A - Overview
The role of signals intelligence in the Gulf war is difficult to determine. While the United States deployed a vast array of space and terrestrial collection systems, Iraqi countermeasures enjoyed a fair degree of success, at least prior to the final weeks of the war.
B - Space Segment
The United States operated two classes of space-based signals intelligence systems during the Gulf conflict. High-altitude geostationary satellites includes both Chalet and Magnum systems. And low-altitude systems included both White Cloud Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellites, as well as signals intelligence sub-satellites launched with an Advanced Keyhole satellite.
Chalet and Magnum
The Chalet series is also known as Vortex, a code name that was assigned after the Chalet code-name was publicly compromised. Presumably the compromise of the Vortex code-name has resulted in a new code-name being assigned this system, although there is no indication as to what this name might be.
|Chalet 3||Vortex 3||10/31/81|
|Chalet 6||Vortex 6 USA-37||5/10/89|
There is some uncertainty concerning the precise configuration of the operational signals intelligence constellation, more so than is the case with any other American, or Soviet, military space system. The notional constellation consists of four satellites at two orbital locations. However, it is possible that there are as many as four Chalet's currently operational, including the spacecraft launched in 1975 that is sometimes referred to as Argus. In addition, many if not all six of the earlier and less sophisticated Rhyolite satellites may remain in service, or be available for service if needed. In principle, ELINT satellites such as Chalet, and its smaller predecessor Rhyolite, could continue in operations for well over a decade. These electronic intelligence satellites are essentially passive radio receivers, with few of the moving parts and high-power electronics that are usually the source of failures on other spacecraft. In addition, they do not require constant maneuvering to maintain a precise orbital location on the geostationary arc. And it is the exhaustion of such station-keeping propellant that is usually the reason that commercial communications satellites are deactivated. Indeed, there is circumstantially evidence in support of this, such as the continued proliferation of receiving dishes at ground stations
that would be used to support these satellites, as well as the large number of otherwise unidentified classified satellites that continue to maintain stations on the geostationary arc.
The primary geostationary signals intelligence satellite is Magnum, of which three were operational by early January 1991. Magnum weighs about twice as much as the earlier Chalet. This increase in mass translates into a significantly large receiving antenna. The reason for the larger diameter antenna is not primarily the ability to pick up weaker signals, although this is a side benefit. Rather, the larger antenna offers an improved capability to intercept signals from a larger number of discrete geographical areas. The focal point of the Magnum antenna does not consist of a single receiver, but rather a large array of feed horns, each of which intercepts signals from a different area on the Earth's surface. As a result, on this satellite, one of the feed horns would be focused on Kuwait, another on the area north of Kuwait, a third on the area south of Baghdad, while fourth is listening in on what's going on around Baghdad. The satellite is simultaneously intercepting transmissions from Moscow, Poland and many other areas. As a result, it's not necessary to point the satellite at a single discrete target to the exclusion of everything else.
In addition to these geostationary sigint satellites, two Jumpseat sigint satellites, launched in 1985 and 1987, remained in service throughout 1990. These satellites, in highly elliptical Molniya-type orbits, provide specialized coverage of the far Northern regions of the Soviet Union. It is not clear that these satellites would have any direct role in the Gulf crisis.
White Cloud Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellites (NOSS)
These geosynchronous satellites are not the sole source of signals intelligence product. In addition, there are the low altitude White Cloud constellations, with four or five clusters of these currently operating. In addition, the June 1990 Titan 4 launch also included a triplet of signals intelligence sub-satellites. For tasks such as locating air defense radars, which has been one of the main tasks of the operation, White Cloud is probably the main system.
The American counterpart to the Soviet EORSAT is the While Cloud Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS). Each White Cloud launch places into low polar orbit a cluster of one primary satellite, as well as three smaller sub-satellites that trail along behind the primary at distances of several hundred kilometers. This widely dispersed array of satellites enables the system to determine the location of radio and radars transmissions, using triangulation, and the identity of naval units can be deduced by analysis of the operating frequencies and transmission patterns of the emitters.
|NOSS 7||White Cloud||2/09/86|
|NOSS 8||White Cloud||5/15/87|
|NOSS 9||White Cloud||9/05/88|
|NOSS-SSU 10-1||White Cloud||9/06/89|
|KH Sigint Subsatellite 1||8/06/90|
|KH Sigint Subsatellite 2||8/06/90|
|KH Sigint Subsatellite 3||8/06/90|
C - Control Segment
Menwith Hill in the UK is the principal NATO theater ground segment node for the higher altitude electronic intelligence satellites.(1) Although this facility is jointly operated with the UK's General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), GCHQ is not privy to the intelligence down-linked to Menwith Hill, since tapes containing the data are returned via air to the United States for analysis.
D - User Segment
Very little information is publicly available concerning signals intelligence user segment. In general, this will follow the pattern outlined for imagery intelligence, since both of these types of product are derived from national systems.
E - Operational Applications
The number of specific mentions of signals intelligence product is significantly smaller than the number of mentions for imagery intelligence. In addition, while the imagery intelligence reporting is usually quite specific that the product was derived from satellite systems, this is generally not the case with reports on signals intelligence. Indeed, the relative contribution of space-based versus other signals intelligence collectors is one of the major open questions of the Gulf War.
Signals intelligence provided one of the first indicators of Iraqi intentions in Kuwait. "A Soviet-built TALL KING radar that abruptly resumed operation Sunday morning, July 29, in souther Iraq gave US analysts their first substantive warning that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was likely." The 350 mile range radar had been out of service for a number of months prior to the invasion.(3)
An intensive signals intelligence campaign mounted in the later part of August was expected to provide 12 to 24 hours advance notice of an Iraqi attack. The order of priority for coverage by electronic intelligence systems is:(4)
1 - Air Defenses;
2 - Airfields and aircraft;
3 - Intermediate range missiles;
4 - Military communications, command and control centers;
5 - Chemical, nuclear and munitions facilities;
6 - Iraqi tank forces;
By early October, "US electronic listening posts -- including AWACS, intelligence ships, and ground stations -- have been somewhat successful in monitoring Iraqi military communications. But much of the Iraqi army has been using underground cables to communicate between Baghdad and Kuwait. The secure communications have made it difficult to determine Iraqi military intentions... the Iraqis took steps to secure their communications several years ago after a US newspaper disclosed details of a US electronic eavesdropping operation against Iraq."(5)
During the third week of October, "electronic intelligence operations in the region detected the first characteristic signs of Hawk radar operation at a special test site for air defense equipment near Baghdad. The radar emanations indicated that Iraq is 'playing around' with the weapons systems, as one official put it, but still remains weeks to months away from actually deploying them."(6) And reportedly "US intelligence collected in November (revealed) that a Soviet military officer was overheard giving orders on an Iraqi military radio channel in Kuwait. The US intercept, picked up in southern Kuwait, sounded like a Soviet officer directing an Iraqi tank battalion... The information was collected by the US National Security Agency and reported secretly within the US government. A subsequent intelligence report said Britain's electronic intelligence agency disputed the veracity of the intercepted communication and said the report was 'under further analysis'."(7)
Signals intelligence systems also provided warning of impending Iraqi Scud missile launches. The missile launchers "have a radar, code named END TRAY by NATO, that it used to track a balloon sent into the upper atmosphere just before launch to help compute high altitude winds and increase accuracy of the missile. But Soviet doctrine calls for the radar to be turned on for only a short time, making in hard to detect. Also, although there are communications links to the surveyed sites, they are buried, so chances of picking up any emissions are minimal."(8)
Given the limits of photo-interpretation in assessing the effectiveness of the air campaign, "a key technique of bomb damage assessment is monitoring the operational pace of the unit that has been hit. Radio traffic intercept should provide some indications" of this.(9) "The kind of thing they'd get would be, for example: such-and-such a radar in Iraq was switched on today for 10 minutes instead of the usual 12."(10)
By the first week of February it was reported that, "for the first time, some Guard units have broken radio silence, enabling US intelligence to study their codes and deduce that they are under pressure... (but) Radio traffic remains low, and the bombing doesn't appear to have totally destroyed Iraq's elaborate underground communications network, which is much tougher to intercept."(11) By the second week of February, it was reported that "many Iraqi troops are being forced to communicate outside of secure networks on regular VHF radio channels, which are far easier for allied intelligence gatherers to intercept... such open communication could allow allied special forces teams to infiltrate Iraq's airwaves with false battle orders designed to confuse Iraqi troops."(12)
During the early days of February, it was reported that Soviet advisors were providing the Iraqi "military with information about the times US spy satellites pass overhead... The information on the Soviet action was gathered from what the sources described as an 'extremely sensitive source,' a term often use to describe communications intercepts."(13) And during the second week of February, it was reported that "Allied electronic eavesdroppers intercepted Russian voices communicating on Iraqi military radio channels... allied military and diplomatic officials doubt the intercepts were conversations from Russian-speaking Iraqis. The communications were overheard at the corps, division and battalion levels, indicating a large Soviet military presence with Iraqi ground forces."(14)
Signals intelligence was central to efforts to attack Iraqi leadership assets, including Saddam Hussein himself. "Saddam has changed his daily routine and movements as a result of disclosures that US air forces had targeted him, his family, his mistress and members of his family."(15) On or about 8 February a pair of F-16 aircraft attacked a convoy of fifty vehicles about 160 kilometers north of Basra, destroying several cars. Subsequent analysis revealed that the convoy included Saddam Hussein himself, who was apparently not injured in the raid. Subsequently "American electronic warfare aircraft (were) flying continually round the clock over Baghdad in an effort to pinpoint the Iraqi leader. The missions began in the last few days (mid February) and are intended to pick up conversations between Saddam and his military commanders, so he can be targeted in an operation called 'The Yamamoto Option'... 'We have adopted a strategy of leaving Saddam with some communications so that we can track him,' said a Pentagon source."(16)
Signals intelligence was instrumental in the identification of the Amiriya bomb shelter in Baghdad, although "there was no give-away radio gear atop the bunker, sources said, because the Iraqis routinely locate antennas away from the sources of transmission, in order to confuse aerial and electronic intelligence. At Amiriya, they allegedly sent signals from the bunker to remote broadcast facilities by coaxial cables."(17) Despite limited photographic coverage of the Amiriya shelter, "intercepts of military communications from the shelter were monitored until much closer to the bombing" which killed hundreds of civilians on 12 February.(18) However, a "Pentagon official, who asked not to be named, suggested that the installation was not broadcasting its messages by antenna. Rather, this official implied, that the center used buried communications lines to transmit its messages, which were later relayed to forces in the field."(19) In the wake of the controversy surrounding the bombing, "some political leaders pushed to release intercepted radio signals from the site,"(20) but this not done.
American skepticism concerning Iraq's 15 February offer to withdraw from Kuwait, subject to a number of conditions, was reinforced by signals intelligence. "... radio intercepts overheard no orders going out from Baghdad telling Iraqi commanders the war is nearing an end..."(21) Another account noted that "Radio intercepts showed that Iraq had no inkling of the flanking attack."(22)
"Days before the start of the ground war, the forces began dropping 15,000 pound 'Daisy Cutter' bombs on Iraqi troops from the back of C-130 transport planes.... Terrified Iraqis were certain that the devastating explosion signaled the beginning of the ground war, and turned on their air-defense radars all along the boarder. American pilots pinpointed many air-defense installations they never new existed. Says one Pentagon official, 'We were able to 'paint' every radar electronically and knock them out.'"(23)
F - Operational Limitations
Iraqi efforts to defeat American signals intelligence were not entirely unexpected. One commentator noted that "Saddam knows more about American battlefield intelligence than all but a handful of other foreign leaders, thanks to Ronald Reagan, William Casey and aides. The fact that Saddam still has secure communication channels to his Corps commanders in the middle of history's heaviest air raids suggests that he knew enough about US interception and jamming abilities to take special steps to thwart them.... (according to) Howard Teicher, who directed political military affairs on the White House's National Security Council Staff from 1983 to 1986, "You have to ask now what Saddam learned about us from what he was seeing. He seems to have switched to more secure land-line communications to his commanders after we neutralized his microwave relay network. It is fair to ask when he began to build in so much redundancy."(24)
Although the bulk of the SIGINT activities involved traffic analysis, communications intelligence was hampered by language barriers. According to Jeffery Richelson, "The biggest problem the United States is facing right now probably is processing all the information... the question is whether they have enough analysts who can speak Arabic."(25)
By the fifth week of the war, reports noted that "Iraqi 'opsec,' or operational security, has been surprisingly effective, in part because of a resilient fiber optic communications line running underground from Baghdad to Basra and on to Kuwait.Allied bombers have struck a number of microwave communications towers, including several in remote villages, but have had difficulty in severing the fiber optic cables. As a result, the allies have had limited success in forcing Iraqi commanders "up into the air" - giving orders by radio -- where such communications are vulnerable to U.S. eavesdropping."(26)
"The extensive use of radio silence and widespread networks of fiberoptic cables by Iraqi forces... have hampered the efforts" of American signals intelligence units.(27) According to Lt. Gen. Jimmy Adams, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "we were fully prepared for the idea that he (Saddam) would be able to... patch his radio links and that the had redundant systems for command and control. In most cases, the capabilities were hard-wired and so a goal was to force him on the air where communications became more revealed. I think we've had success with that. Obviously, if he's talking on his land lines its more difficult for us to disrupt. So your preference would be to have him on a clear frequency where you exploit the signals, whether you want to target him or use it as an intelligence source."(28)
"The deceptive measures Iraq is using include electronically shielding communications from eavesdropping: broadcasting phony messages; maintaining silence on prime military channels... the Iraqis are 'quite sophisticated in matters of electronic deception,' said a former National Security Agency official... 'what Iraq learned from us is having consequences for both SIGINT and imagery,' one analyst said. 'It increased their awareness of the amount of information were can develop...'"(29)
The use of signals intelligence to provide warning of Scud attacks, and to assist in locating Scud launchers, was complicated by Iraqi deception efforts. "US officials said the missile is also vulnerable to detection during final stages of launch preparations, when Iraqi force release balloons to check for wind flow that could divert the missile from its target. The Iraqis monitor the movements of the balloon using small radars that Western military officials have code-named End Tray and Bread Bin. These radars transmit tell-tale signals. US experts say that finding such radars can be complicated, however, by the Iraqi practice of deploying extra radars that send identical signals to confuse potential attackers."(30)
Another account agreed that "... Iraq was using dummy missiles, complete with equipment that emitted electronic signals designed to fool attacking airplanes."(31)
G - Alternative Systems
Airborne SIGINT systems deployed in the Gulf regions included U-2Rs, TR-1s and the RC-135 Rivet Joint.(32) According to one report, "some U-2Rs can relay Comint/Sigint intercepts to the NSA in real time, via a wideband satellite link."(33)
The RC-135 is one of the Strategic Air Command's principal electronic intelligence collection platforms. At least twelve versions of the aircraft have been produced.(34) These aircraft, carrying a variety of passive electronic sensors, monitored Iraqi communications, air defense radars, and other active emitters. Bases in Europe that are host to RC-135 elements of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing include the 306th Strategic Wing at RAF Mildenhall (UK) and the 992nd Support Squadron at Hellenikon Airport (Greece).
Ground-based signals intelligence facilities in the region included "the British radio base at Ayios Nikolaos, Cyprus. A dusty plain dotted with radio aerials, east of Famagusta, this is the main Western center for monitoring Iraqi military, air force and diplomatic signals. The base (is run by the British) Army's No 9 Signals Regiment... The key US monitoring station in the region is 'Diogenes Station' at Sinop, Turkey (the philosopher was born nearby). British technicians from GCHQ also work covertly at the site, which is run by the US Army Security Agency and the US Naval Security Group. During the 1980s, US monitoring of the Middle East has been built up from Diego Garcia (also with British participation) and a covert network in Oman, centered on the island of Masirah. The Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia have also purchased their own Sigint systems. Saudi Arabia's own intelligence service operates security stations throughout Saudi Arabia, tow of which are located close to the Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders at Kafji and Araz."(35)
For the Army at the Corps-level, intelligence support is managed by a Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Group, which operates a Tactical Operations Center to provide a "coordination center for intelligence systems from other services or from strategic assets normally associated with echelons above corps."(36) The CEWI Group includes an Aerial Exploitation Battalion, which controls the Guardrail and Quicklook collection systems.(37) The Tactical Exploitation Battalion controls ground-based assets such as Quick Fix (AN/ALQ-151), Teampack (AN/MSQ-103A), Trailblazer (AN/TSQ-114), Tacjam (AN/MLQ-34), TACELIS (AN/TSQ-112), and REMBASS.(38) Data from all of these organic sensors will be fused with echelon above Corps data using the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). Other analysis assets are currently in use. "Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (EPDS) is a ground-based, computer assisted Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) correlation facility for theater and national sensors. Enhanced Tactical User Terminal is a processing and visual display for ELINT and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) support to the Corps."(39)
The U.S. Army Division-level assets are managed at the Division Technical Control and Analysis Center by a Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalion support element.(40) Guardrail is an airborne communications intelligence (COMINT) system mounted on a Beechcraft RC-12D. The system intercepts ground-based communications, calculates the location of emitters, and transmits this data to a transportable ground station. Planned upgrades include the addition of the Guard Lock electronic intelligence system.(41) And Quicklook is a tactical electronic intelligence collection system mounted on the Grumman RV-1D Mohawk aircraft. The system is used for detection and localization of opposing forces radars operating between 500 MHz and 18 GHz. The on-board signal processors are capable of identifying hostile radars on the basis of their signal characteristics.(42)
H - Iraqi Capabilities
Despite their limited imaging intelligence capabilities, the Iraqi military entered the war with a sophisticated signals intelligence apparatus. But the functioning of this system was dependent on communications networks to permit coordinated analysis, and Coalition attacks on Iraqi communications degraded this capability.(43)
Iraqi signals intelligence were further hampered by Coalition deception efforts. "Among the many smaller deceptions of the war, one official said, was the creation of a mock battlefield 'headquarters' by teams operating opposite the site of feigned border crossings. By broadcasting a large volume of encrypted radio traffic from portable equipment at these otherwise desolate locations, US military officials hoped to -- and evidently did -- convince eavesdropping Iraqis that their forces were concentrated at sites distant from the real headquarters."(44) This 100 man deception cell of XVIII Corps "broadcast the kind of radio traffic and other electronic signals typically emitted from a Corps headquarters... with phony communications transmitters and a device that feigned Hawk anti-aircraft missile signals."(45)
The British conducted a successful signals intelligence operational deception using troops code-named "Rhino Force."(46) The deception effort "began in the weeks before the ground war with a series of field exercises conducted by the Fourth and Seventh Brigades of Britain's First Armored Division... the British troops used low transmission power to evade Iraqi electronic intelligence unit and to avoid the need to encode radio traffic. The transmissions were recorded and later played back at full power to the Iraqi's signal intelligence units -- equipped with Soviet and British surveillance gear -- in reverse... So when British forces moved away from the Kuwaiti boarder about 125 miles to the west to join the main US Seventh Army Corps attack into Iraq, Iraqis monitoring allied radios heard the British moving east, in the opposite direction.... We were tuned into the Iraqi command radio net... Rhino force was so successful that Iraq steadily altered the disposition of its forces, concentrating increasingly on the southernmost point where the Kuwaiti and Iraqi boarders meet."(47)
And "on the second day of the ground war, Iraqi troops heard on Iraqi-controlled Radio Kuwait that Kuwait City had been liberated by Allied airborne landings. Several Iraqi formations, believing themselves in danger of being cut off, began leaving their positions, and the rout gathered pace as the story spread. The broadcasts was actually a fake from an Allied transmitter in Saudi Arabia. The remnants of the Iraqi radio network were either heavily jammed or used to pass false messages to the Iraqis."(48)
"Soviet-made electronic equipment was used by the Iraqis to collect operational intelligence on allied forces... to determine allied air tactics and develop ways to counter them... Both US and Saudi forces were often lax in operational communications security procedures, US officials said. The Saudis, mainly because of their lack of combat experience, 'have no idea of operational security' and regularly 'talk in the open' about sensitive subjects, according to a US advisor. 'After the first two weeks of the war, (other US units) stopped taking to us... because the Saudis were spreading intelligence we gave them as gossip'... (American) Air Force fighter units used the same frequencies and call signs 'far too long'... Iraqi communications analysts would try to listen in as allied airborne forward air controllers contacted incoming attack aircraft... While monitoring Iraqi radio traffic in one such 'killing box,' US officials heard the commander of a mobile Scud missile launcher talking to his immediate superior. The commander reported he was pulling out of his position because there were 'F-16s coming after me,' an Air Force officer said. 'They had figured out' the target coding system..."(49)
I - Net Assessment
The overall contribution of space-based signals intelligence to the Gulf War is difficult to determine. In part this difficulty stems from the ambiguity as to the relative contribution of space-based and other signals intelligence systems. Certainly the paucity of explicit references to space-based signals intelligence, coupled with the abundance of airborne and ground-based systems, leaves open the possibility that satellite systems played only a marginal role. The Iraqi forces and commanders were certainly alive to American signals intelligence capabilities, and took extensive countermeasures, including use of landlines and emission control, to compromise their effectiveness. A major focus of American operations was to reduce impact of these Iraqi countermeasures, and to force them back onto the air. In the later weeks of the war, the American campaign appeared to meet with success, but the net result of this success is less clear. The record of Iraqi signals intelligence is equally mixed, with tactical successes balanced by failure to discern coalition deceptions masking the ground campaign.
1. Desmond Ball, Pine Gap, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988), page 61.
3. "Invasion Tip," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 August 1990, page 15.
4. "Joint Intelligence Effort Pinpoints Iraqi Military Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 August 1990, page 19.
5. Gertz, Bill, "US Breathes Easier as it Spots Iraq's Jamming Gear," The Washington Times, 9 October 1990, page A8.
6. Smith, Jeffrey, "Iraqis Learning to Use Captured US Missiles," The Washington Post, 21 October 1990, page A1, A28.
7. Gertz, Bill, "Russian Voices Directing Iraqis," The Washington Times, 13 February 1991, page 1.
8. "Scud Launch Procedures May Hold Key to Defeat of Mobile Missiles," Aerospace Daily, 28 January 1991, page 149-150.
9. "The Battle Damage Assessment Challenge," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 9.
10. Honey, Peter, "US Used Overwhelming Technical, Military Advantage," The Baltimore Sun, 3 March 1991, page 11A.
11. Mossberg, Walter, "US Aides Await Bomb Damage Report In Considering Early Ground Offensive," The Wall Street Journal, 4 February 1991, page A12.
12. Moore, Molly, "Bombing Damage Hard to Assess," The Washington Post, 7 February 1991, page A21.
13. Gertz, Bill, "Soviets Giving Aid to Iraqis, US Says," The Washington Times, 4 February 1991.
14. Gertz, Bill, "Russian Voices Directing Iraqis," The Washington Times, 13 February 1991, page 1.
15. Tyler, Patrick, "US Strength in Gulf May Rise by 100,000," The Washington Post, 26 October 1990, page A1, A32. This story does not indicate this source of this information, but signals intelligence satellites would be used to collect this type of information, and it is not clear what other intelligence source would provide this insight.
16. Adams, James, "The Day Saddam Escaped Death," London Sunday Times, 17 February 1991, page 3.
17. Barry, John, "What Really Happened," Newsweek, 25 February 1991, page 20.
18. Seib, Gerald, "Heavy Civilian Casualty Toll of Raid on Iraq Has US Scrambling to Keep Alliance United," The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1991, page A16.
19. Gordon, Michael, "US Calls Target a Command Center," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 17.
20. "Washington Wire," The Wall Street Journal, 15 February 1991, page 1.
21. Cody, Edward, "Allied Test Joint Land, Sea, Air Assaults," The Washington Post, 17 February 1991, page A29, A30.
22. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
23. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
24. Hoagland, Jim, "America's Frankenstein Monster," The Washington Post, 7 February 1991, page a19.
25. Kiernan, Vincent, "Satellites Crucial in Countering Iraq," Space News, 13 August 1990, page 1, 20.
26. Atkinson, Rick, "Iraqis Called Vulnerable to Land Attack," The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, page A1, A31.
27. Munro, Neil, "Enemy Silence Hampers Army Intelligence Efforts," Defense News, 25 February 1991.
28. Capaccio, Tony, "Single Air Maestro Was The Key To Bombing Orchestra Over Iraq," Defense Week, 11 February 1991, page 6-7.
29. Weiner, Tim, "Iraq Uses Techniques in Spying Against Its Former Tutor, the U.S.," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 January 1991, page 1-A, 10-A.
30. Smith, Jeffrey, "Compactness, Simplicity, Mobility of Scuds Complicate US Search," The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, page A31.
31. Richter, Paul, "Foe Skilled at Trickery, Decoys Show," Los Angeles Times, 24 January 1991, page A1, A18.
32. Streetly, Martin, "Allies Take Advantage of Electronic Support," Flight International, 30 January 1991, page 10.
33. Banks, Tony, "Techint V. Humit: the Unseen War," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 February 1991, page 221.
34. Martin Streetly "U.S. Airborne ELINT Systems, Part 3: the Boeing RC-135 Family," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 March 1985, pp 460-465.
35. Campbell, Duncan, "Under U.S. Eyes," The Independent on Sunday, 30 September 1990, page 20.
36. Scott Gourley, "Tactical Intelligence is Key to the AirLand Battle Scenario," Defense Electronics, February 1988, page 44.
37. James Rawles, "U.S. Military Upgrades Its Battlefield Eyes and Ears," Defense Electronics, February 1988, pp 56-70.
38. James Rawles, "The Mighty Five," Defense Electronics, November 1987, page 74.
39. U.S. Department of Defense, Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's, (Washington, 1988), page V-5.
40. The Army Communicator, Fall 1981, page 9.
41. James Rawles, "The Mighty Five," Defense Electronics, November 1987, page 60.
42. James Rawles, "The Mighty Five," Defense Electronics, November 1987, page 60.
43. Budiansky, Stephen, "The Run and Shoot Offense," US News & World Report, 25 February 1991, page 38-43.
44. Gellman, Barton, "Deceptions Gave Allies Fast Victory," The Washington Post, 28 February 1991, page A1, A30.
45. Atkinson, Rick, "Outflanking Iraq: Go West, Go Deep," The Washington Post, 18 March 1991, page A1, A14.
46. Fullerton, John, "British Ruse Held Iraqi's Attention While Real Invasion Came Elsewhere," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 march 1991, page 8-A.
47. Fullerton, John, "British Ruse Held Iraqis' Attention While Real Invasion Came Elsewhere," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 March 1991, page A-8.
48. "Allied Employ Deception Techniques," Flight International, 6 March 1991, page 9.
49. Fulghum, David, "US Searches for Electronic Equipment Used
by Iraqis to Foil Allied Attacks," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
18 March 1991, page 27.