FAS | Space | Military | Doc/Ops | Ops | Desert Star |||| Index | Search | Join

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

Overview
Space Segment
Control Segment
User Segment
Operational Applications
Operational Limitations
Alternative Systems
Iraqi Capabilities
Net Assessment

A - Overview

For almost three decades the United States has relied on photographic intelligence satellites to provide information about Soviet strategic capabilities. This information has become a key ingredient in American planning for weapons procurement, nuclear targeting and arms control. In 1960s and 1970s the data supplied by the satellites was intended essentially for peacetime use. The Gulf War marks the full transition of these systems to a warfighting capability.

According to Ronald Elliot, Technical Director of the DoD Intelligence Communications Architecture Project, "Revolutionary techniques have included... the use of large numbers of near instantaneous intelligence systems capable of providing information in picture form to all military echelons... This deployment also features the most extensive use in history of intelligence imagery to support a military operation. Diverse sophisticated optical and electromagnetic sensors continuously observe Iraq's forces and transmit the observations in photographic and other formats to military commanders in the desert and contiguous regions. This pictorial information in disseminated widely to all the military components, including those at lower command echelons. This level and volume of dissemination on a continuous basis is the most comprehensive ever. In previous conflicts, such graphic information was only available to national command authorities and select elements of regional unified and specified command headquarters."⁽¹⁾

It has been suggested that the photo satellites are physically capable of taking pictures at approximately 5 second intervals. Superimposing a five kilometer square grid on that entire area around Kuwait indicate how many separate pictures are required in order to completely cover the area. It is also reported target folders are being updated at approximately three day intervals which is suggestive that the amount of time that the system requires to complete revisit the entire range of targets is approximately three days. It's also publicly reported that the delay between time that the photographs are taken and the time the photographs are relayed to the Middle East is approximately 18 hours at least through lower priority army units. This preliminary assessment indicates an Iraqi force deployment area somewhat in excess of 31,000 square kilometers, and dividing this into 5 Km by 5 Km squares gives 1250 images to cover the entire area. This number compares to the several hundred images processed daily on a normal peacetime basis. During a three day interval (defined by the intelligence update cycle) there will be a total of 36 passes over this area. To provide the 1250 images needed each satellite would have to collect an average of 35 images, which if collected at 5 second intervals would require about 17 seconds. With the satellite traveling at about 7 kilometers per second, each pass would have to average about 1200 kilometers. This is clearly an industrial assembly line process in which hundreds of images are being repetitively generated over an extended period of time.

B - Space Segment

A total of four imaging intelligence satellites were operational in orbit during the initial phases of the Kuwait crisis: three Kennan KH-11s and one Lacrosse imaging radar satellite. All of these satellites have a 24 hours capability, with night coverage is provided by some type of image intensifier system. These satellites use some sort of starlight scope -- the same sort of night vision goggles that helicopter pilots are used. Or the satellite sensor can blend the pixels on the CCD to increase the gain to deal with the lower ambient light in the evening.

This is one of the big differences between current systems versus those operating 10 or 20 years ago. A decade or more ago there was a very symmetrical morning and afternoon pattern which lined the satellites up so that the shadows were optimal for photo analysis. But since the newer KH-11's can take pictures 24 hours a day, it doesn't make much difference what time of day or night they fly over a target. That one of the reasons these satellites operate in orbits with inclinations of from 57 going 62 degrees, rather than the 98 degree sun synchronous orbits of earlier systems.

In contrast to civilian remote sensing satellites, these satellites are not restricted to photographing targets directly beneath their flight path. These satellites have a large flat surface scanning mirror, and the movement of this mirror is the determinant of the 5 second interval between pictures that is typical of these systems. This is substantiated by the Aviation Week photo of the Blackjack bomber published back in 1978, which was taken from a considerable distance and from a relatively low elevation above the horizon. This photo was taken with a KH-11 which was constrained by the 10 foot diameter of the Titan 3. Under some circumstances, such as trying to count tanks, rather than trying to tell the difference between a T-72 and a T-80, very high angles of obliquity, 400, 500 or 600 kilometers off the ground track, would be typical rather than unusual.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, photographic intelligence satellite operations assumed a fairly standard pattern. Two KH-11's, each with an operational life of about three years, would be in orbit at all times. As an old satellite exhausted its maneuvering fuel, it would be commanded to reenter the atmosphere, and a new satellite would be launched a week or two later. A KH-9 film-return satellite would be launched in late Spring each year, and operate until around the end of the year. And a KH-8 film-return satellite would be early Spring, and operate for a few months.⁽²⁾

The United States continued operations of a pair of KH-11 photographic intelligence satellites through most of 1988. The sixth KH-11, launched in December 1984 remained in service at the end of 1988, surpassing by almost a year the previously demonstrated service life for this class of satellites. Given this longevity, it must be assumed that this spacecraft has been assigned secondary responsibilities since the launch in October 1987 of the eighth KH-11, which can be expected to remain operational at least through the end of 1990. And on 6 November 1988 a new KH-11, almost certainly the last of this series, was launched.

KH-11 /6 (1984-122A 15423) was launched on 4 December 1984, and surprisingly enough continues in operation, flying in a 98 degree inclination orbit of 335 kilometers by 758 kilometers. Although the unusual longevity of this satellite (prior KH-11s had demonstrated a typical lifetime of about three years) would suggest that this spacecraft had long since expired, in late July it maneuvered to raise its perigee by about 50 kilometers, postponing its natural decay until well into 1992 (the Goddard Satellite Situation Report of 31 December 1990 confirmed that this satellite was still in orbit). This spacecraft was initially in the morning sun-synchronous plane entered by KH-11 /8, but subsequently has drifted about 7 or 8 degrees out of alignment.

KH-11 /7 (1987-090A 18441) was launched on 26 October 1987 and is currently maintaining an orbit of about 300 kilometers by 1000 kilometers, with an inclination of 98 degrees, which results in 14.76 orbits per day.

KH-11 /8 (1988-099A 19625) was launched on 6 November 1988, and is also currently maintaining an orbit of about 300 kilometers by 1000 kilometers, with an inclination of 98 degrees, which results in 14.76 orbits per day. Both of these satellites repeat are in sun-synchronous orbits, which repeat their ground tracks at four day intervals, and are synchronized to provide two day overlaps in coverage. The 1987 spacecraft is in the late, afternoon plane, and the 1988 spacecraft is in the early morning plane (which it initially shared with the 1984 spacecraft).

Lacrosse

Despite its many advances, the KH-12 suffers the shortcoming common to all photographic intelligence satellite, the inability to see through clouds. With much of the Soviet Union and other areas of interest frequently covered with clouds, this has always posed a problem for intelligence collection. However, in the past, this problem was primarily one of directing the satellite's coverage toward cloud-free areas, and awaiting improved visibility in cloudy regions. While this procedure may have been adequate for peace-time operations, it is clearly inadequate for war-time target acquisition.

A space-based imaging radar can see through clouds, and utilization of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) techniques can potentially provide images with a resolution that approaches that of photographic reconnaissance satellites. An project to develop such a satellite was initiated in late 1986 by then-Director of Central Intelligence George Bush.⁽³⁾ This effort led to the successful test of the Indigo prototype⁽⁴⁾ imaging radar satellite in January 1982.⁽⁵⁾

Although the decision to proceed with an operational system was very controversial, development of the Lacrosse system was approved in 1983.⁽⁶⁾

The distinguishing features of the design of the Lacrosse satellite include a very large radar antenna, and solar panels to provide electrical power for the radar transmitter. Reportedly, the solar arrays have a wingspan of almost 50 meters,⁽⁷⁾ which suggests that the power available to the radar could be in the range of 10 to 20 kilowatts, as much as ten times greater than that of any previously flown space-based radar.

It is difficult to assess the resolution that could be achieved by this radar in the absence of more detailed design information, but in principle the resolution might be expected to be better than one meter. While this is far short of the 10 centimeter resolution achievable with photographic means, it would certainly be adequate for the identification and tracking of major military units such as tanks or missile transporter vehicles. However, this high resolution would come at the expense of broad coverage, and would be achievable over an area of only a few tens of kilometers square. Thus the Lacrosse probably utilizes a variety of radar scanning modes, some providing high resolution images of small areas, and other modes offering lower resolution images of areas several hundred kilometers square. The processing of this data would require extensive computational power, requiring the transmission to ground stations of potentially several hundred mega-bits of data per second.

Lacrosse 1 (1988-106B 19671) was launched on 2 December 1988 by the Space Shuttle. The spacecraft entered an orbit with an inclination of 57 degrees, with an perigee of 680 kilometers and an apogee of 690 kilometers, and has not maneuvered significantly since launch.

Lacrosse 2 (1991- A) was launched from Vandenberg on a Titan 4 on 8 March 1991. Although the orbital elements of this spacecraft have not yet been determined, the launch time (4 AM) is suggestive of a radar satellite rather than a photographic system.

C - Control Segment

The imaging intelligence satellites are directed by the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), with daily tasking provided by the Operations Subcommittee, which provides continuous direction on a round-the-clock 24 hour basis.⁽⁸⁾

Once those collection priorities are agreed to by COMIREX the Satellite Control Facility at Onizuka Air Station in Sunnyvale is responsible for actually physically telling the satellite what to do and when to do it. Onizuka is also responsible for network management for getting the information back from the satellite to processing centers in the United States.

There are several data paths for imagery from photo satellites. One path is from the photo satellite through ground stations and then coming back to the United States through commercial communication satellites. A second path is from the photo satellite through Satellite Date System satellites and back down to Ft. Belvoir. And a third path is directly from the satellite to ground stations in the theater. Most if not all of this imagery is coming through NPIC and then being relayed via DSCS to field users.

The time delay between a pass over Kuwait and a time of visibility over one of the ground stations is not great. There are lot of passes where you're going to pick up a ground station within just a couple of minutes. If it is a south to north pass that satellite can down-link to Germany or Greenland a few minutes later. The additional delay of 5 to 15 minutes getting the picture down from the satellite won't have a significant impact on users.

"All of the spacecraft relay their imagery back to the U.S. via Satellite Data System (SDS) spacecraft or NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRSS) spacecraft. The data can also be downlinked directly to two large antennas located at Ft. Belvoir just south of Washington. Imaging data processing occurs at both Ft. Belvoir and the Air Force/CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)" in Washington.⁽⁹⁾ Staff at NPIC were reported to be working 18 hour shifts in August to support expanded collection requirements.⁽¹⁰⁾

LaCrosse has clearly been quite busy using TDRSS during Desert Shield. When Hubble was taking pictures of the big storm on Saturn in September, the Hubble scientists complained that they only got about 25% of the pictures that they asked for because they had to send the pictures to TDRSS and a higher priority user was preempting the TDRSS time for most of the time. The only other high priority user that was in orbit was Lacrosse.

D - User Segment

Prior to Desert Shield, CENTCOM noted that the great distance to the region "and the shortage of in-theater infrastructure strongly influence the type of intelligence capabilities we seek. We are improving intelligence support potential through increased management effectiveness and new systems... In Fiscal Year 1990 we will complete installation of a new imagery receipt and processing system which will provide imagery intelligence results within hours of an event. A high quality secondary imagery system, combined with the Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications System (STICS) will move imagery and data to operational levels within minutes. The Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS) also to be fielded in fiscal year 1990, will greatly increase our ability to manage, store and manipulate large amounts of intelligence information. This is essential for quick analysis and dissemination of intelligence data to all users."⁽¹¹⁾

One report noted that "in the wake of the invasion the CIA hurriedly convened an Iraq Task Force whose assignment was to monitor the crisis and provide intelligence options on each of its many aspects. It was given access to... communications, signals interceptions and analysis, satellite reconnaissance... the Iraq Task Force soon expanded into the (Near East) Division's warren of offices on the sixth floor of Langley. Some 150 people began to collect and assess information..."⁽¹²⁾

"Images gathered by the planes and satellites are almost instantaneously relayed to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, where they are examined by Navy analysts armed with a 'watch list' of sites at which small variations could mean big things. Among the most closely evaluated indicators of possible Iraqi intentions, the experts said, are Scud missile batteries, where a change in the angle of a missile could betray preparations for launch, and deployment of forces along national frontiers, who might move from entrenched positions into more mobile ones."⁽¹³⁾

"The reconnaissance satellite imagery processed in Washington is being transmitted back to senior military commanders in the Persian Gulf by special encrypted communications satellite links. In addition to the imagery that goes to Central Command, more selected imagery is being provided to Army and Marine commanders in the field using small portable image readout systems. These systems have slow data rate capabilities that require a few minutes for each picture to print out."⁽¹⁴⁾

Israel

By the end of December, the United States had agreed to provide real-time imagery to Israel, which was expected to provide two to three hours warning of an Iraqi missile attack.⁽¹⁵⁾ Certainly by the end of January, Israel had gained real-time access to American imaging satellite intelligence of western Iraq, covering mobile Scud launcher deployment areas.⁽¹⁶⁾ Previously the United States had been reluctant to share such information with Israel, fearing that it would be used in military actions against other Arab countries.⁽¹⁷⁾ But in this case, Israeli action against Iraq was impeded by withholding Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) codes, which would have enabled Israeli aircraft to fly unimpeded through Coalition air forces. In addition, this intelligence link helped to persuade Israeli authorities that the United States was working vigorously to address the Scud threat.

Dissemination Programs

The United States has initiated a number of programs to improve the dissemination of intelligence derived from national systems to combat forces. These include the Intelligence Communications Architecture, the Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan, and the Defense-Wide Intelligence Plan.

The Intelligence Communications Architecture (INCA) "will provide for continued contractual efforts to gather data on existing and planned intelligence communications requirements and capabilities."⁽¹⁸⁾ "...the results of INCA will be accomplished by the services, intelligence community, and the newly formed Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JT3A)."⁽¹⁹⁾ The program was established in 1983 to address wartime intelligence needs of operational commanders and to handle the "anticipated flow of both national and tactical intelligence" to such users. An architecture plan was published in late 1987 for operations in the early 1990's. Initially, operational users are defined as "major combat echelons" (MCE) with stress on "communications connectivity above and below MCE."⁽²⁰⁾ In Phase Two, intelligence timeliness and communications adequacy will be aggregated in a "new figure of merit" algorithm, with targeting, maneuver planning and near-term strategic planning seen as primary uses. Phase Three will assess current and planned communications technologies; Phase Four moving to INCA implementation and action plans.⁽²¹⁾

The Imagery Acquisition and Management Plan (IAMP) was initiated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1984 to coordinate acquisition and management plans for wartime dissemination of imagery to tactical commanders. IAMP aims to "address congressional concerns regarding the most effective mix of imagery collection, transmission and exploitation systems to meet operational needs... The mix of low volume, high quality imagery transmission systems, such as the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST); magazine quality transmission systems, such as the Intra Theater Imagery Transmission System (IITS); and high volume, high quality systems, such as the Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES), have major impacts on communications requirements and the ability to exploit and disseminate imagery intelligence ... with the right mix, affordable and survivable communications networks" can deliver essential imagery and/or imagery exploitation reports to "appropriate tactical levels." The fusion and refinement of raw imagery data could be resolved by TACIES to provide "all-source imagery exploitation," along the lines of a recently "automated electronic intelligence (elint) processing system that reduces tactical flow to usable levels."⁽²²⁾

The Defense Intelligence Agency AIRES (Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System) "will be directed toward providing 24 hour a day support to accommodate the increased volume of data flow from [deleted] collection systems. We will also begin development of a functional design for the replacement of the current AIRES system to meet the needs in the late 1980's through the 1990's in view of planned collection system improvements." ⁽²³⁾

TACNAT

One effort to improve dissemination of imaging intelligence to tactical users is the TACNAT (Tactical use of National Technical Means) effort of the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI) program in the Defense Department. BTI director John Transue notes that TACNAT products include "'two systems that accomplish different aspects of intelligence report handling.'... one computer system would 'fuse information from various sources and provide either conclusions or at least cues to the operator which should make our intelligence operations much more effective and efficient.' The second piece of hardware would be aimed at speeding the interpretation of intelligence photos taken by orbiting US satellites. Photo interpretation has been 'a considerable bottleneck' for US forces in Saudi Arabia, according to Transue... In a January report to Congress, the Pentagon said TacNat would 'automate the monitoring of threat garrisons, such as tactical missile sites, and predict changes... (and) predict and determine likelihood of target field locations and deployment sites.'... A related computer workstation, dubbed Fulcrum, has been sent to the gulf units."

TENCAP

The Lacrosse is the centerpiece of a new effort aimed at providing satellite imagery to tactical users. The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) is designed to "facilitate tactical use of national intelligence systems within an operational framework"⁽²⁴⁾, providing satellite imagery to battlefield commanders and weapons systems. The role of TENCAP in securing the future of the Lacrosse is indicated by the decision to establish TENCAP programs in all of the military services in 1977, around the time the Lacrosse program was initiated. By bringing the field commander into the user community, the managers of these satellite systems developed an additional base of support for the new program. The importance of exploiting satellite intelligence for tactical purposes was demonstrated in Lebanon and Grenada.⁽²⁵⁾

Initiated by the Army in 1973, TENCAP met with sufficient success that Congress in 1977 "directed each service to establish a Tactical Exploitation of National Space Program Capabilities (TENCAP) office to improve military use of national systems."⁽²⁶⁾ "DOD formed the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) to specifically address, across all Services, the use of space-based systems from stand-alone acquisition to sharing of national space programs, and research and development toward new capabilities. The Director of the DRSP has been and remains the Secretary of the Air Force; he chairs a cross-Service, senior Steering Committee which manages the DoD account. Also, each of the Services has organized offices to address the operational concepts and the employment of space systems in direct support of tactical operations."⁽²⁷⁾ The effort to widen the applications of national intelligence has a long history which precedes the formal service-wide TENCAP program. For example, in 1976 the Aeronautic Ford Corp. was awarded $16.5 million by USAF Space and Missile Systems Organization (as part of the Air Forces's Defense Dissemination Program) to develop equipment to help the Air Force to speed delivery of imagery secured by satellites to world-wide using commands.⁽²⁸⁾

TENCAP has become a prerequisite for successful prosecution of the Airland Battle doctrine and strategy. Much of the intelligence required - deep strike interdiction, initiative, mobility - can be supplied only through TENCAP. According to Brig. Gen. Howard D. Graves "Today, space activities offer unique real-time capabilities to see to the full depth of the enemy's forces and their supporting bases and to help us attack as deep as necessary to disrupt his ability to execute his plans -the keystones of the Airland Battle Doctrine."⁽²⁹⁾ Another source notes that "JSTARS, in conjunction with TENCAP and the Joint Tactical Fusion System -which will place automated processors at the Tactical Operations and Intelligence Center -will help provide the real-time data that commanders need to fight the Airland Battle."⁽³⁰⁾

Despite the promise of TENCAP, a number of shortcomings persist. "The problems of national systems support to contingency forces have generally fallen into three major categories. First, the systems themselves must respond to collection priorities set at the national level. These priorities may or may not be responsive to collection requirements for contingency operations of in Third World areas. The second category of problems compounds the first, in that the general capabilities of tactical units to request and receive information from national intelligence systems are frequently lacking. Third, are the limitations of the Armed Services for using information from national sources. In other words, the inability to properly consume and exploit information from national technical means."⁽³¹⁾

Another factor preventing tactical use of intelligence derived from national systems has been technical. As Army Brig. Gen. Graves says: "Although the TENCAP program is highly successful it provides only part of the information needed by the tactical commander and cannot satisfy all battlefield surveillance requirements. This is because national systems were designed for a different purpose where, for example, rapid dissemination to tactical users is not critical. Through TENCAP, however, special interface systems provide valuable information to the ground commander in a timely manner."⁽³²⁾

Additional barriers to the widespread tactical use of satellite data include the high level of classification. In the early 1970's General Daniel Graham discovered on a European trip that target folders shown to bomber pilots contained only sketches - not photographs. The pilots were not able to see the photos of the targets they were to bomb. At Graham's urging, William Colby initiated a downgrading of some satellite photography.⁽³³⁾ Perhaps because of this secrecy, the services simply were not accustomed to and did not trust satellite intelligence systems.

These barriers remain. "Combat information from space-based systems is not universally accepted or considered tactically useful. Issues of tasking, control timeliness, and survival in combat are the main reasons for the current lack of reliance on such systems by potential users. The most serious believer is perhaps the Navy, as an outgrowth of the Libyan operation, but its commitment to space-based systems appears uncertain."⁽³⁴⁾ The Navy's ambivalence can be appreciated when it is noted that it took three days for a courier to deliver the satellite images used in the raid.⁽³⁵⁾

In an effort to remedy these problems, the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) was initiated to coordinate Service development TENCAP hardware. "JSIPS provides tactical commanders with a deployable, modular intelligence support system that processes and exploits imagery data from national, tactical and strategic sensors and platforms."⁽³⁶⁾ The Air Force and Marine Corps initiated JSIPS in November 1985, with the Army Joining in January 1987. However, JSIPS was not available for service in the Gulf, with the first system delivered to the Army in Germany beginning operations in February 1991.⁽³⁷⁾ FIST (Fleet Imagery Support Terminal), which is the Navy equivalent of the JSIPS effort, is expected to achieve an Initial Operational Capability by December 1988, and a Full Operational Capability by October 1990.⁽³⁸⁾

Air Force TENCAP

Air Force management of the TENCAP effort is under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and operations.⁽³⁹⁾ "The purpose is to exploit the current and future tactical potential of national systems and to integrate these capabilities into the tactical decision-making process as rapidly as possible. The objectives of this program are: To expand and improve exploitation of national systems as a complement to tactical systems; To develop appropriate doctrine, training, force structure and systems; To establish collection system requirements that will benefit tactical forces."⁽⁴⁰⁾ Air Force TENCAP objectives include "development of procedures, tactics and interface equipment/software to facilitate tactical use of national space systems within an operations framework. Efforts will include participation in tactical exercises, system interface, software/hardware development and related development studies."⁽⁴¹⁾

Air Force TENCAP efforts have included several exercises to further develop this capability. "As the lead Service for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Special Project 86 NIGHT SURGE, TENCAP coordinated all Service efforts and funded the development of prototype receive equipment for the exercise. NIGHT SURGE provided tactical forces the opportunity to gain experience in the use of national intelligence systems in a contingent exercise environment. Similar support was provided for the JCS directed Special Project 87 POWER HUNTER. Air Force TENCAP will develop a prototype testbed for the evaluation of CONSTANT SOURCE ... and will expand Operational Test & Evaluation of CONSTANT SOURCE into the theaters to support Major Command requirements."⁽⁴²⁾

According to Martin Faga, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space (and head of the National Reconnaissance Office), "Constant Source is an Air Force terminal that allows tactical users to access certain classified kinds of satellites and obtain data from them. There are more of those now than there have been in the past, and field units are finding how to use them. This is a product of TENCAP that has been successful and is continuing."⁽⁴³⁾ Constant Source reportedly uses a broadcast channel on the FLTSATCOM UHF satellites.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Constant Source is said to "combine ease of use with a tailored intelligence product responsive to specific missions... (it) gives the tactical commander, aircraft commander, and intelligence analysts tailored, timely intelligence that reduces weapons systems vulnerabilities while increasing the potential for mission success."⁽⁴⁵⁾ Maj. Gen. Donald Hard, Director of Air Force Space Systems and SDI, noted that Constant Source is "providing mission essential information on enemy order of battle. This information in provided in near-real time directly to the field to allow informed and accurate decisions for mission planning and battle management." ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Constant Source is a "small ruggedized transportable UHF receipt exploitation system."⁽⁴⁷⁾

The Air Force Electronic Systems Division "delivered 12 Tactical Digital Facsimile machines for use during the Gulf Crisis. The units are located at headquarters, operating units, tactical fighter wings, US embassies, with US Marine Corps units, and even with the Strategic Air Command unit at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The high-resolution machines allow satellite photos and other classified targeting data to be relayed by satellite link from the US to operational units in the gulf region, including tactical fighter wings. The fax machines work with a variety of secure communications systems and provide copies with nearly the same resolution as the original photos."⁽⁴⁸⁾ One account concluded that "another noteworthy success was the tactical digital facsimile machine, ridiculed in the past as an example of gold-plated military hardware because it costs about $75,000. About 125 fax machines were used to transmit high-resolution images, usually near realtime satellite photos, to commanders throughout the theater. The fax was designed to strict military standards to survive harsh conditions. The new equipment gave individual units in the field unprecedented C3I capability."⁽⁴⁹⁾ As a result, "Intelligence briefings are provided to 1st TFW personnel approximately every third day."⁽⁵⁰⁾ "US intelligence sources now provide the military with hour-by hour reports on the movements of the Iraqi forces."⁽⁵¹⁾

Army TENCAP

The Army's TENCAP program is overseen by the Army Space Program Office, directed by the Army Staff.⁽⁵²⁾ Army TENCAP's aim is "developing a tactical support system to receive, process, and disseminate information from multiple sources which locate enemy units, activity, and targets representing a general tactical threat. Systems developed will be the primary source of information on enemy second-echelon forces. Such information is essential to the tactical commander. The tactical commander must have the capability to locate, identify, engage, and destroy superior forces at maximum range to insure that a manageable combat power ratio exists in the main battle area. The tactical commander must also have the capability to seize the initiative from the enemy by blunting his strength and exploiting his weaknesses. In the TENCAP program, advanced techniques are applied to exploit information collected from a variety of nationally controlled sensors which, in general, is not otherwise obtainable. That information is provided to the tactical command and control environment in a sufficiently timely and useful form to greatly assist the commander in defeating the enemy."⁽⁵³⁾

The main thrust of the Tactical Surveillance System program is development of the Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TACIES), and development of a direct communications link from national systems along with development of supporting software for compressing, processing, and disseminating data from national systems.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The Tactical Surveillance System program has continued software and hardware development for the interface of a multi-source data exploitation system with TACIES and development of "unique" data processing techniques for high rate digital imagery. It is also working on hardware development for testing and integrated logistics support planning and production engineering for TACIES. In 1986 it began development of the Communications transition for TACIES, and in 1987 initiated Integrated Logistics Support for TACIES.

The Joint Tactical Fusion Program is the principal Corp-level data fusion program of the U.S. Army and Air Force.⁽⁵⁵⁾ The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is the Army element of this program, and the Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE) is the Air Force equivalent. "The ASAS/ENSCE is the analytical hub for intelligence fusion and dissemination in the Army Corps and division and the numbered air forces.... The Army contributes about 90 percent of the program funding and the Air Force about 10 percent."⁽⁵⁶⁾ This program will "develop a single automated system that would correlate, analyze, and disseminate high volumes of time-sensitive, multi-sensor intelligence data. ASAS/ENSCE is to provide tactical commanders with precise location and structure of the opposing forces and near real-time battle situation displays."⁽⁵⁷⁾ "The system will also facilitate tasking of organic assets and requests for intelligence data from national assets."⁽⁵⁸⁾

"Design of ASAS/ENSCE began in fiscal 1984. Development of system modules began in fiscal 1985. The system was designed to incorporate two other intelligence fusion systems: the Technical Control and Analysis Center-Division (TCAC-D - also often referred to by its military designation as the AN/TSQ-130V) and the Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) system."⁽⁵⁹⁾ The TCAC system has been deployed with V and VII Corps, and BETA has become the core of the Limited Operational Capability Europe (LOCE) at EUCOM. The Air Force will deploy the ENSCE as part of the Tactical Air Control Center of the numbered Air Forces.⁽⁶⁰⁾ "These functions, which can take days to perform with current systems, can be done in minutes, if ASAS performs as expected."⁽⁶¹⁾ However, the program experienced serious cost growth and schedule slippage, primarily due to problems with mission software, with an initial operational capability expected in April 1993. Procurement of over 100 modules is anticipated.⁽⁶²⁾

Navy TENCAP

Navy and Marine Corps TENCAP is performed by the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command and the Naval Supply Systems Command.⁽⁶³⁾ This "provides direction and management of overall ocean surveillance and targeting programs by the Director, Command and Control Programs....[It] provides for a continuation of a 1978 Congressional initiative to investigate tactical applications of National assets to Navy missions and to develop tactical concepts to utilize those systems in the out-years."⁽⁶⁴⁾

The Navy's increasing reliance on space intelligence is notable. "The Navy appears to operate with considerably more space-derived sensor data than is generally appreciated. An October 1982 Signal issue featured an article on OSIS by a former naval intelligence officer who disclosed that the Navy has operated satellites `placed in various orbits to not only detect, locate and disseminate information on surface contacts but to photograph units as well.'"⁽⁶⁵⁾

"Today we use over three-quarters of the tactical data gathered by National space systems," according to Dr. E. Ann Berman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy. She notes the need to expand the Navy's tactical use of space for surveillance, "first, by more affective leveraging of National assets; and second, by designing, developing, acquiring, and operating tactical space systems dedicated to our warfare commanders."⁽⁶⁶⁾ Naval Space Command Commodore Richard H. Truly concurs, for he considers direct fleet support the preeminent mission of his command, and this includes "...exploring methods for improving national systems support through such programs as Tactical Exploitations of National Capabilities."⁽⁶⁷⁾

Navy TENCAP aims "to exploit all available National and Service sensor systems for tactical support to fleet operational commanders....and provides support to fleet exercises, which will provide background for development of modifications to existing programs and assist in establishing/validating requirements for new programs."⁽⁶⁸⁾ In 1985 Navy TENCAP refined collection management support; evaluated and tested Blue Force Location System using national assets; trained to operating forces in National Systems exploitation; developed analysis capability to evaluate contributions of National Systems to exercise operations; investigated cross-cuing of National Sensors using inputs from the OSIS; supported OTH Targeting concept development; upgraded Naval Wargaming. In 1986 the Navy worked on collection Management Support; prepared testing of tactical support applications of man in space; prepared tactical impact statement on new National Sensor Systems; In 1987 the Navy participated in JCS TENCAP Special Project and arranged non-routine support from national Systems for fleet exercises.⁽⁶⁹⁾

In 1985, the TENCAP program incorporated the TADIX-B and National Systems Enhancement Tactical Support projects.⁽⁷⁰⁾ Other related Navy activities include the Naval Command and Control System (NCCS) System Engineering and Integration; Navy Command and Control, Afloat, which include the Outlaw Shark terminal for submarine and the Outlaw Hawk terminal on aircraft carriers; and the Navy Command and Control System, Ashore Nodes. "These are key elements of Tactical Satellite Reconnaissance Office (TENCAP) initiatives whereby national sensors are continually being tasked and outputs evaluated to analyze time and quality of receipt through each of these elements in reaching the tactical commander."⁽⁷¹⁾

Marine Corp TENCAP

Marine Corps TENCAP is designed to "enhance the ability of tactical Marine Corps forces to exploit the capabilities of national intelligence gathering systems."⁽⁷²⁾ Efforts to date include liaison/discussion with national intelligence organizations, training and education, participation in the JCS-directed Special Projects, follow-on action to implement findings of the national tactical intelligence interfaces study, attempt to increase reserve forces participation in TENCAP; submission of Tactical Impact Statements; and conduct of annual Intelligence Planning Conference.⁽⁷³⁾ Related programs include the All Source Imagery Processor and the Tactical Receive Equipment (TADIX B - TRE).⁽⁷⁴⁾

"There has been a major improvement in the Marines' ability to exploit satellite intelligence for tactical purposes-the so called `Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities' program. Last spring, Gen. Robert Barrow said that Marine task forces like the one in Beirut, even with limited reconnaissance capabilities, could get `regular and continuing' intelligence. Barrow, who has since retired as commandant, said: "The value of national collectors, in combination with theater and organic systems, was highlighted by the vital and effective intelligence support provided to our Marines deployed to Beirut, Lebanon."⁽⁷⁵⁾

E - Operational Applications

The Gulf War occasioned an unprecedented number of public discussions of the use of imaging intelligence satellite as the crisis unfolded. Indeed, the history of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were narrated by imaging intelligence.

"Early in March, US intelligence detected the construction of six fixed launchers for long-range Scud missile at an Iraqi base near the Jordanian border, placing these weapons within range of Israel. A CIA report said that the launchers, which could easily be observed by US satellites, were intended as a blunt statement by Iraq that it would retaliate against any Israeli attack on its chemical weapons or nuclear installations."⁽⁷⁶⁾

Starting on 17 July, the 22nd anniversary of the coup that brought Saddam Hussein to power, "the CIA began to include information about Iraq's ominous military buildup in the daily intelligence digest that it sends to President Bush... satellites had provided the CIA with photographs of Iraqi armored divisions -- some 30,000 soldiers in all -- moving toward Kuwait."⁽⁷⁷⁾

"On Friday, July 20, a foreign military attache was traveling along the six-lane highway from Kuwait City to Baghdad when he encountered a remarkable sight: hundreds of Iraqi military vehicles filled with troops and weapon moving south toward the Kuwaiti border... Within a few hours of the report, US spy satellites had aimed their cameras at the border area, and analysts estimated that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to positions near Kuwait."⁽⁷⁸⁾ By 23 July, these forces were photographed on the Kuwait border.⁽⁷⁹⁾

On 25 January, the CIA reached a "set of judgments, mainly on the basis of Iraq's deployments. For the first time, the CIA estimated that Baghdad was not bluffing, but would probably use force against Kuwait. However, the agency did not expect that Saddam would seize the entire country, believing instead that Iraqi would limit itself to disputed territories along the northern boarder."⁽⁸⁰⁾

"The most compelling evidence had been obtained by a KH-11 on the night of July 27. The satellite's photographs showed Iraqi trucks hauling ammunition, fuel, water, and medical supplies to the troops on Kuwait's northern border. After they viewed the pictures... (CIA Director) Webster and Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the president that an invasion was 'probable.'"⁽⁸¹⁾ "Intelligence reports had allowed Gen. Norman C. Schwarzkopf, commander of the US Central Command, to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the impending Iraqi invasion about 6 days before it occurred. Schwarzkopf was able to accurately predict both the timing and magnitude of the assault..."⁽⁸²⁾

On 28 July, "a contingent of top CIA officials arrived at the White House to deliver a critical briefing... The CIA officials brought with them the satellite photos... The CIA's emissaries were convinced that the evidence they presented to the president indicated that Hussein would invade Kuwait. They couldn't guarantee that an invasion would take place, however; their information wasn't definitive because the CIA didn't have credible informants to report on Hussein... The CIA's lack of credible 'humint' was critical to Bush's evaluation of the evidence... Moreover, some of Bush's advisors were skeptical of the CIA's conclusions, notably Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Each of them told Bush that his sources were more persuasive than the CIA's photographs... The agency's leaders had done their best to warn the president and had failed. The language of diplomats had triumphed over their world of facts, charts and satellite photos."⁽⁸³⁾

"Shortly before the invasion, an American KH-11 spy satellite picked up 100,000 Iraqi troops along Kuwait's border. Saddam had tripled his forces. Satellite photos also showed a new 'logistics train' that gave him everything he needed to invade. Noting that he had done nothing to disguise his moves, the US intelligence community assumed it was a bluff to bully Kuwait into a more compliant oil policy."⁽⁸⁴⁾

"Iraq dispatched fuel, trucks and cargo planes to troops massed on the Kuwaiti border two days before the invasion," and on the basis of these indicators the CIA warned that "if mediation efforts and negotiations failed, Iraq was likely to take military action against Kuwait," while the DIA "continued to stick to a general agreement that Iraq was only staging a massive show of force to intimidate Kuwait and would not invade."⁽⁸⁵⁾ "A day before the invasion, Iraq reinforced the buildup with scores of artillery pieces and other specialized equipment."⁽⁸⁶⁾

On the morning of 1 August, "Webster hand delivered a package of new, more alarming intelligence briefings and satellite photos to Scowcroft at the White House. The CIA, Webster reported, was predicting, with 70 percent certainty, that the invasion would come within the next 24 hours. By three o'clock in the afternoon, after more evidence had been considered, the agency was predicting, with a 90 percent certainty, that the invasion would come within 12 hours."⁽⁸⁷⁾ The invasion occurred three hours after that estimate.⁽⁸⁸⁾

"On the second night of the invasion... someone had told him the time that an American spy satellite would pass over head. At that moment, Jassim and hit family turned on the lights and held a noisy pro-Kuwait demonstration on the roof. They held pictures of Kuwait's Emir aloft to show the American eye lurking in the night sky that resistance in Kuwait was alive and flourishing."⁽⁸⁹⁾

On 3 August, "President Bush had been told by the Pentagon that satellite photographs showed three Iraqi divisions heading for the Saudi border -- though CIA radio intercepts did not indicate that they planned to cross it. This information, which left Iraq's intent undeciphered, was shared with Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, and he presumable conveyed it back home."⁽⁹⁰⁾

On 6 August, "Cheney flew to Saudi Arabia on a Boeing 707 that was specially equipped to receive the latest intelligence information on Iraq's intentions, including up-to-the-minute digitized satellite photographs of Iraq's military formations on Saudi Arabia's border. The photographs revealed a frightening turn of events: by design or accident, two Iraqi tank columns had entered Saudi Arabia. Cheney gave King Fahd the photographs; they were the CIA's most convincing evidence that his nation was threatened. Middle Eastern officials have since persuasively argued that Hussein's soldiers entered Saudi Arabia by accident, but King Fahd didn't want to take any chances."⁽⁹¹⁾

Other accounts agree that "it was US satellite photography confirming an Iraqi army buildup on the Kuwaiti - Saudi Arabian border that convinced Saudi King Fahd (in early August) to jettison his country's long-standing resistance to outside military help. After seeing the crystal-clear images of Iraqi tanks and troop carriers massed on his frontier, Fahd gave Defense Secretary Dick Cheney the green light to send in US troops."⁽⁹²⁾

President Bush noted the use of satellite photography in dispelling Iraqi claims of withdrawal from Kuwait, "we had the photography to demonstrate it. We showed it to some who questioned it in the Middle East. What are these tanks doing going south when the man says he's withdrawing from Kuwait?"⁽⁹³⁾

By the second week of August "US forces in Saudi Arabia would have about 24 hours warning of an attack... because US intelligence assets are tightly focused on the logistical movements and communications of the estimated 120,000 man Iraqi force in Kuwait."⁽⁹⁴⁾

"Analysts in both the CIA and DIA claim that photo-reconnaissance and other intelligence sources show critical Soviet military shipments reaching Baghdad as late as August 7 -- a full five days after the invasion was launched and the embargo announced."⁽⁹⁵⁾

"Iraqi military forces appeared to be loading poison gas aboard combat aircraft yesterday ( 7 August)... the loading of chemical weapons was the most plausible explanation for what we have seen."⁽⁹⁶⁾ "Iraq loaded some aircraft with chemical bombs, then unloaded the planes in a move that some intelligence analysts believe was intended as a warning to the United States."⁽⁹⁷⁾ And efforts in the aftermath of the Kuwait invasion to assess Iraqi nuclear capabilities included satellite reconnaissance.⁽⁹⁸⁾

"The US apparently lost track of four Iraqi divisions for a 24 hour period on August 7-8, and one strategic reconnaissance source blamed the inflexibility of overhead satellites for this intelligence failure."⁽⁹⁹⁾

On the night of August 8, "Kuwaitis assembled on rooftops and shouted defiance at the Iraqis, together with cries of "God is Great!" They are encouraged by the belief that their demonstration will be seen by American spy satellites."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

In mid August, "US intelligence has monitored two Syrian army divisions moving toward the border with Iraq,"⁽¹⁰¹⁾ By the middle of August, "Iraqi forces numbering about 50,000 troops have been observed moving south, and if they go as far as Kuwait they will increase troop strength in kuwait to about 170,000."⁽¹⁰²⁾ Intelligence reports also noted that the "Iraqis are improving their air defenses in Kuwait" and that "there seems to be some gathering of Iraqi forces on the Turkish border."

"About 80,000 Republican Guards were the shock troops in the Aug. 2 storming of Kuwait. But two weeks after the invasion, US intelligence detected their withdrawal to the Iraq-Kuwait border region in what US officials believe is an attempt to keep them in reserve..."⁽¹⁰³⁾

During the third week of August, plans for the American naval blockade of Iraq were complicated by "the fact that intelligence officials spotted a Chinese cargo ship believed to be carrying fertilizer moving from Iraq's only functioning port at Umm Qasr."⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ During the third week of August, "the United States was left frustrated... as Iraqi forces withdrew from the Iranian border, by its inability to discover what had happened to a particular elite unit. 'We lost them for a few days' the source acknowledged."⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

By the third week of August "Recent satellite photos show that new troops are being deployed in two lines, one running parallel to the Saudi border, and the other running along the beachfront on the Persian Gulf. The satellite data also show that while Iraqi troops are digging in, they are not constructing massive earthen barriers of the sort built along the Iranian frontier from 1985 to 1987. Satellite monitoring of the main supply route into Kuwait City has shown that crucial military supplies headed to Kuwait City are backed up at the head of the road, near a large rail depot in Basra."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Intelligence sources continued to indicate that "Hussein's elite Republican Guards, which led the attack into Kuwait, are being replaced on the front lines of his defense by other troops."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Four or five Guard divisions withdrew from the Saudi border and moved to Iraq, just north of Kuwait.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

During the third week of August, reconnaissance satellites monitored Iraq moving ballistic missile launchers (possibly for the Al Hussein modified Scud) to the Kuwait-Saudi border.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ During this period, intelligence sources reported that satellite photos indicated that "Iraq had pulled perhaps 50,000 elite Republican Guards back toward Baghdad from Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia."⁽¹¹⁰⁾

"Military commanders in Washington and in the Saudi desert rely on a combination of intelligence sources, including surveillance satellites, Saudi and American AWACS radar planes patrolling the skies and intercepting enemy communications. 'I have adequate intelligence and I think we have an extremely good picture of what the situation looks like on the ground north of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border,' General Powell said today. He said for example that he knew whether or not the Iraqis had deployed long range surface-to-surface missile there. He declined to confirm such reports."⁽¹¹¹⁾

By early September, the blockade of Iraq includes "Warships patrolling the Gulf have vast stores of computer data about commercial vessels as well as access to intelligence -- ranging from surveillance by radar aircraft and satellites to publicly available port records -- with which to identify ownership, cargo loads, and routes of specific ships."⁽¹¹²⁾ Also during this period "intelligence from satellites ... (indicates that) the army of President Saddam Hussein is digging into the type of defensive positions that were the hallmark of most of Iraq's eight-year war with Iran. 'They have an abnormal capacity to dig' an Egyptian officer said of the Iraqis..."⁽¹¹³⁾

During the first two weeks of September, satellite imagery detected the deployment of a new type of missile mobile launcher. "The launchers were discovered within the past two weeks by a US spy satellite. They were described as special missile launchers mounted atop a flat-bed truck.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ The Iraqi missile force was estimated to include about three dozen mobile launchers, as well as about 200 Scud-class missiles. Some of this data, including indications of impending launches, was being conveyed to Israel.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ However, requests in early September for realtime access to satellite imagery were not immediately agreed to.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

By the middle of September, American intelligence began to detect major strengthening of Iraqi fortifications in and around Kuwait.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ During the second and third weeks of September, Iraqi forces began a major "buildup, which is being monitored largely through pictures taken by intelligence satellites... sharply increased the number of its troops and tanks in Kuwait and Southern Iraq... redeploying many of its elite armored columns away from the Saudi border and into more flexible tactical positions. The armor is being replaced near the border with infantry unites that are designed to absorb the brunt of the attack... By moving the infantry forward and drawing many of the tanks back into more flexible positions, the maneuvers had broadened slightly the area in which American intelligence analysts most closely monitor Iraqi troops and equipment."⁽¹¹⁸⁾ During this re-deployment, it was reported that "the CIA's photo interpreters had repeatedly lost track of Iraqi military units, and once even a whole Iraqi army. The 80,000-man Iraqi Republican Guard Corps was lost for almost a week..."⁽¹¹⁹⁾

In addition, the Iraqi Air Force began "dispersing its aircraft to remote airfields, many in the southern part of the country... bases we haven't seen them operating from before... not equipped with aircraft shelters..."⁽¹²⁰⁾

By the later part of September, "US troops in Saudi Arabia would have six to nine hours of warning time before an attack by Iraqi forces, according to Defense Department officials. It would take Iraqi forces 18 hours to launch an attack once President Saddam Hussein gave the order, the officials said. The warning estimate is based on the amount of time required by intelligence officials and commanders on the ground to interpret movements of Iraq's elite Republican Guards, which would lead the attack."⁽¹²¹⁾

During the third week of September "US intelligence agencies identified several chemical decontamination sites in Iraq... spread out along a line north of the Kuwaiti border with Iraq. Another official described the decontamination sites as V-shaped areas dug out of the ground large enough to accommodate vehicles such as troop transports or tanks. 'The actual decontamination equipment has not been brought in yet,' the official said, 'but it's still a worrisome sign.' The V-shaped facilities are used for washing down with water equipment that has been exposed to chemical weapons."⁽¹²²⁾ The sites, numbering about half a dozen, "which have been organized over the past two weeks... are behind the second echelon of Iraqi forces, which include the elite Republican Guard armored units." American officials speculated that "the conspicuous organization of the sites might be intended to intimidate the United States and discourage it from using military force..."⁽¹²³⁾

By the later part of September, American intelligence had seen indications of Iranian food shipments to Iraq, in apparent violation of the UN embargo.⁽¹²⁴⁾

During the first week of October "several vans photographed by a US spy satellite have been identified as Soviet mobile electronic countermeasures equipment... The jamming gear, code-named 'Paint Can,' was discovered at several locations inside Kuwait and along Iraq's border with the occupied kingdom... discovery of the exact location of the jamming equipment was greeted with relief by US military planners because it assists targeting before military action."⁽¹²⁵⁾

In mid October, "A large ammunition storage facility in Iraq exploded... the explosion near the southern Iraqi city of Basra caused a chain reaction that destroyed more than a dozen bunkered ammunition dumps. A US spy satellite photographed the demolished ammunition dumps... US intelligence analysts said sabotage by Kuwaiti resistance fighters may have been the only way for 12 ammunition dumps, each about 500 yards apart, all to be ignited. Other intelligence officials said 'poor handling' by Iraqi military personnel was a more likely cause..."⁽¹²⁶⁾

By late October, reports emerged that the Defense Department was "using satellite reconnaissance to track the stripping of Kuwaiti facilities."⁽¹²⁷⁾ This included Iraqi efforts to dismantle Kuwaiti petroleum refineries. It was also reported that "US Intelligence has succeeded... in collecting detailed information about Iraq, giving US military commanders confidence that they understand Iraq's battle plans, weapons, capabilities, military weaknesses, leadership movements, and the control of forces."⁽¹²⁸⁾ This included identification of "plans to blow up several oil tankers off Kuwait's coast to delay an allied assaults from the sea... millions of gallons of the spilled oil would be set afire in the Persian Gulf. Three tankers are anchored near the Saudi Arabian border" at the port of Ra's al Qulay'ah. "The three large Iraqi oil tankers... were loaded at a northern Kuwaiti port last month," and subsequently moved south. "US intelligence officials have also spotted electrical cables stretching into the surf at some beaches for the purpose of electrocuting invading troops. US officials say the shock defenses are probably ineffective, but were used by Iraq against Iran during their eight-year was that ended in 1988... Iraqi defenses in the area also include anti-tank trenches that stretch for hundreds of miles along the coast and borders... about 10 percent of the trenches are filled with barrels of flammable liquid that also would be set ablaze during a tank assault..." In addition to five armored divisions of the Republican Guard deployed north of Kuwait, "eleven other divisions, part of the total 430,000 troop deployment, are located throughout Kuwait and southern Iraq. The forces shift position frequently to frustrate US satellite intelligence cameras."⁽¹²⁹⁾

By early November "some aspects of US-Israeli cooperation have improved. Earlier in the crisis, for example, Israel was disturbed because it was not getting data from US satellite reconnaissance on missile sites in western Iraq. Now, officials here say, intelligence sharing has been stepped up. Israel has continued to provide US forces with intelligence, including detailed information on the movements of Iraqi forces and commanders."⁽¹³⁰⁾ Another report at the same time noted that "Israel would need US satellite intelligence to know if the missiles are being prepared for launch. It would also need the intelligence because some of Iraq's launchers are mobile. It's believed that the US currently doesn't give Israel instant, or 'real time,' information. One Israeli military official noted that, despite the complaints about America's reluctance to coordinate battle plans, intelligence from the US has been 'improved' recently. He refused to provide specifics, though."⁽¹³¹⁾

By mid-November, "analysts who have studied satellite reconnaissance photographs say Iraq's frontline ground defenses are widely dispersed."⁽¹³²⁾ During this period, "US Intelligence officials said they have identified two Iraqi military command posts under construction around Kuwait City. The underground facilities were photographed by a spy satellite." ⁽¹³³⁾

In mid-November, "US intelligence monitors in the region - satellites, ships and aircraft -- also have detected a major increase in Iraqi ballistic missile training activities."⁽¹³⁴⁾

During the last two weeks of November, satellite photography indicated that Libya was removing large quantities of military equipment, including tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers, from about 10 storage depots around the country.⁽¹³⁵⁾ In addition, images of military bases in northern Libya indicated large-scale mobilization of Libyan forces.

In the last week of November a new Defense Department analysis of the Iraqi military presence in Kuwait upgraded the total force level from 430,000 to 450,000 troops, from 3,500 to 3,600 tanks, and from 2,200 to 2,400 artillery pieces. This was the first overall assessment released since late September, and "the new troop figures represent a recalculation by U.S. intelligence analysts studying satellite photos."⁽¹³⁶⁾

Imaging intelligence systems were also used to monitor the effectiveness of the embargo, and by early December "Satellite photos show a steady stream of trucks entering Iraq from Iran."⁽¹³⁷⁾ Other satellite observations during this period included "Iraqis unloading mines in Kuwait and putting them on mine-laying boats... (and) intensified activities at plants producing poison gas and germ weapons..."⁽¹³⁸⁾ Satellite photos also showed an increase in the number of oil-filed trenches that Iraq could set afire to keep American tanks and infantry out of Kuwait.⁽¹³⁹⁾

The December 2 launch of three Iraqi Scud missiles from Basra was not detected in advance by American intelligence satellites, leading analysts to conclude that in order to avoid detection the missiles were fueled and prepared for launch in a building of aircraft hangar, and were moved outside on their mobile shortly before launch.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

In mid-December, satellite intelligence was cited in reports of fighting in northern Iraq between the Iraqi army and Kurdish rebels.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

On 31 December, "US spy agencies detected about 300 Iraqi aircraft in flight... the largest number of planes and helicopters active at one time since the Aug.2 invasion."⁽¹⁴²⁾ Although no explanation was offered at the time, it seems that this was an effort to redistribute these aircraft to new airfields, to complicate American targeting activities.

On 3 January, it was announced that "US intelligence agencies have noticed 'an increase in the westward expansion of (Iraqi) defensive lines.' This movement partially accounts for an additional 20,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq... the Iraqis are expanding their defensive line westward up to 48 miles to prevent allied forces from outflanking the defensive barriers."⁽¹⁴³⁾

By the eve of Desert Storm, "US and British forces, using satellite photographs of the 108 mile long Iraqi entrenchment, have reconstructed the series of tank ditches, mine fields, and razor wire entanglements they would face in an assault. Training against this obstacle, using live ammunition, grenades and tank-killing weapons..."⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ In addition, "US satellite and surveillance flights have located most anti-aircraft radars and the Air Force has drawn 'paths' around the surface-to-air missiles directed by the radars."⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

During the final meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, the American side did not present a planned briefing that included satellite photos, intended to convey the range of information available on the Iraqi military.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ This briefing reportedly included "a detailed listing of President Hussein's recent movements, to demonstrate that if war started the Iraqi leader could easily be tracked by American intelligence and killed."⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

"When American satellite reconnaissance specialists turned on their photo coverage of Iranian airfields on Jan. 14, two days before the opening allied assault, they were stunned to see evidence of apparent collusion between two sworn and bitter enemies: Iraqi airplanes, including several commercial airliners, parked in Iran. That number has subsequently multiplied to nearly 100 top-performance aircraft, by the Pentagon's count."⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

Throughout the air campaign in January and February, "US and Allied pilots preparing to attack targets in Iraq and Kuwait routinely are shown, as part of pre-flight briefings, images of their assigned targets taken by (intelligence satellites). The satellite images are used to show enemy defenses and the proximity of civilian areas to be avoided in the attack."⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ "Attempts are made after each bombing raid to assess the success by using a combination of satellite and airborne reconnaissance. For high-priority targets, damage assessments can be made at the edge of a runway in special trailers equipped to receive and analyze video or still photos by returning bombers."⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ "The Navy is relying primarily on Defense Intelligence Agency satellite imagery to assess strike effectiveness."⁽¹⁵¹⁾ During the initial weeks of Desert Storm, Iraqi mobile missile launchers were hiding by day and moving and shooting during the nighttime to elude American intelligence systems.⁽¹⁵²⁾

In late January Iraq dumped a large volume of crude oil into the Persian Gulf creating a large oil slick that threatened Saudi water desalination plants. A briefing by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf used sketches made from satellite photos to illustrate what had happened. He noted that "these sketches all come from hard evidence.... the five ships that were located, and are still located, at those piers. These ships on the 16th of January were low in the water -- they were completely full of oil. As of this time, on the 24th of January, these five ships right here were apparently emptied of oil, or almost empty, because they are riding very, very high in the water. You also have out there a Sea Island terminal and an oiling buoy. These terminals and buoys are both used to fill the super tankers that can't get into the shallow draft are in this area. As of 1227 local (on 24 January 1991), what you saw here was the Sea Island Terminal intact, and a very, very large oil spill that was coming out of the oiling buoy... We have gone back and checked all our military operations between the time when we last looked at this buoy and nothing was coming out, which was approximately the 16th and the 24th... The best estimates we have, based on the length of the oil spill, is that this probably was opened up about the 19th in order to have what happened between the 19th and 24th when we got this evidence."⁽¹⁵³⁾

According to one report in late January, "US intelligence agencies have indications that Soviet military weapons and equipment are reaching Baghdad in truck convoys. The CIA recently identified several truck convoys that are believed to contain munitions moving from the Soviet Union through Iran into Iraq. As many as 400 trucks have been spotted."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

On January 31, in response to reports that 800 to 1,000 Iraqi vehicles, and perhaps as many as six Iraqi divisions were moving from central Kuwait toward Wafra as a prelude to an Iraqi attack, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell noted that "we are monitoring that situation, and if I confirm some of those reports, I am potentially compromising some of the strategic and tactical sensors that we use. If I give that information in a public situation, I'm also providing it to the other side. So I have to not answer that question..."⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

In the first week of February, "satellite reports show that at least a few Guard units are shuttling tanks between shelters and some troops are scrambling to find better hiding places... Some satellite photographs received last week showed numerous bomb crater, but dug-in armor is still visible."⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Satellite photos also showed the Iraqis "attempting to salvage equipment and material from the bombed nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha, south of Baghdad... attempting to obtain the nuclear reactor cores and the plutonium fuel in four nuclear reactors in the area."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ During the same period, "satellite photographs showed that at least three terrorist training camps -- which were detected by a US spy satellite last month -- are deserted... A training camp for Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists, that had been identified by US intelligence months ago, also appeared abandoned in the satellite photos..."⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

The American bombing on 12 February of the bomb-shelter at Amiriya in Baghdad, which killed several hundred civilians prompted concerns about civilian casualties. In defending American targeting practices, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney noted that Hussein is "'placing military equipment in civilian areas, especially in Kuwait but also in Iraq.' Cheney said the practice includes placing two MiG-21 fighters next to an ancient pyramid near the city of Ur, northwest of Basra, which he described as the 'oldest continuously inhabited city on Earth,' and the site of valuable archeological ruins dating back to 2700 BC. He said the evidence was based on satellite photos obtained yesterday morning."⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ To bolster this claim, these photos were rushed to United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ And it was reported that "the Pentagon later showed an artist's rendering of the two planes beside the pyramid."⁽¹⁶¹⁾

Coalition commanders had learned "through reconnaissance teams and other intelligence sources in the final weeks before the land offensive that Iraqi defenses were far less daunting than originally believed. 'The magic defensive line that was the marvel of the century did not exist,' said (Marine commander Gen.) Boomer."⁽¹⁶²⁾

During the third week of February, negotiations between Iraq and the Soviet Union resulted in a proposal for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait over a three week period, with the process to be monitored by international observers. The United States proposed withdrawal within one week, with no provisions for on-site monitoring of the pull-out, "since American and allied combat planes have air supremacy and the United States has spy satellite there would be little problem in monitoring compliance."⁽¹⁶³⁾

Brig. Gen. Richard Neal indicated that "we had pretty good location of the Republican Guard units. Some of them, as the battle unfolded, repositioned into supplementary locations..."⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Another source noted that "during the battle, US satellite photography was so good that American planes were able to drop leaflets on Iraqi forces that identified brigades and divisions by name."⁽¹⁶⁵⁾"Surveillance satellites showed that the Guard's Tawakalna Division was moving slowly south, perhaps deceived by the First Cavalry's feint. Other Republican Guard divisions were doing little more to gird for action than uncovering their vehicles."⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

"Two jet aircraft used by Saddam Hussein for personal travel were spotted at a military airfield near Baghdad... The two Iraqi jets, described as VIP jets, were photographed by a US reconnaissance satellite over the past several days... Both jets were 'associated' with travel by Saddam in the past..."⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

During the first week of March, satellite and aerial reconnaissance systems were used to monitor political and military unrest in at least six Iraqi cities.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ According to Navy Capt. David Herrington, Deputy Intelligence Director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "What we've seen are buildings, structures, perhaps some government buildings, that are on fire in some of those cities. We've also seen vehicles on fire in some of those cities. We've also seen military checkpoints set up at strategic intersections in some of those cities..." Brig. Gen. Richard Neal indicated that "Some of our overhead pictures have indicated a lot of chaos, and that's hard to describe by virtue of overhead photography, but there's an intermingling of a lot of civilians and military."⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ And Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations noted that "We see, for example, T-55 tanks, and that reads Iraqi Army; we see T-72 tanks, and that reads Republican Guard, and we're not sure they're both on the same side right now."⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

F - Operational Limitations

Despite these major contributions, American imaging intelligence experienced a number of shortcomings during the war. Some of these were as simple as inadequate communications, which hindered Army applications of satellite photography.⁽¹⁷¹⁾ Many of these problems were only overcome because American forces "had the luxury of six months to develop solutions... When Army, Navy and Air Force units first deployed to Saudi Arabia last August, they fielded nine different intelligence collection and analysis systems that could not communicate with each other, though they performed the same mission, according to Rear. Adm. Thomas Brooks, chief of naval intelligence. 'Interoperability is a word, not a fact,' said Brooks..."⁽¹⁷²⁾

Other problems arose from the large number of targets."The CIA and DIA rely almost exclusively on intelligence satellites, which can provide photographic coverage of only 20 to 40 percent of the targets attacked by coalition forces each day..."⁽¹⁷³⁾ Other failures were more complex in nature.

Two significant complicating factors were cloud cover over areas of interest, and Iraqi deception efforts.

Cloud Cover

Cloud cover over Iraq during the early days of the air campaign significantly impeded bomb damage assessment (BDA). According to one former high-ranking CIA official, "even without clouds, it takes a long time to process all that data. With clouds, you just can't tell very much."⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ According to another account, "even high clouds interfere with these images" from satellites.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

Starting on 21 January, "Thick cloud cover and heavy fog sharply curtailed US and allied bombing raids... and hampered efforts to assess the damage inflicted during five days of war..."⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ In a briefing on 21 January, a Maj. Gen. Burton Moore noted that "the weather patterns continue as they have for the past few days, and it has continued to impact our ability to get battle damage assessment..."⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ Subsequently, Lt. Col. Mike Scott noted that "weather has hindered our capability to obtain assessment of battle damage in a real-time manner. For obvious reasons, cloud cover hinders aerial photography. Additionally, depending on the level, clouds may also prevent us from sending in reconnaissance aircraft below them."⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Robert Johnston noted that cloud cover "does degrade somewhat our ability to fire on targets, and certainly to be able to see whatever battle damage that you've been able to inflict on those targets. But you have to appreciate that we have enormous technology that allows us to do things in the dark and under marginal weather conditions."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

Natural cloud cover was supplemented by Iraqi efforts to ignite oil well fires. On 22 January, Iraqi forces set fire to two oil refineries at Al-Wafra in southern Kuwait. "Western military officials said smoke from the fires could affect military operations against Iraq by limiting aerial surveillance, by planes or by satellites, of Iraqi military positions in Kuwait. 'Obviously, if there's heavy smoke, that's going to affect operations somewhat,' said Lieut. Col. Greg Pepin, a Pentagon spokesman... Al-Wafra is a small, low-pressure field that had been responsible for only about 7 percent of Kuwaiti oil

production before the Iraqi invasion on Aug. 2. Oil industry officials said there were potentially more serious fires today at storage sites the two refineries that were set afire, at Mina Abdullah and Shuaiba, south of Kuwait City. They are two of Kuwait's largest."⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

CENTCOM Commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf noted in a visit to the front lines in mid-February that the Iraqis "talk about the smoke their going to create, but look over there. It's overblown. Smoke really isn't that big of a problem. Whatever difficulties it's going to cause are going to be neutral, as much of a problem for them as for us."⁽¹⁸¹⁾ But according to one report, "the smoke has complicated the search for targets in Kuwait, American pilots say."⁽¹⁸²⁾ And by 22 February, over 200 oil wells in Kuwait had been set afire by Iraqi troops, covering the south-western half of the country in a thick cloud of black smoke, obscuring the area from observation by photographic satellites.⁽¹⁸³⁾ In assessing Iraqi motivations for setting the oil fields afire, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell note that "if you're being subjected to continuous air attack, covering this are with smoke would make it more difficult for the pilot to find his target, so that, perhaps, is an objective on the part of Saddam Hussein."⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ "A US Army lieutenant colonel assigned to the 1st Marine Div. as a fire support officer said that... dense smoke from Iraqi-set oil well fires also prevented CAS (Close Air Support) during some periods... Weather was good as the thrust began, and favorable winds blew away smoke from burning oil wells. But as the Marines approached the Burgan oil field, the wind changed, and smoke cut visibility."⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

Iraqi Deception Efforts

Iraq made extensive efforts to deceive American intelligence concerning targets and damage inflicted, including decoys tanks and dummy missiles. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell noted that "They're quite good at it. We've seen it. We've also seen them paint damage on airfields, to spoof us into thinking that it is sill damaged, and therefore we don't have to worry about it. There are also reports that they are trying to put out dummy Scud systems."⁽¹⁸⁶⁾

Iraq used deception "techniques they learned from US military intelligence officials during the eight year war between Iran and Iraq... In the course of receiving the US intelligence assessments, based on information from US spy satellites, the Iraqis 'were able to learn how we did the assessments,' one analyst said. 'They were able to learn how we keep track of what goes on in a war' -- and thus how to mask their military operations."⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

According to James T. Westwood, head of Military Science and Defense Analytics, a Fairfax, VA consulting firm, "If you were going to entice the coalition to attack a certain structure, like may have happened, you would have to make it look like a command post, have to emanate signals that make it look like a command post."⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

One account noted that Iraq "employed two- and three-dimensional decoy tanks in the hopes of fooling the allied air effort into wasting ordnance on them. Some of the false tanks house cheap electronic gadgetry emitting electronic 'blips' and heat waves like real tanks, thus attracting missiles. US officials say Husseins's fakes range from Scud missile launchers to plastic runway and road craters."⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ According to another account, "Iraq has built dummy Scud launchers and aircraft, and even painted fake craters on airport runways and on bomb shelters to suggest possible damage."⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ And "British military sources have said that the Iraqis changed the contours of some buildings to make them appear to be communications centers, factories and chemical weapons plants."⁽¹⁹¹⁾

According to another account, "intelligence officers are sifting through thousands of satellite photographs, radio interceptions, pilot reports and other data to assess the damage to Iraqi forces... The most skillful at deception... are the elite Republican Guard... (which) uses numerous devices to carry out those efforts. Sheets of aluminum placed under camouflage netting can deceive radars into believing an armored vehicle sits beneath the cover, leading pilots to waste valuable bombs on a fake target. In other instances, when allied bombs and missile do not hit a real tank, Iraqi troop et off large smoke bombs to make the pilots believe they scored a hit, discouraging them from returning to the area until satellite photographs reveal the tanks are still operational."⁽¹⁹²⁾

One significant instance of Iraqi deception was asserted on have been spotted at a mosque near Basra, which was shown to a group of Western reporters on 11 February as an example of bomb damage to a civilian target.⁽¹⁹³⁾ Rear Adm. Mike McConnell, chief of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that the Iraqis had dismantled the dome and second story of the mosque, to simulate bomb damage. He noted that the mosque is "about 50 miles from the northern end of the Gulf, about 15 miles from Iran. On the 7th of February, when this information was obtained, you can see a bomb crater located at this position. This is the mosque. It's intact. There was a military target about half a mile from this location. One of the bombs went long and it landed in this position. On the 8th, with that bomb crater that I mentioned to you, occurring on the 30th of January, we noticed overnight demolition at the mosque. Now I apologize for the orientation on the presentation here, but this is a representation of the information available to us, and we're looking at it a little differently... What we notice about this image, this portrayal, is that the top portion of the dome of the mosque is undamaged, other than the dome has been removed. It's perfectly spherical. The damage that was inflicted here probably was by demolition, and it did not occur from a bomb strike. If there had been a bomb involved,

there would have been some cratering. The debris that would have been left would have been sizeable, in chunks. And we can tell from the information available that there's no debris down on the top of this building, which in fact is lower than the original structure. Apparently what happened, on the 7th its intact. On the 8th it was deliberately destroyed, and most of the debris removed."⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ McConnell concluded "This is open and shut. On the 7th it was intact, and on the 8th it was destroyed."⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ Other observers pointed to the absence of rubble or burn marks as indicators of the fabricated damage. "Satellite photographs of the mosque showed the dome missing, but window casings intact, an absence of debris on lower floors and walls that had been detached but were not buckled as they would have been from bombing..."⁽¹⁹⁶⁾

Predicting the Invasion

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was generally unanticipated in Washington. The United States had tilted toward Iraq in its war with Iran, including supplying intelligence support. Following the cease fire, Bush administration policy toward Iraq was codified in National Security Directive 26 of October 1989. "The central assumption of US policy was that normal relations with Iraq would serve long-term American interests and promote stability in the Persian Gulf... The thrust of the Bush directive... was that the United States should keep trying to use political and economic incentives to moderate Iraq's behavior... The very openness of the Iraqi military buildup and the nature of the political backdrop led most observers to believe that its purpose was intimidation of Kuwait rather than invasion.... (according to one official) 'It was an intelligence failure of sorts. We were guilty of a kind of mind-set or a framework' about Iraq, he said. 'It might even be cultural. The idea that a country would march up to the border, put 100,000 troops there, go in and do what they've done; I don't think anybody here thought they'd do it.'"⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ Indeed, Republican lawmakers continued to urge moderation toward Iraq on the very eve of the invasion of Kuwait.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾

Although the US intelligence community provided some warning, it was too late to affect the course of events. Senator David Boren (D-OK), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, initially concluded that there was no intelligence failure in predicting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "Our analysts were right on top of it, the accurately projected three or four days in advance. They were very strong in their beliefs that the invasion of Kuwait would occur... I think far ahead of any other intelligence source in the world."⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ But after the war, he stated that he was "generally convinced there was a failure of strategic intelligence leading up to the conflict. Two months out, one month out, there were not adequate warnings to policy makers that Iraq could be a problem.... There was not enough beefing up of human intelligence."⁽²⁰⁰⁾

One analysis after the end of the war noted concluded that "Washington didn't fail to anticipate Iraq's full-scale invasion because of a breakdown in 'tech int' -- technical intelligence... What Washington lacked was adequate 'humint' - human intelligence. and analysis of technical data."⁽²⁰¹⁾ "Defense Secretary Cheney says technical intelligence gathering was generally very good' in the runup to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but human intelligence was all but useless. While the pre-invasion military buildup was easily spotted in the open terrain, 'we couldn't tell their intentions,... The Kuwaitis themselves said it was only saber-rattling.' Cheney attributes the Iraqi elements of surprise to 'a well thought-out deception plan.'"⁽²⁰²⁾

Bomb Damage Assessment

The most serious operational shortcomings of imaging intelligence were exposed in the assessment of the progress of the air campaign. This issue was critical to the course of the war, given an American decision not to initiate ground operations until the air campaign had achieved a 30% to 50% reduction in the combat effectiveness of Iraqi forces.⁽²⁰³⁾

Despite initial claims of decisive results in the first days of Desert Storm, after ten days of aerial bombardment it was reported that "about 65 percent of the Iraqi airfields are still operational... Nearly all of Iraq's air defense radar war taken out in the first week of the war, but about 20 percent of it is now back in operation. The Iraqis are now using mobile radar units and have taken old radars out of storage... only eight of Iraq's 30 fixed Scud missile launchers had been damaged enough to fully disable them... some of the mobile Scud missile launchers also have been hit, but US intelligence has not produced proof of that. 'There is not one picture of the carcass of a mobile Scud launcher,' one official said... About 50 percent of the country's capacity to manufacture new chemical and biological weapons has been destroyed... The Iraqis demonstrated an unexpected skill at restoring the runways at their 66 major airfields, most of which have been put out of action at one point or another since the war began... Eleven of Iraq's 12 major petrochemical facilities, including three refineries, have received moderate damage... Baghdad's normal electrical generating capacity has been destroyed."⁽²⁰⁴⁾

Another element, Les Aspin, Chair of the House Armed Services Committed concluded, was that "this is going to be a problem because those bomb damage assessments aren't going to be forthcoming. The problem will turn out not to be the cloud cover. The problem will be with the release of the information itself. Releasing BDA information will tell Saddam Hussein what targets we will be going back to hit again... With our photographs, I believe we will know a lot more than Saddam Hussein about the damage to his country."⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams noted that "There's no such thing as an unclassified picture of bomb damage assessment, unfortunately, because the system that does it is eternally classified."⁽²⁰⁶⁾

Lt. Gen. Jimmy Adams, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, offered another perspective on the bomb damage assessment problem. "I don't mean to indicate there is a shortfall. I mean to tell you that if you started to design a system and said I want to be able to go over a get very fine detail of particular systems in a variety of locations you may design a system different than if someone told you I want to view a contingency operation with perhaps a broader perspective. It's a matter of processing time. It's a matter of resolution. It's a matter of how much is good enough. So I think we have adapted very well the capability that we have on hand. But I can tell you that in some cases the systems we are using that were not specifically designed for contingency operations -- I don't mean there's a shortfall or there's a problem -- I just mean that the frustration with not having BDA (bomb damage assessments) you want comes from the fact that some of the systems we're using just were not designed for the kinds of things we're using them for... In some cases, the systems we are using for theater BDA were designed for peacetime information collection operations. If we had started from scratch to design a theater system for BDA collection operations, some of the characteristics may be different from the current system, ie areas of coverage, resolution, connectivity, etc."⁽²⁰⁷⁾

One commentary noted that "assessing the effects of strikes against such ground forces as Iraq's Republican Guard is difficult and time-consuming. These units are small, well dug-in and dispersed over a wide area. Unlike fixed facilities such as airfields, weapons plants and radar sites, they pose difficult targets. An artillery command post may be a heavily camouflaged jeep dug into the sand, for example. Some of the preferred munitions for hitting ground forces -- fragmentation and combined-effects munitions that cover wide areas -- often do not produce clear evidence of damage in reconnaissance photos or satellite imagery. A truck or an artillery piece that has been hit by such munitions may remain in place and appear to be intact. Analysts may not be able to see that holes caused by shrapnel have destroyed the truck's engine or perforated the barrel of an artillery piece."⁽²⁰⁸⁾ According to one Defense Department official, "You can't do bomb damage analysis the way you did in (the Vietnam and Korean Wars) by following a line of bomb craters. Sometimes now, it requires finding a relatively tiny hole in a building. That requires very sophisticated technology. All you see is a tiny hole and maybe then some smoke blow out of a doorway. The plane inside may be incinerated, but how do you prove it? To be sure, you'd have to watch what happens around the bunker for days."⁽²⁰⁹⁾

Iraqi deception efforts also complicated the bomb damage assessment process. According to Michael Dewar, an authority on military deception, these included "dummy aircraft and Scud-B mobile missile launchers that were mistakenly attacked by allied aircraft. There is evidence too, that the Iraqis have been constructing false bomb craters on some runways to give the impression that an airfield is out of commission."⁽²¹⁰⁾

Assessment bomb damage were also complicated by different sources and methods, with each intelligence agency producing different estimates. One account suggested that CENTCOM "has access to reports from Iraqi prisoners of war and tactical, low-level reconnaissance photography that is not routinely provided to Washington. Agencies in Washington have had to rely mainly on high-level satellite photography."⁽²¹¹⁾ Another account agreed that national agencies, such as CIA and DIA, "rely solely on satellite photography and pictures from spy planes, while the Central command also uses pilot reports and other evidence gathered in Saudi Arabia."⁽²¹²⁾

Navy Captain David Herrington, Deputy Director for Intelligence for the Joint Staff, noted that "what we have here is a situation in which all the national technical means that we have are focused on the theater. All those assets, all that information that we collect nationally is sent forward as quickly as possible so that the on-scene commander has the benefit of that information. In addition to all those national technical means, he has available at his disposal a whole lot of tactical sensors -- that includes the RF-4..." Lt. Gen. Kelly pointed out in this regard that "When we started, we couldn't fly a lot of the tactical reconnaissance that we fly now, but we are flying it now, we are getting better every day, we are much more confident in the products we're getting now, and we think we are in good shape."⁽²¹³⁾

Rear Adm. Mike McConnell, Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff, noted that "National technical means are used to sense a battlefield, sense destruction of a strategic target or whatever, and some judgments are made about that target with regard to bomb damage assessment. Everything that's available at the national level is provided to the CINC. There's a structure, there's a process and a procedure for us to provide that information -- not in real time, but close, near real time. If you're in a battlefield environment and the CINC forward, there are many assets that are available to him, tactical assets -- RF-4s, things of that nature -- that can take photographs, assess damage, make those kinds of judgments. The process of getting that back from Riyadh to Washington -- the system's not designed to do that... CENTCOM has the best information. He knows what we know. We are in the process of knowing what he knows in the process of feedback."⁽²¹⁴⁾

By the middle of February, it was reported that "the Central Command estimates are about three to four times as large as the estimates by intelligence officials in Washington, who acknowledge that their projection is a conservative one that represents the minimum number of weapons destroyed."⁽²¹⁵⁾ On 14 February, CENTCOM concluded "that its damage assessment of allied bombing damage to Iraqi military equipment could have been too optimistic, and... adopted a more conservative method of counting destroyed targets... in which only one-third to one-half of the destruction reported by pilots is counted... The change was the third time the assessment method (was) altered... An initial very conservative approach, in which pilot accounts of target destruction were not counted at all, was changed (on 26 January) to counting a majority of them, and then to the current method of counting..."⁽²¹⁶⁾

Just prior to the initiation of the ground campaign, it was reported that "Central Command maintains that the overall strength of the Iraqi forces has been reduced 40% to 50%, the goal allied commanders wanted to reach before launching a ground assault. The Air Force, factoring in eyewitness reports from its pilots, says Riyadh's estimates are 15% to 50% too low. The Defense Intelligence Agency claims Central Command's figures are 15% to 20% too high. The CIA takes the most conservative line and would scale back Riyadh's numbers 20% to 25%."⁽²¹⁷⁾

Iraqi Field Forces

Satellite performance also left something to be desired in following Iraqi forces in th