Mr. GLENN. Madam President, if we go back in history, we see that the development of weapons of war have become more and more hideous as time goes on.
One of the biggest steps forward in that direction--or steps downward, depending on how you look at it--was the development of nuclear weaponry near the end of World War II. I was involved in World War II and in the Korean war. I have been through combat. I know what it is like. When I came to the Senate, I could not imagine anything more horrible than the use of nuclear weaponry in future wars, if they ever came up. The horrors of conventional war are bad enough without imposing nuclear weaponry into that scenario.
My desire to do something in this area motivated much of my work here in the Senate, and I have taken a leading position on this issue through the years. Some of it has been very controversial. There have been various approaches to this issue. I want to discuss just a few of those today.
We have been hearing much talk in this body lately about the use and the value of sanctions, which is one of the tools we have applied to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries around the world. This tool has been applied in many other foreign policy contexts as well, and I am the first to agree with those who say that we may have gone too far in the application of some of these instruments of foreign policy--some of them. There have been successes and there have been failures. It has been a rather spotty record all the way through.
When you consider this whole issue, it seems to revolve mainly around two questions: First, in our international relationships, where do we use carrots and where do we use sticks, to put it in those terms. Where do we use enticements to people, to try and entice them into a certain behavior we would like to see, and where do we use sticks? Where do we threaten the punishments that they may consider ahead of time that might cause them not to go into certain areas of behavior we would like to see them avoid?
Second, what role should sanctions play as an expression of disapproval or punishment in cases where it is manifest that behavior will not be significantly altered as a result of the imposition of sanctions?
Now, the debate in Congress and in most of the think tanks around town and across the country has been most curious because they seem to want it both ways. They want sanctions in some areas and not in others, but not necessarily with regard to nonproliferation.
If we consider some other areas, for example, probably the most salient example of the failure of sanctions from every perspective is the drug war. Now, all of us are against drug use. We want to cut out drug use, whether by cutting the flow from abroad or at our borders or within our communities or whatever. We have those sanctions on, but no one in Congress is standing up to proclaim that sanctions against persons or countries which are contributing to the illegal use of drugs ought to be eliminated. We want to keep those sanctions on. Why? In part, because the drug war is politically popular. The war against drugs is politically popular, and its effect on commercial activity by American business is mixed. We have some businesses in this country actually flourishing because of the drug war--manufacturing of equipment used in surveillance, construction of jails, so on. So those people are not about to go to the National Association of Manufacturers or the Chamber of Commerce to complain about unilateral U.S. sanctions.
But the complaints about sanctions are now legion when sanctions are applied in other contexts, like the one I am addressing today--nonproliferation. This is not to say that the critics of congressionally mandated sanctions have no case. I agree with some of the points that they make. But there are extremists who take the position that sanctions are never effective and are therefore always inappropriate. There are also extremists who insist on taking a punitive approach to every vexing foreign policy problem. These folks never saw a sanction they didn't like, and any approach to an issue that doesn't take the hardest line is denounced as some sort of appeasement. I might add that quite often there are political points as much as public policy points trying to be made by some of the tacks that these people seem to take.
Well, as the author of numerous pieces of legislation on nuclear proliferation that have included both carrots and the sticks of sanctions as tools for achieving certain nonproliferation objectives, I have tried to forge a balanced approach to the proliferation problem. Most recently, my 1994 legislation, which has been referred to as the Glenn amendment, was used by President Clinton to impose a variety of economic sanctions against both India and Pakistan because of their recent nuclear tests. Those sanctions were tough. We didn't pull any punches with those sanctions. Those sanctions mandated that military sales and any aid programs had to stop. It said we would block credits and loan guarantees by U.S. Government agencies. We would oppose any loans or cooperation with those countries under sanction from the World Bank, or IMF, the so-called IFITs, International Financial Institution Transactions. We would also block credit from private banks, and we would prohibit the export of dual-use technology to those countries which might be used for military purposes.
Now, that is tough legislation. We didn't give a waiver authority at all. We had rather spotty experiences with Presidents in the past and we said we were going to make this tough; the President could delay the imposition of those sanctions for 30 session days if he wanted, but the President didn't have the authority to waive those sanctions, as is the case with some other legislation. That was done very intentionally. These sanctions now require congressional legislation in order to remove them.
Let's look at the history behind the 1994 legislation--I think it is important to know--in order to understand why this legislation took the form that it did. It is tied up with the history of the cold war and U.S. nonproliferation policy. We could go back to the days of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Most people realized since those days that we needed to prevent a nuclear holocaust by somehow, some way reducing nuclear weapons. Now, that has remained through the years a long-term objective. And through many of those years it was very disappointing to see the spread of nuclear weapons go on, or nations trying to gain nuclear weapons capabilities.
While nuclear reductions and ultimately nuclear disarmament remained our long-term objective, it would become even more difficult if more and more nations developed a nuclear weapons capability. And with that long-time objective in mind, we passed legislation over a period of more than 20 years trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, while at the same time holding out the hope for eventual weapons control.
In 1978, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which I coauthored, was enacted. It provided for carrots on nuclear cooperation for countries that adhered to certain nonproliferation principles, and it provided the stick of sanctions--cutoffs of nuclear cooperation for countries engaged in dangerous nuclear activities related to bomb making, including nuclear detonations. The Presidential waiver was provided within that legislation. A year earlier than that--in 1977--I authored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that provided for cutoffs of economic and military assistance to countries that received or exploded a nuclear device, or were engaged in--and this is important--either the import or export of dangerous nuclear technologies involving plutonium production and separation--either import or export, either way, whether the country was supplying the stuff or receiving it.
I provided a Presidential waiver in this case also. This legislation, along with the so-called Symington amendment on nuclear enrichment technology transfers, resulted in a cutoff of economic and military assistance for Pakistan in 1979. While the Glenn amendment could have been waived, the Presidential waiver attached to the Symington amendment was impossible to exercise; only congressional action could remove the Symington sanction. Then we came to Afghanistan. After the Afghanistan war erupted--which coincided almost very similar in time to the installation of a new administration--the Reagan administration decided they could not provide military assistance to the mujahedin in Afghanistan without lifting the ban on assistance to Pakistan. The reason was that the material had to flow to Afghanistan through Pakistan. We could hardly get them to transport material through the Pakistani border area and across their territory to Afghanistan if we had sanctions on against Pakistan. So there was a waiver.
The Administration went to Congress and asked for a repeal of the Symington amendment, but Congress wasn't willing to do that. We were unwilling to give the Pakistanis total relief from pressure to halt their evident nuclear weapons development program, so a compromise was struck. Congress agreed to a legislated 6-year waiver of the Symington sanctions, but at the same time passed an amendment that I offered to remove the ability of the President to waive a cutoff of economic and military assistance to any nonweapon state like Pakistan that explodes a nuclear device.
In effect, the line in the sand on sanctions had been pulled back. My purpose in removing the waiver was simple. I didn't know how long in fact the Afghanistan war would proceed. I believed that just as long as it went on, the Pakistanis would count on the Reagan administration not to put nonproliferation policy ahead of cold-war policy. My amendment did provide for a possible 30-session-day delay of sanctions by the President following a detonation, but no waiver without congressional action.
Now, turn over the calendar a little bit. In 1985, when it was clear that the Pakistanis were still going for the bomb--something we had known for a long time--which they consistently denied at all levels of their government, Congress moved the line in the sand a bit closer by passing the Pressler amendment, which also carried no Presidential waiver. It mandated a cutoff to Pakistan, unless the President certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. Note the wording: The President could not certify they did not possess a nuclear explosive device. It was under this amendment that Pakistan was cut off from economic and military assistance in 1990, after the Afghanistan war ended--and I should add about 3 years after the Pakistanis actually had made the bomb that we knew they were working on all that time.
But other international developments were going on all through this same period. In terms of world events at this point, we were witnessing the demise of the cold war and the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This brought new hope for really, truly, and finally at least gaining control of nuclear weaponry, after going through years upon years upon years of what we call MAD--mutually assured destruction--on both sides if anybody set off a nuclear weapon. Those were long years where we thought that nuclear nonproliferation was dead and wasn't something with which we really were going to succeed. But finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this brought new hope for really gaining control of nuclear weaponry.
In a comparatively short period of time there was real optimism that control over these weapons could be gained. I was one of those who changed my views on this completely during that time period, because I had been very pessimistic through the years. Even though I am the author of much legislation, as I just recounted, on this, I didn't feel that we were really gaining much in the world, and we were starting to move in place. And other nations were really trying to get nuclear weaponry. So we weren't really accomplishing much.
But all at once I began to feel very optimistic at this time, because at the end of the cold war and the agreement with the Soviet Union we saw missiles being taken out of silos; weapons being taken down; fissile material being taken out; the cores of nuclear weapons being taken out and used for other purposes, for stockpile, or whatever. But they were no longer in the weapons aimed at each other halfway around the world. Real progress was being made. I began to feel pretty good about this.
With U.S. leadership, we then worked to obtain progress on arms control and nonproliferation. Over a period of time we had 185 nations sign up under the nonproliferation treaty. Progress was being made on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, also, which currently has 149 signatories. If anyone had come to me and told me a few years ago that we would have that many signatories, that we would have 185 sign up under NPT and 149 for CTBT, I would have told them they were crazy to even contemplate such a thing. But that is what has happened. So things are moving in the right direction.
Indeed, so much progress was being made on the test ban treaty and so much progress had been made on computer simulation of nuclear weapon tests that it was unclear whether any further nuclear explosions would have to take place anywhere.
Back in the old days it was quite apparent that if a nation was going nuclear they didn't say they were a nuclear nation unless they had gone out and really tested a weapon. They couldn't just say their engineering was good, that they will rely on engineering and claim they were a nuclear state and that they knew the thing would go off. That wasn't the way it went. You had to take it out and test it. And if you didn't, you couldn't rely on nuclear weapons. What has happened with the supercomputer and supercomputer simulation is that the need for testing is no longer clear. The way it is now is we think probably you could have a nuclear weapons capability without doing any testing.
So the hope was at that point--the hope we had in 1994--that much tougher sanctions would put the final nail in the coffin for nuclear tests. There wouldn't be any nuclear testing if we could just make this a tough law. So although the circumstances in 1994 were much different than those of 1981, the Glenn amendment of 1981 was updated with tough sanctions. It became the Glenn amendment of 1994. I thought it was working. And it was working until just a few months ago. Unfortunately, the hope on which the amendment was based went down the drain when India's extreme Hindu Nationalist Party overrode what most of the world thought should have been more responsible behavior and set off a nuclear weapon. And Pakistan responded in kind with their demonstration also to make sure they were not left out of things, too.
So we are now faced with a situation which will test the mettle of our diplomacy in south Asia like few times in history, I guess we could probably say like never before. The sanctions that are being imposed because of the Indian and Pakistani tests will fall on both of them, and may help us--I hope it does--move the Indians and Pakistanis toward more responsible behavior in the aftermath of the tests.
We must admit that the sanctions did fail in their primary purpose, which was to prevent a test in the first place. But I look at this as a setback, not the end of our efforts. One could only speculate if this failure was due to the sanctions' unilateral nature or whether the Indians would have tested under any circumstance. This is not to say that unilateral sanctions are never to be imposed as nonproliferation threats. Quite the contrary. For example, the threat of such sanctions was helpful in the special cases of Taiwan and South Korea, when both of those countries were taking steps toward proliferative activity some years ago. We could also indicate that there were other nations that we thought were moving perhaps in that direction, too, and who ultimately gave up their programs--like Argentina and Brazil, and South Africa.
But anyway, to go back to Taiwan and South Korea, both of those countries were heavily dependent on the United States. So unilateral sanctions worked, and they worked well. I think our sanctions also worked for a while in maybe holding back some of Pakistan's advance in their nuclear weapons program, because we made it more difficult for other nations to cooperate with Pakistan as they were trying to achieve their nuclear weapons capability.
But in general I believe it has been increasingly clear that with the dramatic expansion of the world community--sources of information, sources of equipment, sources of trade around the world--I believe that sanctions become really effective only if they have multilateral support.
Let me repeat that because that is the basis of some of these things that I want to elaborate on just a little bit further. Sanctions become really effective only if they have multilateral support, whether through our allies or through the United Nations. Unilateral sanctions are not as effective as we would like to see them. That is the understatement of the day. And there are situations where the imposition or continuation of mandated unilateral sanctions may make a problem even worse.
So I have come to believe that except in very special circumstances, such as those we faced in 1981, sanctions legislation that give the President no role in their implementation or continuation should be avoided, and laws which have been constructed in such fashion should be amended. That is the reason I am here on the floor today.
In my 1994 legislation, the President has no role in the process of implementation or the continuation of sanctions. And the Congress, because of the tradition of no limit on Senate debate, can be hamstrung by a determined minority of Senators who wish to retain sanctions because of considerations that may have nothing to do with the original transgression. So we don't want to permit that to happen, either.
So, accordingly, on June 26, just before the recess, I introduced the Sanctions Implementation Procedures Act of 1998, which is labeled Senate bill 2258, which, if passed, will be applicable to all country sanctions laws that do not contain a Presidential waiver which the President may exercise on the grounds of protecting the national interest. I want to, in order to give the President more leeway, get multilateral support, which is what I would like to see happen either with our major allies or through the United Nations. This bill would give the President the option of delaying any imposition of congressionally mandated sanctions for a period not to exceed the combination of 45 calendar days, followed by 15 session days of Congress. The President, if he chooses to delay the sanctions, must provide a report to Congress no later than the end of the 45-day period in which he discusses the objectives of the sanctions, the extent of multilateral support for the sanctions, and the estimated costs and benefits, both tangible and intangible.
If in this report the President recommends that we don't go ahead with the sanctions--he recommends nonimplementation of the sanctions--then expedited procedures are triggered for 15 session days in both the Senate and the House of Representatives--both Houses of Congress--for the purpose of approving or disapproving the President's recommendation--in other words, expedited procedures which provide for no filibuster. We take it up in preference to other legislation. We give it priority. So it could not be delayed.
Equally important, if the sanctions go into effect--let's say that the Congress says, `OK. Yes. Mr. President, we think this should go into effect,' or if the President just chooses to put it into effect and says, `Yes, we do have multilateral support, and, yes, we do have enough support to make the sanctions really bite to make them meaningful'--if the sanctions go into effect, they remain so for two years and then this procedure is repeated on the sanctions' second anniversary, and each anniversary thereafter. In other words, there would be a time certain after every sanction in which the administration would have to consider the effectiveness of it, a report to the Congress, and Congress then would either take appropriate action as they saw fit at that time or we let the sanctions continue on for another year.
For sanctions already in effect at the time of enactment of this bill, this procedure is triggered at the next anniversary of the sanction if it has been in place for 2 years or more, or at the second anniversary for sanctions less than 2 years old.
So this proposed legislation is retrospective and prospective both. We are trying to set down rules here that would apply and make sense on how we will operate in the future with existing sanctions that are in there now and ones that might be applied in the future under current and future laws of our land.
Madam President, this bill does not give the President carte blanche to waive congressionally mandated sanctions, as some bills do, and does not allow a minority of the Senate to prevent sanctions from being lifted as is the case with some of our laws.
We have worked on this very hard, and I believe this bill provides a balance of responsibilities between the President and the Congress. We do not cut the President out of the equation. We do not cut the Congress out of the equation. We recognize our constitutional responsibilities at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. This would apply in the imposition and removal of sanctions, and I urge the support of my colleagues for this bill.
I know that a task force has been formed to look at some of the sanctions legislation, and I will be presenting this to that task force also for its consideration. There are several bills that will address this particular problem, but I think this bill really establishes a balance, and I hope I can rely on my colleagues for support when this subject comes to a vote.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). Without objection, it is so ordered.