FINAL DRAFT - 31 March 2000



This appendix explains the Air Defense Artillery employment principles and guidelines for optimum positioning of Air and Missile Defense Firing Units. Commanders at all echelons use these principles and guidelines for AD planning. When applying these principles and guidelines, planners must consider the tactical and technical capabilities of each weapon system.


    1. Commanders apply four principles when planning active air and missile defense operations. These principles are mass, mix, mobility, and integration.
    2. Mass

    3. Mass is the concentration of air and missile defense combat power. It is achieved by assigning enough firepower to successfully defend the force or the asset against air and missile attack or surveillance. To mass air and missile defense combat power, commanders may have to accept risks in other areas of the battlefield.
    4. Mix

    5. Mix is the employment of a combination of weapons systems to protect the force from the air threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another and complicates the problem of the attacker. All joint and combined arms resources are considered when applying this principle. Proper mix causes enemy aircraft to adjust their tactics. Enemy maneuvers designed to defeat one weapon system may make an aircraft vulnerable to another weapon system.
    6. Mobility

    7. Mobility is the capability to move from place to place while retaining the ability to perform the air and missile defense mission. The mobility of air and missile defense resources must be equivalent to the mobility of the supported asset. First priority for mobility should be planning moves that support accomplishment of the mission. Tactical situations may dictate additional moves to enhance survivability.
    8. Integration

    9. Integration is the close coordination of effort and unity of action that maximizes operational effectiveness. Active air and missile defense operations must be integrated into the supported commander's concept of the operation. The ADA scheme of maneuver entails vertical and horizontal integration of air and missile defense systems across the width and depth of the battlefield.

    11. There are six employment guidelines when planning and positioning air and missile defense resources: mutual support, overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early engagement, and defense in depth (figure A-1).
    12. Mutual Support

    13. Mutual support is achieved by positioning weapons so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon system. For gun systems the dead zone is usually small and the need for mutual support is minimal. For missile systems, especially command-guided systems, the dead zone can be large and the need for mutual support is great.
    14. Overlapping Fires

    15. Overlapping fires are achieved by positioning weapons so their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the air threat can attack, the defense planner must apply mutual support or overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.
    16. Balanced Fires

    17. Balanced fires are achieved by positioning weapons to deliver an equal volume of fire in all directions. This may be necessary when air and missile defense is used in an area where the terrain does not canalize the attacker, or when the Air Avenue of approach is not predictable.
    18. Weighted Coverage

    19. Weighted coverage is achieved by combining and concentrating fires toward the most likely enemy air avenues of approach or direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight his coverage toward another direction.
    20. Early Engagement

    21. Early engagement is achieved by positioning weapons so they can engage the threat before ordnance release; ideally, weapons should engage and destroy the enemy before he can fire on the defended asset.
    22. Defense in Depth

    23. Defense in depth is achieved by positioning weapons so the air threat will come under an increasing volume of fire as it approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth lowers the probability that threat aircraft will reach the defended asset.

    25. ADA commanders and leaders organize their personnel and equipment to command and control their units. There are three types of Command and Control (C2) organizations, which are standard in ADA units: command posts (CP), tactical operations centers (TOC), and fire direction centers (FDC).

    27. The principal facility employed by the commander to control operations is a CP. The commander is located anywhere on the battlefield where he can best command the force and is only present at the CP when necessary. A CP consists of facilities for the commander, coordinating staff, and special staff. The organization of the CP reflects the commander's needs. CPs can be organized by echelon, for example, a tactical CP, main CP, and rear CP. The commander may form an alternate or assault CP. ADA units from AAMDC to platoon level form CPs tailored to their needs.
    28. Command posts are organized to perform the following functions:


    1. A TOC is a sub-element of a headquarters CP with staff elements (AAMDC, brigades, and battalions). A TOC consists of a physical grouping of the staff elements concerned with current and future tactical operations and tactical support. A key standardized, digitized element of equipment in the AAMDC and brigade TOCs is the Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System. At the battalion TOC level, the key standard, digitized equipment is the Air and Missile Defense workstation, which is completely compatible with the AAMDC and brigade equipment.

    3. A fire direction center is that sub-element of brigade, and battalion TOCs, and battery CPs where the commander exercises engagement operations. The FDC receives digitized target intelligence and fire control orders and translates them into appropriate fire directions and fire distribution. Multiple systems are used in ADA units for FDCs based on the type and level of the ADA unit.

    5. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is the Army's analytical approach to problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. The military decision-making process has seven steps that all begin with inputs built upon previous steps. Each step has outputs that drive subsequent steps. The decision-making process begins with the receipt or anticipation of a new mission. This can come from orders issued by higher headquarters or derived from an ongoing operation. Estimates go on continuously to provide input for the MDMP. Estimates are revised when important new information is received or when the situation changes significantly. Estimates are evaluations of how factors in each field of interest will influence the courses of action the commander considers. Although the estimate of the situation lies first and foremost in the commander's mind, staff estimates help the commander determine feasible, suitable, and acceptable courses of action. Staff estimates help the commander gather, update, analyze, evaluate, and validate critical facts, assumptions, and events. The estimate also allows the commander to formulate conclusions based on each staff's estimate.
    6. Estimates provide the basis for logically and analytically developing solutions to situations (both in planning future operations and fighting current operations). The staff recommends how the commander can employ the command's available assets. The commander uses this information to reach decisions.
    7. Once a mission is received, the estimate process begins. The ADA commander develops the air and missile defense estimate in concert with the force S3 or G3. The ADA commander uses the IPB during the estimate process. The ADA commander gathers and analyzes facts and makes assumptions. He will use these facts and assumptions to develop logical courses of action. The commander then chooses the course of action that will best support the mission.
    8. After the force commander selects a course of action, the air and missile defense planning process continues. The result of this process is the air and missile defense annex detailing air and missile defense support for the concept of the operation.
    9. The air and missile defense estimate follows the basic staff estimate format. The air and missile defense estimate provides information regarding the air and missile defense supportability of proposed courses of action. It also provides recommended air and missile defense priorities and an air and missile defense scheme of maneuver. This information forms a basis for the air and missile defense.
    10. The estimate must be constantly reevaluated to keep it current. The factors of METT-TC, OCOKA, and other considerations guide the ADA commander and staff during the estimate and subsequent planning. The degree of detail presented in the estimate depends on the planning time available. However, all elements of the estimate must be considered to make valid recommendations.






Date, time, and zone

Message reference number


References: Maps, charts, or other documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate:


When the estimate's purpose is to support the force level commander's operation, use the force level commander's mission statement. As the commander or operations officer, use the unit's mission statement when the estimate's purpose is to determine which course of action best accomplishes the support mission.


This paragraph describes the conditions under which the unit will perform its mission and the possible courses of action of the supported force.

  1. Characteristics of area of operation. For this paragraph, determine those factors of the situation which influence friendly and threat actions and which, therefore, may influence the choice of a course of action. In the absence of facts, use logical assumptions that might directly affect the mission. Includes analysis of the effects of pertinent characteristics on conducting air and missile defense operations

  1. Weather. Put the analysis of data from predicted weather and light conditions for the period in this paragraph. Assess how the weather affects friendly operations. Also include the evaluation of how weather and light conditions might affect the use of threat UAVs; missiles; aircraft, both fixed and rotary-wing; and airborne or air assault operations. Try to determine or predict when the threat will probably use those assets due to the weather.
  2. Terrain. Analyze the effects of terrain, including effects on observation and fire; cover and concealment; movement (surface and air); employment of friendly and threat NBC weapons; communications, electronic warfare and combat surveillance; unconventional warfare; psychological operations; and other aspects of military operations. Determine key terrain and air avenues of approach. Also discuss terrain features that limit air vehicle detection or target acquisition and terrain that might canalize or force air targets to fly a particular profile. Try to determine where the threat will most probably use air assets.
  3. Other pertinent factors. List analysis of political, economic, sociological, psychological, and other factors (such as environment, communications, science, technology, materiel, transportation, safety and accident prevention, and manpower). Include deduction about their effects on friendly and threat operations.

(b) Threat Forces. A threat evaluation discusses threat capabilities that are or may be a threat to the operation.

    1. Disposition. List locations of threat forces that will participate in air or missile operations or that threaten friendly air and missile defense operations. Determine combinations of air platforms that the threat may use when conducting a particular type of operation.
    2. Composition. The threat organization for combat includes identity of units, types of air platforms, missiles, and armament. Also address how many sorties and missiles expected to be flown per day, and possible composition of those sorties.
    3. Strength. Numbers and sizes of committed and reinforcing units. Consider the location of the threat, threat doctrine, and the unit's mission. Identify air and missile assets and air support units that could or may affect the operation. When, where, and how many air platforms will the threat fly during this operation?
    4. Other considerations. Threat forces not discussed above.
    5. Recent and present significant activities. Summary of recent threat activities successful and unsuccessful. Highlight any threat air activity to include number, type of air platforms, and locations.
    6. Peculiarities and weaknesses. Indicate threat peculiarities and weaknesses that might influence combat effectiveness, including vulnerability to deception.
    7. Threat Courses of Action. A compilation of available information from which to draw conclusions about possible threat air courses of action and how they relate to the threat ground courses of action.

(c) Friendly forces. The friendly force air and missile defense disposition, composition, and strength. Highlight the vulnerability of the force to threat air and missile attacks and surveillance.

    1. Friendly courses of action. State the force commander's course of action. Include any guidance that affects air and missile defense operations. Include description of any phasing of operations in the courses of action and the impact of those operations on support relationships or requirements.
    2. Current status of resources within staff area of responsibility. The status of personnel and logistics in the unit. Identify civil-military operations requirements. Identify limitations that affect or may affect the conduct of air and missile defense operations. Can the mission be accomplished?
    3. Current status of other resources that affect Air and missile defense area of responsibility.
    4. Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.
    5. Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.
    1. Assumptions.


Analyze each COA using evaluation criteria to determine advantages and disadvantages. Identify those aspects in the commander's plan that create difficulty in providing air and missile defense and affect the ability of the force to accomplish its mission.


Compare COA using evaluation criteria. Rank order COA for each key consideration. A decision matrix should visually support comparison. Present an air and missile defense course of action for each of the supported force courses of action. Each ADA course of action presented should include the following aspects:


a. Recommended COA based on the comparison




(Air Defense Coordinator)

ANNEXES: (as required)



    1. The estimate of the situation assists the commander in determining the most suitable course of action to accomplish the mission. Once the commander makes this decision and clearly articulates the intent, the staff prepares OPLANs and OPORDs.
    2. A-25. The ADCOORD must conduct detailed coordination with other staff sections to develop this annex. The ADCOORD derives information affecting the air and missile defense annex from other staff estimates. Additionally, the air and missile defense estimate helps drive these other staff estimates.
    3. The ADCOORD writes the plan as a five-paragraph annex to the supported unit's OPLAN or OPORD. See the Annex G (Air and missile defense) to OPORD illustration. The air and missile defense annex assigns specific air and missile defense missions each unit must accomplish. Concurrently or sequentially, ADA units may be preparing their own OPLANs or OPORDs.

Air and missile defense annex format




Issuing headquarters

Place of Issue

Date-time group of signature

Message reference number


References: Maps, charts, or other relevant documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

Task Organization


  1. Threat. See Annex B (Intelligence).
  2. (1) Terrain. Identify most likely threat ingress and egress routes.

    (2) Weather. Identify threat aircraft all-weather capabilities and limitations.

    (3) Threat air capability and or activity.

    (a) Air threat data. List air-capable organizations including air platforms by number and type.

    (b) Additional air threat information. Lists air threat information pertinent to the operation but not covered in the Intelligence Annex. Highlight specific air threat considerations like sortie rates, subordination of air elements to ground units, ordnance peculiarities, target preferences, tactics, and recent significant activities.

    (c) Air avenues of approach. Lists all expected air avenues of approach and identify by air platform their potential users. List all known, beginning points and describe avenue of approach as it goes through the area of interest.


  3. Friendly situation. ADA missions at all applicable levels. Describe how the air and missile defense plan integrates with higher echelon plans.

    1. Higher units. Outline higher AD unit intent and plans.
    2. Adjacent units. Outline adjacent AD unit intent and plans.

(3) Supporting Elements. Note supporting units and support relationship.

c. Attachments and detachments. Identify air and missile defense resources attached from other commands and identify those air and missile defense resources detached.


Who, what, when, where, how, and why statement of the mission for the air and missile defense artillery unit.


  1. Scheme of ADA support. Commanders overall ADA plan to include the intent, objectives, and priorities.
  2. Tasks to subordinate ADA units. Briefly discuss ADA plan, command and support relationships, and priority of protection.

  1. Coordinating instructions. Instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units. Include references to other applicable annexes.

    1. ADW and ADW authority. LADW and LADW authority also.
    2. WCS and WCS authority. Include any plans to change WCS.
    3. Hostile criteria. Basic rules the commander has established to assist in the identification of friendly or hostile air vehicles. Include preplanned changes.
    4. Rules of engagement. Address ROE unique to the operation or points in the operation where changes are intended. Include use of supplemental fire control measures.
    5. Passive air and missile defense. Specific passive air and missile defense measures that all units should take to protect themselves from air and missile attack or surveillance during this operation.
    6. Combined arms for air defense. Briefly discuss specific techniques units should use to help in defending themselves against an air or missile attack or surveillance.

(7) Early warning. Review method and format for passing early warning to the entire force.


See Service Support Annex.


    1. Command.

    1. ADA CP locations.
    2. Succession of command.

    1. Signal. See Signal Annex.

    1. IFF code edition and book number.

(2) Communications links for early warning equipment.


OFFICIAL: NAME (Commander's last name)

APPENDIXES: RANK (Commander's rank)