Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Delaware.
First, let me congratulate the Senators from North Carolina and Delaware, the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, for working together so speedily and quickly to bring this treaty to the floor. It is a real feat. It is difficult to do this in this length of time. The kind of bipartisan cooperation that this takes really, I think, reflects great honor on this body.
There is one condition that I have some difficulty with that I want to address some remarks to this afternoon, and that is condition 9, which is now part of the resolution before the Senate.
Condition 9 requires the President to submit to the Senate for its advice and consent the memorandum of understanding concerning successor states to the ABM Treaty. In my view, this condition is probably unconstitutional but certainly unwise. As a general rule, a condition on a resolution of ratification is a stipulation which the President must accept before proceeding to ratification of a treaty. And if the President finds the condition unacceptable, he generally has but one choice, which is to refuse to ratify the treaty. There is, however, a generally recognized exception: If the condition is inconsistent with or invades the President's constitutional powers, in which case the condition would be ineffective and of no consequence. The restatement of foreign relations law puts the matter this way:
The Senate has not made a practice of attaching conditions unrelated to the treaty before it. If the Senate were to do so and were to attach a condition invading the President's constitutional powers, for example, his power of appointment, the condition would be ineffective. The President would then have to decide whether he could assume that the Senate would have given its consent without the condition.
In this matter before us, condition 9 has no relation to the CFE flank agreement. The condition, therefore, on that ground is improper. It seeks to invade the President's constitutional powers to recognize states and to implement treaties, and thus is probably unconstitutional.
When the Senate deals with the important issue of advice and consent to a treaty, I think it should limit itself to the treaty before it. When we go beyond that, it seems to me we do not bring honor on this institution, when we try to force the hand of the President in areas beyond the immediate treaty that is being considered.
In a very ironic twist, condition 9 could imperil the continued viability of the treaty that we are ratifying because if the ABM Treaty, when it is multilateralized, needs to come back for ratification, the same principle would apply to other treaties, of which we have dozens. The same principle, if it applies to ABM, would apply to CFE, the treaty before us.
Is this treaty binding on those other states, those other successor states of the Soviet Union without coming back to the Senate? INF, START I, probably dozens of treaties with the former Soviet Union which have been multilateralized, which have been accepted by the successor states, which we now, I hope, consider binding on those States and on us, even though they have not been brought back to the Senate for ratification, if the logic of condition 9 is correct, it would undermine the viability, the efficacy of those other treaties that we had with the former Soviet Union. It would call into question treaties that I do not believe this body wants to call into question.
The reason that it does that is that condition 9 requires the President to submit to the Senate for its advice and consent his recognition of the Soviet Union successor states to the ABM Treaty. It does provide an opportunity for opponents of the ABM Treaty to try to defeat that memorandum of understanding as it relates to the successor states. But in doing so, it jeopardizes the continuing viability of the acceptance by those successor states of their obligations under the ABM Treaty and, in terms of the point I am making, their obligations under a number of other treaties which have been signed by the former Soviet Union.
This outcome could undermine the reductions of former Soviet nuclear weapons that our military has testified are so clearly in our national security interests. Opponents of having successor states other than Russia appear to worry about the potential difficulty of negotiating changes or amendments to the ABM Treaty in order to permit deployment of a national missile defense system in the future. Their notion appears to be that while it may be straightforward for us to negotiate required changes with Russia, it will somehow be more difficult to get the other three successor states to agree to any changes. And according to that view, rather than to give each of the other three states a potential veto over changes to the ABM Treaty, it would be better to prevent those successor states from ever joining the ABM Treaty as a party.
That is what this condition is all about, but it is misguided from a number of perspectives. First, the notion that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan would obstruct any changes to the ABM Treaty but that somehow Russia would be an easier negotiating partner flies in the face of experience. In the negotiations at the Standing Consultative Commission, it is Russia that has been the most challenging negotiating partner, while Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have been more amenable to American proposals.
Furthermore, as the administration has pointed out on many occasions, if the United States determines that there is the threat that requires us to deploy a national missile defense system that would conflict with the ABM Treaty, they would seek to negotiate changes with our treaty partners to permit such a deployment. We would seek to adapt the treaty to our security requirements. But if the Russians would not agree to our proposed changes, then the administration would consider whether to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as is our right under the treaty's provisions relating to our supreme national interests. That is the prudent approach and the one that best serves our security.
Let me just give one other example of the implication of this condition. In 1995, the United States recognized Ukraine as a successor to the former Soviet Union for 35 nonarmed control treaties that we previously had with the U.S.S.R.
We did this without a Senate vote. So now we presumably want the Ukraine to be bound by 35 treaties previously negotiated. But there is no Senate vote ratifying that treaty with Ukraine.
In a diplomatic note from the United States Embassy to the Government of Ukraine dated May 10, 1995, the United States listed the 35 agreements that have continued in force with Ukraine and they include such treaties as the incidents at sea agreement of 1972 with its protocol, which our good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner, negotiated when he was Secretary of the Navy. They included the prevention of dangerous military activities agreement of 1989, which is designed to prevent an accident or mistake from erupting into hostilities. These are extremely important agreements and we should not put those agreements in limbo, or in doubt, by setting this precedent relative to the ABM Treaty.
I ask unanimous consent that the list of those 35 treaties that Ukraine is hopefully bound by, through that note--but which we have not ratified, vis-a-vis Ukraine--that that list and note be printed in the Record at this time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and has the honor to refer to discussions between technical experts of our two Governments concerning the succession of Ukraine to bilateral treaties between the United States of America and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in light of the independence of Ukraine and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In conducting their discussions, the experts took as a point of departure the continuity principle set forth in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties. In examining the texts they found that certain treaties to which the principle applied had since expired by their terms. Others had become obsolete and should not be continued in force between the two countries. Finally, after a treaty-by-treaty review, which included an examination of the practicability of the continuance of certain specific treaties, they recommended that our two Governments agree no longer to apply those treaties.
In light of the foregoing, the Embassy proposes that, subject to condition that follows, the United States of America and Ukraine confirm the continuance in force as between them of the treaties listed in the Annex to this Note.
Inasmuch as special mechanisms have been established to work out matters concerning succession to bilateral arms limitation and related agreements concluded between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, those agreements were not examined by the technical experts. Accordingly, this Note does not deal with the status of those agreements and no conclusion as to their status can be drawn from their absence from the list appearing in the Annex.
Preliminary agreement relating to principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 11, 1942; entered into force June 11, 1942.
Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by forces operating under Soviet command and forces operating under United States of America command. Signed at Yalta February 11, 1945; entered into force February 11, 1945.
Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964; entered into force July 13, 1968.
Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington with annexes and exchanges of notes. Signed at Moscow May 16, 1969; entered into force May 16, 1969.
Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972; entered into force May 25, 1972.
Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal aid and claims. Signed at Washington October 18, 1972; entered into force October 18, 1972.
Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas. Signed at Washington May 22, 1973; entered into force May 22, 1973.
Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973; entered into force January 29, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.
Agreement on cooperation in artificial heart research and development. signed at Moscow June 28, 1974; entered into force June 28, 1974.
Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple entry and exit visas to American and Soviet correspondents. Exchange of notes at Moscow September 29, 1975; entered into force September 29, 1975.
Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington. Exchange of notes at Moscow March 20, 1977, entered into force March 30, 1977.
Agreement relating to privileges and immunities of all members of the Soviet and American embassies and their families, with agreed minute. Exchange of notes at Washington December 14, 1978; entered into force December 14, 1978; effective December 29, 1978.
Memorandum of understanding regarding marine cargo insurance. Signed at London April 5, 1979; entered into force April 5, 1979.
The Agreement supplementary to the 1966 Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended by the Agreement of February 13, 1986. Signed at Washington November 4, 1966; entered into force November 4, 1966.
Agreement relating to immunity of family members of consular officers and employees form criminal jurisdiction. Exchange of notes at Washington October 31, 1986; entered into force October 31, 1986.
Agreement concerning the confidentiality of data on deep seabed areas, with related exchange of letters. Exchange of notes at Moscow December 5, 1986; entered into force December 5, 1986.
Agreement relating to the agreement of August 14, 1987 on the resolution of practical problems with respect to deep seabed mining areas. Exchange of notes at Moscow August 14, 1987; entered into force August 14, 1987.
Declaration on international guarantees (Afghanistan Settlement Agreement). Signed at Geneva April 14, 1988; entered into force May 15, 1988.
Agreement on cooperation in transportation science and technology, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988; entered into force May 31, 1988.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation to combat illegal narcotics trafficking. Signed at Paris January 8, 1989; entered into force January 8, 1989.
Agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities, with annexes and agreed statements. Signed at Moscow June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.
Agreement on a mutual understanding on cooperation in the struggle against the illicit traffic in narcotics. Signed at Washington January 31, 1990; entered into force January 31, 1990.
Civil Air Transport Agreement, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease accounts. Exchange of letters at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement on cooperation on ocean studies, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement on expansion of undergraduate exchanges. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Memorandum of cooperation in the fields of environmental restoration and waste management. Signed at Vienna September 18, 1990; entered into force September 18, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the physical, chemical and engineering sciences. Signed at Moscow May 13, 1991; entered into force May 13, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the mapping sciences, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 14, 1991; entered into force May 14, 1991.
Memorandum of cooperation in the field of magnetic confinement fusion. Signed at Moscow July 5, 1991; entered into force July 5, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in natural and man-made emergency prevention and response. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered into force July 30, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in housing and economic development. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered into force July 30, 1991.
Agreement on emergency medical supplies and related assistance. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered into force July 30, 1991.
Mr. LEVIN. If the logic of condition 9 were extended to Ukraine, all those 35 treaties would be in limbo until we ratified the succession of the treaties. And this list of treaties is just one case of the 12 successor states to the former Soviet Union. Condition 9 could cast into doubt the effect of all of those treaties for all of those states.
I think the aim here, while it is aimed at ABM, does not hit ABM because our ABM Treaty is not touched by this condition. Our treaty relative to ABM, with Russia, is not affected by condition 9. Condition 9 does not refer to Russia. It is the other states that it refers to. So our ABM Treaty with Russia is not affected. It is all the other treaties which are undermined, with all the other successor states. It is the arms control treaties and the nonarms control treaties which are put in jeopardy, left in limbo by the logic of this condition. So, while the aim is at the ABM Treaty, it misses that and, instead, hits treaties that I believe this body wants to be binding on the successor states to the Soviet Union.
What about the treaty before us, the CFE Treaty? Does this have to be ratified with each of the successor states to the Soviet Union? If so, we are putting this very treaty in limbo. This very CFE Treaty which we are ratifying, by the logic of condition 9, is left in limbo as to the other successor states, because there is no ratification of this treaty relative to the other states.
Mr. President, I fail to understand the logic of the supporters of condition 9 that appears to say that Russia is a successor state to the former Soviet Union but the other states of the former Soviet Union can only become successor states if the Senate ratifies that action. If the Senate must ratify the succession of one state, then logically it should ratify the succession of all. Thus this condition would cast into doubt the continuing validity of Russia's obligations under the numerous treaties that the United States had entered into with the Soviet Union but which were not submitted to the Senate for ratification subsequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
And it could cast into similar doubt other treaties with other countries that have dissolved, such as former Czechoslovakia, or former Yugoslavia, where the Senate has not ratified the succession of states to those treaties.
We should also consider the impact of condition 9 on other arms control agreements which successor states to the former Soviet Union have joined. Since we are considering the resolution of ratification for the CFE Flank Agreement, let us start with the underlying CFE Treaty. It was ratified by the Senate in November 1991, prior to the accession of successor states based on the Oslo document in June of 1992. In other words, it was after the Senate voted for ratification of the CFE Treaty that the former successor states agreed on the arrangement for joining the CFE Treaty.
The precedent that condition 9 would set would, if followed in other cases, call into question whether those states are considered members of and bound by the CFE Treaty until the Senate votes on their succession to the treaty.
There is also the case of the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF, Treaty signed between the United States and USSR. When the Soviet Union dissolved into 12 successor states, 6 of those states had INF facilities on their soil while the other 6 did not. All twelve are successors to the INF Treaty, with six having obligations related to their INF facilities and the other six having the obligation not to have such facilities or INF missiles .
The logic of condition 9 would suggest that the successor states are not parties to, or bound by, the INF Treaty unless and until the Senate provides its advice and consent to their accession. I cannot imagine any Member of the Senate wanting to cast doubt on the obligation of these states to comply with the INF Treaty, but that is what condition 9 does when its logic extended to other treaties.
In a June 11, 1996, letter, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry explained the Defense Department's concerns with a proposed provision of law that was essentially the same as condition 9:
. . . this section runs counter to the successful U.S. policy of involving within the framework of strategic stability all states which emerged from the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their territory. Moreover, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine perceive a clear link between their participation in the START and INF Treaties and the ABM Treaty. Casting doubt on their ability to be equal partners in the ABM Treaty could poison our overall relationship with these states and needlessly jeopardize their compliance with their denuclearization obligations under START I.
The logic of condition 9, when extended to other treaties, could well lead the successor states to the former Soviet Union to reconsider whether they are bound by these treaties as well as the ABM Treaty. Such a move would be decidedly against our security interests.
I should point out, Mr. President, that the Congress itself urged the President to discuss ABM Treaty issues `with Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union' in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. At that time there was no question that there were other successor states to the former Soviet Union with whom we would want to discuss possible changes to the ABM Treaty. Section 232(c) of that Act states:
Congress urges the President to pursue immediate discussions with Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union, as appropriate, on the feasibility of, and mutual interest in, amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit--
clarification of the distinctions for the purposes for the purposes of the ABM Treaty between theater missile defenses and anti-ballistic missile defenses . . .
I find it strange that the Senate, after urging the President to discuss the ABM Treaty with Russia and other successor states to the former Soviet Union on demarcation, now would call into question whether there are other successor states to the ABM Treaty without a Senate ratification.
If a treaty must be submitted to the Senate for ratification of successors to the former Soviet Union, or other countries, before it is binding, then hundreds of our treaty commitments are in doubt. All of this is because opponents of the ABM Treaty are trying to maim or kill this one treaty.
Additionally, we should consider the impact of accepting condition 9 on other parliaments in other nations that may take this signal as an invitation for them to reconsider their nation's treaty commitments. I find it ironic that on an act of treaty ratification the Senate is on the verge of creating a potential international treaty uncertainty.
There is no need for the Senate to drag in the ABM Treaty issue on the CFE Flank Agreement resolution of ratification. The Senate will have ample opportunity to debate the ABM Treaty when the administration submits the ABM demarcation agreement to the Senate, as they have committed to do. But this is neither the time nor the vehicle to try to decide this issue.
Furthermore, this issue of the memorandum of understanding on successor states to the ABM Treaty is already connected to Senate consideration on the demarcation agreement. The text of the demarcation agreement states that the MOU on successor states will not go into effect until the Agreed Statement on Demarcation goes into effect. So in effect, the MOU cannot take effect until the Senate votes on the demarcation agreement. Consequently there is no need for this condition and it should not be included in this resolution of ratification.
Mr. President, thankfully, condition 9 is limited to the memorandum of understanding concerning successor states to the ABM Treaty. It is my fervent hope and expectation that the President will make clear in his signing statement for the CFE Flank Agreement that this extraordinary action is not a precedent. In that way he can limit the damage that could otherwise flow from this unwise condition.