National Space Policy a. The national space policy of the United States has been developed over many years. It continues to evolve based on revised goals and objectives of the nation, budget constraints, previous space policies, current programs, national and international law, and treaty obligations.
Development of U.S. Space Policy b. On October 4, 1957 the former Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik 1. This event had an immediate and far-reaching impact on the public perception of space. Prior public view of space activity had been confined essentially to the realm of science fiction. Sputnik made space a reality. The space age was born. Shortly after the success of Sputnik, the U.S. attempted to launch its own earth satellite. Unfortunately, this initial effort to launch the U.S. satellite, Vanguard, was a spectacular failure. The Army responded with its ballistic missile experts from Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. This unique group of scientists and engineers, led by Werner Von Braun, launched the first U.S. satellite, Explorer I, at the end of January 1958. The U.S. had entered the space age. Within two months after the launch of Explorer I, in March 1958, President Eisenhower's science advisory committee issued a statement that the development of space technology was potentially vital to the national security.
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 c. The first official national space policy was embodied in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. It declared that the policy of the United States was to devote space activities to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind and mandated separate civilian and national security space programs. It created a new agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to provide direction to and exercise control over all U.S. space activities except those associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States. The policy framework for a viable space program was thus in place. In fact, the principles enunciated by the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which included peaceful focus on the use of space, separation of civilian and national security space programs, emphasis on international cooperation, and preservation of a space role, have become basic tenants of the U.S. space program. All presidential space directives issued since 1958 have reaffirmed these basic tenets. The element missing from the U.S. space program was how to accomplish the space policy.
3-2 U.S. Presidential Administrations
Eisenhower Administration a. The Eisenhower administration's approach to implementing the new space policy was conservative, cautious, and constrained. Early DOD and NASA plans for advanced manned space flight programs were repeatedly disapproved. Instead, the administration preferred to concentrate on unmanned, largely scientific missions and to proceed with those missions at a measured pace. Between 1958 and 1961, the U.S. launched numerous small satellites to include communications, weather, reconnaissance and scientific payloads.
Kennedy Administration b. The first major space goal was pronounced by President Kennedy on 25 March 1961. The Kennedy statement was made during a period of intense national introspection. Although Yuri Gagarin, the first Soviet in space, spent just 89 minutes in orbit, his accomplishment electrified the world and caused the United States to question its scientific and engineering skills and its entire educational system. The American response ­ to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth ­ bounded U.S. space goals for the remainder of the decade. Prestige and international leadership were clearly the main objective of the Kennedy space program. However, the generous funding that accompanied the Apollo program had important residual benefits as well. It permitted the buildup of U.S. space technology and the establishment of an across the board space capability to include planetary exploration, scientific endeavors, commercial applications, and military support systems.
Nixon Administration c. As the decade of the 60's drew to a close, a combination of factors, including domestic unrest, an unpopular foreign war, and inflationary pressures, forced the nation to reassess the relative priority of the space program as compared to other national needs. President Nixon announced his space policy statement in March 1970. It was a carefully considered and carefully worded statement that was clearly aware of political realities and the mood of Congress and the public. Although spectacular lunar and planetary voyages continued until 1975, largely as a result of budgetary decisions made during the mid­1960's, it was clear that the Nixon administration considered the space program of less priority and would not support increased investment for the initiation of large, new space projects. It viewed space as a medium for exploiting and extending the technological and scientific gains that had already been realized. The emphasis was on practical space applications to include worldwide communications and meteorological systems, earth resource surveys, and scientific stellar and solar observations. Military surveillance satellites and navigation systems received increased emphasis as well. The only new space initiative undertaken was the space shuttle. The 1972 decision to proceed with this program was made for three principal reasons: a reusable vehicle promised to drastically reduce operational launch costs; the project would employ up to 40,000 aerospace workers ; and DOD expressed an interest in the concept. When problems associated with the highly technical program began to arise it resulted in schedule slippage, cost overruns, and impacted adversely on already austere scientific and application programs. It soon became apparent that no Americans would be launched into space for the remainder of the decade, costing the space program much of its early momentum.
3-3 Carter Administration
Introduction a. Early in the Carter administration, studies were conducted that addressed the apparent fragmentation and possible redundancy in the nation's space effort. These studies recommended that President Carter issue two Presidential Directives (PD). PD­37 focused on national space policy and PD­42 addressed civil space policy.
PD-37 b. PD­37 reaffirmed the basic policy principles contained in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, and for the first time, spelled out in coherent fashion the broad objectives of the U.S. space program and the specific guidelines governing civil and national security space activities. PD­37 was important from a military perspective because it contained the initial, though, tentative, indications that a shift was occurring in the national security establishment's views on space. Traditionally, they had viewed space as a force enhancer, that is, as a medium in which to deploy systems to increase the effectiveness of land, sea, and air forces. Although the focus of the Carter administration space policy was clearly on restricting the weaponization of space, PD­37 reflected an appreciation of the importance of space systems to national survival, a recognition of the Soviet threat to those systems, and a willingness to push ahead with development of an ASAT capability in the absence of verifiable and comprehensive international agreements restricting such systems. In other words, space was beginning to be viewed as a potential warfighting medium. Carter was the first President to mention spy satellite capabilities in public speeches. PD­37 basically addressed the space program in its totality.
PD-42 c. PD­42 was directed exclusively at the civil space community and was designed to set the direction for U.S. efforts over the next decade. However, it was devoid of any long­term space goals, stating instead that the nation would pursue a balanced evolutionary strategy of space applications, space science, and exploration activities. The absence of a more visionary policy reflected clearly the continuing developmental problems with the shuttle and the resulting commitment of larger than expected resources.
3-4 Reagan Administration
Introduction a. President Reagan's initial national space policy was National Security Decision Directive 42, publicly announced on 4 July 1982. It superseded all previous presidential space policy directives.
NSDD-42 b. NSDD­42 reaffirmed a national commitment to the exploration and use of space in support of the national well being. It established the basic goals of U.S. space policy as strengthening U.S. security, maintaining U.S. space leadership, obtaining economic and scientific benefits through space exploitation, expanding the investment and involvement of the U.S. private sector in civil space related activities, promoting international cooperative activities in the national interest, and cooperating with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for activities that enhance the security and welfare of the entire human race. NSDD­42 outlined broad principles that were to serve as the basis for the future U.S. space program. For the most part, these principles have characterized, historically, the conduct of U.S. space activities.
NSDD-42 Basic Commitments c. These principles include five basic commitments:
  1. To the exploration and use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes to permit activities in pursuit of national security goals.
  2. To conduct international cooperative space­related activities that achieve scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits for the United States.
  3. To pursue activities in space in support of the United States' inherent right of self­defense.
  4. To develop Space Transportation System (STS) capabilities and capacities to meet appropriate national needs and to make the STS available to commercial and governmental users, both domestic and foreign. This included the recognition that the STS was to be the primary space launch system for national security and civil government missions.
  5. To continue to study space arms control options and to consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban, or otherwise limit, testing and deployment of specific weapons provided those measures were compatible with U.S. national security. Other broad principles included a rejection of national claims to sovereignty over any portion of space and celestial bodies as well as a rejection of any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data from space. There was a recognition that space systems are national property and have the right to pass through and operate in space without interference, and that the United States would view purposeful interference as an infringement on its sovereign rights.
NSDD-42 Policy Guidance d. In addition to outlining the basic goals and broad principles of the U.S. space program, NSDD­42 provided specific policy guidance. The following is some specific guidance as it applied to military activities. The United States would conduct activities in space deemed necessary to national security. These activities would support such functions as command and control, communication, navigation, environmental monitoring, warning, surveillance, and self­defense. The United States would pursue survivability and endurance of space systems, including all system elements. Deficiencies were to be identified and eliminated. Development of an anti­satellite capability was to proceed with a goal of operational deployment. Under attack warning the United States would develop and maintain an integrated attack warning, notification, verification, and contingency reaction capability that could detect and react effectively to threats to U.S. space systems. The policy also allowed development of special purpose launch capabilities as required to meet national security needs. The STS was to be made fully operational and cost effective in providing routine access to space. Enhancement of STS operational capability, upper stages, and methods of deploying and retrieving payloads was to be pursued as national requirements were defined.
NSDD-85 d. NSDD 85, 25 March 1983, clearly reflects the transition to a space warfighting perspective. President Reagan stated that the long term goal of the United States was the elimination of the threat presently posed by nuclear ballistic missiles. Though specific systems are not identified, it is recognized generally that space based systems will play a significant role in this vision in the future.
3-4 Reagan Administration cont'd
PD Dated 3 February 1988 e. On January 5, 1988, the President approved a revised national space policy. It reaffirms the national commitment to the exploration and use of space in support of our national well being. It acknowledges that U.S. space activities are conducted by three separate and distinct sectors: two strongly interacting governmental sectors (Civil and National Security) and a separate, non­governmental commercial sector.
Goals and Principles f. It established the following goals and principles:
  • Strengthen the security of the United States;
  • Obtain scientific technological and economic benefits for the general population and to improve the quality of life on Earth through space related activities;
  • Encourage private sector investment;
  • Promote international cooperative activities taking into account U.S. security, foreign policy, scientific, and economic interests;
  • Cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of all mankind; and
  • Expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system.
Conduct of Space Activities g. The directive also states that the U.S. shall conduct space activities in accordance with the following principles:
  • Committed to the exploration and peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind. Peaceful use allows for activities in pursuit of national security goals.
  • Pursue activities in support of its right of self defense and defense of its allies.
  • Rejects any claim of sovereignty over outer space or celestial bodies.
  • Considers the space system of any nation to be national property.
  • Encourages the commercial use and exploitation of space technologies.
  • Encourages other countries to engage in free and fair trade in commercial space goods and services.
  • Conduct international cooperative space­related activities that are expected to achieve sufficient scientific, political, economic, or national security benefits for the nation.
The Presidential Directive also covered civil, commercial, and national security space policy, inter­sector policies, implementing procedures, and policy guidelines for the civil, commercial, and national security sectors.
3-5 Bush Administration
Introduction a. On November 2, 1989, President Bush approved a national space policy that updated and reaffirmed U.S. goals and activities in space. The policy reaffirmed the nation's commitment to the exploration and use of space in support of the U.S. national well being.
Conduct of Space Activities b. The policy recognizes that leadership in space activities and capabilities requires preeminence in key areas. It also retains the long­term goal of expanding human presence beyond Earth orbit into the Solar System. The policy stated that space activities are conducted in three distinct sectors:
  • Civil government sector
  • National security sector
  • Non­governmental commercial sector
Goal of U.S. Space Activities c. The overall goal of U.S. space activities are:
  • To strengthen the security of the U.S.
  • To obtain scientific, technological and economic benefits for the general population and to improve the quality of life on Earth.
  • To encourage continuing U.S. private sector investment in space and related activities.
  • To promote international cooperative activities.
  • To cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind.
  • To expand human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the Solar System.
The remainder of the policy states the principles, policies and guidelines for all of the sectors.
Space Systems are National Property d. The policy states that the use of space for peaceful purposes can include activities related to national security. It also states that the U.S. retains its right to self­defense. The U.S. rejects any claims for sovereignty over outer space or any limits on the ability to acquire data from space. Space systems are national property and have the right of free passage without interference.
Contribution to National Security e. The policy states that the national security space sector will contribute to national security by:
  • Deterring or defending against enemy attack by any means.
  • Assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent U.S. use of space.
  • Negating, if necessary, hostile space systems.
  • Enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces.
  • Minimizing the creation of space debris.
  • Developing, operating and maintaining enduring space systems. This requires an integrated combination of anti­satellite, survivability and surveillance capabilities. The U.S. will develop and deploy an Anti­satellite (ASAT) capability, as required. DOD space programs must provide for the survivability of selected critical space assets.
  • Developing and maintaining an integrated attack warning, notification, verification and reaction capability which can detect and react to threats to U.S. space systems.
  • Using both the Space Transportation System (STS referred to as the Shuttle) and unmanned, expendable launch vehicles.
3-6 DOD Space Policy
Introduction a. DOD Space Policy defines space functions which include Space Support, Force Enhancement, Space Control, and Force Application.
Foundation b. The foundation for DOD space policy is found in two documents:
  • DOD Directive 5100.1 states, "The Department of Defense shall maintain and employ armed forces to insure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States...." The directive does not specifically mention space but it does not exclude the use of space to further national security.
  • The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 serves as the other foundation.
Space Policy Revision c. In March 1987, DOD issued a space policy which was a revision of the 1982 DOD space policy. The changes include the addition of the Strategic Defense Initiative program, the revision of the nation's launch philosophy to include expendable launch vehicles, the successful testing of the anti­satellite system against an object in space, the formation of unified and service commands for space, the emergence of commercial space enterprises and the initiation of a manned space station program with international involvement, the increasing commitment on the part of other nations towards space exploitation, and the stringent funding constraints imposed by budget limitation legislation. DOD space policy supports and amplifies U.S. national space policy. Space is recognized as being a medium within which the conduct of military operations in support of our national security can take place, just as on land, at sea, and in the atmosphere, and similarly from which military space functions of space support, force enhancement, space control and force application can be performed.
Space Support d. Space support functions are those required to deploy and maintain military equipment and personnel in space. They include activities such as launching and deploying satellites, maintaining and sustaining space vehicles while in orbit, and recovering space vehicles, if required. In order to do this DOD should emphasize robust satellite control. This may include autonomous satellite operations, survivable command links, and mobile ground controlling stations. Also, DOD should have assured access to space through a mix of launch systems, make payloads compatible with more than one launch system when possible, facilitate commercial space capabilities, and pursue new systems, especially launch­related concepts.
Force Enhancement e. Force Enhancement includes those space­related support operations conducted to improve the effectiveness of both terrestrial and space based forces. Force enhancement includes such capabilities as communications, navigation, and surveillance. Also, civil/commercial/allied capabilities may augment DOD systems to support military space force enhancement requirements, particularly if primary DOD capabilities were to be lost.
Space Control f. Space Control consists of operations that ensure freedom of action in space for friendly forces while limiting or denying enemy freedom of action. It includes satellite negation and satellite protection.
Force Application g. Force Application involves the conduct of combat operations from space.
3-7 U.S. Army Space Policy
Introduction a. During the early 1980's the Army recognized that space systems can enhance the execution of its mission. In June 1985, the Army published the Army Space Policy. General Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff, and Secretary Marsh, the Secretary of the Army, signed the policy. During this time, the Army also established the Army Space Council, which is chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff and consists of the Army Staff Principals. When formed, the charter of the Council was to focus on current space activities of the Army, the Army's potential role in a Unified Space Command and a future centralized Army space organization to develop Army space policies, concepts, doctrine and requirements, as well as manpower, training and materiel programs.
1985 Army Space Policy b. The Army Space Policy states: "Since the Sixties, space has become increasingly important to our national interests, joining the traditional land, sea, and air dimensions of National Defense. Space is host to advanced systems critical to this nation's security. Space systems already make essential contributions to Army combat operations and can play an even greater role in Army missions. Future Army operational doctrine must capitalize on emerging space capabilities. Consistent with National and Department of Defense policies and in cooperation with other military ser­ vices and agencies, the Department of the Army will exploit space activities that contribute to the successful execution of Army missions. The Army supports assured access to space and will use space capabilities to enhance the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical missions." "Successful implementation of this policy will require development of a pool of Army space expertise and judicious planning, to include development of concepts, requirements and a long­term management strategy. Army plans and evolving space architecture must capitalize on national and joint programs, preserving options to support initiatives that fulfill Army requirements. Implementation of this policy demands a visionary outlook to exploit fully evolving space capabilities." (New Army Space Policy at Appendix A-July 1994)
Space Policy Provides c. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans published a public press release which stated: "The Army Space Policy of June 1985 states that the Army will exploit space in order to enhance the capabilities of all Army elements ­­ at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Of greatest interest are the abilities of space systems to provide:
  • Reliable communications over great distances.
  • Products of observation of the earth's surface.
  • Extremely precise positioning and navigation.
  • Continuous monitoring of terrestrial environmental conditions.
Events during this time established the framework within which the Army is continuing to develop its use of space capabilities.
3-8 Space Law
Introduction a. Space law is the established rules by which space operations are conducted and governed. Space law is an extension of international law. The United States and most other nations have agreed that no nation can claim national sovereignty over space.
International Law Constraints b. Although the development of space policy is shaped by national interests, U.S. objectives and policies are constrained by international law. Typically, but not exclusively, these obligations are embodied in bilateral and multilateral treaties signed and ratified by the United States. As such they are as much a part of U.S. law as provisions of the Constitution or statutes enacted by Congress.
Sources of Space Law c. There are three general sources of space law:
  • Custom. (The U.S. did not object to Sputnik orbiting over U.S. territory.)
  • Principles formulated by courts. (The Soviets were responsible for the nuclear accident involving Cosmos 954 which landed in Canada.)
  • Treaties and agreements between countries.
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963 d. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963 was signed by 112 nations. It limits underground tests to 150 kt. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Article 1 of the treaty states, "States may not conduct nuclear weapon tests or other nuclear explosions in outer space or assist or encourage others to conduct such tests of explosions." This ban includes nuclear explosions used for peaceful purposes.
Outer Space Treaty, 1967 e. All of the space powers have signed the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This is a treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Article IV "States may not place in earth orbit, install on celestial bodies, or station in space in any other manner weapons of mass destruction (generally defined as nuclear, chemical, and biological)." It also says that states may not build military bases, installations, and fortifications; test weapons of any kind; or conduct military maneuvers on the moon or other celestial bodies. Celestial bodies are not completely demilitarized, however, because the treaty does permit the "use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose" as well as the "use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration," which presumably includes military equipment and facilities.
Article V The astronauts of one state are required to render all possible assistance to astronauts of other states either in outer space or on celestial bodies. This requirement presumably refers only to accidents, situations of distress, or other emergencies, and presumably would require the assisting astronauts to provide shelter to the affected astronauts. This would equate to the law of the sea and assisting sailors in distress.
Article IX If a nation is planning an activity that could be potentially harmful to the activities of another state, it is obligated to consult with those states possibly affected prior to initiating the activity. It also says that states must carry out their exploration and use of space in such a way as to avoid harmful contamination of the moon or other celestial bodies, as well as to avoid the introduction of extraterrestrial matters that could adversely affect the environment of the earth. States are asked to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations, the public, and the international scientific community of the nature, locations, and results of any space activities.
Article XII A nation's space stations, installations, equipment, and vehicles located on the moon may be visited by representatives of other states, provided there is reasonable advance notice given and that the visiting state permits reciprocal visits.
3-8 Space Law cont'd
Antiballistic Missile Treaty f. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Former Soviet Union, was signed in May 1972, at the height of the Cold War. The primary objective was not to prohibit ABM systems and components but only to limit the development and deployment of ABM systems and components. The ABM Treaty initially authorized two ABM deployment sites, but the United States and the Former Soviet Union agreed in 1974 to limit each side to a single deployment area containing no more than 100 ABM launchers and interceptors. The United States chose to deploy its ABM system at the Grand Forks ICBM complex in North Dakota; the Soviet Union chose to deploy its ABM components around Moscow. The United States deactivated its ABM system in 1975. The ABM system around Moscow continues to be deployed.
Restrictions The ABM Treaty restricts the type of ABM systems and components we may develop or deploy. Only fixed, ground-based ABM systems and components are allowed by the ABM Treaty. Article V of the Treaty prohibits developing, testing, or deploying space-based ABM systems or components. This restriction against space-based systems or components extends to currently understood ABM technologies as well as technologies based on other physical principles such as high energy lasers.
Develop- ment and Deployment We can develop and deploy ABM systems and components within the numerical and location restrictions of the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, the ABM Treaty does permit some latitude. We can test, develop, or deploy non-ABM components such as theater missile defense interceptors and we conduct laboratory testing, short of field testing outside the laboratory, with any type of ABM component without limitation on technology.
National Technical Means The ABM Treaty allows treaty verification only through the use of external, national technical means (NTM) such as satellites. Due in part to the Cold War era when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, there were not provisions for verification through on-site inspection. Because NTM is the only means of verification, Article XII of the ABM Treaty prohibits one side from interfering with the NTM of the other side. Therefore, verification of the ABM Treaty through use of satellite NTM systems is vital to effective monitoring.
Salt I Treaty, 1972 g. The full title for the Salt I Treaty is "Interim Agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." It was ratified by the Senate and is law. It restricts both sides on matters concerning the building of ICBM launchers, and SLBM's. However, it also has two provisions that apply to space. These state that both parties agree not to interfere with the other's national technical means of verification and both parties agree not to utilize deliberate concealment to impede the means of verification.
Rescue and Return of Astronauts h. The Rescue and Return of Astronauts treaty, 1968 was signed by 85 nations and says that the signatories will render assistance to astronauts in distress. It also says that the nation will return astronauts to the launching state as soon as possible and recover and return space objects to the launching state. The term "soon" is not, however, defined in the treaty.
Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by a Space Object i. The Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by a Space Object treaty, 1973 was signed by 71 nations. It assigns absolute liability for damages caused by a space craft or satellite and says that compensation will be made. However, it may be difficult to prove liability for damages caused to other objects in outer space. When the Soviet's RORSAT crashed onto Canada, the Canadians demanded payment from the Soviets for the cost of the search and cleanup. The total cost was approximately $11 million. The Soviets finally agreed to pay $3 million.
3-8 Space Law cont'd
Convention on Registration j. The Convention on Registration, 1974 covers the registration of objects launched into outer space with 39 states as signatories. This convention stipulates that the launching state must register the launch with the United Nations which maintains the register. The launching state must provide date of launch; registration number; basic orbital parameters, and the general function of the object. The launching state should also notify the U.N. when the satellite deorbits. This Convention does not require that a nation register the satellite immediately. This gives nations the ability to conduct secret launches and to register the object in space only after it is launched.
Moon Treaty k The Moon Treaty, 1979 was signed by five countries but not the United States or the Soviet Union. It states that the moon is a common heritage for all mankind which implies that all nations would share equally in any benefits derived from moon exploration. If the U.S. signed this treaty it would be hard to get private firms to invest in future moon projects if they had to divide the profits.
Environmental Modification Convention l. The Environmental Modification Convention, 1980 prohibits the military or any other hostile use of environment modification techniques. Environmental modification techniques are defined in Article I as any technique for changing the dynamics, composition, or structure of the earth or outer space through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes. The U.S. and Soviet Union are signatories to this convention. The United States is a signatory to all treaties dealing with outer space except for the Moon Treaty.
START I and II m. The Strategic Army Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed on July 31 1991 and was ratified by the Senate on May 23, 1992. This Treaty reduces the strategic offensive arms (SOAs) of both the United States and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Once fully implemented, the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers of the U.S. and the FSU will be reduced to 1,600 with no more than a total of 6,000 attributed warheads in either side's arsenal. On January 3, 1993, the U.S. and Russia signed START II which, when implemented on January 1, 2003, will further reduce the warheads on either side from an attributed total of 6,000 to an actual total of 3,500. Perhaps equally important is that the land-based, multiple warhead ICBM will be forever banned from either side's arsenal. The START Treaties were created in a post-Cold War era making on-site inspection possible for treaty monitoring and verification. Nevertheless, space-based NTM will still play a vital role for monitoring strategic offensive arms testing or deployment activity that may require additional on-site inspections to verify compliance. The U.S. and the FSU may have entered a new era of cooperation; but the nuclear threat, although reduced, is not eliminated.
U.S. Laws n. In addition to various treaties and agreements, Congress has passed a number of laws that effect space launches and satellite systems.
Commercial Space Act The Commercial Space Act, 1984 gives the Department of Transportation the lead for commercial launches of space vehicles. It gives them the right to monitor launch activities. It permits the Air Force to provide launch support. It establishes licensing rules and requirements for insurance.
Land Remote Sensing Commercializa- tion Act The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, 1984 directed the commercialization of LANDSAT. It provides for the non­discriminatory access of LANDSAT data and the licensing of other U.S. remote sensing systems. The Commerce Department, which is responsible for the satellite system, manages it through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA has a contract with Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT) to manage LANDSAT as a private endeavor. NASA and DOD share responsibility for the development and operation of the LANDSAT 7 and following LANDSAT satellites.
3-9 Military Activities in Space
Introduction a. A fundamental truth of international law is that if an act is not specifically prohibited, then that act is permitted. International law implicitly permits such traditional military support functions such as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorology, and communications. It permits the deployment of military space stations; the testing and deployment in earth orbit of non­nuclear, non­ABM weapon systems; the use of space for individual and collective self­defense; and any conceivable activity not specifically prohibited or otherwise constrained.
International Regulations b. A second and equally fundamental truth is that, in most instances, treaties are designed to regulate activities between the signatories during peacetime only. Unless the international agreement states clearly that its provisions are designed to apply or become operative during hostilities, or the signatories can deduce this from the treaty's content, they must presume that armed conflict will result in the suspension or termination of the treaty's provisions. Thus, in time of hostilities, the scope of permissible space activities broadens significantly.