The program office completed its Source Selection in October 1998 and awarded Development and Initial Launch Services contracts to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Both contractors received a $500M development contract. Boeing's ILS contract was worth $1.38B and Lockheed Martin's ILS contract was worth $650M.
Every American rocket is surrounded by solid rocket motors, and as a result the performance envelope of current US launchers is nearly exhausted. The Evolved Expendable Launch (1) effort is winner-take-all competition to evolve one of the current ELVs (or its components) into a family of medium and heavy lift launchers to perform missions currently conducted by the Delta, Atlas, Titan 2, and Titan 4. A wide variety of concepts may be proposed, not all of which use existing launch vehicles. However, EELV will not be a clean-sheet design, or is it intended to meet all the requirements previously established for Spacelifter, such as and two-day payload change-out or the ability to launch on seven-day notice. Proposed configurations may be based on Titan, Atlas, Delta, or components used in other current launch vehicles, and must constitute a single family of launch vehicles covering medium to heavy lift requirements.
Only current technology, or that which can be demonstrated within the next few years will be considered. Russian engine and other technology may be used, and Rocket Test Stand 1 at Edwards AFB (which can test engines with a thrust of up to 2,000,000 lbst may be reactivated to evaluate Russian engines. Contractors would pay for any such engine development tests. New liquid propulsion system designs offered as part EELV proposals may well come from Russia, though the hardware would be built in the United States. The costs of acquiring an existing Russian design would be small relative to the costs of developing an all-new American engine, such as the Space Transportation Main Engine (STME) which was under development under the ALS and NLS programs. The use of foreign technology will be consistent with the President's policy (TDD NSTC-4). EELV will neither encourage nor discourage use of foreign technology, though foreign launch vehicles will not be permitted in this competition. FY 95 Congressional tasking requires report on DOD policy on the use of foreign technology.
The goal of EELV is to reduce overall cost of launch, while maintaining current ELV capability, reliability and operability. The Air Force anticipates crew-rated missions for some boosters in the family, and it is anticipated that NASA would probably purchase some vehicles.
EELV will launch all US government payloads weighing more than 2177 kg (the maximum polar orbit performance of the Titan 2). EELV will not cover launchers with payloads below the existing Delta range, as this market segment is currently regarded as highly competitive. However, the NASA "MedLite" booster overlaps the lower end of the EELV performance range. And EELV is not intended to be an MLV with a heavy option, as the primary goal is to lower Titan 4 costs. The major cost savings are anticipated to come from increased production rate from a single source. An overall production rate of 17 to 20 vehicles per year is anticipated. Launch costs are expected to drop by about 50%, with substantial reductions in employment in the launch system infrastructure. Design concepts will cover the entire system, not just the launch vehicle, including changes in facility and range interaction.
EELV implements the 1994 Space Launch Modernization Plan Option 2 Upgrade Existing Launchers, which was estimated to have a pricetag of $1.5-$2.0 billion. Between $1.0 billion and $$2.5 billion may be spent on development and testing of an EELV, the launch of two medium lift and one heavy-lift demonstrators and modifications to launch pads. The EELV budget includes both Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office funds. Annual spending will be $76 million in FY1995, $75 million in FY1996, $73 million in FY1997, $104 million in FY 1998, $173 million in FY 1999, $108 million in FY 2000 and $120 million in FY 2001, for a total of $729 million. Subsequent funding is dependent on the specific vehicle concept selected. Although contractor cost sharing is expected, it is not required. Some additional funding will also be available from the National Reconnaissance Office.(2)
EELV is an Air Force Lead Program, which will demonstrate acquisition reform by stating performance requirements without dictate designs. The Air Force plans to save money by replacing system specifications with performance specifications. The Air Force's acquisition strategy will use commercial product development, with significant industry participation. Air Force management of the effort will be centered in a small System Program Office, with no more than 30 military, civilian, and contractor personnel. Only generic performance specifications will be established, based on the Air Force Space Command National Mission Model. Under this concept, the Air Force will encourage contractors to propose technology demonstrations, rather than the government directing technology development. Product development guidelines will be based on the Defense Department's policy on commercial practices.
The Program Office is seeking inputs from industry, and is looking for innovative ideas for streamlining the acquisition process. Program concepts include: design to lowest hardware and operations cost commensurate with low technology, cost, and schedule risk; "Best Effort" improvement of attributes other than cost (eg Reliability, Operability); product development using commercial practices, with product development adopting the Secretary of Defense's policies on commercial practices. Initial products may include: Trade Analysis Results; System/Segment Specifications; System Design Concept; Risk Reduction Demonstrations (Hardware-in-Loop); Life Cycle Cost Estimate; Design Reliability Results; and Proposal for Development and Deployment Phase.
Proposed Acquisition Schedule
Draft RFP Release Dec 94
Program Review Feb 94
RFP Release 17 May 95
Source Responses Submitted for Risk Reduction 19 Jun 95
Contract Award for Risk Reduction 1 Sep 95
DAB Milestone Review Jun 97
Development/Deployment Contract Award Aug 97
MLV First and Second Demonstration Flight 2000
MLV IOC VAFB 2001
MLV IOC CCAFS 2001
HLV First Demonstration Flight 2003
HLV IOC VAFB 2005
HLV IOC CCAFS 2006
Phase One started in May 1995 with the release of a Request for Proposals (RFP). A Milestone IV review by the Defense Acquisition Board of a "system upgrade / modification" program is planned for the summer of 1995.
Initially the EELV program planned to conduct the first risk reduction phase over 8 to 24 months, with contract awards expected in July 1995. This phase was to refine concepts, conduct budget-constrained trade studies, and demonstrate technology. Rather than using computer models and simulations, risk reduction demonstrations will use hardware-in-the-loop. These would not be technology development demonstrations, but rather would show the maturity of proposals. This phase will also develop life-cycle cost and design reliability estimates. Roughly $225 million would be spent for these cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.(3)
Under current plans,(4) the EELV program will begin with a Low Cost Concept Validation (LCCV) module. The LCCV module contracts will be Firm Fixed Price. Contractors will produce authenticatible draft specifications, draft interface control specifications, a Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) with a 70% confidence level, interim trade analyses, risk mitigation demonstration results, a manufacturing plan, an environmental analysis report, and operations and support documentation. The Government plans to award either four LCCV module contracts for up to $30 million each or three LCCV module contracts for up to $40 million each using full and open competition among US Manufacturers. The Government will award no more than one contract per selected prime contractor.
Following the risk reduction phase, the Defense Acquisition Board was again to review the program in June 1997. Following DAB approval of the EELV plan, the two-phase manufacturing development program will begin. The competition will be open only to contractors who have the capability to execute the risk reduction, development, and deployment phases.
Under the initial plan,(5) a single cost-plus-fee contract award covering the second phase engineering and manufacturing development effort was planned for August 1997. Vehicle deployments was to be phased to minimize external costs and mission risk. One or two demonstration flights of the medium-lift version, probably carrying Space Test Program experiments, would take place in 2000. Operational MLV launches would begin in 2001, carrying GPS Block 2F satellites. The heavy-lift EELV will replace the Titan 4 for NRO payloads, with a demonstration flight in 2003 and operational flights starting in 2005. A total investment of up to $2 billion may be required to develop the system.
Under current plans,(6) following a tailored Preliminary Design Review, a Pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) module will be performed. For the Pre-EMD module, the Government plans to limit competition to the LCCV module contractors, selecting two of these contractors to perform the Pre-EMD effort. The Pre-EMD module will conclude with a tailored Critical Design Review (CDR) at the system level.
Following the CDR, an EMD module will be performed. This module will conclude when initial operational capability is achieved for both medium and heavy lift. For the EMD module, the Government plans to limit competition to the two Pre-EMD module contractors, selecting a single contract to perform the EMD module. This single contract will lead to the EELV production program.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS(7)
The purpose of the EELV program is to support the National Mission Model (excluding crew-raed or cargo return missions), reduce overall system recurring costs, and maintain or improve the reliability, operability, and capability of current medium through heavy lift systems (ie Titan Il, Delta, Atlas, and Titan IV). The EELV system may include, but is not limited to launch vehicles, launch facilities, support equipment, and payload integraion in support of the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce.
The EELV system will be used to deploy Government payloads. The EELV system consists of the Launch Vehicle (LV) Segment and the Ground Segment. The EELV system includes all equipment, facilities, and launch base infrastructure necessary to launch a payload, place it in the required delivery orbit, provide specified environments, provide EELV system maintenance, and perform any necessary recovery/refurbishment operations.
The Launch Vehicle Segment consists of the means for transporting the payload from the launch site to the delivery orbit, through completion of the contamination and collision avoidance maneuver (CCAM) and stage disposal. It includes, but is not limited to, production, assembly, propulsion, guidance and control, electrical power, tracking and telemetry, communication, ordnance, flight termination, payload separation, structural elements, payload fairing, software, and appropriate vehicle/ground and vehicle/payload interfaces that are necessary to meet mission requirements. The payload and its unique Airborne Support Equipment (ASE), though transported by the EELV, are not considered as part of the EELV system.
The Ground Segment consists of all existing, modified or new construction, facilities, and the equipment, software, and utilities necessary to support the planning, storage, integration, check-out, processing, launch, telemetry, tracking and control through CCAM, and recovery/refurbishment (if any) for the EELV system.
The EELV system shall meet all non-tradable performance requirements simultaneously. All performance requirements specified are tradable except for the following: reliability; lift capability; launch rates; orbital parameter, attitude and rate accuracies; all payload environments and accommodations (including CCAM); and any required by law. These include, but are not limited to the following.
The EELV system shall provide a sufficient range of lift capability to accommodate the Government portion of the National Mission Model. The EELV MLV and HLV shall have the capability to inject into geosynchronous transfer orbits on either the ascending or descending leg. The EELV MLV shall have the capability to fly directly to 12-hour, highly elliptical, critically-inclined orbits and the capability to perform short duration upper stage burns for circularizing low altitude orbits. This is a non-tradable requirement. Vehicle sizing shall be based on performance estimation techniques which shall provide a 99% assurance of the vehicle fully meeting mass to orbit requirements while considering possible uncertainties in EELV and environmental parameters, such as propellant loading, Isp, and atmospheric density.
The EELV system shall accommodate the Transition Schedule included in the RFP.
The system shall have sufficient throughput to support the range of Government requirements. This is a non-tradable requirement. The system shall also be resilient enough to recover from a downing event or other delays which may cause the system not to meet the launch rate requirements.
The EELV system (ground and launch vehicle segments) shall launch within 7 calendar days of the scheduled launch time. Attributable delays include EELV equipment-caused delays, processing delays and weather delays. The schedule shall be considered firm 90 days prior to the scheduled launch date.
The EELV shall be capable of repeatedly responding to priority requests for launches within a minimal time (MLV goal of 30 calendar days, HLV goal of 60 calendar days) from the date of launch request, assuming the availability of a processed payload ready for mating with the EELV.
The system shall be capable of holding in a mission ready status for a minimum of 30 days. Mission ready means the system can move from the mission ready hold state to launch within 24 hours of notification. The system shall be capable of maintaining a ready-to-launch status with propellants loaded for at least two hours.
The system shall be capable of performing a fail-safe abort such that the payload and launch system are protected following a launch abort anytime prior to launch commit.
The system shall be capable of recycling, following a fueled vehicle hold, to enable launch within the launch window on the next calendar day. The system shall also be capable of performing recycling on at least two successive days.
The EELV must accommodate the Government payloads in RFP Annex C- I and shall provide standard interfaces and services (such as mechanical interfaces, power, environmental conditioning, etc.). This is a non-tradable requirement. The Payload Database Document may be used for reference information regarding current payloads. Current or new payloads having unique interface/services needs (such as special power conditioning) shall provide appropriate payload ASE/services. The weight of the ASE shall be considered payload weight.
The envelope shall be sufficient to provide a minimum of one inch clearance between the payload and the fairing under worst case dynamic conditions and shall accommodate the maximum static payload envelopes. This is a non-tradable requirement.
The LV shall be capable of accommodating the mass properties of the Government payloads in the National Mission Model. This is a non-tradable requirement. The Payload Database Document may be used for reference infortnation regarding current payloads.
Payload Substitution. To maximize operational flexibility and reduce costs, EELV shall accommodate payload substitution (with another payload normally assigned for launch on the same size LV) prior to payload mate, up to five days before a scheduled launch. The EELV system shall facilitate rapid payload substitution so that schedule delays are minimized or avoided. Payload substitution should not drive additional launch processing other than activities norrnally required for payload mating.
Design reliability, including hardware, software, and firmware, from launch commit through CCAM shall be at least 98% for the LV. This is a non-tradable requirement.
Performance margin shall be defined in the Contractor prepared system specification. The Government has an objective of a 15 percent perforrnance margin. Design margin and verification of chosen design margin values shall be defined in the Contractor prepared system specification and Requirements Verification Matrix, respectively.
The EELV plans to reduce annual launch costs by at least one quarter and as much as half, compared to current spacelift systems. The cost target (covering development, procurement, integration and maintenance) is specified in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) statement by US Space Command Commander-in-Chief of Gen. Joseph Ashy, which charecterizes EELV as: "... a family of vehicles that is technically achievable and costs us 25 percent less (threshold) than current systems with an objective of 50 percent reduction in the annual cost of spacelift. . . .[ln] responsivenesS schedule dependability and supportability, we are willing to examine the trade between cost and improvements."(8)
EELV Options(9)
The EELV program documents appear to specify a single launch vehicle that would span Delta through Titan 4 payload classes -- winner take all. There are some fuzz words about a "consortium," which might imply more than one company, but the bottom line on EELV seems to be that a single core stage should (with various strap-ons) be able to accommodate all payload classes. Based on what each launcher currently has on hand (strapons, pads, production facilities etc) it would seem that LockMart would have a much easier time meeting these requirements by starting with Titan or Atlas than McDonnell Douglas will starting with Delta.
From an econometric expectation, the fixed/variable cost consideration is the driver. It turns out that, contrary to popular assumptions, current ELVs at current flight rates appear to have cost structures similar to STS, namely, high fixed costs and low marginal costs. If ELVs are like STS, with high fixed costs and low variable costs, then the only hope to reduce costs is to put all the eggs in one basket and increase the the production and flight rates, which is what is happening with EELV. All of this hinges on the fixed/variable cost issue -- a recognition of an economic reality which has long eluded the space policy community.
The real answer on fixed versus variable cost ratio is it is whatever the system is designed for. There are a variety of fixed versus variable costs on ELV type operations -- dependent upon the specific production system design. Typically, the production system is designed for whatever the expected maximum production rate, which sets fixed costs. If a contractor expects to build 10 rockets a year, then the production facility will include exactly the tooling needed to minimize cost and maximize profit on that particular production size. If the production system is designed for a large number of units per year this will include a fairly high fixed cost and a small variable cost. On the other hand, one designed for just a few items per year will have a relatively low fixed cost, but a much higher variable cost.
For comparison, autos produced from an assembly process designed to produce a few hundred cars per year will cost a lot more those from a production system designed to produce thousands per year -- if the production processes are humming along. And of course, if the plant doesn't run near that economic production level, fixed costs can rapidly dominate the variable costs.
It seems in practice that it is not just a matter of tooling, but also the way the entire labor-force is organized. If it were just tooling, the company could lay off workers and just pay capital costs of unused machinery. But if the labor force is very highly specialized, so that there are few if any substitutable skills, then everyone has to come to work just to build 1 launch vehicle, regardless of whether that takes a month or a year.
The exact percentage of fixed versus variable cost is highly dependent upon the specifics of each system. Current US launch vehicles upgraded from basic ICBM designs -- Atlas and Titan -- were designed to be produced on lines at rates of 8-12/year. Delta's maximum rate seems to be around 12-14 per year, and Ariane was facilitated for about 12/year. It should be noted that Ariane-5 is projecting a rate of about 8 per year or less and the production system is being set up for this.
In any year, the cost curve at current production rates is pretty flat -- but pretty flat is still not perfectly flat. The systems are designed to provide reasonable flat costs around the expected economic build rates, but the current systems are operating (with the exception of Atlas and Ariane) nowhere near economic build rates on their production systems. Delta had only three flights in 1994.
Much of this is disguised in the price/cost relationship. What is typically quoted is price, not cost. For example, a vehicle priced at $100,000,000 probably only costs $70,000,000 or so to make. The differences in production cost due to rate differences get disguised in a variable profit margin. Ariane has a real advantage in this -- they don't have to recover development costs, and they really don't have to turn an economic profit margin. If the vendor guesses wrong, there is no profit margin (or a negative one), and if the vendor guesses right, they can actually offer a lower price than the competition and still turn a profit.
The EELV impetus also comes from some operational personnel at DoD who look at Arianespace and their current operations costs and want to emulate it to get lower costs to launch their payloads. In turn, they are supported by some of the contractors, hoping to get a lock on certain aspects of the market.
It would appear that the DOD EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program will result in the selection of the Titan as the US ELV.
The economies of scale are such that DOD and NRO want to have a single ELV flying at a rate of roughly 20/year, which means flying all their payloads on a vehicle evolved from either Delta, Atlas or Titan, and not flying a combination of Delta and Atlas, each flying 10/year.
Titan is facilitized for ~20/year flight rate at LC-40/41 at CCAFS, even though this flight rate has not in practice been achieved. Delta and Atlas are facilitized for about 10 each at CCAFS, so some new facilities would be required for them. (Titan could add LC-42 for 30/year if needed).
The first E stands for "Evolved" -- the time and money in this program would support an evolution on the scale of Atlas I to Atlas IIAS (cut and paste welding), but EELV has been very explicit that no "development" is contemplated. EELV is not an MLV with HLV option, but is rather a single family of vehicles with MLV/HLV capability. A Titan 2 with Castor IV or GEM is pretty much just welding, and that gives a Delta equivalent. A Titan core stage with a two segment SRMU is cutting and pasting, and that gives an Atlas. But the growth versions of Delta to take you to Atlas, or the growth versions of Atlas to get to Titan are pretty close to clean-sheet designs. Thus it would seem that Delta will be challenged to cannot be grow to the Atlas IIAS or Titan 4 payload class (and Atlas cannot readily be grown to Titan 4 payload class), while Titan can (with appropriate strapons) "shrink" to Delta and Atlas payload classes. NRO will continue to have T-4 class payloads, and it seems to make more sense to have a single DOD/NRO/NASA(?) ELV than to have separate DOD and NRO ELVs.
Although it is unclear just how Delta could be grown to the Titan 4 payload class, Delta started out with a payload capacity of 100 pounds into GTO and has grown by a factor of 40 since then.
Apart from the payload class accommodation and facility flight rate issues, there does not seem to be any particular preference between Delta, Atlas and Titan, with the possible exception of cryogenic versus hypergolic propellants. This does not seem to be a significant issue, and if it is, it could be resolved by (perhaps) using Russian RD-180 engines for cryogenic Titan core stage (Titan 1 was cryogenic). It would seem easier to modify Titan for cryogenic than to work around the Delta 8 foot core diameter (versus 10 feet for Atlas/Titan), or to work around the balloon-tank structural issues for the Atlas.
The problem with the Titan is hypergolic fuels -- there is a perceived need to get away from these and into either clean cryogenic fuels or hydro-carbon based fuels. Hypergolics remain expensive, tricky, and poisonous.
Delta also has a superior safety history, with only one accident in more than fifteen years. The Titan, on the other hand, has such a poor safety record that even the Air Force is unhappy with it. However, in the Delta's case, the fundamental difference in design (no large segmented solids and a simpler upper stage) makes a difference in the reliability. But these are just the things that would have to be added to get Delta up to Atlas IIAS and Titan 3/4 performance range. The difference is safety records may just reflect a statistical "tyranny of small numbers" problem. The bigger the sample, the higher the confidence. Public opinion polls usually sample about 1,000 and have ~3% error bar. The variations between different ELVs is thus pretty much inside the error bar, given the small sample size. The sample sizes (number of flights) for all ELVs are so small that there is no statistically significant difference on reliability (no way to differentiate luck from skill). Apart from a run of bad luck with large solids (and Centaur) Titan has a pretty good record.
Resiliency is an area which the EELV proponents have not yet properly addressed. The DoD community includes some who really want to preserve some level of launch "resiliency" in being able to support launches from two separate class of vehicles. EELV flies in the face of this consideration -- from a concentration upon a single launcher.
The solid motors used on the Atlas are Castor IVAs (Thiokol), on the Delta are GEMS (Hercules), and on the Titan-IV are either UTC (SRMs) or Hercules (SRMUs). There are major differences between then in size, propellant configuration, propellant composition, and in manufacturing -- not to mention manufacturer. A failure on one should not take down the others.
The core motors are a Rocketdyne MA-5 (Atlas), a Rocketdyne RS-27 (Delta), and a Aerojet LR-87 (Titan). Considering the sizable differences in engine design, and construction (even in the two Rocketdyne engines -- they use totally different engine cycles), a failure on one should not take down the others.
Second stage, and upper motors are a P&W RL-10A (Atlas), an Aerojet AJ-10/Thiokol Star 58B (Delta), and an Aerojet LR-91/P&W RL-10 (Titan-IV/Centaur), or an LR-91/IUS (Titan IV/IUS; Boeing, with Thiokol SRM1/SRM2). From first blush, there is not a lot of commonality, so one failure should not take down the others -- excepting the Titan-IV/Centaur and the Atlas/Centaur. Plus, it should be noted for Polar missions, the Centaur is not needed, so that mission should not be affected if there is a Centaur failure.
The EELV is attempting to create a national space transportation company with 80% of the government space transportation needs (excluding crew-transfer) being funneled through it to provide a economies of scale. The EELV program plan envisions competitive design contracts and technology development contracts with multiple sources in the industry, with a single contractor selected, given access to all the technology, and given all
the government launch business -- and the charter to compete for and win commercial launches (to reduce the total government cost).
The loser in the EELV program will be competing against a modernized EELV with strong anchor tenants at DoD and NASA, and is unlikely to be able to remain competitive, and may be forced to exit the launcher market. The EELV ground rules favor Lockheed-Martin, with upgraded versions of Titan 2 at the lower end of the EELV payload range, and Titan 4 occupying the upper end. An effort to upgrade Delta to similar capabilities would entail significantly higher cost and risk.
It is unclear whether Delta, Atlas and Proton would just disappear after the EELV comes on the scene. All these vehicles have commercial contracts and their manufacturers may contest the whole idea. When Lock-Mart wins EELV, it will discontinue Atlas, in order to keep the Titan/EELV build rate as high as possible. About half the Delta order-book is DOD-GPS, and some of the rest is other DOD & NASA, and the EELV program assumes that US Government policy will be to fill up the EELV manifest. And it is not obvious that NASA will go along with DOD launch policy, or that the demand for LEO constellations won't make Delta a viable proposition. But NASA is such a small player in ELV that they would have no choice but to participate in the EELV manifest, at least in the Delta-Titan payload classes.
It is possible that the EELV's "winner take all" approach will be challenged by the losers, particularly those with existing commercial launch vehicles which will be forced to compete in the commercial market between the government-subsidized Ariane and EELV. The way around this is to develop a consortium which includes all of these players (which seems unlikely at this point), or to restrict the EELV to only government missions (which also seems unlikely).
Another way to do it would be for the US government to broker its flights through a single source, backed up with some type of market guarantees and termination liability. This would allow firms to invest on some basis of real market expectations, and yet not lock into a single national space transportation company.
The EELV competition is in some sense similar to the HR 258 Launch Services Corporation Bill (LSCB) approach. The difference is that the LSCB also requires the LSC to launch all of the government missions, and provides some level of funding for them to develop a new launch vehicle. The broker would not necessarily launch on a single vehicle but would procure launches on whatever launcher to get the best price for service, using batches of launches. The broker does not lock into a single launch company and system, but instead procures the best offering for a class of government satellites. All missions would go through a single source (the Launch Service Corporation) then brokered onto the best set of a launch vehicles to get the best service and price across a range of vehicles and payload sizes. This is not putting all of the missions onto a single contract to a single launch system or provider through a single procurement to a single company, as is the case with EELV.
At present, every year or two NASA and DoD organizations each batch up a bundle of their launches and put them out for bid (at DoD is this done from various organizations, at NASA through a single office). The difference under the LCSB is that there would be a single point of contact, instead of the several different offices today running a single procurement with common performance specifications.
The difference is that the EELV concept is to provide a single multi-purpose launch system for the most government missions. But from another perspective, this would provide "lock in" to a single broker with most of the disadvantages of locking in to a single space transportation company, without the advantages of economies of high production rates for any one vehicle.
EELV vs RLV(10)
Also unresolved is how the EELV and the RLV play together. The EELV/MLV comes on line in about 2001 -- which presumes a commitment to the EELV in 1997. NASA is assuming their RLV concept will fly all of the RLV missions (excepting Titan-IV class missions), and that the DoD assumes their EELV will fly all of the RLV missions (excepting ISSA support). NASA is working to a commercial development of the RLV, with a decision for commercial development by 2000. DoD is working towards a "commercialized" EELV, with a commitment to a system by about 1999. Obviously there is an overlap here. If RLV does not get this market and has to compete directly with the government-funded development of a "commercial" EELV, then it is unlikely NASA could get commercial funding for a RLV (as per NASA's plan). On the other hand, if the EELV does not get this market, then its flight rate drops by over two-thirds, and the economics of the EELV go out of the window.
In order to have a reason to build the HL-20, the terminal Shuttle accident would have to occur after the station is largely completed. Assuming things go on schedule and that the HL-20 could be built quickly, it wouldn't be online until 2007 or so.
After the next Shuttle accident, the US will be faced with either developing fully reusable RLV to replace the Shuttle, or putting an HL-20 on top of a Titan 4. The later seems more sensible, and certainly more likely. On the other hand, the Titan 4 has a worse safety and schedule record than the shuttle. The HL-20 does not currently exist and would between three to five years to build and bring to operational status. Unless the shuttle accident occurs soon, the HL-20/EELV pathway would be bypassed by as the RLV moves forward.
The Titan family as a whole has about 95% reliability (in 180 launches). The recent Titans, (the last 50 launches) have had about 88% reliability. But the non-survivable explosions were due to the solid strap-ons. Other mission failures, from which an HL-20/42 might have returned the crew intact, were due to the liquid-fueled stages. If this is the case, the lesson may be that big solid rockets and people don't go together.
If RLV has to compete directly with the government-funded development of a "commercial" EELV, then RLV is unlikely to get commercial funding for a RLV (as per NASA's plan), which probably explains why Norm Augustine has been so skeptical of RLV.
1. Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center, "Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Industry Day," 11 November 1994;
William Boyer, "Competition To Begin for EELV," Space News, 14 November 1994, pages 4, 21;
Michael A. Dornheim, "USAF Wants One ELV Family for Medium, Heavy Launchers," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 November 1994, page 63;
"EELV draft RFP expected next month," Military Space, 28 November 1994, pages 6-7;
"Air Force details EELV goals," Military Space, 14 November 1994, pages 1-3;
Bill Sweetman and J.R. Wilson, "Getting There," International Defense Review, January 1995, pages 29-33.
Department of the Air Force Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquistion, "Request for Proposal (RFP) F04701-95-R-0009, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) -- Executive Summary" 17 May 1995.
2. Ferster, Warren, "Air Force Expects to Award Four EELV Contracts in August," Space News, 27 February 1995, pages 1, 20.
3. Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center, "Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Industry Day," 11 November 1994;
4. Department of the Air Force Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquistion, "Request for Proposal (RFP) F04701-95-R-0009, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) -- Executive Summary" 17 May 1995.
5. Air Force Space & Missile Systems Center, "Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Industry Day," 11 November 1994;
6. Department of the Air Force Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquistion, "Request for Proposal (RFP) F04701-95-R-0009, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) -- Executive Summary" 17 May 1995.
7. Department of the Air Force Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquistion, "Request for Proposal (RFP) F04701-95-R-0009, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) SPD Annex C," 17 May 1995.
8. "EELV Target: Cut Current Launch Costs by 25 Percent to 50 Percent," Inside The Air Force, 21 April 1995, page 3.
9. Adapted from: david.anderman@digcir.cts.com (David Anderman), rbuttigieg@vulcans.caamora.com.au (Ralph Buttigieg), jbh55289@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Josh Hopkins),kingdon@cygnus.com (Jim Kingdon), Larrison@ix.netcom.com (Larrison), prb@clark.net (Pat), johnpike@clark.net (John Pike), and thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson), "RFC: EELV = Titan," thread on sci.space.policy, February-March 1995.
10. Adapted from: david.anderman@digcir.cts.com (David Anderman), rbuttigieg@vulcans.caamora.com.au (Ralph Buttigieg), jbh55289@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (Josh Hopkins),kingdon@cygnus.com (Jim Kingdon), Larrison@ix.netcom.com (Larrison), prb@clark.net (Pat), johnpike@clark.net (John Pike), and thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson), "RFC: EELV = Titan," thread on sci.space.policy, February-March 1995.