Technical Capabilities of U.S. Space Assets

Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL No 8-9. Aug-Sep 92 (signed to press 28 Jul 92) pp 70-76

by Lieutenant Colonel A. N. Kuznetsov, candidate of technical sciences]

Results of the Persian Gulf war showed that the side s' military-technical capabilities as well as the quality of arms and military equipment had a substantial effect on its preparation and method of initiation and on the course and outcome of combat operations. Along with wide use of traditional means and methods of conducting military operations, the United States and its allies made intensive use of all kinds of space reconnaissance assets to obtain coordinates of the most important enemy targets and data on the enemy and above all on the status of his armed forces. This is indicated by statements of H. Cooper, director of the SDI Organization, and U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney. For example, Cooper believes the Persian Gulf war "was the first one in which space played a deciding role," and in a report to the President and Congress on the draft defense budget for 1991-1992 Cheney emphasized: "Space forces were used to the full extent in conducting Operation Desert Shield. More than 60 reconnaissance spacecraft were put to use by refining the deployment of orbiting reserve spacecraft and launching new ones. Some of the spacecraft which had been performing missions in support of other TVD's [theaters of military operations], the British Skynet-4 military communications spacecraft, and satellite communications channels of the Intelsat and Inmarsat international concerns were retargeted to the Persian Gulf area and information was used from Landsat (USA) and Spot (France) Earth resources research spacecraft.

Let us examine combat capabilities of the main military space orbital assets and systems of the United States and their role in Operation Desert Storm in more detail.

Space reconnaissance. The orbital grouping which supported operations of the multinational forces included more than 20 imaging reconnaissance (KH-11, Lacrosse) and signals intelligence [SIGINT] spacecraft (Ferret, Chalet, White Cloud, Aquacade) possessing high technical capabilities. For example, the KH-11 performs a reconnaissance survey of one area (several thousand square kilometers) in a strip up to 2,500 km with a resolution expressed in single meters, or detailed reconnaissance of several areas each with an area of around 10 km² in the very same strip with an accuracy of 15-20 cm. In the assessment of American specialists, by making brief "dives" to the limit of the atmosphere this spacecraft is capable of "identifying" not only the type of combat equipment, but also indicating its side number and nature of the load carried. In performing radar intelligence collection, the Lacrosse spacecraft "identifies" camouflaged targets. Subsequently the image is synthesized with the help of computers, and it is possible to distinguish on it the kind of combat equipment and determine the quantity and coordinates of targets. Spacecraft of this type have rather high combat capabilities. In particular, the Chalet and Aquacade electronic and communications intelligence spacecraft support the intercept of signals from radio relay, tropospheric and VHF/UHF communications stations operating in essentially the entire developed range of frequencies (20-40,000 MHz) and determine their coordinates with an accuracy to several kilometers. They are equipped with large-diameter (up to 100 m) zenith antennas and are the largest satellites in geostationary orbit. Intelligence is transmitted from satellites to main control, receiving and processing centers, then it goes to the National Intelligence Processing Center (Washington, USA), where it undergoes comprehensive computer processing. Intelligence is reported to the supreme U.S. military-political leadership. Until recently it was studied in the U.S. Defense Department " from top to bottom" in accordance with the official hierarchy. That scheme of data transmission provided necessary delimitation of access to intelligence, but did not allow prompt communication of space reconnaissance results to commanders at the tactical level. In particular, in delivering the strike against Libya in 1986 the U.S. Navy command in the Mediterranean had to await space reconnaissance results for around three days.

During Operation Desert Storm the Constant Source system for prompt processing and communication of information was used for the first time; it provided for transmitting data from the National Intelligence Processing Center over satellite communication channels directly to the TVD, including to commanders at the tactical level (Fig. 1). This took no more than 10 minutes, since around 10 data receiving and processing points were used. Similar gear underwent tests aboard U.S. Navy ships participating in military operations.

It was space reconnaissance that permitted discovering advance signs of Iraq's preparation for invasion of Kuwait. Several days before the beginning of military operations Aquacade and Chalet spacecraft detected stepped-up operation of Iraqi electronic equipment and the KH-ll's retargeted to this area permitted discovering the redeployment of Iraqi forces to the border with Kuwait.

During Operation Desert Storm imaging reconnaissance spacecraft provided monitoring of the military operations area with a periodicity of 4-6 times per day under favorable weather conditions and 2-3 times per day in cloudy weather. Their use permitted discovering Iraqi Army main battle groups and singling out priority targets for engagement. With the help of the KH-11 and Lacrosse, Iraqi Army second echelons were reconnoitered; concentration areas of reserves and locations of mass destruction weapon delivery means, aviation and air defense were determined; and coordinates were updated for military and state command and control facilities and the most important industrial enterprises and installations of the Iraqi infrastructure. The information also was used in selecting flight routes and calculating missions for Tomahawk cruise missiles.

SIGINT spacecraft permitted continuous monitoring of the Middle East area. They were used to uncover the Iraqi military and state command and control system and air defense system; determine the type, operating mode and location of radars and communications and EW equipment; identify operating command and control facilities; and intercept messages on military communication nets. The White Cloud spacecraft helped to promptly detect and output coordinates of vessels in Persian Gulf waters in support of a maritime blockade.

On the whole, space reconnaissance assets permitted effective use of their data in planning massive fire strikes with precision weapons. In particular, based on satellite intelligence it was possible to make a prompt estimate of the degree of target damage for planning subsequent strikes. But the war also revealed a number of shortcomings of these assets. Intelligence was not communicated promptly enough due to incomplete deployment of the orbital grouping of imaging reconnaissance spacecraft and troop facilities of the Constant Source system. The rate at which combat operations were conducted by multinational force aviation often exceeded the rate at which intelligence was updated. With the Iraqis' skillful use of maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception" - FBIS] and creation of decoys, space reconnaissance assets did not always reliably support their identification. As a result, a number of air strikes were delivered against artificially created targets.

IMEWS ballistic missile launch detection system. It included five DSP and DSP Block-14 spacecraft inserted into geostationary orbits. The DSP spacecraft permitted determining the launch and azimuth of fire of ballistic missiles and updating information every 12 seconds. The DSP Block-14's are equipped with more advanced gear capable in addition of determining launches of operational tactical missiles. The multinational forces took special measures to combat Iraqi operational-tactical missiles in connection with the threat of Iraq's employment of chemical weapons. A regional missile attack warning system was established in very compressed time periods consisting of two DSP Block-14 spacecraft, IMEWS ground centers and a satellite communications system (Fig. 2). Special air attack elements of the multinational forces were assigned to hunt and destroy Iraqi mobile missile systems. Missiles in flight were intercepted by a point ABM defense system consisting of around 60 Patriot SAM systems. Information from DSP Block-14 spacecraft was transmitted to the IMEWS systems control and data reception and processing center (Alice Springs, Australia), from where it was relayed over satellite communication channels to the system's main center located at the NORAD command post (Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado). Here the missile was identified according to the propulsion unit exhaust flare and its night trajectory was calculated. Data on the launch site and possible missile impact area were communicated over satellite communications channels to American troops and to the civil defense heads of Saudi Arabia or Israel (depending on the presumed impact area).

Because Iraq would deliver missile strikes primarily at night or in adverse weather conditions, detection of mobile missile systems by imaging reconnaissance space assets was hampered. This is why, by intersecting coordinates of missile launch points, the IMEWS system would provide the most accurate information on the location of Iraqi mobile missile systems. It also was used for preliminary target designation to air strike elements of the multinational forces.

The American command, Patriot SAM system command and control facilities, and heads of civil defense of Saudi Arabia and Israel would receive the warning signal 1.5-2 minutes before the warhead appeared over the target. In the opinion of American experts, this time would have been sufficient to significantly reduce losses of servicemen and the civilian population in case of the use of warheads with chemical and biological weapons, but not enough for delivering an air strike and hitting the mobile missile systems. Therefore an IMEWS system data reception and processing point was redeployed to the upcoming combat operations area. As a result the warning time to command and control facilities of air strike elements and the Patriot SAM system was increased from 1.5 to 5 minutes, which permitted increasing the effectiveness of hunting the mobile missile systems and employing ABM defense weapons.

Use of the IMEWS system in the Persian Gulf confirmed the possibility of establishing effective TVD missile attack warning systems. The possibility was demonstrated for the first time of using ballistic missile launch detection spacecraft for performing a qualitatively new mission_issuing target designations on mobile missile systems. In this connection the United States made the decision to unfold work on operational-tactical missile launch detection spacecraft and mobile equipment for the Army and Navy to receive their data.

Space communications. During Operation Desert Storm command and control of forces at the strategic, operational-tactical and tactical levels was provided with the help of space communications systems. Active use of satellite communications began literally in the first hours of Operation Desert Shield, when two subunits equipped with mobile satellite communications stations were moved onto the territory of Saudi Arabia from 7 through 9 August 1990 as part of the first echelon of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. In the words of Lieutenant General J. Cassity, a responsible JCS official, " satellites became the backbone of the entire command and control and communications system in the Persian Gulf. In the first 90 days we set up more communications equipment there than we had in Europe for the last 40 years."

All the main U.S. Defense Department satellite communications systems were used for command and control during Operation Desert Storm - DSCS, FLTSATCOM, AFSATCOM, and TACSATCOM. There were up to 20 spacecraft in the orbital grouping of these systems.

The DSCS system provided communications for the leadership of the multinational forces, and for the American forces command in the TVD with the supreme U.S. military-political leadership.

The FLTSATCO, system was used to provide strategic, operational-tactical and tactical communications in support of U.S. Navy groupings. In particular, it permitted prompt command and control of guided missile ships and submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles and transmission of updated missions for cruise missiles from shore bases to these ships and submarines.

The AFSATCOM system was put to use for issuing target designations to strategic B-52 bombers, and TACSATCOM provided operational-tactical and tactical communications for the multinational forces.

To provide communications for the multinational forces in FLTSATCOM and TACSATCOM system nets, the LEASAT and FLEETSAT, which were in a geostationary orbit over the Indian Ocean were fully retargeted to the Persian Gulf area. In addition, the small experimental low-orbiting MACSAT spacecraft provided communications for Marine Corps subscribers at the tactical level for up to 10 minutes within a radius of around 700 km with a zone of visibility or transmitted information to any area of the Earth in the "electronic mail" mode (data are stored by the spacecraft and played back in a given zone). The advantage of such devices compared with traditional ones lies in their prompt insertion into orbit using mobile booster rockets.

Multinational force communications was provided by the British Skynet-4 military spacecraft, and the U.S. Defense Department leased several satellite communications channels from the Intelsat and Inmarsat international concerns for the period of the operations. It is not precluded that they also were used to transmit battlefield color photographs. That approach was used for the first time by the U.S. Army in Operation Just Cause (Panama) in December 1989, and in the following year the U.S. Defense Department purchased around 150 electronic cameras from the Japanese firms of Canon and Sony for prompt information.

On the whole, the above systems confirmed the high effectiveness of employing precision weapons and of command and control. As stated by Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) M. Faga, " space communications systems proved their usefulness, even when the distance between subscribers was not over 80 km. Their use was especially effective the absence of a developed ground communications system." At the same time, the shortage of communications channels was felt during military operations, above all at the tactical level. To solve this problem the U.S. Defense Department leadership proposes to activate work to create the new MILSTAR jam-resistant communications system, which consists of spacecraft inserted into geostationary and highly elliptical orbits, and tactical satellite communications systems based on the small low-orbiting TACSAT spacecraft intended for supporting battlefield communications.

Space navigation systems. Navigation of Navy ships in the Persian Gulf was supported by the Transit system. Another system, NAVSTAR, together with the Army PLKS automated inertial position-finding system as well as the Air Force and Navy JTIDS joint tactical communications and information distribution system permitted effectively solving problems of navigation employment of precision weapons and of troop operations under desert conditions. These systems exercised continuous automatic control over the disposition of friendly personnel and equipment(down to separate subunits) and supported topogeodetic survey of firing (launch) positions, guidance of precision weapons, and navigation of aircraft and helicopters. In particular, multinational force subunits were outfitted with a large number (up to 2,000) of SLGR autonomous navigation receivers developed for civilian users of the NAVSTAR system. The receiver (1.35 kg) fits in the pocket of a military uniform and permits determining position with an accuracy to 25 m (using navigational signals of enhanced accuracy).

In the words of Lieutenant General T. Moorman, chief of the USAF Space Command, it was the NAVSTAR system which provided the greatest benefit for the United States in the war against Iraq. "Without it," he emphasized," with the enormous expanse of sandy desert the multinational forces would have been unable to properly orient themselves on the terrain, coordinate their actions and make effective use of the data coming from reconnaissance spacecraft on the location of friendly and Iraqi subunits and military equipment."

The high effectiveness of this system under combat conditions led to a revision in the amount of navigation gear procured for the U.S. Armed Forces. In addition to 27,000 autonomous navigation receivers of different types ordered by the Defense Department, it is planned to procure at least another 25,000. The decision also was made to install the Block-3 receiver of the NAVSTAR system in advanced Tomahawk cruise missiles, which will accelerate and simplify their strike planning and increase the flexibility of their employment, since in a number of cases it will be possible to reject missile guidance based on digital terrain maps. In local wars, when the enemy does not use ECM, advanced cruise missiles will be able to be guided to targets based only on this system's information.

Space meteorological support systems. The U.S. Defense Department DMSP space meteorological system was used for meteorological data. During preparation and conduct of Operation Desert Storm it was used in planning air-missile strikes and Army and Navy operations, forecasting the situation in case of Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons, and selecting areas for conducting space electro-optical reconnaissance.

American experts established a precise interrelationship between Iraq's delivery of missile strikes and weather conditions in western and southern areas of this country. Strikes were delivered against Saudi Arabia when there were heavy clouds in the south and against Israel with similar weather conditions in the west. Long-range weather forecasts permitted advance planning of measures for hunting mobile missile systems, for ABM defense systems, and for protecting the civilian population.

Earth resources research spacecraft. By mid-1990 the U.S. Armed Forces had only obsolete 25-year-old topographic maps of the Middle East. Multispectrum space photos obtained by civilian spacecraft for studying the Earth's natural resources were used to promptly manufacture new maps. Around 60 photos obtained from the Landsat and Spot spacecraft were used in the process of creating the new maps. The manufactured topographic maps proved to be more informative, since visible underground geological structures permitted determining optimum places to deploy airfields and build engineer works and selecting routes for moving columns of heavy military equipment.

In assessing results of Operation Desert Storm, one can speak confidently about the capability for significantly increasing combat effectiveness of TVD forces through use of military space forces. This is confirmed by the fact that they provided the multinational forces with prompt information about the redeployment of Iraqi troops, thereby supporting effective fire engagement of Iraqi Army personnel and equipment and of Iraqi military industrial targets with precision weapons, and also prompt command and control of forces and weapons.