The Army In Joint Theater Missile Defense
This chapter describes Army doctrine for TMD operations and how the Army contributes to the TMD fight within joint operations. The JFC is responsible for synchronizing the TMD capabilities of the individual components and supporting CINCs to neutralize or destroy enemy TM capabilities. Integration of TMD into the JFC’s overall CONOPS and campaign objectives will ensure synchronization of all TMD capabilities and maximize force effectiveness.
JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
3-1. Generic responsibilities and command relationships are described in the following paragraphs.
3-2. The combatant commander establishes theater guidance and objectives for joint TMD and assigns and apportions forces and resources. The combatant commander’s staff and component commanders’ staffs plan, monitor, advise, coordinate, and execute overall operations, including joint TMD. The combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that joint TMD plans and operations of subordinate forces are integrated at theater level and documented in the appropriate operations plans and annexes.
Joint Force Commander
3-3. JFCs are combatant commanders, commanders of subordinate unified commands and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) authorized to exercise combatant command or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force (see JP 3-0, Joint Operations). The JFC establishes guidance and objectives for joint TMD. The JFC defines and implements a methodology for joint TMD activities. The JFC issues planning priority guidance by phase for the defended asset list (DAL). The JFC or Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) (if delegated) tasks component headquarters to develop their detailed priorities of assets by phase. Once components provide their priorities by phase, the JFC or AADC, with component liaison officers (LNOs) go through an arbitration process to coalesce all priorities into a single DAL. The JFC’s CONOPS specifies the objectives to be met and provides guidance for the employment of C4I systems, attack operations, active defense operations, and passive defense measures.
Joint Force Command Staff
3-4. The staff plans, monitors, advises, and coordinates the overall operation for the JFC. The staff develops and issues JFC-approved CONOPS, which includes joint TMD. The J2, J3, J4, J5, and J6 are the primary staff elements responsible for joint TMD operations at the joint force level (see JP 3-01.5). The Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) (if established) and the political advisor also support joint TMD operations. The responsibilities of the elements are determined by the JFC.
Area Air Defense Commander
3-5. The JFC will normally assign overall responsibility for air defense to an AADC. The AADC develops a joint force estimate of friendly active defense capabilities to facilitate planning. The AADC develops and executes plans for dissemination of launch warning to all component levels, multinational forces, and civil authorities. The AADC develops and executes plans to disseminate launch warning and cueing information by the fastest means available to service components and active defense forces for engagement operations. The AADC develops and executes the plan for joint TMD active defense operations, including weapons control procedures and measures (see JP 3-01.5). The AADC ensures that optimum effectiveness is realized from each of the weapon systems used for active defense and that no unnecessary restrictions are placed upon their employment.
Joint Force Air Component Commander
3-6. The JFC will normally assign responsibility for the planning and execution of joint TMD attack operations outside the service component commanders’ operational areas to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). Since the location of these operational areas may change, the JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater/Joint Operations Area (JOA) wide attack operations effort. This will ensure the JFACC is prepared to support the other component commanders, when they request JFACC support in conducting joint TMD attack operations within their operational areas. The JFC may also assign the responsibilities of the AADC to the JFACC (see JP 3-01.5).
Airspace Control Authority
3-7. The airspace control authority (ACA) coordinates and integrates the use of theater airspace. Airspace control is vital to active air defense operations involving TM carriers and CMs. Establishment of identification/classification procedures assists units that conduct active air defense to identify targets and prevent engagement of friendly air and missile assets. Usually, one individual will be assigned the responsibilities of the AADC and the ACA. If this is not the case, close coordination between the AADC and the ACA is essential. The ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for coordination among units within the operational area (see JP 3-52 for detailed information on the ACA).
ARMY THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
3-8. ARFOR are assigned to the CINC to conduct sustained land operations. The ARFOR Commander plans and executes joint TMD operations as directed by the JFC, and he executes active defense, in accordance with weapon control procedures and measures established by the AADC, as approved by the JFC. The ARFOR Commander retains OPCON of his forces for joint TMD.
3-9. The ARFOR Commander plans and executes combat operations and jointly coordinates and prioritizes his operations and needs with the JFC and with other component commanders. Inside his operational area, the ARFOR Commander is normally designated as supported commander for attack operations. The ARFOR Commander, as are all component commanders, is responsible for providing warning to assigned and attached forces. Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC is necessary to achieve effective joint TMD operations. Within the ARFOR, the AAMDC is responsible for this coordination.
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
3-10. The AAMDC is the Army organization that performs critical theater level air and missile defense planning integration, coordination, and execution functions for the ARFOR Commander and JFLCC. The AAMDC integrates the four operational elements of TMD: active defense, attack operations, passive defense, and C4I to protect contingency, forward deployed, and reinforcing forces as well as designated theater strategic assets. The AAMDC prepares the air and missile defense annex for the ARFOR operations order (OPORD). The AAMDC commands the echelons above corps (EACs) ADA brigades and other assigned forces. Figure 3-1 provides a functional comparison between the AAMDC and an ADA Brigade Headquarters.
Figure 3-1. Functional Comparison
3-11. The AAMDC provides the staff and equipment to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and monitor the execution of the ARFOR Commander’s (or JFLCC’s if designated) air defense and TMD plans during force projection operations. The AAMDC consists of intelligence, fire support, aviation, chemical, ADA, Special Forces, and signal personnel melded into an effective TMD team. The AAMDC focuses on TMD operations for the ARFOR Commander (or JFLCC if designated) and is continuously collecting intelligence, analyzing information, and coordinating missions across all TMD operational elements. For example, the AAMDC coordinates with the ARFOR G2, G3, and Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) to recommend prioritized TMD targets. In addition, AAMDC LNOs deploy to all major theater elements: JFC, JFACC/AADC, JFLCC, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), DOCC, ACE, and multinational headquarters to provide coordination and deconfliction for the execution of integrated air defense and TMD operations.
3-12. When the AAMDC is deployed to a theater of operations, the commander will perform the functions of Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) and Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) as required. The TAAMDCOORD is the Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (AMDCOORD) to the ARFOR Commander (or JFLCC if designated), JFACC, and AADC. The TAAMDCOORD, as a special staff officer to the ARFOR Commander (or JFLCC if designated), ensures Army air and missile defense is integrated with active air defense operations and planning at the theater level. This will include integration with joint and multinational active air defense and TMD participants. The TAAMDCOORD also ensures that corps air and missile defense requirements are integrated into active air defense and TMD planning. The functions of the DAADC are:
Army Forces Theater Air and Missile Defense Cell/Air Defense Element
3-13. The ARFOR TAMD Cell/Air Defense Element (ADE) is a staff element that works for the ARFOR G3. The TAMD Cell/ADE performs TAMD staff work on a daily basis. During contingency operations the TAMD Cell/ADE plans and coordinates TAMD operations for the ARFOR and prepares for the reception of the AAMDC into theater. Once deployed, the AAMDC assumes the functions of the ARFOR TAMD Cell, and the TAMD Cell serves as the AAMDC’s liaison to the ARFOR Commander.
Battlefield Coordination Detachment
3-14. The BCD is the ARFOR liaison to the service component commander designated as the JFACC and is co-located with the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). The BCD is organized in seven sections: headquarters, operations, plans, intelligence, ADA, airspace management, and airlift. The BCD processes Army requests for tactical air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the JFACC staff, and provides the necessary interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data. The BCD eases planning, coordination, and execution of the following functions: battle command, intelligence, fires, airspace management, air defense, command and control warfare (C2W), airlift support, and TMD. In order to integrate the TAMD battle, the BCD supports the ARFOR TAMD Cell/ADE responsible for TAMD in theater. The ARFOR Commander specifies the role of the BCD to help in coordination of TMD active defense and attack operations with the JAOC. Once the AAMDC deploys to theater, it will assume the functions of the ARFOR TAMD Cell, and the BCD will support the AAMDC in TAMD. (See FM 100-13 for detailed information on BCD operations.)
Deep Operations Coordination Cell
3-15. The DOCC is a C2 node that plans, prepares, and executes Army deep operations. The DOCC brings together those staff elements within the C2 structure normally associated with deep operations. The DOCC assists the commander in processing and cataloguing of information so he can best allocate his assets to win both close and deep operations. These functions are performed simultaneously and continuously throughout the conduct of operations. The DOCC provides a streamlined, automated process to employ the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology for deep operations. Typically, when the ARFOR staff identifies operational high payoff targets (HPT), it will coordinate with subordinate units for acquisition and attack by systems allocated or organic to the corps (see FM 100-7).
Analysis and Control Element
3-16. The ACE, located at various command centers, receives intelligence data from multiple sources, fuses and analyzes the data, produces targeting and situational intelligence, and provides collection management. The ACE conducts an analysis and laydown of the TM threat. AAMDC LNOs participate in the analysis and lay down of the TM threat and conduct continuous coordination with the ACE. Elements of interest include order of battle, number and type weapon systems and their capabilities and limitations, tactics for employment, and general political situation. The ACE identifies the location of TM production and support facilities and TM infrastructure. Terrain delimitation analysis reduces the area required for sensor search and the number of possible engagement areas. The Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) is the early entry portion of the ACE. The military intelligence (MI) unit commander and the ARFOR G2 determine its size and composition.
Joint Tactical Ground Station
3-17. The Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) is a transportable, mobile, in-theater element of U.S. Space Command’s (USSPACECOM’s) Theater Event System (TES). JTAGS performs near real-time tactical event reporting of TBMs and other IR events by using the direct-downlinked data from the Defense Support Program (DSP) sensors. JTAGS uses a variety of voice and data warning networks to report estimated launch point coordinates, predicted ground impact coordinates, and state vectors in support of the theater CINC. JTAGS use of in-theater networks and Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS)/Tactical Data Distribution System (TDDS) broadcasts supports AAMDC and ARFOR TMD operations. USSPACECOM’s CONOPS for C2 of Space Forces furnishes the structure of command relationships and facilitates the full integration of JTAGS into joint and combined operations to maximize its support of the warfighter. USCINCSPACE, as supporting CINC to combatant (theater) CINCs, has combatant command (COCOM) of JTAGS while the ARSPACE commander has OPCON.
ARMY Theater Missile Defense OPERATIONS
3-18. The AAMDC executes Army TMD operations through its Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS), which is the main component of the AAMDC tactical operations center (TOC). All staff sections operate the AMDPCS. Successful TMD operations are dependent on the simultaneous and sequential execution of a wide spectrum of tasks and activities. Some of these tasks begin prior to the use of military force, such as planning, IPB, and training.
3-19. IPB drives the development of a collection plan, which includes specific named areas of interest (NAI), and identifies which sensors will cover the NAIs during designated time periods. Sensor surveillance at the required time against specific TM targets in specific areas is critical to successful conduct of TMD operations.
3-20. During planning, forces are task organized, TM targets are prioritized, and ROE are established to protect the force and provide freedom of maneuver for friendly forces. Passive defense, active defense, and attack operations are planned and C4I requirements are developed.
3-21. Commanders at all levels allocate the proper TMD resources to meet the threat. The ARFOR will sequence units supporting the joint TMD plan in the force deployment and employment schedules so that a joint TMD capability can be established consistent with the overall JFC priorities and risk assessment. Since joint TMD assets are limited, especially during entry operations, commanders must place special emphasis on providing security against terrorist and similar threats.
3-22. While some aspects of TMD operations begin prior to entry, the full range of TMD operations may be needed immediately upon arrival in theaters with a TM threat. Upon arrival all units take precautionary passive defense measures. The ARFOR may conduct proactive attack operations, particularly in counter RSTA operations to preclude observation by enemy sensors. When a launch is observed, the C4I system passes launch warning to subordinate commands to initiate additional passive defense measures. Additionally, the C4I system passes launch point, trajectory data, and impact point and time data to active defense and attack operations units.
3-23. Well-rehearsed TMD plans permit forces to fight effectively in a TM environment. Passive defense measures are implemented throughout the entire force. Selected units conduct active defense and attack operations. C4I is an essential component of all TMD operations because C4I is the foundation to conduct and link all operational elements of TMD. Integrated training with joint and multinational forces prepares the Army to operate as part of the joint and multinational team.
3-24. Planning begins with receipt of a mission statement and planning guidance from the JFC. The ARFOR Commander receives staff estimates of the situation, and ARFOR TMD priorities are established. Concurrently, a detailed IPB of TM activity and infrastructure is conducted, and courses of action are developed and analyzed by the AAMDC and ARFOR staff. The end result is a phased air and missile defense annex to the ARFOR plan. To ensure complementary effort and to achieve maximum effectiveness, TMD planning should be integrated in the AADC’s theater air defense plan and continually coordinated among all joint force components. Coordination of TMD plans with multinational forces and civil authorities should also be considered throughout planning and operations phases.
3-25. Within the ARFOR, the G2, G3, G4, signal officer (SIGO), TAAMDCOORD, military police, engineer, and chemical officers are key participants in the planning process. These staff officers perform their traditional staff functions of intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, air and missile defense, security, route planning, survivability, mobility, and the NBC defense, respectively. However, each must incorporate TMD into their respective areas of staff responsibility. The AAMDC Commander as the TAAMDCOORD will coordinate and deconflict TMD planning throughout the ARFOR staff and subordinate commands and ensure Army TMD operations are integrated with those of the joint force. The AAMDC provides the specialized personnel, training, and equipment to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and monitor the execution of ARFOR TMD operations across all four operational elements.
3-26. Warning, deception, and operational security (OPSEC) plans are the key components for the passive defense effort. Planning for passive defense is conducted at all levels. Planning should include tactical warning, reduction of the enemy’s targeting effectiveness, reduction of force vulnerability to TM attack, and reconstitution. Countermeasures to be taken at each level of command are established. Battle damage caused by TM attacks is reported through the C4I system. In addition to those actions taken by all units, MI, ADA, engineer, CSS, chemical, medical, and signal units provide specific contributions to passive defense.
3-27. The AAMDC and ARFOR staffs conduct planning for active defense. Intelligence requirements are identified and collection management priorities are established for TM detection, acquisition, classification, discrimination, and identification. The C4I architecture is designed to meet the needs of fire units and C2 nodes for integrated near real-time TM track data from national, theater, and Army sensors. Threat priorities and ROE are established by the AADC for engaging both TMs and aircraft suspected of carrying TMs. The Army normally plays an active role in developing the joint priorities and ROE. The AAMDC Commander, if designated the DAADC, assists the AADC in developing the air defense plan for the theater. ROE for ASMs and TBMs are straightforward since identification is not required. ROE for CMs must be synchronized with air defense ROE due to the commonality with aircraft flight characteristics. As technology enables accurate target classification as manned or unmanned, future doctrine should allow for the authority to engage on classification as an unmanned platform. Such a procedure will allow preferential engagement of cruise missiles and UAVs; destroying them at ranges and locations that minimize lethal effects on friendly forces. The JFC, with input from the component services, establishes joint TMD priorities based on the campaign plan. The AAMDC Commander provides mission analysis and courses of action to defend the JFC’s priorities based on criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat (CVRT). Factors of METT-TC must be considered as a part of this analysis. The AAMDC Commander designates ADA forces to protect forces and selected assets, and initial defense designs are developed to counter the threat. Sharing of selected ADA engagement data with the C4I system for passive defense and attack operations is planned to supplement other sources. ADA engagement data frequently is the best data available to support passive defense warning and, as such, may become the primary data source.
3-28. A mix of complementary active defense systems must be employed to effectively counter the TM threat to rear areas during early entry and follow-on operations. This mix will consist of an upper tier system and one or more lower tier systems. The upper tier system counters the longer range TBMs that are beyond the engagement capabilities of the lower tier systems. The upper tier TBM defense system extends the battlespace to permit multiple engagements at longer ranges.
3-29. Lower tier systems must have sufficient mobility and tactical deployablitity to be capable of protecting maneuver forces and assets in the corps and division areas from short-range TBMs, CMs, and ASMs; as well as countering the aerial ISR and CM launch platforms.
3-30. The Army operational area must support active defense operations. Usually, the forward and lateral boundaries of the operational area are generally established based on Army requirements to include active defense. The rear boundary may be designed to include theater and geopolitical assets, which the Army has the mission to protect, and must be coordinated with the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC). However, planners must ensure that active defense resources are consistent with the priorities to be defended or re-designate the Army operational area, or accept the risk to lower priority assets or forces.
3-31. Component commanders plan attack operations based on the assignment of attack responsibilities and the JFC’s concept and priorities. The apportionment decision of the JFC also influences attack operations planning. During planning, decisions are made concerning targets, criteria for attack, sensor assignment for ISR, joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD), and attack assets. Targeting by the ARFOR at the operational level is focused on planning and coordination.
3-32. Typically, when the ARFOR staff identifies high-payoff operational targets, it will coordinate with subordinate units for acquisition and attack by systems allocated or assigned to the ARFOR. There will be some HPTs that subordinate units are not capable of engaging. The critical nature of these targets—and the requirement to coordinate and synchronize the employment of several joint acquisitions/attacks as quickly as possible—requires the ARFOR to establish the DOCC at EAC to accomplish the targeting effort.
3-33. Joint TMD targets include enemy TMs; launchers; command, control, and communications (C3); RSTA; and logistics elements. The decision to attack TMs is based on the JFC’s and component commander’s priorities and is facilitated by the ROE. Accurate targeting data is required for execution. ROE or a trigger event established during the planning process would initiate the attack operations. BDA is planned as an integral part of the attack operations D3A process. Sensor availability for BDA and surveillance tasks must be coordinated and deconflicted.
3-34. Since the ARFOR Commander is the supported commander for attack operations within his operational area, the commander normally establishes permissive fire control measures, to enable the JFACC to support Army attack operations requests. Requests for JFACC attack operations support are sent to the JFACC through the BCD.
3-35. The ARFOR Commander coordinates with the JFC to ensure that the Army operational area boundary is designed to maximize Army maneuver and fire support attack operations capabilities. The operational area should be large enough for commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
3-36. C4I planning considerations should include resources available during the various phases of Army operations. C4I planning must anticipate Army, joint, and multinational needs for near real-time responses to the TM threat, the wide range of appropriate TMD operations, the diverse nature of
3-37. Though discussed sequentially, the four elements of TMD are executed simultaneously. The echelon level of execution is dependent on the measure being implemented.
3-38. The AAMDC monitors the execution of passive defense, active defense, and attack operations. In some situations, the AAMDC recommends the implementation of Army TMD measures especially in the areas of attack operations and passive defense. The AAMDC provides the early warning and alerting of TM predicted impact and launch information for the ARFOR.
3-39. Component commanders receive tactical warning from the joint C4I architecture and provide warning to assigned forces. Tactical warning triggers passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas are in danger of attack). The warning system is prescribed by the JFC.
3-40. Executing passive defense is the responsibility of unit commanders at all levels. Commanders reduce enemy targeting effectiveness through the use of OPSEC measures, deception, and mobility. Commanders reduce their own vulnerability to TM attack by hardening, redundancy and robustness, dispersal, and NBC defense. ARFOR may also be employed to train civilian authorities in passive defense measures. Following a TM attack, units should be reconstituted to a desired level of combat effectiveness. BDA reports are forwarded through the C4I system.
3-41. Active defense operations are centrally controlled (see FM 44-100), but decentrally executed. Initial warning reports can be used to alert ADA units. Specific warning reports (surveillance track data) cue ADA units. ADA units engage TMs to protect the force and selected geopolitical assets. Task organization and defense design support the CONOPS and counter the threat.
3-42. ROE allow ADA units to engage enemy TBMs and ASMs without the need for identification. CMs and aircraft carrying ASMs must be engaged in accordance with JFC-approved ROE established by the AADC. ADA units are deployed in depth to present an ever-increasing volume of fire as enemy TMs ingress.
3-43. When ARFOR resources are not sufficient to attack acquired TM targets, the ARFOR requests joint air support through the BCD.
3-44. Execution of attack operations is centrally controlled and decentrally executed. At the tactical level, responsive intelligence and operations interfaces are required for targeting TM launches and infrastructure. After detection, acquisition, and identification of TM targets, subordinate commanders execute attack operations. Observed enemy activity triggers timely execution, which has been anticipated through the D3A process. Preemptive strikes may be conducted at the onset of hostilities if included in the JFC’s plan. Attacking enemy TM capabilities as early as possible prevents the launch of a substantial number of TMs. C2W is employed against an enemy’s C3 and RSTA to disrupt TM operations. Support facilities are also attacked. Sensors are tasked to provide BDA through the C4I system.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
3-45. C4I system must rapidly disseminate intelligence to subordinate commands and support attack operations and active defense with a near real-time targeting capability. C4I for Army TMD must be integrated into the overall theater and Army C4I architecture. The C4I system uses BDA reports to refine the IPB. The refined IPB may lead to changes in priorities, guidance, and the TMD CONOPS (see Appendix A).
MULTINATIONAL THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE OPERATIONS
3-46. JP 3-01.5 states TMD operations may be required within the context of an alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement. Requirements, responsibilities, and organizational considerations for conducting TMD in a multinational operations environment are similar to joint operations. However, special considerations and areas of emphasis are needed to ensure unity of effort with other national forces. Differences in doctrine, training, equipment, and organization should be identified and considered when determining multinational interoperability requirements for employing forces. When national forces of the multinational force are not uniformly capable of actively defending against threat TMs or attacking threat TM targets, provisions should be made to ensure TMD assets are provided for missile defense within multinational CINC-established priorities. Consensus on the TM threat, a clearly defined chain of command, and a responsive, interoperable C2 structure are crucial to successful multinational TMD operations. Consideration may also be given to assisting civil authorities in establishing passive defense measures for the civilian population and assets consistent with the overall mission. (See FM 100-8, Multinational Operations for more detailed information concerning multinational TMD operations.)