As we commence the 105th Congress and take up, as we surely will, issues with regard to national missile defense and theater missile defense, a key question is whether continued adherence to the ABM Treaty, in its original or a modified form, is compatible with the kind of missile defense we need.
Is this an "either/or" choice?
I hold the view that the ABM Treaty does have, or can be made to have, sufficient flexibility or elasticity to accommodate certain kinds of national missile or theater missile defense systems. By the same token, I reject the notion that we can only achieve the types of theater missile defense or national missile defense we need by outright abrogation of the ABM Treaty.
I am struck more by the commonality than the differences between the prevailing views of some of my Republican colleagues in the Senate and views in the Administration on this subject. Much of the difference has to do with timing, stemming in part from different assessments of the intelligence information on the ballistic missile threat facing the country. Ultimately, responsible policy makers must come to grips with the management of the risk entailed by the threat and how much money we are willing to spend, in a tight budget situation, for various levels of missile defense to counter that threat.
At this point in our debates, there seems to be general agreement that we are not trying to protect the U.S. against a massive nuclear strike from a reconstituted Soviet Union or even a general exchange with Russia. Nor, for that matter, are we talking about protection against a deliberate, massive Chinese nuclear attack on the United States.
A consensus between the prevailing positions on the Hill and that of the Administration comes closer if there is an acceptance that this range of Russian or Chinese threats are beyond our technological and financial means in the near term and that our objective is one of defending America against a Third World, long-range ballistic missile capability from a regime not subject to any rational laws of deterrence.
It is the prospect that rogue states will at some point obtain strategic ballistic missiles ICBMs - that can reach American shores which propels us to consider the deployment of a national missile defense. A second prospect involves an unauthorized or accidental launch of an ICBM from Russia or China.
The kind of national missile defense system promoted both on the Hill and in the Administration would not be capable of defending against thousands of warheads being launched against the United States. Rather, both sides are talking about a system capable of defending against the much smaller and relatively unsophisticated ICBM threat that a rogue nation or terrorist group could mount anytime in the foreseeable future as well as one capable of shooting down an unauthorized or accidentally launched missile.
The critical difference between many of the plans offered on the Hill and those proposed by the Administration has to do with timing. Some Congressional proposals would require selection of a missile defense system to be made within a year, with deployment to begin within three years. The Administration has argued for the need to develop a system, assess the threat in three years, and make a deployment decision accordingly.
It is the difference between the various plans over timing on system- selection and deployment that holds practical implications for existing and potential arms control agreements (START II, the ABM Treaty, START III?) as well as the potential effectiveness of the system deployed. The more immediate the commitment to deploy a national defense system, the greater the risk of a Russian rejection of the START II Treaty and of an outright American rejection of the original ABM Treaty.
Secondly, differences over timing have been linked to the issue of the effectiveness of the system deployed by the United States. The Administration has argued that selection of a system within the next year or so will limit the options to build a system that is better matched to the threat, and that the real choice between various Congressional plans and that of the Administration is between building an advanced system to defeat an actual threat and a less capable system to defeat a hypothetical threat.
Mr. President, is there a middle ground -- one that satisfies neither the Administration nor various Congressional proponents fully but that does move us in the direction of providing the American people with a limited national defense system against the most urgent ballistic missile threats? I believe there is, and this legislation is an attempt to chart it.
Mr. President, I sense a greater willingness in both branches to try to come together in the interest of providing the American people with some form of limited, national defense system against the most urgent form of ballistic missile threat -- to seek to bridge gaps rather than score debating points.
Moreover, with the passage of time, the differences over preferred dates of system selection and deployment have narrowed.
With that in mind, and with a felt need to change the terms of reference of previous ballistic missile defense debates by focusing on areas of commonality between the
Administration's position and the various Congressional plans, I offer this legislation as one of the starting points for a more constructive exchange on the subject of national missile defense.
DEFEND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ACT OF 1997
SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. SHORT TITLE.
This act may be cited as the "Defend the United States of America Act of 1997".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
(a) MISSILE DEFENSES AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. --With respect to missile defenses and arms con trol agreements, Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten United States Armed Forces engaged abroad. Therefore, the expeditious deployment of theater missile defenses to intercept ballistic missiles threatening the Armed Forces abroad is the highest priority among all ballistic missile defense programs.
(2) The United States is developing defensive systems to protect the United States against the emerging threat of limited strategic ballistic missile attacks. Ground-based defensive systems are attainable, are permitted by the ABM Treaty, are available sooner and are more affordable than spaced-based interceptors or space-based lasers, and can protect all of the United States from limited ballistic missile attack.
(3) Deterring limited ballistic missile attacks upon our national territory requires not only national missile defenses but arms control agreements and nonproliferation measures that can lower the threat and curb the spread of ballistic missile technology
(4) The massive retaliatory capability of the United States deterred the Soviet Union, and any other nation, from launching an attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles throughout the Cold War. The Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the Department of Defense affirms the fundamental effectiveness of deterrence of large-scale nuclear attacks now and into the future. While the threat of intentional attack upon the United States has receded, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized attack by Russia or China remains, albeit remotely.
(5) United States arms control agreements (notably the START I Treaty and the START II Treaty, once implemented) will significantly reduce the threat to the United States from large-scale nuclear attack. The START I Treaty, when fully implemented, will reduce deployed strategic warheads by over 40 percent below 1990 levels By the end of 1996, only Russia, among the states of the former Soviet Union, will deploy nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty, once implemented, will reduce strategic warheads deployed in Russia by 66 percent below their levels before the Start I Treaty.
(6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the efficacy and affordability of defensive systems increases, strengthening the long-term prospects for deterrence based upon effective defenses in addition to deterrence based upon the threat of retaliation.
(7) Countries hostile to the United States (such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have manifested an interest in developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. In the absence of outside assistance, newly emerging threats from these countries may take as long as 15 years or more to mature, according to recent intelligence estimates. These countries could accelerate the development of long-range missiles if they receive external support.
(8) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and continuing United States efforts to enforce export controls may prevent or delay external assistance needed by those countries to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Cooperation among our allies and the Russian Federation to limit exports of the relevant hardware and knowledge can help.
(9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic stability by restraining the requirement on both sides for strategic weapons. At the summit in May 1995, the President of the United States and the President of Russia each reaffirmed his country's commitment to the ABM Treaty.
(10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a noncompliant national missile defense system will not add to strategic stability if it impedes implementation of the START I or START II Treaties. With out the reductions to strategic weapons required by both treaties, the consequences and risks of unauthorized or accidental launches will increase.
(11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States must be maintained at START I levels, significant unbudgeted costs will be incurred, encroaching on funds for ballistic missile defenses and all other defense requirements.
(12) Should the combination of arms control, nonproliferation efforts, and deterrence fail, the United States must be able to defend itself against limited ballistic missile attack.
(13) National missile defense systems consistent with the ABM Treaty are capable of defending against limited ballistic missile attack. Should n national missile defense system require modification of the ABM Treaty, the treaty establishes the means for the parties to amend the treaty, which the parties have used in the past.
(14) While a single-site national missile defense system can defend all of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks, the addition. of a second site would substantially improve the effectiveness of a limited national missile defense system.
(15) Adding a second national missile defense site to the initial national missile defense system at the former Safeguard antiballistic missile defense site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, results in only a slight degradation of two-site effectiveness when compared to two optimally-sited national missile defense deployment locations.
(b) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OTHER THAN MISSILE DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.With respect to threatened employment of weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons delivered by long-range ballistic missiles against the United States, Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons delivered by long-range ballistic missiles, the United States faces other threatened uses of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and other delivery means, including commercial or private aircraft, cruise missiles, international shipping containers delivered by land or sea, and domestic manufacture and delivery by private entities.
(2) Chemical weapons have already threatened United States citizens. The terrorist bomb used against the World Trade Center in New York City contained materials intended to generate lethal chemicals in addition to the explosive effect, but the materials failed to generate a toxic mixture.
(3) The explosive device used against the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was constructed of commonly available materials in the United States and delivered by rental truck.
(4) The Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan manufactured lethal sarin gas and released it in Tokyo subways causing numerous fatalities and thousands of casualties
(5) Chechen rebels threatened to spread lethal radiation throughout Moscow and revealed to the media the location of a smell radioactive source hidden in a Moscow park.
(6) Federal, State, and local governments are all poorly prepared to deal with threatened or actual use of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons against United States cities.
(7) Therefore, it is necessary for priorities to be established for dealing with the full spectrum of threatened use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States based on assessments of the likelihood of the occurrence of each particular threat, and for funding to be allocated in accordance with those priorities.
(c) DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS.With respect to the development of complex systems, Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States developed and deployed an antiballistic missile system known as Safeguard. The system was deactivated only months after achieving initial operating capability because of highly cost and concern about limited effectiveness.
(2) Since 1983, the United States has expended more than $35,000,000,000 on the development of missile defenses, and most of that has been expended for the development of national missile defenses.
(3) There exists today no operational hardware that could be deployed to provide a national missile defense capability against strategic ballistic missiles. Therefore, there exist no test data from which to assess the performance and cost of a deployed national missile defense system.
(4) Congress has traditionally insisted that major weapon systems be rigorously tested prior to full-rate production so that system performance is demonstrated and system cost estimates are better refined.
(5) Therefore, consistent with that tradition, it is appropriate that any national missile defense system developed for deployment be rigorously tested prior to a deployment decision in order to demonstrate successful performance and refine system costs.
SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
(a) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM --
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a research and development program to develop an antiballistic missile system described in subsection (b) that could achieve initial operational capability by the end of 2003.
(2) A decision whether to deploy the antiballistic missile system shall be made by Congress during 2000 in accordance with this section.
(3) The Secretary shall ensure that the development and deployment of an antiballistic missile system under this section fully complies with the ABM Treaty and with all other treaty obligations.
(b) SYSTEM DESIGN.The antiballistic missile system developed under subsection (a) shall
(1) be designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or attacks by Third World countries;
(2) be developed for deployment at a single site; and
(3) include as the system components
(A) fixed, ground-based, antiballistic missile battle management radars at the site;
(B) up to 100 ground-based interceptor missiles;
(C) as necessary, space-based adjuncts, including the Space Surveillance and Missile Tracking System, that are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty and
(D) as necessary, Large Phased Array Radars (upgraded from other radars or newly constructed) that ate located on the periphery of the United States, face outward, and are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
(c) DEPLOYMENT DECISION FACTORS.The factors to be considered by Congress for a decision to deploy the antiballistic missile system are as follows:
(1) The projected threat of ballistic missile attack against the United States in 2000 and following years.
(2) The projected cost and effectiveness of the system, determined on the basis of the technology available in 2000 and the performance of the system as demonstrated in testing.
(3) The projected cost and effectiveness of the system if, at the time of the decision to deploy, development for deployment were to be continued for --
(A) one additional year,
(B) two additional years, and
(C) three additional years,
taking into consideration the projected availability of any synergistic systems that are under development in 2000.
(4) Arms control factors.
(5) The preparedness of the United states to defend the United States against the full range of threats of attack by weapons of mass destruction, and the relative priorities for funding of defenses against such threats.
(d) DEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATION.Not later than March 31, 2000, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing the President's recommendation regarding whether to deploy the antiballistic missile system developed under this section. In addition, the report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the system that could be deployed.
(2) A discussion of the basis for the President's recommendation in terms of the factors set forth in subsection (c).
(e) CONGRESSIONAL DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT.
(1) The report of the President under subsection (d) shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate upon receipt in the Senate and to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives upon receipt in that House.
(2) A joint resolutions described in paragraph (1) of subsection (f) that is introduced within the 30-day period beginning on the date on which Congress receives the President's deport shall be considered under the expedited procedures set forth in that subsection.
(f) EXPEDITED PROCEDURE. -- (1) For the purposes of subsection (e)(2), "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "Congress authorizes the Secretary of Defense to begin the deployment at the former Safeguard antiballistic missile site, Grand Forks, North Dakota, of an antiballistic missile system that
"(1) is designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or attacks by Third World countries;
"(2) is developed for deployment at a single site; and
"(3) includes as the system components
"(A) fixed, ground-based, antiballistic missile battle management radars at the site;
"(B) up to 100 ground-based interceptor missiles;
"(C) as necessary, space-based adjuncts including the Space Surveillance and Missile Tracking System, that are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty; and
"(D) as necessary, Large Phased Array Radars (upgraded from other radars or newly constructed) that are located on the periphery of the United States, face outward, and are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty."
(2) A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. Such a resolution may not be reported before the eighth day after its introduction.
(3) If the committee to which is referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of 30 days after its introduction or at the end of the first day after there has been reported to the House involved a joint resolution described in paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, such committee shall be deemed to be discharged from further consideration of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.
(4) When the committee to which a resolution is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged (under paragraph (3)) from further consideration of, a resolution described in paragraph (1), it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived, The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(5) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in paragraph (1), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the following procedures shall apply:
(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.
(B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) of the House receiving the resolution. --
(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but
(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.
(6) This subsection is enacted by Congress --
(A) as an exercise of the rule making power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
SEC. 4. RELATIONSHIP OF ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS CONTROL.
(a) FINDINGS. -- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Deployment of an antiballistic missile system in accordance with section 3 is fully consistent with the rights of the parties to the ABM Treaty.
(2) Deployment of an antiballistic missile system in accordance with section 3 would not threaten the deterrent capability of the Russian nuclear missile forces at force levels agreed to under the START I Treaty, at force levels permitted under the START II Treaty, or even at force levels below the agreed or permitted force levels.
(b) DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA. -- Congress urges the President to pursue discussions with Russia regarding --
(1) potential opportunities for cooperation on research and development of ballistic missile defense capabilities, including, for example
(A) research and development of missile warning and tracking capabilities;
(B) research and development of intelligence and warning indications regarding Third World activities on ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; and
(C) joint research and development of more effective theater missile defenses;
(2) amendments to the ABM Treaty, as necessary, that would permit development and deployment of more effective limited defenses of the two countries against long-range ballistic missile attacks; and
(3) establishment of conditions conducive to more effective national missile defense, such as rescinding the 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty and making conforming changes to the ABM Treaty in order to permit in each country a second ballistic missile defense site, optimally located, and up to 100 additional interceptor missiles at such site.
(c) ALTERNATIVE ACTION UNDER ABM TREATY. -- If the President determines that, due to increasing threats of ballistic missile attack on the United States, it is necessary to expand the antiballistic missile system provided for under section 3 beyond limits provided under the ABM Treaty and that discussions between the United States and Russia regarding cooperative liberalization of those limits is unsuccessful, the President shall consult with Congress on whether to exercise the right under Article XV of the ABM Treaty for a party to withdraw from the treaty.
SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES.
The Secretary of Defense throught the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, shall maintain a robust program of research and development of national missile defense technologies while developing for deployment the antiballistic missile system provided for under section 3. These research and development activities shall be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.
SEC. 6. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) MEASURES TO ADDRESS THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.-- In order to defend against weapons of mass destruction by preventing the spread of fissile materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, the President shall --
(1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in cooperation with other nations, to prevent terrorist organizations from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction;
(2) expedite United States efforts to assist the Governments of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as appropriate, in improving the safety, security, and accountability of fissile materials and nuclear warheads;
(3) undertake additional steps to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their components from being smuggled into the United States, through the use of improved security devices at United States ports of entry, increased numbers of Border Patrol agents, increased monitoring of international borders, and other appropriate measures;
(4) seek the widest possible international adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and pursue to the fullest other export control measures intended to deter and counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their components; and
(5) enhance conventional weapons systems to ensure that the United States possesses effective deterrent and counterforce capabilities against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
(b) MEASURES TO ADDRESS THREATS FROM ICBMs. -- In order to reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles, including accidental or unauthorized launches, the President shall --
(1) urge the Government and Parliament of Russia to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as possible, permitting its expeditious entry into force;
(2) pursue with the Government of Russia, after START II entry-into-force, a symmetrical program of early deactivation of strategic forces to be eliminated under START II; and
(3) work jointly with countries possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles to improve command and control technology
(such as permissive actions links and other safety devices) and operations to the maximum extent practicable.
(c) PLAN TO REDUCE THREATS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. -- The Secretary shall develop a comprehensive plan for reducing the threat to the United States of weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary shall develop the plan jointly with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The plan shall implement the requirements of subsections (a) and (b):
SEC. 7. JOINT PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AFTER DEPLOYMENT OF INITIAL ABM SYSTEM.
(a) REVIEW REQUIRED. -- After the first national missile defense system deployed after the date of the enactment of this Act attains initial operational capability, the President and Congress shall jointly review the matters described in subsection (b) in order to determine priorities for future research and development, and possible deployment, of national missile silo defense technologies and for continued cooperation with Russia on arms control.
(b) MATTERS TO BE REVIEWED -- The review shall cover the following matters:
(1) The status of cooperation and discussions between the United States and Russia on matters described in section 4(b) and on other matters of common interest for the national security of both countries.
(2) The projected threat of ballistic missile attack on the United States.
(3) Other projected threats of attacks on the United States with weapons of mass destruction.
(4) United States preparedness to respond to or defend against such threats.
(5) The status of research and development on national missile defense technologies referred to in section 5.
SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) Requirement. -- Not later than March 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the following plans:
(1) The Secretary's plan for the carrying out the national missile defense program in accordance with the requirements of this Act.
(2) The plan for reducing the threat to the United States of weapons of mass destruction prepared pursuant to section 6(c).
(b) PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE. -- With respect to the Secretary's plan for the national missile defense program, the report shall include the following matters:
(1) The antiballistic missile system architecture, including --
(A) a detailed description of the system architecture selected for development; and
(B) a justification of the architecture selected and reasons for the rejection of the other candidate architectures.
(2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of appropriations required for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 1998 through 2003 in order to achieve an initial operational capability of the anti-ballistic missile system in 2003.
(3) A description of promising technologies to be pursued in accordance with the requirements of section 5.
(4) A determinatino of the point, if any, at which any activity that is required to be carried out under this title would conflict with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's determination, and an estimate of the time at which such point would be reached in order to meet an initial operating capability in the year 2003.
SEC. 9. TREATIES DEFINED.
In this Act:
(1) ABM TREATY.--The term "ABM Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and includes Protocols to that Treaty signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, and all Agreed Statements and amendments to such Treaty in effect.
(2) START I TREATY. -- The term "START I Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including related annexes on agreed statements and definitions, protocols, and memorandum of understanding.
(3) S'l'ART II TREATY. -- The term "START II Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the "START II Treaty" (contained in Treaty Document 103-1):
(A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the "Elimination and Conversion Protocol").
(B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the "Exhibitions and Sections Protocol").
(C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the "Memorandum on Attribution").
(4) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME. --
The term "Missile Technology Control Regime" has the meaning given such term in section 11B(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).