Chapter 5

Research, Development, and Acquisition Modernization Strategy


The goal of AMD modernization is to provide the most capable systems to well-trained soldiers -- at the right time -- to defeat the evolving threat. The Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) community, working with the user community, achieves this goal by improving or developing cost-effective systems that will counter the threat (described in Chapter 2) and satisfy the required warfighting capabilities (described in Chapter 3). The AMD systems can be packaged and deployed to gain Full Spectrum Dominance in any operational requirement, from smaller-scale contingency operations to major theater wars (MTW).

This chapter provides descriptions of AMD weapon and C4I systems being modified or developed to equip warfighters with the most affordable, technologically capable systems. C4I systems are grouped together in the integration section to emphasize the importance of information dominance and battlefield digitization to AMD weapon systems in future conflicts. Capabilities, improvements, and payoffs of each system are specified, along with issues that require resolution to avoid adversely impacting the capabilities. A figure accompanying each system discussion highlights the associated Army modernization investment strategy category, identifies the system mission, summarizes improvements and payoffs, presents the FY99-03 POM status and the FY99-05 issues, and reflects the current schedule. The AMD modernization strategy focus is in concert with Army Vision 2010/Joint Vision 2010 and the Army modernization investment strategy.

The AMD strategy emphasizes a system of systems to implement an overarching, tiered defense and stresses interoperability in a joint and multinational environment, thus supporting the Army Vision 2010/Joint Vision 2010 goal of Full Spectrum Dominance. The AMD strategy capitalizes upon a combination of pre-planned product improvements (P3I) to proven systems and the development of new systems in step with the Army investment categories of information dominance, overmatch capabilities, and essential/leap-ahead (science and technology) capabilities. Information dominance is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Overmatch capability is an advantage in combat capabilities over current and potential opponents by virtue of superior combat systems that employ advanced technologies. Essential science and technology/leap-ahead capabilities are high-leverage, critical technologies that enable the Army patterns of operation (essential science and technology), and those technologies that can provide a significant, almost revolutionary, improvement over current capabilities (leap-ahead).

Air and Missile Defense Modernization Strategy

As reflected in Figure 5-1, the SHORAD, TMD, and AMD C4I elements of the 2005 force will evolve into one interoperable, synergistic AMD Force of 2010 and beyond. The Stinger, Avenger, and Bradley Linebacker are modernized to maintain their overmatch capabilities against the low-altitude threats. Leap-ahead technologies will be examined to identify potential advanced weapons systems. PATRIOT and THAAD in the corps and theater will be fielded/sustained to provide an expanded battlespace defense and ensure continued overmatch capabilities against TBMs and air- breathing threats. When fielded, MEADS will begin to replace PATRIOT in the corps and, with its mobility and 360-degree coverage, will provide a vital link between forward maneuver force defenses and the theater/corps defenses of forces and critical assets. The NMD system will protect the United States -- its population, industrial base, infrastructure, and force projection base -- against limited ICBM attacks. The C4I family of systems (JTAGS, FAAD C2, Sentinel, AMDPCS, and Aerostat or an elevated sensor) integrate the AMD weapon systems into an effective fighting force, enhancing their defense capabilities, and promoting information dominance.

Air and Missile Defense Modernization Strategy


Background. Stinger missile platforms (Figure 5-2) provide defense against low-altitude CMs, UAVs, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft throughout the theater of operations. The original Stinger configuration was man-portable (MANPADS). It consisted of the weapon (missile in launcher and reusable gripstock); an Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) unit; trainers; and ancillary equipment. The software-controlled guidance functions are reprogrammable via a memory module external to the missile (located in the launcher). To enhance deployability and versatility, the Stinger missile system has expanded from its original MANPADS configuration to employment on several low-altitude air defense platforms, including Avenger, Bradley Linebacker, helicopters (Kiowa, Apache, Comanche), and the USMC Light Armored Vehicle-Air Defense (LAV-AD).

Improvements. Stinger improvements focus on incorporating advanced capabilities into existing inventories through P3I. Block I missile upgrades increase missile accuracy, improve performance against slow-moving targets and those employing advanced counter-countermeasures, improve performance against CMs, eliminate the need for superelevation in air-to-air applications, improve night capability, and extend the service life of the missile. Required platform improvements, which consist of circuit card and software upgrades, take advantage of the Block I missile’s improvements. Block II, the follow-on improvement to Stinger, incorporates an advanced focal plane array seeker that counters the standoff helicopter-in-clutter threat, and adds a full night capability and advanced IR counter-countermeasures. This improves performance against the future CM, UAV, helicopter, and fixed-wing aircraft threat.

Payoffs. Stinger Block I and Block II upgrades improve capability against air-breathing targets, particularly the low RCS, low IR signature, and low-observable CMs and UAVs. Stinger missile and platform upgrades result in performance improvements of a 2.5 times increase in acquisition range; a capability to engage helicopters in clutter; enhanced capabilities against CMs, UAVs, and fixed-wing targets; and a full night and degraded weather capability.

POM Issues. The current Stinger reprogrammable microprocessor (RMP) inventory will soon exceed service life expiration, affecting reliability and performance. Lack of funding for Stinger missile and platform upgrades will prevent warfighters from receiving required Stinger technology enhanced capabilities in adequate quantities in a timely and cost-effective manner to meet the evolving threat. Funding shortfalls exist for Block I platform upgrades (FY99 funding for Force Package 2-3, FY00 for Force Package 4), Block II RDTE (FY99 to accelerate system design), and Block I missile upgrade (FY99 for economic buy and FY03-04 for Avenger STC payback). The FY99 Block II RDTE funding shortfall delays fielding until FY07. In addition, lack of funds for the Stinger Troop Proficiency Trainer (STPT) -- the primary MANPADS trainer to maintain soldier gunnery skills in the total Army (active component and reserve component) -- will mean continued reliance upon the existing non-mobile, domed trainer.


Background. The Avenger weapon system (Figure 5-3) is a lightweight, day/night, all- weather fire unit designed to counter the threat of low-altitude, high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. The fire unit consists of two turret-mounted Stinger missile pods, a .50-caliber machine gun, a forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) system, a laser range finder, and an IFF system. The fully rotatable turret is mounted on the heavy HMMWV. The sensor components and armament system are gyro-stabilized for shoot-on-the-move capability. The unit can fire missiles or the machine gun on the move or from a stationary position. The gunner operates the system from inside the turret or from a Remote Control Unit (RCU) away from the Avenger fire unit.

Improvements. Required Avenger improvements (being pursued) will counter emerging threat capabilities and ensure the Avenger remains a viable weapon system through 2010.

Payoffs. The additions of STC and the upgraded FLIR provide a 55% increase in number of engagements and a 66% increase in number of kills, as well as increased battlespace against UAVs and CMs. The upgraded FLIR improves the visual positive identification capability of the current FLIR by 1.5 times. These improvements, coupled with digitization, computer enhancements, RCU redesign, AVT redesign, an embedded trainer and a new machine gun, reduce costs and solve obsolescence problems to continue providing the maneuver force a significant warfighting capability.

POM Issues. Lack of funding to equip Force Package 1-3 units with STC and the FLIR upgrades will deprive warfighters from having technology improvements to increase overall system effectiveness, extend engagement range, and provide a capability against CMs and UAVs. Funding for the additional 36 Avengers is needed to provide the required inventory to up-gun the heavy active component (AC) units. Without funding for the computer, RCU, AVT, embedded trainer, and machine gun upgrades, system obsolescence and operations and support (O&S) costs will seriously detract from Avenger achieving full operational capability and reliability.

Bradley Linebacker

Background. While the BSFV provides air defense of the heavy maneuver force, the Stinger team must dismount to engage targets. Converting the BSFV to the Bradley Linebacker (Figure 5-4) overcomes this deficiency. Bradley Linebacker retains the capability to maintain pace with the armored force with the added enhancement that the Stinger team remains under armor protection during engagements. Bradley Linebacker consists of the M2A2(ODS) Bradley with an integrated, externally mounted launcher that can fire four Stinger missiles while stationary or on the move. An integrated position, navigation, and north seeker capability allows for on-the-move cueing. FAAD C2 and Sentinel provide targeting information to assist in acquisition.

Improvements. The Bradley Linebacker will be integrated with the M2A3 Bradley as funding is provided. The Bradley M2A3 provides a second-generation FLIR, C2 software, and a fully digitized, integrated turret. M2A3 vehicles for Force Package 1 units have been resourced and will begin fielding in FY 02. The M2A2(ODS) Linebackers will "roll down" to Force Package 2-3 units.

Payoffs. The material solutions will correct major deficiencies in Stinger team survivability, fire control, target acquisition, and identification such that Bradley Linebacker will --

POM Issues. Failure to fund Bradley Linebacker M2A3 modifications would continue to require Stinger teams to dismount the vehicle exposing them to direct and indirect fires. In addition, the teams would not benefit from the Bradley FLIR acquisition enhancement and integrated digitized system, thus severely diminishing their ability to acquire and engage air targets. Funding is necessary to procure an additional 8 units to complete the Bradley Linebacker M2A2(ODS) acquisition objective of 107 systems.


Background. The CADEWS (Figure 5-5) provides new warfighting capabilities using directed energy technologies (e.g., laser, high-power microwave) in a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, surface-to-air weapon system. The system will use an integrated suite of directed energy systems to provide protection of forces in the forward area and defense of scarce, high-value assets. It will be capable of "hard kills" of platforms, to a range of six to eight kilometers, and "soft kills" of sensors of an expanded threat target set that includes TBMs, CMs, UAVs, rockets, mortar and artillery rounds, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The potential for engaging ground targets will also be considered.

The CADEWS will operate with a deep magazine and rapid retargeting capability to counter missile volley attacks. It will also have a high kill efficiency -- one shot per engagement.

Improvements. Projected for fielding in the 2015 (+ 10 years) timeframe, it will be integrated with the available suite of sensors and C4I systems to optimize system performance.

Payoffs. The CADEWS system will provide the capability to use low-cost-per-kill technology to defeat the expanded threat and enhance force protection. It will provide an offensive information warfare capability to negate an adversary’s "eyes" (e.g., UAV).

POM Issues. A funding line and documentation are needed to initiate the CADEWS program.


Background. A statement of intent to cooperatively develop and produce MEADS was signed in February 1995. In May 1996, the United States, Germany, and Italy signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the program’s first development phase, known as project definition/validation (PD/V). The international MEADS program uses an acquisition strategy created to reduce the cost associated with developing and procuring the required capability through cost sharing with Germany and Italy. Two international contractor teams are developing system concepts. One team will be selected to continue the program into the design and development (D&D) phase.

The MEADS (Figure 5-6) design will provide low-to-medium-altitude AMD for rapid force projection. The MEADS will consist of missiles, launchers, sensor(s), and a BM/C4I element. It will provide 360-degree defense against multiple and simultaneous attacks by a wide variety of tactical missiles and air-breathing threats (i.e., SRBMs, CMs, UAVs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft) that may employ both conventional and WMD warheads. The MEADS’ versatility, deployability, and mobility will make it the sole TMD system that can provide protection for maneuver forces against the threat spectrum throughout all phases of operations. MEADS will provide a complementary lower-tier capability in conjunction with upper-tier THAAD to achieve near-leakproof TBM protection. The system will also provide an overarching layer of protection for the forward maneuver forces. MEADS will be compatible and interoperable with other Army, service, and allied systems.

Improvements. MEADS will have the needed survivability and mobility required for protecting the force in the maneuver area of the battlefield. It will provide greater capability than PATRIOT with significantly less manpower and O&S costs. It will provide rapid deployment of a minimum battle element that is C-130 transportable.

Payoffs. The MEADS weapon system payoffs are as follows:

POM Issues. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) affirmed the need for a system to provide maneuver force and critical asset protection and affirmed funding through FY99. Negotiations continue with our European partners concerning the future of MEADS. Adequate funding for full development and fielding is lacking. This will jeopardize the projected FY07 First Unit Equipped (FUE) date.


Background. PATRIOT’s mission is to provide defense against TBMs, CMs, UAVs, and other air-breathing threats as part of a multitiered defense system. PATRIOT is the centerpiece of the Army’s active TMD force and is the world’s only battle-proven TMD system. The 1991 Gulf War was the basis for a program to improve PATRIOT capabilities. The PAC-2 capability had been designed to defeat the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty threat. Instead, PATRIOT faced the longer-range Iraqi Scud. This threat missile broke up in flight, thus creating a problem in discriminating between warhead and debris. Lessons learned revealed the need to improve lethality, radar detection range, defended area, and automatic recording of battle data. The PAC-2/Guidance Enhancement Missile (GEM) system in the field today contains a guidance upgrade that significantly improves lethality and coverage. Improvements to the Engagement Control Station (ECS), radar, missile, and launcher are in process to buy back lost battlespace. These requirements are specified in the PAC-3 Operational Requirements Document (ORD), and the development and fielding of these improvements will culminate in the PAC-3 Configuration 3 system.

The basic combat element of the PATRIOT system is the firing battery, consisting of a multifunction phased array radar set, an ECS, an Electronic Power Plant, requisite communications, and eight launchers (four PAC-1/PAC-2 and four dual-capable PAC-2/PAC-3 launchers). The PAC-1/PAC-2 and dual-capable launchers can each hold four ready-to-fire PAC-2/GEM and earlier missiles, while the dual-capable PAC-2/PAC-3 launchers can each hold up to 16 ready-to-fire PAC-3 hit-to-kill missiles.

Improvements. PATRIOT is evolving to the PAC-3 configuration (Figure 5-7) in a series of incremental, phased system improvements that have been grouped into configurations. These configurations are applied in hardware "sweepdowns" to all fielded equipment in conjunction with the necessary software changes in "post deployment builds."

Integration of the PAC-3 missile segment into the PATRIOT system requires the modification of three major items of PATRIOT equipment. The radar set will require changes in hardware and software to support use of the PAC-3 missile expanded uplink/downlink message size and CDI capability. Modifying the ECS with the addition of the PAC-3 Fire Solution Computer will enhance PAC-3 missile fire solutions. The launching station modification consists of replacing the launcher electronics module and launcher missile round distributor with an Enhanced Launcher Electronics System (ELES) module and a launching station diagnostic unit/junction box. New canisters for missile launch, shipping, and storage will carry four PAC-3 missiles each.

The PAC-3 missile is a new design that provides a high-velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile, with the range, accuracy, and lethality necessary to effectively intercept and destroy the tactical missile with NBC/HE warheads and air- breathing threats (ABT) described in the PAC-3 System Threat Assessment Report (STAR). Although interceptor-to-target body contact generates a high destructive energy level against TBMs, a two-ring Lethality Enhancer employed just prior to intercept further increases single-shot probability of kill against ABTs.

PAC-3 Configuration 3 capabilities complete the system of phased improvements.

Payoffs. The PAC-3 system payoffs are as follows:

POM Issues. Within each configuration-phased enhancement, there are improvement elements that are critical to the success of that configuration. The POM issues that can prevent achieving full mission capability relate to lack of funding for the following critical configuration elements:


Background. The THAAD system (Figure 5-8) is being designed to negate TBMs at long ranges and high altitudes to expand battlespace. The system will provide an overlay and cueing to the lower-tier systems (PATRIOT and MEADS). Its long-range intercept capability will make possible the protection of broad areas, dispersed assets, and population centers against TBM attacks. The THAAD system includes missiles, Palletized Loading System (PLS) launchers, C4I units, the THAAD radar, and support equipment. The THAAD radar will provide threat early warning, threat type classification, interceptor fire control, external sensor cueing, and launch and impact point estimates for the THAAD system. The THAAD radar is based on state-of-the-art, solid-state, X-band radar technologies. THAAD will be interoperable with the AMDPCS to enable communications with higher and lower echelons. Netted and distributed C4I will take advantage of previous Army developments that can be incorporated into the THAAD program.

Improvements. The Program Definition and Requirements Review (PD&RR) will prove a design of the objective THAAD system and provide residual hardware (includes an option for 40 missiles) and a cadre of 295 soldiers for the UOES. The UOES will be used in testing to provide early user input into the design of the objective system and will be available for limited use during a national emergency. The objective system will incorporate changes from user input during the PD&RR. Additionally, technology enhancements that have matured during PD&RR (e.g., guidance and control, software upgrades, hardware upgrades) will be included in the system design.

Payoffs. The THAAD system provides --

POM Issues. The THAAD program has been restructured to an FUE of FY06. Congressional mandate for a full operational capability is FY04. Funding for the restructured FY06 FUE is at issue.


The key to effective AMD is efficient integration of all systems, especially in the joint environment, to obtain information dominance. Digitization of the battlefield is a critical element in providing information dominance. Digitization provides the technology to ensure that vertically and horizontally integrated theater missile defense C4I centers will synchronize the AMD battle, linking theater missile defense systems and disseminating missile warning and cueing information. As demonstrated during Task Force XXI, AMD C4I modernization is leading the way in providing an integrated, digitized system of systems capable of effective combat operations. The following systems provide the required inter-operability among active defense elements, other Army systems, other services, and multinational forces to effectively integrate AMD information operations.


Background. The JTAGS (Figure 5-9) is an Army/Navy jointly manned, theater-level ground station that provides a strategically and tactically deployable capability in-theater to receive, process, and disseminate space-based sensor information on TBM launches in near-real-time. It disseminates warning, alerting, and cueing information on TBMs and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater using existing communications networks. JTAGS processes data from up to three DSP satellites to determine launch points, state vectors, and predict ground impact points for TBMs. JTAGS is directly integrated into the CINC’s TMD network that reduces the possibility of single-point failure in long-haul communications architectures.

The JTAGS can deploy worldwide. A unit includes external, collapsible, high-gain antennas, a standard military generator, and standard five-ton trucks as prime movers. Two JTAGS systems have been delivered overseas for contingency operations/exercises, and three systems have been fielded in CONUS: one to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and two to Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Improvements. JTAGS P3I Phase I will improve the accuracy and timeliness of both predicted missile launch and impact points. It will also improve information dissemination through JTIDS integration fusion of DSP data with data from other sensors and sensor calibration via the use of static sources and beacons. Phase II upgrades five JTAGS into Multi-Mission Mobile Processors (M3P) for integration into the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The upgrade is necessary for continued JTAGS operation with the new constellation of SBIRS satellites scheduled to replace the aging DSP in FY02-04. The tri-service memorandum of agreement calls for a common mobile processor and recognizes JTAGS as an in-theater tactical processor. M3P provides a low-cost solution for all services.

Payoffs. JTAGS provides --

POM Issues. None.


Background. FAAD C2 (Figure 5-10) is the air defense battlefield system in the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). It provides automated engagement operations (EO) and force operations (FO) capabilities at the SHORAD battalion. EO capabilities include real-time early warning and cueing information to SHORAD weapon systems, friendly aircraft identification, and air battle management. FO capabilities include automated mission and staff planning and interoperability with other ABCS (i.e., development and distribution of logistical and administrative orders and directives). The FAAD C2 system integrates common hardware and software (CHS) equipment into Standard Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) subsystems and vehicular- and track-mounted SHORAD weapons. The EO and FO software functions at SHORAD battalion and battery command posts use the CHS computer workstations. A Simplified Handheld Terminal Unit (SHTU) is integrated into the SHORAD weapon systems -- BSFV/Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, and Stinger MANPADS.

The EO CHS workstation receives both local cueing and external warning air track information from numerous datalink interfaces (e.g., TADIL-J, TADIL-B). Six organic Sentinels are networked to provide a divisional air picture using EPLRS. The netted divisional air track information is correlated with other external air track sources (e.g., Navy and Air Force AWACS platforms), using the JTIDS Class 2M radio terminal, and with TMD/adjacent SHORAD battalions via TADIL-B mobile subscriber equipment links.

Improvements. A Block IV phase of P3I (being developed) will provide technological system enhancements and upgrades.

Payoffs. FAAD C2 provides --

POM Issues. The primary issues that can prevent achieving full-mission capability relate to lack of funding for:


Background. Sentinel (Figure 5-11), used with the Army’s FAAD C2 system to provide critical air surveillance of the forward areas, automatically detects, tracks, classifies, identifies, and reports targets (CMs, UAVs, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft). Sentinel can provide targeting information on hovering to fast-moving aerial platforms, and those that are flying at altitudes from nap of the earth to the maximum engagement altitude of SHORAD weapons. Sentinel acquires targets sufficiently forward of the defended forces or assets to improve SHORAD weapon reaction time and allow engagement at optimum ranges. The Sentinel IFF reduces the potential for fratricide. Sentinel supports Army divisional, corps, and EAC air defense operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

Sentinel consists of a radar-based sensor system with its prime mover/power, IFF, and FAAD C2 interfaces. The sensor is an advanced, three-dimensional, X-band, phased-array radar with an instrumented range of 40 kilometers. The Sentinel is capable of operating day and night, in adverse weather conditions, and in battlefield environments of dust, smoke, aerosols, and enemy countermeasures. It provides 360-degree coverage for acquisition and tracking. A HMMWV is its prime mover. It is transportable without disassembly and is capable of being march-ordered and emplaced by two soldiers.

Improvements. The Sentinel P3I program will provide enhancements against evolving CM and UAV threats. The P3I program consists of four interdependent improvements. The first is high-order software language conversion and scan rate. The second is microwave power module transmitter phase shifter and antenna load power improvement. The third improvement will enable transmitter power increase. The last improvement is an adjunct sensor and fusion of the adjunct sensor with the radar.

Payoffs. Sentinel improvements provide the following:

POM Issue. Current program funding procures 115 Sentinel systems. Additional funds are needed for initial/diagnostic spare parts (beginning in FY00) and for Sentinel fieldings to ARNG Avenger battalions. Failure to procure the initial/diagnostic spares will result in decreased operational availability.


Background. The AMDPCS (Figure 5-12) will provide Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE)-compliant horizontal and vertical interoperability within the Army Force XXI, as well as with joint and multinational command and control systems. The AMDPCS consists of three major components: the AMD Brigade TOCs and AAMDC, the Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS), and the AMD Brigade Fire Control and Monitoring capability. The AMD Brigade TOCs and AAMDC are standardized with common hardware -- vehicles, shelters, communications, and computers. The AMDWS integrates FAAD C2, PATRIOT, THAAD, and MEADS force operations software products (defense planning, staff functions) to provide common AMD workstations for all echelons of command. It provides the common planning module to be incorporated into the joint AMD planning systems. The AMD Brigade Fire Control and Monitoring capability is achieved by integrating the AMDWS with the Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution (JTIDS) radio/ Multifunctional Information Distribution system radio.

Improvements. AMDPCS enhances the ability to integrate defense plans at multiple weapon systems and to coordinate mission essential information effectively and in a timely manner.

Payoffs. AMDPCS automates functions performed by AMD units at all echelons, modernizes and standardizes AMD command centers, and provides for integrated, interactive force management.

POM Issues. The primary issues that can prevent achieving full-mission capability relate to funding for the AMDPCS (including the AMDWS) and for common hardware for the remaining ADA Brigade TOCs and the AAMDC. Furthermore, it allows the retirement of the obsolete AN/TSQ-73 fire control system.


Background. Aerostat (Figure 5-13) is being explored for its potential as a cost-effective airborne sensor platform to provide air surveillance information and fire-control quality tracking data for the engagement of targets beyond line of sight of ground-based radars. The Army leads the joint (Army, Navy, Air Force) program office, established in January 1996, to develop an Aerostat-based sensor to support over-the-horizon (OTH) engagement of CMs. Aerostat, mounting surveillance and fire control radars, will enhance CM defense capabilities by significantly extending the detection and warning range and the defended area footprint for AMD systems. It will provide information to supported command and control and weapon systems to enable threat evaluation, friendly protection, and engagement decisions. The Aerostat will give commanders a long endurance, low-cost, highly effective capability to buy back battlespace and protect the force.

Improvements. The Joint Aerostat Program is a technology development program that will run to FY05 and yield two small/tactical Aerostat operational unit sets by FY03, with an option for two deployable prototype (large/strategic) systems available in FY05.

Payoffs. Aerostat provides --

POM Issues. None.

National Missile Defense


Today, the United States has no defense against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The potential for increased proliferation of WMD technologies and ballistic missiles creates uncertainty about the timing and sophistication of the emerging threat. Within this context, the Department of Defense shifted the NMD emphasis from technology readiness to a Deployment Readiness Program. The program will develop the elements of an initial NMD system (Figure 5-14) to the point that, within three years of a deployment decision, a limited capability could be fielded. Assuming a FY00 decision, fielding would be in FY03. This system would provide effective protection of all 50 states against small attacks (e.g., a few reentry vehicles (RV) of limited sophistication).


The Deployment Readiness Program approach allows for the preservation of a capability to deploy an NMD system within three years, while allowing the United States to continue the advancement of technology, add new elements to the system, and possibly reduce deployment timelines.


NMD will provide protection of the United States against accidental, unauthorized, or intentionally limited ICBM attacks.

POM Issues

None. The QDR increased funding for NMD; however, program schedules will remain high risk.

Mature Technology Infusion

With the active participation of SMDC, AMCOM, and other government agencies’ laboratories, the AMD community is pursuing the identification and infusion of mature technologies that meet requirements of the core acquisition programs. The AMD community has the responsibility to carry out a coordinated program for the identification of mature technologies that are being developed under the guidance of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (SARDA).

The development of technologies to support AMD systems is an ongoing and evolutionary process. This technology initiatives process provides a framework within which the technology developers and the Program/Project/Product Management Offices can identify optimal decision points for infusing and integrating mature technologies into the core acquisition programs and, when necessary, can make program adjustments to maximize the effectiveness of limited research and development funds.

The AMCOM RDEC is pursuing a DARPA funded technology program in which polarized filters are incorporated into passive IR seekers to improve clutter and countermeasure rejection. If successful, this effort is expected to further enhance Stinger Block II.

The Arrow program provides additional technology base contributions. Arrow is a U.S.-Israeli cooperative development program designed to assist the Government of Israel (GOI) in the development and test of the Arrow weapon system, including an interoperability capability with other TMD systems. Four successful tests of the Arrow II missile have been completed, including intercepts at two different locations within the Arrow battlespace. The Arrow program benefits numerous areas of U.S. TMD programs, including kill assessment, RF sensor/radome, electro-optical seeker/focal plane array, flight environment effects, warhead/lethality, guidance and control, propulsion, aerodynamics/staging, TBM signatures, and window/aero-optics assessment.


This chapter has described the emerging systems and improvements to existing systems that support the AMD modernization strategy for ensuring that warfighters have timely, technologically capable systems to counter the evolving threat. The AMD force will employ these assets, with sound doctrine and tactics, to provide defense of the force and critical assets against the air and missile threats.

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