THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8000
JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
JROCM 047-95
30 March 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY
Subject: Defense Information System Network (DISN) Mission Need Statement (MNS)
On 14 February 1995, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed and validated the Defense Information System Agency's Mission Need Statement for a Defense Information System Network (DISN). Recommend the a Major Automated Information System Review Council (MAISRC) be convened to consider how to fulfill this joint requirement in lieu of a Defense Acquisition Board. An accelerated acquisition process is essential in this case to take advantage of commercial capabilities. The JROC decided to retain approval authority for future MNS-related Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs).
[SIGNATURE]
W. A. Owens
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JROC Chairman
Enclosure
MISSION NEED STATEMENT (MNS) FOR
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK (DISN)
1. Background. This MNS responds to the requirements identified in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (FY1996-2001), and to requirements for implementing C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW) concepts. An integrated transmission infrastructure is needed to support the military's move into the 21st Century information age of dynamic bandwith allocation and to replace the individual legacy communications systems with a seamless transport capability that can keep pace with evolving technology and meet the changing C4I demands of the warfighter. To date, C4I strategic and tactical connectivity for the warfighter has been provided via costly interfaces between disjointed, disparate, and stovepiped wide and local area networks which are duplicative and inefficiently consume limited bandwith and shrinking fiscal resources.
1.1 The Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4l) and Space-Based Systems section of the DPG specifies the following requirements:
a. Integrated connectivity to all theater and tactical elements through modernized, jam-resistant telecommunications network support.
b. Joint and combined interoperability in all mission areas to facilitate Joint and Combined Task Force (JTF/CTF) operations.
c. Improved systems to integrate strategic, theater and tactical intelligence with joint/combined operating forces.
d. Intelligence systems that are fully integrated with C4 systems.
1.2 To effectively and economically support these requirements, a common user transmission infrastructure with integrated wide area networking interfaces to local area networks, integrated network and system management capabilities, and value-added services transport capability must be fielded. The integrated capability must ensure the warfighter has responsive and reliable command and control, intelligence, and support information anywhere, anytime, to support any mission.
2. Mission and Threat Analysis
2.1 Mission. The primary C4l systems support mission is to enhance the warfighter's effectiveness by providing an integrated global communications infrastructure with sufficient bandwith for high volume exchange of voice, data, imagery, and video transmission services for strategic and tactical mission areas. The capability that provides transport of this mission critical C4I information must be global and seamless in connectivity, scaleable in capacity, flexible in provisioning, easily extended to any location in the world, and capable of accepting technology insertions and value-added services in support of future warfighting requirements. When contingencies and conflicts arise, warfighters will need continuous C4l connectivity as they transition from the sustaining base to their respective areas of operation. The network providing C4l support must be flexible enough to handle rapid expansion of connectivity/bandwidth (dynamic reallocation) requirements to support all JTF/CTF operations.
2.2 Objectives. The primary objectives of all DoD efforts to implement these capabilities are to ensure the network and provided C4l support can:
a. Provide a stable migration path to the 21st Century that exploits information age technology for direct warfighter support.
b. Support two (2) Major Regional Contingencies (MRC), in addition to peacetime, daily worldwide operational requirements.
c. Provide transport capability of value-added services of Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the Defense Message System (DMS), common C2 and intelligence information transfer network, video/textual teleconferencing network, voice networks, Integrated Tactical Strategic Data Network (ITSDN), and other programs, systems, and initiatives enhancing the warfighter real time information exchange and processing.
d. Support afloat, airborne, and ground Joint military operations/forces in all theaters, worldwide.
e. Meet C4l systems demands for joint and combined US military operations at local, regional, theater, and global levels.
f. Support the exchange of national and theater intelligence and/or combat sensor information among combat and C2 systems.
g. Meet demands of sustaining support bases/post/camps/stations providing mission support for deployable forces. This includes being the interface point and providing the long-haul backbone.
h. Meet demands for transition from sustaining support bases to the JTF deployed area of responsibility. This includes the transition over the interfaces between the strategic and tactical environment, such as the Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) and the ITSDN.
i. Meet demands for interoperability requirements with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and our allies to support coalition warfare.
j. Meet demands for connection of worldwide modeling and simulation, and tele-training platforms that comprise warfighter decision support, and distance learning training systems.
k. Meet operational demands for network availability, scalability, reliability, ease of extension, restoral, faster provisioning, higher bandwidth, survivability, and end-to-end global interoperability using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems and components to maximum extent possible.
l. Operate in a diverse communications environment.
m. Meet projected C4I systems demands for responsive, and reliable command and control, intelligence, and support information.
2.3 Threat. This worldwide DoD capability will support information transport for C4l systems and facilities supporting DoD missions in all operational environments. Each C4l element of this capability need not be protected against all threats at every level of conflict.
2.3.1 Formal threat and vulnerability analyses were performed and documented in the NSA Threat Assessment for DISN-NT Security Architecture, dated 17 April, 1992, and the DISN-NT Security and Vulnerability Assessment, dated 17 April 1992, and prepared by NSA. A resulting DISN-NT Risk Assessment, dated 13 May, 1992 was produced. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I approved the DISN-NT Security Architecture on 19 January, 1993.
2.3.2 The objective is to construct an appropriately integrated, balanced and cost-effective network (including built-in redundancy and alternate routing where required) that has as a minimum the core capability for voice that includes data integrity, authentication, and availability; the core capability for data that includes integrity and availability; and the core capability for video that includes data integrity and confidentiality, availability, and authentication. The respective capabilities are defined in the DISN-NT Security Architecture, 19 January 1993.
2.3.3 As with current C4I systems, individual network components must provide varying degrees of threat mitigation as required for the supported mission. In peacetime, the documented threats include counter-intelligence, inadvertent jamming, intercept, OPSEC considerations, viruses, hackers, and spoofing. During crisis or regional conflicts, the threats include physical destruction, attacks by directed energy devices, and attacks through electronic and information warfare techniques including jamming, deception, and database penetration/corruption. Added threats in the unlikely event of global war include nuclear blast, radiation, scintillation, High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), anti-satellite weapons and high-altitude nuclear blasts.
2.4 Priority/Timing. The need for this integrated information transfer capability generates and impacts a number of supporting Service and Defense agency operational requirements, telecommunications systems, and programs. This capability is mission essential to the warfighter, and fiscal realities demand it. Consequently, supporting operational requirements and telecommunications systems programs associated with this capability are ranked high by Services and agencies.
2.4.1 As the C4I community continues to push the technology envelope, it must ensure that appropriate interfaces for combined operations are being considered and provided as an integral part of any future C4I capability. Technology breakthroughs in C4I will be considered for insertion to the integrated information transfer capability.
2.5 General Capabilities. The warfighter requires a service that will provide transport and routing of voice, circuit switched data, packet switched data, video, and point-to-point bandwith. In today's multiple threat environment requiring quick response, the rapid establishment of capable C4I connectivity is essential. Each segment of the capability must incorporate appropriate safeguards commensurate with the existing or projected threat, and as required by governing policies.
2.5.1 The integrated worldwide telecommunications capability will support transmission of voice, data, imagery, and video at all security classification levels. The network will support flexible and rapid provisioning, be easily extended, and capable of easily accepting future technology insertions. It will also provide seamless interfaces to commercial networks as required to support increased traffic during surge, and contingency conditions. The network will be capable of rapid restoral in order to minimize the necessity for independent/stand-alone operations.
2.5.2 The network will support the requirement for the exponential increase in bandwidth, especially in support of modeling, imagery, and video teleconferencing requirements.
2.5.3 The network will integrate satellite, airborne and terrestrial based (wire and wireless) transmission and switching systems (strategic and tactical) and provide for end-to-end visibility to support integrated management of the network and connected systems. To perform path assurance, configuration management, and other global network and systems management functions, network components will be integrated to provide seamless connectivity. Additionally, it will have integrated network, systems and security management and control capabilities at local, regional and theater levels. Integrated network and systems management will employ state-of-the-art capabilities to manage connected resources, and enhance responsiveness to surge contingencies and outages. All management activities will be guided by common standards and procedures for integrated management of network and system resources.
2.5.4 The network will provide the transport mechanism for the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII).
3. Nonmateriel Alternatives. Numerous policy and procedural measures have been undertaken to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of fielding and providing C4I connectivity capabilities for the warfighter. Policies and procedures, to include DoD Directives, Defense Management Review Decisions, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, that impose interoperability considerations on all new systems and mandate the use of standards, have been published. However, progress toward the required DoD-wide end-to-end integrated capability has been slow. Additionally, the existence of legacy systems and the need for ClNCs, Services and Defense agencies to retain the costly, dedicated transmission systems have resulted in only marginal improvements in end-to-end C4l connectivity capability and savings. Today's warfighters' missions, economic realities, and technology breakthroughs demand faster improvements for C4l systems connectivity and support.
4. Potential Materiel Alternatives. There are three material alternatives for meeting this need:
a. Alternative 1 - Maintaining the "status quo" of loosely coordinated development, implementation, and management of Service and Defense agency systems (special purpose and common-user) that require special interfaces to achieve the interoperability and integration to support joint operations. Major common-user systems that require interfacing include, the Defense Switched Network, Defense Data Network, AUTODIN, Defense Simulation Network, Defense Red Switch Network, Defense Special Security Communications System, and the national Secure Telephone System. Special purpose systems with partial or dedicated transmission and network management that must be interfaced include Service and agency router networks, dedicated intelligence Community networks, and dedicated CINC C2 support networks.
b. Alternative 2 - Simultaneously upgrade all department switching/transmission and network systems to standard state-of-the-art platforms.
c. Alternative 3 - Incrementally integrate all DoD network and transmission systems into a secure, seamless, standards based, information transfer infrastructure with responsible DoD activities at local, regional, theater and global levels, and tactical interfaces, performing integrated management. Stay in step with evolving commercial technology and standards via planned technology insertion, thereby avoiding use of "proprietary" hardware and software solutions and their related pitfalls.
5. Constraints. The requirements and capabilities prescribed in this MNS must be satisfied through a logical and orderly transition of information infrastructure assets (existing systems, networks, and associated management systems) in order to minimize mission impact and implementation cost. Management and replacement, or continuation of DoD information transfer programs must be planned and phased to achieve the maximum benefit to DoD and particularly to warfighting ClNCs and JTF commanders.
5.1 DISN will maintain C4I support in all operational environments.
5.2 Services and agencies must perform assigned network and management responsibilities within a centrally defined framework of architectures, standards, and procedures.
5.3 The user will determine operations, maintenance, and logistics support staffing required, with the goal of no increase in manpower requirements.
5.4 NATO and other allied forces will continue to have the same or better level of interoperability as experienced with the Defense Communications System (DCS).
5.5 The network will employ appropriate security measures to address known threats. Security measures will be implemented to protect mission data and safeguard system resources and information to ensure system availability in all conflict/threat scenarios. Using available information security techniques and tools, the network will support information transfer at all classification levels (Unclassified but Sensitive (UBS) to Top Secret Special Compartmented Information (SCI)), in accordance with governing security regulations. Multilevel security (MLS) capabilities will be incorporated as they become available, assuming they are operationally feasible and affordable.
5.6 The underlying implementation objective is that the DISN and other connected telecommunication facilities and services, evolve with: technical coherence, operational responsiveness, global interoperability and cost-effectiveness. Maintaining the technological currency of the DISN will be accomplished through the competitive and timely insertion of key technologies and services via an acquisition approach that will include a leading edge technologies activity.
6. Joint Potential Designator. Joint.
thomas2r@ncr.disa.mil - Last Revision: 1 October 1996