Subject: Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976) From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson) Date: 1995/10/19 Message-Id: <thomsonaDGoADL.Dv8@netcom.com> Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia I was recently rereading the famous "Team B" alternative National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1976 while preparing a posting for a.p.o.cia and came across the following section on Soviet ASAT. It's interesting from several points of view, so I've reproduced the entire available text here (there are many redactions, unfortunately). I've made some comments in places where there is information relevant to present-day problems of satellite vulnerability and other things which interest me. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Estimating History [i.e., previous NIE assessments] [One or two paragraphs redacted] In 1968, the Soviets initiated actual non-nuclear ASAT testing, a fact which was reflected in the 1969 NIE. By 1971 (Feb), NIE 11-3 noted that a non-nuclear ASAT capability had been demonstrated, but that "a fully operational system would require greater flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet tests." [NIE 11-3-71, p.79, paragraph 207] It was believed hat the same constraints on ASAT use discussed in earlier years would continue to prevail, and would, in fact, be reinforced by the increasing dependence of the Soviets upon their own satellite systems as well as the effects of the SAL [Strategic Arms Limitations] negotiations. It will be very interesting to obtain those 1960s - early 1970s NIEs to see what the "constraints on ASAT use" were believed to be, as those probably influenced the way future U.S. systems like the KH-11 (IOC Jan 1976) were designed. As far as increasing Soviet dependence on satellites goes, it's my impression that, at least in a qualitative sense, they never got to the degree of dependency the U.S. did. In an August 1971 supplement, the NIE noted that the Soviets were in a period of frequent ASAT testing, and questioned why they did not employ a non-nuclear ASAT variant of the Galosh ABM, which would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and therefore highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites. Quite a relevant comment in the present-day context: non-nuclear direct ascent ASATs, the kind easiest to build, were recognized as "highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites." This reasoning let to the view that the ASAT system was a long range program ultimately directed against the full range of US space systems which could have originated in response to hypothetical systems (e.g., orbital bombardment) widely discussed in the early 1960's, but not introduced. An interesting notion, but I'd want to see the evidence before accepting it. The hiatus in ASAT testing from 1971 to 1976 has led to the publication of essentially unchanged estimates concerning the Soviet ASAT system, although Soviet laser capabilities have been given increasing emphasis as they have advanced. In addition, in 1974 the NIE noted that the Soviets demonstrated a capability to place satellites in geostationary orbit, thus potentially extending their ASAT capabilities to that altitude. The second sentence contains a point worth bearing in mind as we sail off into the future: GEO (or even GTO, for crossing shots) launch capability implies some degree of GEO ASAT capability. The Evidence [entire text, approximately two to four paragraphs, redacted] Darn. Analysis/Estimate [by Team "B"] As it currently exists, the Soviet ASAT system has several operational limitations which must be considered in assessing its potential utility to the USSR. (1) Altitude Limitation. This was noted above, and is primarily a function of the launch vehicle [SL-11]. It could be alleviated by use of a larger launch vehicle such as the SL-12, although Soviet views regarding the necessity of testing at higher altitudes prior to operational use remain unknown. [ section 2 redacted ] (3.) Target Capacity. As noted, each target satellite requires a separate ASAT launch. Although US reconnaissance systems ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ maintain only a small number of satellites, which cannot be ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ rapidly replaced, on orbit ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Aigh! This is *still true today, and is getting worse* as the "recapitalization/reinvestment" program rolls along. Lots of people know it now, lots of people knew it then. So what the hell has been going on in the NRO these past twenty years? a militarily effective attack upon planned systems (such as GPS) would seem to require development of an ASAT vehicle with a multiple engagement capability. [One or two paragraphs redacted] While Soviet intentions for the current system cannot be determined, consideration of its characteristics and limitations does permit attribution of several potential applications: (1) Political Use. Demonstration of intent, political "shock" effects, etc. True today as well. (2) Crisis Management. One time denial of information during a high intensity crisis situation. Hm. I'd tend to think that the availability of UAVs makes this less valid in today's world. (3) Extended Conventional War. Denial of tactical information over an extended period of time, possibly preceded by or coupled with lower level antisatellite operations, such as laser blinding, ECM, etc. Well, given the small numbers of spysats and long replacement times, this is probably still important. UAVs might take up much of the slack locally, but loss of global reconnaissance would be a serious indirect consequence of satellite destruction in a regional conflict. It would be interesting to find out what kinds of industrial lasers could be used for blinding satellites these days. Physical satellite destruction may be more likely as the nuclear threshold is approached. [about four lines redacted] This would be fully in consonance with Soviet employment of other space systems, such as their radar ocean surveillance satellite, in tactical operations. IMO, "the nuclear threshold" is totally irrelevant today in talking about ASAT. We'll nuke'm if they use nukes (or just maybe biological weapons -- not chemicals) on U.S. territory or troops and not otherwise. (4) Strategic Research and Development. Provide test and operational data for use in development of more capable ASAT systems. It is worth noting that the second series of Soviet ASAT tests began about a year after the ABM treaty, which had significantly constrained the number of ABM launchers that the Soviets could possess. Since the ASAT system is totally ineffective in an ABM role, its development may reflect a Soviet desire to avoid diverting any of their ABM system to an anti- satellite role, while at the same time acquiring an ASAT system that could in no way be construed as a violation of the ABM treaty. Another interesting dissertation topic: to what extent were early ABM (and perhaps high-performance SAM??) systems on either side designed to be usable as LEO ASATs? Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View Report of Team "B" Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis December 1976 Note: This document is one part of an experiment in competitive analysis undertaken by the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on behalf of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence or the views of the Director of Central Intelligence. Introductory Remarks: The mandate of Team "B" was to take an independent look at the data that go into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 [on Soviet strategic forces], and on that basis determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore more threatening to U.S. security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs... Team Leader : Professor Richard Pipes Associates : Professor William Van Cleave : Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.) : Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation : General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.) Advisory Panel : Ambassador Foy Kohler : The Honorable Paul Nitze : Ambassador Seymour Weiss : Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF : Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy From: "Allen Thomson" Date: 18 Sep 2005 12:05:07 -0700 Subject: 1977 DCI view of tactical use of spysats, vulnerability A while back I posted some vulnerability-related excerpts from the famous (or infamous, as you choose to see it) Team B pseudo-NIE: "Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)" http://tinyurl.com/b57uy also http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/at_951019.htm The document the following was taken from was published soon after the Team B report and probably was at least somewhat influenced by it. 1977 Director of Central Intelligence Report on The Intelligence Community DCI/IC 77-4657 SECRET Approved for Release 2002/05/07: CIA-RDP83M00171R002100110007-6 -Page 1- INTRODUCTION A. Purpose of the Report This is the first comprehensive report(*) on the Intelligence Community presented to the President and the Congress by the Director of Central Intelligence. It is designed to provide an over-view of the context, significant trends and major challenges confronting the United States national foreign intelligence effort from the DCI's perspective on the Intelligence Community as a whole(**). (U) (*) The original report, published in January 1977, was classified Top Secret. This version is being published at the Secret level to make the report available to a wider readership. (**) The term "intelligence," whenever used in this report, should be taken to mean foreign intelligence unless otherwise specified. [remainder of footnote omitted]. (U) -Page 20- National/Tactical Intelligence Interface. Considerable attention has recently been devoted to problems related to the conflicting demands of national and tactical needs for intelligence derived from national systems, particularly over-head reconnaissance systems. In reality the problem is three-tiered, involving the needs of national, departmental and field consumers. Each element has needs and missions which are unique, and which differ in important respects from those of the others. The nature of some of these differing needs is such that certain collection systems cannot be optimized for one consumer without serious degradation of their utility to others. Tradeoffs are required, and must be made from a national perspective. (S) The current mission of most national intelligence collection resources is the timely and continuing support of national- level decision makers involved in policy formulation, international negotiations, and crisis, control. These systems are designed to operate in an essentially benign environment. If we were to redesign our national intelligence capabilities to operate effectively in both benign and conflict environments, we would have to make a major investment in system survivability and the tactical communication and dissemination links and subsystems. We would also have to consider the impacts of such a step in terms of effects on aspects of our foreign policy (such as the Open Skies Agreement. SALT verification, etc.) and on the overall intelligence budget, including national, departmental, and intelligence-related* programs. (S) In effect, we are faced with the dilemma of trading off our capabilities to support war avoidance and crisis control and our capabilities to provide tactical intelligence from hardened national systems at such time as our military forces may be committed. In reality, the viability of national intelligence systems as wartime assets remains to be proven. It needs to be tested in more joint exercises and war games. Such evaluations would demonstrate the relative capabilities of national and tactical intelligence assets for support of combat operations, as well us of the National Command Authority. We must ascertain what can be accomplished effectively with the systems now in being, both national and tactical, before we venture into a massive redesign which would be expensive in terms of money, time and capabilities. (S) (*) Intelligence-related programs are those programs which, while not art of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, are closely related to it; included are such things as tactical warning, airborne reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, and certain training. (C) -Page 20- The recent recommendation for a national-level study to provide the basis for a Presidential decision is the first step. Planning for more joint exercises involving national systems is underway and should establish what we can effectively do now. Simultaneously, the capability of tactical systems to provide information to the National Command Authority will be tested. On the basis of what we learn from these initiatives, we can make informed judgments as to how to proceed in resolving the interface problem. (S) As intelligence-related assets become more expensive, complex, and interrelated with national intelligence assets, it becomes even more crucial that central control be exercised to prevent overlap and unnecessary duplication. The Congress has stressed this point and E.O. 11905 has emphasized the same theme. There must be the necessary concept, doctrine, policy, and strategy to assure that we are moving in the right direction. (U)