1. Defense Planning Guidance Element. This need responds to section II.C.1 of the Defense Planning Guidance FY 19972001 dated 09 May 1995 to create an interoperable "system of systems" geared toward enhanced C4I. The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, February 1995, also requires that C4I capabilities must support the ability of forces to achieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The ability to win the Information War is dependent on our ability to provide critical information to combatant commands. A wideband broadcast would allow simultaneous receipt by all approved recipients in the theater. This would improve efficiency of both long haul and tactical transmission in today's environment, and help support the expected explosion in communications requirements growth in the joint operational environment.

2. Mission and Threat Analyses.

a. Mission.

(1) Joint tactical operations require high speed, multimedia communications and information flow to garrisoned forces and to in-transit and deployed mobile forces. There is an asymmetric flow of information in that deployed units normally require more information for mission performance than is required for return transmission. Many individual products today, (e.g. ATO, IMINT, weather, ) have data file sizes ranging from hundreds of kilobits to gigabits, which take significant time to transmit via existing low data rate channels. Furthermore, many of these products require the use of multiple low speed channels to transmit to multiple addressees. Current military satellite communications are oversubscribed and were neither designed for nor configured to provide high capacity broadcast service. They either cannot support, or would have difficulty delivering, a multimegabit per second broadcast per transponder to multiple receivers using small antennas or to mobile users without significantly limiting or curtailing other critical twoway voice/data network services to the warfighter. Most existing multi-megabit systems are point-to-point, fixed location systems using large antennas. The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War--The Final Report to Congress, April 1992, highlighted the limited ability of current military and civilian satellite communication systems to provide responsive, high-capacity communications to deployed, mobile tactical units.

(2) A high capacity broadcast capability is needed to provide timely dissemination of information products, such as imagery, intelligence information, missile warning, weather, record message traffic, joint and serviceunique news, education, training, video, Morale Welfare & Recreation (MWR) programming, and/or other desired information. The implementation of a "Global Broadcast Service" (GBS) would provide worldwide, high capacity, oneway transmission of a variety of highspeed computertocomputer data updates, high quality imagery, and other information products to supported forces. GBS should provide the capability for CINC and CJTF theater injection of information onto the broadcast. This capability should support rapid transfer of near-real-time targeting data, becomming an integral part of the Sensor-to-Shooter architecture providing targeting information to warfighters.

(3) GBS should support existing and proposed information dissemination requirements appropriate for one-way, wideband transmission. The service should provide expeditious delivery of selected data to enroute, deployed, and garrisoned tactical forces and commanders. GBS should support routine operations, training and military exercises, special activities, crises , and the transition to and conduct of opposed operations short of nuclear war. The need for high capacity, asymmetric data flow results from growing emphasis on providing joint operational commanders and tactical units with tailored products and services required for successful mission accomplishment. There is an immediate need for a GBS to provide this high capacity information flow to warfighters. GBS is a new capability that cannot be compared to other programs. GBS has the potential to significantly overcome existing capacity limitations of current and planned communications systems. Correction of this deficiency is listed as a high priority in CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPL).

(4) GBS is an extension of the Defense Information System Network (DISN), and will require development of a data management capability and injection scheme in parallel with the space segment. Data management must include the capability to access and retrieve archive data as well as provide timely dissemination of requested information. Prioritization procedures that allow users to receive the most critical information first and a method for responding to user requests must be developed and implemented. GBS provides the capability to transmit high data rates of information to multiple users equipped with small terminals. GBS incorporates a smart push/user pull philosophy.

(5) The "smart push" portion of GBS should provide "packages of information services" that may be predetermined based on existing and known user mission and operational requirements. Examples of this type of information include pre-planned priority intelligence requirements, general intelligence data, meteorological and oceanographic data, and DoD-wide news and information. Careful consideration of "smart push" information must be made to ensure capacity is used in a manner fully responsive to the warfighter's requirements .

(6) "User pull" requests could be accomplished by using existing/planned communication architectures (e.g. DSCS, UHF, MILSTAR, commercial PCS ) to provide access to the source to specify ad hoc information requirements for delivery via GBS. Examples of "user pull" requests include tailored intelligence data, imagery, imagery perspective products, battle damage assessments (BDA), Tomahawk Mission Data Updates (MDU) , local weather forecasts, regional or local environmental updates, highspeed computer updates, news updates, and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) products. The ability of users to tailor the broadcast to satisfy emergent requirements is a primary feature of GBS.

(7) Reception of the broadcast should be via small, lightweight, and inexpensive antennas and receivers to the maximum extent possible. This will increase portability and functionality to a wide variety of users to include ground (including Special Operation Forces), sea, and air units down to the tactical level. GBS will improve information transfer to deployed forces and free capacity on existing systems for growing two-way C4I requirements. The concepts of "smart push" and "user pull" described here support the tenets of "C4I for the Warrior."

(8) GBS has the potential to rapidly disseminate data carried over current and planned lower data rate tactical broadcasts, imagery dissemination systems, and other communications hosted on fixed wing aircraft, UAV, etc.. The possibility of migrating low data rate broadcasts to GBS, and the ability of GBS to meet the imagery transfer timeliness requirements should be examined.

(9) Network security must be provided on the data collection and injection segment and on the data dissemination segment of GBS. It must provide protection for classified information, assurance of delivery, and access control to ensure system integrity as an integral function of the service.

b. Threat.

(1) The space segment of GBS would be vulnerable to the same threats as many commercial satellite systems. The Global Broadcast Service receiver and antenna would be subject to the same threats as other terrestrial satellite communications components. They may be jeopardized by electromagnetic and physical threats to the communications links and/or to the system segments themselves.

(2) Electromagnetic threats include interception, exploitation, highaltitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), and degradation of commercial and military communications links or the signal environment. Physical threats include the entire battlefield/shipboard spectrum of direct and indirect fire weapons, environmental factors, chemical contamination, and nuclear destruction. The GBS ground terminal would also be vulnerable to capture when deployed with forward units.

(3) GBS uplink vulnerability to nuisance EMI and jamming could be mitigated by using narrow beam, steerable antennas.

(4) GBS is not required to be a survivable or endurable system and therefore will not be equipped with special HEMP/HANE (High- altitude Electromagnetic Pulse/High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion) protection. A classified threat assessment to satellite communications is found in the current National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) publication, EW to Satellite Communications Links - Foreign.

(5) The major threat to any computer system is from Information Warfare (IW). GBS, as an extension of the DISN, may be vulnerable to IW attack. Methods to protect against threats such as terrorists, foreign intelligence services, organized crime, introduction of software bugs and viruses, and unauthorized user intrusion must be examined.

3. Nonmateriel Alternatives. Mission area analysis performed by the Navy and staffed through all Services did not identify any changes in US or Allied doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, organization, and training that could satisfy the requirement.

4. Potential Materiel Alternatives. There are numerous potential solutions to meet GBS requirement. All possibilities will require consideration of each alternative to satisfy total communications requirements, costs, schedule, and risk.

a. Existing Systems.

(1) Current military communication systems could be reconfigured to provide a limited low to high data rate broadcast capability.

(2) Current commercial direct broadcast systems have proven that required technology is available in commercial off the shelf (COTS) products, even though they emphasize television and audio. They do not provide worldwide coverage (only being targeted to well-populated, economically profitable areas), operate under geographically oriented international regulations, and would require augmentation by a military system. Procedures to ensure military access and control of information for broadcast would need to be developed and implemented. Additionally, international agreements would have to be concluded for commercial landing rights.

(3) Commercial data management systems may partially satisfy military requirement for various information media (voice, data, imagery, video) transfer over GBS and need to be evaluated.

b. Modify current capabilities/programs.

(1) Hardware modifications to on-orbit MILSATCOM satellites are not possible. Although it may be possible to modify procedures to realize a very limited broadcast capability using existing satellites, this would reduce the availability of those assets to carry two-way communications and would likely not provide the required high capacity, multimedia data broadcast capability. An interim, limited space segment GBS capability has been proposed by addition of "broadcast packages" on satellites being built under existing programs (e.g., UFO, DSCS, and Milstar ). The cost effectiveness of these alternatives and their ability to satisfy DoD requirements must be fully examined. The baseline design of existing MILSATCOM systems is not optimized for the delivery of multimedia, multi-megabit data to deployed forces equipped with a small, man-portable receive terminal.

(2) Technologically, commercial direct broadcast systems could be modified and extended to meet some GBS requirements. However, the DoD requirement for worldwide coverage (70 N to 70 S) is not compatible with many commercial objectives and may prohibit this option due to cost (i.e., landing rights) and conflicting requirements.

(3) Current intelligence broadcast data management techniques may provide a foundation for GBS data management.

c. Develop new systems.

(1) The next generation of MILSATCOM satellites, circa 2005, could either carry specific packages for GBS, provide satellite capacity for GBS in parallel with other services, or include dedicated satellites for GBS. Any new military system will utilize non-developmental items (NDI) to the greatest extent possible.

(2) Advances in high power amplifier and high data rate modem technologies at SHF and higher frequencies indicate a broadcast capability could be achieved with relatively low risk. Technological advancements in commercial satellite systems could be readily adaptable to military use. A commercial direct broadcast capability was developed and became available for CONUS use in 1994. Development of worldwide DoD GBS capability, using commercial technologies and military frequencies is a potential solution to the requirement to provide high data rate information to warfighters. Joint military cooperation can be expected in this effort and allied participation should be pursued.

(3) Development of the required management procedures and infrastructure to support retrieval, injection, and distribution of broadcast information is the critical link to successful implementation of the GBS.

5. Constraints.

a. Logistics support. GBS should make maximum use of existing logistics support infrastructure. Conceivably, theater injection sites could utilize existing facilities and be augmented by deployable equipment if required.

b. Manpower, personnel and training (MPT). Requirements for MPT will depend on the option chosen to meet the GBS requirement. GBS should minimize manpower and personnel requirements and be operable within the existing force structure. Training should be accomplished using current training programs where feasible. New training requirements should be integrated into the existing DOD training infrastructure and should make maximum use of existing resources. Initial training will be accomplished upon equipment installation and classroom training will be based on experience with satellite communications systems. Operations and maintenance manpower requirements are expected to be met without increasing manpower authorizations or creating new military occupational specialties.

c. Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence interfaces.

(1) Although a simplex broadcast, GBS must be compatible and integrated with existing and planned in theater and centralized C4I systems such as Intelink, GCCS , United States Imagery System (USIS), Defense Message System (DMS), and the DISN to the maximum extent possible. Interface methods to GBS, such as ATM, IP or other promising, widely-accepted data transfer standards, will support the capability of GBS as a means of data transmission. Potential Allied interoperability issues will also need to be addressed.

(2) Any GBS control system (TT&C) should be compatible with current and planned military satellite control systems, unless a totally commercial satellite system is used. For a commercial satellite system, Government control and access of TT&C must be assured.

(3) Significant doctrinal impacts are envisioned within the force structure in the areas of information delivery, exploitation, and battlefield use of the associated data. Efforts to assess the impact and to modify existing doctrine to incorporate the significant advantages offered by a GBS must be conducted.

d. Security.

(1) GBS must have the capability to accommodate broadcast transmission of all levels of information, from UNCLAS up to and including SCI (with further compartmentation if necessary). This requirement may be satisfied by the data handling features inherent in the ATM communications protocol or by provisions for a multi-channel broadcast. Security features must be incorporated to ensure GBS provides the appropriate level of protection to information throughout the transfer process. For a military GBS capability, the requisite security may be provided as for existing military satellite communications systems. Appropriate privacy and confidentiality features as well as access control, including provisions for "lost" terminals, must be incorporated into GBS.

(2) The simplex nature of GBS will present some challenges for encryption, coordination and synchronization, and key management. Security may be further complicated by the potential for hundreds of users. GBS should provide a hierarchy of encryption levels geared toward maximizing the availability of useful information to the lowest force components, consistent with policy, doctrine, and with the vulnerability of the receiver to capture.

e. Operational Environments. The Global Broadcast Service space segment must survive in the harsh environment of space. Ground terminals and receivers must operate in the full range of climatic conditions that occur within the coverage area, including the shipboard environment. GBS is not required to be functional in a HEMP/HANE environment and may not be required to include special jamming protection.

f. Standardization and Interoperability. To the maximum extent possible, GBS will utilize best commercial practices to exploit the economies of scale for the receive terminals available via the commercial market infrastructure. Interfaces at all levels should avoid proprietary solutions. As appropriate, any system(s) fielded to satisfy the GBS requirement will comply with applicable information technology standards in the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management (TAFIM) and the NORAD/USSPACECOM Integrated Command and Control System Objective Technical Architecture (OTA) document. Additionally, GBS data stream must contain interfaces into standard joint C4I systems for display and possible retransmission to nonGBS equipped units. If a commercial system is selected to provide the required Global Broadcast Service , its COTS and military capabilities should be standardsbased, to ensure maximum interoperability and compatibility among multivendor (non-proprietary), multiservice equipment, and minimize the cost to the Government. To accommodate legacy systems, the feasibility of providing backward compatibility to the triband (C, X, Ku) SATCOM terminals should be evaluated.

g. Frequency. Implementation of a GBS with a satellite downlink in other than military frequency bands will require national and international communication agencies approval. Significant issues regarding landing rights, host nation approval, tariff rates, and licensing will need to be resolved. Use of military frequencies will mitigate the landing rights issue, but host nation approval and potential interference problems will need to be addressed.

h. Transportation.

(1) MILSATCOM satellites must be able to use a variety of cost-effective launch systems (including commercial launch). Standard launch system interfaces are needed to help obtain a launch-on-need capability to meet unexpected military operational requirements.

(2) Preferences should be given to MILSATCOM systems that reduce the satellite terminal weight and size/cube for the mobile user. Although GBS will support small mobile terminals, some additional transportation requirements will be generated. Efforts to support transportability, while minimizing cost increases, should be considered.

6. Joint Potential Designator. Joint (Program).