Mr. LUGAR. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] proposes an amendment numbered 3156.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under `Amendments Submitted.')
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to propose an amendment that seeks to improve the way Congress and the executive branch consider and impose unilateral economic sanctions on other countries and entities. There has been a dramatic rise in the number and variety of U.S. economic sanctions directed against other countries to achieve one or more foreign policy goals. More often than not they have not been successful. Despite this record, we continue to impose one new unilateral sanction after another. We typically do so without careful analysis of their effects on our interests and our values.
Because of this, I believe it is time we engage in a serious debate on the merits of using unilateral economic sanctions to accomplish foreign policy goals. That is the purpose of this amendment. My amendment is a modification of Senate bill S. 1413, the `Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act', or simply the Sanctions Policy Reform Act, which we introduced last November. The companion bill was introduced in the House at the same time. There are now 36 Senate cosponsors from both sides of the aisle.
Let me take a moment to note some of the important changes from Senate bill 1413 that are now in my proposed amendment. These changes were included to reflect discussions with the administration, with legal counsel of the Senate, with our colleagues in the House, and with others. First, we clarify in the amendment that our general sanctions guidelines, procedural requirements, analytical reports and sunset provisions pertain only to future sanctions. I underline that point. This amendment deals only with the future. It is not an amendment about sanctions past or sanctions present. We are talking about sanctions in the future and only unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States alone.
Our bill is totally prospective. We have eased some of the public notification requirements about the proposed new sanctions. We do not want the President to inadvertently alert a country targeted for sanctions to take steps to avoid our sanctions before they are imposed. If a country knows in advance that we intend to impose an asset freeze, for example, it would initiate moves to conceal, shift, or otherwise avoid our sanctions, thereby undermining their effectiveness.
We have strengthened the language in the bill against the use of food, medicine, and medical equipment as a tool of American foreign policy. As a guideline, we believe food should never be used this way except in cases of war or a threat to the security of the United States. We have also included language in the bill that permits a slowing down of the process in the Congress to help guarantee that information about proposed new sanctions is available to the Members prior to their voting on the floor.
There are other minor changes in reporting requirements and procedures.
The fundamental purpose of my amendment is to promote good governance through thoughtful deliberation on those proposals involving unilateral economic sanctions directed against other countries. My amendment lays out a set of guidelines and requirements for a careful and deliberative process in both branches of Government when considering new unilateral sanctions. It does not preclude the use of economic sanctions, nor does it change those sanctions already in force. It is based on the basic principle that if we improve the quality of our policy process and our public discourse, we can improve the quality of the policy itself.
This principle is familiar to us all. James Madison wrote eloquently in the Federalist Papers on the merits of slowing down the legislative process on important matters in order to achieve more careful, thoughtful deliberation and avoid the passions of the moment. This amendment is consistent with Madison's view. When we introduced Senate bill 1413 last fall, we did so because we believed that unilateral economic sanctions, when used as a tool of foreign policy, rarely achieved their goal, and frequently harmed the United States more than the target country against whom they were aimed.
The imposition of unilateral sanctions may help create a sense of urgency to help resolve a problem, but it often creates new problems, many of which may be unintended. In some cases, unilateral sanctions may be counterproductive to our interests.
Over the past several years, there has been a growing interest in the practice of unilateral economic sanctions as a tool of American foreign policy. Numerous studies have been conducted by think tanks, trade groups, the business communities, the U.S. Government, and foreign governments. These studies reached similar conclusions that unilateral economic sanctions that are utilized to achieve foreign policy objectives rarely succeed in doing so.
They further conclude that unilateral economic sanctions seldom help those we seek to assist, that they often penalize the United States more than the target country, and that they may weaken our international competitiveness and our economic security. The studies also show that unilateral economic sanctions have increasingly become a foreign policy of first choice, even when other policy alternatives exist.
Because of these studies, data on the use of sanctions are becoming familiar. According to Under Secretary of State, Eisenstat in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, the United States has applied sanctions 115 times since World War I and 104 times since the end of World War II. Nearly one third of the sanctions applied over the last 80 years have been imposed in just the past 4 years.
There are now dozens of new proposals before the Congress that would tighten or impose sanctions on one or more countries, many of whom are our friends or our allies. There are other sanctions pending at the State and local level directed at nearly 20 countries.
The 1997 Report of the President's Export Council on U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions, for example, cited 75 countries representing more than half the world's population, that have been subject to or threatened by U.S. unilateral sanctions. The application of new sanctions in the past 2 years have increased this global percentage to nearly 70 percent of the world's population affected or threatened by one or more U.S. sanctions.
These sanctions are not cost-free. They are easy to impose because they appear to be cost-free and are almost always preferable to the use of force or to doing nothing, but they have many unintended victims--the poor in the target countries, American companies, American labor, American consumers, and, quite frankly, American foreign policy.
One cost estimate put the income loss to the American economy from economic sanctions at between $15 billion and $19 billion, while impacting more than 150,000 jobs in 1995 alone. Magnify this overtime, and the economic and foreign policy costs to the United States become enormous. These sanctions weaken our international competitiveness, lower our global market share, abandon our established markets to others and jeopardize billions in export earnings--the key to our economic growth. They may also impair our ability to provide humanitarian assistance. They sometimes anger our friends and call our international leadership into question.
Someone compared the use of unilateral economic sanctions in foreign policy to the use of carpet bombing in warfare. He noted that both tactics are indiscriminate and fail to distinguish between innocent and guilty victims. Those who are well-off financially, entrenched politically, or responsible for foreign policy actions we oppose, are those who tend to be least affected by unilateral sanctions. The point is that unilateral sanctions are blunt instruments of foreign policy that are too readily employed against foreign targets, even when other persuasive instruments of foreign policy may be available.
The statute regulating our actions against India's and Pakistan's behavior, for example, is unusually inflexible and limits our options to develop solutions that work in South Asia. Our punitive sanctions, however meritorious they may be, do not help us achieve cooperation with either country in coping with regional and global problems; nor do they promote essential American goals of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, or other values we would like to see in both countries. Indeed, these particular sanctions could inadvertently serve to destabilize an already unsteady situation in Pakistan--a nuclear Pakistan--which would not be in anybody's interest.
Mr. President, my amendment does not prohibit sanctions. There will always be situations in which the actions of other countries are so outrageous or so threatening to the United States that some response by the United States, short of the use of military force, is needed and justified. In these instances, sanctions can be helpful in getting the attention of another country, in showing U.S. determination to change behaviors we find objectionable, or in stimulating a search for creative solutions to difficult foreign policy problems.
Indeed, many unilateral sanctions are intended to achieve very laudable foreign policy goals--human rights improvements, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stemming the flow of international narcotics, countering terrorism, prohibiting child labor, and others. These goals are worthy foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, unilateral economic sanctions are not effective tools for advancing these objectives or our interests. They may, in some cases, undermine them. In the end, they typically inflict punishment on the American people or on the most vulnerable populations in the country against whom the sanctions are directed.
Mr. President, if we use unilateral economic sanctions to advance our foreign policy, we must be more sparing in their use, we must improve the process by which we consider international sanctions, and find ways to increase their effectiveness once they are implemented.
My amendment proposes to do that by improving the way we consider unilateral sanctions in both branches of the government. It is a modest amendment. It applies to a very limited class of sanctions which are unilateral in scope and which are intended to accomplish one or more foreign policy objectives.
My amendment excludes those trade remedies and other trade sanctions imposed because of market access restrictions, unfair trade practices and violations of U.S. commercial or trade laws. It excludes those multilateral sanctions regimes in which the U.S. participates, when other participating countries are imposing substantially equivalent sanctions and taking their burden. Our legislation is prospective and would not change, amend or eliminate existing U.S. sanctions, although I believe they should be reviewed as well. The Sanctions Task Force set up by the Senate leadership is undertaking that
review. Finally, the amendment does not pertain to state and local sanctions intended to achieve foreign policy goals. It deals simply with those of the Federal Government.
To help achieve a more deliberative policy process, the bill establishes procedural guidelines and informational requirements before unilateral economic sanctions are considered by the Congress or the President. My amendment provides that any unilateral economic sanction proposed in the Congress or by the President should conform to certain guidelines. These should include:
clearly defined foreign policy or national security goals;
Presidential authority to adjust or waive the sanctions if he determines it is in the national interest to do so;
narrowly targeted sanction on the offending party or parties;
expand export promotion if our sanctions adversely affect a major export market of American farmers;
efforts to minimize the negative impact on humanitarian activities in targeted countries; and
a sunset provision to terminate new sanctions 2 years after they are imposed, unless reauthorized.
The amendment includes provisions to fully inform members of the proposed sanctions and requires new sanctions be consistent with these guidelines. It also mandates that all proposed new unilateral sanctions include reports from the President which assess the following:
the likelihood that the proposed sanctions will achieve the stated foreign policy objective;
the impact of the sanctions on humanitarian activities in affected countries;
the likely effects on our friends and allies and on related national security and foreign policy interests;
any diplomatic steps already undertaken to achieve the specified foreign policy goals;
the prospects for multilateral cooperation and comparable efforts, if any, by other countries to impose sanctions; against target country;
prospects for retaliation against the U.S. and against our agriculture interests;
an assessment as to whether the benefits of achieving the stated foreign policy goals outweigh any likely foreign policy, national security or economic costs to the U.S.; and
a report on the effects the sanctions are likely to have on the U.S. agricultural exports and on the reputation of U.S. farmers as reliable suppliers.
I include that section, Mr. President, because agricultural exports are usually the first hit in retaliation. This is the area in which our Nation does best and has, by far, the largest surplus. Therefore, this is of special importance to the American agricultural producers that are the focus of our attention today in this appropriations bill.
A separate section includes similar analytical requirements for any new sanctions the President considers. These include those sanctions imposed by executive order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). these requirements must be shared with the Congress before imposing new sanctions. However, the bill allows the President to waive most of these requirements if he must act swiftly and if the challenge we confront is an emergency. The requirements on the President are as rigorous as those on the congress.
FInally, my amendment establishes an inter-agency Sanctions Review Committee to include all relevant agencies in the executive branch in order to coordinate U.S. policy on sanctions.
If unilateral sanctions are approved and implemented, the amendment requires annual reporting on their economic costs and benefits to the United State and any progress they are having on achieving the stated foreign policy goals.
There would also be a sunset provision in each new sanction that would terminate new sanctions after two years unless they are re-authorized by the Congress or the President.
The agriculture provision merits special comment because it singles out American farmers and ranchers whose exports are especially vulnerable to retaliation and whose products are most easily substituted by foreign competitors. American agriculture is heavily dependent on exports.
About a third of all of our sales from the farms of this country are in the export trade.
Last year, American agriculture contributed a net $22 billion surplus to our balance of trade, more than any other sector. Economic sanctions can have a serious long-term adverse impact on American agriculture. My amendment provides authority to compensate for lost exports through agriculture export assistance permitted under current statutes and agreements. No new appropriations would be required.
To protect American agriculture, my amendment defines humanitarian assistance to include all food aid provided by the Department of Agriculture for the purchase or provision of food or other agricultural commodities. As such they would be exempt from sanctions other than in response to national security threats, where multilateral sanctions are in place, or if we are engaged in an armed conflict.
I have focused many of my remarks on the economic and trade consequences of unilateral sanctions because they are more easily measured. But, the use of sanctions also raises a fundamental question about the effects of unilateral sanctions on the conduct of American foreign policy. Can we further our national interests and promote our values as a nation through the use of unilateral sanctions which distance ourselves from the challenges we face, or can we better accomplish our purposes by staying engaged in the world and keeping our options open to solutions? The answer is not always black and white because sanctions can sometimes be an appropriate foreign policy tool.
On balance, I believe American interests are better advanced through engagement and active leadership that afford us an opportunity to influence events that threaten our interests.
In some cases, unilateral sanctions restrict our ability to take advantage of changes in other countries because trade embargoes impose a heavy bias against dialogue and exchange. Unilateral sanctions may create tensions with friends and allies--including democratic countries--that jeopardize cooperation in achieving other foreign policy and priorities, including multilateral cooperation on the sanctions themselves.
U.S. leadership and American values are better promoted through our presence abroad, the knowledge we share and impart, and the contacts we
make and sustain. Many countries want to be exposed to our values and ideas if they are not imposed. The lessons of the free market and democratic values are learned more easily when they are experienced first hand, not as abstractions from a distance and not behind artificial barriers imposed by unilateral sanctions.
Let me suggest a number of fundamental principles that I believe should shape our approach to unilateral economic sanctions: Unilateral economic sanctions should not be the policy of first resort. To the extent possible, other means of persuasion and influence ought to be exhausted first;
If harm is to be done or is intended, we must follow the cardinal principle that we plan to harm our adversary more than we harm ourselves; when possible, multilateral economic sanctions and international cooperation are preferable to unilateral sanctions and are more likely to succeed, even though they may be more difficult to obtain; we should secure the cooperation of the major trading and investing countries as well as the principal frontline states if economic sanctions are to be successful; and we ought to avoid double standards and be as consistent as possible in the application of our sanctions policy.
To the extent possible, we ought to avoid disproportionate harm to the civilian population. We should avoid the use of food as a weapon of foreign policy and we should permit humanitarian assistance programs to function; our foreign policy goals ought to be clear, specific and achievable within a reasonable period of time; we ought to keep to a minimum the adverse affects of our sanctions on our friends and allies; we should keep in mind that unilateral sanctions can cause adverse consequences that may be more problematic than the actions that prompted the sanctions--a regime collapse, a humanitarian disaster, a mass exodus of people, or more repression and isolation in the target country, for example; we should explore options for solving problems through dialogue, public diplomacy, and positive inducements or rewards; and the President of the United States should always have options that include both sticks and carrots that can be adjusted according to circumstance and nuance; the Congress should be vigilant by insuring that his options are consistent with Congressional intent and the law.
In those cases where we cannot
build multilateral cooperation and where our core interests or core values are at risk, we must, of course, consider acting unilaterally. Our actions must be part of an overall coherent and coordinated foreign policy that is coupled with diplomacy and consistent with our international obligations and objectives. We should have a reasonable expectation that our unilateral actions will not cause more collateral damage to ourselves or to our friends than the problem they are designed to correct.
Mr. President, the United States should never abandon its leadership role in the world nor forsake the basic values we cherish in the pursuit of our foreign policy. We must ask, however, whether we are always able to change the actions of other countries whose behavior we find disagreeable or threatening. If we are able to influence those actions, we need to ponder how best to proceed. In my judgment, unilateral economic sanctions will not always be the best answer. But, if they are the answer, they should be structured so that they do as little harm as possible to ourselves and to our overall global interests. By improving upon our procedures and the quality and timeliness of our information when considering new sanctions, I believe we can make that possible. We should know about the cost and benefits of proposed new sanctions before we consider them. That is the intent of my amendment.
I ask that all Members look closely at my amendment and hope you will agree that it is good governance amendment that will help improve the quality and conduct of American foreign policy.
Mr. President, I will conclude by pointing out that a bipartisan sanctions task force has been appointed by the leadership of this body. That task force has met. I look forward to making a contribution to the work of that group.
Mr. President, as I mentioned earlier in the debate today, I visited with the presidents of the 50 farm bureaus in our country. I visited with them because they are concerned about the farm prices that we have been talking about, and I am concerned as well. Very clearly, the farm organizations of our country have a strong and clear agenda, to which I subscribe. They believe that we must pass fast track authority for the President, that we need reform of the IMF and replenish those funds, and that we must have sanctions reform.
The American Farm Bureau has been a strong contributing member to the U.S.A. Engage movement, which now includes 675 American companies who are involved in exporting. The American Farm Bureau and these American companies are companies who say, first of all, that sanctions have to remain a part of our foreign policy apparatus; that unilateral sanctions, those imposed by ourselves, usually fail and usually cause more harm upon us than upon the target countries; that on occasion we may be so outraged that we may be prepared to accept that cost, understanding that the harm to our jobs and our income will be greater than that which we have fostered. But, Mr. President, the farmers of America and their organizations are crying out in this legislation for attention.
I argued on the last amendment that our best policy in this country was to sell grain, to sell livestock--not to store it. I think that is the issue, Mr. President. But if we are to be credible with regard to the export side, farmers and farm groups are saying, `You must reform. You must do more.' And I agree with that.
That is why I offered this amendment on the appropriations bill for agriculture, because it is a passionate cry by our farmers to take this concrete action to give some hope that their concerns are being addressed, that, in fact, we are going to move exports, and are going to do so because we are beginning to think more carefully here in this body about what we are doing.
To reiterate the bidding, Mr. President, before unilateral sanctions alone are imposed, there has to be a purpose stated for why we are doing them.
And criteria and benchmarks that would show the degree to which we have been successful in interim reports, and an assessment of the cost to American jobs and the lost income. I mentioned $20 billion of lost income in a year and 150,000 jobs. These are not inconsequential. Debates occur on this floor frequently over 100 jobs or 1,000 jobs. I am asking that to consider very carefully these cost implications before we adopt another unilateral sanction. And finally, I am saying that after 2 years there should be a sunset provision. The sanction ends at that point, unless it is authorized again by the Congress or by the President for valid foreign policy reasons. These sanctions go on forever. This amendment is prospective. It deals with the future. I hope the sanctions task force set up by the leadership will deal with the present and past sanctions.
Mr. President, I ask for careful consideration by this body of my amendment. I am hopeful it will be a strong plank in this appropriations bill.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, I rise in respectful opposition to some of the implications of the amendment offered by my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar. Now, we all know that sanctions have come under assault of late. It is the politically correct thing to do amidst Senator Lugar's and my friends in the business community. And I think neither Senator Lugar nor I has failed to stand up for the free enterprise system and the business community when the community deserved to be supported, which is most of the time.
Nevertheless, there are some powerful corporate interests in this town which have launched a well-financed lobbying campaign against sanctions, all sanctions, in an obvious attempt to convince Congress that all sorts of unreasonable sanction laws have been presented and that these sanctions are something new and unusual and somehow detrimental to the best interests of this country.
On that point I beg to differ. The fact is, as an effective and principled foreign policy tool economic sanctions are older than this Republic itself. What did the American colonies do in response to Britain's imposition of the Stamp Act? The American colonies imposed economic sanctions forcing its repeal as a matter of fact. What did the Continental Congress do when Britain imposed the Intolerable Acts? The Continental Congress imposed economic sanctions on Britain.
Why has Congress always authorized sanctions when needed? This is a question that is worth reviewing, and that is what I propose to do briefly, if it may be possible. Amazingly, some in the business community, and they have always been and will continue to be close friends of mine, have jumped to the conclusion on the recent events in India and Pakistan to pursue their attacks on the U.S. bilateral sanctions. But it is precisely those events in India and Pakistan, the decision by these governments to detonate a dozen separate nuclear weapons, that should heighten our resolve to enforce tough sanctions against governments that seek to destabilize the world.
The fact is, in that instance, Madam President, I believe, and I believe I can demonstrate, that India detonated its devices because of India's fear that the United States was coddling China and bidding friendship for China that ought not to be a part of the foreign policy of this country.
Now, just weeks ago the Senate passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act by an overwhelming vote of 90 to 4. Why did we do that? In order to place a cost on the specific companies for transferring dangerous missile technology to a terrorist regime in Iran which will use that technology to destabilize the entire Persian Gulf region.
Now, we authorize the President to sanction states and foreign companies that threaten the safety of the American people by spreading nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. We authorize sanctions on states, and when I say the word `states,' I mean governments, foreign governments, which provide training, weapons and political or financial and diplomatic support to terrorists who kidnap and murder American citizens. We authorize sanctions on governments involved in the smuggling and transshipment of illegal drugs that poison our children. We authorize sanctions on governments that commit acts of genocide and armed aggression against their neighbors and crimes against humanity.
The question must be faced: Are we unreasonable in doing this? Should we be ashamed? I do not think so. Obviously, sanctions are not always the answer. I do not contend that they are, but we cannot escape the fact that sometimes they are the only answer.
I think we better face the facts. There are only three basic tools in foreign policy. There is diplomacy, sanctions, and war. Without sanctions, where would we be? Our options with the dictators and proliferators and terrorists of this world would be three: empty talk, sending in the Marines, or withdrawing into isolation. And I for one am not willing to place such artificial limits on our foreign policy options.
But this is exactly, I fear, what the pending amendment proposes to do. Perhaps the Senator from Indiana can persuade me and the remainder, the rest of the Senate that that is not intended and at least make some statements for the Record that can be viewed in the future.
In practice, this amendment is not about sanctions reform as it states. It is an obvious attempt by opponents of sanctions and the business community to hamstring Congress' ability to authorize sanctions. The proposed amendment would tie Congress' hands with mandatory waiting periods for the implementation of all sanctions, require mandatory sunsets on all future sanctions laws and define a wide range of congressional actions known or referred to as `sanctions' when they are nothing of the sort.
This amendment, I fear, would impose a mandatory 2-year time limit on all U.S. sanctions law. I'm afraid that would be opening a Pandora's box. Imagine if this was the law of the land when the United States enacted the Arms Export Control Act which prohibits the sale of sophisticated weapons to nations that the State Department determines annually support terrorism--governments like Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Would we have wanted those sanctions to be eliminated under an arbitrary 2-year timetable? I think not.
Further, what exactly is meant by the term `sanctions'? The pending amendment, it seems to me, breaks new ground on what henceforth would be considered a `sanction.' Under this amendment, it seems to me, the denial of U.S. foreign aid would be deemed a sanction. Any conditionality on U.S. funding to the World Bank or the IMF would be a `sanction' on a foreign government. And let me remind Senators that since it was created in 1945, American taxpayers have anted up billions of dollars for the World Bank and now the antisanctions crowd tells us that we can't place any conditions on the expenditures of those funds.
According to a recent report by the USIA, the conditions placed by Congress on U.S. foreign aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organization are a `sanction.' Really? Conditioning U.S. foreign aid to the PLO--an organization whose modus operandi for most of its existence has been killing innocent civilians--is now deemed a sanction?
What this amendment, I fear, proposes to do is to enshrine U.S. foreign aid giveaways as an entitlement, an entitlement to foreign countries.
Wait one moment before jumping to conclusions. While this amendment expands the definition of sanctions to absurd proportions, it doesn't cover all sanctions. Oh, no. You see, our friends in the business community--and they are my friends, and they are Senator Lugar's friends--and their lobbyists who helped write this amendment have quietly carved out an exemption for bilateral sanctions they like--sanctions that directly benefit them. The same folks who are busy telling us that sanctions don't work and should be scrapped, have ensured that certain retaliatory trade sanctions are exempt from the restrictions of this legislation.
The way some in the business community have influenced the crafting of this amendment, Congress would be hamstrung in implementing sanctions against any nation that poses a threat to the safety of the American people, even if a government proliferates dangerous weapons of mass destruction, commits genocide, or supports terrorists responsible for murdering American citizens. But, if they flood the American market with cheap television sets--whoa, that is a different proposition. We can throw the book at them.
Under this amendment, the President would be prohibited from implementing sanctions against any country for at least 45 days, supposedly under the guise of a `cooling off' period. On the surface, that sounds pretty reasonable. But in practice, a 2-month lapse is not only foolish, it can be downright dangerous.
One example--after the Libyan terrorists blew up Pan Am flight 103, murdering 263 innocent citizens in cold blood, the United Nations spent months and months debating appropriate actions against Libya. Meanwhile, Libya divested itself of most reachable assets in order to avoid the impact of sanctions. So the pending amendment would essentially afford other terrorist states the same courtesy. While the United States `cools off' for 45 days, the terrorists, the proliferators, the genocidal dictators, would have 2 months to quietly divest their finances and conceal the evidence and provide safe haven for fugitives. That strikes me as being something short of reform.
The pending amendment would not place these requirements on multilateral sanctions. Of course, multilateral sanctions are more effective than bilateral sanctions. But, should the United States be handcuffed to the will, or more likely the lack of will, of the so-called international community? Should we tie our hands to the whims of our European `allies'--and I put quotation marks around allies because their slumping welfare state economies are driving them to employ increasingly mercantilist foreign policies.
Right now the United States is waging a lonely battle at the United Nations to stop our allies from caving in and lifting U.N. sanctions on Iraq. If it were up to the French and the Russians, international business would be rushing headlong into Baghdad to renew commercial ties with Saddam Hussein, notwithstanding his continued defiance of U.N. weapons inspectors. Yet, we should give these people a veto over our national security policy that was won through the sacrifice and courage and blood of American men and women just 7 years ago?
I believe we need sanctions reform. One reform we might consider is requiring that the sanctions which Congress passes would be actually implemented. Not long ago, Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act--a targeted law much of whose language, I might add, was drafted by the Clinton administration itself. Live on CNN, the President signed it into law with great pomp and circumstance. But then, when the time came to implement that law, the President lost his nerve and the U.S. foreign policy suffered yet another devastating loss of credibility.
The distinguished majority leader, Mr. Lott, and the Senate minority leader, Mr. Daschle, have established a bipartisan `sanctions reform task force' to determine if, as critics have complained, Congress has gone `sanctions mad.' This, in my view, is a wise plan, and I serve on that task force; the Senator from Indiana serves on it, as does Senator Glenn and other interested Senators from both parties. The first question we are seeking to answer is, What is a sanction? In fact, we are having a hearing planned for July 31 to study this and other questions.
In conclusion, Madam President, instead of rushing forward with any sort of ill-considered amendment--and I say that as respectfully as possible--the ramifications of which are unknown to most Senators, we should let that task force do its work and consider ways Congress can strengthen its consideration of proposed sanctions laws.
Those who are prone to criticize the `impulsive' actions of the U.S. Senate, actions which I happen to believe are motivated by a devotion to the security of this country and its people, should themselves be wary of impulsive `one-size-fits-all' solutions such as this amendment.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator withhold his request?
Mr. HELMS. I certainly will.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSON. Madam President, I will be very brief. I commend my colleague from Indiana for his sponsorship of this amendment to the agriculture appropriations bill. In my view, it is long overdue that this Senate develops a more thoughtful, more deliberative, a more analytical approach to our sanctions strategy on the part of the United States.
An observer noted during this discussion last week that Congress is in general opposed to sanctions, but in specific supports each one of them that comes along--all too often, sanctions that are contradictory, that are counterproductive, that do not, in fact, carry out the goals of the sanctions themselves. So I think the framework that Senator Lugar of Indiana has developed, which would cause us to approach this in a much more analytical perspective--to see to it that we have a cost-effectiveness that results from our sanctions, or even if it doesn't, that we deal with the sanction from that perspective--I think makes all the sense in the world.
It is true that sanctions most often are effective when they are multinational in nature. There is nothing, as I understand Senator Lugar's amendment, that says we can only engage in multinational sanctions. We can engage in unilateral sanctions if we so choose. We can engage in sanctions that may not be cost-effective, if we so choose. But we ought to be fully cognizant of the nature of the sanctions and their consequences if, in fact, we are going to go down those roads. It is not tying our hands, it is not tying the hands of American foreign policy or trade policy or economic policy, to know with certainty what it is we are doing and to approach it in the kind of thoughtful manner that Senator Lugar suggests.
There is nothing in this amendment, as I see it, that constitutes the development of an entitlement for foreign aid or anything of that nature. I think that is a gross misreading, not only of the intent, but the actual effect of this amendment. There is nothing that would restrict the ability of the American Government to impose sanctions as a response to terrorism or genocide or the development of weapons of mass destruction. It does not tie our hands in that regard.
I want to say that I think we made a step in the right direction this past week with the handling of the sanctions that were about to be imposed on Pakistan in terms of agricultural sales. I think it is appropriate that this amendment be brought up in the context of this particular bill.
Again, I thank the Senator from Indiana for a great deal of work, a great deal of thought and care that has gone into this. The foreign policy of the United States and oversight that this body, the U.S. Senate, can exercise will be enhanced and not detracted from by the adoption of this amendment.
I yield back my time.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I, too, rise and commend our colleague from Indiana for this amendment. I am proud to be a cosponsor of the amendment, along with a number of my colleagues. To use the language in another situation, this is indeed a very modest proposal. This is prospective. It affects none of the sanctions that are presently in place.
As the Senator from Indiana has rightly pointed out, sanctions are a very effective and useful tool when applied well. I think the threat of sanctions may have an even greater impact in utility. I certainly agree with him on that.
What he is merely asking us to support today is that when a proposed sanction is being suggested by the executive branch--by the way, I wish we were applying this to ourselves because too often, when the Congress of the United States offers sanctions legislation, which is oftentimes where these bills originate, we should also be asking the question of what is the cost-benefit effect of this proposal. It doesn't say don't impose the sanction. In fact, there may be situations that arise when, in fact, the outrage is so egregious that is the subject of the sanction that we would be more than willing to pay the economic price to impose it. This amendment does not preclude that result. It merely suggests that we have some ability to make an analysis of what that relationship would be and to ask for a few days to allow for objective analysis of what the sanction cost might be. I hope this will enjoy strong, unanimous, bipartisan support.
We have heard eloquent statements made on the floor of this Chamber, Madam President, over the last several weeks, as I think all of us have begun to focus on sanctions policies as a result of the tragic events in India and Pakistan with the detonation of nuclear weaponry. That was a very sad occasion, still a very worrisome occasion in terms of what it means and the implications for us in the near term and longer term.
If there has been any silver lining, if you will, in these clouds, to draw an even tighter analogy, it is that I think everyone in this Chamber has stepped back a little bit and said,
What are these sanctions policies and how do they work? What is going on here? Are we really achieving the desired results that are the subject of our rhetoric in speeches? Are we causing policies to be changed in countries on whom we impose sanctions? Are the political elite of these nations affected by our policies? Are they in some way being impacted by these decisions? What damage do we do to ourselves in the process as a result of sanctions being imposed? Are average people in these countries, who have nothing to do with setting policies, being affected in some way? What does that do in terms of
eroding support for our country and our policies where public support in foreign countries can be pivotal in unpopular decisions that may have been made by allies of ours around the world? What sort of corrosive effect do sanctions have on those decisions?
I think these are good questions that deserve answers. What the Senator from Indiana has suggested is that, at least in one aspect of these, that we know and understand what the cost-benefit relationship is.
Madam President, at a later point in this debate, I will offer another amendment dealing with food and medicine, to merely just take food, medicine, and agricultural products off the table as a tool of sanctions, for the primary reason that I don't think it has any impact on trying to modify the behavior of nations on whom we have a substantial or less-than-substantial agreement. I will wait for the appropriate time to do it when this debate is concluded.
I also have authored, along with my friend, whom I see on this floor, who has cosponsored that amendment, Senator Hagel from Nebraska, Senator Roberts from Kansas, Senator Warner from Virginia, Senator Burns from Montana, Senator Dorgan from North Dakota, proposals that will deal with a broader issue of how sanctions ought to be dealt with. But I will save that debate for a later day. It is a broader question and one for which we have a task force taking a look at some of these issues. I certainly want to make sure we are heading in the right direction.
On the food and medicine and agricultural products, I think that makes a lot of sense, and I will offer that at the appropriate time.
I conclude by urging my colleagues to be supportive of the Lugar proposal. It is a significant step in the right direction and one that I think deserves broad-based support as we try to sort out how best to advance our foreign policy interests while not unnecessarily doing damage to our own Nation and to innocent people around the world, particularly in the unilateral application of these sanctions.
With that, Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HAGEL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
Mr. HAGEL. Thank you, Madam President.
I rise to support Senator Lugar's amendment. I am an original cosponsor of that amendment. I am an original cosponsor of the Lugar amendment because I believe the Lugar amendment applies some common sense and some relevancy to the issue of sanctions.
I know that we have a bipartisan task force on sanctions. I think most of this body supports the efforts of that task force, but I don't see any conflict in what Senator Lugar is proposing today, and what Senator Dodd and others will propose later, with the task force assignment.
It is interesting to note that since 1993 we have imposed 65 unilateral sanctions on 35 nations. We have some responsibility to give some focus and some understanding to our trade policy, which is part of our foreign policy, which is connected to our national security, which is connected to our economy and jobs and growth and productivity.
I fail to appreciate why this is not relevant, why this is not important. This is not getting in the way of the task force. The task force, as I understand it, is to help frame up this issue.
This amendment would not undo any existing sanctions. This amendment would establish a process for a more rational consideration of future use of sanctions. Sanctions surely must remain a tool of foreign policy, but sanctions are not foreign policy. Sanctions are only effective when they are multilateral. The world is dynamic. The world is changing. Trade is spherical. It moves. It will move right over the top of us unless we attempt to manage the movement.
Every great event in history has produced new opportunities, new challenges, new threats, new uncertainties, and the collapse of the Soviet empire has given the world great new opportunities and hope. Only one nation on Earth can help lead the nations of the world to that hope and opportunity, and trade surely must be a major part of that.
Why in the world would we continue to impose unworkable, unachievable, outdated, irrelevant policy rather than looking forward, getting us into the next century, with the promise that only this country can give?
Does anybody really believe, in this body, that any nation on Earth cannot get any service, any commodity, any product if they want it from some other nation? Of course not. This is a new world. Both the President and the Congress want some control of the issue of sanctions. We want some definition of what this is about. The Congress of the United States owes this Nation some leadership on this issue. The President must lead on this issue.
Senator Lugar has described his amendment in detail. It would sunset new sanctions after 2 years. The way it is now, Madam President, we go on and on with sanctions. This amendment starts to clean up sanctions. Do we need them? Are they relevant? Does the world change? I fail to see that that is a threat to our foreign policy and to those who wish us ill.
It would require cost-benefit studies. My goodness, imagine that. What a terrible thing--a cost-benefit study. It would require an effort, first, to make sanctions multilateral. It would require an evaluation of whether a sanction is likely to achieve its policy goal. Again--again--what a questionable objective. My goodness, actually focusing on an action and figuring out, if you can, if there are consequences, if it is workable.
I know some in this body care occasionally about a headline, about a press release.
A CRS study, January 22, 1998--this year--listed 97, total, unilateral sanctions now in place. Since that report came out, we have added sanctions against India and Pakistan, for a total of at least 99 sanctions now in place. We dealt with some of that a little earlier.
A study by the National Association of Manufacturers found that from 1993 to 1996 we imposed, as I mentioned, another 61 sanctions. These 35 nations--these 35 nations--where we have imposed these sanctions make up 42 percent of the world population. Almost half of the 5.5 billion people on the Earth are included in these sanctions and 19 percent of the world's export market--$800 billion.
Who are we kidding here? Who are we hurting? We are not isolating anybody except ourselves. We are isolating our producers, our farmers, our ranchers, our manufacturers. We are isolating ourselves. And for what end? Bring a little sanity and common sense to this? I think so. I think so.
I might add, is there something really wrong about business actually stepping into this debate? Is there something really wrong about having business say, `Gee, we're being hurt'? Is that a special interest? Is American business a special interest? Is industry a special interest, people who work in business and the industry, produce jobs, create wealth, pay taxes? Be careful of that special interest. Be careful of that special interest. That is America. That is why we are the most powerful, dominant, free nation on Earth.
A new study by the International Institute of Economics estimates that, in 1995 alone, unilateral sanctions cost Americans $20 billion in lost exports, losing 200,000 jobs. That does not include, Madam President, what is referred to as the `downstream loss.' The downstream loss, when you lose markets--it means the suppliers and the jobs and the adjunct jobs--no way to really calculate that.
The National Foreign Trade Council has identified 41 separate legislative studies on the books that either require or authorize the imposition of unilateral sanctions.
Well, it goes on and on. The fact is, Madam President, what Senator Lugar is doing is important. It is really relevant to today. It is more relevant to our future. It is relevant to our place in the world. What is the U.S. interest in the world? It is relevant to our children, and it is relevant to everything we are and who we are. That is why I strongly support this, why I was an original cosponsor, and why I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this amendment.
Madam President, thank you. I yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, let me applaud the Senator from Nebraska for a statement that I think was eloquent and filled with good sense. And I certainly want to associate myself with the remarks he has just made. And even though we were on different sides of the previous amendment, let me say, as I did previously, the Senator from Indiana is a very respected Senator, someone for whom I have great respect on foreign policy issues.
I am pleased to be here to speak as a cosponsor of the amendment that he has offered. It makes good sense to me. And I say, I think, as the Senator from Nebraska said, I would only go further than this. I certainly support this. I think it is a step in the right direction, but there is even more that we can do.
The question that is required to be asked now is, When we impose sanctions around the world, for various purposes, many of them important purposes that deal with national security and other issues, should those sanctions include the shipment of food and the shipment of medicine?
Frankly, I wonder if anyone believes that Saddam Hussein has ever missed a meal because of sanctions imposed by this country. Does anybody believe that Saddam Hussein has missed a meal? I do not think so. We cut off food shipments to Iraq. And if Saddam Hussein is making all of his meals, guess who misses their meals? It is almost always the poor and the hungry who are injured when you cut off shipments of food.
Does anybody believe that Fidel Castro does not eat well nearly every meal when he chooses to have what he wants to eat? But when we cut off food shipments to Cuba, we know that it will be the poor and the hungry who will be injured by that.
Our country, for very legitimate reasons, says we are very concerned about what is happening in Iraq, Iran, Libya, Cuba, and more. For legitimate reasons we say that. I am sure the Senator from Indiana, at greater length than any others of us, could recite the foreign policy issues and the national security issues that attend to those countries and their relationship with us and others in the world.
But the question before us is not, Should we be concerned about those countries? Of course we should. The question is, When we impose sanctions, what should those sanctions contain? Is it in our interest and in the interest of the hungry and the poor around the world to include in those sanctions the withdrawal of shipments of grain and the withdrawal of shipments of medicine?
I have clearly an interest here on behalf of family farmers. I represent one of the most agricultural States in the Nation. And nearly 10 percent of the market for wheat is out of limits or off limits to our family farmers because we have decided to impose sanctions and therefore take those markets off limits to our farmers. Does that cost farmers money? You bet. It takes money right out of their pockets. They are, in effect, told by these sanctions, `You, Mr. And Mrs. Farmer, you pay the cost of these sanctions. You pay the cost as a result of lost income.'
Where I would go further is, I would support and am a cosponsor of an amendment that will be offered by Senator Dodd, and I think cosponsored by Senator Hagel, saying, let us not include food and medicine in future sanctions. That is not appropriate as part of sanctions. I am a cosponsor of that amendment to be offered. I would go further to say, this country ought to decide, if it is to impose sanctions in the future, or for sanctions that now exist, it ought to reimburse farmers for the cost of those sanctions. Why should this country simply say, `Here is our desired effect, Mr. and Mrs. Farmer. You pay the cost of it'? If it is for national security, let it come out, then, of the national security accounts from which we pay for many other matters, and say to family farmers, `We'll reimburse you for those lost markets.' That is an amendment I am thinking of offering to this as well. We will see what results from that.
But it is required, I think, to say, as we discuss this issue, as I said earlier today, there is some horrible disconnection in this world.
Halfway around the world there are people in Sudan, we are told, old women, climbing trees to forage for leaves to eat, leaves because they are on the abyss of starvation; a million to a million and a quarter of them are on the edge of starvation because they don't have enough to eat.
Turn the globe another halfway around and you will find America's farmers, who are the economic all-stars, produce food in abundant quantity, and they are told in our system that when they take that grain which represents that food to market, that their product doesn't have value, doesn't have worth. There is something that is terribly disconnected about that.
I have been in many parts of the world. What I remember most about the desperate poverty and hunger that exists, for example, is in the desperate slum called Cite Soleil, on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. You see poverty as bad and conditions as desperate as anywhere else in the world. I leaned over a crib where a young child was dying of starvation in one of the worst slums you can imagine. This child had no one. The child had lost most of its hair; what hair was left was turning red as a result of severe malnutrition and starvation. This child, the doctor told me, was dying.
I thought to myself, there is such a terrible, terrible, disconnection here because we produce food in abundant quantity. How on Earth can moving food around the world to all parts of the world that need our food in a way that connects our interests to the interests of those who need it, how on Earth could that ever threaten our national security? It does not and it could not.
The Senator from Indiana offers an amendment on the issue of sanctions. It is very simple. It describes sanctions in the future. We ought to deal with sanctions that now exist, as well. It describes conditions for the imposition of those sanctions that deal with unilateral sanctions. It says the Secretary of Agriculture should use export assistance under various programs to offset any damage or likely damage to producers and so on.
I fully support that and I am pleased to be a cosponsor, but I say again we have much, much more to do. Hubert Humphrey, many years ago, used to say, `Send them anything they can't shoot back.' What he meant by that is it will never injure our national security interests to send American food around the world, to sell it in markets where we can sell it, and to move it to other markets under title II and III under Food for Peace, and in some cases, title I, in other markets where they cannot afford to purchase it. It is always in our best interest. Is it in the best interest of farmers? Of course, but it also happens to run parallel to the national interests of our country.
Let me finish where I began and say I am pleased to vote for this amendment, pleased to be a cosponsor, and will cosponsor an amendment that will go further, that Senator Dodd will offer, and may offer one myself, that deals with present sanctions and reimbursement to farmers for those sanctions, saying that the Government ought to not force them to bear the full burden of the cost of sanctions.
But I thank the Senator from Indiana for offering this amendment. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.
Mr. DOMENICI. I do not intend to delay matters at all. Whenever the chairman is ready to go, I certainly won't be on my feet. I want to rise and congratulate Senator Lugar and those who helped put his amendment together. I am a cosponsor, but I don't take credit for any of the innovation and thoroughness of this work.
I just want to say on a very personal note that every now and then when you see things out in our country or in the world sort of mixed up, and you see mixed signals, you wonder just what is our country doing, and somebody like Dick Lugar comes along and makes sense out of something that appears to be just a mess.
There can be no question, whatever support there is in this body for sanctions--and clearly they must be an instrument, a tool--whatever support there is for that concept does not mean our country ought to be living under a `quilt' of sanctions, many of which are just bilateral between us and some country, when we already know that many of them don't work or they work to our detriment.
Here we sit today with an emerging crisis in agriculture, probably mostly from the Asian flu; that is, from the failure in the Asian markets because of their banking systems falling apart, and those people can't buy the products they were buying. Nonetheless, when we added Pakistan for something they did, which we were all worried about, and they depended upon our grain and that kind of product to feed their people, obviously American agriculture is hurting.
Now, there are some who would like to make it that the new legislation creating an open market at some time in the future, a totally free and open market, is the cause of the problem. That is not the cause. The cause is that America's trading in
foodstuffs and products from our farms is not working as well as it should because we have done something that is harming it, or failed to do some things that would cause it to work better.
Let me repeat one more time, why in the world are we still holding up IMF? If we want to reform it, why don't we reform it and pass it? There is hardly anybody in agriculture or American industry that hires our people that doesn't think we ought to do that.
Now, Senator Lugar would like to do that. That isn't what he is doing here today. He is doing the next best thing. If that isn't a prescriptive manner, postmanner, trying to get rid of some of the nonsense of the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral situations that we have where we say we can't sell countries our product. Why don't we get on with fast track? If you want to talk about what would help our farmers, that is what would help. Get America's trade markets open so they can sell their products.
Obviously, what we are doing here today is a very rational, sensible approach to a very, very, confused set of policies which are not working to America's benefits, which we can pass and then sit back and say we did something. Isn't that great; we did something. We never measured it. I gather the new guidelines will ask us to at least measure before we do it; is that correct, Senator Lugar?
Mr. LUGAR. Yes.
Mr. DOMENICI. At least measure before we do it.
I commend you again, Senator Lugar. You have done it a number of times before. We have been here a long time together. I regret, even though the color of your hair might indicate to the contrary, I have been here longer than you. Nonetheless, we have been here a long time together. I do compliment you because every now and then when things are confused, you make up for that and come up with something like this.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Mr. ROBERTS. Madam President, I would like to join the chorus of well-deserved accolades--common-sense, I guess, accolades for the distinguished Senator from Indiana, the outstanding chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee.
The Senator from New Mexico has summed it up very well. I am not going to take the Senate's time to repeat what has already been said in regard to this debate. Senator Lugar has already done that. Others have done that.
I do have a statement that involves obvious `golden words of truth' in regard to this issue that I will simply insert for the record, but I do want to say again that the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool have skyrocketed since the conclusion of World War II. The last 4 years, as has been said on the floor, 61 new U.S. laws or executive actions were enacted authorizing the unilateral sanctions against 35 countries, and in all, over 70 foreign nations representing 75 percent of the world's population are currently subjected to a unilateral sanction by the United States.
These are easy perceptions, I guess, actions that people take. I think in earlier days we used to call it gunboat diplomacy. Maybe we sent a gunboat over to a nation to demonstrate our unhappiness with a foreign nation and their policy. But there have been terrible repercussions in regard to these sanctions. They do not achieve their policy goals. They are very counterproductive,
and as has been indicated by some across the aisle, and others, we shoot ourselves in the foot. So the distinguished chairman has, for a considerable amount of time, taken a look at the overall objective of sanctions and what has happened in a counterproductive way, not only to U.S. agriculture, but the entire U.S. economy and the global marketplace. He has come up with a comprehensive, thoughtful approach, and it is commensurate with the debate that will take place and the discussion that will take place in this body with regard to sanctions reform overall.
There are those of us--Senator Dodd, Senator Hagel, Senator Biden, as well as Senator Lugar and myself--who want to take a look at all of the sanctions that we have in place. And that is appropriate. We have taken action in a 98-0 vote last week regarding the GSM program and the possibility of selling wheat to Pakistan. The chairman was a real leader in that effort. We have taken action now by unanimous consent on the India/Pakistan situation, which will give the administration flexibility to deal with that issue. The next logical step is to consider, and I think favorably pass, the Lugar reform initiative. So I stand in solid support of the chairman for what he is trying to do.
Madam President, U.S. influence, prestige and resolve in foreign affairs currently rests at a cross-roads. The United States, which has prided itself on providing international leadership through strength and by example, has increasingly turned away from that legacy by embracing ambivalence and sanctions instead of engagement and respect. Nowhere is this more clear than in the area of unilateral economic sanctions.
The United States in recent years has developed a seemingly uncontrollable desire to show our displeasure over a specific action, behavior or belief in a foreign country by punishing that country through the imposition of unilateral sanctions. Regardless of whether a Republican or Democrat was President, regardless of whether Republicans or Democrats ran the Congress, the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has literally sky-rocketed since the conclusion of the Second World War. In fact, in just the last four years, 61 new U.S. laws or executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral economic sanctions against 35 countries. All in all, over 70 foreign states representing nearly 75 percent of the world's population are currently subjected to unilateral sanctions by the United States.
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, sanctions very rarely work. In order for sanctions to be successful, the United States must--absolutely must--convince the entire rest of the world to join our boycott. Unless this occurs, the sanctioned country simply gets what it needs--food, financing, etc: from the other countries that chose not to join the Sanctions Circle.
There are two serious repercussions when this happens. First, the sanctions hurt us instead of their intended targert. Yes, that's right, when U.S. businesses lose access to markets for their products, U.S. workers lose job opportunities. So instead of joining us in professing outrage about some particularly repugnant act, foreign governments simply feign indignation while they quietly slip in to take away business from U.S. companies. And if you don't think that's true, just ask a foreign businessman or government official whether they support or oppose the American penchant for unilateral sanctions. They love it and they hope it continues.
Yes, this is the second repercussion. Foreign governments--even our allies--have figured out that by refusing to join the United States in imposing sanctions, their countries actually benefit. What a bonus! They can stick it to the United States and create new markets for their businesses at the same time! As a result of this revelation throughout the world, it has become nearly impossible for the United States to build a unanimous case for sanctions against anyone.
Just look at Iraq. If ever a case could be made for sanctions, Saddam Hussein is the poster child. After all, armed aggression against a peaceful neighbor and use of weapons of mass destruction on one's own citizens are truly reprehensible offenses, right? Surely Iraq deserved tougher sanctions when Saddam refused to accept U.N. weapons inspectors just a few months ago, right? Wrong. When Saddam pulled his latest stunt, the vast majority of the world flatly refused to support further sanctions. If we can't build a case for sanctions with Saddam Hussein as our target given the utter disregard he has shown for the United States and the rest of the world, will we ever be able to? I wonder.
Where do sanctions come from anyway? They usually are issued by the President under the authority of at least twelve different laws governing international affairs. Again, in recent years, sanctions have been used far more frequently than ever before in U.S. history. This isn't an indictment of the current administration or any previous administrations; it is simply an assessment of how U.S. foreign policy is changing. Instead of using our influence and diplomacy to encourage good behavior, we attempt to use our power to punish bad behavior. And as I've just discussed, whether used as a threat to try and prevent unwanted actions or imposed as a punishment for undesirable actions, sanctions rarely work.
Although most sanctions are imposed directly by the President, unilateral sanctions can be particularly damaging when they are imposed by Congress. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of our country. He is charged with implementing our foreign policy. While the Congress can and should be involved in the construction of that policy, the President is ultimately responsible for implementing it. When the Congress forces the President to impose sanctions on a country for a given action or behavior, it takes away the flexibility the President needs to address distinctly different foreign policy problem that may arise. The Congress basically says, `we don't know or care what caused the action or behavior; however, we insist that you impose these sanctions regardless of what the ramifications may be.' That is a dangerous and irresponsible manner in which to conduct U.S. foreign policy.
Let me make one other point regarding the perception of the United States abroad. Foreign countries and their citizens do not distinguish between U.S. military/diplomatic policy and U.S. trade policy. To them, they are the same thing. To them, it's just plain, old-fashioned U.S. foreign policy. When the United States imposes unilateral economic sanctions, when we fail to pass fast track negotiating authority, when we fail to renew IMF funding and when we threaten to withhold regular trading status with China, the prestige and authority of the United States in foreign affairs is greatly and permanently diminished.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I would like to speak to this amendment and express a contrary view to that expressed by my colleague who has just spoken. With all due respect to the Senator from Indiana, who has put a lot of work into this, and who has offered the amendment, and while agreeing with much of what is in the amendment and much of what he proposes to try to do, I have to object for two reasons to the consideration of the amendment at this time.
First of all, it is in reaction to--at least partially, although he has been at this for a long time, and understanding that we do need to make some changes--what has occurred with the sanctions placed on India and Pakistan. We just resolved the issue with India and Pakistan primarily because of the amendment we just passed, which eliminates the agricultural component, broadly defined, of the India/Pakistan sanctions. Therefore, to the extent that my colleague, Senator Roberts, was just speaking, and others who have talked about the impact on our farmers as a result of the imposition of those sanctions, we have solved that situation.
As a matter of fact, if you analyze the other sanctions imposed as a result of their nuclear tests, it gets down to a very narrow issue of some Eximbank loans or World Bank loans primarily and, therefore, I urge us not to rush into a consideration of this amendment on this particular appropriations bill because of the need to fix something that was not done with respect to India and Pakistan, when we have already begun to solve that problem.
Secondly, because of the fact that sanctions have not always worked as we have desired them, and because of the obvious deficiencies with the sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan, the majority leader has appointed a bipartisan task force, consisting of Members of both parties, with different backgrounds, to deal with this question. We had a meeting yesterday.
I am somewhat shocked that the Senator from Indiana would offer this amendment today, because yesterday he said that he wanted to preserve the option of proposing this amendment at some time in the future. But he seemed to agree with the majority opinion expressed there--in fact, all but one of the Members, in one way or another, expressed a view that a September 1 deadline was somewhat unrealistic in trying to deal with this problem. The Senator did preserve his option to offer an amendment at a future date, but I am shocked that it is offered today because the task force has not had an opportunity to review this matter in any depth.
Madam President, I would like to now discuss some of the things that we talked about yesterday, which I think will illustrate the fact that this amendment is prematurely offered at this time. Again, notwithstanding the fact that the goals behind it--to review broadly our sanctions policy and some of the specifics about it, and to be more careful about how we impose sanctions--are both worthwhile and, in many respects, something we can all agree on, one of the things we can't agree on is a definition of what a sanction is. There is a broad definition, according to the Senator from Indiana. I wonder whether we are really ready to apply the limitations and the
tests that are called for in this amendment to foreign aid reductions, because as I read the proposal, one of the sanctions would be a reduction or elimination of foreign aid.
U.S. aid is not an entitlement. We are going to make different decisions every year about how much foreign aid we may want to give to a country. Should that be subject to the limitations imposed in this amendment? How about export controls on sensitive U.S. technology?
We just came from a very highly classified briefing of a committee that was specially appointed to examine the missile threat to the United States. That report is, I must say, extraordinarily concerning, I am sure, to everybody who received it. On some of the countries that pose this threat to us, we have imposed stringent export controls with respect to sensitive technology going to those countries, which could assist them in the development of their ballistic missile technology programs. Are we going to impede the President's ability and Congress' ability to impose those kinds of limitations on the sensitive export of technology to countries that we don't want to have that technology? As I read the amendment of the Senator from Indiana, that is all covered.
We need to have a common definition of what a sanction is in order to apply these kinds of limitations. And there should not be a 45- or 60-day--I think it is now reduced to 45 days--waiting period. There are all kinds of things that would cause either the President or Congress to want to impose sanctions right away and not wait 45 days.
Mr. McCONNELL. Would the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. KYL. I am happy to yield.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I am not sure I ought not to propound this question to the Senator from Indiana.
It is my understanding that this morning the President announced sanctions and trade reductions, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, against certain Russian companies. Is it the understanding of the Senator from Arizona that that is the kind of sanction that might not be allowed under the Lugar amendment?
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I will give the Senator my understanding of it, but I would be pleased, also, to refer that question to the Senator from Indiana. As I read it, that kind of sanction would, of course, be controlled by the 45-day limit, and the rules of the Senate that would apply, and so on. I think the Senator from Indiana should defend his own proposal.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator.
Mr. McCONNELL. Then I pose the question to him.
Mr. LUGAR. Clearly, the President, in the case of an emergency, has a right to impose whatever sanction he wants. There is no prohibition. Obviously, when national security is involved--and the national security situation is explicitly mentioned--I think that is important. But I ask the President to tidy things up. In other words, after imposing the sanction, he should state, if he has not already, the objectives and benchmarks and the cost to the American people of jobs and income. Some administration people have objected to the President playing by the same rules as the Congress. Nevertheless, the amendment is evenhanded. He has to fill it in. But he has emergency powers, of course.
Mr. McCONNELL. So, if I can follow up with the Senator from Indiana, is that the 614 national security waiver? Does that sort of override everything? Is that some sort of override?
Mr. LUGAR. If that is the correct text of the national security waiver, yes.
Mr. KYL. We will get back to that because I am not sure--if that is the intent of the Senator, I will have to see whether or not, in fact, it is effectuated.
Let me get to another national security issue. We have, I think, come to the conclusion--most of us, but not all in this body--that it would be a mistake to put an explicit time limit, for example, on our presence in Bosnia, or an explicit time limit on certain other kinds of military activities or threatening national security activities because, of course, what that does is enable the party against whom the action is being taken to simply ride it out and to understand if they can just get by the next 60 days or 6 months, then they will not have to worry about that. So we have always taken the position that when it comes to this kind of thing--national security--our actions should be somewhat open-ended to ensure that the other party begins acting in the way that we would like to have that party act.
Obviously, when you have a 2-year sunset on these kinds of sanctions, you eliminate that flexibility. I think that is one of the reasons why most of us have tended to want to support the kind of review and analysis about which the Senator from Indiana is talking. Clearly, that kind of thing should be done. But there should be a mechanism for the Congress and the President to, in effect, pull the plug on a sanction whose time has run rather than to have an arbitrary time limit for its imposition.
If the Senator from Indiana would like to respond, I am happy to yield.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, to answer the question posed, both the President and the Congress can reauthorize the action after two years. Additionally, they are constrained simply to explain how successful things have been and what their objectives were to begin with. But the law--at least my amendment--explicitly gives them the ability to reauthorize. They have to take that affirmative action.
Mr. KYL. If I could, Madam President, go to another point; that is, the failure to discriminate among or between different kinds of sanctions.
The amendment, as I read it, treats all sanctions alike. It does not differentiate between sanctions imposed for the transfer of nuclear technology, for example, or the exploding of nuclear devices in violation of treaties, and sanctions imposed for less dangerous activities, for example. In a sense, when one reads it, it appears to condone sanctions which have as their goal the promoting of trade but severely restricts sanctions for other purposes.
I understand that the Senators from farm States have been very concerned about limitations on exports of agricultural products.
As I say, I think we are all pleased to support the amendment which enables India and Pakistan to import American agricultural products. But I think we ought to examine this in a balanced way and understand that many of the sanctions are imposed for national security reasons. I think most of us understand that national security has to take a front seat to other considerations of a lesser degree of priority, if, in fact, it has gotten to the point that the country, either the President or the Congress, thinks it is in our national interest to impose sanctions. Yet, under the sweeping definition of a sanction here to mean literally `any restriction or condition on economic activity,' it appears there is no differentiation to account for the differences in reasons why we impose sanctions.
For example, as I said before, we may have a reason to sanction a particular country, or a particular kind of trade activity, because of the national security implications of that. With respect to China, for example, we require a special waiver for certain kinds of technology transfers, or the launching of satellites, just to cite one example. It seems to me that is an entirely different kind of sanction than the typical kind of trade sanction on imports or quotas that we might apply for some other reason.
I think it is very important for us to try to come to some agreement on a definition of just exactly what is a sanction before we begin applying across the board a set of rules that would automatically sunset sanctions after 2 years; that would require a 45-day time period before sanctions could be implemented; that would change the rules of the Congress, in effect, after first stating that it is our policy that these things should be done, and changing the rules of the Senate to ensure that policy is affected.
It seems to me that we have time to deal with this now since we have dealt with the immediate emergency. The leader has appointed a task force, and we have identified this as one of the things that we need to do in this task force so that we are clear about the differentiation between the different kinds of sanctions before we begin identifying what kind of limitations should be placed upon each of them, and, therefore, that consideration of this amendment at this time is premature notwithstanding the fact that many of the ideas in the Senator's amendment might well be the kinds of things that we would adopt for certain kinds of sanctions when we end up actually adopting legislation.
But, clearly, this is not something in which there is an easy one-size-fits-all solution. I fear that is what we are doing by trying to rush this matter.
I will be happy to yield the floor at this time. I will have other things to say, but I know the Senator from Kentucky, who chairs the task force, wants to speak to the issue as well.
Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, as a follow-on to my good friend from Arizona, let me say first I am a farm State Senator. I have been on the Agriculture Committee for 14 years. I am a supporter of GATT, NAFTA, fast track, and replenishment of the IMF, which we handle in our subcommittee of appropriations for foreign ops. So put me down as a free trader. Also, put me down as a principal sponsor of the amendment last week to lift the agricultural sanctions on India and Pakistan. We did sort of a partial job on that last week, and then, as the Senator from Arizona pointed out, sort of finished the job today.
Also, put me down as a great admirer of the chairman of the Agriculture Committee and his distinguished work over the years in foreign policy, and on trade matters as well.
The majority leader asked me to chair the task force on sanctions. The Democratic leader asked Senator Biden to do that. As the Senator from Arizona just pointed out, we have had an opportunity to only have one meeting. It was yesterday.
I say to my good friend from Indiana, by September I might well be supporting this bill. But I am, frankly, among those in the Senate--and I expect this is almost everyone in this body--who has not been exactly consistent on the subject of sanctions over the years. Having supported MFN to China, I have also advocated certain kinds of sanctions against Burma. My guess is that there is hardly anybody in this room who has been entirely consistent on this subject.
What the distinguished Senator from Indiana tried to do here is to enact a broad piece of legislation that may well be justified. But let me say I am just not yet comfortable in taking that step. Maybe by September I will be comforted that this is what we ought to do. But I want to echo the observations of the distinguished Senator from Arizona that I am just not sure we are ready, as a body, to wipe the slate clean.
Reading from Senator Lugar's bill, unless I am missing something here, it says, `Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not implement any new unilateral economic sanction under any provision of law with respect to a foreign country, or foreign entity, unless at least 45 days in advance of such implementation the President publishes notice in the Federal Register of his intent to implement such sanctions.'
It is my understanding that just today the President announced sanctions and trade restrictions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act against certain Russian countries. I am concerned, for example, whether under this bill the President could have taken that step. Maybe he should not have. Maybe that is the point of the bill.
But let me just say, Madam President, that I am queasy about taking such a broad, comprehensive step, even though it is only prospective, before we have even had a chance to work our way through it. I confess that many of us have not spent the amount of time the Senator from Indiana has already spent on it. He is undoubtedly one of the experts in the Senate on this subject.
But, since all of us are called upon to vote, let me appeal to those in the Senate who may not yet have the level of expertise on the sanctions issue that the distinguished chairman of the Agriculture Committee has, and ask the question, Are we ready to enact on this appropriations bill a broad, sweeping sanctions policy at this time?
Let me repeat. The Senator from Indiana may be entirely correct that this is the way to go. But I will suggest to the Senate that we give this a little more time and think it through a little further. I am not sure the work of the task force, on which many of us serve, including the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Arizona, is going to shed a whole lot of light on this. But we are going to try. We are going to try to shed some light on it by having a hearing on July 30. We are going to try very hard to meet the majority leader's deadline of having at least a report by September 1. That may or may not enlighten a whole lot of Members of the Senate.
But for those of us who have not spent as much time on this as the distinguished Senator from Indiana maybe, that report will be helpful to us. Maybe we will get a chance, as the Senator from Arizona pointed out, to kind of start out with what a sanction is. I am not even sure I know, frankly, at this point exactly what is and what isn't a sanction. Is a restriction in a foreign aid bill a sanction? Do we make a distinction between transfers of military significance? I think most Senators would argue that you should make that kind of distinction on things like agricultural products, food and medicine, and the like.
So I commend the Senator from Indiana for a very important piece of legislation and just suggest that maybe this isn't the best time for most of us to be going forward on this, and I hope we can shed some light through the task force over the next few weeks on this whole subject.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
I rise to join with my colleagues from Arizona and Kentucky, who have just spoken, with a certain sense of reluctance about opposing the amendment of the Senator from Indiana because of the respect I have for him, because of the thoughtful way in which he goes about matters generally and particularly matters of foreign policy. But to echo what has just been said, this is a very complicated and controversial subject, an important exercise of one of the major options that the United States has in carrying out its foreign policy.
The bipartisan Senate leadership has created a task force that has been referred to. As has been said, we only had an opportunity to hold our first meeting yesterday. So I think for us to act on this quite comprehensive piece of legislation, which will dramatically alter the landscape in which the United States, Congress, can impose economic sanctions, is a rush to judgment before we have had a chance to hear from all sides, as the task force will do--a public hearing is going to occur--to reason together and then to come up with a proposal.
As the Senator from Kentucky said, the end proposal may contain major parts of the amendment offered by the Senator from Indiana. But I think we would do much better and serve our national interest better if we worked this out over a period of time. There is no emergency now that I can think of, that I know of, that requires us to adopt this wholesale change in what has been a fundamental part of our foreign policy for a long time now, deriving, incidentally, from a constitutional premise of the ability, Congress' ability, to regulate commerce with other nations of the world.
So I think this is premature, though probably thoughtful. But I say `probably' because this is a detailed amendment which I, frankly, have not been able to absorb in the time it has been in the Chamber, to make a reasoned judgment, even if there was not a task force that had been appointed on this very subject.
I hear the Senator from Indiana; his intention is for its effect to be prospective, not to affect any sanctions that are in law now, and yet there are sections of this that begin `notwithstanding any other provision of law' and impose procedural requirements that make me wonder whether they would affect, for instance, the President's ability to impose sanctions in an emergency situation which, if we adopted this amendment, he might be limited from doing.
So there are questions. And I think we should step back, acknowledge that there is a chorus that has risen rather rapidly in the last period of months questioning the extent to which we have applied sanctions, the manner in which we have done it, and listen to that chorus but not rush to act in response to it before we have had a chance, each of us, to deliberate and do what is right.
Now, I want to offer one other set of thoughts here, Mr. President. Why is this so important? Well, let's all begin with the fact that most of us acknowledge, as the Senator from Kentucky said, we have not, most of us, been consistent in our votes on these matters. It is hard to be consistent in our votes on matters of sanctions, that they have been used too much. I think most of us in this Chamber would say that. That is why the leadership created the bipartisan task force, to begin to set some guidelines. But in all the criticism that we are heaping on ourselves, I think it is important not to lose sight of the value of sanctions. They are, roughly speaking, one of three options that a government has to protect its strategic interests and uphold its ideals--diplomatic, economic, and military.
If I may say so--and I know people sometimes say that we are foolish to do this, that it is self-defeating--we have to consider the impact some of the sanctions have had not just on farm States. I can tell you, some of the sanctions regimes have had an effect on manufacturing, high tech and industrial, from my State. And I am not reaching judgment on the net effect.
Let's just say a word for the fact that there is a part of our national character that, as Americans, is prepared to say we care so much about what is happening in another country, about the way that country is suppressing its people, or the threat that that country represents to our security because they are threatening their neighbors, who are our allies, or they are building missiles, that we are prepared, if our allies will not go along with us, to impose economic sanctions on them to affect their behavior. In an age when a lot of people question, well, all we care about is materialism, I am speaking respectfully of the impact of sanctions on people. This is in its way an expression of American idealism and principle and values. And while we may have overused it, we should not diminish its utility and its substance.
Finally, Mr. President, there is a very important question to ask: Have they worked? I think the record is mixed, but that is something I would like to have our task force study and, at least as one Member, learn more about. I don't know enough about it.
I know most people cite South Africa as a case where sanctions worked. Those were multilateral. More recently, sanctions we imposed on Colombia did work to alter the fundamental policy of the Government on an issue that matters to us. We have sanctions against Iraq and Libya. Well, I note that the heads of those regimes worked mightily in international diplomatic circles to get the sanctions off, so they must be having an effect on them. The same is true about the opposition of the Chinese to sanctions that we consider, and the Russians with regard to supplying components of missile parts to Iran.
I know that Senator Lugar is not speaking against sanctions generally, and I appreciate that, and I share that view with him. We share that view because we understand, I hope all of us, that sanctions have value and have had effect. We are using them too much, but I think it requires more thought than we have had the opportunity to give before we vote on this amendment to change the ground rules so dramatically. So I intend to vote against the amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will vote against tabling the Lugar amendment. It is a useful starting point in bringing some rationalization to our sanctions policy.
I have been in the Senate for over 25 years. Over that time, I have supported many sanctions laws, and even authored a few. But I am now re-examining my approach to sanctions policy. I do so not because I oppose sanctions--sanctions are an important part of our foreign policy arsenal.
But I believe we need to rethink our overall approach. Statutory sanctions, once imposed, are difficult to repeal, and they therefore do not provide the President the flexibility that I believe he needs to conduct foreign policy. As we all know, it is easier to block legislation than to pass it; accordingly, lifting a sanction to meet changed circumstances is difficult, and sometimes impossible. I believe, therefore, that we have to start building into our sanctions policy the necessary flexibility for the President to waive, modify, or terminate sanctions with the ability of the Congress to respond to his actions.
The Lugar bill is not perfect. It has a few provisions that I believe should be changed or modified. For example, I do not believe it is wise to provide, as the amendment does in Section 806(c), for a point of order against legislation in cases where the Senate has not received required reports from the Executive Branch. This provision would conceivably permit the President to prevent consideration of a bill simply by withholding the required report. In addition, I believe the bill should clearly exclude from the definition of `sanction' those measures taken to enforce criminal laws and those measures taken pursuant to the authority of the Federal Aviation Administration to ban foreign airlines from flying to the United States which do not satisfy our safety standards. Finally, I believe the contract sanctity provision is too broad, for two reasons. First, there may be cases where a multi-year option contract would render the sanction--at least as to that contract--a nullity. Second, there may be cases--a proliferation sanction comes to mind--where it may be in our national security interest to stop the flow of technology immediately.
Despite these concerns about the Lugar amendment, I will vote against the tabling motion. The bill is a good framework upon which we can begin to construct a more rational sanctions policy, and I believe the Senate should continue to consider it further on this bill. I did not offer amendments to perfect the amendment because it was obvious that it was not going to be adopted and if it was it could be perfected in conference. We will surely revisit this issue at which time I'll have more to say.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to share my views on the amendment of the Senator from Indiana which was voted upon earlier this evening. I agree with those of my colleagues who have argued that we have too many unilateral sanctions in place, many of them mandated by Congress, and that often these sanctions fail to achieve the stated foreign policy objectives while hurting American business and competitiveness. I support the overall objective of the amendment offered by the Senator from Indiana--to provide a rational framework for the imposition of sanctions by both the Congress and the President. However, some aspects of this legislation concern me, in particular the broad definition of the term `unilateral economic sanction' and the extensive process which is to be exhausted before sanctions are imposed.
I have always believed that sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral not unilateral, but I also recognize that there may be circumstances in which we need the option of imposing sanctions unilaterally, for example to send a message of disapproval of a given regime as we did with respect to the military junta in Burma, or to respond to a horrific event such as the use of force against those protesting for democracy in Tiananmen Square in 1989. I recognize that the legislation of the Senator from Indiana does not prevent us from imposing sanctions in these cases but I fear that the process in the bill would make it more difficult to do so expeditiously. In light of these concerns and the fact that the Senate Task Force on Sanctions, of which I am a member, is trying to address the question of unilateral sanctions and is going to begin hearings later this month, I voted to table the amendment of the Senator from Indiana at this time. However, I believe there is much of worth in this legislation, and I would like to work with him and others who believe, as I do, that we must reign in the tendency to address every foreign policy problem with a sanction.
Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me just say, at the rate we are going, we should be able to finish this bill by Saturday night a week around midnight. We have 64 amendments left. We have spent about 2 1/2 hours on this one. A lot of the people on this side are going to the White House at 4:30, and I hoped we could get a vote on it before they had to depart. I am always reluctant to suggest to anybody they cut their remarks short, and I guess we have already missed the 4:30 deadline. I see two Senators who are just chomping to speak, so there is no point in asking for a time agreement at this point. But I just want to make the Members aware, and I know I am joined by my distinguished chairman in saying, we are going to have to do something to speed this process up or we are not going to get out before December 1.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I think the Senator from Arizona wants to propose a unanimous consent.
Mr. KYL. Yes. I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague from Alaska.
I ask unanimous consent that John Rood be admitted to the floor during the pendency of this amendment and other amendments on which he may desire to be present under my supervision.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I will try to be brief. I recognize the timeframe.
I think it is fair to recognize another thing though: That two-thirds of the world's population, or thereabouts, are under some type of sanctions or threatened sanction by the United States. I think the question we have to ask ourselves is, As we address the justification of sanctions, are we really helping the people we want to help?
I commend the Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar, for bringing this matter up, because we can continue to debate it, we can continue to evaluate it, but the reality is, it is time to address the effectiveness of these sanctions. And, as a consequence, I rise to support the amendment of the Senator from Indiana on sanctions.
I think he is offering the amendment for one reason, which is because sanctions are now a popular choice to promote our agenda and, of course, legitimately protect our national interests. There is nothing wrong with this reasoning except many times sanctions simply do not work in the manner that we have intended. They are one tool that we can use against rogue nations--granted. The question is, How effective are sanctions? In what cases should they be used? Unfortunately, as I have indicated, the tool of choice is sanctions. Some suggest it is a hammer for brain surgery.
In any event, it is time to take stock in whether this amendment by the Senator from Indiana passes now or later. I think it is fair to say we should take up this matter and resolve it and examine, if you will, the posture of our policies.
Let me conclude with one reference that is in the amendment of the Senator from Indiana; that is, he sets guidelines before imposing sanctions. That is important, in his amendment. The amendment will require a check and balance. It will require information on the goals of the sanctions, the economic costs to the United States, the effect on achieving other foreign policy goals, and whether other policy options have been explored. It is kind of a cost-benefit risk analysis. I wish we could apply it to some of our environmental measures. That is what we are proposing here, and that is why I support the amendment of the Senator from Indiana.
This amendment will require careful thought before imposing sanctions. It does not prohibit sanctions. Dozens of sanctions are now pending before Congress. Sanctions, because they are the easy way out, have become a knee jerk reaction.
Between 1914 and 1990 we imposed unilateral sanctions 116 times. Between 1993 and 1996 alone we imposed unilateral sanctions 61 times on 35 nations. In 1995 alone, it is estimated that sanctions cost the United States $20 billion in exports.
The President has declared a national emergency 16 times during his term. In the case of Burma, the President invoked unilateral powers reserved to `deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat.'
Is Burma an `unusual and extraordinary threat' to the national security of the United States? I will go out on a limb and say perhaps no.
But that is the problem. The choice to use unilateral sanctions is easy. It is a choice made for the short term to appease special interest groups. No thought is given to the chances of success or possible alternatives.
Will unilateral sanctions work in Burma--probably not! Will they hurt the people we are trying to help--definitely so!
We must look to the long term.
I think a perfect example of this is Vietnam. Restoration of diplomatic relations and the lifting of the trade embargo on U.S. exports led to progress on the MIA issue and greater economic freedoms in Vietnam.
The old saying that a rising tide lifts all boats is true.
When we decide on appropriate action to take against rogue countries, we must make decisions based on what are the most persuasive actions rather than the easy way out.
I do not condone the policies of Iran, or Libya, or North Korea. All these countries clearly pursue policies contrary to our national interests.
But I believe it has come to the point where U.S. unilateral sanctions run the risk of being completely counterproductive because they get in the way of more effective multilateral steps that could be pursued.
Unilateral sanctions should be a tool of last resort and only used after careful thought about the consequences, the costs, and the chances of success. I urge my colleagues to support Senator Lugar. Implementing sanctions should not be based on emotion but on a rational process. This is what this amendment does.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I will also keep my statement very short.
Mr. President, I also strongly support Senator Lugar's amendment to include the Enhancement of Trade, Security and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act to the agriculture appropriations. Consistent with our commitment yesterday to help American farmers, I believe this is the appropriate time to consider this important amendment that will help us think about the consequences of unilateral sanctions before they are imposed, either by the Congress or by the President.
As you have heard, this amendment does not prohibit the Congress or the administration from imposing Unilateral sanctions, but it forces us to think before we act. It is easy to look like we are combatting various problems such as human rights abuses, religious persecution, nuclear proliferation, child labor, etcetera, by imposing unilateral sanctions. But it is not so easy to determine the negative effect they will have. It is my opinion that unilateral sanctions do not work. They do not force countries to adopt our policies, or our standards. Therefore, they wind up doing nothing but hurting our American farmers and workers who lose export opportunities to the affected nations.
Senator Lugar's amendment, which I have also cosponsored in its bill form, establishes procedures by which we can analyze the impact of the sanctions--first, whether they----
Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?
Mr. GRAMS. Yes, sir.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to notify the Senate that at 6 o'clock I shall seek the floor to move to table the Lugar amendment. I think it is a vote that must be taken to see where the votes are on this amendment. If it is not tabled, then it will still be open to amendment, but hopefully we might be able to work something out to see in what shape we would agree to take the Lugar amendment to conference and have a vote on whatever the Senator wants. But I do expect to make a motion to table the Lugar amendment at 6 o'clock. I ask cloakrooms notify their respective sides of that.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. GRAMS. Just to briefly finish my statement today, I believe the Lugar amendment will help to establish procedures by which we can analyze the impact of these sanctions. That is first by whether they
will accomplish the intended purpose, and second, the impact they have on U.S. international competitiveness and other foreign policy goals.
This amendment is also flexible. The President can waive the provisions of this amendment in an emergency, and the amendment does not affect existing sanctions. It also does not apply to multilateral sanctions.
I urge my colleagues to take a look at this, to support this amendment which will help us determine whether a particular unilateral sanction will work or whether we should pursue the problem in another way. If unilateral sanctions are imposed, we need to ensure they will work and they are initiated only as a last resort, and only after multilateral sanctions are pursued.
Again, I thank Senator Lugar for his leadership on this important issue. For those of us concerned about the growing trend toward unilateral sanctions without analyzing whether they will work or how they will affect our farmers and workers, I think this is a no-brainer. This is an amendment that should have no opposition from this body.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am sure when my colleague just referred to a `no-brainer,' that no one would be in opposition to it, he wasn't suggesting there is not a logical, reasonable argument in opposition to the amendment, and I would like to again try to make that and urge my colleague, if he would like, to engage in any kind of colloquy he would like to clarify what I have to say, to at least assure him that there is a reasonable argument on the other side.
I want to begin by commending Senator Lugar for identifying many of the things which ought to be done with respect to the imposition of sanctions in his amendment. He has a lot of good material in this amendment. I know he has given it a lot of thought. I think, at the end of the day, we will be able to accept a lot of that.
Mr. President, I also believe there are some things that are not adequately thought out here. I would like to focus on a few of those. One of the things I am pleased with is a very broad definition of national emergency, which would permit the President to essentially waive the requirements of the legislation in the event of a national emergency, which is very, very broadly defined here. In one sense, that is good. But in another sense, all of the good that we are trying to achieve here could be easily undone, simply because the President decided to go forward and waive in the interests of national security. If the national security definition were a little tighter, then what we are seeking to accomplish here could probably be done, and the President would not be able to undo it easily through the invocation of a national emergency waiver.
So I want to begin this part of the debate by acknowledging that some of what the Senator from Indiana is seeking to do clearly is going to gain wide acceptance here. In some cases, we are not going to want to let the President easily get out from underneath these requirements, which the definition of national emergency, in my view, would allow him to do.
I also want to begin by making a point that one of my colleagues made, and that is to establish bona fides with respect to this. I have been getting a lot of calls from commercial associations seeking support for this, in the name of free trade. I have always supported fast track and do to this day, and I hope we will take fast track up again this year and pass it. I have supported GATT. I have supported NAFTA. I will proudly call myself a free trader, too. So my comments are not made from the perspective of someone who has not supported trade. In terms of business support, I certainly provided that.
But we also have a national security obligation as Members of the Senate, and what I do not see adequately addressed in this amendment is the careful balancing between support for economic considerations on the one hand, and national security on the other. Those interests have to be very carefully calibrated. I think, with some additional work on the amendment of the Senator, we might be able to help achieve that calibration, but not if we have to vote on that today.
Third, I mentioned the definitions problems, and I would like to get into that in detail now. I would like to read from the amendment of the Senator, the very first definition of what we are talking about when we talk about a unilateral economic sanction. Here is the definition. I am quoting:
The term `unilateral economic sanction' means any prohibition, restriction or condition on economic activity, including economic assistance, with respect to a foreign country or foreign entity. . .
Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
That means foreign aid, for example. So before we do a foreign aid bill here, are we going to have to go through the requirements of this legislation? Before we reduce a country's foreign aid, is the President going to have to give the Federal Register notice for 45 days? Is the Congress going to have to wait for 45 days before we can reduce that aid? Is that reduction going to be in force only 2 years and then we would have to revisit it? Something as simple as foreign aid--we raise and lower a country's foreign aid every year for lots of different reasons.
We may apply a little more money to the foreign aid budget and be able to increase aid, or we may reduce it and have to increase aid. It has nothing to do with whether we are trying to sanction somebody or punish somebody or prohibit trade. Yet, that would be implicated because of the breadth of the definition of `economic sanction' contained in the legislation.
What about some of the other actions that we may take? I mentioned before export controls on sensitive U.S. technology. I think it is absolutely incredible that restrictions of U.S. trade, technical assistance, or any other way in which the United States would provide assistance to another country with respect to sensitive matters would be deemed subject to the requirements of this legislation.
This legislation may well be appropriate for the kind of sanctions that we would apply against a country that doesn't agree with us on a particular human rights policy, for example, or something of that sort or perhaps with whom we have a trade dispute. But it certainly should not apply to the limitations that this country imposes upon U.S. businesses wanting to transfer technology to another country. There are good and sufficient reasons we have an entire regime of export controls in place.
To show just exactly how far this legislation goes--and I think this is critical before Senators vote in favor of this amendment--they had better understand the following: We have just had exposed a tremendous technology transfer to the country of China that occurred because a couple of U.S. companies may--may; they are under investigation for it--allegedly have violated U.S. law with respect to technology transfer.
When a missile blew up and destroyed a satellite, information was provided to the country of China. That may have been in violation of U.S. law. It may well have compromised our national security. Yet, the kind of things that we impose upon companies that are going to do business with a country like China to limit the transfer of that highly sensitive technology would be implicated because of the breadth of the definition of this legislation.
Would we be able to limit the kind of technology transfer that has gone on to China that we are trying to stem?
Would we be able to require defense monitors to accompany this equipment?
Would we be able to preclude reports being issued to the Chinese Government on what went wrong with a particular launch?
Would we be able to require an export license for the kind of satellites being exported here or the kind of technology that is being transferred in aid of the launch of U.S. satellites to make sure the rockets themselves don't blow up?
Would we be precluded from putting those kind of technology transfers on a munitions list?
Would we be precluded from requiring reviews by the Justice Department?
This morning I talked with the Attorney General in a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and I said, `Even though you had this matter under direct investigation, pending investigation, and Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser, was advised that it could significantly adversely impact the judicial process of the prosecution of people who would be indicted for having possibly violated the law, for the President to grant a subsequent waiver, notwithstanding that the President granted the waiver,' and I asked the Attorney General, `did you object to that in any formal way?'
She said, `No, there is nothing in the law today that permits or requires that, and there is not even any procedure for that.'
I said, `Do you think there should be?'
Her answer was, `We are working right now on recommendations that would get the Justice Department into the loop here.'
What I am saying, Mr. President, is that with regard to the transfer of highly sensitive technology that could jeopardize the national security of the United States, we do impose limitations, and as I read the definition of `unilateral economic sanction,' many of the kind of activities in which we engage here would be implicated by this definition.
I know, or at least I firmly believe, that the Senator from Indiana would not want to jeopardize our national security and that it would not be his intention to have that kind of technology transfer limited, or the limitations on that kind of technology transfer limited by his amendment. Yet, as I read his amendment, that is exactly what occurs, because, again, the definition is:
Any prohibition, restriction or condition on economic activity.
Clearly, all of the things that we imposed on Loral and on Hughes are restrictions and conditions on their economic activity with China, and for a good reason: to prevent the transfer of technology that we think might harm our national security.
Are we saying today, are we willing to vote for an amendment that essentially says, with respect to that kind of
condition, we are going to treat that as a sanction and we are going to put all kind of limitations on whether or not it can be done?
One of the answers is, `Well, there's a section in here that permits the President to waive any of this if there is a national security interest involved in that case.'
Mr. President, it seems to me that we simply ought to make an initial determination that there are certain kind of things that we do not deem to be economic unilateral sanctions and they ought to be excluded in the legislation in the first instance, because otherwise we are going to have an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure where thousands of things that this Government does, in either the executive or the legislative branch, from foreign aid decisions of the Congress to highly sensitive national security technology transfer limitations, are going to be deemed to be sanctions that have to go through the processes of review and delay and sunset, and so on, of this legislation, or else be exempted by a waiver that the President would then have to specifically invoke with respect to each one of those particular actions.
That doesn't make sense. That is why I say this one-size-fits-all kind of approach is not the right approach. The kind of things the Senator from Indiana should be dealing with are a fairly narrow range of economic activities and limitations on those activities that either the President or the Congress has imposed in the past but that don't have anything to do with foreign aid, that don't have anything to do with national security technical assistance limitations and the like.
That is the third point I want to make.
I should also note that there are other things that could be deemed conditions or restrictions on economic activity, like denials of visas, cuts in taxpayer-funded export credits such as from OPIC or Eximbank. Are those things implicated by this? I think clearly they are. Is that the intent of the Senator from Indiana? And, if so, how are we going to get around those with a national security waiver? There are some things that I don't think we want this to apply to for which the national security waiver isn't going to be available. There, again, the one-size-fits-all approach to this just isn't going to work.
I will conclude this third point by reiterating what I said before. One of the things the Senator from Indiana is trying to do here is to be sure, before we invoke sanctions, we think it through, we analyze the impact, and we have a set of standards by which to measure whether it is effective or not and we have a mechanism for ending the sanction that forces us to, in effect, focus on whether or not it has been effective and we want to continue it or not.
All of those are valid propositions. My guess is, before we are done with this, that kind of approach will be adopted by the Senate. I am not arguing against those things, but what I am doing is reiterating the argument of the Senator from Connecticut, the Senator from Kentucky, and expanding on a point that I made earlier, and that is that just as we are getting into this issue with the first meeting of the sanctions task force--a bipartisan task force--yesterday to identify exactly what we want to cover by the kind of reforms and others that the Senator from Indiana is proposing, just as we are beginning this process, we have placed on the desk an amendment that is going to do it all and do it with a definition that is so broad that it would cover virtually any condition or limitation on economic activity. That is not, I think, what the sanctions task force views as the proper approach.
I urge my colleagues to slow this process down just a little bit. We don't have to have this amendment on this appropriations bill today. I am sure that if the Senator from Indiana will work with us, if there is deemed to be a necessity to put something in place fairly soon, and certainly before the end of this legislative year, we can come up with a good set of criteria, such as those the Senator has in his bill, for imposing sanctions--a good review process, some mechanisms for revisiting the sanctions after a point in time to ensure we still want them in place. All of those things that Senator Lugar's amendment goes to I think we can include in a piece of legislation.
But I also think we are going to want to take a look at these definitions carefully and modify them to some extent so in one case it does not go too far and embrace just too many things, and in another case it perhaps does not go far enough.
Finally, I will close with this point, Mr. President. Sanctions--and because of the breadth of the definition of sanctions here, I think we are literally talking about any kind of action the United States might take--can be in response to all kinds of different things.
We have the Jackson-Vanik sanctions that were imposed upon the Soviet Union when it would not allow the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. We have sanctions that were imposed on South Africa to try to change that country's behavior. We have sanctions that were imposed upon the Soviet Union after it invaded Afghanistan. We have sanctions in aid of various treaties or agreements that are hard to enforce unless you can impose some kind of sanction. The NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty, and other kinds of treaties that we have signed, some bilateral, some multilateral, have to provide some kind of enforcement.
As Senator Lieberman pointed out, you do not want to have to turn to the military option right off. So all you have are economic or diplomatic activities. Now, diplomatic activities sometimes work; sometimes they do not. They more frequently work if you have some other kind of hammer behind it, like a military or economic card to play. What it boils down to is that an economic limitation can sometimes be very important. But I do not think we ought to blame sanctions necessarily when things do not go right.
The best example of a failed policy is one which we have all dealt with here very recently, and that is the automatic sanctions that were imposed upon India and Pakistan--for doing what?--for nuclear testing.
Mr. President, I submit that the problem here is not sanctions per se. The problem is that the policy that was put in place was a failed policy to begin with, and to attach sanctions as the only way to respond to that was simply wrong. Congress was in error for doing that. We are now rushing to correct that error. But we are doing it in the wrong way.
Let us understand that the problem with the sanctions on India and Pakistan go back to the fact that as a nation we should have recognized that, just like China, Russia, and France, these nations are going to do what they think is in their best national interest, which may include testing nuclear weapons, and that they are going to do that irrespective of world opinion or economic sanctions. Their own internal country opinion was more important to them.
In both cases, they were willing to suffer the consequences economically that might result from sanctions being imposed. In fact, I think in both countries there was a certain sense of pride that they did this and that they could stand up to the rest of the world. So for us to have had to impose economic sanctions was folly. It was never going to work. These countries were going to do what they felt was in their best interest, and we were not going to be able to stop them with economic sanctions.
All we did was hurt a couple of countries that have been friendly to the United States--in the case of Pakistan, a country that is really hurting economically. And the last thing I think we really wanted to do is hurt the people of Pakistan with these sanctions; nor did we want to hurt our own country's agricultural interests. The problem was not sanctions per se. The problem was in ever thinking that we could, by the use of something like sanctions, prevent them from doing what inevitably they were going to do.
Let us not blame sanctions; let us blame a failed policy embraced by the U.S. Congress. Sanctions sometimes do work; and, as Senator McConnell said, sometimes they do not work. Our record has been inconsistent in this regard. I know that is one of the things that Senator Lugar is trying to address here. But that should animate our thinking here--not that sanctions are per se wrong and, therefore, they have to be used only in very, very limited situations, and so on, as some of the language in this amendment suggests. I agree with that as a general proposition.
We ought to be careful how we use sanctions because in some cases they are never going to be effective because the underlying policy is not a valid policy. But by the same token, in the interest of satisfying our commercial constituents, I do not think we should rush to judgment here and literally throw out the baby with the bathwater by making it very difficult to impose or retain sanctions in the future when, in point of fact, there are certain areas, like national security, for example, where we very definitely want to have conditions or limitations on economic activity--the definition in the bill--that have nothing to do with the ordinary understanding of sanctions.
For that reason, I urge my colleague from Indiana to withhold for a few days or a few hours or some point in time where we can sit down and try to rework the definitions and rework some of the other language so that we are not applying a
one-size-fits-all solution to what is, as Senator Lieberman pointed out, a very complex situation.
We were going to address this through the task force and take quite a bit of time to do it. If there is any reason to rush to judgment here, let us at least take enough time to narrow what we are doing and try to make it apply in a fairly restricted way to achieve whatever short-range objective we have here until we have time to think it through more thoroughly to impose a policy that would cover all of the different kinds of limitations that, as a country, we may wish to impose.
Mr. President, I urge that this amendment not be supported, that if a motion is made by Senator Stevens, that we support that motion, and that we not consider the amendment at this time. I certainly, as a member of the sanctions task force, will work with Senator Lugar to try to take many of the good ideas he has in this legislation and pull them into a bill I think all of us can support at the appropriate time.
Mr. BRYAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Nevada.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the parliamentary situation on the floor? The intention of the Senator from Nevada is to offer an amendment, of which I have alerted the manager. If there is a pending amendment, if I could be so advised, I will make the necessary request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a pending amendment to be laid aside.
Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair for his courtesy.
Mr. President, I see the chairman of the committee is rising. I would certainly yield to him.
Mr. LUGAR. I ask the Senator a question. If it is just a parliamentary procedure, I have no objection if it is a noncontroversial amendment, because I would like to help the bill proceed. But I want us to move toward the conclusion of the debate on my amendment.
Mr. BRYAN. Responding to the inquiry of my friend, the senior Senator from Indiana, I wish I could represent to the Senator that this was noncontroversial. In this Senator's judgment, it ought to be. But fairness requires me to say, this is an amendment which has been before the Senate on many occasions dealing with the Market Access Program. It is controversial. I was under the impression that we could lay the pending amendment aside and consider it, but if the chairman has a concern about that, it is not my purpose to interrupt the orderly flow of the processing of this appropriations bill.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, Senator Lugar desires to make further remarks in support of his amendment, and we hope the Chair will recognize him for that purpose. Any other Senators who want to speak on that amendment should do so now, because there is the plan that has previously been announced that Senator Stevens will move to table the Lugar amendment at 6 o'clock. We will have a vote on that motion to table. But if Senators have completed their remarks on the Lugar amendment, then we could set that amendment aside, if the 6 o'clock hour has not yet arrived, and have other amendments debated. That would be our hope.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, during this debate on the pending amendment, three arguments have been made. I want to respond to them briefly. One came about through Senators suggesting that the President of the United States, who just today proposed sanctions on certain firms in Russia and pertaining to Iranian missile transfers, would not have had the ability to impose those sanctions if the amendment that we are debating had been the law of the land.
Later, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, after a careful reading of the legislation, noted that on page 30 of the amendment--this is the language: `The President may waive any of the requirements of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)'--and so forth--in the event that the President determines there exists a national emergency that requires the exercise of the waiver.
I made that point in an earlier presentation, but I simply wanted to reiterate there are emergency situations regarding the national security of this country. The President must have the ability to act. Our legislation expressly gives him that waiver ability.
Then the distinguished Senator from Arizona raised the question as to whether, in fact, that waiver might be too broad. Perhaps. But, you cannot have it both ways. If on one hand you argue that the President of the United States is constricted in terms of what he may do, but then you find out he has full ability to do it, I suppose you could then argue that you do not want to have full ability at that point.
Let me just offer a moment of reassurance. On the same page 30 of the amendment, there is a section setting up a Sanctions Review Committee in the executive branch. It reads:
There is established within the executive branch of Government an inter-agency committee, which shall be known as the Sanctions Review Committee, which shall have the responsibility of coordinating United States policy regarding unilateral economic sanctions and of providing appropriate recommendations to the President prior to any decision regarding the implementation of a unilateral economic sanction.
Now, that committee is composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, the U.S. Trade Representative, and so forth.
The point being that the President of the United States should be well advised before he decides on a unilateral waiver for even national emergency purposes.
I suspect that this could be perfected further, but during the course of the debate on this legislation I simply note that many Members--and this is understandable--say this is very complex matter and we need more time to walk around it, try to think through the national security implications, the ability of the players to deal with this successfully.
I point out, respectfully, that my original legislation on which this is based was introduced last October. This has been widely discussed in this city for many months. It is supported by 37 Senators explicitly who have thought through all the implications of this and have studied it at some length.
Finally, Mr. President, I respond to the argument that the India and Pakistan incidents are the reason we are discussing this. As I recall, the distinguished Senator from Arizona pointed out we have resolved some of those problems and, therefore, it may be premature to move on to other problems. But, in fact, India and Pakistan had not gone through their nuclear testing regimes last October.
The problem that has to come back to this body is that of the American farmers--the gist of the overall agriculture appropriation bill--need some hope that this body understands the effect of economic sanctions on agriculture. The USA*Engage group, composed of some 675 businesses, including the American Farm Bureau, have strongly encouraged this body to understand the problems faced by American business.
I think the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Senator Hagel, stated it well: American business is not a special interest. It is not a nefarious group of people with whom we should have no contact as we talk about national security or economic security. American business and American farmers provide the money that gives us the ability to provide security to this Nation. These are the people who actually are out there working and providing jobs. They are saying to us: You folks with all of your sanctions are creating unemployment for 200,000 Americans. That number of people are losing their jobs because of what is occurring in the sanctions regime.
Of course, we have to be considerate of each and every aspect of making certain that national security is not compromised. It would be a stretch to think of many of these sanctions that have had a substantial national security implication to begin with.
I suspect, finally, there has to be a balancing of interests in our country. Even as we are deeply concerned about democratic procedures in other countries, about religious procedures in other countries, about economic procedures in other countries, we ought to weigh and we ought to have a procedure in which we say we are going to impose a sanction on some country and take the time to state why, and then take time to say, `What would be considered a success? How would we know we have victory? What are the benchmarks of our success?' At least once a year, we should think about what the sanction did. Did it make any difference? Did it make a difference in American jobs and income that was totally disproportionate to whatever the impact might have been, in the target country?
Now, that is what my amendment calls for--however you weave the argument around it, the need to state the purpose of what we are doing, the benchmarks of success, to examine periodically whether we have hit the mark even remotely, and, in any event, to estimate the cost of sanctions to Americans. It really is time to think about Americans, people in this country, farmers, producers, even as we are spinning wheels of economic sanctions for whatever economic purpose we might think of.
From the beginning--and I think everyone has heard this clearly--we are talking about sanctions in the future, prospective sanctions. I hope Senators understand that. But that is the case.
Secondly, we are talking about unilateral sanctions which we do ourselves that hurt us, that have no cooperation from others, with every other country grabbing our markets, entering in to eat our lunch. We have prescribed any number of ways in which people in this Congress and the administration have to think about it, and at the same time giving the President, as our Commander in Chief, the ability in terms of our security, to act if he must.
Finally, we have said after 2 years the sanction comes to an end unless the Congress reauthorizes it. That is, take some more time to think about what has occurred, what the implications and the costs for Americans have been.
I am hopeful this amendment will not be tabled. I regret that the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee feels he must do that at 6 o'clock, but I understand the expeditious procedure of this bill, and it is an important bill, has to go on. I hope Senators will vote against tabling the amendment when that time comes, about an hour from now, because I think that a vote against tabling sends a signal of hope to American farmers that we care, and we had better send that signal.
I hope Senators understand that we have a difficult situation in American agriculture, not because of the farm bill but because demand from Asia is down and demand from other countries will be coming down as their income is constricted. We will need all of our weapons of trade in order to meet that, and the same eventually will occur to other industries.
I stress agriculture today, Mr. President, because that is the first wave. That is where the first implications of economic downturn have come, with raw materials and food. But it will spread unless we are successful in adopting a new trade strategy that must surely include greater thoughtfulness about sanctions.
Therefore, I call for a new regime of thoughtfulness--not a prohibition of sanctions, not a breach of international or national security, but a thoughtful approach, giving full latitude to the Commander in Chief and, hopefully, better latitude to us, to think through what we are doing and to do it more correctly and positively.
I conclude by saying, as I recall, the distinguished Senator from Arizona was asking a hypothetical situation whether as to whether the President could act or not, I think I have answered the question that he could have acted on today's sanction. But let's say that the President acts, or the Congress acts; how do we know in advance that this is going to have any particular effect? The answer is that we don't. As a matter of fact, in most cases, the effect has been dismal, inappropriate, and costly to the United States and to our citizens.
So I say that the President of the United States has the full ability to act, but whether he will act appropriately is another question. And that is why even the President is asked to consult with his Cabinet, and why we are asked to consult with each other--in the hope that if we do adopt a sanction, it will do some good, that it will have some wisdom behind it, some rationale and some procedure that the American people can follow. I submit, Mr. President, that many of the sanctions we have adopted have not had that wisdom, that procedure, and they have not had a very good effect.
It is for this reason that I ask the support of Senators for this amendment and the support, particularly, on the vote to table. I am hopeful that that tabling motion will not be adopted when that moment comes.
Mr. President, I thank all Senators for allowing us to have this full debate. I appreciate that there are many other issues that should come before the body.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the premise of the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from Indiana is that--as President Clinton recently put it--the United States has gone `sanctions happy.' We've all heard the statistics, repeated without question by the media, that the United States has enacted sanctions 61 times in just 4 years, thereby placing 42% of the world's population under the oppressive yoke of U.S. sanctions.
Well, it just ain't so.
I've examined these so-called statistics. And I've found that they are fabricated. The `61-sanctions' figure, which came from a study by the National Association of Manufacturers, and circulate widely by an anti-sanctions business coalition calling itself `USA Engage.'
The NAM claims that, over a 4 year period (1993 through 1996) `61 U.S. laws and executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes.' According to NAM, these sanctions have targeted 35 countries, over 2.3 billion people (42% of the world's population) and $790 billion--19% of the world's total--in export markets.
NAM lists a catalogue of 20 new laws passed by Congress and 41 Executive Branch actions for a total of 61 new sanctions in just 4 years.
The `61 sanctions' figure cries out for examination. I asked the Congressional Research Service to analyze the NAM claim. After examining the NAM study, CRS reported to me, `We could not defensibly subdivide or catagorize the entries in the (NAM) catalogue so that they add up to 61.'
How did NAM come up with this 61-sanctions claim? Here's how:
The National Association of Manufacturers includes as examples of `unilateral economic sanctions' every time the U.S. complied with U.N. Security Council sanctions--which are, by definition, multilateral sanctions;
The NAM used double-, triple- and quadruple-counts certain sanctions;
They included as a so-called `sanction' any executive branch or Congressional actions denying, limiting or even conditioning U.S. foreign aid. (Since when, I ask, did foreign aid become an entitlement?)
The NAM lists as sanctions instances where no sanctions were actually imposed, cases sanctions were actually lifted, and cases where sanctions were imposed briefly and then lifted.
The NAM piled into their `sanctions' list any decision to bar the sale of lethal military equipment to terrorist states, and various actions which affect just a single corporate entity or individuals--not countries.
Mr. President, this is not what most of us have in mind when we think of `sanctions.' We think of trade bans and embargoes on states--not seizing the assets of Colombian drug traffickers, blocking imports from a single factory in southern China which is using prison labor, or banning the sale of lethal equipment to states which arm and train terrorists.
The fact is, there is no credible way to argue that the U.S. has imposed 61 sanctions in just four years, or that anywhere near 42% of the world's population has been targeted by U.S. sanctions. In other words, there is no basis for the claim that we in Congress have gone `sanctions happy' or for the problem that the amendment offered by the Senator from Indiana proposes to fix.
But don't take my word for it. The staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations has prepared a document which analyzes the NAM study and exposes its failings. I now ask uninanimous consent that this analysis be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the analysis was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The NAM study charges that Congress enacted 20 new sanctions laws between 1993 and 1996. This is a deliberate falsehood.
In reality, three-quarters of this total (15) were denials, restrictions or conditions on U.S. foreign aid, included as part of normal Foreign Operations and Defense Appropriations legislation.
What were these so-called sanctions? One so-called sanction is a prohibition on aid to foreign governments that export lethal military equipment to countries supporting international terrorism. Another barred U.S. assistance for military or police training in Haiti to those involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations. Another placed conditions on assistance for the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Another prohibited Defense Department aid to any country designated as supporting international terrorism.
Another withheld foreign aid and directed U.S. to vote `no' on loans in international financial institutions for countries knowingly granting sanctuary to persons indicted by the international war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for the purpose of evading prosecution.
Are these the kinds of `objectionable' and `irresponsible' actions Congress needs to reign in? I think not. Indeed, of the 20 congressional actions listed by NAM, in reality only 5 can really be called `sanctions laws.' These are: The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (April 30, 1994); the LIBERTAD (Helms-Burton) Law (March 12, 1996); the Anti-Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (April 24, 1996); the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (August 5, 1996); and the Burma Sanctions (September 30, 1996--part of FY97 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act).
The fact is, Congress has passed a handful of carefully crafted, highly-targeted sanctions in recent years--most of which passed the Senate by comfortable margins.
And what about NAM's claim of 41 `Executive Actions' implementing sanctions in just four years? This list is also deceiving. Consider the following breakdown of the NAM list:
The NAM study double-, triple- and quadruple-counts the same sanctions over and over again on seven different occasions.
Cuba--Same Sanctions Counted 2 Times. (NAM counts the LIBERTAD (Helms-Burton) law as two separate sanctions, once on the date it was enacted by Congress (in Table I) and a second time when the President took measures to implement Title III of the act.)
Sudan--Same Sanctions Counted 5 Times. (NAM counts the imposition of sanctions on Sudan, and then each adjustment to existing sanctions policy as a separate new sanctions episode.)
The study counts U.S. compliance with multi-lateral U.N. Security Council sanctions as `unilateral economic sanctions' five times:
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Jan. 21, 1993 (NAM: `These restrictions were designed to help implement U.N. Security Council Resolutions 757, 787, 820, and 942.')
UNITA & Angola, September 26, 1993 (NAM: `Designed to help implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 864.')
Libya, December 3, 1993 (NAM: `President announces tightened economic sanctions against Libya in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 883.')
Haiti and Angola, April 4, 1994 (NAM: `The regulations are amended to add Haiti, as a result of the U.N. arms embargo against it, and to reflect the qualified embargo of Angola, also in line with U.N. multilateral sanctions.' (Sudan?)
Rwanda, May 26, 1994 (NAM: `Prohibition on sales of arms and related material to Rwanda. Designed to help implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 918)
The NAM study lists every single executive order or decision blocking the sale of lethal military items to a rogue states as a broad-based `sanction':
Zaire, April 29, 1993 (NAM: `Ban on the sale of defense items and services to Zaire.')
Nigeria, June 24, 1993 (NAM: `Steps taken in reaction to the military blocking a return to civilian government. . . . U.S. announces there will be a presumption of denial on all proposed sales of defense goods and services to Nigeria.'
China, May 26, 1994 (President announces support for MFN for China, but imposes ban on import of certain Chinese munitions and ammunition)
Nigeria, November 1994 (NAM: `U.S. bans the sale of military goods to Nigeria. In reaction to hanging of nine environmental activists, U.S. adds to sanctions already imposed . . . Besides ban on the military sales, the U.S. also extended a ban on visas for top Nigerian leaders.')
Nigeria, December 21, 1995 (NAM: `Suspension of all licences to export commercial defense articles or services to Nigeria.')
Sudan, March 25, 1996 (NAM: `Departments of State and Commerce announce new anti-terrorism export controls on Sudan. . . . They are nearly identical to the controls maintained on Iran for anti-terrorism purposes.'
Iran, Syria, Sudan, March 25, 1996 (NAM: `Departments of State and Commerce impose new export controls on explosive device detectors to Iran, Syria and Sudan.')
Afghanistan, June 27, 1996 (NAM: `U.S. announces policy to ban exports or imports of defense articles and services destined for or originating in Afghanistan.')
Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, December 29, 1993 (NAM: `This is a restructuring of existing export controls, and did not result in the imposition of new controls, except on Sudan.'
[Note: See multiple-counting of existing Sudan sanctions])
Executive Order, November 14, 1994 (NAM lists as a sanction an Executive Order which, in NAM's own words, `establishes some policies and bureaucratic responsibilities within the U.S. Government for dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It did not impose any specific new sanctions on any countries.')
China, February 28, 1996 (NAM: `Secretary of State asks Ex-Im Bank to postpone any financing for U.S. companies planning to export to China because of reports that China had shipped ring magnets to Pakistan and was otherwise supporting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Secretary makes a second request on April 24, 1996. Sanction lifted on May 10, 1996)
Taiwan, August 9, 1994 (Import restrictions imposed based on Taiwan's trade in tiger and rhinoceros products, lifted several months later)
None of us would consider seizing the assets of drug traffickers, or blocking imports from one company using in prison labor as a `sanction.' The NAM study does--seven times:
Haiti, June 4, 1993 (NAM: `limits on entry into U.S. and freezing of personal assets of specially-designated nationals who act for or on behalf of the Haitian military junta or make material contributions to that regime.')
China, June 16, 1993 (One entity affected: Qinghai Hide & Garment Factory. Reason: Use of slave labor)
China, August 24, 1993 (Two Chinese entities affected. Reason: Nuclear proliferation to Pakistan.)
Middle East, Jan. 23, 1995 (NAM: `President blocks assets of persons determined to have committed or present a significant risk of committing actions of violence that would disturb the Middle East Peace process, and he blocks transactions by U.S. persons with these foreign persons.')
Colombia, October 21, 1995 (NAM: `Executive Branch blocked property subject to jurisdiction of important foreign narcotics traffickers. Original list of four traffickers expanded to 80 entities and individuals on October 24, and more added in November 1995  and March 1996 .')
China, April 29, 1996 (One Chinese entity affected: Tianjin Malleable Iron Factory. Reason: Use of slave labor.)
North Korea, Iran, June 12, 1996 (NAM: `Sanctions imposed on three entities in Iran and North Korea that have engaged in missile proliferation activities.')
And, once again, NAM lists every restriction on foreign aid as a sanction, asserting in effect that foreign aid is an entitlement:
Guatemala, May 27, 1993 (NAM: `Suspension of U.S. aid programs to Guatemala, except for humanitarian assistance, and U.S. opposition in . . . international financial institutions for loans to Guatemala . . . [in] opposition to a military coup.'
Nigeria, April 1, 1994 (NAM: `President decertifies Nigeria for its inadequate anti-narcotics efforts,' making it ineligible for most U.S. foreign aid and most programs from Ex-Im Bank or OPIC.)
Gambia, August-October 1994 (NAM: `Cut off of all U.S. economic and military aid because of a military coup in July against the duly elected head of state . . . pending the return of democratic rule to Gambia.')
Afghanistan, February 28, 1995 (President decertifies Afghanistan for inadequate counter-narcotics efforts. Ineligible for most U.S. foreign aid, Ex-Im Bank or OPIC support, direct U.S. to vote `no' in international financial institutions)
Colombia, March 1, 1996 (NAM: `President Clinton decertifies Colombia for its inadequate anti-drug efforts,' making it ineligible for most foreign aid, Ex-Im Bank or OPIC support, and subject to U.S. opposition for loans in international financial institutions.)
NAM even lists a decision by the Ex-Im Bank not to issues a `letter of interest' in one case as a `sanction.'
China, May 30, 1996 (NAM: `Ex-Im Bank board of directors declined, because of environmental concerns, to issue letters of interest to three U.S. exporters.')
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the review of the NAM study makes clear, most of these actions were taken at the President's discretion, either by Executive Order or based a law where President had broad waiver authority.
If the Senate is going to have a debate over sanctions policy, we should do so on the basis of facts, not distortions presented by the anti-sanctions lobby. That is the reason that the Republican and Democratic leaderships have formed a bipartisan sanctions task force to examine the facts, and make recommendations.
Apparently, some in the business community would prefer for the Senate to act before the facts come out. We should not fall for such tactics.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if there are no other Senators wishing to speak on the Lugar amendment at this time, and I see none on the floor, I think we should proceed to set aside the Lugar amendment and turn to an amendment to be offered by the Senator from Nevada, Senator Bryan. It is my hope that we can complete debate on the amendment of the Senator from Nevada before the hour of 6 o'clock, and at 6 there would be a motion to table the Lugar amendment and a vote thereon. Then I will move to table the Bryan amendment and we will have a vote on that. That is the plan of action.
With that, and if there is no objection, I ask unanimous consent that the Lugar amendment be temporarily set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.