Figure 3-1: ABPBD Schedule
The objective of this ACTD is to evaluate the military utility of an air base/port biological detection (ABPBD) capability and to develop operational procedures for that capability. An additional objective is to provide a residual capability to detect, alarm/warn/dewarn, identify, protect, and decontaminate against a Biological Warfare (BW) attack on an air base or port facility. Currently, there is no fielded biological detection system to provide advance warning of point (e.g., ballistic missile) or to cover BW attacks to critical Air/Sea Ports of Debarkation (APOD/SPOD). A BW attack on APOD/SPOD during early entry could be a "war stopper" without bio detection capability.
Participants
The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense (JPO-BD) is the executing agent for the ACTD. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the lead development agency based on previous development with the Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD). The ACTD will be leveraging advanced detection and identification technologies from the DoD counterproliferation initiative and technology base community. Co-sponsors for the ACTD are Pacific and Central Commands who will provide the crews and doctrine/concept of operations. Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) will provide the test range for tests and demonstrations.
Residual Capability
In addition to the detection and identification system, several other leave-behind capabilities will be provided in this ACTD: (1) large area decontamination equipment will be provided to support base/port recovery procedures; (2) collective equipment will be provided for key personnel protection in the event of BW attack; (3) low cost oronasal masks which are available off-the-shelf will be provided for the civilian/stevedore workers; (4) reporting and warning system; (5) medical countermeasures (e.g., antibiotics and antitoxins); and (6) tested concept of operations and doctrine.
Concept of Operations and Technical Approach
BW agents are generally aerosol particles that are respirable by humans and animals, and when inhaled by personnel, the organisms infect, or, in the case of toxins, poison them. These agents can affect personnel over a time period ranging from minutes to days, and would be released in a manner that would mitigate the advantage gained by the facility in the region without exposing the aggressor to the conventional defense mounted by that facility. Such an action may take place prior to increased U.S. operations, thus slowing or stopping the base's contribution to the effort. Such operations are also deniable if covert dissemination of the agent can occur.
BW agents are usually disseminated in stable weather conditions with mild wind speeds at night, and can be disseminated from a point source or from a moving source in a vehicle (line source). Relatively small amounts of a BW agent can contaminate large areas and their persistency ranges from minutes to years. The most effective time to use these agents would be during the buildup phase of expeditionary operations at forward bases, or during the operational phase, against logistics centers, especially those that use civilian personnel.
The concept of employment would be to install the detection system and command and control interface at the site prior to buildup or as a permanent installation. Monitoring of the area would begin immediately to establish background aerosol particle counts and size ranges. The detection system could consist of a combination of stationary and mobile point detectors that would monitor the density of the respirable aerosol particles associated with BW agents.
The point detector(s) begins taking liquid samples when there is an increase in particulate background, and sampling will continue as long as the background remains high. The liquid sample is fed to a generic detector for a bio/non-bio reading. An alarm is sent to the operations center after a positive detection. Once the sample is taken, the liquid media will be transferred to an identifier. The identifier will provide a specific identification (BW Agent) from available assays. The remainder of the liquid sample will be stored and transferred to the forward laboratory and/or CONUS for extensive analysis to be used to for National Command authority decisions. If a known agent is found by the identifier and/or forward laboratory, a chain-of-custody will be established at the detector site. The sample(s) will then be taken to the designated laboratory in a certified manner. The chain-of-custody will be established at the detector site and maintained to the designated confirmatory laboratory.
This ACTD will develop and install an automated interface to the base/port facility Combat Operations Center, linking the system to the CINC's C4I system and tailoring to the specific system(s) installed and operational at the CINC's location. The ACTD will support any modifications to the interface required by changes to the existing Combat Operations Center and C4I systems which are implemented during the two year support phase of the ACTD.
Demonstration Phase
The ACTD will start in FY96. A field demonstration will be conducted in FY96 of the IBADs coupled with several generic detectors. A second demonstration is scheduled for FY97 which will demonstrate the selected system configuration, the automated components of the system, and the RF link which will be used to interface the system into the base/port Combat Operations Center. Training and installation is scheduled for FY98.
Novel elements for this ACTD, shown in Table 3-1, include the Fixed Site Automation and C4I connectivity of biological point detectors which expand on current Biological Defense programs by permitting their exploitation for air base and port facility protection.
| Elements | Description |
| Generic Detector | A promising generic detector, capable of providing a biological/non-biological indication, will be selected from a set of state-of-the-art detectors under test at the Joint Field Trials for integration in the demonstration system. |
| Fixed Site Automation | Multiple detector site layout/topology for perimeter area Automation protection and tailored algorithms to mitigate individual detector false alarm potential and to provide increased overall detection and reporting accuracy. |
| Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4I) Connectivity | Nuclear and Chemical detection/reporting systems integrated with the Biological detection component to demonstrate an integrated Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) detection and reporting capability using shared real estate, communications, data processing, and C4I resources. |
| Protection System | Collectively protected locations where key personnel would go in the event of a hazard alarm. Available service systems will be evaluated as possible solutions. |
| Oronasal Masks | Masks are currently available as off-the-shelf items (e.g., 3M Corporation) and in Service inventories with known performance characteristics which will be evaluated for adoption for this ACTD. |
The Joint Program Manager for Biological Defense is the Demonstration Program Manager. The NAVSEA is responsible for program execution and is responsible for technical matters. The ACTD schedule is shown in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: ABPBD Schedule
ABPBD points of contact are listed below.
| AT Staff | Service/Agency POC | User Sponsor |
| Mr. Troy Crites (703) 693-8045 |
BG J. Doesburg (703) 681-3449 |
Lt Col Tom Clark CENTCOM (813) 828-6228 |