Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my friend from California, Mr. Hunter yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, here we go again. It seems like we always go through this every year or so on what to do with the D-5. I think the point has been made, and made very well, that as we finally had the cold war come to an end, the thing that did it was the triad system, or the system where we figured out how we were going to handle this problem.
We had the aircraft, and we looked at the old B-52, which is a very, very old airplane, came out with the B-1 and now the B-2. We got the land-based missiles , and now we are going to take the MX and take it out of the silos and all we will have is the Minuteman III.
But the ace in the hole, all this comes down to, is the D-5. I think most people, when they look at this, find out that if you can take a boat and hide it somewhere and just sit it somewhere, fine. But I still recall, when Les Aspin was the chairman of the committee, bringing in some admirals and generals from the old Soviet Union, as it was then constituted, and talked about how difficult it was to stay up with the modernization of the United States. And the key to this whole thing is modernization. C-4 has been a reliable missile , but it is the D-5 that now gives us the ace in the hole.
It would seem to me that now we have the opportunity to finish out all 14 boats, get them up to this very, very accurate missile , a missile with more range, a missile that can do the job that gives us that deciding edge that we finally won with the Soviet Union years ago. It would be very foolish, in my humble opinion, to do away with it. It also puts our negotiators in a very bad position when we have Congress micromanaging what they are going to do and what type of armament they would use.
I have great respect for my friend from Minnesota, but in my humble opinion, it would be a smart thing to defeat this amendment and go ahead with the production of the D-5.