Approval Date:

22 Feb 93



                         (NO. CCC 11.9)

1.  Defense Planning Guidance Element.  This Mission Need Statement responds to two of the four foundations of the Defense Planning Guidance dated 22 May 1992:  Forward Presence and Crisis Response.  It is further supported by capabilities 20, 31, and 49 in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan dated 28 June 1991 and implementing actions in the (Draft) Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) expected to be published during April 1993.  Additionally, it is supported by the (Draft) MAGTF Equipment Assessment on Mission Area 11 (Command and Control) dated 23 November 1992 which provides further analysis down to the Capability Set level.

2.  Mission and Threat Analyses

    a.  Mission.  The Marine Corps deploys the MAGTF throughout the world to meet its operational commitments.  MAGTF's must be capable of fighting across the spectrum of conflict.  When these   MAGTF's are employed, our present tactical SATCOM resourceses cannot support communications requirements for both tactical and non tactical applications.  Scarce MILSATCOM space segment assets are not sufficient today to meet DOD requirements.  Furthermore, UHF and SHF SATCOM tactical terminal equipment is not directly capable of accessing commercial satellite systems which could provide interoperability and relief for command and control along with required telephone service.  Commercial satellite systems would provide such a capability.  In order to complete our mission, the MAGTF Commander must be able to use commercial satellite communication terminals to interface with either a commercial satellite system or a DoD satellite system; the type of satellite system is mission dependent.  The Initial Operational Capability is required in FY93 and the Full Operational Capability is desired by FY02.   
    b.  Threat.  Threat forces may attempt to adversely affect, degrade or deny use of selected portions of the radio frequency spectrum through the use of electronic warfare (EW) (including detection and location of radio transmission sources).  Radio communications may be severely degraded by nuclear or non-nuclear electro-magnetic pulses.  The terminal could be targeted for physical destruction.  Furthermore, directed energy weapons (laser, radio frequency and particle beam) will assist in performing the EW function of jamming, degrading and destroying critical U.S. control of elements.  This threat is identified in the classified Naval Technical Intelligence Center report, System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) - Satellite Systems, NTIC TA #008089, of March 1989 and in various Defense Intelligence Agency studies (e.g., ECM/ESM Capabilities - ECC, and Free World Electronic Warfare Capabilities).   
                                                                             3.  Nonmateriel Alternatives.  Based on our assessment we have made a mission need determination that there are no changes in doctrine, tactics, organization, or training that will provide this capability to the Marine Corps.

4.  Potential Materiel Alternatives

    a.  Product Improvement Program.  The AN/LST-5 UHF commercial satellite, which the Marine Corps has fielded, could be enhanced through a product improvement program.  Initial improvements would include embedded COMSEC and Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA).

    b.  Research and Development.  The Marine Corps could either initiate or participate with other Services in a research and development effort to develop terminals that could be used within the commercial spectrum.
    c.  Nondevelopmental Approach.  The Marine Corps could procure off-the-shelf commercial satellite terminals.  International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) is a commercial maritime satellite program for U.S. and foreign flag commercial ships.  Motorola, Magnavox, Harris, GE, GTE, just to name a few companies, have potential commercial solutions.  Furthermore, the Marine Corps could use commercial satellite terminals used by  other Services.  The LST-8000 SHF commercial satellite terminal is such an example.
5.  Constraints

    a.  Mobility and Transportation.  Depending on the capabilities of the commercial satellite terminal, the terminal could be either manpackable (capable of being carried by an individual Marine with full combat load), mounted in tactical vehicles, or for the stand-alone terminals, capable of roll-on and roll-off with C-130 or larger aircraft.  The capability to externally lift these larger terminals with the CH-53E is required.

    b.  Manpower.  The commercial satellite terminal will be employed in the Fleet Marine Force without the requirement for a new or additional Military Occupational Specialty. The requirement for additional personnel will be dependent on the frequency spectrum of operation.  For example, the use of a UHF INMARSAT terminal can be accomplished by any MOS, while a LST-8000 terminal will require additional personnel of a specific MOS to operate.

   c.  Operational Environment  

       (1) Organizational Concept.  The Communications Battalions, Marine Wing Communications Squadrons, Division Communications Companies and the Force Service Support Group Communications Companies will carry the commercial satellite communications system on their Table of Equipment.

       (2) Performance Characteristics.  The physical characteristics of the commercial satellite terminal are such that the terminal must interface with either commercial or DoD satellite systems.
           (a) The commercial satellite terminal must have the following similar capabilities:  1) capable of providing voice quality communications equal or superior to the Secure Telephone Unit III (STU III) operating at 2.4 kps with minimal voice delay; 2) capable of being integrated into existing FMF tactical communications systems; 3) capable of remote operation; 4) use built-in test (BIT) diagnostics or prognostics that will fault isolate to a single line replacement unit (LRU); 5) have integrated terminal Transmission Security (TRANSEC) and capable of Over-The-Air Rekey (OTAR); 6) not be controlled as COMSEC items; 7) capable of TRI-TAC interoperability; 8) capable of exercising strict control over transceiver to maintain compliance with Emission Control (EMCON) policies; 9) ability to provide surge protection and interrupted power supply to prevent casualties during power fluctuations; and 10) ability to provide data for access Defense Data Networks (DDN), electronic-mail (e-mail) and non-tactical ADP networks, allowing for future access to classified data network.

           (b) For those commercial satellite terminal which must have capabilities similar to those of UHF tactical terminals, the following capabilities apply.  The satellite terminal must have the capability to transmit and receive 75 bps data to 16 kps voice or data signals.  It is desirable that this terminal not weigh more than twelve pounds and be capable of transportation by a single Marine.  There is a requirement to vehicle mount the satellite terminal in a high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV).  It is desired that this terminal be capable of communicating while on the move.  The terminal must be powered by an internal battery source, both rechargeable and nonrechargeable, with a desired capability of using adaptable power conversion/filter devices.  Batteries must be standard within DoD and approved for air transportation.  The satellite terminal must have the capability to provide warning of low battery power to the operator.  The satellite terminal must have the capability of remote operation through a user-provided input/output device.   
           (c) For a larger and more capable commercial satellite terminal, the following capabilities, which are similar to SHF tactical terminals, apply.  The satellite terminal must provide the communications path for tactical, Defense Communications System (DCS) and commercial networks with a desired carrier rate of T1 (1.544 Mbs) or greater. The terminal must be capable of subdividing the channels to individual subscribers and digital switchboards at 16 kbps/32 kbps data rates using remote multiplexer combiners or similar devices.  Larger trunk group rates using digital group multiplexer equipment is desired.  Primary power will be provided by Marine Corps inventory generators, with under-the-hood vehicle power used as back-up power.  The terminal must be capable of operating unattended.  The terminal must be capable of having its channels remoted at distances of up to 1 km, 2 km desired.
       (6) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical.  There is no requirement for these systems to be nuclear hardened; although, there is a requirement for this equipment to be functional in a chemical or biological environment as well as it being possible for Marines to operate the commercial SATCOM systems while wearing Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear.        
   d.  Training.  Required training will be accomplished as on-the-job training.  Formal school training of operators and maintainers will be determined at a later date.  

   e.  Logistics.  Complete intermediate and depot level maintenance and logistical support is required.  Organizational level maintenance is required for limited inventory of spare parts consisting of plug-in and pull-out modules to facilitate trouble-shooting and repair.