Subject:      Satellite vulnerability: a view from the USAF
From:         thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date:         1995/11/22
Message-Id:   <thomsonaDIGsG3.I99@netcom.com>
Newsgroups:   sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia

   Thanks for D_Day for calling my attention to this article.  Of 
course, I let my membership in the USNI lapse this year...

   We Can Reduce Satellite Vulnerability
   by Major Jeffrey L. Caton, U.S. Air Force
   Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute
   November, 1995, pp. 81-83
   [excerpts]

      Can the United States cope with a space war of attrition? 
   Recent experience indicates that it cannot.  During the Falklands 
   Conflict, the Soviet Union launched 29 satellites within 69 days 
   -- an extraordinary surge capability.  In contrast, it took the 
   United States 113 days to replace a defense weather satellite 
   after an emergency call. 
      Future regional conflicts may be won or lost in much less 
   time -- and the United States cannot afford to assume that its 
   space assets will be left untouched: planners must consider 
   satellite attrition.
      We took for granted that our satellites were not attacked 
   during Operation Desert Storm, the first space war.  Military 
   satellites were the first systems on scene, and they supported 
   Coalition missions that included theater ballistic missile 
   defense, Scud hunting, interdiction missions, navigation and 
   intratheater and intertheater communications.
      Military operations will continue to depend heavily on 
   support provided by satellites... but present U.S. space systems 
   are neither responsive nor flexible enough for the future, 
   especially if confronted with an adversary that has space 
   capabilities...
      On-orbit reconstitution and rapid space force reconstitution 
   are two current options [to address the problem]...
     On-orbit Reconstitution[:]  [The concept of] on-orbit storage 
   and repositioning is flawed... [because it] makes the spares as 
   vulnerable as the active satellites.  Enemy space forces can 
   monitor and selectively target critical satellites and take them 
   out at once. 
      [Several other lesser disadvantages of on-orbit spares 
   deleted.] 
      Rapid Space Force Reconstitution[:] ... General Thomas 
   Moorman, vice chief of staff of the Air Force, noted in 1992 
   that "our current launch vehicles and their associated processes 
   do not provide the responsiveness needed to rapidly replace or 
   augment on-orbit assets."  In addition to being too slow, the 
   U.S. launch infrastructure is vulnerable, inflexible, and 
   expensive. 
      This shortfall points to the need for a rapid-response 
   spacelift system as an essential element of future combat 
   forces.  The development of rapid response space-lift could 
   change fundamentally U.S. space operations, but only if it is 
   coupled with a parallel change from complex, heavy, long-life 
   satellites called LightSats. 
      In war fighting terms, the big satellites are like B-17s in 
   space: self-defending [sic; ???], capable -- and easy targets 
   for a determined foe.  In contrast, the use of LightSats coupled 
   with a rapid-response spacelift system could dramatically 
   increase space combat capability.  This combination of 
   systems -- rapid-response spacelift and LightSats -- is rapid 
   space force reconstitution. 
      The U.S. military's growing dependence on space systems 
   presents a vulnerability that a competent foe cannot afford to 
   ignore.  Planners and commanders must recognize that the 
   operating conditions in space will change significantly in the 
   future.  Lieutenant General S. Bogdanov, chief of the former 
   Soviet Union general staff's operational research center, points 
   out that because "Iraq did not have the necessary 
   countermeasures, U.S. space means functioned under test-bed 
   conditions."  Simply put, no one challenged our high ground 
   during Desert Storm.  This was an anomaly; more potential 
   adversaries are gaining space capability. 
      [Much discussion of the advantages of Pegasus- and Taurus-
   like launch vehicles and compatible smallsats deleted.] 
      In choosing the status quo approach to spacelift, the 
   Pentagon is sentencing spacelift to remain unresponsive and man-
   power-intensive into the 21st century...  Future studies 
   concerning spacelift options, especially those that make cost 
   the primary measure of merit, also must consider the 
   consequences faced by peacetime space systems in a combat 
   environment.   
   
   
   Major Caton is Deputy Commander, Space Control Center Delta 
   Crew, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Station, 
   Colorado.  He has served as Chief, Launch Vehicle Test Branch, 
   6595th Test and Evaluation Branch at Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
   California, where he directed test operations for the small ICBM, 
   Peacekeeper, Minuteman and the Taurus space launch vehicle. A 
   graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, 
   Alabama, the author condensed this article from a detailed 
   research paper (AU-ARI-94-4) published by the Air University 
   Press.