[Page: S6988]

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in just a moment, Senator Lugar, myself, and Senator Domenici will explain this amendment. I know the chairman of the committee would like to make some comments on the amendment.

At this point, I will yield the floor for whatever the chairman is prepared to say.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the Senators from Georgia, New Mexico, and Indiana, to authorize the establishment of an emergency assistance program to train and equip State and local authorities to respond to domestic terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.

The amendment would also expand authorities for the DOD and DOE cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as increase the funding for these programs.

I have grave concerns about increasing the funding for DOD and DOE's cooperative threat reduction programs, as well as expanding the scope of the programs in DOD and DOE.

Based on my review of the amendment and the new activities authorized by this amendment, DOD and DOE will require significant funding authority in the outyears to complete these programs.

For example, how much money are we talking about in the defense bill to complete the program to replace the reactor cores at Tomsk 7 and Krasnoyarsk 26?

How much money will it take to convert, or eliminate, the chemical and biological facilities in all the independent states of the former Soviet Union?

We have not received any information from DOD, DOE, or the National Security Council on the budgetary impact of the increases for these two programs, or whether funds will be included in the future years defense plan for this program, as well as DOE plan.

I would point out that none of the funds necessary for the increases in this amendment have been appropriated.

Mr. President, I believe the efforts of the sponsors of this amendment are laudable. I do not question whether its appropriate, or not, to conduct these programs. I question whether its appropriate for the funds to come out of the defense budget for these foreign assistance programs.

I would also point out that DOE has not even spent the funds authorized for it currently in the materials, protection, control and accountability account. The same is true for funds in DOD's program. Although DOD has done a better job at proposing to obligate funds.

Clearly, with the recent terrorist events at the World Trade Center, in Oklahoma City, and in the Tokyo subway, we need to provide assistance to our State and local authorities to prepare them to provide emergency assistance, in the event a domestic terrorist WMD incident occurs.

I think that we should provide more in the way of establishing this particular program, and providing a regional NBC emergency stockpile.

I want to commend the senior Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, for the work that he has done throughout the years to ensure that DOD, DOE and the intelligence community are conducting activities to prevent or combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also want to commend him for his work in authoring the provisions in the last two defense bills that provided the authority for DOD to provide emergency assistance to State and local authorities in the event of a domestic terrorist WMD incident.

I want to work with my colleagues, however, I want to emphasize my concerns about increasing funds in the DOD and DOE budget for cooperative threat reduction activities, for which there are no appropriations.

Lastly, I would ask, is it wise for the United States to provide this type of assistance to Russia, while it continues to build SS-25's; continues to transfer nuclear technology and knowledge to Iran and China?

Mr. President, in closing, I want to re-emphasize my support for the efforts of the sponsors to provide assistance to State and local authorities to respond to domestic terrorist use of WMD . I hope that we can increase the funding for this assistance in the conference.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

I particularly thank him for the references to the work he and I and others on the committee have done in previous years, which, in some respects, laid a modest foundation for the important additions that are presented in the amendment soon to be submitted by the senior Senator from Georgia.

However, I share with the chairman the views that I have, which coincide with his, regarding these expenditures at this particular time. And in the course of the deliberation on this amendment, I shall address specific questions to the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from New Mexico and, indeed, the Senator from Indiana on the points the chairman has raised.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I first thank the chairman of the committee, as well as Senator Warner, for their support of this amendment. I am pleased that we are able to present it this evening and that we are likely to get a vote on it tomorrow.

Mr. President, this amendment deals with one of the most urgent national security problems America faces today. That is the threat of attack on American cities and towns by terrorists, malcontents, or representatives of hostile powers using radiological, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, because Senator Lugar is on the floor, Senator Domenici is on the floor, and my statement will probably run 15 to 20 minutes, I ask to be notified in 10 minutes, and then I intend to yield and complete my statement after they have made their remarks.

If the Chair could notify me when 10 minutes expires.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will do so.

Mr. NUNN. This threat is very different from the threat of nuclear annihilation with which our Nation and the world has dealt during the cold war. During the cold war, both we and the Soviet Union recognized that either side could destroy the other within about an hour, but only at the price of its own destruction.

In the course of carrying out that mutual assured destruction, most of the rest of the civilized world would have been destroyed, in greater or lesser degree, as well. Today, this kind of cataclysmic threat is greatly reduced. And if we are able to continue to implement START I and START II Treaties on both sides, reducing the number of warheads dramatically, it will be reduced further.

Tragically, the end of the cold war, however, has not brought peace and stability, but rather has seemingly unleashed countless small bloody wars around the globe. The end of the cold war also encouraged a number of states that are hostile to the United States to try to acquire weapons of mass destruction and appropriate delivery means as an adjunct to their conventional military forces. They are motivated by two beliefs. One is that the possession of such weapons of mass destruction will advance regional status and power relative to neighboring and often rival states. Second is that they believe possession of weapons of mass destruction, coupled with the threat to use them, can both deter superpower states from interfering in regional conflicts and blackmail them into favorable courses of action.

While here I am not speaking of nuclear weapons, I am including that. In many of these countries, probably a greater threat is the chemical and biological proliferation we now see going on.

Finally, Mr. President, fanatics, small disaffected groups and subnational factions or movements who hold various grievances against governments, or against society, all have increasing access to, and knowledge about the construction of, weapons of mass destruction. Such individuals and groups are not likely to be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction by the classical threat of overwhelming retaliation.

In many past instances of terrorism, we have not even known who the perpetrators were or where they were based. It is very hard to threaten retaliation when you do not know who did it or where they came from or where they were based. These groups are not deterred by the threat of a nuclear counterstrike. A national missile defense system, no matter how capable, is sometimes and often irrelevant to this kind of terrorism.

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which Senator Roth chairs, and I am the ranking Democrat on that committee, held a series of hearings over the last year on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We heard from representatives of the intelligence and law enforcement communities, the Defense Department, private industry, State and local governments, academia, as well as foreign officials.

These witnesses described a threat that we cannot ignore and which we are virtually unprepared to handle. CIA Director John Deutch, for one, candidly observed that `we have been lucky so far.'

Mr. President, the release of deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system should have been a warning bell for America. Prior to those attacks, this Aum Shrinkiyo sect that made this attack was unknown to the United States intelligence and was poorly monitored by Japanese authorities. The Aum Shrinkiyo sect actually conducted several test releases of lethal chemicals prior to the subway attack. Yet, their capacity to manufacture and store those chemicals was unknown to Japanese authorities, this in spite of the fact that they had over 50,000 members in Russia. They were recruiting nuclear scientists. They owned a radio station in Vladivostok and tested sarin gas in Australia against sheep. In addition to many other things they have done, they were not on the radar screen.

We received an even louder warning bell in the World Trade Center bombing which brought it home to America. It was here in the United States, not halfway around the world. The trial judge, at the sentencing of those responsible in that terrible terrorist incident, pointed to several factors that could have made the tragedy far worse.

First, in an effort to get that tower to fall down over its twin tower next door, the killers wanted to park the truck in front of a key structural member of the outer corner of the building. But they could not find an empty parking space. So they went elsewhere.

Second, the killers had access to chemicals to make lethal cyanide gas and, according to the judge, probably put them into the truck bomb. Fortunately, the chemicals appeared to have been vaporized by the force of the blast. Otherwise, the smoke and fumes that were drawn into and up through the tower would have been far more lethal.

So, Mr. President, in all likelihood, it is very likely that the United States has already had, without really focusing on it, our first chemical attack by terrorists. That is the World Trade Center bombing. Fortunately, those chemicals did

not activate.

Mr. President, we had a third warning bell in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This showed yet again the ease of access to simple, widely available commercial products that when combined can create powerful explosions. This knowledge, and much more, is available today over the Internet for anyone who wants to tune in.

The Department of Defense invested billions in the design and protection of binary chemical weapons. A binary chemical weapon contains two chemicals, each of which is harmless when used separately, and they are widely used industrial chemicals. Yet, when mixed together, they create lethal chemical weapons. You can find lists of the ingredients needed to make binary weapons on the Internet today.

Now let me turn to the current state of our domestic efforts to deal with nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological attack.

In recent years, several modest test exercises have been held. In one large exercise, the first hundred or so emergency response personnel--police, firemen, medical personnel--arriving at the scene of the mock simulated disaster rushed headlong into the emergency scene and were promptly declared dead by the referees. In other words, the people who came to the rescue were among the first victims.

In the second exercise, featuring both chemical and biological weapons, contaminated casualties brought to the nearest hospital were handled so carelessly by hospital personnel that within hours most of the staff were judged to have been killed or incapacitated by spreading contamination.

Mr. President, my purpose is not to frighten the American people; it is to persuade the Congress and the American people that we face a new and severe national security threat for which all governments at all levels are woefully inadequately prepared. We must begin now to prepare what surely threatens us already. To do this effectively requires three things.

First, it requires taking the expertise that has been built up over the years in both the Department of Defense and Department of Energy by successive defense budgets and making that expertise available--and rapidly available--to Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness and emergency response teams.

The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy need to bring training to the other officials in our State, local, and Federal Government in the detection, recognition, containment, and treatment of acute crises arising from the use of some form of weapon of mass destruction to those on the front lines in our major metropolitan areas.

DOD and DOE need to train them in the use of detection equipment and in the use of protective gear to avoid becoming casualties themselves. DOD needs to train emergency medical personnel in the appropriate treatment, for triage, and the administration of antibiotics.

There is much to do, and doing it will require DOD and DOE funding. There is simply no other practical source of this kind of expertise. The time to do it is now and not after we suffer a great tragedy.

I, like many of my colleagues, believe there is a high likelihood that a chemical or biological incident will take place on American soil in the next several years. We do not want to be in a posture of demanding to know why we were not

prepared. We do not want a domestic Pearl Harbor.

This training and equipping function is the heart of the amendment, but it is not the whole amendment. There are other parts of the amendment dealing with Customs and dealing with the stopping of these weapons of mass destruction at the source.

At this point in time, I will reserve the remainder of my remarks, and I yield the floor to my two partners in this endeavor, Senator Lugar and then Senator Domenici.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask of the principal sponsor and two cosponsors about the availability of the three to respond to questions at an appropriate time this evening. I intend to pose a number of questions. I am quite anxious to join with these three distinguished Senators because I certainly wholeheartedly support the domestic portions of this legislation. But I would like to ask a question in terms of the overseas portion and designs, and I wonder if the Senators will be available.

Mr. DOMENICI. I would be available, if we do not stay too late. It is pretty tough for me to answer questions if we stay too late.

Mr. LUGAR addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when Chechen rebels placed a 30-pound package of radioactive material in a Moscow park last November, it marked the first act of nuclear terrorism in the post-cold-war era. Although the container was not equipped with the explosives needed to disperse the cesium, the Chechens demonstrated a credible terrorist threat to employ nuclear material attached to explosives as radiological dispersion devices in Russia.

The act crossed a new threshold in terrorism. Demonstrating on Russian television the ability to penetrate Moscow's increased security, Chechen rebels were now in a position to panic the Russian public by issuing similar threats of radiological contaminants.

Terrorism was alive and well in another part of the world at roughly the same time. The worldwide activities of the Japanese Dooms-Day Cult, the Aum Shrinkiyo were not on the radar screen of United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies before the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway last March. This is alarming, considering the cult accumulated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in six countries on four continents.

Cult members actively recruited scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia, and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass destruction. They succeeded in producing chemical weapons, including toxic chemical agents such as sarin, VX, and sodium cyanide; and they were in the process of developing biological weapons, including anthrax, botulism, and `Q' fever.

We have since learned how much more devastating the attacks in Tokyo could have been if the cult had simply perfected their delivery systems. The arrest and subsequent interrogation of members of the Japanese cult has shed more light on the activities of the group, particularly with respect to the extent and nature of its efforts in the area of offensive biological agents.

The Japanese cult conducted extensive research on the manufacture of offensive biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, and tested their dispersal against specific targets on at least three occasions between 1990 and 1995.

The dispersal incidents were attempts to test the effectiveness on humans of Aum-produced toxins and to judge whether they could be used as weapons. Although the cult's tests caused no known casualties, the relative ease with which the botulinum bacteria and anthrax spores were obtained and the need for only basic scientific knowledge to conduct research on biological agents suggests either Aum members still at large or other terrorist groups may be more successful in the future.

We have also learned how close we have come to witnessing acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction directed toward the United States. Listen to the words of Judge Duffy in his sentencing statement before the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing:

The harm actually caused by the World Trade Center bombing was enormous, but what is even more frightening is what was intended by you and your cohorts . . . The bomb was big and that's what you intended, but that's not quite all that was intended . . . The evidence clearly indicated that you attempted to enhance the destructive force of the (device) . . . If the bomb had the explosive force that you envisioned, placed as it was at the base of the north tower next to a diagonal brace, you might have succeeded in your nefarious plot to topple over the north tower into the south tower just like a pair of dominoes.

Had that happened, we'd be dealing with tens of thousands of deaths and billions of dollars of damage, but death is what you sought to cause. You had sodium cyanide around, and I'm sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the sodium cyanide burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had vaporized, it is clear that what would have happened is the cyanide gas would have been sucked into the north tower and everybody in the north tower would have been killed.

I say to my colleagues: Here we have three incidents involving materials and weapons of mass destruction--in Russia, in Japan, and in the United States. The fact that the destruction wrought by the attempted use of these materials was not more massive owes more to luck or accident than to prevention, deterrence, or consequence management.

The threat of weapons of mass destruction is real, and it is now.

As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, a vast potential supermarket of weapons and materials of mass destruction is becoming increasingly accessible. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decay of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological legacy has eliminated this proliferation chokepoint, since states and possibly even sub-state groups can now buy or steal what they previously had to produce on their own. This central fact has transformed the nature of the proliferation problem for the United States as well as the rest of the world.

If this is a fair description of the nature of this threat, the prevailing view that there is today no direct threat to U.S. national security is dead wrong. It is my view that the risk of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon detonation on American soil has increased. While the probability of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia has mercifully decreased dramatically, the probability that one, or two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction detonate in Russia, or Japan, or Europe, or the Middle East, or even the United States has increased.

However, because this new threat comes in a form so unfamiliar, indeed, so radically different from prior experience, and because the instruments and policies to address it are so unlike the business our White House and national security establishments have pursued for decades, the American political leadership, the Congress, and the American people have great difficulty in awakening to this fact.

But, let us be clear. Absent a U.S. response to this threat of leakage of weapons and materials of mass destruction that is as focused, serious, and vigorous as America's cold war strategy, Americans may have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.

To oversimplify, there are three main lines of defense against these emerging threats:

The first is prevention and this must entail activities at the source.

The second is deterrence and interdiction and involve efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials of death.

The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness.

As we have explored the weapons material leakage and proliferation problem, one point has become increasingly clear. If the United States is to have any chance of stopping the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction on our soil, prevention must start at the source, the weapons and materials depots and research institutions in the former Soviet Union.

We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials for terrorist purposes.

The most direct line of defense against these dangers is negotiated, verified reductions in nuclear, chemical, and biological forces. It makes no sense to be for missile defenses and against the START treaties and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, defense spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union is a wise investment. This is the essence of the Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

I favor a prudent approach to strengthening our third line of defense--namely crisis and consequence management, including defense against ballistic missiles--but not at the expense of shoring up the front lines of defense--namely, prevention and deterrence. It is important to point out that a ballistic or cruise missile is not the likely delivery vehicle a terrorist or rogue nation will use to attack the United States. Rather, a Ryder truck, an already proven form of delivery, or a minivan, is much more likely.

Many refuse to believe that this type of drive-up nuclear, chemical, or biological attack is likely. I say it is the most likely. We must protect ourselves from missile attack, but at the same time, we must also be willing to expend the resources necessary to prevent, deter, and interdict this much simpler and more likely form of attack.

In my view, the potential costs of ignoring the threats and problems associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction are so enormous that they demand a national mission on par with the Manhattan Project--Manhattan II. We need to assemble the best minds, with massive resources, to come up with, in a relatively short period of time, the kinds of technical tools that will allow our policymakers to develop truly credible responses and plans in the areas of nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

It will take time. But we can jump start that effort here in the Congress today. And that is the purpose of the amendment being offered by Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici, and myself.

There are three basic elements or components to our amendment. The first component stems from the recognition that the United States cannot afford to rely on a policy of prevention and deterrence alone, and therefore must prudently move forward with mechanisms to enhance preparedness domestically not only for nuclear but chemical and biological incidents as well.

The second component addresses the supply side of these materials, weapons and know-how in the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Building on our prior Nunn-Lugar/CTR experience, and recognizing that it is far more effective, and less expensive, to prevent WMD proliferation in the first place than to face such weapons on the battlefield or the school playground, our amendment includes countermeasures intended to firm up border and export controls, measures to promote and support counterproliferation research and development, and enhanced efforts to prevent the brain-drain of lethal know-how to rogue states and terrorist groups.

The third and last major component stems from the recognition much of the current effort to deal with the NBC threat crosscuts numerous Federal departments and agencies and highlights the need for the creation of a national coordinator for nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy in order to provide a more strategic and coordinated vision and response.

Let me deal briefly with each of these components.

The first component of our amendment concerns domestic preparedness for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Senator Nunn has described this part of the amendment and I will not repeat his explanation. Let me simply say that our hearings have demonstrated that the United States is woefully unprepared for domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although recent Presidential decision directives address the coordination of both crisis and consequence management of a WMD incident, the Federal Government has done too little to prepare for a nuclear threat or nuclear detonation on American soil, and even less for a biological or chemical threat or incident.

The second component of our amendment focuses on further constricting the supply side of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Nunn-Lugar or cooperative threat reduction program and related initiatives has sought to address the threat to United States security posed by the nuclear weapons, scientists, and materials of the former Soviet Union. The mission to secure these nuclear assets, as well as their chemical and biological equivalents, is unfinished.

We week to capitalize on the progress achieved in dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet states and in preventing the flight of weapons scientists over the past 5 years and to expand the core mission of the program so as to address strategically the emerging WMD threats that compromise our domestic security. The resources that will be required to implement programs proposed in the amendment are not intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, current Nunn-Lugar funding levels.

More specifically:

First, cooperative programs to improve the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials must be accelerated and expanded to encompass all of the nuclear facilities that handle sensitive nuclear materials and components.

Second, the security of nuclear materials during transportation between nuclear facilities must receive greater attention. Transportation risks will grow as more nuclear warheads are disassembled and their materials are shipped to interim or permanent storage sites.

Third, greater programmatic emphasis needs to be placed on safeguarding highly enriched uranium fuel used in Russian naval propulsion. We need to accelerate and expand our programs with the Russian Navy to encompass all unirradiated enriched uranium fuels used for ship propulsion.

Fourth, we need to get on with the business of closing down plutonium production facilities in Russia. Russia agreed to a United States proposal to cease plutonium production for weapons but action has been stymied by the fact that the three reactors in question also produce heat and electricity. These reactors can be converted so that they can no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium while permitting them to continue to produce heat and electricity.

Fifth, in order to expand our transparency program efforts with the Russians, we need to undertake new efforts to evaluate technologies and techniques to verify that weapons are being dismantled and to verify the quantities of nuclear materials from disassembled warheads.

Sixth, in the area of securing weapons and materials, it is time to make a concerted effort at chemical and biological threat reduction. Opportunities do exist to secure materials that can be

used to make chemical and biological weapons, and we need to determine the feasibility and priority of moving beyond nuclear threat reduction and beyond chemical-weapons demilitarization efforts to explore possibilities for improving security for chemical and biological weapons materials.

Seventh and last, in addition to enhanced efforts to secure the weapons and materials of mass destruction, we must recognize that the combination of organized crime, porous borders, severe economic dislocation and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union has greatly increased the risk that lethal materials of mass destruction as well as the know-how for producing them can pass rather easily through the borders of the former Soviet Union.

Although Nunn-Lugar programs have begun to offer training and equipment to establish controls on borders and exports throughout the former Soviet Union, much more needs to be done. Much of the training that is done by the U.S. Customs Service will lapse this year.

The third component of the amendment focuses on the need for a national nonproliferation coordinator. There is a broad consensus that WMD proliferation is now, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the top threat to U.S. national security interests. Yet the American response to this proliferation threat remains scattered and unfocused.

The present nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts include dozens of departments and agencies that have responsibilities in one way or another to protect the United States from such threats. This patchwork effort suffers from lack of coordination, overlap, and duplication. The very nature of the WMD threat demands not just the attention of our armed services and diplomatic corps, but also our law enforcement community, our scientific community, and our intelligence community.

In my view, our Nation's nonproliferation effort is in need of a strategic and coordinated government-wide plan.

In order to best address the crosscutting nature of the proliferation challenge, we propose to establish the position of the national nonproliferation coordinator who will be charged with coordinating policies and activities to combat the threat posed by WMD both domestically and internationally. The coordinator should have the authority to review the budgets of all agencies with programs in nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and related areas of intelligence and law enforcement. The office of the coordinator should be augmented with nonproliferation and counterproliferation experts from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, Commerce, the intelligence community, and such other agencies as may contribute to the mission of the national coordinator.

To support a comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, the national coordinator should chair a new committee on proliferation, crime, and terrorism, to be established within the National Security Council. That committee should include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, the DCI, and other department and agency heads the President deems necessary. This committee within the National Security Council should serve as the focal point for all government nonproliferation, counterproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and other efforts to combat threats to the United States posed by weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. President, it is time to go beyond a recitation of the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to start developing an appropriate strategic, coordinated response. We know what the threats and the problems are. We even have the knowledge and expertise to deal constructively with these threats.

Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part of the problem. Summoning the political leadership, the political will and resources, and the support of the American people to act is harder still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of this country, including this Congress, step up to the plate?

Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the morning after the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism takes place on American soil? What will we wish we had done?

This amendment represents our considered judgment as to the appropriate starting points for a national effort to deal with the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have held over 20 hearings during the course of the last year. We have worked with experts in the executive branch--in the law enforcement area, in the Energy Department, in our national laboratories. And we have consulted with officials at the State and local levels--with first responders who will be on the firing line if our efforts at prevention and deterrence should fail.

Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici and I are convinced that the programs and measures outlined in the amendment are doable. And we ask for the support of our colleagues in agreeing to this amendment.

I yield the floor.

[Page: S6992]

Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I first want to indicate to my good friends, Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, how appreciative I am that we have been able to work together to put this comprehensive amendment before the U.S. Senate.

While this is not a session this evening attended by very many Senators, I believe if this amendment is adopted tomorrow and if it remains part of the authorization bill and if it is signed by the President, then this will have been a red-letter day in the future of the United States and our people, because it appears to me that we ought to do everything we can to avoid a catastrophe that can occur in the United States with reference to a nuclear weapon being detonated here or a biological or chemical weapon, which I believe most experts say is probably more apt to happen and more dangerous today to America's future. If we can get our country started in a preventive program and in a coordinated program of using the finest talent we have, scientific and technological, to bear down on this issue, then I believe this will have been an extremely productive defense authorization bill.

Having said that, I would like to make a part of the Record the following: a letter dated June 26 to myself from the Secretary of Energy. I will merely paraphrase it. The Secretary says:

Finally, the amendment will improve both our near-term and long-term work to prevent and counter the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United States. We look forward to working with the Congress to address these priority concerns . . .

I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

(Mr. LUGAR assumed the chair.)

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on June 26, Senator Nunn received a letter--it was actually for all of us and for this amendment--from Defense Secretary Perry. I quote the last paragraph:

Taken together, the amendment's provisions will result in important improvements to the Defense Department's capabilities to prevent and respond to the threats both here and abroad posed by terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[Page: S6993]

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, within the last 3 or 4 days, a very interesting report has been forthcoming. I believe it is a godsend for us. It is called `A Nuclear Black Market,' and it was a report issued under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is very significant, because many of the participants in this study have great credibility with many Senators with reference to issues of this type.

Arnaud De Borchgrave, who many know as former editor of the Washington Times, was the project director of this report. I am not going to make it a part of the Record; I am merely going to suggest to those who wonder whether this amendment moves us in the right direction, I suggest if they want the recommendations of this group, headed by the person that I just talked about, under the auspices of a very reliable think-tank group and containing the following prognosis--and if this does not sound something like the speeches just given by Senators Nunn and Lugar--let me share it with you.

The prognosis says--and that is all I will read and urge that Senators or their staffs interested should read it--the prognosis says:

In the near term, several key variables in the nuclear smuggling equation appear likely to remain bad or may even worsen. Barring an unlikely economic turnaround in the former Soviet Union, struggling nuclear workers will continue to be tempted to steal material. Disarray in the Russian military is apt to worsen in the near term, threatening security at nuclear weapons storage sites.

The current trafficking situation shows a disturbing upward trend. Substantial quantities of materials are likely to remain at large, and the potential for an accident or use of smuggled nuclear materials probably is increasing, partly as a result of dismantling.

By contrast, certain trends are favorable. Improvements in the materials protection and controlled accounting in the former Soviet Union are progressing slowly. The number of deployed warheads and assembled weapons is shrinking and facilities are consolidating. Transit states are beginning to deploy technical detectors and are acquiring needed training and experience. Meanwhile, the international community is starting to respond to this severe challenge. Although any prediction is tenuous, the situation seems likely to get worse over the near term and will not improve unless immediate security enhancements are made.

Then one might be surprised to read the recommendations. The recommendations begin to sound like this bill. For that, I am very pleased, because the three of us and our staffs and an assemblage of experts, not including those who put this report together, have worked very hard in an effort to bring a comprehensive bill before the U.S. Senate tonight.

So, Mr. President, after yesterday's bombing in Saudi Arabia, my colleagues do not need to be reminded of the devastation of a conventional bomb. I am not aware of any of my colleagues who had the opportunity to observe an above-ground nuclear blast, but I believe my colleagues recognize the devastation that such an explosion would have if a nuclear weapon were to explode in New York City or in Indianapolis or in Atlanta or in Chicago.

We are less familiar, however, with the threat of chemical weapons, although we do have some experience from the Tokyo

subway incident, which has been discussed thoroughly here tonight, from observing the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, and from dealing with accidental chemical leaks in events such as railroad car derailments.

I think very few of us are aware of what could happen if a rogue nation or group attacked the United States with a biological device. The device could very well be made in a laboratory the size of a kitchen.

My colleagues recognize all the equipment necessary to culture a biological agent. Most of it can be found in a high school or college chemistry laboratory, or ordered, I might say, from a number of mail-order houses in the United States and around the world.

In that kitchen laboratory, the first drop of an agent would be cultured until it multiplied billions of times. To turn those germs into a weapon would be very straightforward. The biological agent would be placed in a container designed to open and disperse the material into the air, possibly with a small fan. The device would be most effective placed in locations of which significant airflows interact. And when that interacts with large numbers of people, they have almost a special place for this kind of destruction:

A metro station, the air-conditioning system of a large building, an airport.

People passing through would breathe the agent into their lungs, where it would continue to multiply with every breath. The unknowing transporter would exhale some of the agent, to be breathed in by others. The first illness might not occur for several days. First, those directly exposed would start to die. Then their co-workers, their families, their friends would start to die.

Initially hospitals would be overwhelmed, like we found when we have had viruses before, including the Ebola virus. The virus would flourish at the hospitals, turning them into killing grounds. I could go on.

I do this because I truly think it is imperative that somehow we get the message to the policymakers of this country and ultimately to the people of this Nation that just as we amassed in the Manhattan project the greatest of our scientists with a mission, a mission to save America by developing the atomic bomb, it is imperative that we coordinate our best efforts and resources, our best scientists and technicians to lodge an attack on the impending potential disasters that can come from biological and chemical destruction and the forces that can be set forth and lay millions of people to waste.

There are no easy answers. But there were not easy answers to some of these gigantic technical and scientific problems that we have faced in the past. The longer we sit by and assume it will all be taken care of because a lot of people are working on these kinds of issues, the longer we are being fooled. So we have put together a bill that addresses these issues on many fronts.

Clearly, it addresses the issue of the nuclear black market. That has already been discussed in great detail. I merely want to say to Senators who might wonder whether it is in America's interests to negate this black market or whether it is in somebody else's interest, there can be no question, it is in our interest, the whole notion of a black market coming out of the Soviet Union, because they are dismantling, are in a state of disarray, building down their nuclear weapons, all of which contributes an enormous potential for the dissemination of those kinds of things from whence nuclear bombs can be made.

It is in our interest that we continue, as difficult as it is, to put some resources into trying to tame that which is being loosed on the world through individual conduct in the Soviet Union and in some cases through organized conduct. The genie is out of the bottle there, but it behooves us to try to make that as small as humanly possible. And we can do better.

If we adopt this amendment, and find the resources to fund it, it will be just another very positive stride in the direction of doing what is prudent for our people in reference to this very, very serious threat.

It is kind of amazing and somewhat ironic that as we end the cold war, we turn loose a new hot substance. It is no longer necessarily the fleet of rockets aimed at us, but it is the tremendous inventory from plutonium to enriched uranium and everything in between that can be turned loose because a country cannot control its people and does not have the money to pay its scientists to keep working and do productive things. What a tremendous, difficult situation we are confronted with, difficult enough to do something serious about.

This bill clearly takes some giant steps in the right

direction. It directs the Department of Defense to create an emergency response team similar to the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team. This team could be called upon to locate and deactivate chemical or biological devices or try to contain them once detonated.

The amendment directs the Departments of Energy and Defense to develop new technologies to detect the production and transportation of these agents. Just think of how tough this one is. But if we do not tell our scientists to try to find ways to detect these devices and the places of their origin, then what chance do we have to make any real strides in inhibiting the devastating potential, a little piece of which I described in my early remarks.

Metro medical strike teams are established. I will not go into great detail. Joint exercises are provided for, and an effort to help our local law enforcement, not take over, but to help them become more proficient in this potential and thus more able to be of help and be part of prevention rather than wait until something happens and then have the clamor that nobody knew what to do, nobody was trained.

We are smart enough to know that these things can happen. Tonight my two colleagues have already explained how they have already happened and how close we have come in our own country to a major--to a major--biological disaster in New York City.

There is much more I could say tonight. Most of my remaining remarks would have to do with the former Soviet Union and certain programs that are working fairly well, some that we ought to enhance and make better. But I will not do that because between Senators Nunn and Lugar, they have touched on it. I am sure when Senator Nunn finishes his remarks tonight, since he has started in this arena in the former Soviet Union, he will make additional remarks about what we ought to be doing.

I merely want to say that I got some very good education about this from some of our national laboratories. I participated in two national seminars hosted by Los Alamos National Laboratory, and in the last case by them and Harvard University, when they brought the best thinkers together to tell us about the reality of this situation.

Are we pipe dreaming or is it real? If it is real, what should we be doing about it? From those kinds of contacts, I have arrived at the conclusion that if one is going to leave a legacy around here, one ought to leave a legacy in this area of calling this kind of problem to the attention of the policymakers and then doing something about it.

If one would have been part of originating the Manhattan project, one might have been very proud of having a part in assembling this massive talent, managed in an appropriate way, to bring America the first atomic bomb. The same thing might be happening here, for our great scientists might permit us to evolve from this legislation into something that might really preserve and save literally millions of people and literally millions of Americans now and in the future.

Now, let me turn to the threat of nuclear weapons. At its peak in 1992, the Soviet Union possessed approximately 45,000 nuclear warheads and weapons grade nuclear material to fabricate thousands more.

The Soviet Union also produced an unknown amount of highly enriched uranium for reactors and for their nuclear navy. That material is also weapons usable.

While we will never know for certain how much of this material exists, the number 1,200 metric tons of weapons-usable material is frequently used.

If one considers that a simple nuclear weapon requires 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 4 kilograms of plutonium, there is enough weapons usable nuclear material in Russia to build more than 63,000 nuclear weapons, each of which could fit in a briefcase.

That material cannot be accounted for--the best concrete example we have is Project Sapphire.

Project Sapphire occurred when the Government of Kazakhstan found 600 kilograms--enough material for 32 nuclear weapons--of highly enriched uranium that had been inadvertently left in Kazakhstan when the Soviets left.

Not only was 600 kilograms left behind, but the inventory of that material conducted according to Soviet measuring techniques was off by 4 percent--enough to make almost two nuclear weapons.

In the Sapphire case, the Department of Energy secured that material and transported it to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. But that case demonstrates how lacking inventory control systems are in the former-Soviet Union.

Even when the material is in dedicated storage facilities it represents a threat. At Chelyabinsk-65, bulk plutonium is stored in a warehouse with glass windows and a padlock on the door. Inside the facility are over 10,000 ingots of separated plutonium stored in thermos-sized containers--perfect for picking up and walking out.

If the terrorists who tried to blow up the World Trade Center had used a nuclear weapon made of that weapons usable nuclear material, Manhattan--all the way up to Gramercy Park, would have disappeared. If such a device had been set off in Oklahoma City, most of Oklahoma City would have disappeared.

The examples I have given are using a simple weapon design that is available over the Internet. If a rogue nation were to hire a Russian weapons designer and have access to the necessary material, that designer could build a sophisticated, multiple-stage weapon many times more powerful.

My colleagues need to understand that the weapons used in Nagasaki and Hiroshima were much cruder designs than are easily available today. If a terrorist or rogue nation gains control of weapons usable nuclear material--they immediately become a nuclear power more advanced than the United States was when we bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We cannot let that happen.

For the past 5 years, under the leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, Congress has provided $300-$400 million per year to address this problem. Unfortunately, when the original legislation authorizing that work was enacted in 1991, it included numerous restrictions on its use.

I understand why those restrictions were put in place--when Nunn-Lugar was first enacted, the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Empire still flew over Red Square. But there have been some real successes--a lot of which resulted from the less formal interactions of the Department of Energy with their counterparts in the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy.

It turns out that these scientists; ours at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia; and theirs at Arzamas, Tomsk, and Chelyabinsk; think alike. They have been following each other's work for years and have tremendous respect for one another. So when the Cold War ended, they started getting together and found they have a great deal in common.

Out of those informal relationships have developed some very important programs.

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The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear material at 35 facilities in the former-Soviet Union. Those security systems include, cameras, gates, portal monitors, and tagging devices to track nuclear material.

At the January Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, six more sites were added to the list of sites to which DOE will have access to secure nuclear materials.

Because these sites were only agreed to in January, funds were not included in the President's budget request. However, these sites are a top priority--one of the sites is Krasnoyarsk-26, one of the sites of Russia's remaining three plutonium production reactors.

The amendment includes an additional $15,000,000 for the program.


The close relationships developing between the national laboratories here and the Russian Institutes is the foundation of our success to date.

Lab-To-Lab efforts are intentionally diverse. Currently, efforts are focusing on ways to safeguard and transport assembled Russian nuclear weapons.

This amendment expands the Lab-To-Lab Program to include all the states of the former-Soviet Union and provides an additional $20,000,000.


Highly enriched uranium intended for naval propulsion can be used in nuclear weapons. To date, our material protection, control, and accounting efforts have focused on the Ministry of Atomic Energy and have not involved the Russian Navy.

Through the Lab-To-Lab Program, the Department of Energy has met with Russian naval officers. In April, a delegation of Russian naval officers visited Oak Ridge, Sandia, and Los Alamos to familiarize themselves with our protection, control, and accounting systems.

In turn, Department of Energy officials have visited Murmansk and an agreement is now in place to secure fresh Russian naval fuel at two locations.


The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear material at 35 facilities in the former-Soviet Union. Those security systems include, cameras, gates, portal monitors, and tagging devices to track nuclear material.

At the January Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting, six more sites were added to the list of sites to which DOE will have access to secure nuclear materials.

Because these sites were only agreed to in January, funds were not included in the President's budget request. However, these sites are a top priority--one of the sites is Krasnoyarsk-26, one of the sites of Russia's remaining three plutonium production reactors.

The amendment includes an additional $15,000,000 for the program.


The close relationships developing between the national laboratories here and the Russian Institutes is the foundation of our success to date.

Lab-To-Lab efforts are intentionally diverse. Currently, efforts are focusing on ways to safeguard and transport assembled Russian nuclear weapons.

This amendment expands the Lab-To-Lab Program to include all the states of the former-Soviet Union and provides an additional $20,000,000.


Highly enriched uranium intended for naval propulsion can be used in nuclear weapons. To date, our material protection, control, and accounting efforts have focused on the Ministry of Atomic Energy and have not involved the Russian Navy.

Through the Lab-To-Lab Program, the Department of Energy has met with Russian naval officers. In April, a delegation of Russian naval officers visited Oak Ridge, Sandia, and Los Alamos to familiarize themselves with our protection, control, and accounting systems.

In turn, Department of Energy officials have visited Murmansk and an agreement is now in place to secure fresh Russian naval fuel at two locations.

The amendment includes $6,000,000 to initiate this work and expand to eventually include 10 to 15 locations and a navy-wide accounting system.

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Weapons usable nuclear material is a clear threat. However, if that material is combined with someone knowledgeable enough to build a sophisticated, multiple-state system, the threat increases dramatically.

The Industrial Partnering Program seeks to bring together Russian nuclear scientists with U.S. industry to provide new careers so those individuals are less likely to be lured into the service of rogue nations or groups.

U.S. companies benefit from the exceptional technical capabilities of these scientists and engineers, but we also gain the knowledge that at least some of these potentially dangerous people have found a way to feed their families without endangering our national security.

Because the Armed Services Committee has already increased funding for IPP to $50,000,000 from $15,000,000, this legislation simply expands IPP's mandate to include facilities once used to produce biological and chemical weapons.


The United States has to develop better means of detecting nuclear, biological, and chemical materials.

Using current remote sensing technology, a chemical or biological weapons factory is almost impossible to differentiate from a fertilizer factory or a brewery. Our experience in Iraq demonstrates that, even in a country that allows International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, it is difficult to detect a covert nuclear program.

The amendment includes an additional $20,000,000 to develop technologies so that we can assess whether our enemies are developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capabilities.


Unlike the United States, the reactors used to produce plutonium for Soviet nuclear weapons, also produced electricity to heat surrounding towns. Three of those reactors continue to operate and produce plutonium; two at Krasnyarsk-26 and one at Tomsk-7.

Russia has refused to shut the reactors down because they are desperate for the electricity. However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has agreed to convert the cores of the three reactors so they no longer produce weapons grade plutonium.

It is my understanding that the conversion will cost $70,000,000 to $90,000,000.

The amendment includes $15,000,000 to complete the necessary design analysis and to begin procuring the necessary components.


Russia is currently dismantling 2,000 warheads per year and storing the nuclear components in facilities one Russian advisor has referred to as `an old warehouse'.

The first priority must be to secure that material through the MPC&A Program but our long term objective must be the permanent disposition of that material.

Recently Los Alamos National Laboratory won an R&D 100 award for a new technology that enables us, for the first time, to transform plutonium from weapons into non-weapons usable forms in a verifiable manner.

This is a significant accomplishment because the Russians refuse to let us see the plutonium from their weapons since the shape of the plutonium is one of their most closely guarded secrets.

However, the new ARIES technology will enable us to verifiably transform weapons grade plutonium, removed directly from a weapon, into an ingot of plutonium oxide or hydride unsuitable for weapons use.

The amendment provides $10,000,000 to initiate a joint program in this area.


These are the programs we have determined are of the highest national security--they are not foreign aid.

As a result of these programs, we will safely and permanently dismantle and inventory Russian nuclear weapons, and tie up their weapons expertise.

When the original Nunn-Lugar legislation was enacted, it was accompanied by all sorts of requirements for certifications that Russia was meeting certain requirements. That logic is exactly backwards--we are undertaking these programs where they are in our national security interest and the Russian Federation is willing to cooperate.

Again, I am very proud to be part of this amendment. We have worked very hard together on it. I am very grateful to the two Senators, the occupant of the chair and Senator Nunn, for letting me join you in this effort. I hope it does reach fruition. I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from New Mexico and my friend from Indiana who now occupies the chair. This has truly been a partnership. I say that the Senator from New Mexico has been really a part of this overall effort from the very beginning.

I remember very well when we had the original Nunn-Lugar amendment on the floor and the Senator from New Mexico came and spoke up very vigorously in favor of that, as did the Senator from Virginia. The Senator from Virginia has been very helpful in this legislation from the very beginning.

So the Senator from New Mexico has made immense contributions here and in the DOE lab program, the many other programs that the Department of Energy is involved in. And primarily it is the work of the Senator from New Mexico. So we are very proud to be partners in this endeavor, and it is truly a bipartisan endeavor.

I know the Senator from Virginia would like to ask questions. I am going to abbreviate my concluding remarks.

Mr. President, as I said earlier, this training and equipping function is the heart of this amendment, but not the whole amendment. Other parts of the amendment are designed to beef up our customs capability to try to interdict the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and their components into the United States, and to provide the latest detection technology to customs officials. The best way to prevent a terrorist incident involving a nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapon is to stop these dangerous materials at our ports and airfields and borders.

While some equipment is available that is capable of detecting materials related to these weapons, this equipment is not yet widely deployed, and we must speed up the process. In addition, we must speed the development of new technologies that can detect nuclear, chemical, and biological materials before they reach the terrorist who will assemble them, or detect the materials in an assembled weapon before it can be set off. Better technology is essential to guard our borders, and it is essential for our domestic law enforcement.

We are also concerned about interdicting supplies of dangerous materials across frontiers in Eastern Europe, the Caucusus, and along the southern flank of the former Soviet Union, where many newly-independent states effectively have no customs capability. Therefore, the amendment provides modest funding for US customs to train counterparts in those countries, upon request.

In addition, the amendment allocates some funds for expansion and continuation of the original Nunn-Lugar concept through programs run both by the Department of Energy and by the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We are seeking to expand these programs both in Russia, and, increasingly, in other states of the former Soviet Union. My cosponsors will describe these activities in more detail.

Finally, there are three serious deficiencies in planning for contingencies. First is the lack of coordination of activities across the many Federal agencies who have some responsibility for some portions of the overall problem. Second is the lack of coordination of Federal agencies and activities with those of the states and municipalities who will be first to bear the brunt of future attacks. Third is the lack of a national security funding mechanism to match the new national security missions in many of the Federal agencies whose actions must ultimately be integrated with those of DOD and DOE. To address these fundamental problems, this legislation establishes a coordinator in the office of the President to try to bring a degree of order to the fragmented responsibilities that exist today.

With this introduction and description of the main purpose of the legislation, Mr. President, let me next give a brief section-by-section overview of the amendment.

Title One focuses on the need to better train, equip and coordinate our emergency response personnel who are presently unprepared to deal with terrorist incidents involving nuclear, chemical or biological agents. Our bill makes efficient use of the expertise in our military and energy departments to train local officials to response to incidents involving WMD . Our hearings highlighted weaknesses in federal preparedness for WMD incidents,

especially regarding coordination among agencies. Our legislation goes a long way toward improving this situation by establishing a chemical and biological response team, modeled after the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team. Such assistance and expertise could only be brought to bear if called up by civil authorities to implement the Federal disaster response plan, and would be limited by language that respects the proper demarcation between our military and civilian agencies. Keeping in mind these precautions, it is possible to apply our Nation's hard-won expertise in chemical and biological warfare to this urgent national security threat without infringing on our political traditions.

Additionally, this legislation creates medical responses teams throughout the United States. These highly trained and deployable health care teams will assist the existing local resources in our cities and towns to respond to and mitigate a WMD incident.

Title II includes countermeasures against the smuggling of WMD materials when they do leak from their source. This legislation supports efforts to tighten border security and export controls both at our boarders, and elsewhere on likely routes that these lethal materials might take through states of the former Soviet Union. It also supports research for development of technical means to detect the unauthorized transportation of these lethal materials. Finally, it recommends greater penalties for those criminals involved in smuggling of these materials.

Title III builds upon the successes of the Nunn-Lugar program to address the full range of the proliferation threats to our country. The Nunn-Lugar/cooperative threat reduction programs focus on the problem at its source by improving safeguards on weapons, weapons materials, and expertise inside the FSU. Since its inception, this program had made an enormous contribution to improving the security of our Nation. As of June 1, Ukraine, which held far more nuclear weapons than any state other than the United States and Russia, is no longer a nuclear state. Kazakstan became nuclear free last year, and Belarus will become nuclear free by this fall. Our legislation provides funds to the Defense and Energy Departments in order to promote efforts at control of these weapons and materials, and conversion of facilities that produce them. I often ask the critics of these programs how much it is worth--in terms of our security--to destroy Soviet missiles and to dismantle their warheads, and to keep the resulting nuclear weapons materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations? How much did we spend to deter the use of these same missiles during the cold war?

Finally, what is needed is a comprehensive strategy that encompasses the many facets of the proliferation threat. The time has come to adopt our Government to the complexities of the post cold war national security situation. WMD proliferation crosscuts numerous agencies and departments, including some such as the Customs Department, the FBI and the Department of Health and Human Services, that have not previously been recognized as having major responsibilities for national security. The convergence of proliferation with terrorism and organized crime, the growing awareness of the potential use of chemical and biological agents in a terrorist incident, further complicates the implementation of a comprehensive approach to this problem.

Title IV establishes a national coordinator to pull together the different parts of our nonproliferation policy. The national coordinator would be appointed by the President to serve in the Executive Office of the President. He or she would oversee the senior directors for nonproliferation, counterproliferation, arms control, terrorism and global crime to assure that we remain focused, that our priorities receive consistent high-level attention, and that vital proliferation threats do not slip through the cracks.

I am convinced that we must address this issue before the unthinkable happens. Can we afford to dismiss the possibility that another World Trade Center or Oklahoma City bombing could involve chemicals, biological organisms or radioactive materials? We do so at our peril. The trends are clear: more nations and groups are exploiting increased availability of information, technology, and materials to acquire mass destruction or mass terror capabilities. There is no reason to believe they are not willing to sue them. I have heard too many experts whose opinions and credentials I respect, tell me that it is not a question of if but only of when. I believe this legislation, while only a beginning, responds to a very urgent national security concern of our Nation.

Mr. President, in essence, we have three different ways of trying to protect the American people from weapons of mass destruction in terms of proliferation.

One way is the original Nunn-Lugar program, which is an effort to stop the material at its source, not to have the material, the scientists, the know-how come out of the former Soviet Union and spread all over the world, ending up threatening either the United States and our people or our allies. That is what we are beefing up here. We are trying to accelerate some of the good programs that are ongoing there.

So that is step No. 1. Just as we have tried to stop drugs at their source, we are trying to prevent this proliferation from getting out of the former Soviet Union. That is not just Russia.

I hear people talk about `foreign assistance.' This is not foreign assistance.

We have other programs that are foreign assistance. This program is national security. It is in our national security interests not to have the Russian nuclear weapons, nuclear material, nuclear know-how, scientists all over the world ending up threatening both the United States and our military forces wherever they are deployed, but also threatening American people. This is in no way foreign assistance. As a matter of fact, there is no cash involved here. We are not furnishing cash to Russians. They do not have any way to convert this cash to their own defense programs that do not relate to this. They are basically being furnished equipment and know-how for a specific purpose. There is one cash provision, I believe, going to the Ukraine. That is the only one and that is subject to very strict accounting procedures.

Stopping the proliferation at its source is the best, most productive, the most effective, the most efficient way of dealing with this problem. We ought to continue that effort as long as the window of opportunity is open. It remains open today in Russia and it remains open in Belarus, and it remains open in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. We have succeeded beyond what any of us thought was possible in this regard. Since September 1990, over 4,000 warheads have been removed from operational status in the former Soviet Union; over 1,000 missiles have been removed from launches; over 800 missile launchers and bombers have been destroyed; controls, safety guards and a myriad of nuclear facilities in Russia have been enhanced, adding new layers of defense against proliferation efforts.

Outside of Russia, the most significant event, which I know the occupant of the Chair now, and I, believed at one time was not likely to happen, and that is the other countries that could have become nuclear powers--Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--are no longer headed down that road. In Kazakhstan, all the nuclear weapons have been removed. No nuclear hand on the trigger or finger on the trigger in Kazakhstan. About a week and a half, 2 weeks ago, the last nuclear warhead came out of the Ukraine. I have been informed by people in Belarus and my own officials that the last warhead will come out of Belarus this year. If nothing else, if nothing else, having one nuclear hand on the trigger, that is Russia, instead of four countries that we have to deal with and defend against and worry about is an enormous accomplishment.

How much would we have paid during the cold war to basically find three countries that had weapons of mass destruction and be able to get rid of them? If the CIA or the Department of Defense had come in and said, `If you will give us x number of dollars in our budget, we will guarantee you that we will get rid of the weapons in three countries that are now aimed at the United States,' how much would we have paid for that? Ten billion dollars, $20 billion, $30 billion, $40 billion, $50 billion? Probably $60 billion or $70 billion. It would have been enormous. We spent trillions of dollars defending over the years. Now we have been able to accomplish this not because they were doing us a favor, but because these countries realized it was in their own best interests, their own national security interests to get rid of these weapons, to ship

them back to Russia to keep them under central control.

We were able to use these funds to give them the incentive and the priority and the reason to their own people, to their own legislative bodies, to help justify what was fundamentally in their interests. Stopping these weapons at their source is the No. 1 effective way. I am very much in favor of the other parts of this bill, but this is the most effective money we will spend. I hope everyone recognizes that. If you look at what has been accomplished, you can see that very clearly.

The second way we are trying to deal with the problem is through the Customs Service. We are using, yes, DOD and DOE money to help the Customs Service beef up their capability to prevent weapons from coming into this country, so that the Customs Service is able to get from DOD and DOE the best technology we have to be able to detect weapons coming across the border--not just nuclear, but chemical and biological, as well. Also, we are beefing up the DOD-DOE work in finding better ways to detect these weapons.

I have been briefed many times on this subject, most recently this last week, and it is very clear that even with all the work DOD and DOE have done, we still have a long way to go to find, really, effective state-of-the-art methods of detecting particularly chemical and biological weapons. We are better at nuclear detection than chemical and biological. Those are the threats that are more likely to happen. Not only detecting coming across the borders but detecting these in airports, ports and major cities where an attack may be suspected. That is the second way, beefing up customs.

The other facet is customs will also, under this bill, be given a mandate and some money to help these other countries like Kazakhstan, Belarus, the southern countries in the former Soviet Union so that they will be able to beef up their own customs. These countries want to help, they want to be able to help prevent the spread of these weapons, but they do not have the know-how or the expertise. In many cases, they do not have the training, and they certainly do not have the equipment. This is the second way we are dealing with this problem.

Finally, we are dealing with it by acknowledging that we have a serious and fundamental problem in terms of our cities, our States, particularly our metropolitan areas, in being able to, No. 1, detect the materials that may be used for attack against soft targets, against population centers, against airports, against major sporting events, whatever, to detect it and prevent it. Second, to be able to deal with it if it happened. We are woefully unprepared to deal with this kind of catastrophic act of terrorism if it occurs. There is no doubt about that.

We have had before the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and the occupant of the Chair has had similar hearings in his Foreign Relations Committee, and we have had hearings in the Subcommittee on Investigations, and there is no doubt the police departments, the fire departments, are on record as saying, `We need help.' That is what we are trying to do here.

This will not solve the problem. This is a beginning. This is an effort to help train, probably first of all, some Federal people who can go out and train others. Probably we will have the FEMA people involved. They are not ready to do this now, but it is my hope that we will be able to phase DOD and DOE out of this kind of training for domestic law

enforcement officials and firemen, sometime in the next 2 to 3 years. They are the best source now, but perhaps the administration will decide with the flexibility they have been given to train the Federal emergency management people so they can continue this training in the future. Right now, we have no choice but to deal with the expertise we have, and that is in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. We are encouraging that.

I know the Senator from Virginia, being a former Marine, would be very interested, and I know he is aware that the Marine Corps is beefing up a considerable amount of talents and capability now to be able to deal, as the NEST team does in the Department of Energy, with nuclear threat, to deal with the chemical and biological threat. The Department of Defense will make that decision as to who is the main resource there, but the Marine Corps is out front, and our special operation forces also very much are involved in this area. So we have some military capability there that is going to be developed.

Mr. President, the only other thing I add, we are beefing up the research capabilities of both DOE and DOD. I emphasize that because we need better methods, we need better tools, we need better equipment, we need better protective gear and we need to do everything we can to bring our considerable technology to bear to deter and to prevent and to detect and finally to deal with this threat, if necessary.

Rather than take more time now, I thank my colleagues. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his patience. I know he has some questions and I know they will be pertinent and relevant questions. Those should be answered here. I thank all of our colleagues and I thank the cosponsors of this amendment, Senator Biden, Senator Graham, Senator Specter, Senator Daschle, and others who will be speaking, I am sure, on this subject in the hours ahead.

I yield the floor.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do join and commend the principal sponsors for their work product and for their many, many hours of labor devoted, together with staff, in preparing the amendment. I will ask some questions of my colleagues and I am certain they will see these in the spirit of constructive dialog.

First, the joint DOD-DOE report on preparedness of the Government to respond to nuclear, chemical and biological incidents.

That report, which was just issued recently--I think, in the last few weeks--recommended provided authority to establish a training program, authority to establish a chemical biological response team, and the establishment of a regional NBC stockpile, particularly for medical stockpiles and the like.

Can the proponents of the amendment inform the Senate with respect to that report and the parallelism in the amendment and that report?

Mr. President, I just learned of the report. It may well be that the sponsors have not had the opportunity to see it.

Mr. NUNN. I will supplement it for the Record. I have not studied that report at this stage. We have had a number of hearings in our committee. We have heard from these same officials, such as the Department of Energy Secretary, and I believe the Senator from New Mexico put a letter in the Record from the Department of Energy and Secretary of Defense Perry endorsing this legislation.

It is a strong endorsement for this effort from the DOE and DOD. So I am confident that this report, based on those endorsements, based on the numerous meetings we have had, and based on the testimony--I am sure this amendment would reinforce, supplement, and give impetus to the recommendations in that report. I would have to supplement the Record on that particular answer because I have not had a chance to study the report itself.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is quite satisfactory. I will be glad to work with my colleagues.

Mr. DOMENICI. I just wanted to say we put in the Secretary Perry letter.

Mr. NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. WARNER. My understanding is that the pending amendment includes authority for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to the Department of Justice. There was a comparable attempt made in the antiterrorism bill, but that was specifically dropped in the conference. Can my colleagues enlighten me on that problem?

Again, Mr. President, I am perfectly understanding. Your amendment, Senator, has a provision for the Department of Defense to provide assistance to the Department of Justice. A similar effort was made in the antiterrorism bill, and that comparable provision was dropped in conference.

Mr. NUNN. Yes. I talked to Senator Hatch about that this evening. I have also conversed with Senator Biden, and our staffs have been in touch with both of them. This provision we have in this bill is very close to the amendment that passed the Senate overwhelmingly and that was worked out carefully between Senator Hatch and myself and Senator Biden. It does provide an

extraordinary circumstance that the DOE and DOD can help State and local officials. For instance, if there were a subway attack in New York, if the fire department and police department were overwhelmed with the chemical sarin gas, there would be the ability to ask for emergency assistance. Then the Departments of Defense and Justice--the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General--could respond. It would have to be very narrowly prescribed circumstances, where they could respond to that situation only, in very unique circumstances, where the State and local governments and the normal law enforcement officials would not be capable of responding.

So that provision is in this bill. It was dropped--the Senator from Virginia is correct--from the antiterrorism bill in conference. I think that was a fundamental mistake, a flaw. But it is a part of this legislation.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in essence, we have now renewed the attention of the Senate to the need for that provision.

Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WARNER. Two years ago, Mr. President, the Congress authorized $10 million for a joint DOD-FBI training program to assist the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe to control the export of weapons of mass destruction.

Is there a current status report on that program available, and, if so, at some appropriate time, could it be made a part of the Record?

Mr. NUNN. I would also like to supplement that for the Record. Director Louis Freeh took a trip to the former Soviet Union, including Eastern Europe, and established liaison offices in a number of those countries. I also know that those countries were very anxious to have FBI cooperation. It also is clear that our Customs Service has liaison with their colleagues in these former Soviet Union countries, as well as all around the world. What we are trying to do here is give the Customs Service of this country the ability, the wherewithal, the mandate, and the funding to begin a much more vigorous program and that kind of coordination. That is where we stand on it, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. The costs of eliminating or converting chemical and biological facilities, as we know, are very high both here at home and indeed abroad in the former Soviet Union. What is the justification that we would provide to our taxpayers for authorizing funds for such activities in the former Soviet Union, and, particularly, why would we be authorizing an activity that would, in some respects, contravene our requirement under the CWT, which is to completely destroy the chemical facilities?

Mr. NUNN. I do not know of any contradiction between this legislation and the Chemical Weapons Treaty. Perhaps the Senator could amplify on that question. In fact, everything in this would be aimed toward helping the former Soviet Union countries--not just Russia, but others--comply with their obligations under the arms control agreements, including chemical, but not limited to that.

Mr. WARNER. The question dealt with the conversion as opposed to the destruction in the facility. I would suggest that, at some point, that be supplemented into the Record, if I might have that.

Mr. NUNN. We can look at that. Basically, a facility that is converted, from my definition of conversion, would lose its

ability to have any kind of production capability. That would be my definition of conversion. If a facility were being assisted in terms of conversion by any of the funding here, it would certainly be my view that that facility should not continue to produce chemical weapons. But we have a long way to go in that regard. There is nothing that I know of that is taking place in that kind of conversion. There has been some conversion with the nuclear facilities, particularly missile fields and that kind of thing.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, speaking for myself, although other colleagues and the chairman spoke earlier, I wholeheartedly support the portions of this amendment which relate to the domestic requirements here in the United States. I thought the Senator from New Mexico spoke most eloquently about the contingencies; indeed, all three Senators did, but I was particularly taken by the remarks of the Senator from New Mexico. I, likewise, studied these and have spoken on the floor of the Senate, and elsewhere, about my deep concern facing the United States in view of the simplicity, particularly in the area of chemical and biological, and about the creation of even very small weapons of mass destruction.

My concerns with the amendment, however, are directly and primarily to the continued assistance to the former Soviet Union and the states therein. This is a substantial increase in spending, Mr. President, on this particular program. I point out that, according to my rough calculations here, we are in this bill for the cooperative threat, that is the CTR, with the Soviet Union, $327 million in DOD funds, $108 million in DOE funds, and this amendment would add around another $143 million to this sum.

I think Members of the Senate are hopeful that this amendment will pass. We should address these expenditures either in conference, or at some point in time, to determine the capability of expending such large numbers. Would the Senator wish to comment on that? I stated them in the aggregate. I do not think either Senator that presented it mentioned the other parts of the bill.

Mr. NUNN. If I could just elaborate on that last question, let me state that on the conversion and elimination what we have done in this amendment is provide flexibility because the Chemical Weapons Treaty has not entered into effect yet. So until that enters into effect there would be flexibility for us to assist in. But once it enters into effect, when and if it does--and, of course, we have not ratified it here in the Senate yet--at that stage the parties to that would be obligated to eliminate. And basically that elimination provision would be required. There would be no more conversion.

But I think it is clear that we would not intend to help them convert unless they stopped production. But they could convert, stop production, and not eliminate. But once the treaty goes into effect they would have to eliminate.

If I could elaborate just briefly because I have been handed the report that the Senator from Virginia alluded to between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense signed by Walter Slocombe and Thomas Grumbly, Slocombe being Undersecretary of Defense, and Grumley being Undersecretary of Energy. And I think that is the one the Senator referred to.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator give the date of the document?

Mr. NUNN. This was June 13. So that is it. I will quote one paragraph which I think goes right to the point that I think the Senator was asking about, page 24 of the report, paragraph 3:

The focus of efforts to significantly improve our ability to manage the consequences of a terrorist incidence, however, should be on the first response by local police, fire, and rescue organizations. Local authorities need quick access to NBC detection--that is nuclear, biological, chemical--and decontamination and transport equipment. When an incidence involving NBC materials is suspected, lack of timely arrival in well trained, community based teams, fully equipped with the state of art equipment, could cost thousands of lives in most communities today across the Nation. These casualties would include unacceptable numbers of irreplaceable emergency personnel.

So I think the heart of what we are trying to do is also in this joint report. I think the report is entitled `Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical Terrorist Attack.'

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Mr. WARNER. If I could just summarize that, as I understand for the proponents of the amendment, the objectives to the amendment are in parallel to, consistent and supportive of, the objectives in that report.

Mr. NUNN. That is correct.

I say to my friend from Virginia that in terms of the amount of money here it is not an insignificant sum. We are talking about a total amount under the Nunn-Lugar program thus far of $1.5 billion that has been spent.

Mr. WARNER. Since the inception of the program.

Mr. NUNN. Yes. This amendment tonight represents $235 million. It is not additional money to the DOD-DOE bill. It is shifting of funds within the bill.

So this is not an increase in DOD-DOE funding. I happen to believe--the Senator from Virginia may not share this; others may not--but I think it is clear and in that report that the CSIS just issued by Judge Webster, former head of the FBI and former head of the CIA--there is great respect for him I know

in this body on both sides of the aisle, and for others on that very distinguished panel--they came to the conclusion, and I have come to this conclusion and stated it often, that this is our No. 1 one national security threat.

In the era we are in, this is the No. 1 one security threat to American people; that is, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, nuclear, scientific know-how, and scientists themselves ending up in countries like Libya, Iran, Iraq.

As the Senator from Virginia will recall, after World War II the biggest contest we had in the first stages of the cold war was who was going to get the German scientists, whether it would be the Soviet Union or the United States. We got more of them than they did. Much of our space age came from that.

So we are in that unusual period of time when an empire has collapsed still containing 30,000 nuclear weapons, over 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, and no one knows how much in the way of biological weapons--tens of thousands of scientists and technicians that know how to make these weapons, know how to make weapons of mass destruction, with many of those people not knowing where their next paycheck is coming from and how they are going to feed their families.

So this is an unprecedented era that we are in. We have a window of opportunity now that may not be open very long, certainly not with all the countries there. We hope it will. But we could not have any assurance of that. While we have this window of opportunity open, I think that it is a priority expenditure in terms of helping them, focusing enough money, but not doing the job for them because they are spending far more of their money than we are. Ours is only a small part. It is seed money. But what it has succeeded in doing is it has focused their attention and helped them make this a priority.

In the final analysis, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus are not doing us any favor and the other countries. They are going to take steps in their own national security interests. They are in very dire financial straits having cut back on their procurement budget in Russia by 80-some odd percent from the peak in that kind of condition. This kind of funding helps focus the attention and it gives us the ability to communicate with them. It opens them up for us telling them what we think about the threat, and it has an enormous psychological effect in terms of their capability.

I recall Secretary Cheney said--not on this program but on the START II treaty when that one was signed, I believe under the Bush administration--he said then that he recommended that we give substantial amount of aid to Russia so they could accelerate the START II schedule, and take down those missiles on a more rapid pace. That probably is still good advice.

So it is within that context that Secretary Cheney was saying this is our national security. And I would say this is a very small amount of money compared to the $260-some odd billion in our defense budget each year. This is a small amount of money if you compare it to almost any category of expenditure, and what we are getting for it. I think it may be the highest leverage defense money in terms of national security that we spend.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me reply. I want to make it very clear that the Senator from Virginia agrees entirely with the Senator's premise that this is the most serious national security threat posed against our Nation indeed, and I

think the nations of the Western World. So I concur in that.

I simply feel it necessary to ask these various questions so that we have a complete record before the Senate such as they can vote I think in a fully informed manner tomorrow. I agree. I shall not expand beyond that.

I so stated my concern about weapons of mass destruction and about proliferation many, many times on the floor of this Senate, and I hope, may I say, for many years to come.

I yield the floor.

Mr. DOMENICI. Let me go through three or four things that we are doing, and point out to the Senate and in a roundabout way respond to one of your questions.

Some people are going to say that this is foreign aid. Right? This is not foreign aid as I see it. Let me cite a couple of these things we are doing and let us see what kind of aid it is: Materials protection control and accounting. What have we done and what are we going to do with the money?

The Department of Energy has already secured nuclear materials at 35 facilities in the former Soviet Union.

Those security systems include cameras, gates, portal monitors, tagging devices to track nuclear materials. And in January when our Vice President met, six more sites were added to the list which the DOE will have access to secure these materials. Because these sites were only agreed upon in January, funds were not included in the President's budget request. We are including them here. And, obviously, that is another $15 million for that entire program.

Then there is a lab-to-lab program. It was developed informally. But because the Soviet nuclear scientists trusted the scientists of our nuclear laboratories in some very strange way they would rather deal with those who made the bombs while they were making the bombs than they would with a bunch of politicians or a bunch of State Department people. And all of a sudden the lab-to-lab relationship grew into something that is very fundamental. They are working together. They are doing things that will cause those labs to move in peaceful ways instead of military ways to produce peaceful products instead of military products, and we are gaining from it. That is a $20-million investment.

Is that foreign aid? It would appear to me that probably is the best kind of investment in national security that we could ever have. Not only what I have just described--but these great scientists who produce this nuclear capability in Russia are now friends with great American scientists. I mean that is sort of worth something even if they were not accomplishing the other things that they are.

Then we have the cooperation with the Russian Navy on nuclear materials--a tough one, a huge undertaking, but if it works, and if we get it started, it is not giving anything to the Soviet Union. In a sense, they get something, but look what we get from it.

We have an industrial partnering program that developed with a one-time expenditure of $35 million. It is doing marvelously. Can you imagine private sector American companies working with Soviet institutions and American laboratory scientists to disengage Soviet scientists from producing nuclear proliferation? They are producing things for their domestic market and moving dramatically away from what they have been doing for all these years.

Now, there are many more things that we are trying to do. We do not have enough money to do everything that is mentioned by our scientists and military people. But I think the Senator asked some wonderful questions, and it is our responsibility here tonight to make sure our colleagues understand this is not foreign aid.

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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me press on with another question, perhaps the most troublesome one certainly from this Senator's standpoint, and that is, what do I say to the American taxpayer in reply to the following. It is my understanding as a member of the Armed Services Committee that Russia continues to develop and deploy a new generation of land-based ICBM's, follow-on to the SS-25, first. Second, Russia is pursuing a new generation of sea-launched ballistic missiles, follow-on to the SSN-20, second. Third, our intelligence community forecasts that the Russians are developing a new submarine for the purposes of sea-launched ballistic missiles.

Now, by comparison, the United States currently has no plans for any follow-on strategic systems--land-based, sea-based, not a one. Money is a fungible product. Money in Russia in the defense budget goes to these programs. How do we answer to the American taxpayer, why are they pursuing their modernization program and the United States is not, and yet we will be called upon for these significant expenditures to hopefully pursue and continue the demilitarization of a number of their strategic programs? That is a question with which I conclude tonight's debate with my colleagues.

Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, that is a very good question, and the American people have every right to get an answer to that question.

First of all, this program is much more broader than Russia, and we are encouraging in this amendment that it be broadened beyond the four former nuclear States, primarily to be focused on Kazakstan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, but we think, for instance, the border States with Iran and the southern tier of Russia are very important in terms of border control, in terms of lab work. They may not have nuclear weapons now but the know-how and the chemical weapons and those kinds of technologies are there.

So, first of all, it is not just Russia. It is much broader than that.

Second, I would say to the Senator from Virginia that, as he well knows, the whole thrust of American arms control efforts for years was to get the Russians, then the Soviet Union, to de-MIRV, to get rid of the multiple warheads and move to single warhead weapons. That was what we ended up getting in START I and START II under the two Republican Presidents, President

Reagan and President Bush.

That was the subject of an awful lot of debate on the MX, as you know. We felt that MIRV'd warheads had a chance of basically being used in a first strike, whereas single-warhead missiles, if you used one of them and you basically would be going after another single-warhead missile, therefore the ratio did not favor the offense, it did not favor the first strike--if we both had single warhead weapons. But if we had MIRV'd weapons, and they were vulnerable on a first strike and you could take 10 warheads and destroy 100 warheads by MIRVing and having them moved to different targets, then everybody was on more of an alert hair trigger.

So the effort of U.S. arms control, beginning really with Senator Jackson's amendment in this Chamber back in SALT I, was to move towards de-MIRVing and getting rid of the Soviet very heavy missiles.

That is what the Russians are now building, is the SS-25, a single-warhead missile. It would be the ultimate paradox if we told them, after all these years arguing with them and getting them to move toward that weapon, that we now expect them not to de-MIRV and not to replace. That is a replacement missile for the de-MIRVing that we hope is going to take place under START I and START II.

I would prefer that nobody in the world have weapons but us, but that is not the real world. I would say if you look at the U.S. expenditures in these areas the Senator has named compared to the Russian expenditures now, our expenditures overwhelm them both in submarines and submarine warfare and classified programs, as well as in our overall strategic deterrent.

I think that is appropriate because we have a responsibility all over the world, our allies. We do not have any longer the same equation we had then. The Russians have cut back very substantially. I do not defend some of the expenditures they are making. For instance, we are very concerned about the underground facility. That has come out in the paper. I do not know the answer to that, and we are probing that now, as we should. But I would still say that we are gaining when we can get the Russians to take down weapons that are aimed towards us.

I do not think the goal of this legislation can be or should be realistically to say to the Russians that we expect them to completely demilitarize. They have been a great power. One of these days they will be a great power again.

I do not think that is in the cards. I do think we can demand they use the funds wisely, that we can demand that as long as we are giving them assistance, they be used for their purpose. And I think we can measure that purpose in a way to make sure it is in our national security interest.

I see this as self-interest. If someone says, well, if the Russians were not getting these funds, then perhaps they would have to use their funds they are now using to build SS-25's or submarines for these purposes and thereby not build SS-25's and submarines. I think that would be very unlikely, based on anything I know about not just Russian history but about the history of any country, because no country is going to completely demilitarize. No country is going to put the control of warheads and dismantle warheads in front of what it perceives to be its own national security. We would not, and I think it is not realistic for us to expect them to completely demilitarize.

I would say, though, that one of the original provisions of the Nunn-Lugar amendment that has been certified by the President over and over again is that the Russians are living up to their arms control obligations, and that is a requirement of this amendment. If we find that they are breaching the arms control obligations, then the money is not supposed to be forthcoming. They either are in compliance or the President has to certify that they are intending to be in compliance, as in the case of the CFE Treaty where we know there have been problems, and so forth, but where they are moving forward.

There are occasions where the Russians do things with this equipment that we loan them that we think breach the spirit of the agreement, and in those instances that have come to my attention where that has happened, where we have gotten in touch with them and we have complained about it, they have taken immediate and corrective steps on it.

So we have to be vigilant. We have to be alert. We have to make sure that we understand all the time what is happening here, but again, while this window is open, I think it is very much in our fundamental national security interest to pursue it.

The bottom line, as I mentioned a few minutes ago, is that we have had thousands of warheads dismantled. We have had thousands of missiles that were pointed at the United States and our cities and our targets which are no longer pointed toward us.

We have had a tremendous decrease in the risk of nuclear war, and we have had three nuclear states give up their nuclear weapons voluntarily.

In addition to that, we had Kazakhstan basically get in touch with us and tell us they had some weapons-grade uranium, highly enriched, that they would like to have us help them store safely and move out of that territory. That could have been sold for billions of dollars in places all over the globe. We use this Nunn-Lugar funding to help secure that, and that is no longer a threat.

So I would say if we stop right now and put up a scorecard of how much we basically improved our national security compared to the amount of money we have spent, it would be my view, and I may be biased on this one--I do not think too biased, though--that this would be the most effective defense expenditure we have had in many years.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague. It is a debate he and I have had, I think, for about 3 years. On this very spot on the floor in years past, I posed this question.

I also mentioned, for the Record, we well know the United States, likewise, has destroyed a number of its missile launchers and so forth. But all at the expense of the American taxpayer.

I just want to close out my comments tonight reading from a very interesting document called `Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade.'

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Today, for the first time, Russia's front-line submarines are as quiet or quieter in some aspects than America's best. Programs to provide still further reductions in radiated noise are active today and expected to continue. By the year 2000, over half the remaining submarines in Russia will have incorporated stealth technologies on a par with those of modern Western submarines, and 20 percent of Russia's nuclear-powered attack submarines will be quieter than the U.S. Navy's front-line improved Los Angeles class SSN's.

That, to me, represents a tremendous expenditure of money. I do not know what the threat is, other than I suppose to our U.S. submarine force, to require them to pursue that much expenditure in an area where the United States has been preeminent for these many years.

Mr. President, I have no further questions at this time to propose to my distinguished colleagues. Therefore, I observe perhaps the debate on this amendment has concluded, and the Senate could now turn to conclusion of wrapup matters. Would that be correct?

Mr. NUNN. I certainly think so. I appreciate very much the questions and comments of the Senator from Virginia this evening. Perhaps the Chair would like to make further remarks in answer to these questions, because no one has more knowledge in these areas than the Senator from Indiana, who is now presiding.

Other than that, I think we are prepared to basically dispose of the amendments.

Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to take the Chair if the Presiding Officer cares to speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair observes there have been important questions and excellent responses, and suggests we proceed on to wrapup.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time I advise my distinguished colleague there are several amendments on the pending bill, which I believe have been cleared and can be acted upon by the Senate, if the Senator from Georgia is prepared to proceed.