The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Gonzalez] is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in continuation of the subject matters that I have been discussing for almost 2 years and to which the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs has been dedicating quite a bit of time and hours as well as staff time.
I particularly wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to the staff director, Kelsay Meek, under whose direction and assistance a professional staffer, Mr. Dennis Kane, very ably assisted by professional counsel, Debra Carr, has been very diligently working on what started out as the oversight or the concern expressed by us and the committee with respect to the Agency Bank of the Italian Bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which main headquarters started and has been in New York, but which operates and has operated agency branches in Atlanta, GA, in Florida, in Illinois, and in California.
The disturbing thing I have brought out time after time and now and then things will happen that will underline and stress the importance of this matter.
We are looking at it strictly from the standpoint of the responsibilities that inure to the Committee on Banking and its oversight responsibility with respect to the regulatory structure in our country to defend the public interest in the matter of this now extremely high volume of so-called international money. It was the scandals coming out of the letters of credit issued in several billion dollars worth by this agency in Atlanta, letters of credit in favor of Iraq, that has laid open a badly needed correction and one in which some of us have been trying to do something about since the passage of the first 1978 International Banking Act, which I pride myself in having everything to do with bringing about as a result of the hearings that we first had in my district, San Antonio, TX, in 1975, but with the act of 1978 have felt and said in the interim was totally inadequate for the public interest protection and the people's protection in our country.
Today I want to develop one aspect and also a suggested bit of legislation to address it. It has to do with this tremendous exponential increase and now very alarming spread of weapons of mass destruction.
We live in eras. The 20th century in which we are here in the dying years and hours will turn out to be in history as perhaps one of the bloodiest and the most violent in the history of all total mankind to date.
It looks as if the augur, the prediction, as we march into the 21st century is not too promising. But all those people who talk about 2000 and the year 2000, we must remind you that what we do now or do not do now is going to determine what we look forward to in the year 2000. I can recall when this year, 1992, seemed so distant that none of us ever thought it was within the realm of possibility that we could imagine it, much less that we would live to it. That was--just how long ago? When I was growing up, when we entered into the war and I saw many of my classmates, friends, and relatives, go off and not return. These are things as we look back then seemed impossible of ever happening.
So as we peer into the future we must recall that what we do tomorrow or do not do, fail to do, is going to determine just what shape the so-called new 21st century will be like.
We know this, that the proliferation of these fantastic weapons of disruption is of such a nature that now even some of the poorest countries in the world have that capacity. We do not have a good record. You would think that after our experience in the Persian Gulf we would do something in the name of stabilizing that area and trying to control that. We have not. In fact, we have contributed to the sale, wholesale processing of armaments of all types and kinds.
So it is very difficult for me to come and say I have now an amendment to the International Financial Institutions Act over which our committee has jurisdiction, by the way, in order that our representatives to these institutions be instructed not to vote in favor of any kind of assistance to those nations that do not belong to the Nonproliferation Agreement or area of nations, but it seems like morally we are the last ones to preach that right.
As a matter of fact, I feel that all of those who consider the so-called Persian Gulf war to be over to be very deceptively mistaken. It has just barely started. We have not seen the end of it at all, because rather than stabilizing, we have destabilized this area that is potentially the most explosive in the world.
I said in last week's statement that in revealing the incredible sort of self-divided policy of an administration or two where we started out since 1983, when President Reagan removed Iraq from the list of terrorist nations to peddle all kinds of goods, commercial as well as military to Iraq, to suddenly find that as late as the spring and early summer of 1990, just 2 years ago, we were still doing that, only to find that the invasion on August 2, led to a precipitous decision to enter into a state of war.
Now, I was one of those who not only criticized it from the beginning, but voted against it. There was never any debate about the war. The debate was whether or not to be loyal or disloyal to what the President had already done since August 1991. So when we had the so-called discussion in January 1991, it was over with. The decision and the die had been cast and made.
So we are in a similar position today, not too far removed. We have learned nothing. The only thing that I see is that the potential for a tremendously increased and enhanced destabilized world is so great that it takes a very special effort to keep from being demoralized.
The issue of the alarm of worldwide proliferation of this weaponry of mass destruction has now reached the point of what should be total concern to us. Clearly, we in the Congress and the administration could be doing a lot more, and we are not.
I am not one of those--my record shows that I have been a consistent supporter of an adequate defense posture. There have been specific issues in which I have taken the side of some opinion among our own military which differs from that opinion that happened to be in control at the time. And this goes back almost 30 years, or at least 26 years.
So I am not speaking now with hindsight. I am saying that at this time with this haste on the part of the administration as well as the Congress to decimate what was very extensively built up, particularly since 1980-81, and our very, very heavy allocation of resources to so-called defense, but which on occasions we have used for other than defense, we have used it in what I consider to be a very, very unforgivable and, I think, mistaken--I hope I am wrong but up to now I do not think so--manner.
Mr. Speaker, I say this by way of parentheses: We are in the midst of repeating mistakes that were made in the 1920's, in the 1930's, then in the 1950's--the late 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, and then with the buildup during Vietnam in the middle 1960's in, I believe, a misdirected way.
At this point, we are about to discharge 50,000 military from the Department of the Air Force alone, this year, 50,000, just like that. We are about to discharge three times that number from the Army. I do not recall the figures for the Navy.
To me at this time, with no planned phase, no planned easing in for these very, very trustworthy citizens who have made their lives work that of performing in our service, and discharging them into a depressed economy I think is one of the most abominable mistakes ever made.
Now, I have written as of weeks ago to my colleagues who have the responsibility for chairing the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations; I have addressed letters to the executive branch; I have addressed letters to the Secretary of Defense, saying to please give some thought, because one thing is to dismantle and bring back from overseas in a hasty and intemperate manner, at least, at least 200,000 of our military, with no planned phase, and at the same time reduce domestic defense facilities that have a very basic, basic defense mission. I just cannot imagine how we could have allowed ourselves to reach that point.
So, when I speak with the backdrop of trying to do something to control the proliferation of these terrible weapons of mass destruction, I also pause to say that we have to learn from our past errors.
Mr. Speaker, we have the same thing; there is really nothing new under the Sun. If we are closely interested in our history, we will read the same thing happened after World War I. No question about it, the only thing is the timespan was shorter. And it is the same thing today except the timespan has been enlarged with respect to the events that now impose themselves upon us. It should be no surprise that we would be floundering in a situation that has been described by the predecessor speaker in these special orders, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], our distinguished majority whip. We know full well, those of us in touch with our constituencies, that our people are hurting and suffering. But I am particularly aware, also, of the pathetic circumstances in which men and women who have served our country loyally, well, patriotically and faithfully, but who now find themselves trying to eke out an existence; say, a retired sergeant with a total family of 4, he cannot live on his retirement pay.
I think these are things we ought to consider while we start, while we begin to add and subtract the so-called peace dividend. I think we have to start first with, as we do other fundamental things, with such as what kind of a banking system do we want for our country? We are here on the threshold of having to make that decision one way or the other.
The same thing with what kind of a defense do we wish for our country and the world as it is evolving?
I think too much has been misperceived about what has happened in other parts of the world, not only in China but in Germany, middle Europe, and Russia, above all.
I think the day is going to come when we wish we had the old Communists to battle, because what we are going to face--and I hope again I am dead wrong in my prediction--will be a lot more worrisome, it will be a lot more destructive and it will hit us here at home a lot more than the other old-time religion known as anti communism.
So, having said that and also let me say having given some suggestions to these people and my colleagues as well in the Defense Department as well as here in the Congress who have that responsibility for our defense mechanism, what my suggestions would be, they are born out of observations I have made to my colleagues in the Record years ago, since the 1960's when I was saying that we were spending 55 percent of our defense budget for the so-called defense of Europe but which was a Europe of the 1949-50, and the 1950's, which was long gone. I predicted that when the new generation, which now are either in power or on the threshold of power, that it would be another world, that Germany would, by the very nature of things, reunite or merge or whatever you want to call it, and that in Russia there would be a transformation. But how that transformation works out, I have not seen any real knowledgeable, knowledgeable expression yet from our officialdom in this country.
It is not just simplistically put that from our standpoint, socialism is over with and capitalism is coming in, that is too simplistic and it is a misforgotten and misperceptive interpretation of what is happening. But it all has connotations to what we do in these other areas.
We must never forget that the actions we took and the fact that we intervened in a most massive way in the Middle East has overshadowed our intervention in Central America, our invasion of Panama, where we still have two-thirds of the troops we had at the height of the invasion in Panama. And we had better keep them there because the day they are removed, the regime we put in there will not last 3 hours and no American life is going to be safe.
Now, is that victory? Is that successful policy, or a bankrupt one?
In the Middle East, what do we have? We have the results of the folly of a sort of a vague, inconsistent and contradictory policy by the same administrations in power. These were not anybody else making these decisions.
Mr. Speaker, today what I want to stress is what we can do at this time, and I have already suggested what I intend to do with respect to the other problem of those $800 billion floating around in our country every day of foreign interests over which none of our governmental agencies has the slightest notion exactly where they are going or how they are doing. They might have a little idea, but not even a fragmentary idea. And so much of it, just a little bit of that $800 billion, can be leveraged in moments to a 1,000 percent more than that amount in such things as drug money laundering to even the continuation of arms peddling. The committee's investigation of the BNL, the Italian branch bank, has even covered a multitude of troubling issues. I have reported what our investigation has uncovered by the use of the credit programs; that is, taxpayers-backed credit programs, Commodity Credit Corporation, the Export-Import Bank particularly, and these were letters of credit through these agencies to Iraq, which was actually very well defined in its plans, building up to a very, very sizable proportion its armament and its arms, and with highly developed and sophisticated arms.
The administration turned a blind eye to all these developments, and it showed the disarray within an administration between these various entities and agencies that presumably we all assume an executive branch would have control of and would synchronize or, at least, coordinate. That was to the fact. At that time the
United States, right or wrong, was trying to take the side of Iraq against Iran, but at the same time President Reagan was venturing forth with his deals with Iran with respect to missiles, the TOW missiles, and what turned out to be the very questionable thing known as the Iran-Contra business.
I think what we ought to see here is that in all of these instances what has turned out to be most embarrassing and reflects very badly on our country to the outside world--we do not see ourselves as the outside world does. Our perception of ourselves in many ways is a misperception as compared to the perception external countries have of us. Our misperception of other countries is equaled by their misperception of ourselves. Had we had the correct perception, had we had the cultural and historical knowledge that should have been guiding our leadership, I doubt seriously we would have had 55,000 to 58,000 Americans die in Southeast Asia in Vietnam alone.
Now I said this even before I came to the Congress in the case of Korea. I was saying in 1950, when hostilities had broken out and for the first time we had a cold war type of situation, where we had dismantled our fighting apparatus, we then had a call in a hot shooting phase of a draft system that was predicated on a declared war/hot war status, and of course everyone knows the result of that. But even at that time I was saying that we had obviously failed in our diplomacy because in the name of anticommunism we were sending thousands of our boys to the Korean Peninsula, whereas, as far as I know, not one Russian soldier was out there fighting an Asian. We were. To me that was failure of diplomacy and everything else. I think, had we known the history of that area, instead of having been lost in that tremendous anti-Communist cold war culture, which is still keeping us from making wise decisions even now with respect to Russia, doubt seriously we would have had that mistake, even though the Korean incident was done in the name of the United Nations, and President Truman did have some other countries. It was really, truly an American war. But, unlike Vietnam where you did not have that, other than under aegis of American flag, you did not have anybody else participating in what we said was our goal.
We know the results. We know that a lot of things happened, including the hostage taking in Iran, that probably would not have happened if we had not had the predecessor occurrences in Vietnam. But, be that as it might, the only reason we can let the experiences of the past even be attributed to is for us to learn. If we have not learned anything from experience, where is the gain?
What does it profit us now to flagellate ourselves and say, `Well, we're still in need of watching out'? There are a lot of dangers, unspecified dangers. But the point is that one immediate thing that I think we can do so we can help bring about, I thank, a welcome relief, is in doing everything we know how to reduce the possession of these mass-destruction weapons. It is just one of those things that we certainly must do so that, as far as we can in our time, do the best we can to safeguard the interests of our children and grandchildren.
I think that the most disturbing of all is the fact that Saddam Hussein was able to utilize these credit programs to build a war machine that included all aspects of weapons of mass destruction.
Well now, as I said, have we learned from experience? No. As far as I can see, we are doing the same thing with China. We have had a succession of Presidents, and Secretaries of Defense, and Directors of the National Security Council, go to China, and come back and make reports that China has
finally agreed not to send any more of these weapons to the Middle East. Well, that is hogwash. The first time that was said was several years ago when the Secretary of Defense then came back and said China has given us its word. Just a few months after that, the Secretary of State went over and discovered that China said, `Oh, we're going to stop now.'
In other words, the United States has been sashayed by China in identically the same way as Iraq. There is no difference because most of these weapons, such as the missile known as the Silkworm; it was us, a President and a Secretary of Defense, that gave China the license to manufacture that missile.
That was a missile that was used in the gulf to hit one of our Navy ships, killing 37 of our sailors.
Now, this is how ridiculous and how abominable the situation has become and so contrary to our interests, in not having learned from experience.
It so happens that the policy of the regime, not only of Mr. Bush, but Mr. Reagan, was to have extremely friendly relations with China. In fact, the Presidential veto of the conditioning of the most-favored-nation status to China was recently defeated because the Senate did not do what the House did and override that veto.
So I do not know what the expectation there is, other than maybe perhaps President Reagan, who was most vehement in his denunciation of Russian communism, and President Bush, feel that they can get a gentler and kinder communism in China. But let me assure my colleagues, that is not the case. China, like every other nation should, including ours, is looking out for No. 1 first and foremost. Then they consider whatever it is they can to accommodate the United States in its wishes.
But right now the policy of our Government was after the buildup in the Persian Gulf and in Saudi Arabia for the United States to consider anybody who was against Iraq as our friend. So President Bush met with Assad, the leader of Syria, in Switzerland in November 1990. Why, because Syria was the only Arabic nation that went in favor of Iran as against Iraq. Every other Arabic nation supported Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war because, as I have told my colleagues, there seems to be no perception in our country that Iran is a non-Arabic country.
So have we learned anything? No. We are still making deals under the table with Iran.
They are getting arms. For what purpose? At this point I wish I knew completely. All I know is that Iran is building up a tremendous armament and is looking up toward the Russian border where you have 3 million Muslims, a border that is just 90 miles from Iraq, incidentally. So these weapons include all devices capable of killing many people indiscriminately.
Also the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons has traditionally been a major concern to the international community. The aftermath of the Persian Gulf war clearly demonstrates a need for not only getting tougher standards to limit this proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry, missiles, missile systems, but also the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and the transfer of dual use goods and technology that can be converted with little or no difficulty to military use.
The demise apparently, certainly of the so-called Soviet Union, and the increased threat of the development and use of weapons of mass destruction by Third World countries, should be sounding international alarm bells all throughout the world.
The collapse of the Soviet economy is unleashing a flood of uranium ore and other nuclear materials and technical expertise into the world market, and it will only be a matter of time before dangerous products such as plutonium from spent Soviet reactor fuel reaches the black market, if it has not done so already.
In addition, sophisticated weapons are becoming standard equipment in Armed Forces throughout the world. As a matter of fact, Syria and its leader Assad in the Arab world and in the Middle East are not considered too much different from Saddam Hussein.
I reported to my colleagues months ago that Syria had obtained 300 newly improved, sophisticated Scud missiles by way of North Korea almost a year ago, or at least 10 months ago.
Here about 3 weeks ago I saw there was some ship supposedly delivering arms to Iran, and maybe Syria too. But the fact is, Syria got its 300 improved, sophisticated Scuds at least 9 1/2 or 10 months ago.
These have contributed to the regional insecurity and instability, and will vastly increase the death and destruction when and if hostilities do break out.
Many of my colleagues think the Persian Gulf situation is over with. My friends, I wish it were. It is not.
The number of declared nuclear powers has grown slowly since World War II and is still limited to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, that is, the full power.
You have some sort of a subsuming of that power in some much lesser nations, that is, considered lesser. I do not think there is such a thing.
These five, of course, are our country, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. However, at least four other countries probably have a nuclear capability. I would say they do, not just probably. But there again, it is my word. These countries are India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa.
Several other nations are considered capable of developing nuclear weapons in the next several years if they want to. Those countries include Argentina, Brazil, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan.
As a matter of fact, our CIA Director, Robert Gates, recently warned that North Korea may be only months away from building an atomic bomb. My information is that Pakistan was a lot closer than North Korea months ago.
Remember, in the Persian Gulf war we killed better than 200,000 Moslems. If my colleagues think that there is not a very bitter, anti-United States feeling where you have vast multitudes sworn to revenge, if it takes a thousand years, that is the translation from at least the Arab Moslem.
But remember, the Moslem world is worldwide Pakistan is a Moslem country.
We have been lucky, up to now. But these things are changing so quickly, so unpredictably, that the potential for great and serious mischief is great.
Iraq and Syria have reportedly developed offensive biological weapons, and five more countries are progressing toward the development of biological weapons. It has been reported that Iraq used biological weapons. Certainly the accusation has been passed.
But there again, where is the moral right? The first one to use gas against Arabs was Winston Churchill, the British, in the early 1920's. They were Iraq Arabs they used them against.
In the words of Winston Churchill, or his military head, it was used in order to subdue the, quote/unquote, recalcitrant Arabs.
So where is the moral right? Who are we to preach?
At least 14 Third World countries have offensive chemical weapons, and 10 other countries are trying to develop them. Most of these countries are located in regions of political and military tension, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast and Northeast Asia.
Iraq repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iranian troops during the brutal Iran-Iraq war, and even against its own citizens of Kurdish extraction.
Approximately 25 countries now have surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and 12 of those countries are in the Middle East and Asia, not counting Africa.
The transfer of advanced conventional weapons has since contributed to regional instability. In the last decade and a half, at least, the sheer amount of money spent on armament in the Middle East defies any kind of calculation. Iraq was able to build the world's sixth largest armed forces and equip them with some of the best weapons systems of the industrial powers.
It did not expose that during the Persian Gulf, so-called, war. I have always been intrigued by that. It was a war without a battle. There were no battles in the recent
Persian Gulf war. There were some skirmishes.
The administration has done little to contain the proliferation, and clearly there is a need for action, my colleagues. It is not enough to insist that Iraq cleanse itself when China ships Scuds, Pakistan develops nuclear bombs, and North Korea produces weapons-grade plutonium.
The United States must show leadership in response to these unprecedented threats and one way to do this, at least from our standpoint and jurisdiction, is to insist that countries who benefit from multilateral development banks comply with all weapons control regimes. Those regimes should be tighter, tougher, better enforced, but there also must be incentives for compliance. For this reason, I have planned to, I had planned tomorrow, we were going to have the markup on the International Institutions legislation, but I understand that the chairman of the subcommittee has requested we postpone that. I may offer it as a separate bill, but I think the best way to do it is as I intend, and I would like to place a copy of this amendment, which I will append sooner or later, assuming I get the majority of the committee to go along with me, when and if we do have that markup, and I intend to have a copy of that here in the Record for the study of my colleagues when the Record is printed and delivered tomorrow.
For this reason I plan to introduce legislation that would prohibit the United States from providing funds or agreeing to provide funds through these international monetary institutions, such as the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its affiliates, as well as the multilateral development banks, if a member country of these institutions is capable of producing or seeking to produce a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction, unless such country is adhering to the applicable weapons control regimes. We shall not vote for those funds.
There are four internationally recognized nonproliferation regimes. We have a nuclear nonproliferation regime, a chemical, biological and missile. The nuclear nonproliferation is more extensive and fully developed than those designed to control the spread of chemical and biological weapons and missiles.
This nuclear regime is organized on the foundation provided by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is supported by an international organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, dedicated to servicing the regime with verification mechanisms.
It is this one, the IAEA, that is monitoring the situation in Iraq. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, however, suffers from several inadequacies. For instance, two of the five declared nuclear weapon nations, China and France, because France has had nuclear weapons for a long time, certainly since it removed itself from NATO, have not signed this treaty. Neither has India, nor Israel, nor Pakistan, nor South Africa.
At the same time China, India, and Israel are all heavy users of one facility or another of the multilateral institutions.
We should, and I intend to, exert some effort in that area.
The chemical and biological regimes are structured loosely around two treaties; the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Well, that was 3 years or 4 after Mr. Churchill sanctioned the use of gas, I think it was mustard gas, if I remember correctly, against the recalcitrant Arabs, which is now Iraq, which prohibits the use but not the stockpiling of chemical weapons.
That is interesting. It prohibits the use but not the stockpiling. And the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which outlaws the use, development, production, stockpiling of biological weapons.
Despite the existence of these regimes and the international organizations that monitor these weapons, Iraq not only had the ability to purchase the technology and materials to produce chemicals and biological weapons in the international marketplace, including the United States. They were also able to develop the technology to produce these weapons themselves, which was the prime objective of Saddam Hussein.
The missile technology control regime consists almost exclusively of multilateral export control groups and support for the regime is limited to a relatively small number of technologically advanced nations.
These export controls can obviously be manipulated by the governments that control them, including ours.
Iraq hopes to produce its own missiles but in the meanwhile had no problem in obtaining Scuds from Soviet and Chinese sources. Although these control regimes serve a purpose in slowing down the spread of these lethal weapons, clearly more must be done. Countries that take advantage of and benefit from the programs available through the international development and financial institutions have an obligation to the same international community that comprises these organizations.
My legislation requires that the countries that belong to these institutions, and thereby benefit from them financially and economically, step up to the plate and be responsible citizens of the world community.
If not, they should be outside of the pale of law and certainly outside of the area of assistance through these international financial institutions.
The United States must insist that those countries that expect to receive credit from the IMF, World Bank and the other multilateral development institutions stop wasting resources on the futile and possible fatal request for weapons of mass destruction. How can we and why should we provide credit to countries that spend the resources building terror weapons?
Someday they can very well and quite easily be directed against us. And for the first time on our own land, and see the terrible consequences of war and all its accoutrements. God forbid what I say, but I say the potential is there.
Should we wait to find out if that is right or wrong? We should apply that lesson by refusing to provide funds for international institutions that do not insist on adherence to international regimes for the control of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to regimes intended to stop the proliferation of the missiles to deliver them. Surely this is not too much to ask of the clients and the recipients of these institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the other, of which the United States was one of the initiator countries, and the other multilateral economic assistance agencies.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the amendment to which I referred.
At the end of the bill, insert the following:
SEC. 901. FUNDING OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS DENIED.
(A) Funding Prohibition:
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, no department, agency, or officer of the United States Government may, on behalf of the United States, provide funds to any international development institution, or enter into any agreement to do so, if the most recent determination of the Secretary of the Treasury to paragraph (2) is that a member country of the institution--
(A) is capable of producing, or is seeking to produce, a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction; and
(B) is not adhering to the regime.
(2) Role of the secretary of the treasury.--Within 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
(A) determine which member countries referred to in paragraph (1) are capable of producing, or are seeking to produce, a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction;
(B) with respect to each country described in subparagraph (A)--
(i) identify the international development institutions of which the country is a member; and
(ii) determine whether or not the country is adhering to the regime; and
(C) report such information to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) United States To Urge Adoption of Requirement.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each
international development institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to urge the respective institution to amend the charter of the institution to require that, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, each member country of the institution which is capable of producing, or is seeking to produce, a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction adhere to the regime.
(c) Definitions: As used in this section:
(1) Adhere: The terms `adhere' and `adhering' mean, with respect to a country and a regime, that the country is honoring a formal commitment to participate in the regime that was made by the country to the other participants in the regime.
(2) International development institution: The term `international development institution' means the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the African Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Inter-American Investment Corporation.
(3) Regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction: The term `regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction' means--
(A) the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime;
(B) the chemical weapons non-proliferation regime;
(C) the biological weapons non-proliferation regime; and
(D) the missile Technology Control Regime (as defined in section 11B(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979).
(4) Nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime: The term `nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime' means--
(A) the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, (TIAS 6839), and any amendments thereto;
(B) Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the `Treaty of Tlatelolco'), signed at Mexico on February 14,
1967, (TIAS 7137), and any amendments thereto;
(C) the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the `London Club'; and
(D) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and any amendments thereto.
(5) Chemical weapons non-proliferation regime: The term `chemical weapons non-proliferation regime' means--
(A) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (also known as the `Geneva Protocol of 1925'), and any amendments thereto; and
(B) the chemicals export controls adopted by the group known as the `Australia Group'.
(6) Biological weapons non-proliferation regime: The term `biological weapons non-proliferation regime' means--
(A) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (also known as the `Geneva Protocol of 1925'), and any amendments thereto; and
(B) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (also known as the `Biological Weapons Convention'), and any amendments thereto.
SEC. 902. PROHIBITION AGAINST EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE FOR EXPORTS TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES NOT ADHERING TO REGIMES FOR CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
Section 2(b) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635i(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
`(13) The Bank may not guarantee, insure, extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in connection with any export of goods or services to any country which--
`(A) is capable of producing, or is seeking to produce, a type of weapon that is a subject of a regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction (as defined in section 901(c) of the International Development, Trade, and Finance Act of 1991); and
`(B) is not adhering to the regime (as determined in accordance with subsection (a) of such section).'
Amend the table of contents accordingly.