Opening Statement of
Lt. Gen. Lyles
Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is my
pleasure to appear before you today to present the Department of Defenses' Fiscal Year
2000 missile defense program and budget.
As Dr. Gansler just outlined, the Department has made a series of substantial changes
to our approach to missile defense and increased the resources available. In order to
address the missile threat and fully execute the Department's plans for missile defense,
we have structured a sound and affordable program for fiscal year 2000 and beyond. I would
like to take a few moments to outline specifically the status of our programs and how we
intend to proceed over the next few years to demonstrate and field these systems.
Fiscal Year 2000 Program and Budget. The total fiscal year 2000 budget request for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is $3.3 billion. This includes $2.9 billion for RDT&E, $355.9 million for procurement, and $1.3 million for military construction activities. Combining these three budget categories, Theater Air and Missile Defense programs account for $1.9 billion or roughly 60 percent of the budget. National Missile Defense represents $836.6 million or 25 percent of the budget. We are requesting $65.3 million for Applied Research and $173.7 million for Advanced Technologies, together, these represent about 7 percent of the budget. BMD Technical Operations accounts for $192.0 million and is about 6 percent of the budget. We will ask for $16.5 million for Threat and Countermeasures efforts and $36.6 million for International Cooperative Programs. Together, these represent 2 percent of our overall budget. The chart that follows provides a break out of the fiscal year 2000 budget request by program element for BMDO-managed programs.
TY$M FY1999 FY2000
Theater Air and Missile Defense
PAC-3 EMD* 320.842 29.141
PAC-3 Procurement 245.494 300.898
Navy Area EMD 242.597 268.389
Navy Area Procurement 43.189 55.002
THAAD Dem/Val 433.922 527.871
THAAD EMD 0.000 83.755
THAAD Procurement 0.000 0.000
Navy Theater Wide Dem/Val* 364.284 329.768
TAMD BMC/3 Procurement 22.759 0.000
Joint TAMD Dem/Val 200.133 195.722
Joint TAMD Milcon 0.331 0.000
FoS E&I 95.721 141.821
MEADS Dem/Val 9.915 48.597
(ADSAM in FY99 and MEADS PDV in FY00)
National Missile Defense
NMD Dem/Val* 1533.532 836.555
NMD Procurement 0.000 0.000
NMD Milcon 9.669 0.000
Applied Research 97.436 65.328
Advanced Technology Dev. 272.82 173.704
BPI 6.426 0.000
BMD Technical Operations
BMD Tech Ops 184.842 190.650
BMD Tech Ops Milcon 0.000 1.372
International Coop Pro 58.903 36.650
Threat & Countermeasures 23.263 16.497
* Funding shown on FY1999 includes funding from the FY1999 Supplemental that will be
executed in FY2000
Theater Air and Missile Defense - the Family of Systems Approach.
The Family of Systems (FoS) concept is a flexible configuration of highly interoperable
theater air and missile defense systems capable of joint operations, which allows the
joint force commander to tailor the right mix of systems and capabilities according to the
situation and threat. This FoS must be able to counter a wide range of threats providing a
robust defense for U.S. forward-deployed forces, our friends and allies. This mission
cannot be accomplished with just one or two systems; it requires multiple systems designed
to counter an ever-growing and diverse missile threat during all phases of flight. The
Department's recent missile defense program review again endorsed this TAMD family of
systems approach as the most effective means to provide highly effective defenses to
protect our interests.
Our analyses continue to conclude that one system cannot do it all. The mission of TAMD
requires a layered defense allowing for multiple shot opportunities. The threat is so
varied, and the mission demands so complex, that we do not currently have the technology
to allow us to develop a single weapon system that can meet all of the mission
requirements. In short, there is no single "silver bullet" in theater missile
defense. Multiple systems working in unison greatly enhance the probability of destroying
incoming missiles before they can hit U.S. or coalition forces, critical assets, or
For these reasons, BMDO is working to acquire and integrate land- and sea-based systems
that will effectively counter current and rapidly emerging theater missile threats. This
strategy includes pursuing four major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) within BMDO,
with Service execution. These include the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Navy
Area, Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) systems. In
addition, the U.S. Air Force is managing and executing the Airborne Laser (ABL). While
this program is not funded or managed by my organization, the ABL remains a critical part
of the FoS architecture. The ABL system will provide a critical boost-phase intercept
capability in the theater of operations, thereby extending our layered defense approach to
the earliest stages of missile flight.
In the context of the Department's program review, let me summarize the status of these
theater air and missile defense major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and address our
direction on the cooperative TAMD program known as Medium Extended Air Defense System
Lower-tier TAMD systems. Fielding both the PAC-3 and Navy Area systems
remains our highest near-term TAMD program priorities. Our goal is to press on with those
activities, which will allow us to achieve first unit equipped (FUE) dates of fiscal year
2001 for PAC-3 and 2003 for Navy Area. Unfortunately, these represent a slip from last
year's projected FUE dates. I would like to explain why these programs are delayed and
what, specifically, we plan to do in the next fiscal year on these programs and fact of
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3). In the case of PAC-3, the first
intercept flight test has been delayed by about a year because of software and seeker
integration setbacks. Moreover, a planned seeker characterization risk reduction flight
test did not take place in December because of a failure of the test target. This was a
target that we have reliably flown many times before. We had planned to conduct the flight
test last week, but adverse wind conditions forced us to delay the test. These winds could
have carried debris off the test range.
These flight test delays have resulted in a one year slip to Developmental Test &
Evaluation and a comparable slip to Milestone III - full rate production authority. In
addition, the FY 1999 Defense Appropriation bill specifically directed that PAC-3 may not
enter low-rate initial production until two successful intercept flight tests have taken
place. In hindsight, I think that was a very prudent move. Based on these issues, the
planned PAC-3 FUE is now targeted for FY 2001.
In addition to the delay in the program that I have already mentioned, the Committee
should know that there is substantial cost growth in the PAC-3 program. This is not a good
news story. It is a serious matter that concerns me greatly. In order to cover this cost
growth, the Department proposes using part of last year's $1 billion emergency
supplemental for the PAC-3 program. Specifically, we propose using $60 million in fiscal
year 1999 and $80 million in fiscal year 2000 to ensure the program remains on track.
I appreciate that such transactions are unusual and do not increase one's confidence
that the program is well-executed. But, I want to make certain that we are in the best
position to field PAC-3 as soon as possible. I regret that we are in the position of
either covering this cost-growth at this time or accepting further delays in fielding the
system. These resources are absolutely necessary for us to keep PAC-3 on track.
In concert with our Army executing agent, I have commissioned a comprehensive review of the entire PAC-3 program. Additionally, we have asked the Defense Contracting Management Command (DCMC) and the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA) for assistance. We are examining all aspects of cost growth, technical and program management, and the fundamental assumptions behind the schedules that the contractor has proposed. I have also requested a team of senior-level acquisition leaders - to include retired general officers - for their assessment of the program. Based upon my initial findings, I have already reviewed some initiatives aimed at reducing the unit cost of these missiles. While I am very concerned about the cost aspects of the program, I cannot ignore the need for a realistic schedule, performance and timely deployment for the warfighter. I have met with the prime contractor at the CEO level and have expressed my concern about the program and desire for corporate commitment to a realistic program baseline, a realistic schedule and real cost-reduction efforts. This should include cost-sharing arrangements to reduce Government liability. I am committed to coming back to the Committee and reporting on our progress before you complete action on the Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills.
Ultimately, I want to reduce the unit costs of PAC-3 so we can procure more inventory
for the warfighter with the same level of funding. This must always be our bottom line -
more inventory and defensive protection within the budget allocated.
Navy Area. The Navy Area program builds upon the legacy of success found
in the AEGIS program. This sea-based missile defense capability consists of modifications
to the AEGIS combat systems and the SPY-1 radar to enable the ship to detect, track and
engage theater ballistic missiles using a modified Standard missile. There are over 50
AEGIS destroyers and cruisers which will eventually constitute a fleet of forward
deployed, multi-mission platforms - including theater missile defense. The Navy Area
program is currently in the engineering and manufacturing development phase. We have
successfully developed and demonstrated this system - including a successful series of
flight tests. However, the program's progress has been slowed by the Navy's AEGIS Weapon
System (AWS) Baseline 6 Phase III software development - not missile defense development
issues. This has resulted in an eighteen month slip to ten developmental/operational
assessment tests that were scheduled to occur in fiscal years 1999 to 2000. This slip has
caused a six month delay to initial EMD testing and a one year delay in the FUE status for
Navy Area. We are requesting $268.389 million in EMD and $55.002 million in procurement
funds for Navy Area in fiscal year 2000.
In light of the emerging missile threat, we are endeavoring to provide a capability to
the fleet as early as possible. Our plan includes providing a User Operational Evaluation
System (UOES) that we call "Linebacker" for fleet use. "Linebacker"
will be a single mission ship capable of performing TBMD or Aegis multiple missions. Two
AEGIS cruisers, the USS Port Royal and the USS Lake Erie, are at sea now providing
critical feedback to influence the tactical design improvements and modifications to the
AEGIS combat system. They will conduct a variety of at-sea tests, develop core doctrine
and tactics, and serve as a focal point for getting our theater missile defense capability
to sea. In a contingency, the warfighting CINCs can call upon this Linebacker capability.
I believe this is the most prudent approach to fielding our lower-tier naval TAMD
capability as soon as possible.
Upper-tier TAMD Strategy. Dr. Gansler has provided a detailed overview of
how the Department arrived at the revised upper-tier TAMD strategy. I realize there has
been a lot of concern that we are directly competing these two systems. Some Members have
pointed to language in the fiscal year 1999 National Defense Authorization Conference
Report as direction that these two systems should be seen as "complementary"
versus "in competition." While we have referred to our revised TAMD upper-tier
approach as a "competitive strategy," we are not directly flying one system off
against the other.
At the heart of our revised upper-tier strategy is the fact that we have found
ourselves in a very tight spot. The medium-range ballistic missile threat is emerging very
rapidly. More countries are acquiring ballistic missiles with ranges up to 1,000
kilometers, and more importantly, with ranges between 1,000 and 1,300 kilometers. North
Korea has deployed the No Dong-1 missile. Last July, Iran conducted a
partially successful flight test of its Shahab-3 missile. With a range of
1,300 kilometers, the Shahab-3 significantly alters the military equation in the
Middle East by giving Iran the capability to strike targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia and
most of Turkey.
The emergence of these missile capabilities is important because our upper tier systems
- THAAD and Navy Theater Wide - are designed to specifically take on these medium-range
theater-class missiles. The dilemma we face, however, is that we continue to have problems
demonstrating the THAAD interceptor. Each of our five intercept test failures were caused
by a different problem with a different missile component. This leads us to believe there
are problems with the quality of the interceptor's components, but not the overall
At the same time, Navy Theater Wide has experienced development problems of its own -
even though it is not yet at the same level of testing as THAAD. In September 1997, the
initial Control Test Vehicle flight test was unsuccessful due to a steering component
failure. The follow-on flight test is scheduled for later this year and will use improved
Standard Missile-3 components. The first Navy Theater Wide intercept attempt is currently
scheduled to take place during the third quarter of fiscal year 2000.
Based on a review of program performance - test results, schedule, cost, program risk,
and projected performance - we will propose in December 2000, that either THAAD or Navy
Theater Wide be deployed first. The system that is not selected will continue to be
developed and will be fielded as soon as practicable. Therefore, instead of a competition,
I really see this more akin to a "leader-follower" approach.
The fundamental reason why we are compelled to follow this approach is that the threat
is rapidly expanding and we have not made substantial progress in demonstrating
these systems. I think in this area - because of the pressing threat - a little
"sibling rivalry" can go a long way within our family of systems.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense. So, with the threat rapidly expanding
and our upper-tier programs experiencing development setbacks, we have devised an approach
that will challenge us to field an upper-tier system as early as possible in order to meet
the threat. As part of this approach, we will continue to fly THAAD. Our next flight test
is in a few weeks. Following this, we plan to conduct four more flight tests this year.
The cost-sharing agreement we have worked out with the prime contractor requires that the
program achieve three flight test intercepts by the end of this year. The three intercepts
are required for the missile and system to demonstrate sufficient design maturity to
proceed into the next phase of development. The cost-sharing agreement provides that the
contractor shall be responsible for up to $75 million of negative cost incentives should
these intercepts not occur.
It is important to note that the rest of the THAAD system has performed
remarkably well during all flight tests. We have successfully demonstrated the THAAD
ground-based radar, the launcher, and the battle management, command, control and
communications system. Overall, the THAAD system has performed well, but the critical
element - the interceptor - still needs to demonstrate its technical maturity. The
Department has made the right decision by continuing to fly the THAAD interceptor. We must
get the missile into the critical "end game" and learn from that vital test
experience. I am absolutely confident that if the THAAD team can shake out all the various
"bugs in the system," THAAD will successfully intercept its target later this
I would like to note that Lockheed Martin's senior leadership has demonstrated to me
that it is fully committed to the success of the THAAD program and that it has devoted the
resources necessary to ensure success. I believe the cost-sharing plan that we have agreed
to is a clear indication of the contractor's commitment to the success of the program. I
continue to meet frequently with their leadership and remain very impressed with the
quality of the people they have working on this program. They clearly have put the "A
plus" team on the program. In light of this and the considerable progress I have
observed over the last year, I am confident that the program will successfully engage its
target during the next flight test.
If the next flight test, however, should fail to fully meet its objectives and
successfully engage and intercept the target, I hope the Congress will recognize that this
remains a program in the demonstration/validation phase. This is the phase when we want to
learn from our mistakes and failures. This is the phase when we can still fix the system
and have it properly aligned for acquisition. I confess that no one is more frustrated
with our progress to date than me, but we need to be patient and to work the "bugs
out of the system." THAAD is a critical element of our family of systems. We need to
successfully develop, demonstrate and field a ground-based upper-tier system.
Navy Theater Wide. The Department is following the Congress'
recommendation that we allocate the full funding required to make Navy Theater Wide an
acquisition program. In fiscal year 2000, we will request $329.768 million for Navy
Theater Wide. Over FY1999 - 2001, we will increase Navy Theater Wide funding by about $500
million, including funds added by Congress.This increased level of funding will allow the
Navy Theater Wide system to conduct ground and flight tests to demonstrate its
capabilities. The Navy Theater Wide AEGIS-LEAP Intercept Program now in progress is a
series of progressively more challenging flight tests culminating in a demonstration of
the Navy's ability to hit a ballistic missile target above the atmosphere. A Control Test
Vehicle flight test is planned for the fourth quarter of this fiscal year to test the
flight characteristics of the SM-3 missile. Following this, we plan to fly seven Flight
Test Round shots - one per quarter - through the third quarter of fiscal year 2001. The
last five flight tests will attempt to intercept their targets. The first intercept flight
test will now take place in fiscal year 2000.
In acquisition programs, we have seen how competition has encouraged technological
progress, reduced system costs and provided the Department with more than one program
option to address a threat. My hope is that this competitive approach to the upper-tier
strategy will also provide a positive incentive for both the THAAD and Navy Theater Wide
teams to succeed.
Personally, I want both programs to successfully demonstrate their readiness to be
fielded. Both THAAD and Navy Theater Wide will play vital roles in protecting our forward
deployed forces, friends and allies against the existing and emerging theater-class
missile threat. We need both THAAD and Navy Theater Wide in our TAMD family of systems
Medium Extended Air Defense System. As a result of resource constraints,
especially in the years when we intend to field our core TAMD systems and develop and
deploy NMD, the Department recognized that it could not afford to proceed with the Design
and Development phase of the MEADS program as originally planned. We made this decision
even though there remains a valid military requirement for maneuver force protection and a
compelling case for armaments cooperation with our allies.
The Department proposes using about $150 million over the next three fiscal years to
demonstrate critical technologies - such as a fire control radar and mobile launcher - we
need to satisfy the MEADS requirement. This restructured MEADS program allows us to
explore less costly program options by leveraging developments in existing missile defense
development programs, such as PAC-3. This approach will hopefully enable us to continue
cooperation with our allies in this important mission area. As we solidify our approach
with our allies, we intend to capitalize on the concurrent Air Directed Surface-to-Air
Missile proof-of-principle activity as well.
Earlier this month, on Dr. Gansler's behalf, I met with our German and Italian partners
to discuss the future of MEADS. I must report that they were concerned about the
commitment of the United States to this program. However, they recognized the resource
constraints we faced in missile defense and support our overall approach. They would,
however, like for the Department and Congress to express our commitment to following the
three year technology demonstration with an affordable restructured program to field a
MEADS system. Quite frankly, they are concerned that the Congress will not support the
program in fiscal year 2000. I know that both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary are
looking to Dr. Gansler and me to work with the four defense committees to secure a stable
future for our MEADS technology development program. I realize that especially in a tight
budget environment $48.5 million is a very substantial amount of money. I hope to work
with the Committee and the other three defense committees to lay out how we intend to
proceed with this program, demonstrate that we have clear end-products for our
investments, and also outline how our German and Italian partners will play in this
Joint TAMD Programs.
Several research, development, test and evaluation efforts - which effectively support
multiple theater air and missile defense system development program requirements - are
managed and funded under the Joint TAMD program. Joint TAMD requirements and supporting
tasks include development of target missiles, collection and analysis of target signature
and discrimination measurements, and funding of CINC-level planning and participation in
wargaming exercises that maximize the consideration of theater air and missile defense
requirements and systems capabilities.
BMDO funds the development of the Extended Air Defense Testbed (EADTB), an object-based
simulation and analytic tool which supports architecture analysis and system performance,
and supports the theater air and missile defense community through distributed interactive
simulation (DIS) connectivity. An important element of Joint TAMD is the TAMD Critical
Measurements Program (TCMP), which provides tactical ballistic missile target signature
and related discrimination data. Collected data from recent test flights will be used to
characterize potential countermeasures and to develop and test algorithms designed to
mitigate their effects. Programs that are expected to directly benefit from EADTB and TCMP
include all theater air and missile defense MDAPs and the U.S. Air Force Space-based
Infrared System (SBIRS). The Joint TAMD program element includes a requested $195.7
million in fiscal year 2000.
Family of Systems Engineering and Integration.
Each member of the family of systems will contribute what it sees to a
common picture of what is occurring in the battlespace, and then based on that picture,
the warfighter will launch the most effective and efficient missile defense response. All
theater air and missile defense systems must be capable of joint or autonomous operations.
For example, based on cueing from a space-based sensor and target detection and tracking
by the THAAD ground-based radar, a Navy Theater Wide interceptor could be launched to
counter a ballistic missile threat. This system will be demonstrated through a series of
systems integration tests. We are currently planning such an integration test for fiscal
year 2002. That test will fly targets that realistically simulate medium-range ballistic
missiles against both the PAC-3 and Navy Area systems. Our intent is to calibrate how well
our lower-tier systems can protect their defended areas against these longer-range
targets. Our fiscal year 2000 budget request for FoS E&I is $141.821 million.
Theater Missile Defense Challenges. Mr. Chairman, missile defense is one of the most
technically challenging projects the Department has ever undertaken. The urgency to
develop and deploy a highly effective TAMD system grows directly out of our experience in
the Gulf War. We recall that the largest single loss of U.S. servicemen was the result of
the SCUD missile attack on our barracks in Dharan. And we see how the threat is growing in
both numbers and capabilities. The Gulf War experience and emerging threat drove us to
make TAMD a schedule-driven effort that has stressed the Department's most technically
Missile defense requires the integration of many new technologies into a
system that must perform in a very dynamic threat and operating environment. For instance,
TAMD systems must operate largely inside the atmosphere at very fast speeds against
targets that are traveling several kilometers per second. TAMD systems, such as THAAD and
PAC-3, use hit-to-kill technologies and must literally "hit a bullet with a
bullet." This is a technical and engineering challenge - but it can be done.
We have other substantial programmatic challenges as well. For instance, we must develop and test TAMD systems and demonstrate they are highly interoperable - to ensure that the whole architecture is greater than the sum of its parts. And finally, we must ensure these systems are affordable - because we want to maximize the inventory we can buy for the warfighter. Despite our recent program and cost setbacks, I believe we are up to these challenges.
We must continue to press on with these TAMD systems because the threat
is there and it is growing. I pledge to keep the pressure on our Government and industry
team to deliver highly effective and affordable defenses as soon as possible. For the sake
of our servicemen and women, we cannot afford to fail.
National Missile Defense.
As Dr. Gansler just discussed, the Department has dedicated the funds necessary to
develop and deploy NMD should we decide to do so. We have worked to ensure that our NMD
development program was properly funded. But until now, we had not budgeted funds to
support a possible NMD deployment that could protect us against a limited missile attack.
In fiscal year 2000, we are requesting $836.555 million for NMD. In addition, we propose
to use for NMD roughly $600 million from last year's $1 billion emergency supplemental
appropriation. Between fiscal years 1999 through 2005, we intend to allocate $10.504
billion (in then year dollars) for the NMD program.
The Secretary's January 20, 1999, announcement acknowledged and affirmed the missile
threat is emerging. In addition, he announced the dedication of an additional $6.6 billion
for NMD during fiscal years 1999 through 2005. He also noted that the Administration had
begun a dialogue with Russia about the development related to our NMD program and ABM
Treaty. Finally, he recognized that the program was now structured to work toward a key
requirement - developing and demonstrating the technological readiness of our system.
I will defer to Lieutenant General Martin, USAF to discuss the U.S. Air Force's
Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) program decisions. However, both SBIRS High and Low
will be critical elements of the NMD system.
Our challenge during the next few years is to make sure all NMD elements work together
as an integrated system and that it can do exactly what the mission tells us we need to
do. Success on the critical tests and execution of the element schedules, which constitute
the NMD program, will provide the answer to the question: are we technically ready to
deploy a capability?
I would like to lay out for the Committee the time line of programmatic
decisions we will seek between now and 2005. I will also review our plans to develop and
test the NMD system elements and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the integrated NMD
NMD Decision Time Line. In order to be able to deploy a ground-based NMD system
by 2005, we have developed a detailed plan of program activities to ensure success. The
proposed changes to the NMD program I will address today will ensure that we fully
develop, test and demonstrate the system elements in an integrated fashion before we begin
to deploy. This will significantly reduce the program risk associated with our previous 3
plus 3 program approach.
We still plan to conduct a Deployment Readiness Review in June 2000. This review will
take place at the defense acquisition executive level - with full participation from all
key Department of Defense stakeholders. It will not constitute the actual decision to
deploy the NMD system. It will assess whether or not the technical progress has been made
which would allow the Administration to decide whether or not we should commit to
deployment. At this time, we will also assess the threat, the affordability of the system,
and the potential impact on treaty and strategic arms reduction negotiations. If a
decision is made to deploy, we will seek commitment to several key elements of the
program. First, we would seek approval of the recommended NMD site - either in North
Dakota or Alaska. Similarly, we would seek approval to award the construction contract and
start construction at the selected NMD site. And finally, we would seek a decision on
whether to pursue deployment sooner than the proposed deployment of 2005 if it is both
warranted and technologically possible.
In fiscal year 2001, we would conduct a Defense Acquisition Board review to assess the
status of the program. Based on program performance, we would seek approval to initiate
upgrades to the current early warning radars; begin building the X-band ground-based radar
and start integrating the battle management, command, control and communications into the
Cheyenne Mountain complex.
In fiscal year 2003, we would conduct a second Defense Acquisition Board review to seek
approval to build and deploy the weapon system - the ground based interceptor. At this
point, we would seek authorization to procure 61 GBI missiles - this would include
deployment interceptors, spares and test rounds. Based on this schedule, if the program
proceeds as we anticipate, we would deploy in late 2005.
In order to meet this schedule, we plan to conduct a series of 19 more flight tests between now and 2005 to demonstrate the technical maturity of the system. As the Committee is aware, in June 1997 and January 1998, we conducted two very successful seeker "fly by" tests which allowed us to demonstrate key elements of the kill vehicle - namely the "eyes" that will allow the weapon to move into the end game, discriminate the warhead from decoys and intercept the target. In the remaining 19 flight tests we will attempt to intercept the target. In addition, we will conduct major ground testing of hardware and demonstrate the integration of system elements. Let me simply outline our test program briefly.
NMD Flight Testing. The proof of the NMD system' maturity literally will be
"put to the test" over the next 18 months in a demanding series of system tests.
In Summer 1999, the performance of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle will be demonstrated
for the first time as we attempt to intercept a target. We have a lot to learn in this
first intercept test. Later in the fall, we plan to conduct a second intercept flight
test. Both flight tests will use the developmental version of the kill vehicle produced by
Raytheon. We will fly these interceptors against threat-representative target warheads
launched from Vandenberg AFB, California. We will launch the kill vehicle on a booster
from the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean. The actual intercept will take
place outside the atmosphere over the Pacific Ocean. We intend to demonstrate the
continuing development of our non-nuclear kill vehicle, its sensor, software and
In fiscal year 2000, we plan to conduct two full integrated system tests - one in each
of the second and third quarters. This will allow us to conduct four intercept
opportunities prior to the Deployment Readiness Review.
Starting in fiscal year 2001, we plan to fly three intercept flight
tests each fiscal year through 2005. This will allow us to gradually demonstrate the
increasing sophistication of our kill vehicle and ultimately the integrated ground-based
interceptor weapon system. Flight test 7, scheduled to take place in fiscal year 2001
after the DRR, will be the first flight test to incorporate both the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle and the proposed operational booster. Flight test 13, scheduled for 2003, will fly
the production-quality ground-based interceptor - including both the kill vehicle and
The revised program follows a very specific path to reaching the initial operational
capability by fiscal year 2005. This path includes two key milestones that, in effect,
postpone the need to freeze the interceptor design until the latest possible time dictated
by lead time to the 2005 deployment date. The interceptor remains the least mature
element of the NMD architecture. Therefore, by waiting to lock in the
interceptor design until after we have tested the production-quality "round," we
add confidence to the system we will ultimately deploy.
We have done nothing in the NMD program that would result in a delay of the program as
a result of the Secretary's announcement. Between now and the DRR in June 2000, nothing
has been slowed down. In fact, we have actually added modeling and simulation efforts in
the next two years that will help us develop and demonstrate the system further, as well
as reduce flight test risks.
To prove out the system's readiness for deployment, we have chosen 2005 as the
deployment date for NMD to avoid rushing to failure. I have testified on several occasions
that I felt the NMD program was being executed along a very high risk schedule.
Our recommended approach will reduce schedule risk by taking the time to develop,
demonstrate and, ultimately, deploy the system in a more prudent manner. . However, the
program schedule, albeit less risky, still has significant concurrency. In the meantime,
if the testing goes flawlessly, we may be able to deploy a system on an accelerated basis.
However, such acceleration would be a very high-risk approach that we would
only pursue if our assessment of the technological maturity, threat, affordability, and
potential impact on treaty and arms control negotiations indicate it is warranted.
I would like to echo Dr. Gansler's sentiments about the NMD program.
Given the reality of the threat, the NMD program cannot afford to fail. The funds provided
by the Congress in last year's Emergency Supplemental, combined with the programmatic
adjustments proposed in our POM budget, will enable us to deliver the defensive protection
as soon as practicable against the emerging rogue nation limited threat.
NMD Concept of Operations. I would like to take a moment
to explain how we envision the individual NMD system elements will operate when combined
as a fully operational and integrated system. A hostile launch from a rogue state begins
the engagement process. Space-based sensors make the initial detection and report of a
threat launch. DSP, and ultimately SBIRS high, will alert the entire system of a potential
ballistic missile attack; cue the radars to erect "search fences" to detect the
incoming missile and start the battle management centers to evaluate engagement options.
SBIRS-low will provide critical midcourse track and discrimination data to the battle
manager. When the threat missile crosses into the range of ground-based early warning
radars, these radars confirm flight and tracking information on the target missile. Upon
data confirmation, the battle management, command and control center directs the launch of
a ground-based interceptor. A ground-based X-band radar will provide high resolution
target tracking data to the interceptor in flight through an In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System - IFICS. This data will be used by the interceptor to manuever close
enough to the target missile for the on-board kill vehicle sensor to discriminate the
warheads from potential decoys. Sensors on the kill vehicle provide final, precise course
corrections to enable the kill vehicle to destroy the target with a direct hit - or
We have already made progress in demonstrating some elements of the
system. For instance, some hardware and software upgrades to early warning radars have
been incorporated into an existing radar and are being tested. A prototype X-band tracking
radar has been built at the Kwajalein Missile Range and has successfully tracked test
launch vehicles out of Vandenberg AFB, California, including the most recent Air Force
operational test on February 10, 1999. Both the upgraded early warning radar and prototype
X-band radar will support the intercept flight tests this year.
The ground-based interceptor (GBI) weapon is the least mature element of
the system and entails the highest technological development risks. The GBI consists of
the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) launched by commercial-off-the-shelf boosters. As I
noted earlier, we have already flown two successful EKV sensor flight tests. Our next 19
flight tests will build upon these two sensor tests and demonstrate our kill vehicle's
The battle management, command, control and communications system links the NMD system elements to the warfighter. The BMC3 development is a continuous effort. Our capability will be increased on an incremental basis as we progress toward system deployment.
While we have been developing and testing the system elements, we have
also been proceeding vigorously on deployment planning activities. We have conducted
fact-finding and siting studies in two potential site locations - North Dakota and Alaska.
We have also initiated site designs for the X-band radar and weapon sites. We will start
the design of the BMC3 facilities later this year. On November 17, 1998 we published in
the Federal Register a Notice of Intent, announcing the beginning of the NMD Program's
Deployment Environmental Impact Analysis process. We held public scoping meetings in North
Dakota and Alaska in which over 650 people attended. We are in the process of preparing a
draf Environmental Impact Statement. We plan to return to North Dakota and Alaska this
fall to conduct public hearings on the draft Environmental Impact Statement. As required
by law, the results of the EIS will represent one of many inputs into the deployment
I believe that we have structured a prudent NMD program and we are
moving out smartly to execute it. We have made important technical progress to date. While
we have important challenges still ahead of us, I believe we can meet those challenges and
field an NMD system in a timely manner.
International Cooperative Programs
Our International Cooperative program element contains two project areas. First, our
cooperative programs with Israel. Secondly, our cooperative efforts with Russia. I would
like to outline briefly our efforts in both areas.
Cooperative Programs with Israel. The U.S.-Israeli cooperative Arrow
Program continues to make progress toward the deployment of a contingency capable Arrow
Weapon System (AWS) later this year. On September 14, 1998, Israel conducted a successful
fly-out test against a simulated ballistic missile target. For the first time, the Arrow
II interceptor was controlled throughout the flight by the other system elements of the
Arrow Weapon System; for example: the surveillance/fire control radar (Green Pine), fire
control center (Citron Tree) and launcher control center (Hazel Nut Tree). The integrated
AWS flight test was a combined Phase II/III test that served to complete the Phase II
Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES) program and to begin the integrated flight tests
under the Phase III Arrow Deployability Program (ADP). The next ADP flight test is
scheduled for this summer and will be an intercept test against a ballistic missile
target. If successful, the Israeli Air Force will declare the Arrow Weapon System to be
initially operational, as a limited contingency capability.
Several proof-of-concept tests have been conducted toward achieving Arrow
interoperability with U.S. theater missile defense systems. The Arrow Link-16 Upgrade
Converter is in final development and will be delivered to Israel later this spring. This
device is a two-way translator that will convert U.S. Link 16 TADIL-J formulated messages
to the Arrow-formatted protocols, and vice-a-verse. Once the Foreign Military Sales case
is concluded for Israel to purchase a JTIDS 2H terminal, with delivery anticipated in late
1999 or early 2000, Israel will have the full capability for Arrow to
"interoperate" with U.S. TAMD systems.
We are continuing our efforts that use both the Israeli Test Bed (ITB) and the Israeli
Systems Architecture and Integration (ISA&I) analysis capabilities to assist with the
deployment of the Arrow Weapon System. In addition, we are working with Israel in the ITB
and ISA&I to refine procedures for combined operations between USEUCOM and the Israeli
Air Force, and to examine future missile defense architectures that consider evolving
regional threats. Recent contingency operations with Israel have benefited greatly from
the work conducted bilaterally in the ITB and ISA&I.
We continue to reap benefits from our cooperative missile defense programs with Israel.
In one specific case, the Arrow seeker technology flown by Israel is the same seeker
planned to be flown aboard THAAD. Similarly, the lethality mechanism used in Arrow will
greatly assist us as we develop the Navy Area system that also employs a fragmentation
warhead. Additionally, the experience gained with the cooperative Arrow flight tests will
provide many benefits as we begin a very robust flight test program for our TAMD systems
Cooperative Programs with Russia. The Russian-American Observatory Sensor
(RAMOS) program has been our cooperative effort with Russia on space-based surveillance
technology. The program was conceived as a way to jointly develop and test these
technologies. The projected budget to complete this program over the next few years is
about $250 million. After very careful scrutiny we decided that the technical merits of
the program did not warrant that level of funding - especially in light of the limited
resources available for technology programs that directly benefit the missile defense
While I appreciate the importance of cooperative programs with Russia, I cannot
recommend continuation of the RAMOS project as it existed. However, in the spirit of
cooperation with Russia, we are considering two other cooperative programs with Russia
that promise similar benefits but at a substantially reduced cost. Both will ensure that
the Russian scientific and technical community is engaged in a funded endeavor with
America research interests. For instance, we will continue to work with the and several
Russian research institutes (through the Utah State University Space Dynamics Lab) to
cooperatively research space surveillance technologies of mutual interest. As the
Committee recognizes, it is in our collective interest to work cooperatively with Russia's
technical and scientific community on a wide-range of mutual interests. Together, we can
build a bridge of technical and political understanding, while lessening the opportunity
for rogue states to gain access Russian space and missile expertise.
I will personally ensure that we keep the Committee and interested Members fully
informed as we proceed with our plans.
Threat and Countermeasures Programs.
BMDO's Threat and Countermeasures program provides intelligence and threat support to
all aspects of the missile defense program. The efforts covered under this program element
directly support our TAMD and NMD acquisition programs by providing potential threat and
countermeasures information central to the planning and execution of those programs. In
addition, it also supports our Advanced Technology Development program by providing
information on future threats and the time lines associated with their emergence. Our
efforts draw heavily on the Intelligence Community for analysis, reports and, in some
cases, collection of technical data in the field. It also sponsors threat work tied
directly to the performance parameters of BMD defense systems, exploring possible
vulnerabilities as they may be perceived by potential adversaries. This
countermeasures-oriented work is conducted in a systems-engineering context by means of a
newly developed threat risk assessment methodology that is supported by selected
hardware-oriented experiments. For example, we work very closely with the U.S. Air Force
Phillips Laboratory's Countermeasures Hands-on Project (CHOP) to assist us with such
hardware-oriented efforts. Lastly, the BMDO Threat and Countermeasures program produces a
series of carefully constructed and documented missile attack scenarios - including
simulated flight trajectory information - for use in many forms of missile warfare
engagement modeling and simulations. These include wargames conducted at the Joint
National Test Facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. We propose $16.5 million for these
activities in fiscal year 2000.
Ballistic Missile Defense Technical Operations.
The BMD Technical Operation program element contains the centrally-managed activities
that provide functional expertise (i.e., systems engineering), analytical tools and
support (i.e., the Joint National Test Facility) and test resources (i.e., data collection
assets and test ranges) for theater missile defense, FoS engineering and integration,
national missile defense and advanced technology efforts. Technical Operations truly
provides a common, critical base of economical support for the entire BMD program.
This program element specifically provides funding for the activities of the Chief
Architect/Engineer office that is responsible for the joint system mission area
architecture, integration, interoperability, and engineering. The Chief Architect/Engineer
provides the technical foundation for program acquisition decisions at the architecture
level and leads the BMDO process for development, integration, and upgrade of mission area
requirements with the military users and systems engineers for NMD and TAMD. Within BMDO,
the Chief Architect/Engineer leads the implementation of Department of Defense
architecture and engineering initiatives, such as Open Systems, Value Engineering, and
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) from an engineering perspective.
Advanced Technology Programs
Advanced Technology programs underlie the success of our current MDAPs and remain a
critical component of the overall BMD program. Our Advanced Technology program's objective
is to enhance the effectiveness of our current MDAPs and reduce their costs while
simultaneously investing in future technologies that that could serve as our nation's
"insurance policy" to protect against future missile threats.
In recent years, we have found that it has become increasingly difficult to maintain
our technology programs in the face of competing demands presented by the MDAPs.
Therefore, it is not as robustly funded as in previous years. Although our annual Advanced
Technology request has remained constant, investment has declined from the last several
years appropriated levels, but it continues to focus on providing some of the critical
capabilities needed across the current missile defense architecture.
Our Advanced Technology program has become more focused through a new,
more formal technology planning process which we implemented last year. This process
builds upon the technology needs identified by our system architect in coordination with
the MDAPs based upon current system performance, emerging threats, and cost drivers.
Working with the Services, we have tailored our technology programs and leveraged Service
technology programs to meet many but not all of our highest priority needs. This process
has helped us maximize benefit from every technology dollar through harmonizing the
Services efforts in the areas of interceptors, surveillance, and ballistic missile C4I
technology to provide advanced technology performance enhancing and cost reducing
components and software, as well as critically needed phenomenology data, for as many
MDAPs as possible with limited funding. This ensured these efforts benefit the Services'
MDAPs as much as possible.
I would like to provide you with some specific examples. Our Atmospheric Interceptor
Technology program is currently developing an advanced interceptor seeker and a solid
propellant divert and attitude control system to enable block upgrade capabilities for our
current generation of endo-atmospheric interceptors. Concurrently, the AIT program, along
with other BMDO technology programs, is developing cost saving components for both PAC-3
and THAAD. Our Exo-atmospheric Interceptor Technology program is developing an advanced
active and passive seeker system to enable future block upgrades for our Upper Tier and
National Missile Defense interceptors to counter a potential growth in the threats those
systems must address.
Finally, in our fiscal year 2000 program, we will begin to more robustly fund a program
to develop advanced radar technologies to support cost reduction and performance
enhancements for all of our ground- and sea-based radar systems. Unfortunately, because of
our fiscal constraints, we were able to provide funding for this advanced radar technology
program only through reducing our funding for other important technology programs.
Our concern about the Advanced Technology program remains. In the past, we were able to
fund more robust technology programs, such as LEAP which is now the basis for both the
Navy Theater Wide and NMD interceptors. At the current funding levels, we are unable to
fund programs such as this for next generation weapon systems. We are concerned about our
ability to keep pace with the emerging threat through our Advanced Technology program. We
continue to examine ways we can increase technology funding in the future.
Space-based Laser Program. The key focus of our Advanced Technology
directed energy program remains the chemical Space-Based Laser (SBL). SBL is a
high-payoff, next generation concept for a missile defense system. The SBL concept we
envision would provide the Nation with a highly effective, continuous boost-phase
intercept capability for both theater and national missile defense missions. In addition,
SBL could perform non-missile defense missions, such as aerospace superiority and
information dominance. . Working with ground-, sea- and air-based missile defenses, the
SBL's boost-phase intercepts could "thin out" missile attacks and reduce the
burden on mid-course and terminal phase defenses. The SBL will be instrumental in
protecting airfields and ports in the early stages of the conflict. Additionally, because
of its global presence, SBL will be available to protect U.S. Allies and coalitions that
may be threatened by inter-theater ballistic missiles.
The SBL program is managed by BMDO and executed by the U.S. Air Force on our behalf. I
think that Lieutenant General Martin, USAF will discuss the SBL program in detail in his
testimony. Both BMDO and the Air Force are requesting funds in the fiscal year 2000 budget
for the SBL program. We are working jointly on this very important program, pooling
resources and ensuring the program is following a clear direction. The BMDO budget
contains $75 million and the Air Force budget has $63.8 million, for a combined request of
$138.8 million. This level of funding on an annual basis will allow us to work on the
program at a moderate pace while focusing our efforts on reducing the program's technical
and engineering challenges.
In the near term, the SBL program will focus on ground-based efforts to develop and
demonstrate the component and subsystem technologies required for an operational
space-based laser system. These efforts will lead to the design and development of an
Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX) vehicle to be tested in space. I believe this approach
is a prudent, moderate-risk development program.
We recently sponsored the third Independent Review Team (IRT-3) as part of the ongoing
assessment of technology readiness, role, and content for a meaningful Integrated Flight
Experiment program for SBL. I believe Lieutenant General Martin will provide the committee
with a detailed discussion of this as well.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to express my gratitude for your continued
support of missile defense. You and the Members of this Committee have steadfastly
supported this program and have made very difficult funding decisions in order to ensure
our programs succeed. Over the last few years, the additional funds provided by Congress
have helped us in many areas to keep these programs moving forward, ensure additional test
hardware could be procured, and in some cases accelerated our progress. Last year's IMPACT
legislation, which was ultimately provided to the Department as a supplemental
appropriation, helped us to gain momentum to do some vitally important activities which
otherwise we would not have been able to afford.
Finally, last year the Congress authorized and appropriated an additional $1 billion
for missile defense efforts. As my detailed testimony outlines, we in the Department look
forward to putting those additional resources to good use. Part of the billion dollars
will be used to directly support our NMD program. Another portion will be used to posture
the Navy Theater Wide program for acceleration.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the missile defense community, I want to thank you and the
Committee for your leadership and support. Successfully developing and fielding missile
defenses has been a joint goal of ours. Since we work hard everyday to make substantial
progress in fielding these systems, we are often too focused to remember to acknowledge
the partnership we form and to thank you for your leadership, support and continued
confidence in this important mission area. Thank you.
I would be delighted to answer the Committee's questions.