Chapter 3Warfighting Concept and Required Capabilities
This chapter addresses the role of the AMD force in the early 21st century and identifies the required capabilities it must possess to fulfill its mission. The ensuing discussion focuses on the AMD force in the Armys next vision of warfighting in the 21st century -- Army Vision 2010. While Army Vision 2010 serves as the baseline for the discussion, the themes of Joint Vision 2010 will be continuously referenced. AMD is inherently a joint operation, and Army AMD forces must function in synergy with other joint and multinational AMD forces to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance.
In the next 25 years, the Armys warfighting concept will evolve from Force XXI to Army Vision 2010 to the AAN. Force XXI is "the process to advance into the 21st century." Army 2010 is the intermediate step -- the bridge -- to the long-term vision -- AAN. Force XXI, Army Vision 2010, and the AAN "establish a continuum of orderly change, assuring a disciplined approach to meeting the challenges of an uncertain future...." Transitional timelines are presented in Figure 3-1.
Force XXI Army is primarily a continental United States (CONUS)-based, rapidly deployable force that can dominate any battlespace, situation, or region through the conduct of simultaneous and continuous operations in all dimensions and across the spectrum of conflict. The Force XXI Army relies upon its strategic deployability, mobility, agility, and lethality to achieve decisive victory with minimum casualties. The Army executes Force XXI operations through a deliberate set of patterns of operation that serve to focus the many tasks performed in war and other military operations. The patterns are: gain information dominance, project the force, protect the force, shape the battlespace, decisive operations, and sustain the force. Although the patterns are discussed in a specific sequence, they may not be distinct phases, and more than one may occur simultaneously.
The AMD force to support Force XXI is a combination of integrated capabilities of multiple systems -- SHORAD (Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, Stinger MANPADS), TMD (PAC-3, THAAD, MEADS), and C4I (AMDPCS, FAAD C2, Sentinel, JTAGS, Aerostat). It is both a tactical and strategic force that is deployable, highly mobile, tailorable to mission needs, lethal against multiple threats, operationally agile in support of the force, and sustainable. The mission of this AMD Force XXI force is presented in Figure 3-2. AMD Force XXI will operate as part of an integrated joint force and protect forces and assets from air and missile threats -- TBMs, CMs, UAVs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and rockets. AMD Force XXI forces will support Force XXI in each of the patterns of operation. This support appears graphically, from a macro perspective, in Figure 3-3. The depicted air and missile defense operations are representative of those that might be conducted in a given scenario.
Transition to Army Vision 2010
Army Vision 2010 builds upon the philosophy and operational underpinnings of Force XXI and applies these to the world in the 2010-2015 timeframe. It envisions the continuance of traditional conflicts, the continuing dominant role of land forces in engagements ("force of decision"), and increased reliance upon joint operations.
Army Vision 2010 operations will be executed through the same six patterns of operation as Force XXI. As with the Force XXI patterns of operation, the Army Vision 2010 patterns are neither distinctive in execution nor sequential. Fundamental to Army Vision 2010 are information dominance (the overarching pattern, critical to the execution of all other patterns) and technology (the enabler of future full-spectrum operations).Army Vision 2010
While evolving from Force XXI, Army Vision 2010 amplifies the precepts of Joint Vision 2010. The two visions are inextricably linked, though terminology varies. Army Vision 2010 is expressed in terms of six patterns of operation; the Joint Vision 2010 framework for operations consists of four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Figure 3-4 shows a crosswalk between the patterns and concepts. While treated as an "equal" concept in the figure, information superiority is defined as an overarching consideration in Joint Vision 2010.
Terms of Reference
The operational discussions are couched in terms of Army Vision 2010 to emphasize the Army implementation of Joint Vision 2010. Numerous references to joint AMD systems and capabilities will appear, for AMD operations are inherently joint in nature. No single services systems can satisfy all AMD requirements throughout the theater of operation; each service brings unique capabilities to the operation.
The Army Vision 2010 timeframe considered is 2010-2015.
The term "AMD" or "Army AMD" applies to all Army air and missile defense weapons and C4I systems, as their capabilities are synergistic. (The other services AMD systems will be referenced as "joint AMD"). AMD forces in the division consist of Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, Stinger MANPADS, Sentinel, FAAD C2 systems, and an advanced weapon system(s) projected to enter the force by 2015. (The advanced weapon system(s) may be a missile, kinetic energy system, directed energy system, or multiple combinations of these.) The corps AMD units will contain MEADS, Avenger, Sentinel, FAAD C2, and, perhaps, the advanced weapon system(s). The AMD force at echelons above corps will consist of PATRIOT, THAAD, and JTAGS. Aerostat will be task organized into the AMD force and deployed in both corps and theater areas in support of AMD forces and missions. AMD Planning and Control Systems (AMDPCS), modularly configured, will appear throughout the force, from the theater-level AAMDC to battery and platoon levels.
AMD operations in 2010 will be fully integrated with those of Army, joint, other governmental, and multinational partners. The succeeding paragraphs present Army AMD support of the patterns of operation and its role in achieving Full Spectrum Dominance.
Gain Information Dominance. Gain Information Dominance encompasses defensive efforts to attain and protect friendly force information and offensive efforts to deny information to threat forces (Figure 3-5). Gain Information Dominance will magnify the advantages provided by our high-quality force and enable U.S. forces to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. AMD systems are critical components in information warfare.
Defensive information warfare to protect U.S. information operations will be one of the biggest challenges ahead. Fixed sites, within the United States and in forward-deployed areas, will be potential targets for aggression. In deployed areas, Army AMD planning to protect vital information systems from attack begins in the AMDPCS. The AMDPCS will integrate AMD weapons, sensors, and C4I capabilities with those of the joint force into a cohesive system capable of protecting assigned information systems. AMD weapon systems will defend information system assets at national (NMD), theater (THAAD, PATRIOT), corps (MEADS, Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)), and divisional (Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)) levels.
Offensive information warfare operations will neutralize an adversarys ability to collect information. The ability to remove the threats "eyes" or his communications flow and to degrade his continuity of operations is fundamental to the attainment of information superiority. The AMDPCS is the essential focal point for AMD offensive information warfare, integrating with joint and other Army systems to synchronize the actions of all AMD elements. In conjunction with offensive air and deep attack strikes against command, control, and communications complexes, AMD forces will engage UAV RISTA platforms, denying them aerial intelligence data on friendly force locations, movements, and intentions. Warnings of threat aerial activity will trigger passive defense measures, further preventing threat situational awareness. Throughout the operation, corps and divisional AMD systems (e.g., Avenger, advanced weapon system(s)) will position forward of defended assets -- given considerations of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and Weather, and Time Available (METT-T), security, and system availability -- to limit or deny observation by RISTA UAVs. While highly effective against the low-altitude UAV threat, these systems and sensor capabilities are further enhanced when integrated with MEADS units.
The AMD information systems must collect, process, and disseminate common airspace and C2 information to support information warfare operations. Long-range air picture information, provided by the consortium of national sensors and satellites, joint sources such as the Air Force and Navy airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and JTAGS, assists in creating early warning intelligence for the force commanders. The Army AMD sensor/data network -- with inputs from JTAGS, AMD weapon system radars, the Aerostat system, and Sentinel nodes -- can provide a real-time or near-real-time air picture of the AMD battlespace to the force commander. The shorter-range sensor systems, such as Sentinel and Aerostat, provide added intelligence on low-level, smaller signature threats (CMs, UAVs, helicopters) that may be "invisible" to other sensors. The synergy of capabilities allows for the creation and distribution of a common, true air picture. Interoperable C2 centers throughout the joint force and the ground force, with requisite connectivity and responsiveness, provide integrated battle management and execution. The AMDPCS will be employed with the AAMDC, in support of the Joint Force Land Component Commander, and with AMD units on the battlefield to support ground forces from maneuver brigade to theater level. In addition, the AAMDC will establish an integrated air, sea, and ground picture, share this picture with deploying forces, refine and update the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), monitor friendly and threat air operations, and recommend defense designs and AMD priorities in coordination with maneuver plans.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Gain Information Dominance objectives are as follows:
Project the Force. The focus of AMD operations during Project the Force (Figure 3-6) encompasses mission planning and deployment preparation actions in CONUS, or other staging bases, to early entry and initial buildup in the theater of operations. Mission planning must include pre-deployment, en route, and post-deployment actions. Key considerations are what are needed, when, and where. Threat, strategic transport availability, force and system capabilities, and interoperability needs are driving factors. Simulation, analysis, and rehearsal are major contributors to force readiness prior to employment.
Protection of the force projection base is of paramount importance. The threats ability to threaten that base, whether real or perceived, may significantly influence deployment flow. AMD forces must be alerted to and prepared for any possibilities of threat aerial actions. When deployed, the fixed land-based NMD system will protect the U.S.-based force projection capability as well as the U.S. population, industrial base, and infrastructure against limited ICBM attack on the American homeland.
The initial AMD force to be deployed must be modular, tailorable, versatile, interoperable, and lethal. In scenarios with littoral operations, it is likely that the Navy Aegis will provide initial TMD protection of the deploying forces. Airlifted Army AMD forces will be among the first deployed Army elements and, with Navy (and perhaps Marine) AMD systems, will operate in task-organized forces to establish the multi-layered protection to counter the threat spectrum. Army AMD forces will be interoperable with the Navy elements for C2 and for common, shared situational awareness, synchronization of operations, and sensor resource sharing. At a given point in the operations, based on mission, threat, and requirements, Navy AMD forces will likely withdraw or reposition to protect the sea lines of communications for the deployed force. Army, Air Force, and Marine forces and C2 elements will assume Navy functions and missions and maintain the full dimensional defense of the later arriving deployers into aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) and seaports of debarkation (SPOD) as buildup of forces and equipment continues. Additional Army AMD forces, most likely the highest percentage of committed AMD assets in theater, will expand defenses of critical assets and the deployed force commensurate with, and in response to, the Joint Force Commanders directives.
In deployments where the threat of air and missile strikes exists, AMD units deploy with the initial force. The AMD deployers consist of a mix of systems tailored to meet mission and threat considerations. With airlift requirements at a premium, the lighter, multi-threat capable systems such as MEADS, Avenger, and the advanced weapon system(s) are attractive deployment options. However, where a significant longer range TBM threat exists, the more airlift-intensive THAAD and PAC-3 systems assume higher movement priority by strategic airlift. The theater AMD systems (THAAD and PATRIOT) provide a two-tiered defense for the lodgment APODs/SPODs and the initial force concentrations located under their protective envelope. Corps AMD assets (e.g., Avenger, MEADS, advanced weapon system(s)) are task organized for composite and complementary defense against the other aerial threats.
An element of the AAMDC will deploy early in the force projection phase if the air or missile threat requires employment of theater and/or corps AMD. As the senior Army command for AMD, the AAMDC supports the centralized planning, coordination, integration, and execution for the Army Force Commander/Joint Force Land Component Commander. The AAMDC is the focus for the coordinated employment and integration of Army AMD (including corps AMD forces) into joint theater air and missile defense with joint counterair/TMD plans and C4I architectures.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Project the Force objectives are:
Protect the Force. Protect the Force is arguably the most joint of the patterns of operation. From initial entry through redeployment, Protect the Force encompasses the host of AMD weapons and C2 systems (Figure 3-7). Each services systems bring some unique capabilities to the overall defense. Virtually all may participate during the course of the operation, some from the start and others not until well into the buildup. Sustained interoperability is key to ensuring maximum engagement opportunities and mission success.
Prior to the initial entry, throughout any operation, and after the end of hostilities, the U.S.-based power projection capability and infrastructure must be protected. Both at home and abroad, the Army will contribute to the strategic defense of the United States. The Army, integrated into a detection and C2 architecture with air- and sea-based components, will provide the teeth of the missile engagement capability to protect the United States against its most serious external threat -- missile attack. When deployed, the Armys fixed, land-based NMD system will provide the effective protection of all 50 states against limited ICBM attacks.
Layered defense is achieved by the synergy of joint AMD weapon systems and the C4I architecture. Critical C2 centers, logistical complexes, and troop assembly areas are prime targets for missile attacks. Synchronized joint AMD forces minimize threat aerial operations and maximize friendly force freedom of action in the air and on the ground. Upper-tier systems (i.e., Army THAAD and/or Navy Theater-Wide TBM Defense) and lower-tier systems (i.e., PATRIOT, MEADS, Navy Area TBM Defense) provide defense of the designated assets. Army divisional and corps AMD and, potentially, Marine air defense units may also be integrated to increase defense capabilities. Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighters add capabilities against threat aircraft. The air picture provided by the Aerostat, Sentinel, JTAGS, and other service sensors enhances engagement timelines and force survivability.
Defense in depth extends to the forward areas of the battlefield and throughout the battlespace. The Land Component Commanders AMD units move with and support the maneuvering forces and their sustainment organizations and facilities. Overwatch by the longer range systems (i.e., PATRIOT and MEADS) expands defense in depth and altitude and against TBMs.
Army AMD units position to optimize defense of selected assets in accordance with the Joint Force Commanders priorities. Lower-tier systems, such as PATRIOT and MEADS, generally employ in close proximity to defended assets. THAAD employs as separate batteries, normally attached to the lower-tier PATRIOT/MEADS battalion. The upper-tier THAAD system protects defended assets against attack by MRBMs and SRBMs. Overlapping TBM coverage of all assets is preferred to thicken the defense and provide assured, near-leakproof defense of high-value assets. Deployed JTAGS will report on TBMs using satellite data. JTAGS interfaces with theater communications networks to transmit warning, alerting, and, where possible, cueing information on launched TBMs. This will support AMD active defense measures, passive defense measures, and attack operations. During entry, corps and divisional AMD systems -- Avenger, Bradley Linebacker, and the advanced weapon system(s) -- integrate with MEADS and PATRIOT for defense against CMs, UAVs, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. The advanced weapon system(s) will provide a "deep magazine" capability to counter saturation raids throughout the battlespace. Corps and divisional AMD systems position forward of defended assets and orient toward the anticipated directions of approach. The Sentinel is integrated into the overall surveillance plan. Positioned forward of defended assets, Sentinel provides increased detection and cueing and extends engagement ranges against low-altitude threats.
The Army Aerostat system is also inte-grated into the AMD architecture. The Aerostat, which complements other joint airborne sensors, provides multidimensional awareness to the force. Its primary missions are to detect the low-altitude LACM threat and to provide a surveillance umbrella, denying terrain sanctuary to low-flying aerial platforms. It can also detect and share ground target information with other Army C2 nodes and support Army and joint active defense, passive defense, attack operations, and C4I operations.
As forces continue to build up and expand in the theater, additional PATRIOT and MEADS systems arrive to augment the initial theater missile defense, extending AMD coverage to provide protection of maneuvering forces. Arriving PATRIOT battalions replace MEADS elements that have been employed in theater-level, lower-tier missions. THAAD, PATRIOT, and corps AMD units continue to defend APODs, SPODs, and selected geopolitical assets designated by the Joint Force Commander. MEADS units transition to protection of maneuver forces moving to or within assembly areas, in conjunction with other corps and divisional AMD units. Divisional AMD resources generally defend their organic divisions in staging and assembly areas. The corps AMD battalions are task organized (MEADS battle elements and Avenger/advanced weapon system(s) batteries) to leverage the synergy provided by combining individual systems firepower and surveillance capabilities. The AMD role in Protect the Force continues through the Decisive Operations and Sustain the Force phases of the operation as described below.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Protect the Force objectives are:
Shape the Battlespace. Shape the Battlespace creates an environment that affords mobile and quick-reacting friendly forces flexibility of actions while constricting threat options and actions. Defense of forces against threat missiles is gained through a common, integrated C2 architecture, shared air intelligence, and timely synchronized engagements of threat platforms by capable, lethal AMD forces (Figure 3-8). Air and space intelligence results in a common air picture and precise calculations and targeting data for the location of TBM launch points. Conversely, enemy observation is denied or restricted, thereby reducing his targeting capabilities and visualization of the battlefield.
AMD forces are essential contributors to the Armys decide, detect, and deliver imperatives of Shape the Battlespace. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine air defense and air control elements contribute to the understanding of the friendly and threat third-dimension activities and the potential threat to the commanders concept of operations. AMD sensors provide early warning of approaches by threat observation and attack platforms, permitting force dispersal and concealment and preparing AMD and other force weapons for engagements. The creation of a detailed, common air picture allows unambiguous situational awareness. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine systems defend against missile attacks, provide long-range fires, and conduct deep attack missions to limit threat capabilities and isolate the battlefield.
AMD shaping of the battlespace focuses on protecting the force and denying or limiting the threats understanding of friendly intentions. Divisional and corps AMD systems will protect maneuver forces, while moving and in assembly areas, and other critical assets against RISTA UAVs and attacks by CMs, TBMs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and rockets. Systems, such as Avenger and the advanced weapon system(s), generally position out from the defended route of movement or asset, in depth, and orient toward likely directions of approach. MEADS units complement these systems, providing protection against short- range TBMs and cruise missiles and extending the defense against threat aerial platforms that attempt to overfly or standoff from the shorter range/altitude systems. Sentinel, employed in conjunction with the MEADS sensors, orients on low-altitude targets, covers gaps, and extends MEADS surveillance forward. When augmented with Aerostats, Sentinel sensors negate terrain sanctuary to low-altitude aerial platforms. PATRIOT, THAAD, and Avenger/advanced weapon system(s) units continue their protection of critical theater assets, generally in rear areas.
The AAMDC and brigade/battalion AMDPCSs will review and process intelligence data, provided via space-based, aerial and ground sensor platforms, and reassess threat situations based on these data. Data from JTAGS, PATRIOT, THAAD, and MEADS may assist in determining TBM launch points and can be transmitted to deep attack systems to facilitate engagements.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Shape the Battlespace objectives are as follows:
Decisive Operations. In Decisive Opera-tions, concentrated combat power successfully overwhelms the threat. While operations continue throughout the theater, the focus of Decisive Operations is the forward area (Figure 3-9). The maneuvering forces must retain flexibility of action and overwhelming superiority in tempo to meet mission objectives. Maneuvering forces are continuously supported by integrated fires from air and ground systems.
The joint AMD force extends protection from the rear to the forward areas. Air Force aircraft provide air superiority against threat aircraft and attack threat artillery, missile, and C2 sites. Marine Low-Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) systems defend their forces and may complement or extend the air and missile defense of Army forces. Army AMD in rear areas of the corps and theater maintain protection of critical C2 and logistical nodes and move forward, as directed, to extend an overarching layer of defense. Survivable, agile, mobile Army AMD forces move with the force and provide close-in defense against the low-flying attackers. Interoperable C2 and operations centers are continuously aware of activities on the battlefield and in the battlespace. They maintain an unambiguous picture of the airspace and are capable of expeditiously positioning or repositioning AMD assets to maximize responsiveness to threat activities.
The AMD mission focus is the defeat of threat air and missile strikes against maneuver forces and theater assets and denial of threat UAV RISTA efforts. While PATRIOT, THAAD, and Avengers/advanced weapon systems maintain their defense of the APODs, SPODs, and priority geopolitical assets throughout the theater, Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, advanced weapon system(s), and MEADS units provide AMD coverage of the corps maneuvering units and such critical assets as forward refueling and ammunition points, aviation forward operating bases, and potential choke points. PATRIOT units may move forward and position to augment coverage of the corps logistical concentrations, particularly against SRBMs.
Divisional and corps AMD systems will position both in the maneuvering force formations and along routes of advance. Bradley Linebackers and advanced weapon systems accompany the maneuver units as they advance to counter the threats close battle air support platforms -- helicopters and lethal UAVs. The Bradley Linebackers and advanced weapon systems generally position immediately behind the lead maneuvering elements, weighted toward the flanks of the formations. Avengers and other advanced weapon systems deploy along the routes of advance to protect the force against helicopters, CMs, lethal UAVs, and RISTA UAVs. Sentinel and Aerostat data, integrated with those of the MEADS sensors and other Army and joint AMD sensors, enhance the forward air picture.
MEADS employs forward to provide overwatch protection of maneuvering forces against TBMs, cruise missiles, and low-altitude air-breathing threats, in conjunction with Bradley Linebacker, Avenger, and advanced weapon system(s) units. Sensors position to extend sur-veillance forward of the close combat area, permitting engagement of aircraft, standoff heli-copters, and UAVs deployed beyond Avenger, Bradley Linebacker, and advanced weapon system(s) capabilities.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Decisive Operations objectives are:
Sustain the Force. Sustain the Force is a continuing operation from deployment to redeployment. Significant planning, however, must precede deployment. The loading designs must maximize capabilities with minimum equip-ment and transportation assets. Units will be tailored to fit the mission. Logistics must be defined to meet demands at the right time. Continuous interoperability between the various elements of the force is key to facilitating resupply efforts in the most efficient, effective, and timely manner (Figure 3-10).
Logistical complexes, embarkation and debarkation ports, and resupply points, all critical force assets, must have protection from air and missile attacks. The greatest threat periods are during the initial buildup, the early hours and days of the operation, and during reconstitution and redeployment. During these times, large concentrations of personnel, equipment, and supplies in relatively small areas become lucrative targets for threat missiles. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine AMD components will provide the requisite warning, counter-attack, and synergistic defense of logistical facilities to ensure the unimpeded flow of operations.
AMD units throughout the force, integrated via modular, tailored AMDPCSs, focus on the defense of the logistical facilities and deploying or reconstituting forces. PATRIOT and THAAD maintain protection of the air and sea ports and staging areas against TBMs. MEADS adds capabilities against TBM and CM attacks and complements divisional and other corps AMD systems. Bradley Linebackers, Avengers, and advanced weapons systems focus on countering potential threat RISTA or lethal UAVs and providing a low altitude "gap-filling" capability against CMs, thereby preventing surprise attacks and enhancing force security.
AMD required operational capabilities to achieve Sustain the Force objectives are:
AAN is the process that follows and connects Force XXI, the Armys process of change, to the long-term vision of the Army. The AAN process conceptualizes the geo-strategic environment 30 years into the future and focuses on issues from 2010 to 2025. The AAN provides a vehicle for anticipating the course of future warfare and strategic issues affecting the Army. The research cycle of workshops, wargames, and conferences that comprises the AAN process will be repeated annually to permit comparative analysis and ensure that assumptions of the future are continuously exposed to critical inquiry.
The following emerging insights have become key factors in the AAN program:
In the period leading to AAN, the AMD force must assume greater force protection responsibilities. The force of the future cannot afford to absorb the first volley from an enemy. The AMD force must thus be able to counter the array of weapons across the technology spectrum and ensure that nothing targets or attacks the force from the air (Figure 3-11).
AMD Force 2025
Wargames and conferences will provide insights and findings to develop an AMD path to AAN. The AMD forces in AAN -- AMD Force 2025 -- will mold the capabilities of legacy systems with new systems.
By 2025, the air and missile defense battlespace will greatly expand. Potential future opponents will likely possess advanced aerospace warfare capabilities that could at least equal our own. AMD Force 2025 must be ready to defeat technologically improved, long-range, precision- strike TBMs and CMS, mini- and micro-UAVs, the equivalents of F-22/JSF manned aircraft and Comanche helicopters, and such futuristic additional threats as space transport and attack vehicles (the latter armed with kinetic energy projectiles, launched missiles, or directed energy weapons), information warfare systems, and airborne lasers.
AMD Force 2025 may organize into Battle Units of roughly 100 soldiers in strength. The Battle Units will contain AMD weapons and C4I functionality integrated into on-board weapons systems. AMD weapons will "plug-in" to a C4I host architecture for situation awareness, targeting, and C2. Those weapons systems can be multi-tasked for close battle, fire support, and air defense simultaneously.
Sensor-to-shooter links, target acquisition, cueing, and fire control for AMD will feed into the overarching theater C4I network to supply data, as required, to all battlespace requesters. Fire control will largely be machine-driven with opportunity for human "command-by-negation" as necessary. Command will be exercised by the human creation of statements of intent that will be interpreted and applied by machine intelligence.Summary
Full Spectrum Dominance remains at the heart of the Armys warfighting vision as that vision evolves from Force XXI to the AAN. AMD forces and systems will be capable of meeting the requirements identified for each of the Army Vision 2010 patterns of operation. They will continue to protect forces and key assets from air and missile threats, including ICBMs, TBMs, CMs, UAVs, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and rockets. These AMD systems, together with improvements in doctrine, training, leader development, and organization, will allow AMD soldiers to execute Force XXI operations, the Army Vision 2010/Joint Vision 2010, and the AAN.
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