THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
QUESTIONS FOR UNDER SECRETARY SLOCOMBE FROM SENATOR GLENN
QUESTIONS FOR GEN. GOODPASTER FROM SENATOR GLENN
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
UNDER SECRETARY SLOCOMBE
FROM SENATOR GLENN
Post-Cold War Challenges to Nuclear Deterrence
1. Russia's Defense Minister has warned recently that he may not be
able to ensure the safety and reliability of his nuclear arsenal--in
terms of U.S. policy responses that would likely enhance stability, is
this threat best addressed on the ground in Russia (e.g. via
Cooperative Threat Reduction) or on the ground in America (e.g. by
expanding the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, resuming U.S. nuclear
testing, developing a new generation of nuclear weapons, and deploying
immediately a national missile defense system)?
Answer: Defense Minister Rodionov's comments may have been
intended to encourage additional funding for the Russian
military. We believe that the Ministry of Defense continues to
exercise control over Russia's nuclear weapons and the Ministry
of Atomic Energy exercises tight control over the dismantled
nuclear weapons stockpile. Nevertheless, through the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, we are helping to
enhance the stability of the Russian nuclear arsenal by working
with Russia on assistance projects to improve the security,
control, and accounting of their nuclear weapons. For example,
CTR is providing assistance to improve security at nuclear-
weapon storage sites in Russia and to implement an automated
inventory control and management system that will enhance the
Russian MoD's capability to account for and track their nuclear
weapons. We are working with Russia on a number of projects
designed to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons and
weapons components while being stored or transported to
dismantlement facilities. These activities complement the
strategic deterrent that we have maintained and will continue
to maintain through START II and any further agreed reductions
in offensive strategic forces.
2. Your testimony disputes the existence of a class of countries
that two former Secretaries of Defense have termed ``undeterrable'';
you also testified that nuclear weapons can deter ``rogue states with
WMD programs''--(a) Are neighbors of such states thus justified in
seeking their own bombs? (b) Do only U.S. bombs deter?
Answer: (a) The fact that nations are, in principle, not
undeterrable does not, in itself, justify a nation seeking
nuclear weapons. As of 1 March 1997, 185 countries have signed
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which indicates that they
have concluded that possession of nuclear weapons does not
serve their security interests even given the existence of
other declared and undeclared nuclear powers. Multiple means
exist that preclude the need for a state to acquire nuclear
weapons, including being a party to the NPT and other non-
proliferation agreements, reliance on U.S. and alliance
security guarantees, and the like. Through participation in one
or more of these mechanisms, states bordering rogue states
don't need nuclear weapons to guarantee their security.
(b) No. But, as stated above, the fact that deterrence is
possible is not, in itself, a justification for a nation
seeking nuclear weapons.
3. How does your department contribute to U.S. efforts against WMD
proliferation by countries that are not ``rogue states'' and do you
regard such proliferation as destabilizing or inimical to U.S. security
Answer: DoD believes that in general further proliferation of
nuclear weapons is not in U.S. interests. Regarding South Asia,
for example, in a presentation to the Foreign Policy
Association earlier this year, former Secretary Perry stated,
``We believe that a strong defense relationship and increased
cooperation [with India and Pakistan] will allow us to better
pursue our common security interests, but, at the same time,
they will provide a better basis for working out the policy
differences which we have with each of those countries. . . .
we find India and Pakistan's position on nuclear proliferation
unpalatable. But to use this as a reason to disengage from the
region, or to avoid deepening our security ties with these
nations, could undermine efforts to cap their destructive
capability. It could even help push them into an unfettered
arms race. That would be disastrous. I believe that we can best
help to avoid the disastrous by building bridges of trust
between the United States and India and between the United
States and Pakistan.''
With that as our guidance, Department of Defense has
attempted to build bridges of trust through the strengthening
our bilateral defense relationships and increasing our
military-to-military cooperation within the established legal
4. How will arms reductions beyond START II and III likely affect
America's ability to maintain its nuclear umbrellas in Europe and East
Asia? Will these cuts affect the proliferation risk in those regions?
Answer: The arms reductions agreed to under START II will not
affect our ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent for
allies and friends in Europe and East Asia, nor will the
reductions that are likely under START III. By the same token,
these forces, along with our other military capabilities, will
continue to serve as a deterrent to proliferant threats against
5. Is it a current mission of U.S. nuclear forces to preempt, to
deter, or to respond to chemical weapons attacks on the United States
or its allies emanating from the Third World?
Answer: The mission of U.S. nuclear forces is to help deter
attacks on the United States, its allies or interests. Nuclear
weapons are part of our overall defense posture which is
designed, in its totality, to contribute to the deterrence of
any state threatening the United States or its allies including
with chemical weapons. However, nuclear forces are only one of
several options available. We have a broad range of
conventional offensive response options, as well as active and
passive defenses. As a long-standing policy, the U.S. does not
specify in advance what response we would make to CW use, a use
which would be in violation of the laws of armed conflict.
However, it is our policy that we would consider all options in
response to a CW/BW attack and that our response would be
absolutely overwhelming and devastating. Former Secretary Perry
added, ``in every situation I have seen so far, nuclear weapons
would not be required for response. That is, we could have a
devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we
would not forswear that possibility.''
6. Is it a current mission of U.S. nuclear forces to preempt, to
deter, or to respond to aggression against the United States or its
allies involving only the use of conventional weapons?
Answer: The mission of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter
attacks on the U.S., its allies and interests. In general, we
do not now foresee circumstances in which it would be in our
interest to use nuclear weapons in response to a purely
conventional attack. However, we would assess the situation in
light of the circumstances then prevailing.
7. Is America prepared to use the bomb against parties to the NPT
or treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, if such
countries attack the U.S. or its allies with chemical or biological
Answer: A 1978 Presidential declaration provided so-called
Negative Security Assurances (NSA) for NPT NNWS. This assurance
has been reaffirmed many times, including at the highest levels
of the U.S. government. It says: ``The United States reaffirms
that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapons States Parties to the NPT except in the case of an
invasion or an attack on the United States, its territories,
its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State
towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or
sustained by such a nonnuclear-weapon State in association or
alliance with a nuclear weapon-state.'' Additionally, the
Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and Treaty of Pelindaba
include a provision that each protocol party undertakes not use
or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against any
treaty party or against any dependent territories within the
zone. This provision would come into effect once all
ratification and entry-into-force steps had been taken. In
connection with the Treaty of Pelindaba the USG stated: ``. . .
we will not limit the options available to the United States in
response to an attack using weapons of mass destruction.'' See
also the answer to question 5.
8. A Brookings analyst has estimated that the minimum total
historical cost of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was at least $4 trillion
(in constant 1996 dollars)--(a) Was that a fair estimate? (b) For the
record, can you estimate the total costs (including the stockpile
stewardship, operations and maintenance, C\3\I, personnel, cleanup,
etc.) of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at the START I and START II force
levels from 1997-2010? (c) Assuming a ceiling of 2,000 weapons, can you
estimate the savings from moving to START III in the same period?
Answer: The Brookings analysis consolidated government-wide
data in Fall 1995, including the estimated expenditures of the
DoD, DoE, International Atomic Energy Agency, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
Justice Department, and a host of other government activities.
The Brookings analysis only looks at historic data, l950s to
FY95. Reporting future expenditures, as you have requested, is
more difficult because we cannot predict the force structure
out to 2010. However, I can speak to some DoD estimates that
were developed as part of our START I and START II assessments.
If we maintain the START II force structure though FY2010, the
DoD cost (force structure, operations and maintenance,
personnel) is $7-$8 billion per year. To decide to maintain
START I forces out to FY2010 would cost an estimated $10-$12
billion more over the FY1997-FY2010 period (the cost per year
varies from a few million to over a billion dollars).
Additionally, we understand that DOE plans to spend
approximately $4 billion per year over the next 10 years on
stockpile stewardship. As for START III, there is no decision
on the force structure, but it would be reasonable to assume
that the budget per year would be somewhat less than that of
START II depending on the force structure.
Future of Nuclear Deterrence in the Third World
1. Former CIA directors James Woolsey and John Deutch have each
testified that they could not think of an example where the
introduction of nuclear weapons into a region has enhanced that
region's security or benefited the security interests of the United
States--do you agree?
Answer: It is not clear what is the context of the statements
cited in the question. However, the statement is accurate in
regard to those regional powers that are the focus of our
current nonproliferation concerns.
2. Are new regional balances of nuclear terror in the Third World
likely to be stable or to make war less likely, and if not, how exactly
will they affect U.S. security interests? Will the emergence of such
deterrence relationships have any effect on U.S. nuclear targeting
Answer: The United States considers further proliferation of
nuclear weapons to be destabilizing and inimical to U.S.
interests, particularly in regions of tension, because it is
destabilizing and raises the prospect that a regional conflict
could result in the use of nuclear weapons. We, of course, have
to take the nuclear capability of any proliferator potentially
hostile to U.S. interests into account in our own planning.
3. What is the role of U.S. nuclear weapons (both strategic and
non-strategic) in current U.S. ``counterproliferation'' policy? What is
the official military mission of the nuclear-armed Tomahawk?
Answer: The goal of the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative is to ensure that our forces are prepared to protect
themselves and to fight effectively on an NBC-contaminated
battlefield. We can accomplish this by equipping our forces
with active and passive defenses, counterforce capabilities,
and the supporting command, control, communications and
intelligence systems. Military preparations for operations in
an NBC environment make clear that threats of use or actual use
of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying
its military power to protect its vital interests. In addition,
effective capabilities to counter proliferation devalue the
potential political and military benefits of NBC weapons and
thus have a deterring effect on the acquisition and use of such
weapons by rogue states. In addition to these conventional
capabilities, U.S. nuclear forces also provide a significant
deterrent to proliferators to even contemplate the use of NBC
The nation's Non-Strategic Nuclear Force (NSNF) are available
to be deployed to or tasked to support theater nuclear
requirements and thereby link conventional forces to the full
nuclear capability of the United States. The Tomahawk missile,
in particular, since it would be carried on board our attack
submarines, gives the U.S. the ability, in a crisis, to hold at
risk key targets from a stealthy, offshore position.
4. Are India and Pakistan now practicing nuclear deterrence as a
basis for stability in South Asia? If so, how will U.S. interests be
affected and what are the continuing risks of instability?
Answer: Both India and Pakistan view their potential nuclear
capability as a central part of their national security. One of
our key objectives in the region is to keep the nuclear and
missile capabilities on both sides from escalating in order to
avoid an intensification of the South Asian nuclear arms race.
We therefore seek to cap, roll-back, and eventually eliminate
these capabilities. Currently, our objective is to seek Indian
and Pakistani adherence to global nonproliferation norms;
specifically to seek their accession to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty and support for the negotiation of a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty.
5. A recent Council on Foreign Relations report has urged the U.S.
to drop its goal of rolling back the bomb in South Asia and to aim
instead at fostering a ``a more stable plateau for Indo-Pakistani
(a) Is nuclear rollback now an impossible U.S. nonproliferation
goal in South Asia--is U.S. policy in the region now limited merely to
preventing detonations or extra-regional bomb transfers?
Answer: Our policy is not so limited. It is as stated in
response to question 4. Our near term challenge has been to
break the momentum and cap a potential South Asian nuclear arms
race through mutual restraint and confidence building measures.
Currently, our efforts are focused on getting both India and
Pakistan to become parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and to engage constructively in negotiations on the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty--two nondiscriminatory treaties that
both countries have long supported in principle. In parallel
with our efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
we have urged both sides not to be the first to produce or
deploy ballistic missiles which could trigger a missile race
with tragic consequences.
(b) Would it advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives for America
to assist India and Pakistan in managing their ``nuclear competition,''
as opposed to the current U.S. policy of opposing both bomb programs?
Current U.S. policy is to oppose nuclear weapons programs in
both countries. For the near term, the U.S. can contribute to
the cause of regional stability by urging both countries to
expend maximum effort towards resolving differences, one by
one, through dialogue. We believe India and Pakistan should
revalidate confidence building measures (CBMs) agreed to years
ago. These include: a ``hotline'' between Directors General of
Military Operations; prior notification of major military
exercises; limitations on size and location of exercises; a
pledge not to attack each other's nuclear facilities; and a
prohibition on chemical weapons.
We also believe India and Pakistan would benefit from
implementing additional CBMs, one example being a negotiated
end to their confrontation over the Siachen Glacier. There are
many civilian and military areas in which India and Pakistan
can strive to build a foundation for fruitful and cordial
relations. The U.S. should support the constructive efforts and
continue to disapprove of India and Pakistan's development of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
We should encourage both states to become parties to the CTBT
and to support negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
(c) Does America have a strategic interest in assisting either
Pakistan or India to have a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal and would
such assistance square with U.S. obligations under the NPT?
Answer: It is not our policy to assist either Pakistan or
India to have a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal. Of course,
it would be in the interest of any state which created a
nuclear weapons capability to ensure that is was as safe and
secure as possible.
(d) The Council's report also urges new U.S. arms transfers to
Pakistan as an instrument of nonproliferation policy--given the
experience of past transfers for this purpose, how likely would such
transfers either advance U.S. nonproliferation policy or assist
Pakistan to achieve military parity with India?
Answer: Government-to-government arm sales to Pakistan, of
course, continue to be prohibited under the Pressler Amendment.
In the case of India, we have abstained from major arms sales
that might alter the existing military balance of forces.
Simultaneously, the Department of Defense is actively involved
in the coordinated U.S. effort to convince India and Pakistan
that weapons of mass destruction do not provide the security
that each side perceives. DoD will continue to seek new ways,
within the bounds of U.S. law and policy, to expand military-
to-military cooperation with both India and Pakistan.
6. How would the introduction of an effective missile defense
system in either India or Pakistan likely affect the nuclear weapons
posture of the other country? Would such a development likely prove to
Answer: There are sharp differences of view about the
stability effect of missile defense systems. Since neither
India or Pakistan now has a deployed nuclear weapon-delivery
missile system, much less an anti-missile defense system, it is
not possible meaningfully to assess the application of these
debates to the South Asia case.
7. What options would be available to China by way of a strategic
response to the introduction of an effective missile defense system by
either Russia or India? Would the deployment of effective missile
defense systems throughout East Asia add to or jeopardize strategic
stability in that region?
Answer: Russia already has an ABM system consisting of about
100 nuclear-tipped ABM interceptors in the vicinity of Moscow
as permitted by the ABM Treaty. For a number of years, Russia
has also deployed a TMD system for use against shorter range
systems. China has embarked upon a strategic missile
modernization program even as Russian force readiness across
the board has significantly diminished and its ABM capability
has remained relatively static. Presumably one purpose of that
program is to enhance the capability of Chinese missiles
Whatever may be the case with regard to the China-India-
Russia case, deployment of TMD systems for defense against
rogue state missiles, especially from the DPRK, would be
stabilizing in East Asia, as well as elsewhere.
8. Does America have a strategic interest in assisting China to
have a safe and reliable nuclear arsenal?
Answer: It is certainly in America's interest that China's
nuclear weapons are physically safe and not prone to
unauthorized or accidental launch. However, the United States
has not engaged in programs to assist China in ensuring the
safety and security of its nuclear arsenal, or dismantlement of
nuclear weapons, as we have with Russia.
National Missile Defense
1. Have the existing technologies and components now under
consideration for the national missile defense system been adequately
and successfully tested under realistic conditions to justify full
deployment by 2003? Would such systems guarantee that no foreign
strategic missile would ever strike any point in the U.S.?
Answer: No. Under Secretary Kaminski's recent testimony to
the SASC addresses the technical particulars of our NMD
program, including the test schedule. In summary, the 3 plus 3
program conducts sufficient development, albeit at high
schedule and technical risk, to allow a deployment decision to
be made in 2000 if a threat warrants. If the decision is made
in 2000, an IOC of an initial NMD system could be achieved in
2003, subject to the risks noted. This decision would
necessarily be based on limited test data and would only be
justified in the face of a clearly defined emerging threat to
the United States. In the absence of such a threat, we expect
to continue development and testing of the NMD system in order
to achieve the user's requirements. No system can guarantee
protection absolutely under all circumstances.
2. For the record, what is your rough estimate of the total
historical costs of U.S. national missile defense efforts?
Answer: In determining the rough estimate of historical NMD
costs, SDIO/BMDO costs from FY85 through FY98 were selected
that could be attributed to a defined architecture for National
Missile Defense--Phase I, GPALS, NMD, and Technology Readiness.
The resulting cost estimate is approximately $15 billion, or
slightly more than one-third of the total SDIO/BMDO costs for
FY85 through FY98. This figure does not include research
programs that were part of the SDIO/BMDO advanced technology
base, e.g., space-based laser.
3. As an issue of sound procurement practice, should the U.S.
government deploy any missile defense system, technology, or key
component that had not been successfully tested under realistic test
Answer: No. Normally, the United States should not deploy a
national missile defense system (or anything else) without
adequate testing. The program that we have designed for the
``objective'' NMD system employs adequate testing. Our ``3+3''
philosophy would permit deployment of an initial NMD capability
in an emergency created by a threat emerging much more rapidly
than the intelligence community now expects. The ``3+3''
program provides for testing appropriate to support a
deployment decision in such an urgent situation, but it
explicitly does not allow sufficient time before an FY 2000
deployment decision for traditional rigorous testing of the
system elements or the integrated configuration in the absence
of reason for a deployment.
4. Say the U.S. unilaterally deployed an effective strategic
national missile defense system by 2003--(a) How would this likely
affect the offensive nuclear capabilities and postures of Russia and
China? (b) What would be the implications for the future of START, the
fissile material control convention, the CTBT, prospects for future
cuts by nuclear weapons states other than the U.S. and Russia, and the
NPT and ABM treaties?
Answer: As the Administration has stated on numerous
occasions, the development of the U.S. NMD program--a limited
defense capability designed against a ballistic missile threat
from a rogue state--will be conducted in compliance with the
ABM Treaty. Depending on its configuration, a deployed NMD
system could either be compliant with the treaty as written, or
might require amendments of the Treaty's provisions, or, if the
necessary amendment could not be agreed, withdrawal. Amendment
should be possible because the type of limited ballistic
missile defense for the U.S. being considered would not affect
the strategic offensive postures of the declared nuclear
powers, nor should it have any effect on the arms control
5. If the U.S. should leave the ABM Treaty and deploy a multiple-
site national missile defense system, which American states would
likely host such a system?
Answer: No decisions have been made as to locations of NMD
sites. The elements of the NMD system are being designed to a
baseline set of requirements that would allow them to be
deployed in a flexible manner, depending on the emerging
threat. The Department is continuing to examine the issue of
specific NMD architectures, including where elements of the
system might be located.
Future of the ABM Treaty
1. What are the key strategic benefits to the United States from
continued membership in the ABM Treaty and how would these benefits be
jeopardized by a U.S. or Russian abrogation of that treaty?
Answer: The Administration considers the ABM Treaty to be a
cornerstone of strategic stability, as do many other states,
including key U.S. allies and START partners. The Treaty's
limitations on defenses against strategic ballistic missiles
provide a certain measure of predictability and foster a
situation conducive to reductions in strategic offensive
2. How would the demise of that treaty likely affect Russia's
strategic offense and defense capabilities, and specifically, how
confident are you that Russia will never be able to develop an
effective response (offensive or defensive) to the U.S. deployment of
an effective, multiple-site national missile defense system?
Answer: How the hypothetical demise of the ABM Treaty would
affect Russian strategic capabilities cannot be determined in
the abstract, but instead would depend on the actual
circumstances at that time, such as the reasons for the
Treaty's demise. However, a hypothetical U.S. deployment of a
national missile defense system would not necessarily lead to
the demise of the ABM Treaty or prompt an adverse Russian
reaction. The Administration has made clear that the national
missile defense capabilities we are developing are not directed
at Russian strategic forces, but rather at the limited
potential threat that would be posed by rogue states were they
to acquire long-range ballistic missiles. If it were determined
necessary to deploy a national missile defense system for this
purpose at more than one site, the U.S. could seek Russian
agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to permit this. Under such
circumstances, U.S. deployment of a multiple-site national
missile defense would not necessarily elicit a Russian response
in either offensive or defensive terms, nor cause the demise of
the ABM Treaty.
3. How does the ABM Treaty's ban on the proliferation of strategic
missile defense systems serve U.S. security interests and how would the
end of that ban, with the collapse of the ABM Treaty, jeopardize those
Answer: The ABM Treaty prohibits the parties from
transferring ABM systems or their components (or technical
descriptions or plans enabling their construction) to other
states. However, these provisions were formulated in the
context of the Cold War confrontation between the U.S. and the
then Soviet Union, and were not intended to address
contemporary proliferation problems. It is difficult to assess
in the abstract the net impact which termination of these ABM
Treaty provisions would have on U.S. security interests.
Moreover, the U.S. and Russia have undertaken other
international commitments that would also affect decisions to
transfer missile defense systems abroad, including the MTCR and
the Wassenaar Arrangement.
4. If Russia developed what it termed a ``theater missile defense''
system that had significant capabilities against strategic missiles,
and deployed that system to cover its entire territorial periphery--(a)
What would be the impact of such a development upon the reliability of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent and how would the U.S. likely have to
respond? and (b) Are you confident that Russia could never develop or
deploy such a system?
Answer: Systems properly designed and tested as theater
missile defense systems to counter theater ballistic missiles
would not be able to perform effectively as ABM systems to
counter strategic ballistic missiles. In their May 1995 summit
joint statement of principles, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed (inter alia) that theater missile defenses may be
deployed by each side which will not pose a realistic threat to
the strategic nuclear force of the other side and which will
not be tested to give such systems that capability, and that
theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the
sides for use against each other. The U.S. and Russia are
engaged in negotiations intended to implement these principles
and to provide a clear demarcation between non-ABM systems
(such as those for theater missile defense) and ABM systems,
which are intended to counter strategic ballistic missiles. The
conclusion of the demarcation agreement we envisage would
preclude the hypothetical situation described by the question.
FROM SENATOR GLENN
1. Former CIA Directors James Woolsey and John Deutch have each
testified that they could not think of an example where the
introduction of nuclear weapons into a region has enhanced that
region's security or benefited the security interests of the United
States--do you agree? (Woolsey 2/24/93 and Deutch 3/20/96 (SGAC
Answer 1. From the creation, under General Eisenhower's
command in the early 1950s, of NATO's collective force in
Europe (the area with which I am most familiar) up to the end
of the Cold War, the availability of nuclear weapons support
and the presence of a nuclear capability in Europe in which our
allies shared (primarily with their delivery capabilities)
have, in my judgment, made a contribution of the highest order
to allied confidence in the deterrent, to the region's security
and to the security interests of the United States. I myself
rate that contribution as indispensable to the success achieved
by the alliance, including the United States.
2. Last month, the Council on Foreign Relations released a report
urging the U.S. to abandon its goals of preventing or reversing nuclear
weapons proliferation in South Asia and to aim instead at establishing
a ``more stable plateau for Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition''--Do
you agree that it is either too late or impossible to stop or to roll
back nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia?
Answer 2. I believe it should be a goal of the United States
to persuade India and Pakistan, insofar as possible, not to go
beyond their respective current stages of weapons development
and/or production, and to urge them to seek to resolve their
disputes by peaceful means. Until there has been substantial
progress in the latter regard, which cannot now be foreseen, it
seems unlikely that they will agree to any greater restraints
or reduction of their nuclear programs.
3. Russia's Defense Minister has been warning recently that he may
not be able to ensure the safety and reliability of his nuclear
arsenal--in terms of their likely effectiveness, how would you assess
the following as possible U.S. responses: (a) expanding the Cooperative
Threat Reduction program; (b) immediate deployment of a national
missile defense; (c) expanding the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal; (d)
resuming U.S. nuclear testing; and (e) developing a new generation of
Answer 3. The continuation and, as practicable, extension of
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program seems clearly the most
promising course for the United States to follow. It reinforces
what should be the governing aim of U.S. security policy: The
building of an overarching relationship of cooperation and
friendship between Russia and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic
community, including the United States above all. The other
listed responses move in the wrong direction, and should be
considered only in the unlikely event Russia should revert to a
policy and practice of confrontation and mutual threat.
4. What do you will expect will be the role (if any) of
international organizations in verifying deeper reductions as a result
of the START process?
Answer 4. The IAEA has, and should have, the lead role in
nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation verification. Its
functions should be strengthened (as its charter already
allows) and it should be supported financially,
technologically, and otherwise by the world's nations, notably
including the United States.