May 26, 1999
  Cornerstone of Our Security: Should the Senate Reject A Protocol to 
          Reconstitute the ABM Treaty With Four New Partners?

Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared 
  statement......................................................   323
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., chairman, Kissinger & Associates, New 
  York, NY.......................................................   326
    Prepared statement of........................................   329

S. Hrg. 106-339 BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations <snowflake> Available via the World Wide Web: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director (ii)
CORNERSTONE OF OUR SECURITY: SHOULD THE SENATE REJECT A PROTOCOL TO RECONSTITUTE THE ABM TREATY WITH FOUR NEW PARTNERS? ---------- WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1999 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. The committee met at 10:21 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Frist, and Biden. The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues its scheduled series of hearings on the ABM Treaty. This morning the committee welcomes the distinguished Dr. Henry Kissinger who served as National Security Adviser to President Nixon and as Secretary of State to both Presidents Nixon and Ford. I should note for the record that Dr. Kissinger is the principal architect of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, I think he is uniquely qualified to advise this committee on the extent to which the concept of mutual assured destruction is a useful notion in today's world of proliferating missile threats. Before beginning my comments, I commend the leadership of Senator Hagel in steering the committee's study of the ABM Treaty. Senator Hagel is arriving at this moment. Senator Hagel. Right on cue. The Chairman. For 2 months, Senator Hagel has directed the committee's examination of the growing threat and has assessed the feasibility of various missile defense technologies, all the while uncovering the pernicious effect that the ABM Treaty has had and is continuing to have on U.S. defense plans. Also, I am deeply grateful for the work being done in the committee on the ABM Treaty by Senators Ashcroft and Lugar. Now, Senator Lugar, who will be shortly--no, he will not. He has an important meeting of his own committee, and I am supposed to be there, but I cannot be there and he cannot be here. But in any event, Senator Lugar steered the committee's hearing on the technical aspects of missile defense, and Senator Ashcroft chaired a critical hearing just yesterday relating to the legal status of the ABM Treaty. It is widely recognized that the treaty itself lapsed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but what some may not know is that the Clinton administration is seeking to reconstitute the ABM Treaty with four new partners. The fine work being done by Senator Ashcroft is central to the question of whether the Senate should approve this effort. In any case, the committee has determined, through the aforementioned work of one colleague on this committee, that the Clinton administration continues to cling to ABM Treaty strictures despite the clear and growing menace of ballistic missile attack. I must conclude, for one, that the administration has developed blueprints for national missile defense not on the basis of the best technology available, but on the basis of what can be most easily negotiated with Russia in a revised ABM Treaty. Which leads me to one main point which I feel obliged to stress. I'm sure that Dr. Kissinger will help the committee assess the merits of my proposition which is that the time has come to dispense with the ABM Treaty. The concept of mutual assured destruction was negotiated with an adversary that no longer exists in a world without rogue nations armed with ICBM's. The MAD concept emerged at a time when it was cheaper and easier to build offensive systems rather than defensive ones, and if the ABM Treaty ever served a useful purpose--and that is a debatable suggestion in my judgment--it is undeniably out of touch with today's post-cold war world. In short, the ABM Treaty buys the United States nothing whatsoever today. All it is doing, even while in legal abeyance, is complicating U.S. missile defense plans while talk continues about this proposal or that proposal which would need to be negotiated with Russia. I think Senator Hagel put it best when he emphasized the moral bankruptcy of strategic vulnerability in this day and age. No nation has the right to obliterate United States cities and no nation has the right to veto U.S. defense plans. Russia is not the Soviet Union and Russia should not be encouraged to think in ABM Treaty terms as the Soviet Union did. Parenthetically, Red China, a nation which has just been caught stealing atomic secrets for their nuclear ICBM's, with which it has already explicitly threatened our cities, has absolutely no right to complain about U.S. deployment of a missile defense. Now, I am going to do everything within my power to ensure that the ABM Treaty is never resurrected or reconstituted regardless of whether the President proposes one other party to the treaty or twenty. The concept of limiting missile defense is a moral and defunct proposition for a Nation that has both the ability and the urgent need for such defenses. Now, I say to my distinguished guest that I have given the President until next week to fulfill his legally binding certification that he will submit a succession arrangement to the treaty. As I have said, consideration of such a document will be more than a political referendum on the treaty. It will be a very real debate over whether the Senate will bring the ABM Treaty out of legal limbo or hold it in abeyance forever. [The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues its scheduled series of hearings on the ABM Treaty. This morning the Committee welcomes Dr. Henry Kissinger, who served as National Security Advisor to President Nixon, and as Secretary of State to both Presidents Nixon and Ford. I should note for the record that Dr. Kissinger is the principal architect of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, he is uniquely qualified to advise the Committee on the extent to which the concept of ``mutually-assured destruction'' is a useful notion in today's world of proliferating missile threats. Before proceeding with my comments, I commend the leadership of Senator Hagel in steering the Committee's study of the ABM Treaty. For two months, Senator Hagel has directed the Committee's examination of the growing threat, and assessed the feasibility of various missile defense technologies, all the while uncovering the pernicious effect that the ABM Treaty has had--and is continuing to have--on U.S. defense plans. I also am deeply grateful for the work being done in the Committee on the ABM Treaty by Senators Ashcroft and Lugar. Senator Lugar steered the Committee's hearing on the technical aspects of missile defense and Senator Ashcroft chaired a critical hearing yesterday relating to the legal status of the ABM Treaty. It is widely recognized that the treaty itself lapsed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But what some may not know is that the Clinton Administration is seeking to reconstitute the ABM Treaty with four new partners. The fine work being done by Senator Ashcroft is central to the question of whether the Senate should approve this effort. The Committee has determined, through the aforementioned work of my colleagues, that the Clinton Administration continues to cling to ABM Treaty strictures despite the clear and growing menace of ballistic missile attack. I must conclude that the Administration has developed blueprints for a national missile defense--not on the basis of the best technology available--but on the basis of what can be most easily negotiated with Russia in a revised ABM Treaty. Which leads me to the main point I feel obliged to stress--and Dr. Kissinger will help the Committee assess the merits of my proposition-- that the time has come to dispense with the ABM Treaty. The concept of mutually-assured destruction was negotiated with an adversary that no longer exists, in a world without rogue nations armed with ICBMs. The ``MAD'' concept emerged at a time when it was cheaper and easier to build offensive systems rather than defensive ones. If the ABM Treaty ever served a useful purpose--and that is a debatable suggestion--it is UNDENIABLY out of touch with today's post- Cold War world. In short, the ABM Treaty buys the United States nothing today. All it is doing, even while in legal abeyance, is complicating U.S. missile defense plans. Talk continues about this proposal or that proposal which would need to be negotiated with Russia. Senator Hagel put it best, I think, when he emphasized the moral bankruptcy of strategic vulnerability in this day and age. No nation has a right to obliterate U.S. cities, and no nation has a right to veto U.S. defense plans. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and Russia should not be encouraged to think in ABM Treaty terms as the Soviet Union did. And, parenthetically, Red China--a nation which has just been caught stealing atomic secrets for the nuclear ICBMs with which it has already explicitly threatened our cities--has absolutely no right to complain about U.S. deployment of missile defenses. I shall do everything within my power to ensure that the ABM Treaty is never resurrected or reconstituted, regardless of whether the President proposes one other party to the treaty, or twenty. The concept of limiting missile defenses is a morally-defunct proposition for a Nation that has both the ability, and the urgent need, for such defenses. I have given the President until next week to fulfill his legally- binding certification that he will submit a succession arrangement to the treaty. As I have said, consideration of such a document will be more than a political referendum on the treaty. It will be a very real debate over whether the Senate will bring the ABM Treaty out of legal limbo, or hold it in abeyance forever. Today marks the 740th day that the President's promise has gone unhonored. More than 2 years have passed since the President made his pledge, which, significantly, was the basis upon which the CFE Flank Agreement was brought into force. The President's delay, together with his repeated efforts to circumvent his pledge (by calling Russia a Party to the treaty), now call into question to validity of the CFE Flank Agreement and the ongoing CFE negotiations in Vienna. I must urge the President to fulfill his promise immediately, or risk being forced to explain to various European nations why the Senate has judged that U.S. agreement to the revised Flank Document is defective under law. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has enjoyed a tremendously productive working relationship with the Administration this session. Both the International Nuclear Safety Convention and the Amended Mines Protocol (two treaties desperately wanted by the executive branch) were moved expeditiously to the Senate floor at the Administration's request. In both cases the Committee bent over backwards to accommodate the White House and to secure ratification in time for the United States to participate in treaty-related meetings. But the treaty-making power under Article II, Section II, clause 2 of the Constitution is a two-way street. The President cannot violate the letter and spirit of his ratification-related pledges without undermining the confidence of the Senate in the cooperative ratification process. This is an issue larger than just the legal status of the ABM Treaty. It goes to the heart of the manner by which the United States enters into, and is bound by, treaties. If the President cannot be relied upon to fulfill his commitment and submit a document that has been collecting dust for 2 years, he should not be surprised when the Senate takes action to enforce previously-imposed legal conditions. With this final exhortation to the President to fulfill his legal obligations, I turn to Senator Biden for any comments he might have. The Chairman. Senator Biden, we will be glad to hear from you. Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, believe it or not, the chairman and I are good friends. We agree on everything. The only thing that has not changed is our view on strategic defense and the ABM Treaty. I wish the chairman would be more blunt about how he feels about this. I take it very seriously, Mr. Secretary, when the chairman says that, in so many words, over his prostrate body will we see the ABM Treaty remain in force. I have no doubt about his conviction on that point, and I have no doubt about his ability to generate sufficient votes on this committee. But I do have a little bit of a doubt about the contention that the committee has already concluded this. If it has already reached the same conclusion as the chairman, I missed the meeting. But I have no doubt that it will be a difficult meeting--not in a personal sense, but a difficult meeting in terms of the intellectual debate that is going to take place over this issue. The storm clouds are gathering. And I read your statement, Mr. Secretary, and I do not think my case is going to be helped by your statement. But I mean this sincerely when I say it is always a pleasure to have you come and consult with this committee. You and I often kid when we are together with those around us about the first consultation that I had as a young United States Senator, when I was 30 years old. I am going to repeat it for my friend from the Midwest. I walked into the hearing late. It was an executive session. The chairman may remember it. He was on the committee at the time, I think, as well. I walked in late. I sat at this hearing table thinking this was where the meeting was, not realizing that we had an executive committee meeting room. Then I went running over. It was late spring. It was hot. The Secretary was giving his ``world view,'' which is the way it was titled. I went running in. The guard stopped me, spun me around when I tried to go in the door, and demanded identification, which sort of heightened things a little bit. My hand was perspiring. You know that door that opens inward in our committee room? There used to be filing cabinets, the chairman will remember, right on the right-hand side. The door slipped out of my hand. There was no restraining device on the door then, because they did not want to spoil the look of the wall. So the door smashed against the filing cabinets and I arrived in the middle of the hearing literally upon the back of the Secretary. The chairman at that time was the acting chairman, our Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield. He said, ``sit down.'' I sat down, making myself the second ranking member of the committee. The hearing was almost over. The leader said, are there any more questions? And I can tell the Senator remembers this. And I said, yes, I have a question. I had rehearsed my question. It was my first appearance. The question had been asked 17 times already, I suspect. And I asked my question with as much sense of authority as I could muster. The Secretary looked across and he said to the chairman, ``I thought no staff was permitted in this meeting.'' At which point Joe Sisco, who was his assistant at the time, passed over a note that said, Biden-Delaware. He said, ``oh, I apologize, Senator Bidden.'' And I said, ``Secretary Dulles, it does not bother me a bit.'' But from that moment, from that time to now, there is no one whose views I listen to more closely than yours, Mr. Secretary. You are probably the most knowledgeable person in this country on American foreign policy, and as the old joke goes, you have been there and you have done that. And you did the ABM Treaty as well. I am anxious to hear what you say and to get a chance to ask you some questions. But let me digress for another 2 minutes, Mr. Chairman, before we move to the topic. I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your speedy appointment of Steve Biegun to be the staff director of this committee. Nobody will really fill the shoes of Admiral Bud Nance. We are going to miss him, no one more than you. But the committee work has to go on and I think you have made a fine choice, and I look forward to working with him. I got to know Steve during work on NATO enlargement and the CFE Flank Document, and he has been able and honorable. I am confident we can continue the kind of relationship we have had. Let me conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having these hearings. I look forward to the debate we are going to have on the future of ABM. I would like to urge you again. I wish you were willing to move us forward with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hearings, as well. I told you I am going to raise that question with you every time I can. I think that it is critical that we have hearings on that issue, but we can get underway here. I do not want to delay the Secretary any longer. Again, welcome, Mr. Secretary. It is a delight to have you here. The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, he has a needle about that long in his right-hand pocket. Senator Biden. But I keep telling him about it. The Chairman. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I too wish to add my welcome, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for spending some time with us listening to Senator Bidden here. I thought that is the way it was done, Joe. But I appreciate Joe Biden's leadership and the chairman's leadership on this issue. Hardly an American understands as well as you, Mr. Secretary, the importance of what we are dealing with here. I wish to also express to you, as I have heard it over the last 48 hours many times, the excellent framing piece that you did in Newsweek this week. Those of you who have not read it, should read it. You connect the world better, as you normally do, than about anybody around. In this piece, I think it is not only eloquent but it is right on the mark as to not only the short-term challenges this country and the world must deal with, but more importantly what is ahead for the next millennium. So, thank you for that contribution. I do have a statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. I would, in my brief statement, wish the Secretary Happy Birthday tomorrow. I have been told that somewhere around 51 or 52 is the appropriate age. But Happy Birthday. We wish you many more. And if Senator Bidden really cared about you, he would have baked a cake I think. Senator Biden. We still have time, Mr. Secretary. Look, the cake has already been baked. I remember he used to come up here and everybody would say, ``Kissinger, what are you doing?'' Now everybody comes up and says, ``Mr. Secretary, it is so good to see you.'' So, he has gotten his cake. He has been through a lot over the years before this committee, although he always has given more than he has taken. Senator Hagel. Senator Biden has just finished my statement. So, thank you, Mr. Secretary. The Chairman. You finally get a chance. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN, KISSINGER & ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NY Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, before I turn to my testimony, I would like to pay tribute to Admiral Bud Nance, whom I had the honor to meet as your chief of staff and who then became a good friend. Our country needs leaders who reflect about the national interest without partisanship, who dedicate their lives to the service of their country. There is nobody more fair-minded, more knowledgeable than Admiral Nance. He was, in addition, a remarkable human being, whom I miss personally, but I know how much more he must be missed by those who have been his friends since childhood. The Chairman. Thank you very much. That means so much to me personally, and I know his family will appreciate it. Dr. Kissinger. Now, Mr. Chairman, since Senator Biden has pointed out he has read the statement, I will not read my statement again unless you wish me to. And I will just sum up my views so that we can turn to questions. I would like to point out that I have not studied the treaty recently and I am no technical expert on which weapons system is the most suitable. In preparation for this hearing, I tried, and I did get myself briefings from various groups. I have talked to those involved with the various studies that have been made, including Don Rumsfeld and the Heritage Foundation study. But the thrust of my remarks will deal with the strategic and geopolitical environment and not with the technical aspects of the treaty, though I will be glad to respond to questions insofar as I can. I have been in a complicated position with respect to the ABM Treaty. So long as I have been writing on strategic issues, I have been deeply worried about the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. When I came to Washington as Security Adviser, I looked at the estimates of damage in a nuclear war on both sides. I am speaking here very informally. This is obviously not part of my statement. I called up the former Secretary of Defense McNamara, and I said, what are they holding out? What is it that they are not showing me, because there has got to be something else? Because we cannot risk the future of this country on such casualty figures and on such risks. He said, well, I never meant to carry it out, which is what he has repeatedly said publicly since then. Well, that is a very dangerous strategy. We then tried to modify in an environment of no defense, and we just found that there was no way to reduce casualties to what could be described as an acceptable level even by the widest stretch of the imagination. So, I have always been extremely uneasy--and I have said so repeatedly and in all my writings--about the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. That doctrine, briefly stated, is that if one can keep the level of damage to both sides above a certain level--not below a certain level, above a certain level-- neither side would ever go to a nuclear war. Therefore, the best guarantee for peace was the certainty of the destruction of one civilization and maybe of human life on the planet as we have known it. This is an absolutely unprecedented concept and it violates one of the basic reasons for the existence of government in general in the history of mankind--which is to improve the security of the people under their charge. So, intellectually I have always opposed this concept, and I have looked for limited applications of force and a better relationship between force and diplomacy. In fact, my personal preference was always for missile defense. When President Nixon took office, he recommended a system of 12 ABM sites designed to prevent light attacks, of a protection against light attacks, accidental launches, and emerging third countries. And this concept passed with one vote, the Vice President's, in I think 1969 or early 1970. It faced violent opposition because the doctrine of mutual assured destruction had captured most of the intellectual community and most of those who were working on arms control. The arguments that have persisted for 30 years now began evolving then: one, that the system made war more likely; two, that it would not work. It was both destabilizing and would not work, even though both of these propositions could not be true. A lot of ingenuity was devoted to showing how one could penetrate it. Now, our view was that it is true, of course, that a system that protects against light attack can, by definition, be overwhelmed by a large attack. But we thought that even if an adversary were forced into a substantial attack, this would be a much less likely risk for him to take than to try just one or two missiles which would assuredly get through. Of course, the third country problem is self-explanatory. This was during the period of the Vietnam war and it was not a technically effective system. In the bitter debates of that period--in which the defense budget became a surrogate for other issues--the number of sites for the system was reduced each year. So, what started out as a 12-site system was reduced to a 2-site system by 1972. It was at that point, in early 1972, that President Nixon decided, with my strong concurrence, that, before we lost the whole concept, we would be better off saving what we could and limiting the Soviet Union. It was not our preferred strategic and geopolitical choice. Nevertheless, in a two-power world, mutual assured destruction had a significant plausibility, and I respect the serious people who held the view even though I disagreed with it. But we are now in a different world. Nuclear weapons are clearly spreading. Secretary Cohen has testified before this committee--I believe on January 20 of this year--that when he confirmed the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission, ``we are affirming that: there is a threat, and that the threat is growing and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home.'' Therefore, however valid the reasoning was in the 1970's and however much mutual assured destruction may have been taken seriously at that time, I do not believe mutual assured destruction can possibly work in a world of many nuclear powers. And frankly, I do not think it could work over an indefinite period of time in a world of two powers. But this is now an esoteric issue because we will not be facing it. We will face a different one. I also have always been concerned about the position of a government that leaves its population defenseless by a deliberate policy choice, when demonstrably, other choices are available. If the judgment turns out to be wrong and mutual assured destruction does not work and if then massive damage from a nuclear attack were to occur--or any significant damage from a nuclear attack--how would such a government explain to the American people that, knowing a technology was available that might have resisted it, it deliberately rejected it for the sake of theories that were surely esoteric? Therefore, when President Reagan proposed the SDI, I was among those who supported it. And I was influenced by a group of scientists who came to see me to ask me to join them in opposing it by giving me a lot of evidence that proved that, if the Soviet Union launched an all-out attack, it would overwhelm the SDI system. And that was surely true. When I asked these scientists what would happen if they launched--I forget now how many--50 missiles, 100 missiles--it became apparent to me that the system might work quite well at low levels of attack and would require an increasingly higher level to be overwhelmed. And I thought even that was significant progress if the opponent could be forced into making a massive decision and could not use it in a limited way. Be that as it may, I believe there is now a consensus in the United States: one, that we need missile defense for theater defense; second, that the principle of a national defense seems to be more or less accepted, including by the administration. The issue is whether that defense should be within the framework of the existing ABM Treaty or whether it should proceed unconstrained by the ABM Treaty. There are many questions about the ABM Treaty, including whether the entities that signed it still exist and whether it is, therefore, still valid. I believe that we should proceed with the development of the best technology for the defense of the United States and for theater defense, including our allies. I would recommend against having the research constrained by the treaty. Now, there is again some dispute on whether the treaty prevents development or whether it prevents only deployment. I would certainly be in favor of proceeding with unconstrained research into the best available technologies and then making the decision on the basis of what is most suitable. Is it possible to negotiate a modification of the ABM Treaty? Well, since the basic concept of the ABM Treaty is so contrary to the concept of an effective missile defense, I find it very difficult to imagine this. But I would be open to argument, provided we do not use the treaty as a constraint on pushing forward on the most effective development of a national and theater missile defense. I believe we owe it to the security of our country. I regret that this is happening at a time when our relations with Russia are overloaded with a lot of other problems. There is no Soviet Union anymore. But I think our relations with Russia, as I pointed out in the article to which Senator Hagel was friendly enough to refer, needs a realistic basis of mutual interests, and it does not serve either side to pretend to an arrangement that, in the end, threatens the populations of both sides. Now, this in essence is my view which I expressed in greater detail in my formal statement and which I would like to put before this committee. It is a feeling I have had for 30 years about the concept of mutual assured destruction, a conviction that leaves no other choice except to take a position which is going to hurt many people who were associated with the evolution of this treaty, who feel strongly about it and whom I respect. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Henry A. Kissinger I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify on the ABM treaty and missile defense. Let me begin with some qualifications. I am not a technical expert. I have not had the opportunity to review the provisions of the treaty in detail. But I have thought about the political and strategic implications of missile defense and the impact of the ABM treaty on it. And the ABM treaty was negotiated under my general aegis during the Nixon Administration. Therefore let me explain my general view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general sense with respect to it. I was always uneasy about the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. The first responsibility of government is to provide for the security of the people. To the extent the U.S. has the ability to provide for the defense of the country, it would be a dereliction of duty not to do so. I cannot accept the proposition that we contribute to peace by exposing our population to vast and foreseeable dangers as an act of policy. I cannot imagine what an American President would say to the American public if there should be an attack, and if he would have to explain that he did nothing to prevent or defeat the resulting catastrophe. I think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have been an advocate of missile defense ever since I entered government. Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose an ABM system. It was based on much more elementary technology than now exists, but it provided for twelve defense sites circling the United States and was put forward with the argument that it would disabuse the Soviets of any temptations to risk a limited nuclear attack, prevent third country attacks, and protect against an accidental missile launch. But then we faced various oppositions from groups dedicated to the theory of mutual destruction. One group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. Though the criticisms contradicted each other, they affected the Congress. As a result, in every Congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be under pressure in every budgetary cycle thereafter. Limiting an ABM system to only two sites did not make any strategic sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they considered to be an essentially useless enterprise. We negotiated the ABM treaty because we wanted to get something for what the U.S. Congress was going to do anyway--kill the ABM program. The Soviet Union was expanding its military strength and our Congress was cutting back U.S. military strength. And it was under those conditions that we thought we would put a ceiling on the ABM in order to limit the Soviet ABM system, which Moscow had already started to build. We also used the ABM treaty to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in the SALT talks. I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. But there was nothing we could do about it because the defense budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration that a plausible technology for strategic defense existed. As soon as Reagan put forward his 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support a missile defense for the same reasons. When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get me to join them in opposition to it. And they made the traditional arguments--first, that it was destabilizing and secondly, it wouldn't work--despite my difficulty in grasping how it can be both. When I asked them to explain to me the mechanics of how and why they believed it would not work at various levels of attack, it was plain that at a fairly low level of attack involving several hundred warheads, it worked fairly well, but became degraded only as more and more warheads were added to the attack. That seemed to me to strengthen and not weaken the case for missile defense. In the absence of missile defense, penetration becomes totally predictable--a simple question of mathematics. But it is different even when there exists even a light missile defense. Since the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will get through, as the threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise. And in the Soviet case, I always felt that if they knew that they would have to launch several hundred missiles in order to get a significant number through the missile defenses, that was a lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile that they launched was bound to get there. The circumstances that existed when the treaty was drafted and agreed to were notably different from the situation today. Specifically, the current threats, as set forth by our Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, have moved us into a new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed. The country that signed it, the USSR, has disappeared as a legal entity. Missile technologies have evolved in sophistication. The acceleration in the proliferation of ballistic missile and WMD technologies are putting capabilities in the hands of nations that were not even remotely considered to be candidates to possess such destructive power when the agreement was concluded. One of the reasons ballistic missiles are attractive to so many countries is that there are currently no defenses against them. They are almost guaranteed to arrive at their targets. Given their destructive power, they are terror weapons by their mere existence in the absence of deployed defenses. History teaches that weakness is provocative and, in a real sense, the absence of missile defense provokes others into seeking such weapons. The threat to the U.S. from missile proliferation is real and growing. This was underscored last year by the Rumsfeld Commission, which stated that the threat posed by a number of hostile Third World states ``is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.'' Further, the Commission stated that ``the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment'' of missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory by these same states. Secretary of Defense Cohen confirmed the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission on January 20, 1999, when he stated, ``. . . we are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat is growing and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home.'' All of us need to recognize that at some point, and admittedly some will differ on where this point is, the ABM treaty constrains the nation's missile defense programs to an intolerable degree. Secretary Cohen, also on January 20, stated that the Administration recognizes this fact and will require modifications to the treaty. He also suggested that if an agreement on this issue, presumably with the Russians or others, could not be obtained, then the U.S. would consider withdrawal. I share this view. Quite apart from the legal arguments that are made by experts as to the possibility that with the end of the USSR the treaty technically may no longer be in force, the treaty was signed with an eye to an environment that simply does not exist today. For these reasons, I believe that it is strategically and morally necessary to build a missile defense. Strategically, because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them. Morally, because the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which I have opposed in my writings for at least thirty years, is bankrupt. It may have had a limited theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world, but in a multinuclear world, it is reckless. There seems to be an emerging consensus regarding theater missile defense which I favor--though its specific geographic applications require further consideration. I would also favor the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. An impressive array of technical options cannot be adequately explored until we solve the problem of ABM treaty restrictions on development and testing. We need to find a way to end the restrictions the ABM treaty impose on the research, development, testing and deployment of missile defense systems as soon as possible. I have no clear view how to handle the ABM treaty, except that I would not let it stand in the way. First, it is possible to argue that the ABM treaty was made with an entity that no longer exists. It is also possible to use the abrogation clause in the ABM treaty, but I think that is not the key issue. The key issue is whether it should be a national policy to build a missile defense. The battle lines are already forming along the same issue--whether the missile defense system will work. There always will be those who make the claim that a tremendous system is coming along five years down the road, at which point, those same people will argue that there is an even better one coming along five years after that. So there will never be a ``right time'' for deployment. Therefore, we need to get about the task of developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses that are the most cost effective and the most technically capable of deterring and defending against these new threats, and doing so without inhibitions from the treaty. There is ample time to conduct the necessary negotiations since the shape of the system is still under consideration, and no violation would occur until deployment. There are two qualifications: (1) Research must proceed immediately and not be delayed pending negotiations, and (2) Deployment must take place as soon as a system is chosen. To the extent the Russians do not agree to the necessary amendments, the alternative is to exercise our right, as provided in the treaty, to extend six months' notification that we intend to withdraw from the treaty. The Chairman. Before we begin questioning, I wonder if Senator Frist has a statement. Senator Frist. No, sir, I do not, but I will participate in the questioning. Thank you. The Chairman. You were very clear in what you said, Dr. Kissinger. I agree with what I understood to be your message to this committee and therefore to the Senate. The ABM Treaty, you were saying, must not be allowed to stand in the way of missile defense. That was the predicate and the basis of your comments I believe. Now, you have talked about the possibility of amending or abrogating the treaty to render it harmless, and if it came to that, Senator Biden, I would support that. I just do not want it to be harmful to the defense efforts of the United States. I think I should call a little attention to the hearing yesterday, chaired by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, Mr. Ashcroft. They examined the legal status of the ABM Treaty and the clear conclusion, according to the constitutional lawyers who testified yesterday, is that the ABM Treaty lapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union. Now, this is a critical legal point that has some legitimate debate one way or another, even though I am pretty firm in my position on it, because it means that the agreement being peddled by the administration is actually an agreement to revive the ABM Treaty with four new partners: Russia, Belarus, and the other two. Now, if this is the case, it raises the stakes on the significance of a Senate vote on the MOU on succession. The defeat of the MOU literally would mean defeat of the administration's efforts to reconstitute the treaty. Under such circumstances, Dr. Kissinger, would you, nevertheless, recommend that the Senate reject the MOU, the memorandum on succession? Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman I frankly have not thought this problem through, so I am answering off the top of my head. As a general proposition, I am not in favor of attaching new significance to the ABM Treaty, and I would favor a four-power arrangement only if we could renegotiate the treaty in a manner that is compatible with what I have outlined, if that is possible. The Chairman. Well, that is an important distinction between what some are saying and others are saying. Dr. Kissinger. That would be my instinct in dealing with that. The Chairman. You mentioned I believe the Rumsfeld Commission which has warned that North Korea and Iran--and I quote the commission in its report--``would be able to inflict major destruction on the United States within about 5 years of a decision to acquire such a capability.'' Now, I suppose you share the alarm at North Korea's launch of the TD-1 missile with an unexpected third stage. Similarly, according to press accounts, Iran has test fired a Scud missile in a ship-based boat. I guess what I want to ask you is, are you concerned that unless we break ground soon on a national missile defense, that the citizens of the United States could be put in serious peril within the next 5 years? Dr. Kissinger. I believe we should create a national missile defense as soon as it is possible to do so with a system on which there exists a consensus. And I think it is dangerous when people say--I have heard it said--we can wait until these capabilities exist. One could also make the argument, however, that if no defense exists, the easiest way for many countries to threaten the United States is to acquire a rudimentary long-range missile capability. So, one could argue that a national missile defense is a deterrent. My basic view is that we should make it clear we are moving to a national missile defense as soon as possible. How we achieve consensus on what is an effective defense I do not know, but it must be possible to constitute panels, like the Rumsfeld Commission, of technical experts who give us conclusive advice. The Chairman. Well, I guess what I am driving at is, how much delay will be suitable or not objectionable? I am asking the question, should we allow negotiations with Russia to delay our deployment or development of a U.S. missile defense? Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, I start from the premise that we cannot envisage a concept in which we have no missile defense. Therefore, we should avoid a negotiation that leaves open no defense as an option. Also I would not encourage using negotiations as a means of protracting the final decision. So, I would try to reduce the deployment of ballistic missile defense for the United States to a technical question, at which point technical people in whom both sides of the aisle have confidence should consider whether the time has come to deploy it. And at that point, we should do it and either manage a way to renegotiate the treaty, or propose abrogating the treaty under the abrogation clause--which, after all, must have envisaged circumstances totally different from the ones that existed then. The Chairman. Well, if I ask another question, it will overrun my time. We have 7 minutes and I have used 6\1/2\ of mine. You will proceed, please, sir. Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, are we going to get a chance to maybe have a second round? The Chairman. Sure. Senator Biden. Because I cannot think of anyone whose testimony is, quite frankly, more important or more relevant. Mr. Secretary, you are not here to testify as to the legality of the ABM Treaty. The only thing I may know almost as much as you about is the Constitution and the treaty power. I would take issue with the proposition that the ABM Treaty has automatically lapsed. I say that not for your response, but just for the record. Dr. Kissinger. I had trouble hearing this last part. Senator Biden. I believe that under our Constitution and the requirement of the President to take care that the laws are enforced, and his power of recognition of successor States, the break-up of a treaty partner would in fact not cause the treaty to lapse. I just want the record to state I disagree with the chairman's statement and the statement of some of the scholars yesterday. For example, we did not require new treaty arrangements with the breakup of Yugoslavia, or regarding the CFE Treaty. We did not conclude that successor states could not be successor states and recognized by the administration. We seem to have reserved that concern totally for this issue; but that is another question. I have some specific questions, but because you are better than anyone I know--and I mean this sincerely--at putting things in context. My fundamental problem with missile defense as an alternative to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction rests on two points: first, we need a system that can do the job. Are we giving up something to get something better? Because I agree with you that the doctrine makes one, at a minimum, uncomfortable, knowing that this notion of mutual assured destruction is the basis upon which our ultimate security rests. But the first concern is, do we have something that can do the job. The second is, how do we get from here to there? It would be one thing if the Lord came down and sat here on this dais and said, look, we have a system that works and we can put it in place tomorrow. No problem. I do not have any problem with that because then there would be no legitimate worry about the instability that I fear would be potentially created if there were a long lead time for putting in the system--as, indeed, there is in real life. So, what I am trying to get at is this. In a generic sense, I want you to talk about how these pieces fit together. The Soviet Union does not exist. Russia does. It is not as powerful as the Soviet Union but it still has all their nuclear weapons. It still has the capacity to devastate civilization, let alone the United States. So, what do you see, not in terms of not wanting to offend Russia, or not wanting to complicate the relationship, or any of the things you hear some people talk about, but in stark terms, if you are sitting in Russia? The United States abrogates--and I am not suggesting you said we should do that immediately, but the United States concludes that it should abrogate the ABM Treaty and is going for a nationwide missile defense system that we are going to commit billions of dollars to build--and I believe we could probably do it if we commit the resources to it--whether it is a space-based, sea-based, land-based, or multiple-based system. What happens today and next week and next year, in your view, within Russia as it relates to the judgments they will make relative to the arsenal that they now possess and their willingness to bring those numbers down, or their inclination to try to increase the numbers to overwhelm a ballistic missile defense system? What do you think goes on over there? Dr. Kissinger. Let me first go back to what influenced me so greatly in my attitudes, and it was this. When you are Security Adviser and Secretary of State, you are going to be one of the two or three people that will be asked, if there is time, whether nuclear weapons should be used. And in the two- power world in which I functioned, that was my permanent nightmare. What would I say if the moment of truth arrived? At the same time, if you look over our actions, in crises we escalated very rapidly because we wanted to raise the level of risk to the highest level possible because we were afraid of going too slowly. So, if you look at the alerts of 1970 and 1973, we were face to face with this, and I thought that this was something I would not wish on an indefinite line of successors, either of Presidents or of people in my position. I frankly asked myself, if we survive, if I survive, what are we going to say about how this happened? And yet, I had to do it. I mean, when we thought the Soviets would go into the Middle East, we went on alert. We went on alert twice when I was there, and President Nixon was extremely courageous in doing this. So, this has affected me. Now, the debate is usually put in terms of, does it work perfectly or must it work perfectly to be useful at all? I think if one can raise the entrance price, it will reduce the temptation to lob a few missiles. I thought that was useful and therefore I supported President Reagan's SDI. That was not your question, though. Your question was what is the attitude in Russia. My view about our current relations is that we have placed too much emphasis on a sort of psychological approach in which we attempt to influence the domestic structure of Russia and pay too little attention to the fundamental problem that Russia faces as a nation. It has had 400 years of imperialism. This has been the essence of Russian foreign history, partly of being invaded but also partly of expanding. Now they are back to their territories at about the time of Peter the Great, when it all started. So, now they have to get used to this environment. It seems to me that really nothing is more important than to see whether, as nations, we can feel comfortable, both of us, in such an environment. I actually believe that if Russia acts as a nation and stays within its existing borders, there is no reason for the United States to have any significant conflict with Russia. Then the question is, should Russia view its capacity to launch a totally devastating attack on the United States as a significant factor in our relationship? If the issue is no longer world domination--or whatever one calls the ideological conflict--I do not believe they would need to think of it in those terms. I, therefore, believe not in a negotiation on how to amend the treaty, but in a real strategic dialog that treats the Russians as adults and not as subjects that we educate entirely to our point of view. That might lead to a situation where they no longer feel that they must have this capacity to penetrate. I am more concerned about third countries, frankly, than I am about Russia in the nuclear equation of the future. But I do believe that we need a strategic dialog with Russia, not about the treaty---- Senator Biden. I understand. Dr. Kissinger [continuing]. But about our basic relationship, and I think we have been remiss in this. Senator Biden. I will come back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Following along the same path here, Mr. Secretary, that you and Senator Biden have been discussing, you mentioned in your remarks the importance of dealing with Russia, I believe what you said, in a way that would be based on mutual interests. It seems to me, picking up on the last 60 seconds of your response, this surely should be our approach working with the Russians. You just mentioned Third World countries. The Russians too are going to be dealing with this as they are today. No borderless challenges in the world. I was in Russia in December. I met with General Lebed and others. When I asked General Lebed the question what he considered the most significant challenge to Russia, he said it was not NATO. It was not the West, but he said it is probably two things. One is fundamentalism coming from its southern borders, and two, China. If in fact the grounding of your sense of this is correct-- and I believe it is--then what would be the course that would take us through the process working with the Russians on trying to come together with some mutual interest, understanding and dealing through the complications of the 1972 ABM Treaty with this very clear premise that they must understand? No sovereign nation will ever allow the security of its nation to be held hostage to any other foreign policy, and second, as you know very well, the will, the commitment, and the technology, all connected, must be clearly understood by our friends and our adversaries that we will use all of them together. So, I would be interested in your taking this a little further in what you started in your conversation. Dr. Kissinger. Right now we are in a very difficult relationship with Russia because the Kosovo crisis--or the war with Yugoslavia--is deeply humiliating to Russia. Serbia has been its historic ally. I know there was this interlude in the Tito period but, historically, World War I started because Russia would not let Serbia go down. If one looks at history, in 1908 there was a Bosnia crisis in which the Germans decided they would humiliate Russia in order to break the Franco-Russian alliance, and they succeeded. They did not break the alliance, but they humiliated Russia. But 6 years later, it guaranteed that Russia dug in and contributed to the war. Now, I am assuming this Yugoslav crisis will end during the summer in some fashion. I do not think, frankly, Russia can make a huge contribution to settling the crisis because its interests are different from ours. We want NATO to come out of it as intact as possible, and they would not mind NATO being weakened as a result of the crisis. But once that is behind us, I believe we have a whole range of issues to discuss with them: the future of Central Asia, the future of their relations and our relations with the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, actions in the Third World that might affect the general equilibrium. And I think it is in our interest to treat Russia as a major power which will be taken seriously--and automatically seriously--and is made part of a general system of political consultation. If you read many of the speeches we make in Russia, they are usually sort of trying to convert them to our basic theories. One must give them an opportunity to participate. On strategy I would also say that we cannot be without a missile defense in order to make them happy, and it is not good for them. If we made that clear as a constituent element, I believe the Russians would adjust to it. I do not think that the nuclear balance is the most worrisome thing to the Russians. I believe their loss of perceived influence in areas where they have traditionally been active is what concerns them. It is possible for us to give some of this back to them by taking their views seriously. I believe, for example, that when the Yugoslav crisis is over, if we do not want to be having occupation forces all over the place, some political settlement of the Balkans will have to be negotiated. And in that I think Russia could play a role. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Frist. Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, one of the issues that we consider again and an issue that has been one of the more contentious issues before this committee since the beginning of the 104th Congress has been the issue of arms control agreements. I am interested in how you view, if you step back, the overall value, usefulness, utility of arms control agreements and how you believe that the United States should today view them. Dr. Kissinger. Well, if you look at the evolution of the arms control discussions, in a lot of which I participated, when the destructiveness of nuclear weapons first became apparent in the early 1950's and when they were being built into the nuclear systems, the first reaction of the academic community and of the people who were thinking about this was to find a more limited way of using nuclear weapons than the doctrine of massive retaliation. In fact, if you go back to the early 1950's, at the Lincoln Laboratories at MIT, there was a lot of emphasis put on air defense as something to which strategic emphasis should be given. Then, as the 1950's developed, the doctrine of defense was jettisoned, and emphasis was placed on arms control in order to prevent arms races from spiraling out of control. I participated in many seminars that were addressed to this, and within the context of that period, I believe they performed a useful role in educating our side, and both sides, to the implications of nuclear war. The trouble was that technology was moving much faster than concepts of arms control. So when we started, for example, on the first arms limitation agreement, they were single warheads. By the time one got to SALT II, the problem was MIRV's. There were so many more warheads, even with the arms control that had been created, that the environment that had been considered highly dangerous with single warheads was now superseded even by arms control. Now even the lowest level they are talking about is twice and three times larger than what existed under SALT I conditions. It is very difficult with any conceivable arms control system to reduce the numbers to a level at which huge damage cannot be inflicted. So, as a participant in these discussions and one who was involved in the SALT negotiation I believe that they performed a useful role in educating us and, to some extent, in calming the environment. Although if you analyze what was actually done, both sides used arms control to legitimize the programs on which they had already internally agreed. SALT I was madly controversial, but you will not find one program that was canceled as a result of SALT I. Therefore, I think it was more useful as an educational process than anything else. But under present conditions, when you do not have one super power confronting you, the issue is much more complicated. Senator Frist. Although we do not want to focus on any one area, but with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, could you just share your thoughts whether it has any value today in our overall defense strategy either on its own or as part of a larger package of arms control agreements? Dr. Kissinger. Well, I have not really studied this in detail. I think we have an arms control objective and must prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Anything that makes it more difficult to develop more nuclear weapons I would in principle favor. But then one has to weigh this against the constraints it places on us. But the prevention or the slowing down of nonproliferation is an arms control objective to which we should pay a great deal of attention. Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Well, we are on the horns of a dilemma, though, Dr. Kissinger. There are so many things that we are not sure about, our intelligence lacks the capability to inform at least the Senators in the controlled circumstances of room 403 of the Capitol. For example, the black market that countries such as Russia and Ukraine now participate in. It seems to me that they may be facilitating the spread of ballistic missile capabilities, but I am not sure about it. What do you think? Dr. Kissinger. I am not familiar with accusations that Ukraine is helping the spread of nuclear missile capability. It does appear that Russia certainly has contributed to it, and so has North Korea and at various stages China. The Chairman. Well, did we have the same level of concern over proliferation versus criminal elements during the cold war as we have now, more or less? It is a different ball game now because you cannot put your finger--it is sort of like trying to pick up a little bit of mercury in a saucer. You cannot really know what you are talking about based on the limited intelligence we are able to get and how much it is delayed in the case of China, for example. Dr. Kissinger. Well, I think we should have a great concern about proliferation. The Chairman. Yes. Dr. Kissinger. Nobody is more dedicated to friendly relations with China than I am, but I have always made clear to China that nonproliferation has to be a key element in good relations between China and the United States. The Chairman. Well, that was going to be my next specific question. What do you make of the relationship between Russia and China in terms of proliferation? Was Russia providing this degree of assistance to China at the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated, or do you recall? Or did it come up? Dr. Kissinger. At the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated, we were quite sure that there was enormous hostility between Russia and China because the Soviet Union at the time was increasing its military forces on the Siberian border to about 42 divisions. Our strategy toward China was premised at that time on the proposition that they felt extremely threatened by the Soviet Union. The Chairman. Well, then you have worry about China's involvement in the India-Pakistan difficulty. I have not been able to put my fingers, based on the evidence available to me, on the impact of that. What do you think of that? Dr. Kissinger. Well, my impression is that this has stopped now. I suspect, if I have to interpret Chinese thinking there, that they do not want India to be the only nuclear power on the Indian subcontinent and that they want to create a balance of power so that the whole thrust of the Indian nuclear program cannot be aimed at them. This is not anything the Chinese have said to me, but this is my interpretation of why the Chinese have done what they have done in Pakistan. I do not believe that is aimed at us. The Chairman. I am going to pass for the time being and give the ball to Senator Biden. Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, back to the Russian component. I want to make it clear I am not suggesting Russia should hold anything that we should do hostage. We should decide what is in our interest and do it. One of the conundrums we face, though, is that notwithstanding what you said about the need to put our relationship on a more realistic footing, the fact is they still have over 6,000 very sophisticated nuclear weapons easily able to be aimed at and strike us with hard kill capacity. They still have their MIRV'ed systems. There are two things I would like to explore with you. Again, I have specific questions, but I always find it more beneficial to let you talk, because you connect the dots so well. One is that I can envision it being clearly in Moscow's interest to amend the ABM Treaty to accomplish two things: first, give them some sense of security and symmetry, which they are fixated on and have been for as long as I have been here; and second, gain some access to a defensive capacity for themselves. I could wave a magic wand, I would like to see us get on beyond START II to START III, get the numbers down around 1,000, and move the limited ballistic missile defense, a thin shield, to Russian soil to give them the benefit of that along with us. All the scientists who come before us indicate that a thin missile defense, what you are talking about now, has some potential, but also real problems. The surest way to deal with North Korea, they point out, would be to have a boost phase interceptor that was located in Russia near Vladivostok. That would be the surest way to kill a launch of a North Korean missile heading toward the territory of the United States or anywhere, for that matter. Dr. Kissinger. Or on American ships. Senator Biden. Or on American ships. Now, one of the questions I have is beyond this missile defense, in addition to a missile defense, it seems to me there is a fair amount of room for some imaginative diplomacy. I can picture you being able to put together--and I mean this sincerely--a combination of reassurance to the Russians that would allow them to continue to bring down the number of nuclear weapons at their disposal rather than build them up, and to eliminate their MIRV'ed systems, which I think is a significant breakthrough, if we could get it done in the Duma, and us building a missile defense system that is the one we have been discussing thus far. I guess what I am trying to get at here, in as a roundabout way as I can because I cannot think how to do it directly, is, were you putting together the strategic approach to Russia now, in addition to this overall and important sort of altar call that we may require to have here between Russia and the United States relative to how we will deal with one another across the board, how would you be trying to move the missile defense system without exacerbating the instability that exists in Russia? And I assume you would desire to continue to have the number and types of nuclear weapons at Russian disposal come down, rather than go up. Now, I acknowledge that, given the price of the Russians going ahead and building more, you would still prefer us going down the track of a missile defense system and damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead. But is there a way to do both? Dr. Kissinger. I would think that even if you could get the Russian missiles down to 1,000, that would only get us back to the situation which I found when I came in in 1969 and which I really found morally unbearable even though I had to play with these weapons. Senator Biden. But this would be in combination with a missile defense system that you did not have then, but that we are talking about now. It seems to me your thesis is a correct one, that notwithstanding the fact a missile defense system may not be able to be a total nuclear umbrella over the United States, the fact that it would require an overwhelming-- overwhelming--offensive launch to penetrate it would dissuade a power like Russia, or anyone else, from engaging in the first place. Is there a fulcrum here? Dr. Kissinger. We are talking about Russia. Senator Biden. Yes. Dr. Kissinger. Well, first of all, you apparently would agree with me. We cannot make ourselves vulnerable to third country attacks just to reassure Russia. Senator Biden. Unless we thought Russia was so unstable that an attack from Russia may be a greater threat than an attack from a rogue state. Dr. Kissinger. No. I believe, if you look at it in a historical period--let us say 5, 10 years, which is a short historical period--there is no reason why Russia and the United States need to consider each other as mortal enemies. If the proper relationship develops, I believe that the idea of a nuclear war between our two countries, as the essence of the strategic relationship, could, over a period of time, be eliminated, or at least sharply reduced. Senator Biden. I agree. Dr. Kissinger. We, however, need an adult view of the problem. Russia has a different history from ours. Russia has felt that it was a major player and therefore we are bound to have some adversarial relationships in various parts of the world, but not to the point where the idea that one of us or both of us would risk the destruction of our societies would enter the minds of the next generation of leaders. Therefore, I believe it is more important to bring Russia into a dialog of how we see the evolutions of, say, fundamentalism, Central Asia, and the regions not covered by alliances than some of the political science lectures and sociology lectures on which we have concentrated. So, this should be in the evolving relationship, the key element of the relationship. Within that context, I see no reason why Russia should be particularly disturbed by the systems that I am proposing because I cannot conceive a situation in which Russia would launch an all-out attack. But I can conceive, among armed forces that have not been paid for a long time and local rulers, that somebody may want to take matters into his own hands and do the sort of thing which is precisely what I believe we should prevent with the national defense system. Second, since I also believe in theater based systems, it is not natural for us to say we protect our allies more than ourselves. I favor protecting our allies equally with ourselves, but we are now excluding systems for ourselves that we are willing to give to theater defense. And that is not a natural state of affairs. The Chairman. On top of everything else, Russia's economy is in shambles and they just do not have the funds to build a missile system. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in your opinion where does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty fit into all this? Dr. Kissinger. I really am not adequately prepared on all the nuances of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I am not ducking it. I will be glad to come back. I have not addressed that issue. In my day it was always believed that you could not go below a certain threshold with safety. And all the analysis that I was familiar with when I was conducting these negotiations was based on the belief that you (a) could not test below a certain threshold, and that (b) you needed it to have confidence in your own weapons. But this is knowledge that I have not updated. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The general theme of the hearing this morning is obviously on nuclear weapons, national security, ABM Treaty as the core of the hearing. But I think this panel would be very interested in getting your sense or whatever you would like to offer in regard to what you know about the intelligence breach that has provided China with apparently considerable nuclear knowledge of our capacity. Dr. Kissinger. I only know what I read in unclassified sources--I have not been briefed by the administration on what they know and what their side of it is. I have talked to Congressman Cox, and I have no reason to disbelieve his report. In fact, I accept his report. The worrisome aspect to me in the report is not that the Chinese would try to acquire our nuclear knowledge. As the most advanced country in that field, it seems to me we are the natural target of the intelligence activities of other countries. But what I find hard to comprehend is that our security system could be so lax as to permit this. Therefore, the indignation or the concern should be focused on fixing our system so that it can never happen again and to get to the bottom of exactly what happened. This seems to me what must concern us and absolutely must be prevented. Another aspect we need to think through is that there are two levels of criticism being made. One is the theft of nuclear secrets. The other is the commercial sale of information that is dangerous to spread. Again, I am very worried about the deterioration of our relationship with China. I think we will pay for this insofar as we can control it. But I do believe we need a national policy aimed, not at China, but at any non-allied country that takes into account what technology we are prepared to transfer and what technology we must put under some restrictions. I would not aim that especially at China. I would aim it in a general way at non- allied countries because, given the way commerce moves these days, it flows very easily. And for this it seems to me that we need a national policy that does not apparently now exist. Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Frist. Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I want to just extend that a little bit further, again because you are here and I want to take advantage of the opportunity of discussing an issue that we are all very involved in with the release of the report yesterday. I appreciate your comments on the commercial sale and the theft. I want to take advantage of your thoughts on the geopolitical ramifications of accepting what the Cox report has said in terms of the essence and in terms of the acquisition of warhead designs. It clearly has an impact on reliability, effectiveness of delivery systems. By my question goes to relationships with other countries. To me it does not seem that China is on the verge of becoming the type of nuclear rival that you are so familiar with historically in the Soviet Union. But the new element seems to me to be this ability to miniaturize the thermonuclear devices and MIRV their ICBM's and, perhaps even worse than that, be able to develop the whole submarine launched capability. It seems to me that that does forever change the geopolitical climate where all of a sudden we are talking not just about an Asian theater but a true global theater. Is that right? Is that the new element that is being introduced? Dr. Kissinger. I believe that as China becomes an industrialized country, with or without the theft, some of these developments are almost inevitable. Probably if the facts are as damning as the report seems to imply--and I do not challenge it--that moment in time has been accelerated. I still do not think it will be here before 15 years or so because it would still have to be translated into a manufacturing capability. Even if you know what to do to build them, it would seem to me it would take 15 to 20 years. Now, this is not your question, but I must say I am extremely disturbed by the trend of putting China into the slot vacated by the Soviet Union and gearing all of our Asian policy to a confrontation with China. That could turn into a self- fulfilling prophecy. And it is a different problem in Asia from what it was in Europe. Communism in China does not claim universal applicability. China has neighbors, many of which are quite capable of defending themselves. So, it is not an analogous situation. I believe that, if we made confrontation, unnecessarily, the centerpiece of our foreign policy in Asia, we would lose the support of every Asian nation that I know anything about and bring about the opposite of what we are seeking. If China challenges vital American interests, we must resist. What I am warning against is the attempt to build confrontation into an organic aspect of our policy without such a direct challenge. Senator Frist. Just a final question. Either in Chinese calculations or in our own calculations, even though we are talking about 15 or 20 years for full development, does the recent development of this acceleration raise the stakes to a point that they believe that we would be less willing to respond militarily to an invasion of Taiwan in any way? Again, I am looking at sort of the geopolitical ramifications. Dr. Kissinger. You mean the successful acquisition of this technology? Senator Frist. Correct. Dr. Kissinger. I do not think that the point at which they might make that calculation will arise for 15 to 20 years, and I believe that what they will think then depends importantly on how we both conduct ourselves in the interval. I am warning against self-fulfilling prophecies. It requires a balance between military capability and political relationships. But I am very concerned about the way this relationship is now drifting, and I am also concerned about the theft of this technology. But those two need not be brought into direct relationship with each other. Senator Frist. Except that that interval has gotten shorter. Dr. Kissinger. The interval has gotten shorter. It, therefore, makes the conduct of our relationship more urgent. Senator Frist. Even more important. Thank you. Dr. Kissinger. For example, I am not saying we should forego theater missile defense to reassure China any more than I am saying that about Russia. The Chairman. I do not want you to think that your prepared statement will not get any attention. It is excellent. I have read it. There is much wisdom in it, and I would suggest that the folks covering this would look carefully at it because I am going to circulate it and it is going to be part of the printed record as well, which we will circulate among Senators at the time of any action. For example, you made the point--and it is a very good one. Let me quote you. ``Deterrence during the cold war was based upon assumptions of rationality which allowed the United States and Russia to predict each other's reactions with a fair degree of success. Moreover, communication and the centralization of command-control allowed for a mutual familiarity between the United States and the Soviet Union over one another's plans for reaction in crisis situations.'' Well, we do not have that. That is one thing that is lacking. I raised a question with Steve just a minute ago about the deterioration of the stockpile of the Russian missiles. We do not have any figures on that. Perhaps we do not have any way to get it. But Russia is still making, I think, warheads and our last one was made somewhere along about 1985 or 1986, somewhere at that time. Now, Russia is still deploying new ICBM's, the SS-27. And we have canceled all of our modernization programs. So, that is the thing, among others, that bothers me. I do not have another question for you, but I am going to see if Senator Biden has. I wish you had not said that about Bidden because I am going to make the mistake every time. Senator Biden. I do not have any further questions. I would just like to thank the Secretary. He has always been available. The Chairman. You bet. Senator Biden. There are some of us--I suspect all of us here--who appreciate the opportunity of being able to pick up the phone and call you as we do. I would really like to explore with you, Mr. Secretary, over the next couple months, at some point--and if you would be willing to see me, up in your neck of the woods--the combination of some imaginative diplomacy here, coupled with a missile defense initiative and coupled with arms reductions. It seems to me that the debate has devolved to those like me who are portrayed as clinging to the theological touchstone of nuclear theory here, and that is ABM Treaty, and those who have always believed it was a bad idea-- and I am not characterizing you in what I am about to say, Mr. Chairman--those who believe that the answer is elimination of it and going full bore on a missile defense. It seems to me that there is a need for a new strategic concept here that incorporates more than merely the judgment that we go full bore on a national missile defense system and abandon the ABM Treaty or stick with the ABM Treaty and not move forward on any missile defense system. Again, I know you think a lot about these things. I would like to come up and just buy you lunch and listen to you talk about it. I mean it sincerely. Dr. Kissinger. I would be delighted, Senator, to do this. I would always strongly support some bipartisan approach that enables us to account for this new world that has emerged, which is no longer bipolar and in which different parts of the world really operate on different principles quite often. I think that is an important challenge, but I do believe that missile defense will have to be a part of it. Senator Biden. Thank you. The Chairman. So do I. As Joe said and I have said, you have always been so good about making yourself available. I know that there are other things that you need to be doing than coming here this morning, but I appreciate that. Maybe sometime we can not have a formal appearance but maybe have lunch with a bunch of Senators who are interested, have a bowl of soup and just talk. Dr. Kissinger. It would be a privilege. The Chairman. So, I will be in touch with you about that. I think you know I appreciate your coming here this morning and I appreciate your willingness and readiness to be helpful. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you. Stay well. We are going to need you in the next few years. Happy Birthday. The Chairman. And Happy Birthday to you. I cannot sing or I would sing it to you. We stand in recess. [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 3 p.m., September 16, 1999.]