COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE
1.1. Success in military operations depends on the effectiveness of leadership and command and control (C2) systems. The US Air Force will employ a command and control warfare (C2W) strategy to render an adversary's leadership and C2 systems ineffective while preserving the effectiveness of US and allied leadership and their C2 systems.
1.1.1. C2W integrates operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and destruction to control an adversary's C2 capabilities. This is accomplished by denial of information, influencing, degrading, or destroying an adversary's C2 system. Protecting friendly C2 against hostile C2W or friendly interference is the other dimension of C2W. C2W applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Intelligence support is critical for effective C2W offensive and defensive operations.
1.2. The Air Force will maximize US and allied military effectiveness by integrating the objectives of C2W into military strategy, plans, operations, exercises, training, communications architectures, computer processing, systems development, and professional education while reducing friendly vulnerabilities.
1.3. The Air Force will organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct successful C2W.
1.4. The Air Force will include C2W as an integral part in all peacetime, contingency, and combat operations.
1.5. The Air Force will implement procedures to control the sources of friendly information which may be exploited by adversaries.
1.6. During peacetime, the Air Force will control the conduct of C2W activities to ensure they are not interpreted as hostile US intent.
1.7. This directive establishes the following responsibilities and authorities:
1.7.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (HQ USAF/XO) is the office of primary responsibility for Air Force C2W.
1.7.2. Major commands (MAJCOM) will develop C2W programs that address the specific needs of their assigned missions and will ensure subordinate commands implement the C2W strategy in day-to-day operations.
1.7.3. Commanders and their staff will routinely plan and implement C2W activity in exercises and operations. Those commanders with wartime tasking in operation plans (OPlan) will develop C2W annexes for those plans.
1.8. See attachment 1 for measures used to comply with this policy.
1.9. See attachment 2 for publications implemented by this policy directive and for other publications with which it interfaces.
OPR: HQ USAF/XOFE (Lt Col William S. Bounds) Editor: SAF/AAIP (Ms Catherine H. Leason)
Certified by: HQ USAF/XOF (Maj Gen Marvin S. Ervin) Pages: 9/Distribution: F
1.10. See attachment 3 for terms explained.
A1.1.1. A graphic measure of the level of C2W activity in all MAJCOM exercises is displayed in figure A1.1. When commanders integrate two or more of the five functions that make up the C2W strategy (i.e., OPSEC, PSYOP, EW, military deception, or destruction), it becomes a reportable C2W activity. The Air Force goal is to have commanders integrate all five functions of the C2W strategy in exercises and operations. Additional information can be found in AFI 10-705, Command and Control Warfare Procedures (formerly AFR 55-50). MAJCOMs will report once a year (due not later than 31 January to HQ USAF/XOFE) the number of MAJCOM-directed or -supported exercises held each month along with the number of those that included C2W activity. Figure A1.2 shows compliance percentage as the total number of exercises in which C2W was employed, divided by the total number of MAJCOM exercises. These metrics will be compiled annually by HQ USAF/XOFE, not later than 28 February each year (RCS: HAF-XOF (A) 9318, Command and Control (C2W) Compliance Data. Discontinue reporting during emergency conditions; however, continue reporting during MINIMIZE. Data may be reported by message, fax, mail, or telephone.). The Air Force goal is to have C2W activity in 100 percent of the countable exercises and operations.
A184.108.40.206. Participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-, MAJCOM-, and numbered Air Forces (NAF)-directed exercises will be counted. Do not count wing-generated exercises involving only one wing. If more that one MAJCOM is involved in planning and conducting C2W activity in an exercise, each MAJCOM may separately count their C2W activity. Do not count planning activity for exercises that are subsequently canceled without executing any part of the C2W activity.
A1.1.2. Effectiveness analysis will focus on trends within the following categories of C2W assessment: Training Programs, C2W Procedures, C2W Equipment Availability, and Commander's Involvement. Exceptions to Air Force C2W policy along with plans to bring the exception into compliance will be forwarded to the appropriate Air Staff office. Exceptions will be reviewed and staff actions to assist in attaining compliance will be completed.
A1.2. MAJCOMs will ensure OPlans that they support have formally incorporated C2W strategy considerations.
A1.2.1. MAJCOMs will compile a list of all OPlans they support and identify those that have C2W guidance and forward this information annually to HQ USAF/XOFE (due not later than 31 January each year, RCS: HAF-XOF (A) 9318. See paragraph A1.1.1 for emergency condition disposition and minimize handling.). Figure A1.3 displays the percentage of Air Force OPlans reported that provide C2W guidance. It shows the level of compliance as a percentage of total number of Air Force OPlans providing C2W guidance, divided by the total number of OPlans that the Air Force supports. The Air Force goal is to have C2W guidance in each Air Force-supported OPlan.
A1.3. Associated C2W Air Force instructions that supplement this policy directive will contain requirements and instructions for additional compliance measures pertaining to their respective areas of responsibility.
Figure A1.1. Sample Metric of MAJCOM Exercise Assessment Data.
Figure A1.2. Sample Metric of C2W Compliance.
Figure A1.3. Sample Metric of C2W OPLAN Guidance.
Designation Title Date
Department of Defense Department of Defense Electromagnetic August 20, 1990
(DoD) Directive 3222.2 Compatibility Program (EMCP)
DoD Directive 3222.4 Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, July 31, 1992
Control, Communications Counter-
DoD Directive 4650.1 Management and Use of the Radio Frequency June 24, 1987
Chairman of the Joint Electronic Warfare March 3, 1993
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
Memorandum of Policy
(MOP) 6 (lst Revision)
CJCS MOP 25 Wartime Reserve Modes July 13, 1990
CJCS MOP 30 Command and Control Warfare March 8, 1993
JCS MOP 116 Military Deception March 24, 1987
A2.2. This policy directive interfaces with the following documents:
Designation Title Publication or Date
AFI 10-701 Performing Electronic Countermeasures in AFR 55-44
the United States and Canada
AFI 10-702 Psychological Operations No Former Publication
AFI 10-703 Electronic Warfare Integrated Repro- AFR 55-24
AFI 10-704 Tactical Deception Program AFR 55-49
AFI 10-705 Command and Control Warfare AFR 55-50
AFI 10-706 Electronic Combat AFRs 55-90 and
AFI 10-707 Spectrum Interference Resolution AFR 55-3
AFPD 10-11 Operations Security (OPSEC) No Former Publication
AFI 10-1101 Operations Security (OPSEC) Instructions AFRs 55-30, 55-32,
55-36, and 55-39
A3.1.1. Counter-C2. To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system.
A3.1.2. C2-Protection. To maintain effective C2 of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system.
A3.2. Electronic Warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions of electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.
A3.2.1. Electronic Attack. That division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes:
A220.127.116.11. Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception.
A18.104.22.168. Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).
A3.2.2. Electronic Protection. That division of EW involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.
A3.2.3. Electronic Warfare Support. That division of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, ES provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. ES support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).
A3.3. Military Deception. Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives. There are three categories of military deception:
A3.3.1. Strategic Military Deception. Planned and executed to result in foreign national policies and actions which support the originator's national objectives, policies, and strategic military plans.
A3.3.2. Tactical Military Deception. Planned and executed by and in support of operational commanders against the pertinent threat, to result in opposing operational actions favorable to the originator's plans and operations. Also called TD.
A3.3.3. Department/Service Military Deception. Planned and executed by Military Services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel or service operations, or other activities to result in foreign actions which increase or maintain the originator's capabilities relative to adversaries.
A3.4. Operations Security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:
A3.4.1. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
A3.4.2. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
A3.4.3. Select and execute measures that eliminate, or reduce to an acceptable level, the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC.
A3.5. Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. Also called PSYOP. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.