A - Overview
For almost three decades the United States has relied on photographic intelligence satellites to provide information about Soviet strategic capabilities. This information has become a key ingredient in American planning for weapons procurement, nuclear targeting and arms control. In 1960s and 1970s the data supplied by the satellites was intended essentially for peacetime use. The Gulf War marks the full transition of these systems to a warfighting capability.
According to Ronald Elliot, Technical Director of the DoD Intelligence Communications Architecture Project, "Revolutionary techniques have included... the use of large numbers of near instantaneous intelligence systems capable of providing information in picture form to all military echelons... This deployment also features the most extensive use in history of intelligence imagery to support a military operation. Diverse sophisticated optical and electromagnetic sensors continuously observe Iraq's forces and transmit the observations in photographic and other formats to military commanders in the desert and contiguous regions. This pictorial information in disseminated widely to all the military components, including those at lower command echelons. This level and volume of dissemination on a continuous basis is the most comprehensive ever. In previous conflicts, such graphic information was only available to national command authorities and select elements of regional unified and specified command headquarters."(1)
It has been suggested that the photo satellites are physically capable of taking pictures at approximately 5 second intervals. Superimposing a five kilometer square grid on that entire area around Kuwait indicate how many separate pictures are required in order to completely cover the area. It is also reported target folders are being updated at approximately three day intervals which is suggestive that the amount of time that the system requires to complete revisit the entire range of targets is approximately three days. It's also publicly reported that the delay between time that the photographs are taken and the time the photographs are relayed to the Middle East is approximately 18 hours at least through lower priority army units. This preliminary assessment indicates an Iraqi force deployment area somewhat in excess of 31,000 square kilometers, and dividing this into 5 Km by 5 Km squares gives 1250 images to cover the entire area. This number compares to the several hundred images processed daily on a normal peacetime basis. During a three day interval (defined by the intelligence update cycle) there will be a total of 36 passes over this area. To provide the 1250 images needed each satellite would have to collect an average of 35 images, which if collected at 5 second intervals would require about 17 seconds. With the satellite traveling at about 7 kilometers per second, each pass would have to average about 1200 kilometers. This is clearly an industrial assembly line process in which hundreds of images are being repetitively generated over an extended period of time.
B - Space Segment
A total of four imaging intelligence satellites were operational in orbit during the initial phases of the Kuwait crisis: three Kennan KH-11s and one Lacrosse imaging radar satellite. All of these satellites have a 24 hours capability, with night coverage is provided by some type of image intensifier system. These satellites use some sort of starlight scope -- the same sort of night vision goggles that helicopter pilots are used. Or the satellite sensor can blend the pixels on the CCD to increase the gain to deal with the lower ambient light in the evening.
This is one of the big differences between current systems versus those operating 10 or 20 years ago. A decade or more ago there was a very symmetrical morning and afternoon pattern which lined the satellites up so that the shadows were optimal for photo analysis. But since the newer KH-11's can take pictures 24 hours a day, it doesn't make much difference what time of day or night they fly over a target. That one of the reasons these satellites operate in orbits with inclinations of from 57 going 62 degrees, rather than the 98 degree sun synchronous orbits of earlier systems.
In contrast to civilian remote sensing satellites, these satellites are not restricted to photographing targets directly beneath their flight path. These satellites have a large flat surface scanning mirror, and the movement of this mirror is the determinant of the 5 second interval between pictures that is typical of these systems. This is substantiated by the Aviation Week photo of the Blackjack bomber published back in 1978, which was taken from a considerable distance and from a relatively low elevation above the horizon. This photo was taken with a KH-11 which was constrained by the 10 foot diameter of the Titan 3. Under some circumstances, such as trying to count tanks, rather than trying to tell the difference between a T-72 and a T-80, very high angles of obliquity, 400, 500 or 600 kilometers off the ground track, would be typical rather than unusual.
Figure 8 gives a schematic of the scale and proportion of the theater, with the horizontal scale of the ground distance is the same as the vertical scale. The optical satellites are flying at an altitudes of from 400 to 800 kilometers have a swath width of from 600 to 1000 kilometers to either side of their ground track. The Lacrosse imaging radar satellite is flying at a little less than 800 kilometers, and is taking pictures as much as a 1000 kilometers off of their ground track. When these satellites are flying over Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, the optical satellite is going to be able to photograph the area between Kuwait and Baghdad, and the radar satellite and the higher flying optical satellites can photograph Baghdad.
In principle the radar is going to be able to take a picture of anything with an elevation greater than 15 degrees. Based on the photographs that have been released, the photographic satellite the elevation is probably limited to more like about 30 degrees. As Figure 2 indicates, this provides a swath width of about 2000 kilometers at an altitude of 800 kilometers, and a swath of 1200 kilometers from an altitude of 400 kilometers
In general, these satellites have maneuvered very infrequently for drag-makeup, usually at intervals of several months, and as a result of tracking by amateur astronomers, precise orbital elements for five of these seven satellites have been made available for use in this analysis.
Table 1 is an illustrative collection schedule, showing when these satellites, over a ten day period, were flying over Kuwait. This indicates when each satellite was available, what time they rise above 30o elevation, and how long they're overhead. With the orbital
elements for these it is possible to say during a representative period of several days what the pattern of coverage would look like.
One problem limiting this analysis is that these satellite don't have publicly available orbital elements. In the case of Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites observing the Falklands, where new orbital elements were available every day, it was possible to determine that a satellite had lowered its perigee to take a picture on two particular subsequent passes. It is not possible to make such direct correlations with the American satellites. But by using typical orbital patterns, and recognizing that the crisis lasted seven months, an illustrative pattern of coverage over a period of days can be developed.
Initially it was assumed that frequent maneuvers would be a routine element of these satellites operations, enabling them to respond rapidly to emerging situations, as well as pass unpredictably over a target, frustrating evasion/deception efforts on the ground. Maneuverability would also permit shorter intervals between coverage of individual targets, as several satellites can maneuver for repetitive passes over the target area. However, in practice, these satellites have thus far maneuvered very infrequently, only a few times each year, in order to maintain their orbits against residual atmospheric drag. It would seem that the large number of satellites in orbit, as well as their high altitude and resulting broad coverage, have largely eliminated any need to maneuver the satellites to improve target coverage.
As seen in Figure 9, all the orbits are quite different, with three KH-11s in 98 degree orbits. In the late 1970's or early 1980's the constellation was relatively simple, with a morning pass and an afternoon pass. Apart from the two KH-11s that were launched back in 1987 and 1988, all these satellites are in different inclinations and the constellation is nearly randomized in terms of coverage.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, photographic intelligence satellite operations assumed a fairly standard pattern. Two KH-11's, each with an operational life of about three years, would be in orbit at all times. As an old satellite exhausted its maneuvering fuel, it would be commanded to reenter the atmosphere, and a new satellite would be launched a week or two later. A KH-9 film-return satellite would be launched in late Spring each year, and operate until around the end of the year. And a KH-8 film-return satellite would be early Spring, and operate for a few months.(2)
The United States continued operations of a pair of KH-11 photographic intelligence satellites through most of 1988. The sixth KH-11, launched in December 1984 remained in service at the end of 1988, surpassing by almost a year the previously demonstrated service life for this class of satellites. Given this longevity, it must be assumed that this spacecraft has been assigned secondary responsibilities since the launch in October 1987 of the eighth KH-11, which can be expected to remain operational at least through the end of 1990. And on 6 November 1988 a new KH-11, almost certainly the last of this series, was launched.
KH-11 /6 (1984-122A 15423) was launched on 4 December 1984, and surprisingly enough continues in operation, flying in a 98 degree inclination orbit of 335 kilometers by 758 kilometers. Although the unusual longevity of this satellite (prior KH-11s had demonstrated a typical lifetime of about three years) would suggest that this spacecraft had long since expired, in late July it maneuvered to raise its perigee by about 50 kilometers, postponing its natural decay until well into 1992 (the Goddard Satellite Situation Report of 31 December 1990 confirmed that this satellite was still in orbit). This spacecraft was initially in the morning sun-synchronous plane entered by KH-11 /8, but subsequently has drifted about 7 or 8 degrees out of alignment.
KH-11 /7 (1987-090A 18441) was launched on 26 October 1987 and is currently maintaining an orbit of about 300 kilometers by 1000 kilometers, with an inclination of 98 degrees, which results in 14.76 orbits per day.
KH-11 /8 (1988-099A 19625) was launched on 6 November 1988, and is also currently maintaining an orbit of about 300 kilometers by 1000 kilometers, with an inclination of 98 degrees, which results in 14.76 orbits per day. Both of these satellites repeat are in sun-synchronous orbits, which repeat their ground tracks at four day intervals, and are synchronized to provide two day overlaps in coverage. The 1987 spacecraft is in the late, afternoon plane, and the 1988 spacecraft is in the early morning plane (which it initially shared with the 1984 spacecraft).
Despite its many advances, the KH-12 suffers the shortcoming common to all photographic intelligence satellite, the inability to see through clouds. With much of the Soviet Union and other areas of interest frequently covered with clouds, this has always posed a problem for intelligence collection. However, in the past, this problem was primarily one of directing the satellite's coverage toward cloud-free areas, and awaiting improved visibility in cloudy regions. While this procedure may have been adequate for peace-time operations, it is clearly inadequate for war-time target acquisition.
A space-based imaging radar can see through clouds, and utilization of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) techniques can potentially provide images with a resolution that approaches that of photographic reconnaissance satellites. An project to develop such a satellite was initiated in late 1986 by then-Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.(3) This effort led to the successful test of the Indigo prototype(4) imaging radar satellite in January 1982.(5)
Although the decision to proceed with an operational system was very controversial, development of the Lacrosse system was approved in 1983.(6)
The distinguishing features of the design of the Lacrosse satellite include a very large radar antenna, and solar panels to provide electrical power for the radar transmitter. Reportedly, the solar arrays have a wingspan of almost 50 meters,(7) which suggests that the power available to the radar could be in the range of 10 to 20 kilowatts, as much as ten times greater than that of any previously flown space-based radar.
It is difficult to assess the resolution that could be achieved by this radar in the absence of more detailed design information, but in principle the resolution might be expected to be better than one meter. While this is far short of the 10 centimeter resolution achievable with photographic means, it would certainly be adequate for the identification and tracking of major military units such as tanks or missile transporter vehicles. However, this high resolution would come at the expense of broad coverage, and would be achievable over an area of only a few tens of kilometers square. Thus the Lacrosse probably utilizes a variety of radar scanning modes, some providing high resolution images of small areas, and other modes offering lower resolution images of areas several hundred kilometers square. The processing of this data would require extensive computational power, requiring the transmission to ground stations of potentially several hundred mega-bits of data per second.
Lacrosse 1 (1988-106B 19671) was launched on 2 December 1988 by the Space Shuttle. The spacecraft entered an orbit with an inclination of 57 degrees, with an perigee of 680 kilometers and an apogee of 690 kilometers, and has not maneuvered significantly since launch.
Lacrosse 2 (1991- A) was launched from Vandenberg on a Titan 4 on 8 March 1991. Although the orbital elements of this spacecraft have not yet been determined, the launch time (4 AM) is suggestive of a radar satellite rather than a photographic system.
|Wed 01 Aug 90||Lacrosse||03:11:43||03:18:44||03:25||51||123|
|Wed 01 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||07:25:54||07:33:59||07:42||34||286|
|Wed 01 Aug 90||Lacrosse||11:51:16||11:58:08||12:05||33||47|
|Wed 01 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:14:20||18:21:07||18:27||85||230|
|Wed 01 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||19:07:10||19:14:01||19:20||52||262|
|Wed 01 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:56:10||22:02:57||22:09||37||263|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||Lacrosse||03:45:56||03:52:57||03:59||48||310|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||06:11:17||06:19:20||06:27||36||100|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||09:50:48||09:55:06||09:59||40||97|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||Lacrosse||12:25:20||12:32:27||12:39||79||239|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:35:54||18:42:40||18:49||51||258|
|Thu 02 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||19:00:44||19:07:32||19:14||64||262|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||Lacrosse||02:38:18||02:45:21||02:52||57||123|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||06:32:41||06:40:54||06:49||63||105|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||10:10:47||10:15:14||10:19||78||296|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||Lacrosse||11:17:52||11:24:47||11:31||36||48|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:54:19||19:01:04||19:07||79||266|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:57:43||19:04:16||19:10||31||261|
|Fri 03 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:00:42||21:07:02||21:13||32||72|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||Lacrosse||03:12:37||03:19:35||03:26||43||311|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||06:54:16||07:02:25||07:10||74||275|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||10:30:58||10:35:18||10:39||32||287|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||Lacrosse||11:51:58||11:59:04||12:06||71||238|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||17:42:33||17:49:36||17:56||46||76|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:47:56||18:54:35||19:01||84||63|
|Sat 04 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:20:43||21:27:06||21:33||64||72|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||Lacrosse||02:04:53||02:11:58||02:19||64||124|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||07:16:03||07:23:52||07:31||41||284|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||Lacrosse||10:44:28||10:51:26||10:58||39||48|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:03:50||18:11:04||18:18||76||83|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:41:34||18:48:07||18:54||68||73|
|Sun 05 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:40:55||21:47:14||21:53||60||263|
|Mon 06 Aug 90||Lacrosse||02:39:17||02:46:14||02:53||39||311|
|Mon 06 Aug 90||Lacrosse||11:18:37||11:25:41||11:32||63||238|
|Mon 06 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:25:17||18:32:37||18:39||67||255|
|Mon 06 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:35:14||18:41:39||18:48||53||74|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||Lacrosse||01:31:28||01:38:35||01:45||71||124|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||06:23:01||06:30:39||06:38||45||102|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||09:54:42||09:59:25||10:04||53||98|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||Lacrosse||10:11:04||10:18:05||10:25||43||49|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:28:56||18:35:11||18:41||42||73|
|Tue 07 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:47:00||18:54:13||19:01||41||260|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||Lacrosse||02:05:59||02:12:53||02:19||36||312|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||06:44:30||06:52:11||06:59||83||124|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||07:45:17||07:49:47||07:54||39||286|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||10:14:40||10:19:32||10:24||68||287|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||Lacrosse||10:45:16||10:52:18||10:59||56||238|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||17:32:19||17:39:40||17:47||38||74|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||18:22:39||18:28:43||18:34||33||73|
|Wed 08 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:05:40||21:11:22||21:17||32||73|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||Lacrosse||00:58:04||01:05:12||01:12||79||124|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||07:06:09||07:13:39||07:21||51||282|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||07:38:40||07:43:16||07:47||54||285|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||Lacrosse||09:37:40||09:44:43||09:51||48||50|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||10:34:54||10:39:34||10:44||32||287|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||17:53:25||18:01:08||18:08||62||77|
|Thu 09 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:25:41||21:31:26||21:37||72||67|
|Fri 10 Aug 90||Lacrosse||01:32:42||01:39:32||01:46||33||313|
|Fri 10 Aug 90||KH-11 /6||07:32:08||07:36:45||07:41||75||287|
|Fri 10 Aug 90||Lacrosse||10:11:55||10:18:55||10:25||50||238|
|Fri 10 Aug 90||KH-11 /8||18:14:51||18:22:39||18:30||84||250|
|Fri 10 Aug 90||KH-11 /7||21:45:55||21:51:32||21:57||46||263|
C - Control Segment
The imaging intelligence satellites are directed by the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), with daily tasking provided by the Operations Subcommittee, which provides continuous direction on a round-the-clock 24 hour basis.(8)
Once those collection priorities are agreed to by COMIREX the Satellite Control Facility at Onizuka Air Station in Sunnyvale is responsible for actually physically telling the satellite what to do and when to do it. Onizuka is also responsible for network management for getting the information back from the satellite to processing centers in the United States.
There are several data paths for imagery from photo satellites. One path is from the photo satellite through ground stations and then coming back to the United States through commercial communication satellites. A second path is from the photo satellite through Satellite Date System satellites and back down to Ft. Belvoir. And a third path is directly from the satellite to ground stations in the theater. Most if not all of this imagery is coming through NPIC and then being relayed via DSCS to field users.
The time delay between a pass over Kuwait and a time of visibility over one of the ground stations is not great. There are lot of passes where you're going to pick up a ground station within just a couple of minutes. If it is a south to north pass that satellite can down-link to Germany or Greenland a few minutes later. The additional delay of 5 to 15 minutes getting the picture down from the satellite won't have a significant impact on users.
"All of the spacecraft relay their imagery back to the U.S. via Satellite Data System (SDS) spacecraft or NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRSS) spacecraft. The data can also be downlinked directly to two large antennas located at Ft. Belvoir just south of Washington. Imaging data processing occurs at both Ft. Belvoir and the Air Force/CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)" in Washington.(9) Staff at NPIC were reported to be working 18 hour shifts in August to support expanded collection requirements.(10)
LaCrosse has clearly been quite busy using TDRSS during Desert Shield. When Hubble was taking pictures of the big storm on Saturn in September, the Hubble scientists complained that they only got about 25% of the pictures that they asked for because they had to send the pictures to TDRSS and a higher priority user was preempting the TDRSS time for most of the time. The only other high priority user that was in orbit was Lacrosse.
D - User Segment
Prior to Desert Shield, CENTCOM noted that the great distance to the region "and the shortage of in-theater infrastructure strongly influence the type of intelligence capabilities we seek. We are improving intelligence support potential through increased management effectiveness and new systems... In Fiscal Year 1990 we will complete installation of a new imagery receipt and processing system which will provide imagery intelligence results within hours of an event. A high quality secondary imagery system, combined with the Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications System (STICS) will move imagery and data to operational levels within minutes. The Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS) also to be fielded in fiscal year 1990, will greatly increase our ability to manage, store and manipulate large amounts of intelligence information. This is essential for quick analysis and dissemination of intelligence data to all users."(11)
One report noted that "in the wake of the invasion the CIA hurriedly convened an Iraq Task Force whose assignment was to monitor the crisis and provide intelligence options on each of its many aspects. It was given access to... communications, signals interceptions and analysis, satellite reconnaissance... the Iraq Task Force soon expanded into the (Near East) Division's warren of offices on the sixth floor of Langley. Some 150 people began to collect and assess information..."(12)
"Images gathered by the planes and satellites are almost instantaneously relayed to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, where they are examined by Navy analysts armed with a 'watch list' of sites at which small variations could mean big things. Among the most closely evaluated indicators of possible Iraqi intentions, the experts said, are Scud missile batteries, where a change in the angle of a missile could betray preparations for launch, and deployment of forces along national frontiers, who might move from entrenched positions into more mobile ones."(13)
"The reconnaissance satellite imagery processed in Washington is being transmitted back to senior military commanders in the Persian Gulf by special encrypted communications satellite links. In addition to the imagery that goes to Central Command, more selected imagery is being provided to Army and Marine commanders in the field using small portable image readout systems. These systems have slow data rate capabilities that require a few minutes for each picture to print out."(14)
By the end of December, the United States had agreed to provide real-time imagery to Israel, which was expected to provide two to three hours warning of an Iraqi missile attack.(15) Certainly by the end of January, Israel had gained real-time access to American imaging satellite intelligence of western Iraq, covering mobile Scud launcher deployment areas.(16) Previously the United States had been reluctant to share such information with Israel, fearing that it would be used in military actions against other Arab countries.(17) But in this case, Israeli action against Iraq was impeded by withholding Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) codes, which would have enabled Israeli aircraft to fly unimpeded through Coalition air forces. In addition, this intelligence link helped to persuade Israeli authorities that the United States was working vigorously to address the Scud threat.
The United States has initiated a number of programs to improve the dissemination of intelligence derived from national systems to combat forces. These include the Intelligence Communications Architecture, the Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan, and the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan.
The Intelligence Communications Architecture (INCA) "will provide for continued contractual efforts to gather data on existing and planned intelligence communications requirements and capabilities."(18) "...the results of INCA will be accomplished by the services, intelligence community, and the newly formed Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JT3A)."(19) The program was established in 1983 to address wartime intelligence needs of operational commanders and to handle the "anticipated flow of both national and tactical intelligence" to such users. An architecture plan was published in late 1987 for operations in the early 1990's. Initially, operational users are defined as "major combat echelons" (MCE) with stress on "communications connectivity above and below MCE."(20) In Phase Two, intelligence timeliness and communications adequacy will be aggregated in a "new figure of merit" algorithm, with targeting, maneuver planning and near-term strategic planning seen as primary uses. Phase Three will assess current and planned communications technologies; Phase Four moving to INCA implementation and action plans.(21)
The Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan (IAMP) was initiated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1984 to coordinate acquisition and management plans for wartime dissemination of imagery to tactical commanders. IAMP aims to "address congressional concerns regarding the most effective mix of imagery collection, transmission and exploitation systems to meet operational needs... The mix of low volume, high quality imagery transmission systems, such as the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST); magazine quality transmission systems, such as the Intra Theater Imagery Transmission System (IITS); and high volume, high quality systems, such as the Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES), have major impacts on communications requirements and the ability to exploit and disseminate imagery intelligence ... with the right mix, affordable and survivable communications networks" can deliver essential imagery and/or imagery exploitation reports to "appropriate tactical levels." The fusion and refinement of raw imagery data could be resolved by TACIES to provide "all-source imagery exploitation," along the lines of a recently "automated electronic intelligence (elint) processing system that reduces tactical flow to usable levels."(22)
The Defense Intelligence Agency AIRES (Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System) "will be directed toward providing 24 hour a day support to accommodate the increased volume of data flow from [deleted] collection systems. We will also begin development of a functional design for the replacement of the current AIRES system to meet the needs in the late 1980's through the 1990's in view of planned collection system improvements." (23)
One effort to improve dissemination of imaging intelligence to tactical users is the TACNAT (Tactical use of National Technical Means) effort of the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI) program in the Defense Department. BTI director John Transue notes that TACNAT products include "'two systems that accomplish different aspects of intelligence report handling.'... one computer system would 'fuse information from various sources and provide either conclusions or at least cues to the operator which should make our intelligence operations much more effective and efficient.' The second piece of hardware would be aimed at speeding the interpretation of intelligence photos taken by orbiting US satellites. Photo interpretation has been 'a considerable bottleneck' for US forces in Saudi Arabia, according to Transue... In a January report to Congress, the Pentagon said TacNat would 'automate the monitoring of threat garrisons, such as tactical missile sites, and predict changes... (and) predict and determine likelihood of target field locations and deployment sites.'... A related computer workstation, dubbed Fulcrum, has been sent to the gulf units."
The Lacrosse is the centerpiece of a new effort aimed at providing satellite imagery to tactical users. The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) is designed to "facilitate tactical use of national intelligence systems within an operational framework"(24), providing satellite imagery to battlefield commanders and weapons systems. The role of TENCAP in securing the future of the Lacrosse is indicated by the decision to establish TENCAP programs in all of the military services in 1977, around the time the Lacrosse program was initiated. By bringing the field commander into the user community, the managers of these satellite systems developed an additional base of support for the new program. The importance of exploiting satellite intelligence for tactical purposes was demonstrated in Lebanon and Grenada.(25)
Initiated by the Army in 1973, TENCAP met with sufficient success that Congress in 1977 "directed each service to establish a Tactical Exploitation of National Space Program Capabilities (TENCAP) office to improve military use of national systems."(26) "DOD formed the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) to specifically address, across all Services, the use of space-based systems from stand-alone acquisition to sharing of national space programs, and research and development toward new capabilities. The Director of the DRSP has been and remains the Secretary of the Air Force; he chairs a cross-Service, senior Steering Committee which manages the DoD account. Also, each of the Services has organized offices to address the operational concepts and the employment of space systems in direct support of tactical operations."(27) The effort to widen the applications of national intelligence has a long history which precedes the formal service-wide TENCAP program. For example, in 1976 the Aeronautic Ford Corp. was awarded $16.5 million by USAF Space and Missile Systems Organization (as part of the Air Forces's Defense Dissemination Program) to develop equipment to help the Air Force to speed delivery of imagery secured by satellites to world-wide using commands.(28)
TENCAP has become a prerequisite for successful prosecution of the Airland Battle doctrine and strategy. Much of the intelligence required - deep strike interdiction, initiative, mobility - can be supplied only through TENCAP. According to Brig. Gen. Howard D. Graves "Today, space activities offer unique real-time capabilities to see to the full depth of the enemy's forces and their supporting bases and to help us attack as deep as necessary to disrupt his ability to execute his plans -the keystones of the Airland Battle Doctrine."(29) Another source notes that "JSTARS, in conjunction with TENCAP and the Joint Tactical Fusion System -which will place automated processors at the Tactical Operations and Intelligence Center -will help provide the real-time data that commanders need to fight the Airland Battle."(30)
Despite the promise of TENCAP, a number of shortcomings persist. "The problems of national systems support to contingency forces have generally fallen into three major categories. First, the systems themselves must respond to collection priorities set at the national level. These priorities may or may not be responsive to collection requirements for contingency operations of in Third World areas. The second category of problems compounds the first, in that the general capabilities of tactical units to request and receive information from national intelligence systems are frequently lacking. Third, are the limitations of the Armed Services for using information from national sources. In other words, the inability to properly consume and exploit information from national technical means."(31)
Another factor preventing tactical use of intelligence derived from national systems has been technical. As Army Brig. Gen. Graves says: "Although the TENCAP program is highly successful it provides only part of the information needed by the tactical commander and cannot satisfy all battlefield surveillance requirements. This is because national systems were designed for a different purpose where, for example, rapid dissemination to tactical users is not critical. Through TENCAP, however, special interface systems provide valuable information to the ground commander in a timely manner."(32)
Additional barriers to the widespread tactical use of satellite data include the high level of classification. In the early 1970's General Daniel Graham discovered on a European trip that target folders shown to bomber pilots contained only sketches - not photographs. The pilots were not able to see the photos of the targets they were to bomb. At Graham's urging, William Colby initiated a downgrading of some satellite photography.(33) Perhaps because of this secrecy, the services simply were not accustomed to and did not trust satellite intelligence systems.
These barriers remain. "Combat information from space-based systems is not universally accepted or considered tactically useful. Issues of tasking, control timeliness, and survival in combat are the main reasons for the current lack of reliance on such systems by potential users. The most serious believer is perhaps the Navy, as an outgrowth of the Libyan operation, but its commitment to space-based systems appears uncertain."(34) The Navy's ambivalence can be appreciated when it is noted that it took three days for a courier to deliver the satellite images used in the raid.(35)
In an effort to remedy these problems, the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) was initiated to coordinate Service development TENCAP hardware. "JSIPS provides tactical commanders with a deployable, modular intelligence support system that processes and exploits imagery data from national, tactical and strategic sensors and platforms."(36) The Air Force and Marine Corps initiated JSIPS in November 1985, with the Army Joining in January 1987. However, JSIPS was not available for service in the Gulf, with the first system delivered to the Army in Germany beginning operations in February 1991.(37) FIST (Fleet Imagery Support Terminal), which is the Navy equivalent of the JSIPS effort, is expected to achieve an Initial Operational Capability by December 1988, and a Full Operational Capability by October 1990.(38)
Air Force TENCAP
Air Force management of the TENCAP effort is under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and operations.(39) "The purpose is to exploit the current and future tactical potential of national systems and to integrate these capabilities into the tactical decision-making process as rapidly as possible. The objectives of this program are: To expand and improve exploitation of national systems as a complement to tactical systems; To develop appropriate doctrine, training, force structure and systems; To establish collection system requirements that will benefit tactical forces."(40) Air Force TENCAP objectives include "development of procedures, tactics and interface equipment/software to facilitate tactical use of national space systems within an operations framework. Efforts will include participation in tactical exercises, system interface, software/hardware development and related development studies."(41)
Air Force TENCAP efforts have included several exercises to further develop this capability. "As the lead Service for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Special Project 86 NIGHT SURGE, TENCAP coordinated all Service efforts and funded the development of prototype receive equipment for the exercise. NIGHT SURGE provided tactical forces the opportunity to gain experience in the use of national intelligence systems in a contingent exercise environment. Similar support was provided for the JCS directed Special Project 87 POWER HUNTER. Air Force TENCAP will develop a prototype testbed for the evaluation of CONSTANT SOURCE ... and will expand Operational Test & Evaluation of CONSTANT SOURCE into the theaters to support Major Command requirements."(42)
According to Martin Faga, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space (and head of the National Reconnaissance Office), "Constant Source is an Air Force terminal that allows tactical users to access certain classified kinds of satellites and obtain data from them. There are more of those now than there have been in the past, and field units are finding how to use them. This is a product of TENCAP that has been successful and is continuing."(43) Constant Source reportedly uses a broadcast channel on the FLTSATCOM UHF satellites.(44) Constant Source is said to "combine ease of use with a tailored intelligence product responsive to specific missions... (it) gives the tactical commander, aircraft commander, and intelligence analysts tailored, timely intelligence that reduces weapons systems vulnerabilities while increasing the potential for mission success."(45) Maj. Gen. Donald Hard, Director of Air Force Space Systems and SDI, noted that Constant Source is "providing mission essential information on enemy order of battle. This information in provided in near-real time directly to the field to allow informed and accurate decisions for mission planning and battle management." (46) Constant Source is a "small ruggedized transportable UHF receipt exploitation system."(47)
The Air Force Electronic Systems Division "delivered 12 Tactical Digital Facsimile machines for use during the Gulf Crisis. The units are located at headquarters, operating units, tactical fighter wings, US embassies, with US Marine Corps units, and even with the Strategic Air Command unit at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The high-resolution machines allow satellite photos and other classified targeting data to be relayed by satellite link from the US to operational units in the gulf region, including tactical fighter wings. The fax machines work with a variety of secure communications systems and provide copies with nearly the same resolution as the original photos."(48) One account concluded that "another noteworthy success was the tactical digital facsimile machine, ridiculed in the past as an example of gold-plated military hardware because it costs about $75,000. About 125 fax machines were used to transmit high-resolution images, usually near realtime satellite photos, to commanders throughout the theater. The fax was designed to strict military standards to survive harsh conditions. The new equipment gave individual units in the field unprecedented C3I capability."(49) As a result, "Intelligence briefings are provided to 1st TFW personnel approximately every third day."(50) "US intelligence sources now provide the military with hour-by hour reports on the movements of the Iraqi forces."(51)
The Army's TENCAP program is overseen by the Army Space Program Office, directed by the Army Staff.(52) Army TENCAP's aim is "developing a tactical support system to receive, process, and disseminate information from multiple sources which locate enemy units, activity, and targets representing a general tactical threat. Systems developed will be the primary source of information on enemy second-echelon forces. Such information is essential to the tactical commander. The tactical commander must have the capability to locate, identify, engage, and destroy superior forces at maximum range to insure that a manageable combat power ratio exists in the main battle area. The tactical commander must also have the capability to seize the initiative from the enemy by blunting his strength and exploiting his weaknesses. In the TENCAP program, advanced techniques are applied to exploit information collected from a variety of nationally controlled sensors which, in general, is not otherwise obtainable. That information is provided to the tactical command and control environment in a sufficiently timely and useful form to greatly assist the commander in defeating the enemy."(53)
The main thrust of the Tactical Surveillance System program is development of the Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES), and development of a direct communications link from national systems along with development of supporting software for compressing, processing, and disseminating data from national systems.(54)
The Tactical Surveillance System program has continued software and hardware development for the interface of a multi-source data exploitation system with TACIES and development of "unique" data processing techniques for high rate digital imagery. It is also working on hardware development for testing and integrated logistics support planning and production engineering for TACIES. In 1986 it began development of the Communications transition for TACIES, and in 1987 initiated Integrated Logistics Support for TACIES.
The Joint Tactical Fusion Program is the principal Corp-level data fusion program of the U.S. Army and Air Force.(55) The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is the Army element of this program, and the Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) is the Air Force equivalent. "The ASAS/ENSCE is the analytical hub for intelligence fusion and dissemination in the Army Corps and division and the numbered air forces.... The Army contributes about 90 percent of the program funding and the Air Force about 10 percent."(56) This program will "develop a single automated system that would correlate, analyze, and disseminate high volumes of time-sensitive, multi-sensor intelligence data. ASAS/ENSCE is to provide tactical commanders with precise location and structure of the opposing forces and near real-time battle situation displays."(57) "The system will also facilitate tasking of organic assets and requests for intelligence data from national assets."(58)
"Design of ASAS/ENSCE began in fiscal 1984. Development of system modules began in fiscal 1985. The system was designed to incorporate two other intelligence fusion systems: the Technical Control and Analysis Center-Division (TCAC-D - also often referred to by its military designation as the AN/TSQ-130V) and the Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) system."(59) The TCAC system has been deployed with V and VII Corps, and BETA has become the core of the Limited Operational Capability Europe (LOCE) at EUCOM. The Air Force will deploy the ENSCE as part of the Tactical Air Control Center of the numbered Air Forces.(60) "These functions, which can take days to perform with current systems, can be done in minutes, if ASAS performs as expected."(61) However, the program experienced serious cost growth and schedule slippage, primarily due to problems with mission software, with an initial operational capability expected in April 1993. Procurement of over 100 modules is anticipated.(62)
Navy and Marine Corps TENCAP is performed by the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command and the Naval Supply Systems Command.(63) This "provides direction and management of overall ocean surveillance and targeting programs by the Director, Command and Control Programs....[It] provides for a continuation of a 1978 Congressional initiative to investigate tactical applications of National assets to Navy missions and to develop tactical concepts to utilize those systems in the out-years."(64)
The Navy's increasing reliance on space intelligence is notable. "The Navy appears to operate with considerably more space-derived sensor data than is generally appreciated. An October 1982 Signal issue featured an article on OSIS by a former naval intelligence officer who disclosed that the Navy has operated satellites `placed in various orbits to not only detect, locate and disseminate information on surface contacts but to photograph units as well.'"(65)
"Today we use over three-quarters of the tactical data gathered by National space systems," according to Dr. E. Ann Berman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy. She notes the need to expand the Navy's tactical use of space for surveillance, "first, by more affective leveraging of National assets; and second, by designing, developing, acquiring, and operating tactical space systems dedicated to our warfare commanders."(66) Naval Space Command Commodore Richard H. Truly concurs, for he considers direct fleet support the preeminent mission of his command, and this includes "...exploring methods for improving national systems support through such programs as Tactical Exploitations of National Capabilities."(67)
Navy TENCAP aims "to exploit all available National and Service sensor systems for tactical support to fleet operational commanders....and provides support to fleet exercises, which will provide background for development of modifications to existing programs and assist in establishing/validating requirements for new programs."(68) In 1985 Navy TENCAP refined collection management support; evaluated and tested Blue Force Location System using national assets; trained to operating forces in National Systems exploitation; developed analysis capability to evaluate contributions of National Systems to exercise operations; investigated cross-cuing of National Sensors using inputs from the OSIS; supported OTH Targeting concept development; upgraded Naval Wargaming. In 1986 the Navy worked on collection Management Support; prepared testing of tactical support applications of man in space; prepared tactical impact statement on new National Sensor Systems; In 1987 the Navy participated in JCS TENCAP Special Project and arranged non-routine support from national Systems for fleet exercises.(69)
In 1985, the TENCAP program incorporated the TADIX-B and National Systems Enhancement Tactical Support projects.(70) Other related Navy activities include the Naval Command and Control System (NCCS) System Engineering and Integration; Navy Command and Control, Afloat, which include the Outlaw Shark terminal for submarine and the Outlaw Hawk terminal on aircraft carriers; and the Navy Command and Control System, Ashore Nodes. "These are key elements of Tactical Satellite Reconnaissance Office (TENCAP) initiatives whereby national sensors are continually being tasked and outputs evaluated to analyze time and quality of receipt through each of these elements in reaching the tactical commander."(71)
Marine Corp TENCAP
Marine Corps TENCAP is designed to "enhance the ability of tactical Marine Corps forces to exploit the capabilities of national intelligence gathering systems."(72) Efforts to date include liaison/discussion with national intelligence organizations, training and education, participation in the JCS-directed Special Projects, follow-on action to implement findings of the national tactical intelligence interfaces study, attempt to increase reserve forces participation in TENCAP; submission of Tactical Impact Statements; and conduct of annual Intelligence Planning Conference.(73) Related programs include the All Source Imagery Processor and the Tactical Receive Equipment (TADIX B - TRE).(74)
"There has been a major improvement in the Marines' ability to exploit satellite intelligence for tactical purposes-the so called `Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities' program. Last spring, Gen. Robert Barrow said that Marine task forces like the one in Beirut, even with limited reconnaissance capabilities, could get `regular and continuing' intelligence. Barrow, who has since retired as commandant, said: "The value of national collectors, in combination with theater and organic systems, was highlighted by the vital and effective intelligence support provided to our Marines deployed to Beirut, Lebanon."(75)
E - Operational Applications
The Gulf War occasioned an unprecedented number of public discussions of the use of imaging intelligence satellite as the crisis unfolded. Indeed, the history of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were narrated by imaging intelligence.
"Early in March, US intelligence detected the construction of six fixed launchers for long-range Scud missile at an Iraqi base near the Jordanian border, placing these weapons within range of Israel. A CIA report said that the launchers, which could easily be observed by US satellites, were intended as a blunt statement by Iraq that it would retaliate against any Israeli attack on its chemical weapons or nuclear installations."(76)
Starting on 17 July, the 22nd anniversary of the coup that brought Saddam Hussein to power, "the CIA began to include information about Iraq's ominous military buildup in the daily intelligence digest that it sends to President Bush... satellites had provided the CIA with photographs of Iraqi armored divisions -- some 30,000 soldiers in all -- moving toward Kuwait."(77)
"On Friday, July 20, a foreign military attache was traveling along the six-lane highway from Kuwait City to Baghdad when he encountered a remarkable sight: hundreds of Iraqi military vehicles filled with troops and weapon moving south toward the Kuwaiti border... Within a few hours of the report, US spy satellites had aimed their cameras at the border area, and analysts estimated that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to positions near Kuwait."(78) By 23 July, these forces were photographed on the Kuwait border.(79)
On 25 January, the CIA reached a "set of judgments, mainly on the basis of Iraq's deployments. For the first time, the CIA estimated that Baghdad was not bluffing, but would probably use force against Kuwait. However, the agency did not expect that Saddam would seize the entire country, believing instead that Iraqi would limit itself to disputed territories along the northern boarder."(80)
"The most compelling evidence had been obtained by a KH-11 on the night of July 27. The satellite's photographs showed Iraqi trucks hauling ammunition, fuel, water, and medical supplies to the troops on Kuwait's northern border. After they viewed the pictures... (CIA Director) Webster and Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the president that an invasion was 'probable.'"(81) "Intelligence reports had allowed Gen. Norman C. Schwarzkopf, commander of the US Central Command, to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the impending Iraqi invasion about 6 days before it occurred. Schwarzkopf was able to accurately predict both the timing and magnitude of the assault..."(82)
On 28 July, "a contingent of top CIA officials arrived at the White House to deliver a critical briefing... The CIA officials brought with them the satellite photos... The CIA's emissaries were convinced that the evidence they presented to the president indicated that Hussein would invade Kuwait. They couldn't guarantee that an invasion would take place, however; their information wasn't definitive because the CIA didn't have credible informants to report on Hussein... The CIA's lack of credible 'humint' was critical to Bush's evaluation of the evidence... Moreover, some of Bush's advisors were skeptical of the CIA's conclusions, notably Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Each of them told Bush that his sources were more persuasive than the CIA's photographs... The agency's leaders had done their best to warn the president and had failed. The language of diplomats had triumphed over their world of facts, charts and satellite photos."(83)
"Shortly before the invasion, an American KH-11 spy satellite picked up 100,000 Iraqi troops along Kuwait's border. Saddam had tripled his forces. Satellite photos also showed a new 'logistics train' that gave him everything he needed to invade. Noting that he had done nothing to disguise his moves, the US intelligence community assumed it was a bluff to bully Kuwait into a more compliant oil policy."(84)
"Iraq dispatched fuel, trucks and cargo planes to troops massed on the Kuwaiti border two days before the invasion," and on the basis of these indicators the CIA warned that "if mediation efforts and negotiations failed, Iraq was likely to take military action against Kuwait," while the DIA "continued to stick to a general agreement that Iraq was only staging a massive show of force to intimidate Kuwait and would not invade."(85) "A day before the invasion, Iraq reinforced the buildup with scores of artillery pieces and other specialized equipment."(86)
On the morning of 1 August, "Webster hand delivered a package of new, more alarming intelligence briefings and satellite photos to Scowcroft at the White House. The CIA, Webster reported, was predicting, with 70 percent certainty, that the invasion would come within the next 24 hours. By three o'clock in the afternoon, after more evidence had been considered, the agency was predicting, with a 90 percent certainty, that the invasion would come within 12 hours."(87) The invasion occurred three hours after that estimate.(88)
"On the second night of the invasion... someone had told him the time that an American spy satellite would pass over head. At that moment, Jassim and hit family turned on the lights and held a noisy pro-Kuwait demonstration on the roof. They held pictures of Kuwait's Emir aloft to show the American eye lurking in the night sky that resistance in Kuwait was alive and flourishing."(89)
On 3 August, "President Bush had been told by the Pentagon that satellite photographs showed three Iraqi divisions heading for the Saudi border -- though CIA radio intercepts did not indicate that they planned to cross it. This information, which left Iraq's intent undeciphered, was shared with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, and he presumable conveyed it back home."(90)
On 6 August, "Cheney flew to Saudi Arabia on a Boeing 707 that was specially equipped to receive the latest intelligence information on Iraq's intentions, including up-to-the-minute digitized satellite photographs of Iraq's military formations on Saudi Arabia's border. The photographs revealed a frightening turn of events: by design or accident, two Iraqi tank columns had entered Saudi Arabia. Cheney gave King Fahd the photographs; they were the CIA's most convincing evidence that his nation was threatened. Middle Eastern officials have since persuasively argued that Hussein's soldiers entered Saudi Arabia by accident, but King Fahd didn't want to take any chances."(91)
Other accounts agree that "it was US satellite photography confirming an Iraqi army buildup on the Kuwaiti - Saudi Arabian border that convinced Saudi King Fahd (in early August) to jettison his country's long-standing resistance to outside military help. After seeing the crystal-clear images of Iraqi tanks and troop carriers massed on his frontier, Fahd gave Defense Secretary Dick Cheney the green light to send in US troops."(92)
President Bush noted the use of satellite photography in dispelling Iraqi claims of withdrawal from Kuwait, "we had the photography to demonstrate it. We showed it to some who questioned it in the Middle East. What are these tanks doing going south when the man says he's withdrawing from Kuwait?"(93)
By the second week of August "US forces in Saudi Arabia would have about 24 hours warning of an attack... because US intelligence assets are tightly focused on the logistical movements and communications of the estimated 120,000 man Iraqi force in Kuwait."(94)
"Analysts in both the CIA and DIA claim that photo-reconnaissance and other intelligence sources show critical Soviet military shipments reaching Baghdad as late as August 7 -- a full five days after the invasion was launched and the embargo announced."(95)
"Iraqi military forces appeared to be loading poison gas aboard combat aircraft yesterday ( 7 August)... the loading of chemical weapons was the most plausible explanation for what we have seen."(96) "Iraq loaded some aircraft with chemical bombs, then unloaded the planes in a move that some intelligence analysts believe was intended as a warning to the United States."(97) And efforts in the aftermath of the Kuwait invasion to assess Iraqi nuclear capabilities included satellite reconnaissance.(98)
"The US apparently lost track of four Iraqi divisions for a 24 hour period on August 7-8, and one strategic reconnaissance source blamed the inflexibility of overhead satellites for this intelligence failure."(99)
On the night of August 8, "Kuwaitis assembled on rooftops and shouted defiance at the Iraqis, together with cries of "God is Great!" They are encouraged by the belief that their demonstration will be seen by American spy satellites."(100)
In mid August, "US intelligence has monitored two Syrian army divisions moving toward the border with Iraq,"(101) By the middle of August, "Iraqi forces numbering about 50,000 troops have been observed moving south, and if they go as far as Kuwait they will increase troop strength in kuwait to about 170,000."(102) Intelligence reports also noted that the "Iraqis are improving their air defenses in Kuwait" and that "there seems to be some gathering of Iraqi forces on the Turkish border."
"About 80,000 Republican Guards were the shock troops in the Aug. 2 storming of Kuwait. But two weeks after the invasion, US intelligence detected their withdrawal to the Iraq-Kuwait border region in what US officials believe is an attempt to keep them in reserve..."(103)
During the third week of August, plans for the American naval blockade of Iraq were complicated by "the fact that intelligence officials spotted a Chinese cargo ship believed to be carrying fertilizer moving from Iraq's only functioning port at Umm Qasr."(104) During the third week of August, "the United States was left frustrated... as Iraqi forces withdrew from the Iranian border, by its inability to discover what had happened to a particular elite unit. 'We lost them for a few days' the source acknowledged."(105)
By the third week of August "Recent satellite photos show that new troops are being deployed in two lines, one running parallel to the Saudi border, and the other running along the beachfront on the Persian Gulf. The satellite data also show that while Iraqi troops are digging in, they are not constructing massive earthen barriers of the sort built along the Iranian frontier from 1985 to 1987. Satellite monitoring of the main supply route into Kuwait City has shown that crucial military supplies headed to Kuwait City are backed up at the head of the road, near a large rail depot in Basra."(106) Intelligence sources continued to indicate that "Hussein's elite Republican Guards, which led the attack into Kuwait, are being replaced on the front lines of his defense by other troops."(107) Four or five Guard divisions withdrew from the Saudi border and moved to Iraq, just north of Kuwait.(108)
During the third week of August, reconnaissance satellites monitored Iraq moving ballistic missile launchers (possibly for the Al Hussein modified Scud) to the Kuwait-Saudi border.(109) During this period, intelligence sources reported that satellite photos indicated that "Iraq had pulled perhaps 50,000 elite Republican Guards back toward Baghdad from Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia."(110)
"Military commanders in Washington and in the Saudi desert rely on a combination of intelligence sources, including surveillance satellites, Saudi and American AWACS radar planes patrolling the skies and intercepting enemy communications. 'I have adequate intelligence and I think we have an extremely good picture of what the situation looks like on the ground north of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border,' General Powell said today. He said for example that he knew whether or not the Iraqis had deployed long range surface-to-surface missile there. He declined to confirm such reports."(111)
By early September, the blockade of Iraq includes "Warships patrolling the Gulf have vast stores of computer data about commercial vessels as well as access to intelligence -- ranging from surveillance by radar aircraft and satellites to publicly available port records -- with which to identify ownership, cargo loads, and routes of specific ships."(112) Also during this period "intelligence from satellites ... (indicates that) the army of President Saddam Hussein is digging into the type of defensive positions that were the hallmark of most of Iraq's eight-year war with Iran. 'They have an abnormal capacity to dig' an Egyptian officer said of the Iraqis..."(113)
During the first two weeks of September, satellite imagery detected the deployment of a new type of missile mobile launcher. "The launchers were discovered within the past two weeks by a US spy satellite. They were described as special missile launchers mounted atop a flat-bed truck.(114) The Iraqi missile force was estimated to include about three dozen mobile launchers, as well as about 200 Scud-class missiles. Some of this data, including indications of impending launches, was being conveyed to Israel.(115) However, requests in early September for realtime access to satellite imagery were not immediately agreed to.(116)
By the middle of September, American intelligence began to detect major strengthening of Iraqi fortifications in and around Kuwait.(117) During the second and third weeks of September, Iraqi forces began a major "buildup, which is being monitored largely through pictures taken by intelligence satellites... sharply increased the number of its troops and tanks in Kuwait and Southern Iraq... redeploying many of its elite armored columns away from the Saudi border and into more flexible tactical positions. The armor is being replaced near the border with infantry unites that are designed to absorb the brunt of the attack... By moving the infantry forward and drawing many of the tanks back into more flexible positions, the maneuvers had broadened slightly the area in which American intelligence analysts most closely monitor Iraqi troops and equipment."(118) During this re-deployment, it was reported that "the CIA's photo interpreters had repeatedly lost track of Iraqi military units, and once even a whole Iraqi army. The 80,000-man Iraqi Republican Guard Corps was lost for almost a week..."(119)
In addition, the Iraqi Air Force began "dispersing its aircraft to remote airfields, many in the southern part of the country... bases we haven't seen them operating from before... not equipped with aircraft shelters..."(120)
By the later part of September, "US troops in Saudi Arabia would have six to nine hours of warning time before an attack by Iraqi forces, according to Defense Department officials. It would take Iraqi forces 18 hours to launch an attack once President Saddam Hussein gave the order, the officials said. The warning estimate is based on the amount of time required by intelligence officials and commanders on the ground to interpret movements of Iraq's elite Republican Guards, which would lead the attack."(121)
During the third week of September "US intelligence agencies identified several chemical decontamination sites in Iraq... spread out along a line north of the Kuwaiti border with Iraq. Another official described the decontamination sites as V-shaped areas dug out of the ground large enough to accommodate vehicles such as troop transports or tanks. 'The actual decontamination equipment has not been brought in yet,' the official said, 'but it's still a worrisome sign.' The V-shaped facilities are used for washing down with water equipment that has been exposed to chemical weapons."(122) The sites, numbering about half a dozen, "which have been organized over the past two weeks... are behind the second echelon of Iraqi forces, which include the elite Republican Guard armored units." American officials speculated that "the conspicuous organization of the sites might be intended to intimidate the United States and discourage it from using military force..."(123)
By the later part of September, American intelligence had seen indications of Iranian food shipments to Iraq, in apparent violation of the UN embargo.(124)
During the first week of October "several vans photographed by a US spy satellite have been identified as Soviet mobile electronic countermeasures equipment... The jamming gear, code-named 'Paint Can,' was discovered at several locations inside Kuwait and along Iraq's border with the occupied kingdom... discovery of the exact location of the jamming equipment was greeted with relief by US military planners because it assists targeting before military action."(125)
In mid October, "A large ammunition storage facility in Iraq exploded... the explosion near the southern Iraqi city of Basra caused a chain reaction that destroyed more than a dozen bunkered ammunition dumps. A US spy satellite photographed the demolished ammunition dumps... US intelligence analysts said sabotage by Kuwaiti resistance fighters may have been the only way for 12 ammunition dumps, each about 500 yards apart, all to be ignited. Other intelligence officials said 'poor handling' by Iraqi military personnel was a more likely cause..."(126)
By late October, reports emerged that the Defense Department was "using satellite reconnaissance to track the stripping of Kuwaiti facilities."(127) This included Iraqi efforts to dismantle Kuwaiti petroleum refineries. It was also reported that "US Intelligence has succeeded... in collecting detailed information about Iraq, giving US military commanders confidence that they understand Iraq's battle plans, weapons, capabilities, military weaknesses, leadership movements, and the control of forces."(128) This included identification of "plans to blow up several oil tankers off Kuwait's coast to delay an allied assaults from the sea... millions of gallons of the spilled oil would be set afire in the Persian Gulf. Three tankers are anchored near the Saudi Arabian border" at the port of Ra's al Qulay'ah. "The three large Iraqi oil tankers... were loaded at a northern Kuwaiti port last month," and subsequently moved south. "US intelligence officials have also spotted electrical cables stretching into the surf at some beaches for the purpose of electrocuting invading troops. US officials say the shock defenses are probably ineffective, but were used by Iraq against Iran during their eight-year was that ended in 1988... Iraqi defenses in the area also include anti-tank trenches that stretch for hundreds of miles along the coast and borders... about 10 percent of the trenches are filled with barrels of flammable liquid that also would be set ablaze during a tank assault..." In addition to five armored divisions of the Republican Guard deployed north of Kuwait, "eleven other divisions, part of the total 430,000 troop deployment, are located throughout Kuwait and southern Iraq. The forces shift position frequently to frustrate US satellite intelligence cameras."(129)
By early November "some aspects of US-Israeli cooperation have improved. Earlier in the crisis, for example, Israel was disturbed because it was not getting data from US satellite reconnaissance on missile sites in western Iraq. Now, officials here say, intelligence sharing has been stepped up. Israel has continued to provide US forces with intelligence, including detailed information on the movements of Iraqi forces and commanders."(130) Another report at the same time noted that "Israel would need US satellite intelligence to know if the missiles are being prepared for launch. It would also need the intelligence because some of Iraq's launchers are mobile. It's believed that the US currently doesn't give Israel instant, or 'real time,' information. One Israeli military official noted that, despite the complaints about America's reluctance to coordinate battle plans, intelligence from the US has been 'improved' recently. He refused to provide specifics, though."(131)
By mid-November, "analysts who have studied satellite reconnaissance photographs say Iraq's frontline ground defenses are widely dispersed."(132) During this period, "US Intelligence officials said they have identified two Iraqi military command posts under construction around Kuwait City. The underground facilities were photographed by a spy satellite." (133)
In mid-November, "US intelligence monitors in the region - satellites, ships and aircraft -- also have detected a major increase in Iraqi ballistic missile training activities."(134)
During the last two weeks of November, satellite photography indicated that Libya was removing large quantities of military equipment, including tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers, from about 10 storage depots around the country.(135) In addition, images of military bases in northern Libya indicated large-scale mobilization of Libyan forces.
In the last week of November a new Defense Department analysis of the Iraqi military presence in Kuwait upgraded the total force level from 430,000 to 450,000 troops, from 3,500 to 3,600 tanks, and from 2,200 to 2,400 artillery pieces. This was the first overall assessment released since late September, and "the new troop figures represent a recalculation by U.S. intelligence analysts studying satellite photos."(136)
Imaging intelligence systems were also used to monitor the effectiveness of the embargo, and by early December "Satellite photos show a steady stream of trucks entering Iraq from Iran."(137) Other satellite observations during this period included "Iraqis unloading mines in Kuwait and putting them on mine-laying boats... (and) intensified activities at plants producing poison gas and germ weapons..."(138) Satellite photos also showed an increase in the number of oil-filed trenches that Iraq could set afire to keep American tanks and infantry out of Kuwait.(139)
The December 2 launch of three Iraqi Scud missiles from Basra was not detected in advance by American intelligence satellites, leading analysts to conclude that in order to avoid detection the missiles were fueled and prepared for launch in a building of aircraft hangar, and were moved outside on their mobile shortly before launch.(140)
In mid-December, satellite intelligence was cited in reports of fighting in northern Iraq between the Iraqi army and Kurdish rebels.(141)
On 31 December, "US spy agencies detected about 300 Iraqi aircraft in flight... the largest number of planes and helicopters active at one time since the Aug.2 invasion."(142) Although no explanation was offered at the time, it seems that this was an effort to redistribute these aircraft to new airfields, to complicate American targeting activities.
On 3 January, it was announced that "US intelligence agencies have noticed 'an increase in the westward expansion of (Iraqi) defensive lines.' This movement partially accounts for an additional 20,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq... the Iraqis are expanding their defensive line westward up to 48 miles to prevent allied forces from outflanking the defensive barriers."(143)
By the eve of Desert Storm, "US and British forces, using satellite photographs of the 108 mile long Iraqi entrenchment, have reconstructed the series of tank ditches, mine fields, and razor wire entanglements they would face in an assault. Training against this obstacle, using live ammunition, grenades and tank-killing weapons..."(144) In addition, "US satellite and surveillance flights have located most anti-aircraft radars and the Air Force has drawn 'paths' around the surface-to-air missiles directed by the radars."(145)
During the final meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the American side did not present a planned briefing that included satellite photos, intended to convey the range of information available on the Iraqi military.(146) This briefing reportedly included "a detailed listing of President Hussein's recent movements, to demonstrate that if war started the Iraqi leader could easily be tracked by American intelligence and killed."(147)
"When American satellite reconnaissance specialists turned on their photo coverage of Iranian airfields on Jan. 14, two days before the opening allied assault, they were stunned to see evidence of apparent collusion between two sworn and bitter enemies: Iraqi airplanes, including several commercial airliners, parked in Iran. That number has subsequently multiplied to nearly 100 top-performance aircraft, by the Pentagon's count."(148)
Throughout the air campaign in January and February, "US and Allied pilots preparing to attack targets in Iraq and Kuwait routinely are shown, as part of pre-flight briefings, images of their assigned targets taken by (intelligence satellites). The satellite images are used to show enemy defenses and the proximity of civilian areas to be avoided in the attack."(149) "Attempts are made after each bombing raid to assess the success by using a combination of satellite and airborne reconnaissance. For high-priority targets, damage assessments can be made at the edge of a runway in special trailers equipped to receive and analyze video or still photos by returning bombers."(150) "The Navy is relying primarily on Defense Intelligence Agency satellite imagery to assess strike effectiveness."(151) During the initial weeks of Desert Storm, Iraqi mobile missile launchers were hiding by day and moving and shooting during the nighttime to elude American intelligence systems.(152)
In late January Iraq dumped a large volume of crude oil into the Persian Gulf creating a large oil slick that threatened Saudi water desalination plants. A briefing by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf used sketches made from satellite photos to illustrate what had happened. He noted that "these sketches all come from hard evidence.... the five ships that were located, and are still located, at those piers. These ships on the 16th of January were low in the water -- they were completely full of oil. As of this time, on the 24th of January, these five ships right here were apparently emptied of oil, or almost empty, because they are riding very, very high in the water. You also have out there a Sea Island terminal and an oiling buoy. These terminals and buoys are both used to fill the super tankers that can't get into the shallow draft are in this area. As of 1227 local (on 24 January 1991), what you saw here was the Sea Island Terminal intact, and a very, very large oil spill that was coming out of the oiling buoy... We have gone back and checked all our military operations between the time when we last looked at this buoy and nothing was coming out, which was approximately the 16th and the 24th... The best estimates we have, based on the length of the oil spill, is that this probably was opened up about the 19th in order to have what happened between the 19th and 24th when we got this evidence."(153)
According to one report in late January, "US intelligence agencies have indications that Soviet military weapons and equipment are reaching Baghdad in truck convoys. The CIA recently identified several truck convoys that are believed to contain munitions moving from the Soviet Union through Iran into Iraq. As many as 400 trucks have been spotted."(154)
On January 31, in response to reports that 800 to 1,000 Iraqi vehicles, and perhaps as many as six Iraqi divisions were moving from central Kuwait toward Wafra as a prelude to an Iraqi attack, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell noted that "we are monitoring that situation, and if I confirm some of those reports, I am potentially compromising some of the strategic and tactical sensors that we use. If I give that information in a public situation, I'm also providing it to the other side. So I have to not answer that question..."(155)
In the first week of February, "satellite reports show that at least a few Guard units are shuttling tanks between shelters and some troops are scrambling to find better hiding places... Some satellite photographs received last week showed numerous bomb crater, but dug-in armor is still visible."(156) Satellite photos also showed the Iraqis "attempting to salvage equipment and material from the bombed nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha, south of Baghdad... attempting to obtain the nuclear reactor cores and the plutonium fuel in four nuclear reactors in the area."(157) During the same period, "satellite photographs showed that at least three terrorist training camps -- which were detected by a US spy satellite last month -- are deserted... A training camp for Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists, that had been identified by US intelligence months ago, also appeared abandoned in the satellite photos..."(158)
The American bombing on 12 February of the bomb-shelter at Amiriya in Baghdad, which killed several hundred civilians prompted concerns about civilian casualties. In defending American targeting practices, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney noted that Hussein is "'placing military equipment in civilian areas, especially in Kuwait but also in Iraq.' Cheney said the practice includes placing two MiG-21 fighters next to an ancient pyramid near the city of Ur, northwest of Basra, which he described as the 'oldest continuously inhabited city on Earth,' and the site of valuable archeological ruins dating back to 2700 BC. He said the evidence was based on satellite photos obtained yesterday morning."(159) To bolster this claim, these photos were rushed to United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.(160) And it was reported that "the Pentagon later showed an artist's rendering of the two planes beside the pyramid."(161)
Coalition commanders had learned "through reconnaissance teams and other intelligence sources in the final weeks before the land offensive that Iraqi defenses were far less daunting than originally believed. 'The magic defensive line that was the marvel of the century did not exist,' said (Marine commander Gen.) Boomer."(162)
During the third week of February, negotiations between Iraq and the Soviet Union resulted in a proposal for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait over a three week period, with the process to be monitored by international observers. The United States proposed withdrawal within one week, with no provisions for on-site monitoring of the pull-out, "since American and allied combat planes have air supremacy and the United States has spy satellite there would be little problem in monitoring compliance."(163)
Brig. Gen. Richard Neal indicated that "we had pretty good location of the Republican Guard units. Some of them, as the battle unfolded, repositioned into supplementary locations..."(164) Another source noted that "during the battle, US satellite photography was so good that American planes were able to drop leaflets on Iraqi forces that identified brigades and divisions by name."(165)"Surveillance satellites showed that the Guard's Tawakalna Division was moving slowly south, perhaps deceived by the First Cavalry's feint. Other Republican Guard divisions were doing little more to gird for action than uncovering their vehicles."(166)
"Two jet aircraft used by Saddam Hussein for personal travel were spotted at a military airfield near Baghdad... The two Iraqi jets, described as VIP jets, were photographed by a US reconnaissance satellite over the past several days... Both jets were 'associated' with travel by Saddam in the past..."(167)
During the first week of March, satellite and aerial reconnaissance systems were used to monitor political and military unrest in at least six Iraqi cities.(168) According to Navy Capt. David Herrington, Deputy Intelligence Director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "What we've seen are buildings, structures, perhaps some government buildings, that are on fire in some of those cities. We've also seen vehicles on fire in some of those cities. We've also seen military checkpoints set up at strategic intersections in some of those cities..." Brig. Gen. Richard Neal indicated that "Some of our overhead pictures have indicated a lot of chaos, and that's hard to describe by virtue of overhead photography, but there's an intermingling of a lot of civilians and military."(169) And Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations noted that "We see, for example, T-55 tanks, and that reads Iraqi Army; we see T-72 tanks, and that reads Republican Guard, and we're not sure they're both on the same side right now."(170)
F - Operational Limitations
Despite these major contributions, American imaging intelligence experienced a number of shortcomings during the war. Some of these were as simple as inadequate communications, which hindered Army applications of satellite photography.(171) Many of these problems were only overcome because American forces "had the luxury of six months to develop solutions... When Army, Navy and Air Force units first deployed to Saudi Arabia last August, they fielded nine different intelligence collection and analysis systems that could not communicate with each other, though they performed the same mission, according to Rear. Adm. Thomas Brooks, chief of naval intelligence. 'Interoperability is a word, not a fact,' said Brooks..."(172)
Other problems arose from the large number of targets."The CIA and DIA rely almost exclusively on intelligence satellites, which can provide photographic coverage of only 20 to 40 percent of the targets attacked by coalition forces each day..."(173) Other failures were more complex in nature.
Two significant complicating factors were cloud cover over areas of interest, and Iraqi deception efforts.
Cloud cover over Iraq during the early days of the air campaign significantly impeded bomb damage assessment (BDA). According to one former high-ranking CIA official, "even without clouds, it takes a long time to process all that data. With clouds, you just can't tell very much."(174) According to another account, "even high clouds interfere with these images" from satellites.(175)
Starting on 21 January, "Thick cloud cover and heavy fog sharply curtailed US and allied bombing raids... and hampered efforts to assess the damage inflicted during five days of war..."(176) In a briefing on 21 January, a Maj. Gen. Burton Moore noted that "the weather patterns continue as they have for the past few days, and it has continued to impact our ability to get battle damage assessment..."(177) Subsequently, Lt. Col. Mike Scott noted that "weather has hindered our capability to obtain assessment of battle damage in a real-time manner. For obvious reasons, cloud cover hinders aerial photography. Additionally, depending on the level, clouds may also prevent us from sending in reconnaissance aircraft below them."(178)
Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Robert Johnston noted that cloud cover "does degrade somewhat our ability to fire on targets, and certainly to be able to see whatever battle damage that you've been able to inflict on those targets. But you have to appreciate that we have enormous technology that allows us to do things in the dark and under marginal weather conditions."(179)
Natural cloud cover was supplemented by Iraqi efforts to ignite oil well fires. On 22 January, Iraqi forces set fire to two oil refineries at Al-Wafra in southern Kuwait. "Western military officials said smoke from the fires could affect military operations against Iraq by limiting aerial surveillance, by planes or by satellites, of Iraqi military positions in Kuwait. 'Obviously, if there's heavy smoke, that's going to affect operations somewhat,' said Lieut. Col. Greg Pepin, a Pentagon spokesman... Al-Wafra is a small, low-pressure field that had been responsible for only about 7 percent of Kuwaiti oil
production before the Iraqi invasion on Aug. 2. Oil industry officials said there were potentially more serious fires today at storage sites the two refineries that were set afire, at Mina Abdullah and Shuaiba, south of Kuwait City. They are two of Kuwait's largest."(180)
CENTCOM Commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf noted in a visit to the front lines in mid-February that the Iraqis "talk about the smoke their going to create, but look over there. It's overblown. Smoke really isn't that big of a problem. Whatever difficulties it's going to cause are going to be neutral, as much of a problem for them as for us."(181) But according to one report, "the smoke has complicated the search for targets in Kuwait, American pilots say."(182) And by 22 February, over 200 oil wells in Kuwait had been set afire by Iraqi troops, covering the south-western half of the country in a thick cloud of black smoke, obscuring the area from observation by photographic satellites.(183) In assessing Iraqi motivations for setting the oil fields afire, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell note that "if you're being subjected to continuous air attack, covering this are with smoke would make it more difficult for the pilot to find his target, so that, perhaps, is an objective on the part of Saddam Hussein."(184) "A US Army lieutenant colonel assigned to the 1st Marine Div. as a fire support officer said that... dense smoke from Iraqi-set oil well fires also prevented CAS (Close Air Support) during some periods... Weather was good as the thrust began, and favorable winds blew away smoke from burning oil wells. But as the Marines approached the Burgan oil field, the wind changed, and smoke cut visibility."(185)
Iraqi Deception Efforts
Iraq made extensive efforts to deceive American intelligence concerning targets and damage inflicted, including decoys tanks and dummy missiles. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell noted that "They're quite good at it. We've seen it. We've also seen them paint damage on airfields, to spoof us into thinking that it is sill damaged, and therefore we don't have to worry about it. There are also reports that they are trying to put out dummy Scud systems."(186)
Iraq used deception "techniques they learned from US military intelligence officials during the eight year war between Iran and Iraq... In the course of receiving the US intelligence assessments, based on information from US spy satellites, the Iraqis 'were able to learn how we did the assessments,' one analyst said. 'They were able to learn how we keep track of what goes on in a war' -- and thus how to mask their military operations."(187)
According to James T. Westwood, head of Military Science and Defense Analytics, a Fairfax, VA consulting firm, "If you were going to entice the coalition to attack a certain structure, like may have happened, you would have to make it look like a command post, have to emanate signals that make it look like a command post."(188)
One account noted that Iraq "employed two- and three-dimensional decoy tanks in the hopes of fooling the allied air effort into wasting ordnance on them. Some of the false tanks house cheap electronic gadgetry emitting electronic 'blips' and heat waves like real tanks, thus attracting missiles. US officials say Husseins's fakes range from Scud missile launchers to plastic runway and road craters."(189) According to another account, "Iraq has built dummy Scud launchers and aircraft, and even painted fake craters on airport runways and on bomb shelters to suggest possible damage."(190) And "British military sources have said that the Iraqis changed the contours of some buildings to make them appear to be communications centers, factories and chemical weapons plants."(191)
According to another account, "intelligence officers are sifting through thousands of satellite photographs, radio interceptions, pilot reports and other data to assess the damage to Iraqi forces... The most skillful at deception... are the elite Republican Guard... (which) uses numerous devices to carry out those efforts. Sheets of aluminum placed under camouflage netting can deceive radars into believing an armored vehicle sits beneath the cover, leading pilots to waste valuable bombs on a fake target. In other instances, when allied bombs and missile do not hit a real tank, Iraqi troop et off large smoke bombs to make the pilots believe they scored a hit, discouraging them from returning to the area until satellite photographs reveal the tanks are still operational."(192)
One significant instance of Iraqi deception was asserted on have been spotted at a mosque near Basra, which was shown to a group of Western reporters on 11 February as an example of bomb damage to a civilian target.(193) Rear Adm. Mike McConnell, chief of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that the Iraqis had dismantled the dome and second story of the mosque, to simulate bomb damage. He noted that the mosque is "about 50 miles from the northern end of the Gulf, about 15 miles from Iran. On the 7th of February, when this information was obtained, you can see a bomb crater located at this position. This is the mosque. It's intact. There was a military target about half a mile from this location. One of the bombs went long and it landed in this position. On the 8th, with that bomb crater that I mentioned to you, occurring on the 30th of January, we noticed overnight demolition at the mosque. Now I apologize for the orientation on the presentation here, but this is a representation of the information available to us, and we're looking at it a little differently... What we notice about this image, this portrayal, is that the top portion of the dome of the mosque is undamaged, other than the dome has been removed. It's perfectly spherical. The damage that was inflicted here probably was by demolition, and it did not occur from a bomb strike. If there had been a bomb involved,
there would have been some cratering. The debris that would have been left would have been sizeable, in chunks. And we can tell from the information available that there's no debris down on the top of this building, which in fact is lower than the original structure. Apparently what happened, on the 7th its intact. On the 8th it was deliberately destroyed, and most of the debris removed."(194) McConnell concluded "This is open and shut. On the 7th it was intact, and on the 8th it was destroyed."(195) Other observers pointed to the absence of rubble or burn marks as indicators of the fabricated damage. "Satellite photographs of the mosque showed the dome missing, but window casings intact, an absence of debris on lower floors and walls that had been detached but were not buckled as they would have been from bombing..."(196)
Predicting the Invasion
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was generally unanticipated in Washington. The United States had tilted toward Iraq in its war with Iran, including supplying intelligence support. Following the cease fire, Bush administration policy toward Iraq was codified in National Security Directive 26 of October 1989. "The central assumption of US policy was that normal relations with Iraq would serve long-term American interests and promote stability in the Persian Gulf... The thrust of the Bush directive... was that the United States should keep trying to use political and economic incentives to moderate Iraq's behavior... The very openness of the Iraqi military buildup and the nature of the political backdrop led most observers to believe that its purpose was intimidation of Kuwait rather than invasion.... (according to one official) 'It was an intelligence failure of sorts. We were guilty of a kind of mind-set or a framework' about Iraq, he said. 'It might even be cultural. The idea that a country would march up to the border, put 100,000 troops there, go in and do what they've done; I don't think anybody here thought they'd do it.'"(197) Indeed, Republican lawmakers continued to urge moderation toward Iraq on the very eve of the invasion of Kuwait.(198)
Although the US intelligence community provided some warning, it was too late to affect the course of events. Senator David Boren (D-OK), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, initially concluded that there was no intelligence failure in predicting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "Our analysts were right on top of it, the accurately projected three or four days in advance. They were very strong in their beliefs that the invasion of Kuwait would occur... I think far ahead of any other intelligence source in the world."(199) But after the war, he stated that he was "generally convinced there was a failure of strategic intelligence leading up to the conflict. Two months out, one month out, there were not adequate warnings to policy makers that Iraq could be a problem.... There was not enough beefing up of human intelligence."(200)
One analysis after the end of the war noted concluded that "Washington didn't fail to anticipate Iraq's full-scale invasion because of a breakdown in 'tech int' -- technical intelligence... What Washington lacked was adequate 'humint' - human intelligence. and analysis of technical data."(201) "Defense Secretary Cheney says technical intelligence gathering was generally very good' in the runup to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but human intelligence was all but useless. While the pre-invasion military buildup was easily spotted in the open terrain, 'we couldn't tell their intentions,... The Kuwaitis themselves said it was only saber-rattling.' Cheney attributes the Iraqi elements of surprise to 'a well thought-out deception plan.'"(202)
Bomb Damage Assessment
The most serious operational shortcomings of imaging intelligence were exposed in the assessment of the progress of the air campaign. This issue was critical to the course of the war, given an American decision not to initiate ground operations until the air campaign had achieved a 30% to 50% reduction in the combat effectiveness of Iraqi forces.(203)
Despite initial claims of decisive results in the first days of Desert Storm, after ten days of aerial bombardment it was reported that "about 65 percent of the Iraqi airfields are still operational... Nearly all of Iraq's air defense radar war taken out in the first week of the war, but about 20 percent of it is now back in operation. The Iraqis are now using mobile radar units and have taken old radars out of storage... only eight of Iraq's 30 fixed Scud missile launchers had been damaged enough to fully disable them... some of the mobile Scud missile launchers also have been hit, but US intelligence has not produced proof of that. 'There is not one picture of the carcass of a mobile Scud launcher,' one official said... About 50 percent of the country's capacity to manufacture new chemical and biological weapons has been destroyed... The Iraqis demonstrated an unexpected skill at restoring the runways at their 66 major airfields, most of which have been put out of action at one point or another since the war began... Eleven of Iraq's 12 major petrochemical facilities, including three refineries, have received moderate damage... Baghdad's normal electrical generating capacity has been destroyed."(204)
Another element, Les Aspin, Chair of the House Armed Services Committed concluded, was that "this is going to be a problem because those bomb damage assessments aren't going to be forthcoming. The problem will turn out not to be the cloud cover. The problem will be with the release of the information itself. Releasing BDA information will tell Saddam Hussein what targets we will be going back to hit again... With our photographs, I believe we will know a lot more than Saddam Hussein about the damage to his country."(205) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams noted that "There's no such thing as an unclassified picture of bomb damage assessment, unfortunately, because the system that does it is eternally classified."(206)
Lt. Gen. Jimmy Adams, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, offered another perspective on the bomb damage assessment problem. "I don't mean to indicate there is a shortfall. I mean to tell you that if you started to design a system and said I want to be able to go over a get very fine detail of particular systems in a variety of locations you may design a system different than if someone told you I want to view a contingency operation with perhaps a broader perspective. It's a matter of processing time. It's a matter of resolution. It's a matter of how much is good enough. So I think we have adapted very well the capability that we have on hand. But I can tell you that in some cases the systems we are using that were not specifically designed for contingency operations -- I don't mean there's a shortfall or there's a problem -- I just mean that the frustration with not having BDA (bomb damage assessments) you want comes from the fact that some of the systems we're using just were not designed for the kinds of things we're using them for... In some cases, the systems we are using for theater BDA were designed for peacetime information collection operations. If we had started from scratch to design a theater system for BDA collection operations, some of the characteristics may be different from the current system, ie areas of coverage, resolution, connectivity, etc."(207)
One commentary noted that "assessing the effects of strikes against such ground forces as Iraq's Republican Guard is difficult and time-consuming. These units are small, well dug-in and dispersed over a wide area. Unlike fixed facilities such as airfields, weapons plants and radar sites, they pose difficult targets. An artillery command post may be a heavily camouflaged jeep dug into the sand, for example. Some of the preferred munitions for hitting ground forces -- fragmentation and combined-effects munitions that cover wide areas -- often do not produce clear evidence of damage in reconnaissance photos or satellite imagery. A truck or an artillery piece that has been hit by such munitions may remain in place and appear to be intact. Analysts may not be able to see that holes caused by shrapnel have destroyed the truck's engine or perforated the barrel of an artillery piece."(208) According to one Defense Department official, "You can't do bomb damage analysis the way you did in (the Vietnam and Korean Wars) by following a line of bomb craters. Sometimes now, it requires finding a relatively tiny hole in a building. That requires very sophisticated technology. All you see is a tiny hole and maybe then some smoke blow out of a doorway. The plane inside may be incinerated, but how do you prove it? To be sure, you'd have to watch what happens around the bunker for days."(209)
Iraqi deception efforts also complicated the bomb damage assessment process. According to Michael Dewar, an authority on military deception, these included "dummy aircraft and Scud-B mobile missile launchers that were mistakenly attacked by allied aircraft. There is evidence too, that the Iraqis have been constructing false bomb craters on some runways to give the impression that an airfield is out of commission."(210)
Assessment bomb damage were also complicated by different sources and methods, with each intelligence agency producing different estimates. One account suggested that CENTCOM "has access to reports from Iraqi prisoners of war and tactical, low-level reconnaissance photography that is not routinely provided to Washington. Agencies in Washington have had to rely mainly on high-level satellite photography."(211) Another account agreed that national agencies, such as CIA and DIA, "rely solely on satellite photography and pictures from spy planes, while the Central command also uses pilot reports and other evidence gathered in Saudi Arabia."(212)
Navy Captain David Herrington, Deputy Director for Intelligence for the Joint Staff, noted that "what we have here is a situation in which all the national technical means that we have are focused on the theater. All those assets, all that information that we collect nationally is sent forward as quickly as possible so that the on-scene commander has the benefit of that information. In addition to all those national technical means, he has available at his disposal a whole lot of tactical sensors -- that includes the RF-4..." Lt. Gen. Kelly pointed out in this regard that "When we started, we couldn't fly a lot of the tactical reconnaissance that we fly now, but we are flying it now, we are getting better every day, we are much more confident in the products we're getting now, and we think we are in good shape."(213)
Rear Adm. Mike McConnell, Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff, noted that "National technical means are used to sense a battlefield, sense destruction of a strategic target or whatever, and some judgments are made about that target with regard to bomb damage assessment. Everything that's available at the national level is provided to the CINC. There's a structure, there's a process and a procedure for us to provide that information -- not in real time, but close, near real time. If you're in a battlefield environment and the CINC forward, there are many assets that are available to him, tactical assets -- RF-4s, things of that nature -- that can take photographs, assess damage, make those kinds of judgments. The process of getting that back from Riyadh to Washington -- the system's not designed to do that... CENTCOM has the best information. He knows what we know. We are in the process of knowing what he knows in the process of feedback."(214)
By the middle of February, it was reported that "the Central Command estimates are about three to four times as large as the estimates by intelligence officials in Washington, who acknowledge that their projection is a conservative one that represents the minimum number of weapons destroyed."(215) On 14 February, CENTCOM concluded "that its damage assessment of allied bombing damage to Iraqi military equipment could have been too optimistic, and... adopted a more conservative method of counting destroyed targets... in which only one-third to one-half of the destruction reported by pilots is counted... The change was the third time the assessment method (was) altered... An initial very conservative approach, in which pilot accounts of target destruction were not counted at all, was changed (on 26 January) to counting a majority of them, and then to the current method of counting..."(216)
Just prior to the initiation of the ground campaign, it was reported that "Central Command maintains that the overall strength of the Iraqi forces has been reduced 40% to 50%, the goal allied commanders wanted to reach before launching a ground assault. The Air Force, factoring in eyewitness reports from its pilots, says Riyadh's estimates are 15% to 50% too low. The Defense Intelligence Agency claims Central Command's figures are 15% to 20% too high. The CIA takes the most conservative line and would scale back Riyadh's numbers 20% to 25%."(217)
Iraqi Field Forces
Satellite performance also left something to be desired in following Iraqi forces in the field. Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly noted that "The difficulty we've had in BDA (bomb damage assessment) is much more pronounced on the battlefield where we're going after tactical targets which are dug in -- it' much more difficult than it is on a building in Baghdad or any other part of Iraq."(218) Defense Secretary Dick Cheney stated that "assessing the damage on a deployed army in the field is quite a different problem from assessing the damage on a building that you've just hit. You've seen some great film footage of a laser-guided bomb going down the vent shaft of a building, boom, it blows up, it burns down, there you have it. It doesn't work that way when you have a deployed armored brigade in the field. They're spread out, they're dug in, they're hiding -- they're not standing our there like a building. They're avoiding air attack. They are going to put out dummies to try to deceive you as to their exact location... You really don't know how you're doing against an army until that army tries to perform its function."(219)
One of the incidents which was reported in some detail was that in late August, the Iraqis were redeploying the Republican Guard out of Kuwait back to just the other side of the Iraq border. There was apparently a period of over 24 hours in which the pre-programmed photos didn't show those divisions and the place where the divisions had moved to had not been scheduled to be photographed during that period. Once those pictures came in and there were no Republican Guards in those pictures, NRO had to reprogram the satellites to a wider search area to figure out where those divisions had gotten off to. It would seem that within a day or two, once they had reprogrammed the satellites for wider search areas, they figured out where the Republican Guards were located. This demonstrated a rapid response capability to pictures that showed something unexpected.
The Iraqi assault on the Saudi town of Khafji on 28 January also raised questions of "how were the Iraqis able to move on Khafji without being detected well in advance by US satellites, reconnaissance planes, electronic monitoring equipment and US and Saudi observing teams station along the border?... A Central Command briefer, Brig. Gen. Pat Stevens IV, said Thursday that the Iraqi push into Khafji did not represent a failure in advance warning. 'In fact, we probably have the finest ability to see the battle field of any armed force in history.' he declared. 'So no, I would day there's no failure there, absolutely none.' Stevens declined to respond to questions why, in that case, the Iraqis were able to move way he initially reported as a light armored battalion, 400 to 500 men with their tanks, across the border and six miles down the highway without interference from the aircraft that, according to the command, had driven back the two earlier tank columns."(220)
The contribution of satellites to targeting field force's tanks and artillery is also unclear. "Picking out camouflaged, dug-in target proved to be a major stumbling block... (the Air Force formed) a squadron of veteran F-16 pilots who had combat experience or were specially trained in detecting ground target to scout specific bombing areas in advance... The 'Killer Scout' would spend the daylight hours patrolling so-called 'kill boxes,' 20-by-20 mile areas, visually identifying targets... As the daytime strikes became more effective, the Iraqi forces dug in even deeper, burying tanks under sandbags and making it extremely difficult for even expert pilots to spot. Air attack planners improvised a new strategy to attack the buried tanks at night using F-15Es and F-111s equipped with laser-guided bombs and special sensors that detected heat from the entrenched armor. Even when buried, the tanks absorbed heat from the desert sun and radiated it more slowly than the surrounding sands, making them appear as hot spots on the attacker's infrared scopes."(221)
According to one account, American "intelligence officials are using a sophisticated analytical model for assessing the fighting capability of Iraqi forces after bombing. The assessment rates fighting strength based on seven criteria: maneuverability, fire support, air defense, intelligence and electronic warfare, mobility and counter-mobility, survivability, and sustainment."(222) Photo interpreters working with aircraft imagery "can distinguish live and dead aircraft, Scud missile launchers, vehicles and entrenchments -- but not soldiers, who are too small to be seen. Their presence has to be inferred from concentrations of vehicles and equipment. Their numbers can only be guessed at."(223)
At the beginning of September, the Defense Department estimated that the Iraqi presence in the Kuwait Theater of Operations included 265,000 troops and 2,200 tanks. But by mid-September 1990, estimates of the Iraqi presence had grown to 360,000 troops and 2,800 tanks. Attributing the increase to rounding-out of units, Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams noted that "There has been a gradual buildup in Iraqi forces since this operation began. There has been no sudden surge. Its certainly a continued buildup."(224) And by the commencement of the air campaign in January, Iraqi forces were estimated to number about 540,000 troops.
But "US intelligence sources significantly overestimated the size of Iraqi military forces, the complexity of their minefields and obstacle belts... the Iraqi military had positioned no more than 350,000 troops in Kuwait and souther Iraq when the war began in early January... many front-line Iraqi units were manned at only 50 percent of their full strength, and in the rear even the best artillery units were operating with little more than two-thirds of their troops..."(225) According to another account, "some US military analysts and intelligence experts now say the actual number... when ground combat began, may have been closer to 300,000. Other senior officials have said they believe there were only 350,00 Iraqi troops in the theater on Jan. 17, when the air war began, and that only 200,000 remained by the time the ground war started."(226)
By early February, it was reported that "more than a quarter of the positions in Iraq's regular army in Kuwait are either deserted or unmanned... according to reports from allied officials who have debriefed Iraqi defectors in Saudi Arabia... The prisoners have reportedly told allied officials that an estimated one-fourth to one-third of the troops in Iraq's regular Army in Kuwait have either defected, been taken prisoner, suffered casualties or simply fled their positions. Many of them are reportedly returning to cities in Iraq from which they were drafted into the Army."(227) And by mid-February Front line coalition forces were also reporting that entire Iraqi units appeared to have withdrawn from their positions across the Kuwaiti border.(228)
The assessment of Iraqi field fortifications also raises questions. Initial reports suggested that Iraq had prepared an extremely formidable network of trenches, dugouts and other earthworks all along the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia. Coalition forces were reported to have constructed replicas of these fortifications, based on satellite photos, to perfect assault techniques.(229)
But an analysis of Soviet Soyuz-Karta imagery from 13 September found no trace of the Iraqi military presence in Kuwait. Intelligence analyst Peter Zimmermann noted "The Pentagon kept saying the bad guys were there, but we don't see anything to indicate an Iraqi force in Kuwait of even 20 percent the size the administration claimed.... We didn't find anything of that sort anywhere in Kuwait. We don't see any tent cities, we don't see congregations of tanks, we don't see troop concentrations..."(230)
And "only days before the allies launched their ground assaults... Iraqi trenches supposedly forming a second line of defense were shown by allied satellite imagery to be only a foot deep."(231) Following the end of the war, it was determined that "photographic intelligence from satellites, spy planes and remotely piloted aircraft exaggerated the severity of the minefields and obstacle belts... making trenches and other barriers appear far more formidable than they were." Conversely, "the main ammunition and supply depot for the Iraq army corps assigned to defend central Kuwait apparently went undetected by allied intelligence and remained well stocked and intact until Marine forces overran it."(232) According to one account, "Minefields that US Marines expected would be 2,000 yards deep turned out to be only 140 yards deep. Yawning oil-filled trenches turned out to be mere ditches 2 to 3 feet wide... The two parallel rows of 12-foot sand berms that were the heart of the Saddam Line in southeastern Kuwait were almost missed by journalists driving through them, eroded by desert winds.... What happened to the notorious Saddam Line? Did Iraq fool the US military into overestimating it? Or did the Pentagon do so on its own, perhaps to lure Baghdad into a false sense of security, perhaps to make the US public believe its task was much harder than it really was?"(233)
Finally, US intelligence assessments "were unable to gauge the Iraqi soldiers lack of commitment to fight a war for a cause they did not support... the deterioration and lack of military commitment among Iraqi troops.... remained invisible to the sophisticated intelligence equipment in the skies above them."(234)
Scud Missile Launchers
Additional shortcomings were exposed in the difficulties experienced in destroying Iraqi mobile Scud launchers. Total damage inflicted on Israel by the Scud attacks included two dead and 228 wounded, as well as an estimated $200 million in property damage.(235)
The problem with the Iraqi missiles began before the onset of hostilities. Although it normally requires several hours to prepare a Scud missile for launch, American intelligence failed to detect any launcher activity prior to the launches on 2 December.(236) In addition, the Israeli government was "unhappy with delays in receiving US satellite surveillance of Iraqi missile sites."(237) According to some reports, the incident "represents a major intelligence failure... American intelligence was surprised not only by the launches but also by both the launching point and the direction in which the missile were fired... (it) caught American intelligence agencies so completely by surprise... that some US officials feared war was about to erupt in the Persian Gulf."(238)
American planners apparently underestimated the number of Iraqi missile launchers, and the effort required to deal with this threat. Air Force Chief of Staff Tony McPeak conceded that "what surprised us was we put three times the effort that we thought we would on this job."(239) According to one account "early in the air war, 15 percent of Central Command's air assets were diverted to the chase for the tactically worthless missiles."(240)
Rear Adm. Mike McConnell observed that "The numbers that you heard early, on the low side or it, something called TELs, Transporter Erector Launcher, something designed and built to move missiles around, we were fairly confident of those. The ones that we didn't have a good feel for were something called a MEL, Mobile Erector Launcher, which is nothing more than a flat bed truck with missile rails on it to raise and lower the missile. So we think they had a much higher number of those that they had manufactured, home grown, and used to hid in the various places."(241) He later noted that "Our intelligence systems are incredible, they're wonderful, and they did a magnificent job in this effort. But we can't see everything all the time. You ask if we can see a temple, why can't we find something as large as an airplane -- a temple doesn't move. If you're looking for something that you don't know where to start your search, it becomes often a needle in a haystack, and the example in a mobile SCUD."(242)
Gen. Schwarzkopf stated on 20 January that "Our initial estimates were that they had approximately 30 fixed launchers, and more than 20 mobile launchers. today we're very confident that we have managed to neutralize the fixed launchers... We have estimates that say we may have killed as many as 16 of those mobile launchers."(243) Another account noted that "early estimates put the number of fixed launchers at roughly 30; official estimates of mobile launchers go from as few as 20 to as many as 50 to 70. Most estimates put the number of missile around 300."(244) Other sources suggested the Iraqi inventory at about 200 missiles with 36 TELS,(245) or as many as 140 (246) or up to 200 mobile launchers.(247) In the first week of the air campaign, "Administration officials said Iraq might still have as many as 40 mobile launchers in operation."(248) And according to another estimate, 10 to 15 Iraqi mobile launchers remained operational in Iraq at the end of January.(249)
Addressing the discrepancy between the number of MELs estimated prior to the war, versus the number claimed to have been destroyed, Brig. Gen. Richard Neal suggested that "I don't think we were ever comfortable as a command with our numbers on how many TELs and MELs they had. We thought we had a pretty good fix on it, but I don't think our comfort level was pegged over to the right, so to speak... I'm sure that some of them were decoys. I think our pilots have become more proficient in being able to discriminate between what are decoys and what are real things..."(250)
In the early phases of the air campaign Gen. Schwarzkopf noted that "we knew that he had more than 20 mobile missiles -- we had a wide range of estimates. I would tell you quite candidly, that nobody knows exactly how many mobile missiles he had."(251) He later concluded that "We went into this with some intelligence estimates that I think I have since come to believe were either grossly inaccurate, or our pilots are lying through their teeth, and I choose to think the former rather than the latter, particularly since many of the pilots have backed up what they've been saying by film and that sort of thing. But we went in with a very, very low number of these mobile erector launchers that we thought the enemy had. However, at one point we had a report that they may have had ten times as many."(252)
The search for mobile launchers was impeded during the early days of Desert Storm by cloud cover over their deployment areas.(253) But these problems persisted until the eve of the ground campaign. Noting that analysis of imagery of suspected sites had failed to disclose active or destroyed missile launchers, one military official noted that "There is a regiment or brigade-size unit out there somewhere and we just don't know where it is..."(254) At the conclusion of the war, as many as eight mobile launchers, evenly divided between the western and southern deployment areas, were believed to have survived intact.(255)
One account of the problems in the Scud hunt stated that early in the air campaign an "overhead spy satellite was secretly assigned to spot Scud launches, then feed their coordinates to the US Space Command, which relayed them to patrolling AWACS and F-15s over Iraq."(256) Another account noted that "spy satellites have had some difficulty distinguishing them from other objects, officials say.... Mobile Scud units are mostly organized in brigades of six launch vehicles that use one set of command and support vehicles... The brigades must be located near roads or well-established tracks in the desert. 'The launch vehicles... don't go like dune buggies,' said David Isby..."(257) These problems persisted despite the fact that "the soldiers firing the launchers are often creatures of habit, driving to their favorite hilltop and firing because the coordinates for targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia are already set for that location."(258)
One account noted that "Iraq's mobile Scud launchers were apparently driven on many occasions to the vicinity of the country's fixed Scud sites in order to fire the weapon. This allowed known, accurate coordinates to be used in preparing the missile's flight path.... Occasionally, the Iraqis seemed to have taken the mobile launcher right on to a fixed launch site. On other occasions, they moved the mobile launcher to within a reasonable radius -- anywhere from one to five miles -- to shoot because you still get a reasonable degree of accuracy."(259)
By the later part of the war, "combinations of AWACS and Joint STARS and other surveillance systems" were working to detect Iraqi missile launchers. These included the LANTIRN targeting pod carried by F-16 fighters, which provided "a capability for trolling along highways looking for Scud launchers. It has been used in that mode and has been effective in that mode."(260) Another account noted that "with the first 12 to 15 LANTIRN targeting pods, F-15Es of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing's 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron flew Scud-busting bombing runs in Western Iraq..."(261) In addition, the Pioneer UAV "tracked a mobile Scud launcher leaving Baghdad, allowing its controllers to call in an immediate air strike. Destruction of the Scud was filmed by the Pioneer."(262)
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Tony McPeak noted that "Mobile Scud launchers operated at night, drove into these launch boxes, and launched, so we had to do a lot of road wrecking, even with the A-10s. An old, slow aircraft was used to go out where we could do this and run up and down the road and try to find these mobile missiles. Probably the most effective thing we did was put F-15Es in airborne CAPs right overhead these Scud launch boxes, and then use JSTARS... This radar finds and tracks moving targets on the ground. So with it, we could track all these vehicles. When we found one that looked suspicious, then these JSTARS aircraft were able to divert these airborne CAPs and perform on the spot, ad lib attacks."(263)
The campaign against Iraqi missiles was also assisted by American Special Forces units covertly deployed in Iraq.(264) These commandos "helped coordinate air strikes against Scud launchers by shining special laser beans on them so the missile could be precisely targeted by American aircraft... Special forces teams also joined the hunt for Iraq's Scud missiles -- among the operations deep inside Iraq known euphemistically as "direct action" missions. Hiding by day and travelling by small motorcycles or special desert vehicles by night, small teams of commandos helped track the missile launchers. When they found them they used small, transportable lasers to illuminate the launchers so they could be found by combat planes or attack helicopters equipped with laser-guided weapons."(265) These forces "helped locate and direct US aircraft fire that destroyed 16 mobile missile launchers at several sites in western Iraq.... Scud missile launchers, for example, often were hidden in garages or under bridges but were pinpointed for bombers using precision-guided munitions by special forces shining lasers from sites a mile or more distant."(266)
Targeting Saddam Hussein
The question of whether the United States sought to target Saddam Hussein remains unanswered, although it is clear that any such efforts failed.(267) It is equally clear, however, that American war aims extended to the ouster of Saddam Hussein.(268) In mid-September 1990, then-Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan noted that Israeli sources advised that "the best way to hurt Saddam" is to target his family, mistress and personal guard. He concluded that "if and when we choose violence he ought to be at the focus of our efforts."(269)
In the opening days of the air war, Gen. Schwarzkopf stated that "We are not trying to kill any particular person. One of our aims all along has been to make sure that it's very difficult for the leadership to have any impact upon the decision-making process of the subordinate units, and there are several different ways we're going about doing that. We're not targeting any specific person to kill them."(270) But Gen. Colin Powell's remark that "We have not been tracking Mr. Saddam Hussein for the purpose of targeting him,"(271) left open the possibility that Hussein was be tracked for purposes other than targeting.
According to one senior pentagon official, "There is not a direct effort underway to get him, but everybody around here believes that the fastest way to end the war is if Saddam Hussein walks under a Tomahawk missile." Another official noted that "What we're trying to do is eliminate their command and control centers, knowing that he might get hit in the course of our going after those targets. So, while we're not specifically targeting him, we are well aware that there could be a side benefit to these attacks. None of us would mourn his passing."(272)
Early "in Desert Shield, an Iraqi defector told CIA operatives that Saddam Hussein had hired foreign contractors to build several dozen underground bunkers for his family and friends. The agency reviewed bales of satellite photos taken over Baghdad throughout the 1980s and identified many of the sites."(273) However, "despite all the intelligence, the bunkers protecting Iraq's military commanders and communications capabilities have resisted destruction."(274)
According to one report in late January, "Allied intelligence officials believed they had pinpointed the whereabouts of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein one night last week, and warplanes were dispatched to the site, but the storm front that blew across central Iraq prevented bombers from striking there..."(275) But this report was subsequently strongly denied by Maj. Gen. Robert Johnston, CENTCOM Chief of Staff. Another "senior Pentagon official commented 'We go after command and control targets, and if he happens to be there, great."(276)
Mistaken Targets - Baby-Food Factory and Bomb Shelter, and Others
Several targets in Iraq were attacked by mistake. Although the extent of this problem is unclear, anecdotal reports include reference to "targets selected in error, such as the civilian building across the street from the Iraqi Interior Ministry."(277)
When Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Tony McPeak was asked whether "JSTARS that can identify mobile targets, could they identify them well enough to distinguish between a truck that might have been a Scud and a Jordanian oil tanker? Or are they just identifying large moving objects?" responded "I can't answer the question. I'm not sure."(278)
On 23 January Cable News Network reporter Peter Arnett reported that a facility in Baghdad that had been destroyed by coalition bombing was not a biological weapons facility, but rather an infant formula factory. Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stated that "That factory is in fact a production facility of biological weapons. The Iraqis have hidden this facility behind a facade of baby milk production as a form of disinformation."(279) Air Force Lt. Col. Mike Gallagher stated that "this facility... has military guards around it, barbed wire fence; it has a military garrison outside. And numerous sources have indicated that the facility is associated with biological warfare production." And Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said "It was a biological weapons facility, of that we are sure." And Gen. Schwarzkopf stated that "it's surrounded by a high military fence, it has guard posts on all four corners, and it was painted with camouflage paint and defended. That's not something you normally do with an infant formula plant."(280)
However, "... Three administration officials... offered inconsistent explanations of the plant's operations. A White House official said the plant had been converted to germ production last fall. An official at another US government agency said the plant originally was constructed as a biological warfare facility, but was a 'back-up' plant and was not in operation when it was attacked. An official at a third agency said the plant was not a full biological warfare facility but produced items that could be useful in the production of biological weapons.... (but) the French contractor who built the plant in the late 1970s said it was constructed as an infant formula factory, and that the equipment could not have been used to make 'chemical' products." And a technician from New Zealand who had worked on a nearby cheese plant project stated that "there was an outer fence around the entire sprawling complex, an industrial park of several hundred acres, which included the cheese plant, a milk sterilization plant, a housing complex, a pharmaceutical plant and other facilities... 'The garrison is four kilometers doun the road.'" (281)
CNN reporter Peter Arnett concluded "I thing it was a mistaken bombing... It seems to me that it was an unlikely location for a chemical plant. It was beside a main highway with no security fences around it. We were able to walk around it and through it. We took extensive video. I think the US just miscalled it. It didn't argue with Marlin Fitzwater (who said the factory hid a biological or chemical weapons facility) but there was no doubt in my mind that it was unlikely to be a supersecret facility... I see a lot of other installations around here that are probably less important than a facility of that nature, and the security is incredible. I cannot conceive (of their having) the limited kind of security that they had if it was such a secret installation. I mean, it's Iraq, why pretend: they can put it anywhere... I arrived there and they were wheeling a cart out of that baby-food factory with this English product. They said they import the base for their infant-formula preparation (and then) add vitamins and all the rest of the stuff... they later gave me a detailed document of the overseas companies, American and German, that had been involved in this whole procedure."(282)
The effectiveness of American intelligence systems was also called into question by the 12 February American attack on a bomb-shelter at Amiriya in Baghdad, which killed several hundred civilians. According to Brig. Gen. Richard Neal, "it was a military bunker, it was a command and control facility -- it's one of many that have been used by the Iraqi Government throughout this operation. We have been systematically attacking these bunkers since the beginning of the campaign. Within the past two weeks this particular bunker became even more active, as a command and control facility. It's a hardened shelter. The roof was just recently painted with a camouflage patter to further try to keep it out of the aviation vision... we don't feel like we attacked to wrong bunker or that we
made a mistake... If we thought that in fact there were civilians in the bunker... we would not have attacked that bunker...in fact a lot of the Iraqi command and control functions, a lot of their leadership elements have moved back into residential area because they know we have been scrupulously avoiding attacking these residential areas..."(283)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams noted that "it was built as a bomb shelter. There were several dozen of these built around Baghdad -- a couple of different varieties, but several of these built around Baghdad. This particular one, even though it was built as a civilian bomb shelter, was then turned into something else -- a military facility. That made it a legitimate military target because of its command and control, communications function... the Iraqis... made the decision to paint the top either to make it camouflage or to make it look like it had already been hit or whatever... having visited it with military vehicles, had military people go in and out of it, having used it for military purposes... they added military communications equipment..."(284)
Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly asserted that the facility stopped functioning as a civilian shelter "When it was modified to a military communications facility, when it was EMP (electromagnetic pulse) hardened... when they were passing messages (which was right throughout that period) from that facility.... we know that in the late '80s it was converted. It was converted from what had been a civilian shelter... Ducting inside, which was shown in the pictures. That was communications cables. A sign that said 'bomb shelter' in English that looks new. So looking at that thing from the air -- even if we didn't have all this other information -- the camouflaged roof, which was camouflaged, I guarantee you, just stuck out like a sore thumb. This is a military facility. This is not a bomb shelter."(285) He further noted that "the fact that we didn't see an antenna is not very significant since there would be an effort to offset the antennas anyway to try to keep the identification of the identity of the building as secret a possible... I have seen, and I will guarantee you that there's camouflage, blotches painted on that roof."(286)
Navy Captain David Herrington, Deputy Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, reinforced the assertion that the facility was not a civilian bomb shelter, noting that "If you took all the hardened structures that we could find in the city and packed people in standing as closely as you could pack them, less that one percent of the people in the city of Baghdad could be protected during an air strike."(287)
According to an Air Force officer, "a Scandinavian contractor had converted 10 of 25 such bunkers in Baghdad in 1989, including the one hit today. Allied intelligence detected a vast increase in military activity at the bunker beginning on Feb. 5, only a week ago, when trucks began unloading communications equipment... officers said that three black circles, apparently intended to resemble bomb holes, were painted on the roof."(288) One report suggested that "allied military planners were unaware that civilians were in the shelter because the civilians had apparently entered at night when they could not be detected by American reconnaissance satellites... The roof and walls of the buildings were rebuilt with steel and concrete... the top floor of the building was 10 feet thick and was reinforced with metal... American intelligence showed Iraqi military trucks going to and from the building in early February. In addition, limousines that carry Iraq's senior leaders were also observed going to and from the building. The vehicles were presumably spotted by reconnaissance satellites."(289) Another account concurred that "satellite reconnaissance and other intelligence means indicated in recent days that military cars and other vehicles typically used by senior Iraqis were parked outside the building, US officials said last night, although one official added that no satellite images had been taken within at least 24 hours before the attack."(290)
Gen. Kelly conceded, "We can't watch everything 24 hours a day. That country is the size of California, you know, we pointed that out before. That much technology doesn't exits on Earth."(291) As Jeffrey Richelson notes, "that an air-raid shelter has been converted into a military command center while still being used for civil-defense purposes may not be apparent on the basis of reconnaissance data. Civilians may enter the shelter in less than an hour in the dead of the night. The short period of time in which US imaging satellites are overhead, combined with their limited nighttime capability, make it difficult to detect the presence of civilians. And any signals intercepted from such a facility are likely to be of a purely military nature."(292) Some officials attributed the lapse to the fact that "as much as a week may have passed between the past aerial photos taken by US intelligence of the bunker and the bombing raid."(293)
According to Lt. Gen. Kelly, "I am positive the roof was painted with camouflage."(294) But the nature of the camouflage was unclear, and ABC correspondent Bill Blakemore reported from the scene that the roof was covered in gravel, and was not camouflaged. "No western journalists there said they observed such camouflage. Some officials, asked for elaboration, said the paint appeared to disguise the purpose of the building. Others, however, said it simulated damage from bombs."(295) According to one account, one "official said three black circles, apparently intended to resemble bomb holes, were painted on the roof in an attempt to make the building appear already damaged."(296)
However, other sources questioned these claims. "A Congressional source with access to classified information said Soviet-style bunkers for the Iraqi elite would naturally include some barriers to casual entry because ordinary citizens would not be welcome. Reinforced walls, the official said, would protect civilians seeking shelter as well as military commanders. And secure communications, the official said, would be desirable in any place where Iraqi leaders spent time. Baath Party functionaries, for example, 'would want to be able to communicate with the provinces,' the official said."(297) According to an American military source in Riyadh, "there's not a soul who believes it was a command and control bunker... The military did believe it contained soldiers. We thought it was a military personnel bunker... But I am not of the belief that any of the bunkers in and around Baghdad have camouflage. There is said to be barbed wire there but that's normal in Baghdad. We've been told that wire is sometimes put up to control crowds, that there is barbed wire near bakers' shops to prevent riots."(298) Another report noted that the "reporters who visited the building in a middle-class Baghdad neighborhood, saw a sign saying 'shelter' in Arabic and English, typical of such signs near air-raid shelters through out the city."(299)
This controversy provoked a debate over "releasing evidence to back up US claims that the Baghdad bunker bombed was a military facility. Pentagon officials considered showing satellite photos of the bunker, but intelligence agencies vetoed the idea."(300)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams noted that "there's a general rule in the government that about not showing certain kinds of images. We just haven't done that. For some systems, we have never shown those images publicly. This case is no exception to that policy."(301)
G - Alternative Systems
Although American intelligence capabilities were a significant advantage, a variety of sources other than satellites were used during the Gulf War. One account noted that the "allied edge starts with the US's ability to gather intelligence on the location of Iraqi artillery units from satellites, scout helicopters such as the OH-58D Kiowa, and radio direction finders.(302)" However, in some cases the effectiveness of many of these non-space systems was questionable. One analysis noted that "while TR-1s performed well, they only provided coverage to a limited depth. RF-4C photo reconnaissance aircraft were employed, but the lengthy process of developing film was cumbersome.... RPVs, such as the Pioneer operated by Marine units and the Navy for gunfire support, performed well during the conflict. The positive feedback from field commanders who gained valuable operational experience with RPVs in the Gulf should finally help to break the military's skepticism about such systems."(303)
According to Lt. Gen. Gordon Fornell, commander of Air Force Electronic Systems Division, "The biggest enhancement in capabilities to come out of the war is JSTARS ability to do battlefield surveillance."(304) The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is a joint Army/Air Force air-based large imaging radar for identifying ground targets, such as tanks and trucks, at long ranges. The initial E-8A (formerly C-18) JSTARS platform consists of two specially modified used Boeing 707-320's.(305) JSTARS, which builds on the earlier SOTAS and PAVE MOVER experimental systems, is operated by the Air Force, although the Army is the principal user of the system's product.
The Grumman-built radar, which is mounted in a 7.5 meter pod on the side of the forward fuselage of the aircraft, "would in some instances be able to distinguish tanks, which would be high-priority targets, from less-threatening trucks."(306) The radar can operate in a synthetic aperture mode to detect fixed targets, while mobile targets would be detected by operating the radar in a doppler mode. Each aircraft will be able to monitor an area roughly 480 km by 320 Km.(307)
Data from the aircraft is down-linked to a mobile Ground Support Module, built by Motorola, for further analysis. Additional JSTARS connectivity is provided through Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS).(308) The data can also be relayed to as well as to Joint Tactical Fusion All-Source Analysis System and NATO Battlefield Information and Collection System centers.
The area of coverage of JSTARS is limited by concerns over the aircraft's survivability. According to JSTARS Deputy Program Manager Col. G. Sidney Smith, "Over the battlefield, everything is vulnerable. People confuse survivability with immortality. AWACS faces the same problem, but no one worries about it because it is so protected. Our layered defenses are there to protect AWACS, and will be there to protect the Joint STARS aircraft. And this aircraft won't be sitting up at the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops), it stands back. If it is in danger, it can move still further back and still provide usable pictures." JSTARS "will be able to stand back almost 190 n.m. from the forward edge of the battle and ... be capable of looking 20-30 n.m. beyond the FLOT."(309)
Two Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft were deployed to the Persian Gulf as the 4411th JSTARS Squadron.(310) Gen. Schwarzkopf was reportedly impressed with the results of operational demonstrations of JSTARS in Germany in October, and the plane was ordered to the Gulf theater on 18 December, arriving on 11 January. In the three weeks prior to arrival, according to Lt. Gen. Gordon Fornell, commander of Air Force Electronic Systems Division, contractors "worked around the clock to create a concept of operations, train a multi-command crew, complete and install an extraordinary number of upgrades to both aircraft, bringing them to the same combat capability. Radar and communications systems were significantly improved. Key data links to and from the Ground Station Module were added along with JTIDS capability, a limited ECCM and a self-defense system."(311) The two JSTARS aircraft mounted 44 sorties in their first 41 days in the Gulf theater,(312) and a total of 54 by the war's end, with each aircraft flying on alternate nights.(313) Each of these sorties averaged about 12 hours in duration, with the aircraft "running right into the heat of the battle."(314)
The Moving Target Indicator (MTI) radar on JSTARS operates at an angle of obliquity of between one and two degrees, permitting ranges from the aircraft's nadir point of about 275 kilometers, or about 200 kilometers beyond the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) when standing off 75 kilometers. The Synthetic Aperture Radar is limited to angles of obliquity of from four to five degrees, which at the 10 kilometers altitude of JSTARS gives a range of about 125 kilometers. The SAR, with a resolution of a few meters, gives JSTARS a capability to monitor stationary troop emplacements.(315) During the Gulf war, "the E-8s experienced several 'retrogrades,' or forced withdrawal from an area. However, they were never directly threatened by enemy aircraft. They normally flew at altitudes of 30,000 to 40,000 feet."(316)
"Because of the lack of features in the desert, radar pictures were easier to get and interpret than those obtained on a Joint-STARS field deployment to Great Britain and Germany last fall... Fixed Iraqi Scud missile sites were frequently targeted, and operators came to recognize the Scud radar image quickly and report these locations in real time. Mobile Scud launchers were harder to discern."(317)
According the Gen. Fornell, "you see the positions. You'd look in and see the tanks where they are dug in, artillery positions and everything like that. You look like you are looking in daylight... It's beautiful."(318) Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merill McPeak also noted that JSTARS was "doing very well. In fact I think that we will not ever again want to fight any kind of combat without a Joint STARS kind of system... One thin it does is give everybody the same ground picture... and everybody shares that. So, even if its wrong, its good... That's a kind of reconnaissance that's especially valuable."(319)
The JSTARS radar can detect vehicles moving at speeds greater than 15 km/hr, although its ability to distinguish types of vehicles is limited.(320) JSTARS data is downlinked to the Motorola AN/TSQ-132 ground station. On 30 January Gen. Schwarzkopf noted that "JSTARS and other very sophisticated systems give a level of how much damage we're doing to (Iraq) logistics traffic... on the Main Supply Route (MSR)... that comes into Kuwait City.... In the past, on any given day in the early part of the campaign, you could look at that Supply Route, and at any given time you'd find about 1,000 trucks on the MSR. Nowadays whenever we look at it with any of our sophisticated systems, the maximum we find is less than 100... It takes him about 20,000 tons pr day to support the troops in Kuwait. We feel we have reduced them to about 2,000 tons per day.(321)
A US Army analysis of JSTARS employment noted several occasions in which the system was used:(322)
+ "On January 22, JSTARS located a division assembly area and a 60 vehicle convoy moving toward Kuwait. An air strike destroyed 58 tanks.
+ "On February 5, the system reported to the Marine forces fighting in the town of Kafji that there were no approaching enemy forces to back up the initial attack.
+ "On the first day of ground operations (February 24), JSTARS identified Iraqi elements moving into blocking positions while friendly forces of the Northern Area command were conducting obstacle breaching operations. The enemy force was interdicted by tactical air strikes.
+ "On February 26, JSTARS identified a heavy volume of vehicle traffic headed north from Kuwait City toward Basra. Air strikes interdicted a causeway in advance of the traffic to block its flow."
But another analysis raised the question of "what role, if any, the plane played in alerting the Marines to the initial Iraqi assault that appeared to be a surprise attack... However impressive its ability to direct air strikes, JSTARS was primarily deployed to help Army commanders locate targets for the Multiple Launch Rocket System. The Army has yet to release details on how well it performed in that role. Likewise, although it was helpful in finding Scuds, the Air Force has acknowledged in its own preliminary 'lessons learned' that it had problems detecting and targeting so-called 'relocatable targets like a mobile Scud launcher.'"(323)
For twenty-five years, the high-flying SR-71 remains the world's fastest air-breathing aircraft,(324) with a maximum speed of over Mach 3.2 (3900 Km/hr) at an altitude in excess of 26 kilometers. Of the 32 SR-71's originally produced, 20 are still in existence. Until recently, 9 were operational at any one time, but the system was deactivated in early 1990. The SR-71 carries a variety of cameras (some capable of a resolution of 75 cm at a range of 100 km), as well as passive electronic intelligence sensors and high-resolution radars, that can transmit data to ground terminals in real time. The SR-71 is capable of covering an area of over 250,000 square kilometers in a hour's flying time.(325)
A number of advantages were suggested for the SR-71, including greater timeliness and flexibility.(326) With it "you take multiple types of information, you sweep with different types of sensors so you correlate, in other words you do ELINT, you do radar, and so on... When you come with an SR-71, you take everything at the same time. You have synoptic coverage at once and you aren't predictable, plus if its bad weather here, you have an alternate reconnaissance target."(327) Air Force Strategic Air Command Director of Operations Maj. Gen. Howell Estes noted that "certainly we could have used" the SR-71, and the Desert Storm chief of operations had asked "how quickly we could get the SR-71 over there."(328) But Representative Dave McCurdy (D-OK), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, noted that "when I was in the Gulf, I even asked whether they (US Central Command, Air Forces) needed the SR-71... and whether they wanted it. They indicated at that point the (SR-71) was not (needed)."(329)
U-2R / TR-1
Almost three decades after the U-2's intelligence mission was compromised with the downing of Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union, the United States continues to rely on this aircraft for strategic intelligence collection.(330) Despite the advent of the high-performance SR-71, the U-2 offered advantages over the SR-71, in terms of dwell time and the ability to maintain continuous coverage of an area of particular interest.(331) Production of the more capable U-2R began in 1967, with a number of these aircraft currently based at the RAF Akrotiri facility in Cyprus, as part of the 3rd Detachment of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. These aircraft (totalling between 14 and 17 in number) provide high-resolution imagery as well as electronic intelligence that is unmatched by other collection assets.(332)
The TR-1 is an updated derivative of the U-2 intelligence aircraft, that is operated by the Strategic Air Command. A total of 12 TR-1's are flown by the 95th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 17th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at the RAF Alconbury facility in the United Kingdom.(333) With a maximum ceiling of 21 kilometers, the TR-1 platform is host to the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar (ASARS-2), which (334) will locate fixed Pact command posts, transportation choke points and surface-to-surface missile sites, using both low-resolution search patterns and high-resolution spot beams, with a range of about 50 kilometers beyond the FLOT.(335)
The TR-1 was also slated to carry the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS), a passive electronic intelligence sensor for locating emissions from the radars of fixed and mobile anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles. Real-time target acquisition by PLSS requires three TR-1's operating in concert. However, PLSS was cancelled, due to the fragility and complexity of the hardware.(336)
The TR-1 was operating in the Gulf region by late August,(337) and flights of the U-2 and TR-1 continued in the theater during early March, following the conclusion of hostilities.(338) The primary sensor on the TR-1 is the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar (ASARS-II) which provides both synthetic aperture imaging and moving target indicator capabilities. The MTI capability of the TR-1 is of marginal utility, with "a minimum detectable velocity twice that of JSTARS, and much worse electronic countermeasures capabilities in the MTI mode. Moreover, it has an inferior target location accuracy."(339) The imaging radar mode is limited to angles of obliquity of from four to five degrees, which at the TR-1's operational altitude of over 20 kilometers this gives a range of 225 kilometers. One account noted that in the hunt for Iraqi Scuds the "TR-1/U-2 aircraft are providing the bulk ofx real-time imagery. However, due to their vulnerability to enemy aircraft and SAMs they are being held at their stand-off imaging range of more than 100 miles... Their radar imaging ability is excellent, though not as good as the best electro-optical systems..."(340)
As a result, the TR-1 was not able to survey the entire area in western Iraq used by mobile Scud launchers. As a result, the Pentagon proposed requesting permission from Syria for operational overflight rights for the U-2R and TR-1, to permit these aircraft to monitor the northern end of the Scud deployment area.(341) "The Air Force has deployed a new ground station in Saudi Arabia to down link TR-1 data in support of Desert Storm. That station is a mobile version of the Tactical Reconnaissance Exploitation Demonstration Systems (TREDS)..."(342) "Information from U-2 flights reaches Washington a week late."(343)
Tactical Recce (RF-4C, etc)
The Air Force is also using Air National Guard RF-4C aircraft. This aircraft carries the AN/UPD-4 radar, which is being updated to the AN/UPD-8 standard. But this radar system provides short target coverage with low revisit rates (every 30 minutes), complicating moving target tracking. The need to correlate MTI radar data with other SIGINT sources can result in delays of up to two hours in target identification.(344) The RF-4C is also equipped with a suite of cameras to retrieve images for BDA analysis. These include the KA-56 which gives panoramic, horizon-to-horizon pictures, low or higher altitude cameras, and an IR line canner, for day and night operations. At an airbase in Saudi Arabia, "specialized group of US Air Force F-4G Wild Weasels continually land with film taken from nose mounted cameras. Less than 10 minutes after a Weasel touches down, its film is rushed into one of a cluster of van-size steel boxes, bolted together at the edge of a runway, that serve as a photo intelligence center."(345) In addition, Navy F-14 aircraft can carry the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod (TARPS) which has both a day and night capability.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Dugan concluded that "these types of systems received a boost from Operation Desert Storm because it was demonstrated that satellites can't perform all reconnaissance missions singlehandedly."(346) However, these are film-based systems, so the aircraft cannot data-link real-time images to a ground station."(347) "Electro-optical reconnaissance systems such as the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) are still in the laboratory because of funding cuts, leaving allied forces saddled with a time-consuming, Vietnam War-era, film-based system carried by Air National Guard RF-4Cs. When interviewed at 4 pm, for example (CENTCOM Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Charles) Horner sill was waiting for film of strikes against Iraqi Republican Guard positions he had needed at noon."(348)
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
Desert Storm also marked the extensive use of Unmanned Air Vehicles. The Navy used the Pioneer medium range UAV and the Sentinel UAV for fire control targeting, while the Army and Marine Corps used the small Pointer UAV.(349)
Five of the 4 kg Pointers were in service, two with the 1st UAV Platoon of the 82nd Airborne Division,(350) and 3 with the Marine Corps. In contrast to the generally successful Pioneer, the much smaller Pointer was less satisfactory. "UAV planners found the aircraft to be too small and slow."(351)
Five of the 180 kg Pioneers were in theater: one on each battleship and three with the Marines. The Pioneer, which has a range of over 150 kilometers for five hours, carries both daytime television and nighttime forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors. The FLIR can "detect when tanks have passed over the sand recently because they leave a residue of heat... The treads absorb heat from the engine and leave that in the sand, allowing operators to tell fresh tank tracks from old tank tracks."(352) The Pioneers are used to "search for troops and vehicle movements and relay the information to land-based artillery gunners or their counterparts aboard the Wisconsin and the other US battleship in the Gulf, the Missouri. For instance, last Friday morning, the Wisconsin fired 36 rounds directed by RPV to pin down and confuse Iraqi troops in Kuwait during a Marine attack."(353) And "during one of the first artillery duels between US Marines and Iraqi forces (in mid-January), Marines from the 3rd RPV Company used a Pioneer UAV to help spot Iraqi battery positions."(354)
Other Organic Systems
Destruction of Iraqi armor on the battlefield relied in large measure on target acquisition by aircraft crews. The F-111, which accounted for a significant fraction of the Iraqi armor destroyed, "spotted dug-in armor using FLIR forward looking infrared sensors, that could distinguish the heat given off by dug-in Iraqi tanks from cooler sand... we got a pretty good IR signature even if the tank was not running."(355)
Battlefield targeting of Iraqi tanks and artillery by the MLRS (Multiple Launcher Rocket System) rockets, firing fragmentation cluster bombs, was directed by battlefield radars, which tracked incoming Iraqi shells, and computed the locations of the Iraqi forces.(356)
Human intelligence was a significant source of information concerning the Iraqi command and control infrastructure. "German, French and American firms earned billions in recent years constructing a network of hardened sites... After considerable arm-twisting, US intelligence officials pried blueprints of most or all of the structures out of the companies, and they now say they have extraordinary precise targeting data on generators, thickness of concrete walls, and locations of critical ammo-storage areas."(357)
Navy SEAL Teams, as well as British Special Boat Section, entered Iraq starting in mid August to "fill the gaps in the Pentagon's vital intelligence needs."(358) American Special Forces teams "provided vital intelligence when cloud cover or bad weather prevented detailed aerial or satellite reconnaissance, or when Iraqi military assets were hidden. 'We might know from overhead (reconnaissance) that there are Iraqi military vehicles at a specific site but still need a look at the bumper numbers, or soldier's shoulder patches, or weaponry,' one official said."(359) This Strategic Intelligence and Target Acquisition (SITA) capability was originally developed for a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. "In the Mideast, stormy weather and Iraqi deception made it difficult to get a fix on Iraq's combat power. When Schwarzkopf's intelligence picture faltered, Army commandos and Marine Corps Reconnaissance teams became the eyes and ears of the Central Command."(360) "US Special Forces targeted crucial radar stations for allied jets using hand-held laser devices (clearing) a corridor into Iraqi airspace, enabling thousands of missions to be launched undetected."(361)
The contribution of another form of human intelligence -- interrogation of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) -- remains unclear. While some accounts assert that this provided some unique insights, in late February one senior US official noted that "as of today, I am not aware of our having any information achieved through interrogation."(362) While some EPWs are voluntary deserters, in other cases some "of this information is collected by targeting specific types of Iraqi soldiers who are most likely to have the kind of knowledge the allies need. US Rangers and members of Britain's crack Special Air Service have made forays deep into Iraqi territory with 'shopping lists' -- engineers or artillery officers, for example, who have special information about enemy plans and operations... (the allies) learned that Iraqi gunners were suffering from serious maintenance problems and had great difficulty getting spare parts, and that Iraqi helicopter pilots had randomly sown anti-personnel mines along the front the harass advancing troops... (fearing execution by Americans) the great majority (of deserters) have turned themselves in to Arab coalition forces... US officers feel hamstrung by rules laid down by their Saudi colleagues. The Saudis do not permit American intelligence teams to question Iraqis who were captured by Arab troops... The Saudis do their own interrogation of these 'guests' and pass along worthwhile information to the allies... the Americans complain that the Saudis fail to ask follow-up questions and are slow in providing transcripts of their interviews."(363)
H - Iraqi Capabilities
A number of observers commented on the limited intelligence collection capabilities of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. One Israeli official say of Saddam that "his intelligence from time to time is very poor."(364) On the other hand, as Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN) noted, "all he has to do is watch CNN."(365) This dependence on Western media reports facilitated "outright deception. The Pentagon orchestrated a stream of public announcements of units deployed in the gulf; the statements left out the fact that only elements of these units had actually been sent. Saddam had no satellites or spy planes to watch the buildup; he got much of his intelligence from CNN. So Schwarzkopf made sure television crews were out each day shooting the giant C-5 Galaxy transports that landed every few minutes in Dhahran."(366)
Iraq relied on three intelligence agencies to provide human and other intelligence during the Gulf War. The Mukhabarat, run by Saddam Hussein's half-brother Sabawi Ibraihim, is the Ba'ath Party intelligence service. The Estikhbarat military intelligence agency handles external intelligence collection. And the Amnal-Am is responsible for internal security. One analysis of this apparatus concluded that, compared to the Coalition, in the area of "human intelligence (Humint) -- Iraq may have an advantage; in all others it is heavily outclassed. The Humint gap is likely because of the Ba'ath Party's long-term hold on Iraq, making the planting of Western agents difficult and hazardous for many years. However, may allied Arab nations rely on large numbers of Islamic migrant workers, and it is likely that Iraq has long term agents among them."(367)
Another form of human intelligence is the Iraqi use of recognizance patrols to gather intelligence on opposing forces. These started on 30 January, when Iraqi forces mounted assaults at four points along the Kuwait border with Saudi Arabia, including a major assault on the Saudi town of Kahfji.(368) "Iraqi patrols of 20 or more troops want to know which allied positions are best fortified, where the Iraqis might send through an attack force with the least resistance. The job of the US soldiers is to stop such intelligence gathering by stopping the patrols."(369)
"Iraq's technical intelligence (Techint) capabilities are limited. Iraq has... no aircraft that can overfly coalition airspace with impunity: Mig-25R reconnaissance aircraft have been successfully engaged by F-15s. These aircraft are confined to long-range oblique photography (LOROP) and signals/communications intelligence (Elint/Comint) missions, using their high altitude capability to gather data up to 160 km beyond the border."(370) However, the Iraqi forces "have been unable or unwilling even to send reconnaissance airplanes into Saudi airspace. The only way Iraqi generals can find out how many troops, artillery and tanks are massing at which spots along the border is to send troops across to engage them."(371) Even so, "construction of the western bases (for XVII Corps) would not start until the air war did in January, when Iraqi intelligence gathering capabilities would be greatly reduced."(372)
Three commercial remote sensing satellite systems had imagery potentially of interest to the Iraqi military. The American LANDSAT system, managed by EOSAT, continued to sell imagery throughout the crisis, but the 30 meter resolution of this photos was too coarse to provide significant intelligence to Iraq. The 10 meter resolution imagery available from the SPOT satellites through SPOT Image was adequate to show the deployment of American forces in Saudi Arabia.(373) But SPOT Image restricted the sales of their imagery to customers with Western military security clearances, to avoid transfer of such pictures to Iraq. The Soviet Soyuz-Karta images provided 5 meter resolution, and photos taken of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq during August and September were offered on the open market,(374) although with restrictions intended to preclude transfer to Iraq.(375)
Spot Image provided Iraq's National Remote Sensing Center a total of 20 photos of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait beginning in 1988, with the most recent being delivered on 2 May 1990. Some of the pictures "were deemed sensitive by the company. These overlapping photographs of the targeted areas in the region, taken from two different perspectives, allowed the Iraqis to look at territory and installations to map a rout for an invasion and identify potential points of resistance from Kuwaiti defenses."(376)
It is difficult to assess the accuracy of reports that "Soviet advisers were assisting the Iraqis in targeting Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia."(377) Reports of other Soviet intelligence aid to Iraq, including information on the timing of overflights by American reconnaissance satellites, in order to "help Iraq hide the more than 100 mobile Scud launchers that have evaded US and allied air strikes" are equally impossible to verify.(378) However, as one observer noted, "it would appear that (the Soviets) did not give the Iraqis what would appear to be very good satellite coverage of the VII Corps' flanking maneuver, and our positions in the field."(379)
Another account noted that in the days prior to the ground campaign, "there was no way of blinding Soviet spy satellites overhead: they were sure to pick up the big move west. The question was whether Gorbachev would alert Saddam. Around the Pentagon a few spooky sorts are still convinced that Gorbachev did sound an alarm, but not in time for Saddam's military commanders to do anything about it. The White House and CIA don't believe it."(380)
Overall, Iraq appears not to have detected any of the three deceptive elements in the Coalition concept of operations for the ground campaign:(381)
1 - "A series of amphibious feints by Marine afloat in the Persian Gulf..."
2 - Shifting "Marine ground divisions in a leap-frogging dash from the gulf coast westward along Kuwait's souther border to its center."
3 - The "westward migration of two Army combat Corps under cover of the air war that had blinded Iraq's ability to conduct reconnaissance of allied forces."
The United States successfully deceived the Iraqi military about how far to the West of Kuwait the main axis of the American advance would lie.(382) When the American Third Armored Division confronted the Iraqi Republican Guard, the "American troops start off with a tremendous advantage: The Republican Guard, expecting an attack from the south, is caught totally by surprise. Its big guns, in fact, are pointed the wrong way."(383) These effort "duped the Iraqis into moving what reinforcements they had into a valley that runs along the boarder between Iraq and Kuwait -- far from the allied point of entry along the Saudi border with Iraq... When the American forces moved into Iraq, the expected resistance from an Iraqi division north of the boarder with Iraq never materialized. There was so little resistance that the American forces quickly revised their battle plan to move their main armored division north 10 hours earlier than planned."(384)
I - Net Assessment
It is probably too soon to form a complete understanding of the role of imaging satellites in the Gulf War, since as Jeff Richelson points out the public record leaves unclear how well the system worked "in terms of getting information to frontline commanders. We simply don't have the facts in terms of how well that whole process worked."(385) The Air Force, in its annual report to Congress in early 1991, claimed that "Field commanders in the Middle East and elsewhere are currently being provided with more real-time data than ever before."(386)
CIA Director William Webster claims that "intelligence was right on the spot, observing the military buildups with great accuracy, utilizing all of our national technical collection means as well as other sources of intelligence to reflect the nature of the buildup (and) follow the military patterns."(387) One analysis of the sources of the Coalition victory noted that "nowhere was the discrepancy between the powers of Iraq and the US-led alliance more graphically apparent than in the shear breadth and magnitude of the logistical support in Operation Desert Storm... Every day computers located in a tent at operational headquarters at Riyadh would spit out anywhere from 50,000 to 150,000 items of intelligence..."(388) Lt. Gen. Kelly concluded that "the intelligence that has been made available to me during the course of their entire campaign has been by far the best I've ever seen." He suggested that the sources of the Iraqi defeat were "first of all, a terrible failure on the part of Iraqi intelligence. They didn't have their eyes and ears out on the battlefield to see what was happening. Second, in my view, the air campaign was spectacularly successful."(389)
The imaging satellite capability "enables commanders to see the enemy positions ahead of them far better than the Iraqis can assess US and allied ground positions."(390) According to one American military official, "there is simply nowhere in the desert for an Iraqi vehicle to hide, much less a column of tanks. If the other guy moves, we'll know it."(391) Intelligence systems served as a significant force multiplier, freeing ground units from their traditional scouting intelligence collection role. One former Army general noted that "For the first time in the history of warfare, an army won't have to use maneuver units for surveillance. This time virtually all the units will be available to deliver a blow to the enemy."(392)
Intelligence was also an important force multiplier for logistical support. "The key role of timely intelligence in logistical preparation of the battlefield cannot be overstated. Fast breaking changes in either the weather of the enemy situation can send the logistician back to the drawing board just as fast as the operator."(393)
Representative Dave McCurdy (D-OK), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, noted that "if you're going to control the skies so quickly and if you have an adversary that is well equipped on the ground, but he doesn't have the ability to see over the horizon the way we do, that's the most remarkable advantage... I mean, here's a guy who's basically blind. So our intelligence was not only superior, it was dominant. Also, you're talking about a desert, you're not talking about a triple canopy jungle, and you're not talking about facing the Soviets or a similarly outfitted adversary that has good intelligence of their own. I think from an intelligence standpoint, its (Desert Storm) one-sided."(394)
In his briefing at the conclusion of Desert Storm operations, Gen. Schwarzkopf noted that "very early on we took out the Iraqi Air Force. We knew he had very limited reconnaissance means. Therefore, when we took out his air force, for all intents and purposes, we took out his ability to see what we were doing down here in Saudi Arabia. Once we had taken out his eyes, we did what could be best described as the 'Hail Mary Play' in football... When we knew that he couldn't see us any more, we did a massive movement of troops all the way to the west, to the extreme west, because at that time we knew that he was still fixed in this area with the vast majority of his forces..."(395)
One analysis of the impact of intelligence on the war observed that "US ground forces have found much of the Iraqi military force stumbling through the desert without the 'eyes' and 'ears' needed to mount a successful defense or counterattack, an apparent result of the lengthy US bombardment of Iraqi command and control facilities.... officials cited the Iraqi's comparative lack ignorance of the 'shape of the battlefield' as a key factor in the surprisingly swift US and allied advances in the initial days of ground combat. 'We have every reason to believe that Iraq remains befuddled by the coalition's strategies and tactics,' Saudi Col. Ahmed Rubayan told reporters in Riyadh yesterday... 'The battlefield is confused right now on the part of the Iraqis,' said Rear Adm. Mike McConnell, intelligence director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'They are having difficulty sensing from which direction they might be attacked."(396)
Another analysis of the Gulf War concluded that "the coalition's air force's ability to range at will over the battlefield was the decisive factor in Iraq's defeat... The coalition's total air superiority also denied Iraq aerial reconnaissance over Saudi Arabia, enabling the ground forces to shift units westward and drive undetected armored thrusts into souther Iraq as well as Kuwait... they drove north to the Euphrates River before the bewildered defenders knew what hit them."(397)
A third analysis concluded that "central to the campaign' success was the fact that the United States had intelligence satellites and the Iraqis did not. In effect, the Iraqi forces were blinded, a disadvantage the proved impossible to overcome."(398) Another analysis note that "Bereft of satellites or even aerial reconnaissance, Saddam's commanders could not see what was going on behind allied lines. Thus Schwarzkopf was able to hoodwink Baghdad into concentrating its forces in the wrong places until the very end... Most of Iraq's frontline troops hunkered down behind minefields and barbed wire along the 138 mile Saudi-Kuwaiti border, awaiting what Baghdad obviously expected to be the main allied thrust."(399)
Frank Kendall, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Tactical Warfare Programs, noted that "Battlefield surveillance wasn't commensurate with the capabilities of our munitions. We have to look at what to do about that. What you need is a continuous real-time information. That's true in the tactical reconnaissance area, and it's true in some other areas, particularly against ground targets. You want real-time targeting data to enable people to shoot immediately at targets that may not be there in an hour or half an hour or a few minutes."(400)
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2. See also Deep Black, William Burrows, pp.227, 302-305; The U.S. Intelligence Community, Jeffrey Richelson, pp.114,115
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77. Perry, Mark, "The Secret Plot to Out Saddam Hussein," Regardie's, November 1990, page 43-56.
78. Oberdorfer, Don, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," The Washington Post Magazine, 17 March 1991, page 19-41.
79. Meddis, Sam, "Iraq Duped Everyone, Except CIA," USA Today, 12 September 1990, page 1, 2.
80. Oberdorfer, Don, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," The Washington Post Magazine, 17 March 1991, page 19-41.
81. Perry, Mark, "The Secret Plot to Out Saddam Hussein," Regardie's, November 1990, page 43-56.
82. Jehl, Douglas, "Iraq Standoff Exposes Gap in US Intelligence Force," Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1990, page A1, A15.
83. Perry, Mark, "The Secret Plot to Out Saddam Hussein," Regardie's, November 1990, page 43-56.
84. Mathews, Tom, et al, "The Road to War," Newsweek, 28 January 1991, page 57.
85. Scarborough, Rowan, "CIA, Defense Saw Different Aims in Buildup," The Washington Times, 3 August 1990, page A11.
86. Cowell, Alan, "UN Foresaw Kuwait Strike; Warnings Were Not Heeded," The New York Times, 6 October 1990. Although this story explicitly mentions US satellite intelligence, it is unclear whether the reporter's source of this particular piece of information was derived from overhead sources, or ground observers.
87. Perry, Mark, "The Secret Plot to Out Saddam Hussein," Regardie's, November 1990, page 43-56.
88. Gertz, Bill, "US Breathes Easier as it Spots Iraq's Jamming Gear," The Washington Times, 9 October 1990, page A8.
89. Fialka, John, "Kuwaitis Wait in Saudi Arabia Housing Project Recalling Iraqi Horrors and a Broken Resistance," The Wall Street Journal, 5 November 1990, page B5B
90. Viorst, Milton, "A Reporter at Large: The House of Hashem," The New Yorker, 7 January 1991, page 44.
91. Perry, Mark, "The Secret Plot to Out Saddam Hussein," Regardie's, November 1990, page 43-56.
92. Offley, Ed, "Vital Space Assets," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 23 August 1990, page 1.
93. "Talking With David Frost: An Interview With President and Mrs. Bush," Broadcast 2 January 1991, page 3.
94. Tyler, Patrick, "Iraqis Setting Up Strong Defensive Line," The Washington Post, 10 August 1990, page 1.
95. Schweizer, Peter, "Is Moscow Playing Cute on Kuwait," The New York Times, 22 August 1990.
96. "Iraqis Apparently Loading Gas Munitions on Aircraft," The Washington Post, 8 August 1990, page 15. The story says that "officials declined to specify the evidence for their conclusion" but satellite photos seem the most likely source.
97. Gordon, Michael, "Iraqis Are Said to Prepare Chemical Decontamination," The New York Times, 25 September 1990.
98. Gertz, Bill, "Saddam Close to Nuclear Weapon," The Washington Times, 28 November 1990, page 1, A6.
99. "Dugan Orders Review of Limited SR-71 Revival," Defense Daily, 20 August 1990, page 276.
100. Mallet, Victor, "Kuwait Diary," National Review, 17 September 1990, page 23-24.
101. Tyler, Patrick, "American Blockade Criticized at UN," The Washington Post, 14 August 1990, page 1.
102. "US Faces Iraqi Force Growing to 170,000," Aerospace Daily, 13 August 1990, page 243.
103. Moore, Molly, "Crisis Pits High-Tech Against Battle-Tough," The Washington Post, 24 September 1990, page A17, A24.
104. Sciolino, Elaine, "How US Got UN Backing For Use of Force in the Gulf," The New York Times, 30 August 1990, page 1.
105. Jehl, Douglas, "Iraq Standoff Exposes Gap in US Intelligence Force," Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1990, page A1, A15.
106. Ramo, Joshua, "Iraqi Supply Problems Reported," The Boston Globe, 22 August 1990.
107. Associated Press, "Iraq Repositioning Troops," Current News, 24 August 1990, page 16.
108. Gertz, Bill, "Elite Iraqi Forces Retreat to Border Opposite Kuwait," The Washington Times, 29 August 1990, page 8.
109. Katz, Lee, "First Strike? Experts at Odds," USA Today, 22 August 1990, page 4A.
110. Boustany, Nora, "Iraqi Chief Visits British Hostages," The Washington Post, 24 August 1990, page A1, A30.
111. Schmitt, Eric, "Planning at the Helm for Troops in the Sand," The New York Times, 23 August 1990.
112. Coll, Steve, "Allied Naval Network Polices Sea Traffic," The Washington Post, 4 September 1990, page A1, A24.
113. Kifner, John, "Iraqis Said to Be Preparing Defenses," The New York Times, 9 September 1990.
114. Gertz, Bill, "Iraqis Deploying Special Missile Launching System," The Washington Times, 13 September 1990.
115. "Israel Lists Emergency Needs," Flight International, 5 September 1990, page 47.
116. Tyler, Patrick, "US Expands Arms Deal With Saudis," The Washington Post, 15 September 1990, page A20.
117. Smith, Jeffrey, "US Considers Sending More Forces to Gulf," The Washington Post, 25 October 1990, page A1, A32.
118. Schmitt, Eric, "Pentagon Reports Buildup in Kuwait and Southern Iraq," The New York Times, 19 September 1990, page A1, A11.
119. Campbell, Duncan, "Gulf Crisis - Under US Eyes," The Independent on Sunday, 30 September 1990, based on reports published in the newsletter For Yours Eyes Only.
120. "Iraqi Air Force Disperses Aircraft to Sites Near Saudi Border, Doubles Night Missions," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 September 1990, page 20.
121. Scarborough, Rowan, "US Troops Would Be Warned 6 to 9 hours Before Attack By Iraq," The Washington Times, 20 September 1990, page 8.
122. Gertz, Bill, "Toxic Attack Sensed in Gulf," The Washington Times, 24 September 1990, page A8.
123. Gordon, Michael, "Iraqis Are Said to Prepare Chemical Decontamination," The New York Times, 25 September 1990.
124. Lardner, George, "US Intelligence Reports Signs Iran Is Getting Food To Iraq," The Washington Post, 25 September 1990, page A18.
125. Gertz, Bill, "US Breathes Easier as it Spots Iraq's Jamming Gear," The Washington Times, 9 October 1990, page A8.
126. Gertz, Bill, "Explosion at Ammo Facility Not Likely to Slow Iraq." The Washington Times, 7 November 1990, page A8.
127. Greve, Frank, "Report: Iraq dismantling refineries," Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 October 1990, page 4.
128. Tyler, Patrick, "US Strength in Gulf May Rise by 100,000," The Washington Post, 26 October 1990, page A1, A32.
129. Gertz, Bill, "Oil Fire in Gulf is Iraqi Tactic," The Washington Times, 1 November 1990, page A12.
130. Diehl, Jackson, "Israel Fears Confusion in Gulf War," The Washington Post, 8 November 1990, page A55, A62.
131. Greenberger, Robert, "Israel is Angry It's Not Privy to Battle Plans," The Wall Street Journal, 6 November 1990, page A19.
132. Fialka, John "If Mideast War Erupts, Air Power Will Hold Key to US Casualties," The Wall Street Journal, 15 November 1990, page 1, A13.
133. Gertz, Bill, "US to Put On Military Show for Saddam," The Washington Times, 13 November 1990, page A1, A11.
134. Gertz, Bill, "US to Put On Military Show for Saddam," The Washington Times, 13 November 1990, page A1, A11.
135. Gertz, Bill, "Libya Mobilizing Forces, Taking Out Stored Arms," The Washington Times, 29 November 1990, page A3.
136. Boustany, Nora, "Iraq Frees 15 Captives, Sends 67 to New Sites," The Washington Post, 28 November 1990, page A32.
137. Horwitz, Tony, "Wily Smugglers Keep Embargoed Supplies Flowing into Iraq," The Wall Street Journal, 5 December 1990, page 1.
138. Scarborough, Rowan, "Iraq Builds its Defenses, Makes More Poison Gas," The Washington Times, 3 December 1990, page A4.
139. Evans, Rowland, and Novak, Robert, "...Flaming Oil and US Tanks," The Washington Post, 30 November 1990, page A24.
140. Gertz, Bill, "US Detects Iraqi Missiles at Last Minute," The Washington Times, 10 December 1990, page A8.
141. Gertz, Bill, "Iraq Again Targets Kurdish Rebels in North," The Washington Times, 14 December 1990.
142. Hedges, Michael, "Iraq no Match for US in Sky," The Washington Times, 3 January 1991, page A1, A9.
143. Baker, Caleb, "Iraqi Fortifications Will Test Allies," Defense News, 14 January 1991, page 1, 9.
144. Baker, Caleb, "Iraqi Fortifications Will Test Allies," Defense News, 14 January 1991, page 1, 9.
145. Gertz, Bill, "Iraqi Defector Says Baghdad May Hit First," The Washington Times, 7 January 1991, page A1, A9.
146. Hoffman, David, "Bush's Letter Left on Conference Table 6 1/2 Hours," The Washington Post, 11 January 1991, page A14.
147. Friedman, Thomas, "Subtle Crack as Baker Firms Alliance," The New York Times, 8 January 1991, page A10.
148. Fuller, Graham, "Iran, the Landing Strip," The Washington Post, 3 February 1991, page C2.
149. "Satellite Intelligence," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 February 1991, page 13.
150. Smith, Jeffrey, "Picking Right Weapon for a Target Is Complex Decision," The Washington Post, 6 February 1991, page A19, A22.
151. Nordwall, Bruce, "US Relies on Combination of Aircraft, Satellites, UAVs for Damage Assessment," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 24-25.
152. "Iraqi Missile Movements Shrouded by Darkness," Flight International, 30 January 1991, page 7.
153. CENTCOM Briefing, 27 January 1991, page 2.
154. Gertz, Bill, "Soviets Aiding Iraqis," The Washington Times, 25 January 1991, page A1, A8.
155. DoD News Briefing, 31 January 1991, page 2.
156. Mossberg, Walter, "US Aides Await Bomb Damage Report In Considering Early Ground Offensive," The Wall Street Journal, 4 February 1991, page A12.
157. Gertz, Bill, "Battlehip's Target is Chemical Brigade," The Washington Times, 7 February 1991, page B5.
158. Gertz, Bill, "Terrorist Camps Deserted in Iraq," The Washington Times, 4 February 1991, page A9.
159. Atkinson, Rick, and Balz, Dan, "Bomb Strike Kills Scores of Civilians in Building Called Military Bunker by US, Shelter by Iraq," The Washington Post, 14 February 1991, page 1.
160. Rosenthal, Andrew, "Bush's Quandary," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1.
161. Stanley, Alessandra, "Iraq Says US Killed Hundreds of Civilians At Shelter, But Allies Call it Military Post," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1, A16. Defense Department personnel responsible for distribution of photographs were not familiar with this incident.
162. Moore, Molly, "Arab Forces, Marines Take Kuwait City," The Washington Post, 28 February 1991, page A1, A30.
163. Gordon, Michael, "The Seven Day Strategy," The New York Times, 23 february 1991, page 1, 7.
164. CENTCOM News Briefing, 2 March 1991, page 2.
165. Whitaker, Mark, et al, "Avoiding the Next Crisis," Newsweek, 11 March 1991, page 58-62.
166. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
167. Gertz, Bill, "Saddam Aircraft Poised to Flee," The Washington Times, 26 February 1991, page B1.
168. Murphy, Caryle, "Iraqi Troops Said to Quash Rebellion," The Washington Post, 7 March 1991, page A1, A34.
169. CENTCOM News Briefing, 2 March 1991, page 2.
170. "Reconnaissance Photos Show Violence in Six Iraqi Cities," Aerospace Daily, 5 March 1991, page 378.
171. Baker, Caleb, "Army Wants Own Satellite for Long-Range Targeting," Defense News, 17 December 1990, page 1, 36.
172. Holzer, Robert, "Long Buildup Allowed US to Fill Gaps in Intelligence," Defense News, 18 March 1991, page 5.
173. Woodward, Bob, "Command is Paring Pilot Reports of Damage to Iraqi Armor," The Washington Post, 24 February 1991, page A25.
174. Kaplan, Fred, "Stalemate in the Air: Iraqi Clouds foil US Satellites," The Boston Globe, 23 January 1991, page 1.
175. Nordwall, Bruce, "US Relies on Combination of Aircraft, Satellites, uavs for Damage Assessment," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 24-25.
176. Moore, Molly, "Cloud and Fog Over Gulf Region Knock Allied Raids Off Stride," The Washington Post, 22 January 1991, page 1.
177. CENTCOM Briefing, 21 January 1991, page 4.
178. CENTCOM Briefing, 23 January 1991, page 2.
179. CENTCOM Briefing, 19 January 1991.
180. Shenon, Philip, "Iraq Sets Oil Refineries Afire, As Allies Step Up Air Attacks," The New York Times, 23 January 1991, page A1, A6.
181. Pool Reports, "Schwarzkopf Visits Marines for Talks," The Washington Times, 14 February 1991, page 9.
182. "Heavy Bombing Continues," picture caption, The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page A20.
183. Gosseling, Peter, "US Alleges Scorched Earth in Kuwait," The Boston Globe, 23 February 1991.
184. DoD News Briefing, 22 February 1991, page 3.
185. Lenorovitz, Jeffrey, "Allies Fly Defensive Missions After Air War Smashed Iraq," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, page 18-24.
186. Weiner, Tim, "Iraq Uses Techniques in Spying Against Its Former Tutor, the U.S.," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 January 1991, page 1-A, 10-A.
187. Weiner, Tim, "Iraq Uses Techniques in Spying Against Its Former Tutor, the U.S.," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 January 1991, page 1-A, 10-A.
188. Broad, William, "How the Iraqi Military Communicates," The New York Times, 15 February 1991, page A13.
189. Leroux, Charles, "Iraq Known for Its Use of Decoys," Chicago Tribune, 15 February 1991, page 1.
190. Toth, Robert, "Proxy War: US Facing Soviet Tactics, Weapons," The Los Angeles Times, 20 February 1991, page A5.
191. Richter, Paul, "Foe Skilled at Trickery, Decoys Show," Los Angeles Times, 24 January 1991, page A1, A18.
192. Moore, Molly, "Bombing Damage Hard to Assess," The Washington Post, 7 February 1991, page A21.
193. "Photo Shows Fake Damage, Pentagon Says," The Los Angeles Times, 20 February 1991.
194. DoD News Briefing, 19 February 1991, page 2.
195. Bedard, Paul, "Mosque Exposes Iraqi Con Game," The Washington Times, 20 February 1991.
196. Balz, David, et al, "Soviet Close Ranks with US Against Iraq's Conditions for Pullout," The Washington Post, 17 February 1991, page A1, A30.
197. Oberdorfer, Don, "Missed Signals in the Middle East," The Washington Post Magazine, 17 March 1991, page 19-41.
198. Siegel, Mark, "Saddam Hussein's Other Republican Guard," The Wall Street Journal, 21 March 1991, page A19.
199. Meddis, Sam, "Iraq Duped Everyone, Except CIA," USA Today, 12 September 1990, page 1, 2.
200. Smith, Jeffrey, "Congress to Investigate US Intelligence on Iraq," The Washington Post, 18 March 1991, page A16.
201. Whitaker, Mark, et al, "Avoiding the Next Crisis," Newsweek, 11 March 1991, page 58-62.
202. "Intention Intel," Aerospace Daily, 17 September 1990, page 442.
203. Cushman, John, "The Formidable Republican Guard Blocks the Road to Victory," The New York Times, 26 January 1991, page A7.
204. Woodward, Bob, "Key Iraqi Assets Said to Survive 10-Day Air War," The Washington Post, 28 January 1991, page A1, A15.
205. Aspin, Les, "Assessing the War in the Gulf: Looking for the Answers in the Right Places," Speech to the Reserve Officers Association, 23 January 1991.
206. DoD News Briefing, 29 January 1991, page 16.
207. Capaccio, Tony, "Single Air Maestro Was The Key To Bombing Orchestra Over Iraq," Defense Week, 11 February 1991, page 6-7.
208. "The Battle Damage Assessment Challenge," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 9.
209. Fialka, John, "Army Officers, Lacking Air-Strike Data, Urge Delay in Ground Assault on Iraqis," The Wall Street Journal, 28 January 1991, page A2.
210. Dewar, Michael, "Deception as a Strategy," The New York Times, 15 February 1991, page A35.
211. Balz, Dan, Et al, "US Raises Estimate of Iraqi Armor Destroyed," The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, page A1, A30.
212. Schmitt, Eric, "High-Tech Night Raids Cost Iraq Many Tanks," The New York Times, 18 February 1991, page A6.
213. DoD News Briefing, 15 February 1991, page 9-10.
214. DoD News Briefing, 16 February 1991, page 3.
215. Gordon, Michael, "US Officials Link Iraqi Offer to Mounting Losses in Field," The New York Times, 16 February 1991, page A1, A8.
216. Woodward, Bob, "Command is Paring Pilot Reports of Damage to Iraqi Armor," The Washington Post, 24 February 1991, page A25.
217. Elmer-DeWitt, Elmer, "How Badly Crippled Is Saddam?" Time, 4 March 1991, page 32-33.
218. DoD News Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 5.
219. DoD News Briefing, 23 January 1991, page 7.
220. Cody, Edward, "Questions Remain About Khafji Battle," The Washington Post, 2 February 1991, page A15.
221. Schmitt, Eric, and Gordon, Michael, "Unforeseen Problems in Air War Forced Allies to Improvise Tactics," The New York Times, 10 March 1991, page 1, 16.
222. Gordon, Michael, "Iraqi Republican Guard Units Are Described as Substantially Intact," The New York Times, 6 February 1991, page A1, A8.
223. Church, George, "Combat in the Sand," Time, 11 February 1991, page 21-27.
224. Seib, Gerald, "Pentagon Raises Its Estimate on Iraqi Forces," The Wall Street Journal, 19 September 1991, page A3.
225. Moore, Molly, "Pourous Minefields, Dispirited Troops and a Dog Named POW," The Washington Post, 17 March 1991, page A1, A22.
226. Smith, Jeffrey, "Congress to Investigate US Intelligence on Iraq," The Washington Post, 18 March 1991, page A16.
227. Murphy, Kim, "Iraq Army Units Under Strength, POWs Report," The Los Angeles Times, 7 February 1991, page A1, A14.
228. Hedges, Chris, "Some Iraqi Units Seem To Quit Kuwaiti Front," The New York Times, 17 February 1991, page 19.
229. Baker, Caleb, "Iraqi Fortifications Will Test Allies," Defense News, 14 January 1991, page 1, 9.
230. Heller, Jean, "Public Doesn't Get Picture with Gulf Satellite Photos," In These Times, 27 February 1991, page 7, reprint from St. Petersburg Times, 6 January 1991.
231. Fullerton, John, "British Ruse Held Iraqis' Attention While Real Invasion Came Elsewhere," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 March 1991, page A-8.
232. Moore, Molly, "Pourous Minefields, Dispirited Troops and a Dog Named POW," The Washington Post, 17 March 1991, page A1, A22.
233. Tamayo, Juan, "Along with Debris, War Leaves Questions About Overestimation of Iraqi Might," Baltimore Sun, 12 March 1991, page 4.
234. Moore, Molly, "Pourous Minefields, Dispirited Troops and a Dog Named POW," The Washington Post, 17 March 1991, page A1, A22.
235. Diehl, Jackson, "Israel Wants Stiff Weapons Ban for Iraq," The Washington Post, 1 March 1991, page A30.
236. Gertz, Bill, "US Detects iraqi Missiles at Last Minute," Washington Times, 10 December 1990, page 8.
237. Diehl, Jackson, "Israel Shuns First Strike Against Iraq," The Washington Post, 27 December 1990, page A1, A20.
238. Toth, Robert, "Iraqi Missile Test Had US Thinking War Had Started," The Los Angeles Times, 21 December 1990, page A1, A11.
239. DoD News Briefing, 15 March 1991, page 5.
240. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
241. DOD News Briefing, 28 February 1991, page 7.
242. DOD News Briefing, 1 March 1991, page 3.
243. "Excerpts From Comments by US General in the Gulf, On 'Meet the Press,'" The New York Times, 21 January 1991, page A7.
244. Bowman, Lee, "Iraqi Scuds Pose More Distraction Than Destruction," The Washington Times, 23 January 1991, page B3.
245. Gertz, Bill, "Iraqis Deploying Special Missile Launching System," The Washington Times, 13 September 1991.
246. Royce, Knut, "Air Attacks Short of Goal," Newsday, 24 January 1991, page 5.
247. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
248. Gordon, Michael, "Iraq's Military Reported Hurt, But Not Halted in 5 Days Raids," The New York Times, 22 January 1991, page A1, A9.
249. Balz, Dan, et al, "Superpowers Tell Iraq How to Halt War," The Washington Post, 30 January 1991, page A1, A24.
250. DoD News Briefing, 12 February 1991, page 3.
251. CENTCOM Briefing, 27 January 1991, page 2.
252. CENTCOM News Briefing, 27 February 1991, page 16.
253. "Intelligence Flights Essential to Victory," The Washington Times, 19 January 1991, page A7.
254. Tyler, Patrick, "US Prepared for High Poison-Gas Toll," The New York Times, 22 February 1991, page A10.
255. "Iraq fired Scud with concrete warhead," Flight International, 13 March 1991, page 13.
256. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
257. Smith, Jeffrey, "Compactness, Simplicity, Mobility of Scuds Complicate US Search," The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, page A31.
258. Kennedy, Michael, "New Strategy May Bring End to Scud Threat," Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1991, page A1, A14.
259. Lenorovitz, Jeffrey, "Poor Workmanship Discovered in Scud Missile Fragments," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, page 61.
260. "Joint STARS, AWACS Teamed to Hunt Scud Launchers, Rice Says," Aerospace Daily, 1 March 1991, page 363.
261. Capaccio, Tony, "Pentagon's Tops Tester Gives Green Light to Targeting Pod," Defense Week, 11 March 1991, page 15.
262. Baker, Caleb, "Gulf War Takes Toll on Pioneer UAVs," Defence News, 18 March 1991, page 20, 30.
263. DoD News Briefing, 15 March 1991, page 5.
264. Gertz, Bill, "US Commandos Steal into Iraq to Spot Mobile Missiles," The Washington Times, 25 January 1991, page B1.
265. Gordon, Michael, "Desert Missions By Commandos Aided in Victory," The New York Times, 1 March 1991, page A1, A12.
266. Smith, Jeffrey, "US Special Forces Carried Out Sabotage, Rescues Deep in Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 March 1991, page A15, A16.
267. Meddis, Sam, "Saddam's Not Targeted, But He Is Fair Game," USA Today, 17 January 1991 page 2A.
268. "US Could Back Military Coup in Iraq that Results in Death of Saddam Hussein," Inside the Pentagon, 13 September 1990, page 1, 12.
269. Atkinson, Rick, "US to Rely on Air Strikes if War Erupts," The Washington Post, 16 September 1990, page A1, A36.
270. CENTCOM Briefing, 18 January 1991.
271. Morrocco, John, "Allied Attack Iraqi Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 January 1991, page 22.
272. Ullmann, Owen, "Pentagon Reportedly Hopes That Bombings Kill Hussein," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 January 1991, page 12-A.
273. Mathews, Tom, et al, "The Road to War," Newsweek, 28 January 1991, page 62.
274. "The Right Stuff," US News & World Report, 4 February 1991, page 24-30.
275. Gellman, Barton, "Air Strike Against Saddam Foiled by Storm," The Washington Post, 25 January 1991, page A1.
276. Apple, R.W., "US Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil Into Gulf," The New York Times, 26 January 1991, page 1, 4.
277. Gellman, Barton, "US Bombs Missed 70% Of Time," The Washington Post, 16 March 1991, page A1, A18.
278. DoD News Briefing, 15 March 1991, page 5.
279. Campbell, Charles, "US: Milk Factory hid Weapons," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 January 1991, page 15-A.
280. CENTCOM Briefing, 27 January 1991, page 11.
281. Kamen, Al, "Iraqi Factory's Product: Germ Warfare or Milk?" The Washington Post, 8 February 1991, page A1, A30.
282. "Peter Arnett From Baghdad," interview, Newsweek, 11 February 1991, page 36-38.
283. CENTCOM Briefing, 13 February 1991, page 2.
284. DoD News Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 12.
285. DoD News Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 4.
286. "Kelly: We Knew This to Be a Military Facility," The Washington Post, 14 February 1991, page A30-31.
287. DoD News Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 9.
288. Apple, R.W., "Allies Deny Error and Cite Reports," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1
289. Gordon, Michael, "US Calls Target a Command Center," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 17.
290. Atkinson, Rick, and Balz, Dan, "Bomb Strike Kills Scores of Civilians in Building Called Military Bunker by US, Shelter by Iraq," The Washington Post, 14 February 1991, page 1.
291. "Kelly: We Knew This to Be a Military Facility," The Washington Post, 14 February 1991, page A30-31.
292. Richelson, Jeffrey, "US Reconnaissance Satellites Aren't All-Seeing, so Don't Expect Miracles," Los Angeles Times, 17 February 1991, page M4.
293. Seib, Gerald, "Heavy Civilian Casualty Toll of Raid on Iraq Has US Scrambling to Keep Alliance United," The Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1991, page A16.
294. DoD News Briefing, 15 February 1991, page 9.
295. Gellman, Barton, "Iraqi Says 288 Bodies Removed From Bombed Structure," The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, page A29, A32.
296. Broad, William, "How the Iraqi Military Communicates," The New York Times, 15 February 1991, page A13.
297. Gellman, Barton, "Iraqi Says 288 Bodies Removed From Bombed Structure," The Washington Post, 15 February 1991, page A29, A32.
298. Fisk, Robert, "Air Officers in Dispute over Baghdad Raids," The Independent, 15 February 1991, page 1.
299. Stanley, Alessandra, "Iraq Says US Killed Hundreds of Civilians At Shelter, But Allies Call it Military Post," The New York Times, 14 February 1991, page 1, A16.
300. "Washington Wire," The Wall Street Journal, 15 February 1991, page 1.
301. DoD News Briefing, 14 February 1991, page 17.
302. Christy, Sarah, "Curtain of Cannon Fire Faces Allied Troops in Gulf," Defense Week, 14 January 1991, page 1, 15.
303. Morrocco, John, "Gulf War Boosts Prospects For High-Technology Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 March 1991, page 45-46
304. Henderson, Bruce, "Desert Storm Success Pushes Military To Build Advanced High-Tech Systems," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 March 1991, page 169-173.
305. George Leopold, "Service Asks for Planes to Expand JSTARS Role," Defense News, 28 March 1988, pp 1, 12.
306. Peter Grier "High-tech Flying Sentries May Soon Keep Watch Over Battles," Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1986, page 7.
307. Stephen Broadbent "Joint-STARS: Force Multiplier for Europe," Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 April 1987, pp 729-732.
308. George Leopold "STARS Poses Challenge of Producing Software for Complex System," Defense News, 6 April 1987, page 3.
309. Karen Walker, "Joint STARS: A Soldier's Spy," Flight International, 22 November 1986, pp 37-39.
310. "Two Joint-STARS Aircraft to Support Allied Operations in Persian Gulf Region," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 January 1991, page 24.
311. "Joint STARS Success Doesn't Point to Early Use of Other R&D Systems," Aerospace Daily, 11 February 1991, page 248-249.
312. "JSTARS has Flown 44 Missions in 41 Days," Defense Daily, 25 February 1991, page 286.
313. "Joint STARS Data Link Performance Improvements May Not Be Needed," Aerospace Daily, 21 March 1991, page 476-477.
314. "JSTARS Provides Target Data for ATACMS in Saudi Arabia," Aerospace Daily, 12 February 1991, page 251.
315. Grin, John, "Security in an Era of Change -- The Need for Qualitative Conversion," Military Technology, 1991, #2, page 53-61.
316. Kolcum, Edward, "Joint-STARS E-8s Return to US; 20-Aircraft Fleet Believed Assured," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, page 20.
317. Kolcum, Edward, "Joint-STARS E-8s Return to US; 20-Aircraft Fleet Believed Assured," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, page 20.
318. Capaccio, Tony, "JSTARS Has Expanded Role in Gulf War," Defense Week, 11 February 1991, page 2.
319. "Joint STARS Praise," Aerospace Daily, 4 February 1991, page 185.
320. Kaplan, Fred, "Stalemate in the Air: Iraqi Clouds foil US Satellites," The Boston Globe, 23 January 1991, page 1.
321. CENTCOM Briefing, 30 January 1991, page 1-3.
322. US Army, "Army Weapons Systems Performance in Southwest Asia," mimeo, 13 March 1991.
323. Capaccio, Tony, "Air Force's Eyes in the Sky Alerted Marines At Kafji, Targeted Convoys," Defense Week, 18 March 1991, page 7.
324. Paul Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, (Osprey Publishing, London, 1986).
325. Martin Streetly, "US Airborne ELINT Systems, Part IV: the Lockheed SR-71," Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 April 1985, pp 634-635
326. "US Struggles to Distribute Satellite Data in Gulf," Defense Daily, 30 November 1990, page 339.
327. "Single Platform Synoptic Coverage of Gulf Lacking," Defense Daily, 4 December 1990, page 355-356.
328. "SR-71 Would Have Been Useful in Operation Desert Storm," Inside the Pentagon, 7 March 1991, page 6.
329. "Military Said There Was No Need for SR-71 Aircraft in Persian Gulf," Inside the Pentagon, 28 February 1991, page 8.
330. Dick van der Aart Aerial Espionage, (Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1985), pp 40-44.
331. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986, part 2, page 377.
332. Martin Streetly, "U.S. Airborne ELINT Systems, Part 2: the US Air Force," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 February 1985, pp 273-276.
333. "TR-1's Provide High Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 5 August 1985, pp 59, 62.
334. U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, part 4, pp 2079-2082.
335. "TR-1 Reconnaissance Aircraft," C3I Handbook 1986, (EW Communications, Palo Alto, 1986), page 111.
336. James Rawles, "U.S. Military Upgrades Its Battlefield Eyes and Ears," Defense Electronics, February 1988, pp 56-70.
337. "TR-1 Aircraft in Gulf Area," Defense Daily, 27 August 1990, page 316.
338. "Air Force Continues U-2, TR-1 Missions Over Gulf," Aerospace Daily, 4 March 1991, page 370A.
339. Grin, John, "Security in an Era of Change -- The Need for Qualitative Conversion," Military Technology, 1991, #2, page 53-61.
340. "Elusive Scuds Hightlight Hardware Requirement," Defense Daily, 25 January 1991, page 121-123.
341. Tyler, Patrick, "Pentagon Eyes Syrian Airspace but Bush is Wary," The New York Times, 8 February 1991.
342. Nordwall, Bruce, "US Relies on Combination of Aircraft, Satellites, uavs for Damage Assessment," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 24-25.
343. Woodward, Bob, "Command is Paring Pilot Reports of Damage to Iraqi Armor," The Washington Post, 24 February 1991, page A25.
344. Grin, John, "Security in an Era of Change -- The Need for Qualitative Conversion," Military Technology, 1991, #2, page 53-61.
345. Church, George, "Combat in the Sand," Time, 11 February 1991, page 21-27. This account may have confused the RF-4C with the F-4G.
346. "F-117, Joint STARS Are Winners in Gen. Dugan's Desert Shield Scorecard," Inside The Pentagon, 7 March 1991, page 6-7.
347. Nordwall, Bruce, "US Relies on Combination of Aircraft, Satellites, uavs for Damage Assessment," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 24-25.
348. Fulghum, David, "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical Intelligence," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 February 1991, page 18-19.
349. Baker, Caleb, "Desert to Double as Test Range," Defense News, 3 September 1990, page 1.
350. Canan, James, "Steady Course for Unmanned Aircraft," Air Force Magazine, March 1991, page 84-88, suggests that the number of Pointers with the 82nd Airborne was six.
351. Baker, Caleb, "Gulf War Takes Toll on Pioneer UAVs," Defence News, 18 March 1991, page 20, 30.
352. "Limited Number of UAVs Would be of Concern in Ground War," Aerospace Daily, 13 February 1991, page 264.
353. Frantz, Douglas, "Big Guns Find Targets Thanks to Little Drones," Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1991, page A1, A7.
354. "UAV Support of Desert Storm Troops Said Good," Defense Daily, 31 January 1991, page 155.
355. Capaccio, Tony, "Air Force Used Vintage Aardvarks to Plink Iraqi Tanks," Defense Week, 4 March 1991, page 1, 11.
356. Fialka, John, "The Climactic Battle: Iraqis Are Stunned By Ferocious Assault," The Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1991, page 1, A4.
357. "The Right Stuff," US News & World Report, 4 February 1991, page 24-30.
358. Adams, James, "SEAL Teams try to Fill the Intelligence Gap," London Sunday Times, 19 August 1990, page 12.
359. Smith, Jeffrey, "US Special Forces Carried Out Sabotage, Rescues Deep in Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 March 1991, page A15, A16.
360. Healy, Mellissa, "Special Forces: US Eyes Deep in Enemy Territory," The Los Angeles Times, 28 February 1991, page 1.
361. "11 Said Missing in Covert Actions," The Washington Times, 11 March 1991, page A8.
362. Gosselin, Peter, "US Unhappy with Access to POWs," The Boston Globe, 17 February 1991, page 1.
363. Birnbaum, Jesse, "The Fruits of Interrogation," Time, 4 March 1991, page 37.
364. Lynch, David, "Gulf Crisis Sparks Challenges For Israel," Defense Week, 17 September 1990, page 1, 14.
365. Benson, Miles, "US Spells Out Military Movements in an Effort to Psych Out Saddam," Newark Star-Ledger, 5 September 1990, page 11.
366. Mathews, Tom, et al, "The Road to War," Newsweek, 28 January 1991, page 62.
367. Banks, Tony, "Techint V. Humit: the Unseen War," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 February 1991, page 221.
368. Murphy, Caryle, "Iraqi Border Attacks Kill 12 US Marines; Tanks Troops Enter Saudi Arabia at 4 Sites," The Washington Post, 31 January 1991, page A1.
369. Frantz, Douglas, "GIs Ambush Nighttime Iraqi Probes," Los Angeles Times, 7 February 1991, page A1, A7.
370. Banks, Tony, "Techint V. Humit: the Unseen War," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 February 1991, page 221.
371. Church, George, "Combat in the Sand," Time, 11 February 1991, page 21-27.
372. Atkinson, Rick, "Outflanking Iraq: Go West, Go Deep," The Washington Post, 18 March 1991, page A1, A14.
373. "Where are the Troops?" Newsweek, 3 December 1990, page 6.
374. Mower, Joan, "Gulf Satellite Photos," Associated Press, 9 November 1990.
375. Saunders, Renee, "Firm Sells Sharp Soviet Space Data of Mideast to All but Iraqi Agents," Space News, 19 November 1990, page 1,21.
376. Barber, Lionel, "Iraq Bought Satellite Picture of Kuwait," Financial Times, 11 January 1991.
377. Gertz, Bill, "Russian Voices Directing Iraqis," The Washington Times, 13 February 1991, page 1.
378. Gertz, Bill, "Soviets Giving Aid to Iraqis, US Says," The Washington Times, 4 February 1991.
379. DOD News Briefing, 1 March 1991, page 8.
380. Mathews, Tom, et al,"The Secret History of the War," Newsweek, 18 March 1991, page 28-39
381. Gellman, Barton, "Deceptions Gave Allies Fast Victory," The Washington Post, 28 February 1991, page A1, A30.
382. Rosentiel, Thomas, "Pentagon Shows Itself Adept at Art of Deception," The Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1991, page A9.
383. Fialka, John, "The Climactic Battle: Iraqis Are Stunned By Ferocious Assault," The Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1991, page 1, A4.
384. Combat Pool Report, "Tank Feint Deceived Iraqi Army," The Washington Post, 27 February 1991, page A28.
385. "Gulf War Seen Boosting Plan to Build Up Number of Radar Satellites," Aerospace Daily, 4 March 1991, page 369-370.
386. Starr, Barbara, "Satellites Paved Way for Victory," Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 March 1991, page 330.
387. Mossberg, Walter, "US Intelligence Agencies Triumphed in Gulf War Despite Some Weak Spots," The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1991, page A10.
388. Honey, Peter, "US Used Overwhelming Technical, Military Advantage," The Baltimore Sun, 3 March 1991, page 11A.
389. DOD News Briefing, 28 February 1991, pages 6-7.
390. Covault, Craig, "Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 February 1991, page 25-26.
391. Browne, Malcolm, " Disadvantage for US in the Desert: Fewer Tanks," The New York Times, 25 August 1990, page A6.
392. Budiansky, Stephen, "The Run and Shoot Offense," US News & World Report, 25 February 1991, page 38-43.
393. Hayden, H.T., "The Tail That Wags the Dog," US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1990, page 51-53.
394. "Military Said There Was No Need for SR-71 Aircraft in Persian Gulf," Inside the Pentagon, 28 February 1991, page 8.
395. CENTCOM News Briefing, 27 February 1991, page 2.
396. Smith, Jeffrey, "Air War Wrecked Iraqi Ability to Detect and React to Allies," The Washington Post, 27 February 1991, page 28.
397. "The Gulf War's Decisive Lessons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 March 1991, page 9.
398. "Lessons Learned Above the Gulf," Space News, 4 March 1991, page 14.
399. CHurch, George, "The 100 Hours," Time, 11 March 1991, page 25.
400. Morrocco, John, "Gulf War Boosts Prospects For High-Technology Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18
March 1991, page 45-46