high-value targets. These assets, which include aviation, C2, deep strike artillery, and logistics are critical to corps and division operations. ADA planners deploy systems in rear areas which are less mobile, but have greater ranges to allow for early and multiple engagements.
The objective of ADA planning is to establish low- to high-altitude air defense coverage of the maneuver commander's air defense priorities. The ADA commander must ensure horizontal and vertical integration throughout the operational area. ADA operations require synchronization with the supported force and coordination with higher and lower ADA echelons and adjacent ADA units. This often includes the integration of Army ADA plans with joint counterair and TMD operations. METT-T influences integrated air defense planning from theater through battalion level and reinforces the synchronization process.
The corps and division commanders approve a scheme of maneuver developed by their staffs. The approved scheme of maneuver is normally one of several maneuver courses of action. Analysis of METT-T, IPB, and the commander's intent forms the foundation for the maneuver concept. The commander's intent is provided as general guidance and direction to the staff on how to accomplish the mission. IPB includes the evaluation of both the ground and air threat. ADA and maneuver planning incorporate possible enemy courses of action. Appendix A describes the development of air IPB in greater detail.
The ADCOORD develops an estimate which includes air defense coverage for each maneuver course of action. (See Appendix B.)
Figure 6-7. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PLANNING
The ADA commander considers METT-T, IPB, and the supported commander's intent and concept of operations as he develops AD priorities. Priorities are based on the factors of criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and the threat as explained in Chapter 4. The ADA commander recommends these priorities to the maneuver commander for approval.
The purpose of the ADA concept of operations is to maximize protection of the force. The ADA commander assesses the factors of METT-T, the force commander's intent, the IPB, and the approved air and missile defense priorities to determine the numbers and types of air defense resources necessary to protect those priorities. To design that defense, the commander must apply the air defense employment principles and guidelines, and the technical considerations of these resources (see Chapter 4). The ADA concept of operations is the basis of the air defense plan and is synchronized with the higher and adjacent AD plans (see the accompanying illustration 6-7). Major considerations that impact on the development of the ADA concept of operations are theater characteristics, the type of operation (close, deep, and rear), and passive air defense measures available to the force.
The ADA concept of operation, by integrating active and passive air defense into all operations, not only protects the force but also makes the enemy doubt his ability to conduct successful air operations. The concept of operation outlines the best mix, mass, mobility, and integration of ADA assets required to accomplish each task.
Characteristics of mature theaters. In mature theaters, forces require all-altitude protection from enemy surveillance and attacks. Forces in the mature theater are not homogeneous. At the division level, forces tend to be highly mobile and hardened. Their mission requires a maneuver orientation and highly mobile air defense forces. Divisional forces are particularly vulnerable during offensive missions such as deep operations beyond the FLOT. In cross-FLOT operations, enemy air defense may preclude friendly CAP support. Therefore, the forward-deployed ground forces in the division must depend primarily on ADA. To support the division during offensive missions, the corps commander may reinforce the divisional ADA battalion with high- to medium-altitude systems and, possibly, additional low-altitude systems.
Characteristics of contingency theaters. Contingency theaters require air defense for each stage of the operation. During the predeployment activities, analysis of the air threat identifies the air defense requirements. In the deployment stage, ADA systems require lift to the area of operations to provide early air defense protection of the PODs, LOCs, and lodgment area. ADA systems must deploy rapidly and in sufficient numbers to defeat the threat. During the entry stage, ADA counters enemy RISTA and air and missile attack operations. Long-range DCA is normally the responsibility of Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force air assets, but ADA provides the only protection against TMs, UAVs, and helicopters. This multiservice air defense requires integration of the ADA concept of operations into the joint counterair and TMD plans.
During expansion of the lodgment, ADA must accompany the force, particularly in regions where large distances are traversed in a short period of time. ADA systems must be highly mobile to provide the force the low- and medium-altitude protection required during rapid movement. Counter-RISTA remains an imperative. Employment of additional ADA strengthens the air defenses at the lodgment area and the logistics base.
During the operations stage, ADA shifts emphasis from counter-RISTA to force protection. The operation either terminates successfully or escalates into operations similar to those of an established theater. If escalation occurs, additional ADA must deploy and integrate with the ADA resources previously deployed to sustain air defense operations.
Considerations in close, deep, and rear operations. Whether supporting close, deep, or rear operations, the ADA commander at all levels develops and refines the ADA concept of operations to achieve the objectives of all tactical-level air defense. The ADA commander's objective is to provide the force with sustained, low- to high-altitude air defense of priority forces and assets throughout the battlefield. When developing the concept of operations, the ADA commander considers the specific characteristics of the operation and the approved air and missile defense priorities. The commander also assesses the potential contributions of joint counterair, TMD, and non-ADA Army resources. After considering the individual and combined air defense capabilities of all available resources, the ADA commander effects the necessary coordination to integrate and synchronize their contributions with the supported force's concept of operations.
The focus of the ADA concept of operations in close operations is the protection of maneuver forces and reserves. ADA protection is weighted toward the main effort. In close operations, ADA and other members of the combined arms team focus their air defense efforts on defeating enemy attack helicopters and UAVs while retaining the tactical flexibility to destroy attacking fixed-wing aircraft. The combination of ADA and combined arms fires significantly increases friendly force effectiveness. As a result of this synergistic effect, the force kills more enemy air, loses fewer systems, and gains greater freedom to maneuver.
In deep operations, ADA must maneuver with the force to provide low-altitude protective fires. Overwatching ADA fires may come from supporting longer range ADA resources. As in close operations, maneuver elements may also engage air threats with their organic weapons systems. The ADA commander must integrate supporting Air Force and Army aviation fires whenever possible. Air defense assets may consist of only FAAD systems and attack helicopters which the commander can employ rapidly against enemy air throughout the depth of operations. If enemy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are expected, then mobile ADA assets that can counter this mixed enemy threat are crucial to the deep operation.
Rear area air and missile defense includes operations by both forward area and high- to medium- altitude air defense throughout the battlefield. The size of the area, however, requires the weighting of air defense resources around those facilities and assets that the commander determines are most critical to the concept of operation. HIMAD forces protect priority forces and assets from attack by TMs and fixed-wing aircraft. Forward-area ADA is added to the highest priority forces and assets to screen against RISTA attempts, destroy cruise missiles or attacking fixed-wing aircraft, and to provide a mix of weapons systems. Major ports, railheads, airfields, assembly areas, and storage areas are assets normally requiring dedicated FAAD protection. CAFAD employment is also a means of air defense protection in the rear where air defense systems are not available. In these areas, smoke screens can reduce the vulnerability of rear area facilities and might even be used for LZ and PZ denial.
Passive air defense measures. Passive air defense actions reduce the effectiveness of the air threat. The extent of an asset's passive air defense efforts directly impacts on the vulnerability of that asset. Regardless of the type of theater or area of the battlefield, the ADA concept of operations always includes passive air defense measures. Based on the force commander's air defense priorities, not all assets will receive dedicated ADA forces for protection. However, most assets will receive a degree of air defense protection from coverages provided by higher echelon and adjacent ADA units. To enhance the protection available from these air defense coverages, all elements must plan and employ passive air defense measures. Integrated active and passive air defense makes the air threat expend maximum resources with a minimum of success. Based on the threat and scheme of maneuver, assets may need support to enhance their passive air defense posture. All members of the combined arms team must integrate the support requirements for passive air defense into the prioritization of tasks for their forces.
As an example, the threat's air plan may allocate a specific number of air assets to locate and attack battle command assets. The vulnerability of a specific friendly battle command asset depends on the extent of signature reduction, concealment, hardening, and deception employed. Signature reduction makes the battle command asset difficult to locate and less subject to attack. Engineer units can increase the hardness of the battle command asset by constructing field fortifications. Even if the battle command asset is attacked, the site is less vulnerable. Establishing a decoy may result in enemy air threats attacking the wrong location.
Based on the concept of operations, the ADA commander structures ADA forces unit by unit. The commander considers the status of unit leadership, personnel, equipment, experience, and training to determine the best ADA task organization. In determining task organization, the commander selects the appropriate command or support relationship for each unit.
Four factors for assigning command or support relationships are battle command, unity of command, survivability, and sustainability. The appropriate command or support relationship provides ADA commanders at each echelon the flexibility and authority to vertically and horizontally synchronize their forces. When determining command or support relationships, the ADA commander retains a unified internal chain of command. When considering the factor of survivability, the ADA commander analyzes the degree of risk to the ADA unit versus mission accomplishment. The final factor in determining the command or support relationship is sustainability of the ADA force. The commander must ensure each unit will receive all required logistical support. Failure to consider these four factors when assigning a unit's command or support relationship will degrade the integrated air defense coverage of the force and threaten freedom to maneuver. The finalized ADA plan integrates task organization and command or support relationships with the ADA concept of operations.
Concepts and operational requirements for national missile defense are in the development stage. Therefore, the information in this section is subject to change.
The basic national security objective is to preserve the US as a free nation with fundamental institutions and values intact. The broad mission statement of national missile defense is to deter nuclear attack on the US and its forces, discourage the use of nuclear weapons in any war, and should deterrence fail, defeat strategic ballistic missile attacks against the US. This mission directly supports the basic national security objectives.
The principle of centralized command with decentralized execution is applicable to national missile defense. The battle management strategy is to totally negate all reentry vehicles with predicted impact points in the US. If the threat exceeds system engagement capabilities, an adaptive flexible defense strategy will be used to protect the maximum number of prioritized civilian and military assets. This strategy will be predetermined by the NCA. Priorities may be changed during an attack.
Commander in Chief, United States Space Command (USCINCSPACE)/Commander, US Element NORAD (CDRUSELM-NORAD) will exercise combatant command of all forces. Upon receipt of mission and engagement authority, Commander, Army Space Command (COMARSPACE) will conduct the real-time warfighting execution. Due to the time-critical nature of the mission during crisis and wartime, USCINCSPACE/CINCNORAD mission selection and engagement commands will be passed directly to the ADA battalion. For the initial national missile defense operations, COMARSPACE will delegate warfighting execution authority to the ADA battalion commander. COMARSPACE will continue to assess the performance of the battalion and make recommendations to USCINCSPACE/CINCNORAD on the employment of this force.
The ADA battalion commander will conduct the real-time warfighting execution of the initial national missile defense system. For the objective, multisite system, COMARSPACE will retain the real-time warfighting execution responsibilities. Then the ADA battalion commander would implement COMARSPACE's real-time warfighting commands.
A national missile defense system will be deployed in an incremental manner. Initially, it will provide limited capabilities for ballistic missile defense and culminate in a system that will meet the total operational requirements. Deployment will be sequenced such that it takes maximum advantage of system element availability as the elements are deployed. System deployment sequencing will be based upon the threat, technology, and funding.
Command and control elements and battle management/command, control, and communications components will be deployed prior to weapons elements, and prior to or in conjunction with the deployment of the sensor elements. This sequencing will provide the capability to control forces as they are fielded.
Surveillance elements will be deployed to enhance the existing integrated system capability to detect ICBM and SLBM launches. The initial deployment of sensor elements with their increased accuracy and timeliness builds confidence in the sensor suite's ability to detect and report ballistic missile launches prior to the deployment of the weapon elements.
Weapon elements will be deployed incrementally subsequent to the initial deployment of control facilities and surveillance elements. This incremental approach ensures confidence in an in-place, operationally proven command and control system and reliable sensor suite prior to the weapon element deployment.
TMD encompasses all measures taken to defeat, destroy, or neutralize enemy missiles employed against friendly forces and assets. See the Air and Missile Defense Enclave (Task Force) illustration 6-8. TMD is a coordinated joint services effort, with the Army's contribution being the focus of this section.
Due to the political and military aspects of the threat, TMD objectives are often strategic in nature. These include deployment for operations other than war as explained in Chapter 8 and defense of geopolitical assets. Defense of early entry forces and lodgments can also be strategic objectives since US forces are extremely vulnerable during these stages and US political support for operations must be kept at the highest levels possible.
The combination of the theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems constitutes the Army's active defense against TBMs. In addition, FAAD, Hawk, and Patriot all participate in TMD counter-RISTA and counter-CM operations. To accomplish the TMD mission, the defense must provide protection for key military assets and forces during deployment, entry, operations, and postconflict operations. In addition, the protection of selected geopolitical assets stabilizes the theater, prevents threat intimidation of allies or coalition members, and may provide for a measure of deterrence by demonstrating national resolve.
Effective employment of these defensive weapon systems must accommodate trends in force structure, advances in technology, and increases in threat capabilities. The limited number of ADA resources mandate prioritized defense of critical theater assets. Effective employment demands decentralized engagement operations to successfully counter the high-threat velocities and extremely short engagement time lines anticipated on the battlefield.
The force structure objective is to provide sufficient ADA assets to support two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Two THAAD battalions are expected to be resourced. Prior to final fielding of the units, user operational evaluation system prototypes will be available for emergency deployments. Nine Patriot battalions constitute the assets available for deployment. In the long term, the corps SAM system will also be part of the TMD team. Additionally, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force all have plans or programs to participate in active missile defense.
The THAAD and Patriot systems, possibly augmented by Aegis cruisers or destroyers in the littoral, will provide a two-tiered defense for selected high-value theater assets (military and geopolitical). The two tiers will provide near-leak-proof defense for high-value assets, deny the enemy a preferred attack option, and support the theater and corps campaigns and battles. THAAD will provide the upper tier defense against medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. Patriot and Aegis cruisers/destroyers if available, will provide the lower tier defense primarily against short-range ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles and air-to-surface missiles. Patriot will also engage the air-breathing threat which penetrates the joint defenses.
Figure 6-8. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ENCLAVE (TASK FORCE)
An air and missile defense enclave (task force) consisting of one Patriot battalion and one or more THAAD batteries should be deployed to provide force protection against air and missile attack. The task force composition may vary depending on the factors of METT-T. If the task force must protect priority forces and assets in the littoral, Aegis cruisers/destroyers may contribute lower-tier protection as a part of the enclave. Aegis capable ships may be particularly important for active defense during entry operations involving amphibious assault or port operations. Once the lodgment is established, THAAD and or Patriot units should be deployed ashore quickly to establish a fully capable air and missile defense enclave (task force). The assault elements of the task force will include a TOC, a mix of THAAD and Patriot batteries based on METT-T and lift available, and supporting communications elements. Follow-on elements will be deployed as lift becomes available. Task forces will move or reposition as required by the campaign plan and the commander's priorities.
ADA brigades may be deployed as the situation requires to exercise command over one or more task forces or battalions. The brigade commander task-organizes the task force and focuses on allocation and constitution or reconstitution of resources to provide optimum defenses and signal support for multiple defenses. The brigade will also provide personnel and logistics support, distribute essential information, establish required data link interfaces with higher headquarters, and provide requisite ADCOORD and liaison personnel.
Defense planning is critical to coordinated execution of the two-tiered defense. The overall defense will be centrally planned and coordinated by the task force TOC. Defense planning consists of two subfunctions--defense design and defense organization. Defense planning software will be resident in all battle command facilities regardless of echelon. This will allow a battery to perform defense planning in the event the TF TOC is unavailable.
Defense design will consider METT-T as well as system operational characteristics, enemy attack options, and enemy order of battle. Using the IPB and the force commander's concept of the operation and mission priorities, the TF commander will develop options for positioning ADA assets and will evaluate the defense design effectiveness using the software resident in the TOC.
Defense organization will produce the detailed plan for implementing the chosen defense options including the parameters for the initialization of weapon and surveillance system operational software. The outputs of the defense organization function will include firing doctrine, parameters, and thresholds that will classify, identify, and prioritize targets and control, and optimize the coordinated upper and lower tier missile engagements.
Defense planning is centralized, but engagement operations against missiles are decentralized to battery level. The Patriot battalion commander will normally be the task force commander, and the Patriot staff will perform the required battalion-level functions.
The brigade, task force, and battery will contain the facilities and equipment for the conduct of battle command. Command posts will be modular and reconfigurable by software or the addition of software and hardware modules. These command posts will be identical, interchangeable, and reconfigurable to ensure full redundancy of critical EO and FO functions.
When conducting active defense operations, task force elements operate under the rules of engagement and weapon control procedures promulgated by the AADC. The types of controls and procedures appropriate for the airbreathing threat will not apply to the active missile defense battle. There is, for example, no identification or weapon control decision required when tracking an incoming ballistic target with a predicted impact point on or near a defended asset.
The task force will normally receive early warning information directly from national, theater, and joint task force intelligence and sensor systems. The task force will send surveillance data, launch point, and engagement status to higher echelons. THAAD surveillance data will be used by the task force FDC to alert and cue Patriot batteries as appropriate.
THAAD and Patriot will employ redundant means to achieve reliable data and voice communications. Internal EO data will be passed on joint tactical information data system and tactical data information networks while the area common user system will be used for EO voice. It will also be the primary means for both FO data and voice. External communications will be primarily obtained using the area common user system for EO and FO voice and data. The commander's tactical terminal-hybrid will provide the means to participate in theater intelligence networks.
Execution is the final and most critical stage of the decision-making process. Because of the importance of this stage, commanders and staffs must actively supervise the synchronized execution of the plan. During the operation, friendly ADA must have the flexibility to respond to changes in METT-T. The ability to perform the battlefield tasks provides flexibility to execute the plan and to continuously provide ADA coverage to the force.
All combatants on the battlefield go through the same steps to deliver fire on a target. Every shooter must detect, acquire, identify, and engage targets to destroy them.
ADA systems must discern the presence of an enemy air element which is or may become a threat, or the presence of facilities critical to the support of that enemy air element. Early detection demands continuous surveillance of the battlefield.
ADA systems must obtain data defining the position of the enemy air element. The data must be sufficiently accurate to provide targeting information.
ADA systems must determine if a potential target is friendly or hostile and support target prioritization. Ideally, the identification process would discriminate between real targets and decoys, and even identify the type of enemy unit or element.
Participants in air defense, having detected, acquired, and identified enemy targets, must prioritize them for engagement and destruction. ADA systems must have the capability to attack enemy targets with ordnance or electronic countermeasures.
The immediate goal of every air defense operation must be the destruction of enemy targets. If the target's destruction is not posible, the destruction is not possible, the operation must, as a minimum, prevent the enemy target from fulfilling its mission.
Tactical-level ADA units must have mobility equal to the mobility of the supported force. Movement ensures that tactical-level ADA forces can project their operation into any area required by the maneuver force or indicated by the threat. The ability to move also signifies that ADA weapons systems are not tied to a static support base.
The tactical-level ADA commander at each echelon must make the most effective use of the limited communications and intelligence assets available. The commander does this by integrating the tactical ADA battle command system into that of the maneuver force. Tactical ADA battle command must provide the means for collecting, processing, and disseminating information to conduct a continuous air battle. The communications system also provides the means by which the ADA commander conveys decisions and directives to subordinate units across the battlefield.
Communications systems interface tactical-level ADA units with higher, lower, adjacent, and joint headquarters. These link the detection, acquisition, identification, and destruction or disruption tasks at all echelons. In this manner, communications and intelligence systems enhance integration, decision making, maneuver, and target engagement for ADA operations. The type of theater, location on the battlefield, and the concept of operations determine communications requirements. The total integration of air defense operations in support of close, deep, and rear operations requires timely battle command capable of rapidly collecting critical information and distributing it in concise, usable form to leaders, planners, and weapons systems.
As warfare's intensity and complexity increase, so does the importance of logistics and trained manpower. Sustainment is vital to ADA operations. To meet the challenges of sustainment, ADA commanders require well-thought-out plans. ADA units require a streamlined logistics system. The system must provide continuous support over extended distances. Durable, reliable, and easily maintained weapons must complement the system. ADA commanders must anticipate the sustainment requirements for future operations and integrate those requirements with the corps or division sustainment plan. Sustainment must be continuous throughout the battlefield. Logistics must be responsive and provide quick reaction to ADA demands to maintain combat effectiveness. Should the sustainment operation fall short, the ADA commander must improvise to meet unanticipated situations.
Planning for ADA operations must include six sustainment functions. They are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. The functions center around the care, maintenance, and use of all personnel and equipment essential to the unit in accomplishing its combat mission. These functions include such diverse responsibilities as maintaining the strength and spirit of the fighting force and, when necessary, decontaminating personnel and equipment. Logistics packages integrated into the supported force logistics system is the most common approach to use. Chapter 7 has more detailed discussions on logistics.
ADA limits the freedom of action of enemy forces and, therefore, enhances friendly freedom to maneuver. In developing and executing air defense missions, mission accomplishment is foremost in priority. The ADA commander makes an estimate of the situation and considers the factors of METT-T. The ADA plan provides battlefield effectiveness and ensures the availability of ADA assets for subsequent operations. Protection of personnel and equipment is vital to preserving the combat power of the maneuver force. The loss of ADA units increases the force's vulnerability to air surveillance and attack.
In close and deep operations, ADA forces take advantage of rapid maneuver, terrain, cover, and concealment to increase their survivability. ADA systems maneuvering with the force derive a certain degree of protection from the maneuver force.
Some ADA systems in the rear can be hardened to increase survivability. Others take advantage of mobility, cover, concealment, terrain features, and collective protection to enhance survivability.