Appendix 1

Selected Republican Staff Memoranda to the members of the Foreign 
  Relations Committee:
    April 20, 1999 ``Current and Growing Missile Threats to the 
      United States and the Need for Ballistic Missile Defense''.   377
    May 12, 1999 ``The ABM Treaty and the Need for Ballistic 
      Missile Defenses''.........................................   394
    May 24, 1999 ``The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty''..........   399
    May 25, 1999 ``Cornerstone of Our Security?: Should the 
      Senate Reject a Protocol to Reconstitute the ABM Treaty 
      with Four New Partners?''..................................   403
    September 13, 1999 ``National Intelligence Estimate: Foreign 
      Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to 
      the United States Through 2015''...........................   407

S. Hrg. 106-339 BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations <snowflake> Available via the World Wide Web: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director (ii)
A P P E N D I C E S ---------- APPENDIX 1 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, April 20, 1999. MEMORANDUM To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations Through: James W. Nance From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean Subject: Current and Growing Missile Threats to the United States and the Need for Ballistic Missile Defense The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat to the United States and the need for a national missile defense on Tuesday, April 20, at 9:30 AM in SD-562. The first witness will be the Honorable Jim Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense. A second panel will be comprised of the Honorable Bill Schneider, former Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and the Honorable Jim Lilley, former Ambassador to China. Senator Hagel will preside. Attachment. The Current and Growing Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Introduction and Key Judgment The ballistic missile threat to the United States is present, and growing. A number of countries possess the capability today to hold U.S. cities hostage to the threat of ballistic missile attack. Both Russia and China have long fielded nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles that are targeted, or are capable of being rapidly retargeted, at the United States. Several other countries, such as North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan, are making rapid progress in the development of missile systems with intercontinental ranges. (Iraq, too, can be expected to join this club in the absence of UNSCOM inspections). Moreover, a large number of countries possess the capacity to mount a ship-based, short range ballistic missile attack against the United States and its territories. The spread of ballistic missiles and missile production capability is global in character, and is not limited to any specific geographic region. Between 20 and 25 countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Latin America possess (or are seeking to obtain) ballistic missiles, and a small number of countries are pursuing acquisition of large inventories of missiles. During testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated: More than 25 countries, many of them hostile to the U.S. and to our friends and allies, may have or may be developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons--so-called weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. More than a dozen countries have operational ballistic missiles, and more have programs in place to develop them. That judgement was echoed in a March 1995 study released by the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency: At least 20 countries--nearly half of them in the Middle East and South Asia--already have or may be developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria (see country profiles, Annex A)--pose the greatest threat because of the aggressive nature of their WMD programs. All five already have or are developing ballistic missiles. In addition, nine Third World countries also produce ballistic missiles--Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, and South Africa. Four others--Brazil, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria--are developing the means for production. The threat posed to the United States by ballistic missiles is rapidly growing due to nine global trends:
  • The key elements of an indigenous ballistic missile program are not overly complex, are generally related to several types of common commercial ventures, and are increasingly available to third world nations;
  • Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile design, development, and deployment is now available, and is accelerating missile programs;
  • Serious leakage of components and critical technologies is occurring despite limitations imposed under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
  • The United States must be concerned that a country with an ICBM might sell a complete system, or complete stages of that system;
  • Countries can rapidly reconfigure their space launch vehicles to serve as ICBMs; moreover space launch vehicle programs in general can enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development;
  • A country need not engage in a lengthy flight test program prior to deployment of an ICBM;
  • Development of short and medium-range missiles will enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development;
  • Countries are today able to deploy a ship-launched, short or medium-range ballistic missile capable of threatening the United States; and
  • The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from existing nuclear arsenals is serious, and could increase with instability in Russia. The principal cause for concern to the United States posed by missile proliferation is the high likelihood that these systems will be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. troops abroad, to attack key allies, and ultimately to threaten U.S. citizens at home. When mated with a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead, a ballistic missile would enable a country to hold at risk populations and targets in neighboring states. Moreover, several countries of concern (e.g. North Korea, Iran, and China) are making rapid strides in enhancing the range, accuracy, and payload capabilities of their ballistic missiles, seemingly with the intent to hold U.S. cities at risk. Whereas little agreement previously existed on the extent to which the threat of attack by ballistic missiles posed a danger to the United States, consensus on this question has begun to emerge in the wake of the findings by the Rumsfeld Commission, and in the aftermath of the launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile by North Korea. The Rumsfeld Commission, whose formal title was The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201). The Commission's mandate was to ``assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States.'' Members of the Commission were nominated by the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leaders of the Senate and House of Representatives, and consisted of: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and former Secretary of Defense; Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Chairman and Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; General Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command and Strategic Air Command; Dr. Richard L. Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology with the Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. William R. Graham, Chairman of the Board and President of National Security Research and former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Dr. William Schneider, Jr., President of International Planning Services, Inc. and former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance; General Larry Welch, President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force; Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School at Johns Hopkins University and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Partner in the law Firm of Shea and Gardner and former Director of Central Intelligence. unanimous conclusions of the rumsfeld commission regarding the threat The nine Commissioners are unanimous in concluding that:
  • ``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions. The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.'' [emphasis added]
  • ``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.''
  • ``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding. This erosion has roots both within and beyond the intelligence process itself. The Community's capabilities in this area need to be strengthened in terms of both resources and methodology.''
  • ``The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios--including re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea-and air-launch options, shortened development programs that might include testing in a third country, or some combination of these--the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment.'' key unanimous policy recommendation of the rumsfeld commission
  • ``Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.'' trends contributing to the spread of ballistic missile capability Trend #1: The key elements of an indigenous ballistic missile program are not overly complex, generally related to several common types of commercial ventures, and are increasingly available to third world nations This is not a new trend. In 1981 a report prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concluded: The development and production of solid-fueled ballistic missiles with ranges between 1000 and 2000 kilometers is technically within the capabilities of states with experience in the production of advanced weapons systems, and military aircraft in particular.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge, MA, June 1981), p. iii. This finding was based on the judgment that the design and manufacture of a ballistic missile--whether relying primarily upon indigenous or imported components--requires technical capabilities and infrastructure which can be found in the manufacture of aircraft and other advanced systems. In particular, the study found that commercial, ``off-the-shelf'' inertial navigation systems could be adapted for use in ballistic missiles. ``Such items are usually available as spares or replacement parts for exported aircraft, both civilian and military.'' \2\ Certainly the United States, Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union all used adapted materials in developing their own missile programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Ibid, p. 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment identified 12 developing countries--Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil--as having at least an ``incipient'' capability to produce ballistic missiles. This list remains today a fair representation of evolving ballistic missile production capability outside of Europe. Nearly all of the aforementioned countries--perhaps with the exception of Iraq--are being aided in their pursuit of the capability to indigenously develop and manufacture ballistic missiles by the global spread of precision machine tooling capabilities, aerospace ventures, and modern chemical and (in the case of biological warheads) pharmaceutical production facilities. Technological obstacles associated with two of the primary elements of a ballistic missile program (propulsion and guidance) have become increasingly easy to overcome due to this trend.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ A flight-test capability also is important, though less so when a country seeks merely to utilize or adapt proven designs. Finally, if a country wishes to develop sophisticated warheads for its missile program, it must develop a capability to design, (or integrate, if the warhead is acquired from abroad) a re-entry vehicle onto the missile. These elements of a program have linkages to both commercial space launch ventures and to the nuclear, chemical, and/or pharmaceutical industries. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The technological challenges surrounding the development of a propulsion system are formidable, but not insurmountable. For example, solid propellants suitable for medium- and even long-range systems are relatively easy to produce. Any country with a chemical production capacity suitable for manufacturing large-caliber artillery shells also is capable of mastering long range ballistic missile propulsion technology. Iran's experience with developing the Oghab artillery rocket is thought to have contributed substantially to the development of the Iran-130 short range missile. Brazil, too, is thought to have benefitted from this linkage.\4\ Even the more complex, composite solids--typically a combination of ammonium perchlorate and a resin-- can be produced in several Third World countries. Iraq, for example, has been constructing three factories to produce solid-fuel rocket components, engines, and to provide test facilities (as part of Project 395).\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Carus, Seth, ``Long Range Artillery rockets in the Third World,'' Jane's Intelligence Review (Jane's Information Group: London, October 1991), p. 475. \5\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Brookings: Washington, 1991), p. 56. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Likewise, domestic development of missile guidance technology is also increasingly feasible. Any country with electronics and precision tool manufacturing industries, along with engineering laboratories, is capable of developing an inertial navigation system (INS) for use in a ballistic missile program. Aside from INS, even simpler forms of guidance are commercially- available. Radio correction and strap-down systems, both of which use equipment present in common radars and high performance radios, have already been developed by a large number of countries--among them India and North Korea. Despite the fact that these systems may yield large inaccuracies at long ranges, nevertheless a number of countries have found these systems acceptable for their purposes. For instance, China relies exclusively upon strap-down guidance in its DF-4 ICBM. Radio correction was sufficient to give early U.S. and Soviet ICBMs CEP accuracies of 3 km or better over a 9000 km flight.\6\ Indeed, because of its low cost and ease of development, a number of countries may turn to radio corrected guidance. Additionally, radio correction saves weight in the missile in comparison with INS systems, allowing for increased payload or range. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ MacKenzie, D.A., Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 310- 313, 428-429. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In short, due to the increasing availability of general production and manufacturing equipment and commercial off-the-shelf technology, countries with indigenous ballistic missile programs are finding it increasingly easy to overcome key technological hurdles. Trend #2: Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile design, development, and deployment is now available, and is accelerating missile programs Not only has the past decade seen extraordinary improvements in the indigenous production capabilities of various countries, but it also has witnessed a dramatic increase in the availability of outside help to countries seeking ballistic missiles. As the Rumsfeld Commission noted: ``Foreign assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact.'' Previous analyses which overly-focused on indigenous production capabilities produced flawed conclusions due to their failure to factor in the availability of foreign assistance. As Former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey stated during testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 24, 1996: . . . concentrating on indigenous ICBM development seems to me to limit very sharply any general conclusions that might legitimately be drawn. . . . Indigenous development of ICBM's was of interest during the Cold War because the Soviets sought to restrain their client states and maintain a monopoly. But countries such as Iraq are no longer client states of the Soviet Union, which does not exist anymore, and they are not even client states of Russia. They are doing what they please. And in the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia, China, and North Korea particularly are very much in the business of export for many ballistic missile components and for some technologies that relate to weapons of mass destruction. Foreign assistance is the norm in ballistic missile development-- not the exception; this sort of help often is critical to enable countries to solve difficult developmental obstacles. Moreover, external assistance hinders and complicates the U.S. ability to predict how soon a system will be deployed. The Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency published an unclassified assessment in March 1995 that summed up trends in foreign assistance: The widening market for ballistic missiles and missile- related technologies over the past two decades has contributed to an increase in the types and number of suppliers. The growing list of suppliers includes organizations in China, North Korea, the industrialized states in Europe and South America, and in several Third World countries. Private consortiums are also among the suppliers of missile components and technologies. Iraq was able to establish its ballistic missile program through such suppliers. Historically, countries engaged in the development of ballistic missiles have proven more than willing to collaborate with one another on projects. Through Soviet assistance, at least ten countries in the Third World and four republics of the former Soviet Union field either Soviet-made missiles or some variant, the most common of which is the single-stage, liquid-fueled SCUD B. That missile has range of 300 km and is capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram payload. Russia continues in the Soviet tradition of providing ballistic missile assistance to the developing world. Russia is one of the two principal suppliers of components and technological assistance to countries seeking to acquire ballistic missiles. According to a July 1997 study by the Central Intelligence Agency, while China ranked as ``the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries,'' Russia also supplied a variety of ballistic missile-related items to foreign countries during the same time frame, with the majority of the assistance going to Iran. Further, Russia also has served as an important source for Indian and Pakistani missile programs. In January 1997, the Congress became aware of the widespread assistance being given Iran's ballistic missile program by a large number of Russian entities. According to various press reports, at least ten Russian firms, including the state arms export agency Rosvooruzhenie and the Russian space agency, have aided Iran in overcoming a number of technical obstacles--in direct contravention of Russia's obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime. The cooperation consists of key assistance on navigation, guidance systems, rocket motor work, and the transfer of equipment related to the Russian SS-4 liquid-fueled, intermediate range missile. Russia has provided wind-tunnel testing for missile nose cones, and assisted in the development of a solid fuel project. Finally, Russian firms also are reported to have concluded contracts for the construction of a wind tunnel, manufacture of mock-ups, and the creation of software for Iran's missile program. The result has been that the Iranian program is advancing far more quickly than previously expected. This assistance has enabled Iran to make strides that otherwise would have taken years of research, development, and testing. According to a September 10, 1997 story in The Washington Times, Russian assistance has been directed towards two systems--the Shabab-3 and -4--both of which are based on North Korea's No Dong missile. The Shahab-3 will have a range of up to 930 miles and is expected to carry a 1,650 pound warhead. The Shahab-4 is to have a range of 1,240 miles and a warhead of 2,200 pounds. Two additional, unnamed systems with ranges of 5,500 km and 10,000 km respectively may also be under development in Iran.\7\ Until these revelations, Iran was thought to be years away from the development of a missile capable of striking Tel Aviv or Riyadh. Now, according to various press articles, the Shahab-3 will be deployed within a year or two, and the Shahab-4 within three. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Congressional Research Service, Russian Missile Technology and Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran, March 27, 1998, p. 4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Russia also reportedly has provided significant and varied assistance to Chinese missile programs. During testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, 1993, then- Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated: . . . China continues to obtain missile technology from Russia and Ukraine, and China is actively pursuing agreements covering increasingly more sensitive areas. This raises concern not only because the transfers improve China's military capabilities, but also because it introduces the possibility that China could, in turn, pass more advanced Russian or Ukrainian-derived technology to other states, as Beijing has done previously with its own technology. China, in turn, also provides a wide variety of missile assistance to various countries, ranging from the transfer of complete systems to the sharing of technical data and blueprints. China has shown a willingness to transfer ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as related production technology, to the most troubled of regions (e.g., the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf). A case-in-point is China's provision of M-11 missiles and key components to Pakistan. Transfer of M-11's, for which Pakistan may have developed nuclear warheads, has contributed to heightened tensions in the region.\8\ Similarly, Iran's development of medium range missiles using Chinese technology and its equipping of various patrol craft with the C-802 anti-shipping cruise missiles (provided by Beijing) has been a source of concern for the United States Armed Forces and key Middle Eastern allies alike. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ The Washington Post, ``Pakistan May Have Nuclear Tips for Rockets,'' May 30, 1998, p. A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On August 27, 1993, Admiral William Studeman, acting Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn stating that: China is one of Iran's primary suppliers of defense technology. Missile-related technology cooperation, for example, has involved China's provision of technical and production expertise to Iran's indigenous missile development programs. . . . More recent press reports suggest that China may be cooperating with Iran to develop short-range ballistic missiles. Of course, the bulk of Chinese missile cooperation with Iran has consisted of transfers of componentry, rather than complete systems. On June 22, 1995, the New York Times quoted a May 1995 Central Intelligence Agency study as concluding that China had ``delivered dozens, perhaps hundreds, of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran . . .'' Other sources said rocket propellent ingredients were provided as well. The CIA reportedly had determined that the components would give Iran's Scud-type missiles improved accuracy, and possibly the ability to build such missiles on its own. On November 21, 1996, the Washington Times quoted from an alleged October 1996 CIA report documenting China's sale to Iran's Defense Industries Organization of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment meant to test and upgrade various missile systems. In May of 1997, China reportedly agreed to sell Iran X-ray equipment to study missile casings and to check for defects in solid-propellant, and a later press report added that China had supplied telemetry equipment which sends and collects missile guidance data during flight tests.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ The Washington Times, ``Russia, China aid Iran's missile program; Prototype expected within three years of weapon that could hit Central Europe,'' September 10, 1997, p. A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- China's transfer of missile design, production, and testing technology is particularly worrisome. By contributing to the development of indigenous missile manufacturing capabilities, China has enabled several countries to circumvent the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the intent of which is to slow the spread of missile technology by restricting missile-related transfers to a small club of like-minded nations. It also, by transferring such technology, has greatly complicated the United States' ability to predict when countries will be able to field systems capable of striking the U.S. and its allies. The following represents a partial list of Chinese missile proliferation behavior, as reported in the press:
  • China's Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation is alleged to have sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1995 and 1996.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ The Washington Times, ``U.S., China Clash Over Missile Deal,'' October 4, 1994, p. A8. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • ``A complete factory for producing M-11 missiles or systems of similar ranges was sold to Pakistan in 1996.'' \11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ The Washington Times, ``China to Halt Missile Sales to Iran,'' January 20, 1998, p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China's Poly Venture's Company is alleged to have shipped specialized metalworking presses and a special furnace to a Pakistani missile production facility.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • Missile patrol boats equipped with scores of advanced C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles were sold to Iran in 1996.'' \13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Ibid., p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China's Great Wall Corporation is alleged to have sold ``telemetry infrastructure'' and equipment to Iran. \14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ The Washington Times, ``Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program,'' September 10, 1997, p. A1. See also The Washington Times, ``U.S. Offers Deal to Stop China's Nuke Sales,'' October 14, 1997, p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China's Precision Engineering Institute New Technology Corp. is alleged to have agreed to sell Iran's Defense Industries Organization gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ The Washington Times, ``China Joins Forces With Iran on Short- Range Missile,'' June 17, 1997, p. A3. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China is alleged to have agreed to make three deliveries of specialty steel to Iran in 1999 and is alleged to have trained 10 Iranian engineers on inertial guidance systems in China.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China is alleged to have shipped ``rocket motors and test equipment'' to Iran for a new short-range missile ``known as the NP-110.'' \17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ The Washington Times, ``China to Halt Missile Sales to Iran,'' January 20, 1998, p. A1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China's Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation is alleged to have sold ``missile-related components'' to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ The Washington Times, ``State Looks at Chinese Missile-Part Exports,'' July 24, 1996, p. A4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  • China is alleged to have agreed to collaborate with North Korea on both selling to Iran titanium-stabilized duplex steel for its missiles, and on a variety of missile programs in North Korea--including the sale to the DPRK of ``special steel.'' \19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1. In addition to Russia and China, North Korea is a major supplier of both missiles and missile production facilities. During testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated: North Korea has sold Syria and Iran extended range Scud Cs and has apparently agreed to sell missiles to Libya. Russia and Ukraine are showing a growing willingness to sell missile technology prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles, and several Persian Gulf States have purchased whole systems as well as production technology from China and North Korea. Some have equipped these missiles with weapons of mass destruction, and others are striving to do so. . . . North Korea has sold extended range Scud missiles to-- among others--Iran and Syria, and is developing and actively marketing a new, 1000 kilometer-range missile. North Korea apparently has no threshold governing its sales--it is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay. Admiral Studeman added, in response to a question by Senator Lieberman: Iran, one of North Korea's best customers for ballistic missiles and related technology, is likely to be one of the first recipients of the 1,000 km No Dong (vice Dung Ho). By the end of this decade, Iran could be able to manufacture or assemble short-range (Scud B and C) and medium-range (No Dong) ballistic missiles. Several other countries also have transferred missiles or missile production technology in the past, including Argentina, Libya, Egypt, and various European countries. A French company, SAGEM, is believed to have developed the guidance systems for the Condor-2 program. A German firm has been alleged to have assisted Iraq in the development of a new guidance system for its enhanced Scud program. The German space agency, DFVLR, assisted Indian scientists with guidance system algorithms for the SLV-3, Agni and Prithvi.\20\ Likewise, India's indigenous development of rocket propulsion systems was apparently aided by French technology and technicians. \21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ Karp, Aaron, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (SIPRI: Oxford, 1996), p. 119. \21\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development, p. 46. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In short, nearly every Third World ballistic missile program has benefitted substantially from foreign assistance. In some cases, the assistance may have been unknowing, consisting of end-use diversion of dual-use items such as accelerometers. However, in most cases the assistance has been deliberate and has consisted not only of the transfer of sensitive componentry (such as German-built gyroscopes for Iraq's Project 1728), but of production capabilities. For these reasons, we assess that no country is significantly inhibited from acquiring key technologies. Those that have been stymied in their ability to obtain assistance from the West are now shopping in China, Russia, and North Korea. Trend #3: Serious leakage of components and critical technologies is occurring despite limitations imposed under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) An unclassified version of a 1993 CIA report stated: ``The MTCR has been moderately successful at slowing the transfer of missile-related technologies between member and nonmember countries.'' \22\ The authors of the CIA report were careful to make clear that the MTCR did not, of course, prevent transfers between nonmembers, such as China and Iran. Moreover, it must be clear that the intelligence community assessed that the MTCR has not prevented ballistic missile collaboration, but rather has ``slowed'' its pace. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ Attachment to letter from CIA Director of Congressional Affairs Stanley Moskowitz to Chairmen Dellums, Schroeder and Glickman, November 17, 1993. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, put it another way: A short-cut approach that is prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime and by the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be for such Third World countries to buy ICBMs or major components covertly, together with suitable nuclear warheads or fissile materials. Anything such as that would, of course, speed up ICBM acquisition by such nations. . . . If through violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty countries other than Russia and China are able to acquire components and technology from other countries, that could make such things a concern sooner. An independent panel tasked with reviewing intelligence community assessments of the missile threat (chaired by former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates) warned against placing too much stock in the MTCR. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on December 4, 1996, Mr. Gates noted that: ``the panel believes the Estimate [NIE 95-19] places too much of a burden on the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of limiting the flow of missile technology to rogue states.'' This criticism would seem to be well-founded given that members of the MTCR continue to violate their commitments. For example, in a May 10, 1996 response to questions asked by Senator Specter, the Central Intelligence Agency stated: Russian firms are marketing dual-use hardware and technology--including items covered by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime--at international aerospace exhibitions. Similarly, on May 6, 1996, Lt. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote to Senator Specter stating that: Russia is known to be marketing worldwide dual-use technology which may enhance a purchasing country's ballistic missile program. Some of the dual-use technology is most likely covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. Another possible conduit for the transfer of ballistic missile- applicable technology is through aerospace-related joint ventures. Both Russia and Ukraine are pursuing such cooperation. He added that: Rampant corruption and decentralized control have also increased the potential for illegal arms exports since Soviet military trade was consolidated under the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry. In addition, many Russian scientists and engineers are known to be working in/for several non-FSU countries. These individuals were directly involved in defensive missile system research and development programs in the FSU and, more recently, in the successor states. The December 1995 interdiction by Jordanian officials of advanced Russian ballistic missile gyroscopes and accelerometers destined for an Iraqi missile plant serves as a case in point. Indeed, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 1996, Secretary of Defense Perry admitted that time needed by various countries to deploy ballistic missiles ``could be foreshortened if any of those nations were able . . . to get direct assistance from countries that already have [such systems], either sending them missiles, selling them missiles, or giving them an important component or technology assistance.'' The Pentagon's November, 1997, proliferation threat assessment clearly indicates that China, like Russia, continues to proliferate missile technology in spite of its MTCR commitments: Also, China has a bilateral agreement with the United States under which it has agreed to ban all exports of MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles and to abide by the original 1987 MTCR guidelines and parameters. Nonetheless, the United States remains concerned about continuing Chinese assistance to missile programs in some countries of proliferation concern. And of course, other countries which are not MTCR members continue to provide direct assistance to Third World missile programs. With respect to North Korea, the Pentagon's 1997 study determines: North Korea operates a complex, integrated network of trading companies, brokers, shippers, and banks that facilitate NBC weapon and ballistic missile-related trade. This trade involves complete systems, components, manufacturing equipment, and technology . . . North Korea is not a member of the MTCR and is not expected to join . . . Pyongyang's policy of supplying rogue states with ballistic missiles and related technology remains a factor in the advancement of several Middle Eastern production programs. As the North develops even longer range missiles and improves its chemical warfare capabilities, the potential exists for additional North Korea exports. As is clear from the earlier discussion of the scope of Chinese technical assistance to Iran and Pakistan, any assumption that the MTCR can be counted upon to prevent, or significantly limit, ballistic missile proliferation is flawed on its face. Serious circumvention of the MTCR is the norm, not the exception. Trend #4: The United States must be concerned that a country with an ICBM might sell a complete system, or complete stages of that system In 1993, then-National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Larry Gershwin, has stated: ``We also remain concerned that hostile nations will try to purchase from other states ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States.'' \23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Speech to the American Defense Preparedness Association, May 18, 1993. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Similarly, then-DCI Studeman stated in his 1993 responses to Congress: We also remain concerned that hostile nations will try to purchase from other states ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States. Libya, for example, has in the past publicly stated a desire for weapons of mass destruction that could be delivered by ballistic missile to the United States. A shortcut approach--prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--would be to buy ICBMs or major components covertly, together with suitable warheads or controlled materials. The acquisition of key production technologies would also greatly speed ICBM development.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Letter to Senator Glenn, August 27, 1993. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, the Gates Panel rightly pointed out that: ``The United States cannot rule out the possibility of a strategic change of direction or policy in Russia or China--or in other countries--over a fifteen year span of time that might lead to a sale of a long-range missile system to a Third World country.'' The concerns expressed by these officials derive from the fact that countries already have aggressively marketed medium-range missiles and some may already have tried to sell ICBMs. China's sale of CSS-2's to Saudi Arabia has been well publicized. Less attention was given, however, to China's reported marketing in 1984 of the DF-5 ICBM (with a 12,000 kilometer range) for use in the Brazilian and Argentinean ``space'' programs.\25\ While China was turned down for a lack of hard currency, Brazil does seem to have concluded an agreement with China to develop a four-stage, solid-propellant space launch vehicle that may be marketed for export as a ballistic missile.\26\ Numerous press reports also indicate that Russia has sought to market variants of nearly every one of its ICBMs for space launch purposes.\27\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Burrows, William and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), p. 396. \26\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, p. 19. \27\ Anna Bakina, ``Strategic Missile Under Conversion Into Space Booster,'' ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1995; ``RSA To Turn Swords Into Plowshares,'' Kommersant Daily, 7 July 1995, p. 9; ``SS-19s To Be Converted Into Rokot Space Carrier Rockets,'' FBIS Report: Arms Control and Proliferation, FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 4 August 1995, p. 97; Vitaly Chukseyev, ``Russia to Supply Boosters for U.S. Missiles,'' ITAR-TASS, 13 October 1995. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under these circumstances, it would be imprudent to assume that countries hostile to the United States would be unable to acquire a complete missile system, particularly in the event of widespread economic and political turmoil in Russia. While the possibility of the transfer of a complete missile remains remote, it cannot be discounted. Trend #5: Countries can rapidly reconfigure their space launch vehicles to serve as ICBMs; moreover space launch vehicle programs in general can enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development Several countries, including Japan, Ukraine, Brazil, Israel, and India, possess space launch vehicles (SLVs) which could rapidly be reconfigured to serve as ICBMs. While it is difficult to gauge the likelihood of this happening, the United States must recognize that unforeseen political circumstances might prompt such a development. India, for example, may determine that ICBMs are necessary for any number of reasons--perhaps as a means of deterring third party intervention in any future Indo-Pakistani conflict. The circumstances under which Ukraine, Japan, or Taiwan might find an ICBM-capability advantageous also should be examined. At a minimum, an SLV program is an incipient ICBM program. With regard to India, Admiral Studeman noted on August 27, 1993, that: India could convert its space launch vehicles into IRBMs or ICBMs quite easily. India has already demonstrated the ability to build guidance sets and warheads, the two key ingredients needed to convert an SLV into a ballistic missile. . . . An ICBM based on the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) would be technically feasible for the Indians. A warhead capable of handling ICBM reentry conditions and designed for the PSLV would need to be developed. A new IRBM or ICBM based on the propulsion and guidance technology employed by the PSLV would be possible. With respect to Brazil, then-DCI Studeman noted: Brasilia has stated repeatedly that the SLV program is devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. Moreover, there is widespread public support for the program because it is viewed as making Brazil a competitor in the international space launch market. Nevertheless, Brazilian officials admit that if Brazil completed development of an SLV, it would have the capability to build ballistic missiles. India and Brazil are but two of a number of countries who either possess or are developing SLVs capable of being converted into ICBMs. The list grows if one considers those countries that have the technological ``know-how'' to develop an SLV. As General William Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency and chairman of the SDIO Proliferation Study Team put it in a February 1993 report: The conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States during this decade or early in the next decade can be sustained only if plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, February 1993, p. 1. As far as the linkages between SLV and ICBM technologies, during testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, 1993, by then-Director of Central Intelligence, R. James --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Woolsey: The space launch vehicle technology is very similar to and is clearly applicable toward developing ballistic missiles. It was the reason why Sputnik led to concerns for the security of the United States back at the end of the 1950s. . . . it is unfortunately the case that the technologies for ICBMs and space launch vehicles are very close and in some cases virtually identical. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``the only major difference between the space and missile variants is that the final boost stage of the ICBM is terminated earlier, before the payload has achieved enough velocity to enter orbit, resulting in its return to earth.'' \29\ Indeed, of the eight essential components for an ICBM, all but one (the warhead) are used in modified form on a space launch vehicle. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (ACDA: Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Both the United States and the Soviet Union used ICBMs as boosters in their space programs. The Atlas, Titan, SS-5, and SS-6 rockets were all of military origin. Similarly, systems or stages of systems under development in India and Brazil can be used as ballistic missiles. Indeed, perhaps with the exception of Japan, no country has ever embarked upon an SLV program for purely nonmilitary reasons. On August 27, 1993, Admiral William Studeman, acting Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn stating that: Applying space launch vehicle (SLV) components or technology to a ballistic missile program is a relatively straightforward task. SLV and ballistic missile technologies, components, and operations are very similar and often identical, thus no ``safeguards'' exist which could prevent conversion of SLV components or technologies for use in ballistic missiles. For example, India's first space launch vehicle, the SLV-3, was based on the U.S. Scout launch vehicle. Its first stage also serves as the first stage of the Agni medium-range ballistic missile. This interchangeability easily allows diversion of SLV technology into missile programs. Any country which receives technology to manufacture SLVs also receives the necessary technology to manufacture ballistic missiles. By providing SLV manufacturing technology, an inherent ballistic missile manufacturing capability is transferred as well. For countries with little indigenous missile technology, transfer of SLV production technology could reduce their missile development time frame by several years. A 1992 report by The System Planning Corporation found SLV conversion to be ``fairly straightforward.'' \30\ Another 1992 study by Science Applications International Corporation found that ``The increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space launch services could result in the ability of certain Third World countries to threaten the continental U.S. with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.'' \31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, pp. 26-28. \31\ Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, ``GPALS and Foreign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities,'' SAIC, February 1992, p. 18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- First, it is analytical folly to overlook the fact that several countries today have the capacity to threaten the U.S. with an ICBM, though not necessarily the intent. Second, the increasing availability of dual-use technologies--particularly through SLV programs--will enhance the ability of countries to produce ballistic missiles, and may prompt other countries to pursue their own, indigenous development. The proliferation of sensitive technologies via space programs will enable more effective integration of ballistic missile components, will extend the range and payload capabilities of various missiles under development, and reduce the circular error probable (CEP), increasing accuracy. Even as all of this is occurring, the Intelligence Community is finding difficult the monitoring of SLV programs to ensure that they do not contribute to a ballistic missile program. Intent is hard to assess, and since there is no practical capability to distinguish between SLV and ICBM development, the U.S. may be denied timely warning of an emerging missile threat based on SLV technology. In some cases, the threat could emerge ``over night'' as a country simply transforms a commercial system to a military role. Trend #6: A country need not engage in a lengthy flight test program prior to deployment of an ICBM. This means reduced warning time Under the Clinton Administration the intelligence community assumed that a flight test program lasting about 5 years is essential to the development of an ICBM. \32\ Richard Cooper specifically noted that ``a flight test is a sure, detectable sign of a ballistic missile program. Normally the first flight test would provide at least five years warning before deployment.'' He added that ``Moreover, we would almost certainly obtain other earlier indicators of an ICBM program.'' \33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ GAO/NSIAD-96-225, Foreign Missile Threats, p. 7. \33\ Cooper testimony, House National Security Committee, February 28, 1996, p. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The high degree of certainty with which NIE 95-19 judges that indicators of an ICBM program would be detected prior to the missile's flight testing would seem questionable in light of the Intelligence Community's reported intelligence gaps with regard to both the Iraqi and North Korean missile programs. For example, according to one intelligence analyst, it was only after Iraq's test launch of a modified Scud B (the al-Hossein) on August 3, 1987, that the United States, ``suddenly realized we had a missile problem in Iraq.'' \34\ According to many, the al-Hossein test was the first indicator that Iraq had another ballistic missile program besides the Condor II project. While the Scud-upgrade program (Project 1728), was the least technologically demanding of Iraq's missile programs, it ranged in scope from the cannibalization of existing Soviet Scuds to Iraqi manufacture of major components such as missile cases. Moreover, Project 1728 entailed a massive foreign acquisition program which obtained rocket nozzles, virtually a complete testing plant for missile propulsion systems, a liquid rocket fuel plant (which also could make UDMH), turbo pumps for missile fuel systems, and gyroscopes.\35\ It therefore clearly had observable features. Yet it went undetected (according to credible public accounts). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq, (Boulder: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), p. 268. \35\ Ibid., p. 253-255. UDMH, unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine, is a rocket fuel additive which boosts propulsion. The ability to manufacture or obtain rocket fuel additives, particularly for solid fuels, may be important to the indigenous development of an ICBM propulsion system. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On February 29, 1988--just seven months after its first and only flight test of the modified Scud B--Iraq began launching ballistic missiles at Iranian cities. Yet the U.S. Intelligence Community reportedly was at a loss to identify the type of missile being used by Iraq. According to Kenneth Timmerman, Iranian broadcast video of unexploded missile components had the Intelligence Community ``tied in knots.'' \36\ Although the componentry was positively identified as belonging to Soviet-built Scud Bs, the distance to the target in Iran was well beyond the range of even the Scud C (which Iraq had not received). It was only after the Iran-Iraq war that it became clear that Iraq had cut up and rewelded Scud B fuel tanks to create longer fuel tanks that could hold five, rather than four, tons of fuel.\37\ Iraq had additionally reduced the size of the missile warhead and had moved air tanks from the missile's tail to the nose.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ Ibid., p. 288. \37\ Ibid. \38\ Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez, ``Iraq's al-Hossein Missile Program,'' Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. experience with monitoring the Iraqi missile program would seem, at a minimum, to call into question the bold assertion that the U.S. would ``almost certainly'' detect a ballistic missile program prior to a flight test. It would also seem to indicate that a country might, under certain conditions, find a way to ``cut corners'' in the ballistic missile development process. The U.S. experience with North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 missile is no less telling. On August 31, 1998, North Korea stunned the United States by firing a Taepo Dong 1 which had a third stage. ``The existence of the third stage concerned us,'' according to Bob Walpole, the National Intelligence officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs.\39\ ``First, we had not included it in our earlier projections; neither had outside experts looking at our intelligence. Second, it and potentially larger third stages have significant implications for the Taepo Dong-2.'' \40\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ ``North Korea's Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,'' Robert Walpole, 8 December 1998, p. 2. \40\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The launch of the Taepo Dong 1 by North Korea demonstrated significant and unexpected progress in stage separation technology. With only one flight test, North Korea proved that it possessed the ability--in the words of NIO Walpole--``to deliver small payloads to ICBM ranges . . .'' \41\ In other words, North Korea has developed an ICBM capable of attacking the United States with a small biological or chemical payload. It did so--not with a five year flight program--but with only one flight test. As the North Korean example proves, in the absence of concrete indicators regarding a Third World country's ICBM program, a flight test may be the first and only indication we may have of an emerging ICBM threat. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Any assumption that the U.S. will have advance warning of an ICBM deployment since any ICBM flight test program would last at least five years reflects a serious analytical shortcoming: the ``mirror imaging'' of Western ICBM developmental programs. Historically, the United States has engaged in six different types of tests: (1) technology/componentry tests; (2) research and development tests; (3) initial operational tests; (4) demonstration and shakedown tests; (5) follow-on tests; and (6) aging and surveillance tests.\42\ The first three types are those tests normally conducted prior to deployment of a fully operational U.S. ICBM. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Wilkes, Owen et al., Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University: Canberra, 1991), pp. 75-80. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Depending upon circumstances, it may be technically feasible for a country to significantly shorten the time spent on various test stages. For instance, the purpose of technology and componentry testing is to validate the effectiveness of advanced components or sub-assemblies that incorporate unproven, high-risk technology. If a Third World country acquires components that have already been validated in other ballistic missile programs--such as with Iran's reported acquisition of SS-4 liquid-fuel technology--the need for this type of test would be diminished, or perhaps even eliminated altogether. In fact, a Third World country which has acquired only a handful of inertial navigation systems or gyroscopes may be loathe to sacrifice any of its scarce resources in such a test. Research and developmental tests are conducted to validate successive stages in an ICBM design process. If, however, a country were to rely upon proven designs, fewer such tests would be necessary. The French missile program demonstrates how an incremental development process which recycles proven technology may reduce the number of developmental tests required. Relying upon components and sub-systems proven in other systems, France was able to deploy the 2,750 kilometer range S-2 missile in six years with only 12 test launches.\43\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ Villain, J., La Force de Dissuassion: Genese et Evolution (Editions Lariviere: Paris, 1987), p. 61. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- North Korea seems to be following this pattern of development using recycled technology. According to an April 1996 report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Taepo Dong 2 missile is thought to be a new combination of existing missile components--presumably derived from the Nodong program. The same is believed to be true for the Taepo Dong 1 system. If the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 are indeed but extensions of the Nodong program, this would explain why their rapid development may have taken the Intelligence Community by surprise.\44\ The Taepo Dong series' linkages to the Nodong program explains why North Korea did not feel compelled to flight test the Taepo Dong 1 until last summer, since the basic concept was validated in the May 1993 Nodong flight test. Moreover, given the relative success of the Taepo Dong 1's flight test, North Korea may not feel compelled to flight test the follow-on system at all prior to use. At a minimum, North Korea may conduct only a handful of operational flight tests. Under such circumstances, the Taepo Dong 2 could easily be deployed without 5 years of rigorous testing. Further, operational similarities between the Taepo Dong 2 and its Nodong progenitor might foreshorten training requirements for missile crews. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ Barbara Starr, Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is an additional concern here as well. In June, 1994, The Washington Times reported that the United States has confirmed that Iranian officials have been present at a number of missile tests in North Korea, which were described as ``sales demonstrations.'' We may, therefore, presume that Iran also has validated the Nodong's design, having witnessed successful tests.\45\ Accordingly, if the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 are simply further improvements of the Nodong system, Iran also may engage in fewer flight tests of its intermediate systems.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ This raises an interesting point. Press articles from 1994 reported that North Korea may test the Nodong missile in Iran because ``[testing facilities] don't exist for a full-range test in North Korea.'' Obviously, were this to occur, it would shorten Iran's own missile testing timetable. It also raises the troubling prospect that the Intelligence Community might be uncertain, in the future, as to how many countries are deriving technical benefit from a ballistic missile test. \46\ Certainly there is ample evidence to suggest that Iran's medium-range systems utilize Nodong technology. Iranian interest in the Nodong missile has been widely publicized. In his 1994 posture statement, Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Edward Shaefer's reportedly stated that ``Iranian acquisition of the No-dong system from North Korea is possible in the future.'' (Arms Control Today, July 1994, p. 23; see also, Barbara Starr, Jane's Defence Weekly, August 6, 1994, pp. 4-6.) Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau testified on June 14, 1994, that ``We're concerned about press reports and other intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the No-Dong missile-- with a much longer range than the Scud-B and -C.'' (The Washington Times, June 16, 1994, p. A 13; see also, James Bruce, Jane's Defence Weekly, July 30, 1994, pp. 23-33.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If Iran is using Nodong technology for its medium-range program, then it may use it for its longer-range, follow-on missiles. Were Iran to stack two Nodong stages together, flight testing of the basic conceptual design may be viewed as unnecessary. (We will assess the feasibility of ``stacking'' stages later in the assessment.) Finally, as the United States found in testing the MX ICBM, successful developmental tests also could foreshorten the test series. The U.S. conducted its first operational trial test of the MX less than four years after it had initiated the flight test program (June 1983- March 1987).\47\ Moreover, a significant number of the tests from October 1984 to August 1986 were devoted to integration of the MX's re- entry vehicle. (These types of tests may not be germane to a Third World ICBM program, particularly if a biological warhead is to be employed). Operational testing of the MX missile was concluded in March 1990. In other words, the United States moved from testing componentry to certifying operational capability of its most sophisticated ICBM--it had a longer range and higher CEP than earlier systems--in roughly seven years. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Wilkes, Owen et al., Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing, p. 81. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In judging that any flight test program would last at least five years, the intelligence community previously seemed to assume that a would-be ICBM developer in the Third World will have nearly the same demanding requirements for payload, range, and accuracy as did the United States at the height of the Cold War. Instead, it now seems more likely that Third World countries will pursue intercontinental-range missiles for their deterrent value--as a means to threaten counter- value targets, such as cities. Under such circumstances, a far less rigorous test program would be required. A CEP of 800 meters matters little if the target is New York City or Honolulu. Further, given the high cost of flight testing, the temptation to make do with fewer tests may also foreshorten the timetable. Finally, if the country has been able to develop a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead for the missile, the need to test for accuracy is further reduced. The basic rule of thumb for the U.S. missile program, stipulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that the number of missiles tested must be sufficient to provide the U.S. with a 90 percent confidence that the ICBM's reliability is not less than ten points below the success rate of the series.\48\ This is a very rigorous standard. The United States should contemplate the possibility that a Third World test program might not be designed to prove with such a high degree of confidence that every deployed system will work. Rather, testing may be designed to confirm the mechanical integrity of a system--to prove that it can work. One cannot dismiss the political pressures and other imponderables which might prompt a country to deploy a missile with little or no testing, or to foreshorten legs of the testing program. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ Ibid., p. 77. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On this point, while the Gates Panel agreed with NIE 95-19 that a country developing an ICBM would almost certainly test it, it nevertheless concluded that ``most important among the deficiencies of NIE 95-19'' was the Estimate's ``failure to adequately address the motives and objectives of the governments developing missile programs, and how they affect technology needs.'' According to the panel: With the ballistic missile programs we are seeing now, however, motive matters a great deal, and can significantly affect technology. What is required technically for a crude terror weapon is very different than what is required for a weapon that is militarily useful. History is replete with examples of how motives and objectives--as opposed to technical interests--dictated developmental and testing timetables. For example, the pressures of the Sino-Soviet conflict prompted China's decision to deploy the DF-5 for operational training only two months after its first two full-range test flights into the Pacific.\49\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ Lewis, John Wilson, and Hua Di, ``China's Ballistic Missile Programs,'' International Security (Fall 1992), p. 18. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Most significantly, in the midst of the Cold War race to send a man to the moon, the United States developed the Saturn-S rocket with no flight testing at all. The rocket flew successfully for first time on November 8, 1967 as part of the Apollo-4 mission.\50\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \50\ Bilstein, R.E., Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA: Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 349-351. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In July 1993, the CIA explicitly recognized the likelihood--not possibility--that a country might foreshorten an ICBM testing timetable: Because of the limited capabilities and likely motivations for attacking CONUS with ICBMs--such as international coercion, deterring US attacks, and regional influence building--it is highly likely that any country making the decision would pursue a high-risk development program with no (or limited) testing in order to shorten schedules and reduce the visibility of the program.\51\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ Attachment to Moskowitz letter to Dellums et al., November 17, 1993. This assessment underscores the fact that the United States cannot rely upon observation of flight tests for warning that an ICBM threat is emerging. Trend #7: Development of short and medium-range missiles will enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development There are numerous linkages between short- and medium-range missile development and ICBM development. Shifting from a short or medium range missile to a long range ICBM is a viable technological option. Such a shift can be accomplished via two alternatives that are widely discussed in the literature on missile proliferation: vertical stacking and horizontal clustering of shorter or medium-range missiles. Several assessments have taken seriously the potential for horizontal clustering of medium-range missile components. A 1993 CIA report found that ``clustering lower performance engines is an option available for increasing the missile's range or payload capacity.'' \52\ Similarly, a 1992 report by the Space Systems Division of Rockwell International determined that 13 SCUD missiles could be clustered together--nine in the first stage, three in the second, and one in the third--to produce an ICBM with a range of 7000 kilometers. \53\ Indeed, the report goes on to examine other potential combinations of available rocket boosters and finds that clustering could result in an ICBM with a range of 14,000 km or more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ Attachment to Moskowitz letter to Dellums et al., November 17, 1993. \53\ Howe, J.R., Emerging Long-Range Threat to CONUS (Rockwell International, Space Systems Division: Washington, D.C., Dec. 1992). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The United States can ill-afford to dismiss horizontal clustering as a technical option given the history of both U.S. and Soviet long- range rocket designs. In the 1950s both countries progressed rapidly from single-stage, intermediate range missiles (such as the SS-4, SS-5, Jupiter, and Thor missiles) to the development of ICBMs (SS-6 and Atlas) which were essentially single-stage rockets surrounded by strap- on engines. NASA, for example, engineered the Saturn-1 and Saturn-1B space launch vehicles out of eight Redstone boosters. Subsequently the Saturn-S also made use of clustering.\54\ As has already been noted, the Saturn-S was launched ``full up'' and successfully without any prior flight testing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ Bilstein, R.E., Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Washington, DC, 1980) pp. 176-83, 323-45. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Significantly, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea all have experimented with the concept. Iraq, for example, designed the ``al Abed,'' which integrated seven boosters (at least six of which were Scuds). Although there has been speculation that the second and third stages were dummies, U.S. officials nevertheless took the technological implications of the clustering design seriously. It was calculated at the time that the al Abed could ultimately be configured to deliver payloads over an intercontinental distance.\55\ Half a year later, then-Secretary of Defense Cheney stated: ``The booster looked as if it were made up of five short-range rockets. Together the rockets could give the booster a range of 1000 kilometers.'' \56\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ ``U.S. Confirms Iraq has Launched Rocket That Can Carry Satellites,'' The New York Times, 8 December 1989. \56\ U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, No. 294-90, 11 June 1990, p. 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The other technical option that would enable a country to develop an ICBM using shorter range missiles would be to ``stack'' the boosters. A 1981 study for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency examines the feasibility of this approach at length. That report concludes that long-range ballistic missiles could be created by combining two or three single-stage boosters into a single, multiple- stage rocket. The report concluded that ``a two-stage system is relatively easy to construct from the available components . . .'' \57\ In fact, the report concludes that virtually all solid propellant rockets can be adapted to two-stage ballistic missile system. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development, pp. 45-49. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The 1981 ACDA-commissioned report also concludes that, ``while technically difficult, it may be possible to stack three identical stages together to increase the range of these rockets.'' \58\ This is the approach taken by Brazil in its Sonda series of sounding rockets, which according to the Defense Intelligence Agency has evolved from a single-stage to the four stage Sonda-IV.\59\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ Ibid., p. 54. \59\ Pumphrey, Joe D., Status of Third World Ballistic Missile Technology (Defense Intelligence Agency: Washington, 1986), p. 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The study provides a number of examples, including a hypothetical missile comprised of two commercially-marketed French Mammoth boosters (which use rocket engines similar to those licensed by the French government for manufacture in both India and Pakistan) which could deliver a 250 kg payload to a distance of over 1,200 kilometers. Similarly, by stacking two commercial Ariane strap-on boosters, a country could develop a missile with a range of nearly 3,000 kilometers.\60\ As a practical matter, India's two-stage Agni system (with an intended range of over 2,000 km) is a two stage missile which reportedly combines India's solid-fueled SLV-3 booster with a liquid- fueled second stage apparently adapted from the Prithvi.\61\ It also has been speculated that Iraq's 2000 km-range Tammuz prototype was comprised of an al-Hossein booster and modified SA-2 surface to air missile.\62\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ Ibid., pp. 53-61. \61\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, p. 45. \62\ Navias, Martin, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (Brassey's: London, 1993), pp. 106-107. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Further, press accounts indicate that North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 may be a two-stage missile incorporating the Taepo Dong 1 stacked on a 16.2 meter booster.\63\ Certainly, the stacking of the third stage on the Taepo Dong 1 provided an increased range to that system, and also has caused the intelligence community to rethink its assumptions about the range and payload capacity of the Taepo Dong 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ ``U.S. Reportedly Within New North Missile Range,'' FBIS-EAS- 95-175 (September 11, 1995), p. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Trend #8: Countries are today able to deploy a ship-launched, short or medium-range ballistic missile capable of threatening the United States According to the Gates Panel: The Panel also believes that the possibility of a sea-based ballistic missile of less than intercontinental range warrants more attention than given in the Estimate [NIE 95-19]. The Estimate's assessment of the ballistic missile threat to North America concentrates almost exclusively on ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. Consideration of scenarios involving crude sea-launched ballistic missiles (e.g., Scud- derived missiles launched from mobile launchers driven aboard transport ships) is limited. Since developing missiles with sufficient range was identified as one of the most difficult technical obstacles which would have to be overcome before North America would face an ICBM threat, the lack of serious attention to possible SLBM threats is all the more noteworthy. The idea of launching short-range, ballistic missiles from sea is not new. For example, the Soviet Union deployed, beginning in 1958, the R-11FM and R-13 ballistic missiles on its submarines. The two types of short-range ballistic missiles (both were launched from the vessel's sail) had a range of 150 km and 600 km respectively.\64\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ Boris Rodionov, ``First Ballistic Missiles for the Submarine Fleet,'' Military Parade (January/February, 1996), pp. 58-61. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Obviously, future programs may not be as complex as the Soviet submarine system. A country just as easily could roll a mobile transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) onto a barge or merchant ship, or could outfit a vessel's cargo hold with a launch system. In and of itself, this would pose minor technical challenges to most Third World countries. One of the most critical obstacles to be overcome would be hardening the platform against humidity and vibration. A country might find it more difficult were it to pursue integration of the missile's guidance system with some form of inertial guidance on the ship (in order to correct for the unsteady sea state). Left uncorrected, even minimal rolling or pitching by the naval vessel could produce large missile inaccuracies down-range. Of course, for a country intending to deliver a Scud missile tipped with a biological or chemical warhead against a U.S. city, no guidance system correction is necessary. Even ``getting close'' would suffice to cause immense devastation. In short, the requisite technology to threaten the U.S. with short- range ballistic missile attack from the sea already exists and is readily adaptable. Trend #9: The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from existing nuclear arsenals is increasing On February 28, 1996, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Richard Cooper, testified before the House National Security Committee that: In our recent NIE, the Intelligence Community reaffirmed earlier assessments that the current threat to North America from unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese strategic missiles remains remote and has not changed significantly from that of the past decade. Such an assumption is at odds with the Intelligence Community's concerns over the potential for turbulence in the former Soviet Union. A classified CIA report issued in September 1996, entitled ``Prospects for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons,'' seems to have been excerpted in published media accounts. \65\ Reportedly, it concluded that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ ``Russian Renegades Pose Nuke Danger: CIA Says Arsenal Lacks Tight Controls,'' The Washington Times, October 22, 1996, p. A1. The Russian nuclear command and control system is being subjected to stresses it was not designed to withstand as a result of wrenching social change, economic hardship, and malaise within the armed forces . . . . . . despite official assurances, high-level Moscow officials are concerned about the security of their nuclear inventory. In evaluating several worst-case scenarios, the CIA report also reportedly concluded that ``a severe political crisis, however, could exacerbate existing dissension and factionalization in the military, possibly heightening tensions between Russian political and military leaders and even splitting the general staff or nuclear commands.'' Yet another troubling finding of the report is that the command posts of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces ``have the technical capability to launch without authorization of political leaders or the general staff.'' Given time, the report states, ``all technical [security] measures can be circumvented--probably within weeks or days depending upon the weapon involved.'' Moreover, the political leadership probably could not ``prevent the general staff (or perhaps some other national level command post) from launching on its own.'' Additionally, the report warns that nuclear armed units may be conspiring to commit nuclear blackmail and that some submarine crews ``probably have an autonomous launch capability and might have the ability to employ SLAMS as well.'' There are at least two additional incidents which heighten concern about the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia. During the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, a secret order from Russian Defense Minister Yazov led to unauthorized alert status for Russian armed forces, including strategic nuclear forces. \66\ While the August 1991 coup attempt was an incident of previously-unforseen political turmoil in Russia, it is clear that Russia's political future could see similar events in the future. The second troubling event was the January 1995 Russian nuclear alert in overreaction to the launch of a Norwegian meteorological rocket. \67\ This event reportedly led to the Russian strategic nuclear force control terminals--the nuclear ``footballs''--being switched to alert mode for several minutes.\68\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ See ``Yazov Mobilization Order,'' FBIS-SOV-91-166 (August 27, 1991), p. 59 and ``Deputy Procurator General Interviewed on Putsch,'' FBIS-SOV-92-021 (January 31, 1992), pp. 37-41. \67\ See ``Norwegian Science Rocket Puts Russian Defense on Alert,'' The Washington Times (January 29, 1995), p. A16; ``Russian Radars Alert Moscow After Detecting Missile Launch,'' Agence France Presse (January 25, 1996); and ``Yeltsin Leaves Chechnya Behind in Lipetsk, But Takes the `Black Attache Case' With Him,'' Izvestiya (January 27, 1995) p. 1. \68\ See also the article by Nikolay Devyanin, designer of the Russian nuclear force control terminals: ``All That Has Happened, Alas, Had to Happen,'' Moskovskiye Novosti, January 29-February 5, 1995, pp. 1, 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the possibility of a large-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States may be at an all-time low, the risk of mishap--accidental or otherwise--has not decreased proportionately to reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal. In fact, media accounts which have not been challenged for accuracy raise the troubling possibility that Russian control of strategic nuclear forces is not as secure as it was during the Cold War. The possibility of accidental or unauthorized launch may be ``low,'' but--like the possibility of a nuclear exchange during the Cold War--it is clearly a possibility with severe consequences. In the words of the Gates Panel: With major forces of change still at play in Russia, the Panel believes the Estimate's discussion of unauthorized launch is superficial and may be overly sanguine. All agree that a launch unauthorized by the Russian political leadership is a remote possibility. But it would appear to be technically possible. ______ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 12, 1999. MEMORANDUM To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations Through: James W. Nance From: Marshall Billingslea, Sherry Grandjean, and Andrew Anderson Subject: Hearing on the ABM Treaty and the Need For Ballistic Missile Defenses The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat to the United States and the need for a national missile defense on Thursday, May 13, at 10:00 AM in SD-562. The witnesses will be the Honorable Stephen Hadley, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Bush; (2) the Honorable Robert G. Joseph, former Ambassador to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission; and (3) the Honorable David Smith, former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Defense and Space Talks. Senator Hagel will preside. Attachment. Ballistic Missile Defense: Technological Issues Basic Architecture Planned for a National Missile Defense The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) of the Department of Defense has developed a national missile defense (NMD) program which will, if ever deployed, establish a ground-based missile defense designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats. The NMD plan is intended to be layered, over time, to achieve three successive levels of capability (called ``C1'', ``C2'', and ``C3''). The first, most basic missile defense, C1, is meant to provide a very ``thin'' protection against a few, technologically-simple incoming warheads. As such, it is oriented against the North Korean threat. As will be discussed, C1 would not be effective against the Chinese arsenal of two dozen warheads, and certainly would not be capable of stopping an attack by Russia. It will not be suitable for dealing with the emerging Iranian ICBM threat due to the planned location of the single interceptor site in Alaska. It also will be incapable of defending against short-range ship-launched ICBMs. However, the current intention is to deploy C2, and C1 is an intermediate step along the way. The second- and third-generation of defenses, C2 and C3, are meant to provide capability against a few incoming, sophisticated warheads, and defense against a larger number of sophisticated warheads, respectively. elements of the national missile defense system There are six major technological components to the Administration's planned NMD system:
  • Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) (``Missiles'') The GBI and its associated components are the ``weapon'' of the NMD system. Its mission is to strike and destroy by force of impact high speed ballistic missile warheads in the midcourse or exo-atmospheric phase of their trajectories. The GBI consists of three components: --The missile payload, or exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). The EKV has its own sensors, propulsion, communications, guidance, and computing functions which will work together to complete the intercept. --A booster that will propel the EKV toward the approximate intercept location so the EKV can perform the final maneuvers to impact and destroy the incoming warhead. --Ground command and launch equipment needed to launch the interceptor. This includes software and hardware to interface with the BM/C3 system, human-in-control interfaces (consoles), and interceptor storage sites (silos) for daily maintenance and readiness functions and to launch the interceptor. As of March, 1999, the administration plans for 20 interceptor missiles in central Alaska, if a decision to deploy C1 is taken. This is being done because technical assessments indicate that national coverage cannot be accomplished from North Dakota alone. For C2, the plan calls for 80 more weapons in Alaska. C3 adds a further 25 interceptors to the Alaskan site, bringing the total to 125, and calls for a second missile defense site of 125 interceptors at Grand Forks, North Dakota.
  • Forward Deployed and/or U.S.-based X-Band Radars (XBR) The XBRs are forward deployed, ground-based, taskable, multi- function radars. In the NMD role, they perform acquisition, tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment of incoming warheads. XBRs use high frequency and advanced radar signal processing technology to improve target resolution, which permits the radar to perform more effectively against closely-spaced warheads and debris. For C1, the initial XBR capability would consist of the single radar at Shemya, Alaska. C2 would add three more X-Band Radars at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, England. These radars sites already exist, possessing early warning, surveillance capabilities. C3 would add a further XBR in South Korea.
  • Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) U.S. early warning radars are large, fixed, phased-array surveillance radars used to detect and track ballistic missiles directed into the United States. Upgrades to the existing network will provide the capability to support the NMD surveillance function. Prior to deployment of the SBIRS (Low) satellites, the UEWRs will be used to detect and track objects during their midcourse phase, primarily to cue the more precise X-Band Radars. There are cases, however, where the XBR will not possess sufficient range to conduct intercepts; in those cases the UEWR will provide the only tracking data. However, this would not be compliant with the ABM Treaty. C1 will utilize a network of five existing radars. C2 would not add any additional UEWR, but C3 would add a radar in South Korea.
  • Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communication (BM/C3) BM/C3 is the ``brains'' of the NMD system. In the event of a launch against the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) will control and operate the NMD system through the BM/C3. The BM/C3 element supports the Commander-in- Chief with extensive decision support systems, battle management displays, and situation awareness information. In this way, it supplies the means to plan, select, and adjust missions and courses of action; and it disseminates defense engagement authorization (DEA) and other Command decisions to the NMD system elements. The In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) is the BM/C3 communications link to the interceptors during flyout. Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, mistakenly believed by many Americans to house already a robust national missile defense, will be the BM/C3 site for the planned NMD system.
  • Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) SBIRS is an additional element that future NMD systems will utilize. SBIRS (High) is being developed by the Air Force as part of the Early Warning System upgrade which will replace the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites. SBIRS (Low) is being developed primarily to support both national- and theater-missile defense systems. In its NMD mission, SBIRS (High) will detect missiles in their boost phase and the SBIRS (Low) constellation of sensor satellites will acquire and track ballistic missiles throughout their trajectory. This information will provide the earliest possible trajectory estimate to the BM/C3 element. By providing this ``over-the-horizon'' precision tracking data to the NMD system, the effective NMD battle space is expanded to permit interceptors to be launched before the threats come within range of the XBRs or UEWRs. Indeed, with SBIRS (Low), no ground-based radars are needed, though this, too, would be an ABM Treaty issue. SBIRS (Low) not only will extend the defensive ``footprint'' of the NMD several fold, but will be able to supplant the ground-based radars. This is critical for effective National Missile Defense. C1 will draw upon SBIRS (High) satellites. C2 will add SBIRS (Low). C3 will utilize the existing C2 architecture.
  • In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) IFICS is the communication link which will pass target data from the NMD sensors to the interceptor missile. C1 will utilize communications nodes in central Alaska, Caribou, Maine, and Shemya, Alaska. C2 will add a further IFICS site in Munising, Michigan. C3 adds a fifth site in Hawaii. All elements of the NMD system will work together to respond to a ballistic missile directed against the United States. The U.S. Early Warning System, consisting of Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and its follow-on capability the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites, will detect the launch of enemy missiles and will subsequently track these missiles and reentry vehicles (RV). After confirmation, this information will be sent to the Battle Management/ Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3) system. Subsequently, ground-based radars, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) and X-Band Radars (XBR), will acquire and track the enemy missile and will compute an intercept point. After receiving defense engagement authority, BM/C3 will order the launch of one or more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to the intercept point. Nearing this point, the interceptor will use on- board sensors to acquire the threat, select the target warhead, and guide itself to a direct, high-speed collision. During and after the engagement, radars will continue to collect data, observe impact results to provide ``kill assessment'' information to evaluate the interceptor's success or failure. technological issues associated with a national missile defense (This section draws heavily upon an April 1997, publication by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges?) Countermeasures A number of countries--chief among them Russia, China, and India-- have anticipated the eventual development of strategic ballistic missile defenses. These countries are working to ensure that they will be able to penetrate future defenses. The following types of actions could serve as means of degrading the effectiveness of missile defenses:
  • Stealth: Nearly every nation is exploring the use of radar- absorbing or radar-reflectant paints and materials, as well as non-reflecting angular designs, to reduce the observability of their missiles and re-entry vehicles (RVs).
  • Decoys: Russia and the United Kingdom are two nations that already have developed decoys which resemble RVs and which are intended to provide defenses with more targets to intercept. Decoys also might be used for radar jamming.
  • Coning/Corkscrewing: By introducing a ``wobble'' into an RV as it re-enters the atmosphere, a nation can create a 10-15 G spiraling turn (e.g. a corkscrew of 30-40 meters in diameter). Interceptors would need on-board computational capability and/ or larger warheads to intercept this maneuver.
  • MIRVs and Submunitions: Multiple warheads/submunitions are intended to overwhelm defenses. (NOTE: The ABM Treaty precludes placing multiple intercept capabilities on a single ``defensive'' missile, making MIRVs attractive as an option). A variation on this theme would be salvo launches designed to saturate missile defenses.
  • Reduction in Infrared Signature: Several techniques could be used to reduce heat signatures of missiles. For example, a country could double-shroud an RV. This would allow it to shed heat by jettisoning the outer shroud after the boost-phase. Another technique would be the use of infrared-altering paints on the warhead skin. These techniques are designed to make it more difficult for an infrared seeker on a missile to find its target.
  • Radar Jamming: Both RVs and decoys can be equipped with small microwave antennas to receive, amplify, and rebroadcast radar signals (thereby masking the position of the warhead). Simple clouds of metallic chaff or balloons also can be used to scatter radar signals, although they would be stripped away from the heavier RV upon re-entry.
  • Salvage Fusing or Deliberate EMP Attack: Advanced warhead designs may include backup fuses which detonate the warhead if the RV is struck by an interceptor. This will create thermal and radiation effects (including an electro-magnetic pulse) which will destroy or degrade non-hardened electronic circuits and hardware. Moreover, this will result in increased ``noise'' from persistent radiation which will reduce the effectiveness of surviving space-sensor systems. The same effect can be achieved by the deliberate detonation of a warhead in the exoatmosphere.
  • Simple Masking: The infrared signature of an RV can be hard to distinguish when in proximity to the larger, hotter missile body. This becomes even more difficult when missiles ``tumble'' or break apart upon re-entry. While all of these countermeasures are feasible they should not deter the United States from deploying defenses. Rather, they make clear that offensive and defensive capabilities are, and will continue to be, in a cycle of competition. Any defensive system deployed by the United States should be quickly upgradable, at reasonable cost, to take advantage of new technologies to counter an adversary's counter- measures. Given the nature of emerging counter-measure technologies, the United States also should pursue a layered defense with a variety of defensive attack methods to counter incoming RVs. However, this, too, would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Basic Constraints on the Feasibility of Countermeasures Three basic environmental factors will assist the U.S. national missile defense in dealing with countermeasures.
  • Throwweight: Ballistic missiles can only carry so much. Countermeasures, together with the re-entry vehicles and guidance system, must fit within the throwweight limits of the given ballistic missile.
  • Exoatmospheric Flight: All ICBMs must pass through the vacuum of the exoatmosphere. During this phase of flight, maneuverability is severely limited and requires enormous amounts of fuel since maneuvering thrusters will have no air against which to push. As a result, maneuver efforts will be limited to turns of only 2-3 Gs (as opposed to 10-15 Gs in the lower atmosphere).
  • Endoatmposheric Flight: All but the most sophisticated of penetration aids will be stripped away from the RV, generally between 90-100 kilometers of altitude. Further, re-entering objects are subjected to extreme heating, making their infrared signatures much harder to conceal. Likewise, some penetration aids, such as radar jammers, will suffer a decease in transmitting capability during re-entry. Finally, the drag induced on re-entry vehicles will slow the RV, allowing for more intercept possibilities. Basic RVs have a low ``beta'' rating, meaning that their initial re-entry speed of 6-7 km/s will slow rapidly at 25-55 kilometers altitude, resulting in an impact velocity of less than 1 km/s. (However, as RVs become more sophisticated, impact speeds may be greater (perhaps 3.4-4 km/s) and deceleration may not occur until 12 kilometers in altitude.) Counter-Countermeasures Just as various countries are exploring countermeasures, the United States has identified numerous techniques to counter such systems.
  • Laser Radars: Laser radars will enable defenses to see past debris and clutter induced by penetration aids. Such systems, when given the ability to measure angle, range, and range rate, will be able to track maneuvering, coning, and tumbling RVs. Laser radars cannot conduct wide area searches, however, and will be vulnerable to some kinds of countermeasures such as smoke and EMP detonations.
  • Multicolored Infrared Sensors: Two-color infrared seekers will enable interceptors and satellites to track targets regardless of whether the background is the earth (``hot'') or space (``cold''). As infrared capabilities continue to evolve, even further target tracking and discrimination advances will be made. The Atmospheric Interceptor Technology Program (AIT) will utilize a two-color infrared seeker.
  • Optical Signal Processing: Radar jamming is only possible as long as radars use linear frequency modulation. The generation of arbitrary/random wave forms of radar systems will be nearly impossible to jam or spoof.
  • Spectral Band Processing: The splitting of spectral bands can provide the ability for remote identification of objects. Many experts are optimistic that band slices, when combined with powerful processing techniques, will enable future defense systems to develop a composite real-time ``picture'' of penetration aids, RVs, and decoys, and also will enable the United States to neutralize stealth advancements.
  • On-Board Sensing and Processing: Currently, cost considerations limit the incorporation of on-board sensors and processors, driving defense planners to rely upon communication links to external sensors to guide the interceptor. As miniaturization of these electronic components becomes feasible, and more affordable, interceptors can increasingly be made ``smart'' in their own right. For example, the miniaturization of both laser and infrared radars, and their emplacement in the seeker of an interceptor, will greatly increase the discrimination and hit capabilities of the defensive missile. The Discrimination Interceptor Technology Program (DITP) is an example of a U.S. program seeking to capitalize upon this technology.
  • Improved Sensor Integration: Advances in the ability to merge and process information from a variety of sources (microwave radar, laser radar, and both wide- and narrow-area infrared search senors) will enable the United States to discriminate better between penaids and RVs and to identify stealthy targets. In short, stealth is more easily achieved in one dimension; the concealment of an RV across all frequencies, however, is far more difficult. The Advanced Sensor Technology Program (ASTP) is an example of this type of endeavor.
  • Multiple Kinetic Kill Munitions: Just as offensive missiles can be equipped with numerous RVs and decoys, so too can defensive interceptors (if it were not for the ABM Treaty's prohibition). One example of a multiple kinetic kill munition is the Swarm program, which involves autonomously-guided munitions (using a single photo detector and processor chip) that maneuver through the use of small explosive charges on the outer ring of the munition. This program can be used for both endo- and exoatmospheric intercepts.
  • Directed Energy Weapons: As both microwave and laser technologies continue to advance, the prospect grows for use of lasers and microwave systems to kill both re-entry vehicles, as well as missiles at all stages of flight. The advantages over kinetic ``hit-to-kill'' interceptors are readily apparent. Several programs are under development in this area. As can be seen, while numerous countries will pursue a variety of countermeasures, the technology associated with counter-countermeasures is evolving rapidly as well. This has prompted senior U.S. defense planners to assert that the U.S. NMD system will able to defeat such penetration aids. Basic ABM Treaty Technical Limits on Ballistic Missile Defenses The most serious threat to the effectiveness of a U.S. national ballistic missile defense is not enemy countermeasures. It is the Administration's continued adherence to the ABM Treaty and the resultant limitations imposed on the planned C1, C2, and C3 architectures. Aside from the basic prohibitions against having an NMD that are contained in Article I and Article III of the treaty, the treaty also contains a number of specific technological limitations:
  • Limits on Sites and Number of Interceptors: The ABM Treaty would limit the United States to no more than 100 interceptors at only one site. This makes defense of the territory of the United States (also prohibited as a concept by Article I of the treaty) impossible. Even C1 violates this provision.
  • Limit on Interceptor Capability: The ABM Treaty precludes interceptors from carrying more than a single warhead/kill vehicle. This makes missile defense less cost-effective. While the EKV being tested for the missile defense only carries a single warhead, one of the reasons that multiple kill vehicles have not been utilized is due to the ABM Treaty. A number of promising programs suggest that C2, and certainly C3, could capitalize upon multiple intercept vehicles on a single missile. The ABM Treaty, however, would preclude this.
  • Limits on Radars: In essence, any ABM radar handling an intercept must be within 150 kilometers of the single allowed site. With an expected range of no more 4,000 kilometers, the radar will be unable to provide intercept coverage for vast portions of the United States, regardless of where the site (and thus the radar) ultimately is deployed. While early- warning radars can be deployed along the periphery of the U.S., only the single XBR may handle intercepts (according to the treaty). C1 will not be compliant in this respect. Neither C2 nor C3 will be, either.
  • Technical Limits on External Cuing: Use of space, air, or land-based external sensors to provide early tracking information would make it possible to launch interceptors without the associated, local radar ever tracking the target. This, in turn, would substantially enhance a system's coverage potential against longer-range missile threats. However, the ABM Treaty prohibits the conduct of an intercept using only data from sensors other than co-located radars (e.g. conduct of an intercept without the XBR). If this continues to be the case, the defensive system under consideration by the U.S.: (1) will have a much smaller defensive ``footprint'' than it could; (2) fewer intercept opportunities for the system; and (3) greater vulnerability to penetration aids, particularly in the exoatmosphere where space-based terminal cuing could be used. The current defense plan for ``C1'' relies upon five UEWR's to alert the U.S. Space Command of an incoming missile threat. It also relies upon one X-band microwave radar system to detect the RV, identify it as such, and to discriminate between the RV and other objects such as counter-measures. While the NMD system will be able to track up to 1000 objects at a time, the reliance upon the one XBR will make the system vulnerable to a variety of masking counter-measures. As a result, the ``C1'' architecture will not be as effective against technologically-sophisticated adversaries, such as Russia. Once SBIRS (High) is included in the ``C1'' architecture and SBIRS (Low) in the ``C2'' architecture, a number of space-based infrared sensors will be available to assist the XBR in identifying RVs and tracking them. This will add a basic infrared detection capability to the XBR's microwave radar, making several types of countermeasures less effective in hiding RVs. Once satellites are placed in both high and low orbits, the resolution of the infrared imagery will be greatly improved. Moreover, a number of counter-stealth technologies (e.g., laser radars and multi-colored infrared sensors) can only be capitalized upon via the use of space-based platforms. However, due to budget constraints, it does not appear that SBIRS (High) will be available until 2006 or later. Both SBIRS systems will provide sufficiently accurate tracking data to allow the conduct of an intercept without the XBR being in the loop. The current DSP constellation cannot do this. However, none of the Administration's plans--``C1'', ``C2'', or ``C3''--calls for the use of SBIRS in this fashion. This is due to ABM Treaty compliance considerations. ______ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 24, 1999. MEMORANDUM To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations Through: Steve Biegun From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean Subject: The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty The Committee will hold a hearing on the legal status of the ABM Treaty on Tuesday, May 25, at 2:15 PM in SD-562. The witnesses will be Mr. Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy; to be accompanied by Mr. George Miron of Feith and Zell, P.C., Mr. David B. Rivkin, Jr.; to be accompanied by Mr. Lee A. Casey of Hunton and Williams, and Dr. Michael Glennon, Professor of Law at The University of California, Davis. Senator Ashcroft will preside. Attachment. Background i. the senate's role in determination of the abm treaty's status The legal status of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is unresolved today. Indeed, the treaty remains in legal ``limbo'' until Senate advice and consent is obtained by the executive branch to a document establishing new treaty partners. While the President asserted on numerous occasions the right to determine the status of the treaty without the Senate's approval, he nevertheless agreed on May 14, 1997 to submit to the Senate for advice and consent ``any international agreement that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term `national territory' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty.'' This commitment was made by the President in the form of a legally- binding certification. The President's pledge in this form was required pursuant to Condition (9) of the resolution of ratification to the CFE Flank Agreement. In making this commitment, the President agreed that the legal status of the ABM Treaty, including resolution of the question of treaty-successorship, could only be determined with the Senate's advice and consent. ii. inconsistencies in the president's view of the current legal status of the abm treaty Condition (9) is worded broadly, and captures any conceivable international agreement to determine membership in the ABM Treaty. It is not possible to establish any party or group of parties to the ABM Treaty without triggering the provisions of Condition (9), and thus triggering the requirement for submittal of the agreement in question to the Senate. It is impossible for the United States to possess legally-binding treaty obligations under the ABM Treaty unless it has a partner to whom it is obligated. Because the ABM Treaty cannot be said to be in legal force until the United States has determined its treaty partner(s), the requirement under Condition (9) holds the ABM Treaty in abeyance until advice and consent is obtained. However, the Clinton Administration has provided numerous and conflicting arguments regarding the treaty's legal status. On May 21, 1998, and again on December 17, 1998, the President wrote to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee asserting that, despite Condition (9), Russia is today a Party to the ABM Treaty. This argument is politically-motivated. The Administration has become increasingly nervous that Senate defeat of any specific succession document (or Senate refusal to consider such a document) on the grounds that it would reconstitute the ABM Treaty might signify formal termination of the treaty. Certainly the Senate possesses the Constitutional authority to reject treaties and could attach in its rejection message to the President a formal directive giving notice of the ABM Treaty's termination. Alternatively, the Senate could simply indicate the intent to reject any succession arrangement to the ABM Treaty, regardless of its composition of states, thereby indicating the intent to hold the treaty in abeyance indefinitely. By arguing that Russia is today an ABM Treaty partner, the President is seeking to avoid such an impasse. His argument is designed to allow the Administration to continue viewing the ABM Treaty as in force, and to justify continuing U.S. treatment of Russia as a treaty partner. It is an assertion, however, flatly inconsistent with historical fact, the Administration's past representations regarding the successorship issue, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on succession itself. What is most troubling, however, is that the President's claim that Russia is a Party seems designed to circumvent his pledge to the Senate, made in a treaty-related certification on May 14, 1997, that the advice and consent of the Senate would be obtained for any agreement adding parties to the ABM Treaty, or changing its geographic scope. If the Administration persists in the assertions made in the letter of May 21, 1998, the validity of the ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, also known as the CFE Flank Agreement, may be called into question. Certainly the assertion that Russia is a Party directly contravenes the certification of May 14, 1997, raising the possibility that the instrument of ratification for the CFE Flank Agreement deposited on behalf of the United States is defective under U.S. constitutional law. In a November 21, 1997, letter to Representative Gilman, and in accompanying briefings by Administration lawyers, the Clinton Administration stated that ABM Treaty succession arrangements were ``unsettled'' and would remain so in the absence of a new agreement. Moreover, this letter takes note of no distinction between the legal status of Russia and that of the other states proposed as ABM Treaty parties. Indeed, the President stated in that letter: Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972. However, in the May 21, 1998, letter, and again on December 17, 1998, the President reversed course by asserting that ``the United States and Russia clearly are parties to the Treaty.'' Russia's desire to become a party, its participation in the treaty's activities, and the presence of ``ABM-Treaty related facilities''--a newly-invented term found nowhere in the ABM Treaty--on its territory are cited as reasons for this conclusion. The President also declined to identify Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as parties, although he asserted that ``a strong case can be made that even without the MOU, these three states are Parties to the Treaty,'' citing substantially the same factors that supposedly make Russia a party. There is no basis for any distinction between the legal status of Russia and that of the other states. In a briefing to congressional staff on January 30, 1998, Administration lawyers were asked directly whether Russia was the only other clear party to the Treaty. They stated definitively that this was not the case. Numerous Administration representations and public statements, including the State Department's publication of ``Treaties in Force,'' have been consistent in making no legal distinction among the former Soviet states who are potential successors to the ABM Treaty. Article VIII of the MOU itself notes that regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission ``shall reflect the equal legal status of the Parties.'' Further, the record of negotiation on the succession issue is replete with expressions by the United States of the view that the potential successors to the Soviet Union all have the same legal status. In short, the assertions made in the May 21, 1998, letter have no basis in historical fact. Moreover, the May 21, 1998, assertion that ``a strong case could be made'' that four countries could today be parties to the treaty is directly contradicted by Article I of the MOU, which states that the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia ``upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty.'' Very clearly, the entry-into-force of the MOU is the triggering event--and one that has not yet occurred--by which these states may become parties to the ABM Treaty. In short, none of the potential successors were identified as parties to the ABM Treaty during the period of negotiation, nor at any time preceding the President's certification pursuant to Condition (9). Nothing has transpired since that time that would constitute formal recognition of any state as a party to the ABM Treaty. Certainly no document has been submitted pursuant to Condition (9), and no document has received Senate approval. How the President asserts, then, that Russia is a Party to the ABM Treaty, and that the three other states might be, is a mystery. These claims imply that the issue of the ABM treaty's status is fundamentally settled. Yet the matter cannot truly be settled unless and until the Senate approves the MOU, or a similar agreement, through the exercise of the advice and consent powers assigned to it by the Constitution. iii. the legal status of the abm treaty: is the treaty extinct? The Committee will hear testimony from authors of two legal studies on the legal status of the ABM Treaty. The first memorandum was done by George Miron and Douglas J. Feith of Feith & Zell, P.C. The second memorandum was prepared for The Heritage Foundation by David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey of Hunton and Williams. The Miron/Feith Memo draws the simple conclusion that when a State ceases to exist (becomes ``extinct''), that State's treaties lapse automatically by operation of law and do not require action by any other treaty party. The Rivkin/Casey Memo takes the position that the ABM Treaty could have survived the Soviet Union's dissolution only if one or more states survived that both continued the Soviet Union's sovereignty, its international legal personality, and were capable of fulfilling the terms and conditions of the original treaty ``unimpaired.'' No such state survived the Soviet Union. It is important to note that both studies draw the conclusion that the President cannot bring a new treaty into force between the United States and a successor to the extinct State without Senate advice and consent. A more detailed summary of each legal memorandum follows. 1. Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain in force after the USSR ceased to exist in December 1991 and did it become a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation? by George Miron and Doug Feith Following the USSR's extinction, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 did not become a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. Rather the treaty lapsed when the USSR ceased to exist. In December 1991, new States that emerged on what had been USSR territory declared independence, announced the formation of the ``Commonwealth of Independent States'' and proclaimed that the USSR ``as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no longer exists.'' Soon thereafter, the United States acknowledged that the USSR ``is no more.'' The United States has officially expressed its view that upon the extinction of a State, its bilateral political treaties automatically lapse, and has acted in accordance with that view in connection with the extinction of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1898, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1992. The U.S. view is consistent with the opinion of international legal scholars who have addressed that issue. With consistency over more than two hundred years, scholarly writings state that when a State ceases to exist (becomes ``extinct''), that State's treaties lapse. The lapsing occurs by operation of law--that is, automatically upon the State's extinction. It does not require action by any other treaty party. (A possible exception to this rule relates to ``dispositive'' treaties--that is, treaties that irrevocably fix a right to particular territory, e.g., delineate borders between States. The ABM Treaty, which is terminable by either party upon six months' notice, is not ``dispositive.'') President William Clinton has taken the view that the ABM Treaty of 1972 remains ``in force.'' In November 1997, he wrote that the ``succession'' issue is ``unsettled,'' adding: ``Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS [newly independent states] as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.'' In May 1998, President Clinton stated that the ABM Treaty is in force between the United States and the Russian Federation. He did not state the principle of law on which he based this conclusion. Nor did he explain how this conclusion can be squared with his aforementioned November 1997 statement. The pertinent sources of international law support the conclusion that, upon the USSR's extinction, the ABM Treaty lapsed, so it no longer has the force of international law. The United States has never before considered itself bound by international law to accept as its treaty partner the successor to an extinct State. Were the President to use the recognition function to make a treaty that would not otherwise exist, he would put the United States under a legal obligation to other States without Senate advice and consent. The President's recognition authority cannot be exercised in a manner that would nullify the U.S. Senate's authority to advise and consent on the making of a treaty. If a foreign State ceases to exist under international law and, consequently, a bilateral treaty between the extinct State and the United States lapses, the President cannot bring a new treaty into force between the United States and a successor to the extinct State without Senate advice and consent. In other words, the President cannot, without Senate approval, bring a lapsed treaty back to life by declaring that a given foreign State is the successor or continuation of an extinct State. Principles of international law govern the issue of the extinction of States. In sum, the ABM Treaty was a bilateral, non-dispositive treaty. In accordance with longstanding principles of international law, expounded with remarkable consistency by numerous officials and scholars from various countries over hundreds of years, when the USSR became extinct, its bilateral, non-dispositive treaties lapsed. Hence, the ABM Treaty lapsed by operation of law--that is, automatically--when the USSR dissolved in 1991. It did not become a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. 2. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Memorandum of Law by David Rivkin and Lee Casey The ABM Treaty became extinct when the Soviet Union dissolved. Treaties are a species of contract that may be rendered impossible, and discharged as a matter of law, by the disappearance of a treaty partner. Under the applicable rules of international and constitutional law, the ABM Treaty could have survived the Soviet Union's dissolution only if one or more states survived that both continued the Soviet Union's sovereignty, its international legal personality, and were capable of fulfilling the terms and conditions of the original treaty ``unimpaired.'' No such state survived the Soviet Union. ``The President's assertion that Russia is an ABM Treaty party is incorrect. The Russian Federation is not merely a continuation of the Soviet Union under a different name and system of government, as the Soviet Union was a continuation of the Romanov Empire. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, both that empire, and the Russian state around which it was built, collapsed. Boris Yeltsin's Russia is sui generis. Moreover, even if today's Russia could be considered to be a continuation of the Soviet Union, it could not itself carry out the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. That agreement was based upon a number of fundamental assumptions about the parties and their place in the world order during the Cold War. These assumptions now are obsolete. Moreover, the ABM Treaty had a critical geographical component, which at bottom guaranteed the United States and the Soviet Union unrestricted access for their ICBMs to the entire territory of the other party. The Russian Federation controls only a part of the Soviet Union's territory, and has lost control over many of the Soviet Union's most important population centers. Any treaty with Russia alone would not preserve the bargain the United States originally agreed to in 1972. The conclusion that the ABM Treaty automatically was discharged in 1991 also is supported by application of either of the prevailing methods of analysis governing questions of state succession to treaties--the ``continuity'' analysis and the ``clean slate'' analysis. Under the continuity analysis, even if one or more former Soviet Republics was considered to continue the U.S.S.R.'s international legal personality, the ABM Treaty could not have survived because it was a bilateral treaty ``personal'' to the Soviet Union. Such treaties are automatically discharged when one treaty partner disappears. Under the clean slate analysis, one or more of the former Soviet Republics would have to agree to undertake the Soviet Union's ABM Treaty obligations, and the United States would have to accept this new state as a treaty partner. This acceptance would constitute the creation of a new treaty, and could only be effected with the advice and consent of the Senate. Today, the ABM Treaty can be revived only with the participation of the United States Senate. The substitution of one or more former Soviet Republics for the Soviet Union would fundamentally change the ABM Treaty's original bargain, to which the Senate consented. The President cannot, on his own authority, change the ABM Treaty in so fundamental a manner without obtaining the Senate's advice and consent again. ______ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 25, 1999. MEMORANDUM To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations Through: Stephen E. Biegun From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean Subject: Cornerstone of Our Security?: Should the Senate Reject a Protocol to Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New Partners? The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat to the United States, the need for a national missile defense, and the ABM Treaty on Wednesday, May 26, at 10:15 AM in SD-562. The witness will be the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State. Senator Helms will preside. Attachment. Basic Aspects of the Changed Security Environment A number of trends have profoundly altered the global security environment in the post-Cold War era, calling into question traditional assumptions about the relationship between offensive and defensive systems, the wisdom of a U.S. strategy of mutually-assured destruction (``MAD''), and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The following represent the most fundamental changes with relevance to the Committee's ongoing review of the ABM Treaty.
  • The technology associated with a national missile defense has matured. The Committee has heard testimony from expert witnesses who believe that a national missile defense is technically feasible. An effective national missile defense, therefore, is an achievable objective today, whereas, in 1972, it was only a theoretical concept.
  • The relationship with Russia is vastly different from that with the Soviet Union. Not only is the relationship far less adversarial, despite flare-ups over issues such as Kosovo, but Russia is no longer willing, nor able, to devote enormous sums of money to the development and maintenance of an overwhelming ICBM force.
  • The United States increasingly is less concerned with the possibility of intentional missile attack by Russia, and is more concerned with the intentions of a plethora of other nations which either possess, or are on the verge of acquiring, ICBM capabilities.
  • Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile design, development, and deployment is now available, and is accelerating missile programs. Not only has the past decade seen extraordinary improvements in the indigenous production capabilities of various countries, and the spread of commercial launch programs, but it also has witnessed a dramatic increase in the availability of outside help to countries seeking ballistic missiles. As the Rumsfeld Commission noted: ``Foreign assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact.'' This means that the missile threat to the U.S. is growing and evolving in ways that the U.S. intelligence community cannot always predict.
  • The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from Russia's existing nuclear arsenals is increasing. As the prospects for domestic turmoil grow in Russia, the security of the mobile transporter-erector-launchers carrying nuclear ICBMs has become an increasing concern for the United States. The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Post Cold War World At this point it is appropriate to make three general observations about the ongoing revolution in military affairs. United States defense planners are now challenged to conceptualize future conflict in an environment undergoing dramatic transformations. A ``revolution in military affairs'' (RMA) offers the U.S. the opportunity to capitalize upon emerging technologies to compensate for force structure reduction and to maximize platform capabilities. Naturally the identification of those technologies becomes critical; failure in this respect threatens a military with obsolescence. Similarly, this revolution offers other countries the opportunity to offset numerical and qualitative inferiorities vis-a-vis the U.S. military with innovation, and--in the case of ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads-- possibly to neutralize the conventional Armed Forces of the United States entirely. First, military revolutions depend not only on the emergence of new technologies, but upon the adaptation of operations and organizations to maximize the employment of cutting-edge capabilities. For example, German integration of aircraft and radios following the First World War enabled them to defeat the French and British in six-weeks in a combined arms offensive. Today's global positioning receiver, with its utility in both ballistic and cruise missiles (as well as UAVs), holds for the future battlefield what the radio posed for the Western Front in 1940. Second, the comparative advantage conferred upon a military by a given technology tends to be short-lived. Moreover, the initial advantage by no means suggests continued dominance, or even competitiveness. In this environment, the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, and the ascendancy of one over the other, is in a continual state of flux. Defensive technologies have now matured, making both theater- and national-missile defenses an effective and affordable capability. Third, national objectives and strategic cultures prove critical variables determining the manner in which countries capitalize upon revolutions in military affairs. Perhaps the greatest challenge in the next century will be posed by a regional aggressor (such as China, North Korea, or Iran) that decides not to take the United States ``head on'' in a conventional confrontation, but rather elects to use tactics more common to low-intensity conflicts in order to secure its objectives. It will be incumbent upon those who would challenge the United States to devise strategies which take into account the changing dimensions of the operational environment--future warfare will be waged across a variety of fronts and in the public domain. Since the United States has a decided, and apparent, advantage in high-intensity conventional warfare, future aggressors may adopt strategies which are fundamentally political in nature. If conventional military action alone does not offer prospects for success, it will be relegated to a secondary role. Operations will be characterized by terrorism, subversion, and efforts at blackmail using WMD and ICBM capabilities. An ICBM pointed at a U.S. city is, after all, a political instrument of threatened terror--not a military weapon per se. In other words, a future aggressor is likely to employ strategies that tend towards the indirect and unconventional, emphasizing non- military approaches, or at least non-traditional efforts, to deter U.S. and/or coalition opposition and to deny opposition critical nodes from which to operate. Those who would engage the U.S. will follow several imperatives:
  • The dominance of political thinking over military interests.
  • The necessity to integrate various elements of power into a cohesive strategy.
  • The importance of adaptability and flexibility, the likelihood of protracted conflict. Such a state could be expected to prove willing to assume a disproportionate share of casualties, collateral damage, and environmental destruction in an effort to exploit the inevitable social tensions arising in the United States from protracted conflict. Accordingly the most important aspects of the country's order of battle will not be the number of main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery that it fields, but the number of nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions, types of delivery systems (with particular emphasis on long-range ballistic missiles), and access to commercial satellite communications networks it possesses, and the way its seeks to shield these capabilities--presumably with non-belligerents--from the deep-strike capabilities of the U.S. Nor can we be sure that simple notions of overwhelming and devastating nuclear retaliation will be sufficient to deter a nation that is prepared to absorb immense casualties and ``ride out the storm.'' An environment in which Third World powers field WMD mounted on ballistic or cruise missiles will circumscribe the United States' crisis response capability. The use of forward-based tactical platforms will become more difficult with the increased likelihood that U.S. forces will be detected and engaged at their points of entry into the theater. Indeed, the fact that a number of regional powers are actively seeking ballistic missiles with WMD warheads ultimately will preclude the U.S. military from forward deployments unprotected by theater ballistic missile defenses. It is in this vein that Andrew Marshall, Director of the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, has warned against the creation of ``large, juicy targets.'' Future regional aggressors will be well aware that U.S. casualties are of greater political significance than military consequence. Moreover, as the ability to inflict devastation via ICBMs grows ever more available, the United States homeland itself will become an inviting target. Thus U.S. forward deployments also might be circumscribed unless a national missile defense can neutralize a threat to U.S. citizens. Deterrence during the Cold War was based upon assumptions of rationality which allowed the United States and Russia to predict each others reactions with a fair degree of success. Moreover, communication and the centralization of command control allowed for mutual familiarity between the United States and the Soviet Union over one another's plans for reaction in crisis situations. The potential for an action-reaction spiral was controlled by a strategic parity of sorts at the top of the escalatory ladder. The post-Cold War era has none of the predictability or parity of its balanced, bipolar predecessor. Indeed, the role of the conventional/nuclear balance seems to have reversed completely. Whereas strategic forces were previously essential to the U.S. as a means of countering the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, now the commitment of conventional forces may prove critical to countering or reversing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World. In parallel, the acquisition of WMD may be accelerated by desires to counter conventional imbalances. This shift was poignantly enunciated by Les Aspin in 1992, when he recognized that while nuclear weapons may still serve as ``great equalizers,'' it is now the United States that is the potential ``equalizee.'' From Cold War Theories of Deterrence to Modern Notions of Compellance/ Warfighting Use China is a case study in how countries increasingly are thinking about the warfighting utility of ballistic missiles vis-a-vis the United States. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) views advanced ballistic and cruise missile capability as an essential element of its future warfare plans. Indeed, the PLA seems to regard missile development as more important than the acquisition of any other single capability, including air or naval forces. This preeminence certainly is reflected in China's developing strategy and doctrine. PLA doctrine, as it concerns the role of missiles, has migrated conceptually from Cold War notions of deterrence (e.g., the use of nuclear missiles to deter other nuclear powers) to an approach that foresees a wide range of active/compellant uses, both tactical and strategic, for ballistic and cruise missiles. In other words, China has increasingly begun to think of the operational utility of nuclear-armed missiles (as well as non-nuclear armed systems). An advanced ballistic and cruise missile capability is important to the PRC for several reasons: First, this capability is meant to avert United States intervention in Asia in an effort to thwart Chinese regional ambitions. By developing a variety of nuclear and nonnuclear missiles, the PLA hopes to compel the United States to refrain from supporting Taiwan or projecting power in Asia. Continuing U.S. adherence to the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the resultant policy of deliberate vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, have only played into the hands of this strategy, and reinforced the determination of the PRC to emphasize the aggressive role of ballistic missiles to offset U.S. conventional superiority. A clear indication of Chinese thought on this matter was given during a 1995-1996 winter visit to China by former Pentagon official Charles Freeman (during which a Chinese official asserted that the United States would not challenge China militarily over Taiwan because American leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan''). In other words, the PLA may believe that China's strategic deterrent would give it the ability to act against Taiwan with impunity. At a minimum, the ability to place U.S. cities at risk during a crisis would--in the view of the PRC--prompt the U.S. to think twice about intervening. In other words, the primary motivation for acquiring such systems, in this case, is not military in nature, but political. Nor is China the only country that has drawn such conclusions about the utility of missile systems. Iranian defense planners, for example, have oriented their country's military towards a posture presumably designed to deter the United States from engaging in military activities in the Gulf. Iranian analysts have openly claimed that missile systems represent a critical deterrent to outside attack, arguing that Iran should ``build up its own short, medium and long-range surface-to-surface was well as surface-to-air missiles.'' \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ ``Preparing for Protection of our National Interests,'' Resalat, December 3, 1990. Second, missiles allow the PLA to exploit the vulnerabilities of the military forces of the United States and other Asian adversaries, none of whom have effective defenses against theater or tactical ballistic or cruise missiles. Modernization of missile capabilities, coupled with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), provides China the ability to threaten the United States' center of gravity. Presumably the PRC has recognized, as a result of the Gulf War, the need to deny the United States access to forward-based facilities, and to hold U.S. naval power projection capabilities (i.e., the aircraft carriers) at risk. Advanced missile capabilities not only accomplish this objective, but also provide China with the means to strike targets in Taiwan, U.S. military facilities in Korea and Japan, and to hold locations throughout the region at risk. China recognizes that, if properly used, its ballistic and cruise missile delivery systems may circumscribe the United States' crisis response capability. Indeed, the prospect of devastating attack on a U.S. city might, if communicated properly, deter the U.S. from responding at all. As Sun Tzu put it, the objective is ``to defeat the enemy without fighting.'' China's possession of a full spectrum of missile capabilities also makes the use of forward-based tactical platforms more difficult, since U.S. forces can be attacked at their points of entry into the Asian theater. Aircraft carriers will be forced to operate further at sea, and certainly would be precluded from entering the Strait of Taiwan. Indeed, the fact that China is actively seeking a robust nuclear missile capability suggests a desire to preclude the U.S. military from forward deployments at all. The PRC is well aware that U.S. casualties are likely to be of greater political significance than military consequence. For this reason, China views its growing missile capability as an instrument of intimidation and blackmail, in addition to a valuable military weapon. China's emphasis on missiles also is eminently practical, from a military standpoint. China cannot today field a modern air force or navy, but they certainly can build a variety of ultra-modern missiles. Faced with a Taiwanese air force comprised of the most sophisticated combat aircraft on the world market, China has little choice in overcoming Taiwan's tactical air superiority but to rely on waves of short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. For this reason China has been examining the use of combined GPS/ Inertial and Terrain-Contour Matching (TERCOM) guidance systems to give high accuracy to its cruise missiles and is interested in building cluster munitions for ballistic or cruise missile to disable runways. Finally, missiles are a critical element of a strategy for modern information warfare. China recognizes the importance of information dominance in a future conflict. Thus improvements in China's space launch and ballistic missile program (actually two sides of the same coin) will translate into an increased ability to launch more sophisticated reconnaissance and communication satellites. Further, China may also intend to use missiles to attack satellites in an effort to disrupt command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems. The PLA understands the U.S. military's dependence on reconnaissance and communications satellites, and realizes that, in absence of nuclear testing, the United States has ceased to ``harden'' these systems. PLA literature on future warfare is replete with discussions of the need for a range of systems to deny the enemy's use of space. the evolution of china's limited deterrence concept, and the corresponding risk to the united states of ballistic missile attack As has been noted, warfighting requirements factor heavily in China's military and deterrence strategy. The concept, which began to evolve in the late 1980s, has been termed by Chinese strategists as ``limited deterrence'' (you xian wei she). At its core, this notion of deterrence stresses the role of sufficient counterforce and countervalue tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional or nuclear war. In other words, the PRC seems to place less stock than either the United States or Russia did in the notion that a nuclear deterrent, and the prospect of mutually-assured destruction, will avert any major conflict. Accordingly, Chinese doctrine stresses the operational role of nuclear weapons to deter further escalation once a conflict begins, and--in the event that such fails--to ``strive to fight and win a nuclear war'' (li zheng da ying he zhanzheng). The war-fighting orientation of ``limited deterrence'' is apparent in various publications which suggest acceptable types of targets for China's missile forces. The consensus seems to be that China's limited deterrent ought to be able to perform the following operational missions:
  • to strike enemy strategic missile bases and weapons stockpiles, major naval and air bases, heavy troop concentrations, and strategic reserve forces, and thus destroy the enemy's strategic attack capabilities;
  • to strike the enemy's strategic warning and defense systems;
  • to strike the enemy's rail hubs, bridges, and other important targets in its transportation networks;
  • to strike basic industrial and military industrial targets;
  • to strike selectively at several political and economic centers so as to create social chaos; and
  • to launch warning strikes in order to undermine the enemy's will to launch nuclear strikes, and thereby contain nuclear escalation. As such, it is clear that China thinks quite differently about the utility of nuclear ICBMs than did the Soviet Union. Moreover, the matter of Taiwan--viewed by China as an internal matter--is unique to the U.S.-Chinese relationship. For these reasons, and doubtless many others not mentioned here, it would be ill-advised for the United States to assume that Cold War formulations such as MAD (mutually- assured destruction) will introduce strategic stability into the U.S.- Chinese relationship. Indeed, because of the emphasis in Chinese doctrine on compulsion, rather than deterrence, the United States' vulnerability under the ABM Treaty is actually a destabilizing factor (encouraging China in its pursuit of advanced ballistic missile capabilities). ______ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, September 13, 1999. MEMORANDUM To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations Through: Stephen E. Biegun From: Sherry Grandjean and Marshall Billingslea Subject: National Intelligence Estimate: ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015'' The Committee will hold a hearing on the recent National Intelligence Estimate entitled ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015'' on Thursday, September 16, 1999, at 2:30 PM in SD-419. The witness will be Mr. Bob Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs at the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Helms will preside. Attachment. Significant Conclusions from the National Intelligence Estimate: ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015'' Key Judgement ``We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat, although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially posed by other nations, whose missiles are likely to be fewer in number--probably a few to tens, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable and accurate than their Russian and Chinese counterparts.'' Case-by-Case Analysis North Korea
  • ``North Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle (SLV) into an ICBM that could deliver a light payload (sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the United States, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting large urban targets improbable.''
  • ``North Korea is more likely to weaponize the larger Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload (sufficient for early generation nuclear weapons) to the United States. Most analysts believe it could be tested at any time, probably initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed for political reasons.'' Iran
  • ``Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several- hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance.''
  • ``Most analysts believe it could test an ICBM capable of delivering a lighter payload to the United States in the next few years following the North Korean pattern. Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's first test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States--assessments range from likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (although an SLV with ICBM capability probably will be tested in the next few years) to less than an even chance of an ICBM test by 2015.'' Iraq
  • ``Iraq could test a North Korean-type ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States in the last half of the next decade depending on the level of foreign assistance.''
  • ``Although less likely, most analysts believe it could test an ICBM that could deliver a lighter payload to the United States in a few years based on its failed SLV or the Taepo Dong-1, if it began development now. Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States--assessments range from likely before 2015, possibly before 2010 (foreign assistance would affect capability and timing) to unlikely before 2015.'' Russia
  • ``Its strategic force will remain formidable through and beyond 2015, but the size of this force will decrease dramatically--well below arms control limits--primarily because of budget constraints.''
  • ``By 2015, Russia will maintain as many nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles as its economy will allow but well short of START I or II limitations.'' China
  • ``By 2015, China is likely to have tens of missiles capable of targeting the United States, including a few tens of more survivable, land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads--in part influenced by U.S. technology gained through espionage.''
  • ``China tested its first mobile ICBM in August 1999.'' Forward-Based Threats
  • ``A short- or medium-range ballistic missile could be launched at the United States from a forward-based sea platform positioned within a few hundred kilometers of U.S. territory. If the attacking country were willing to accept significantly reduced accuracy for the missile, forward-basing on a sea-based platform would not be a major technical hurdle. The reduced accuracy in such a case, however, would probably be better than that of some early ICBMs.''
  • ``A commercial surface vessel, covertly equipped to launch cruise missiles, would be a plausible alternative for a forward-based launch platform. This method would provide a large and potentially inconspicuous platform to launch a cruise missile while providing at least some cover for launch deniability.''