DRAFT

Process 1
Issues to be Addressed 2
Alternative Nuclear Postures 2

Specific Issues 3

1. nuclear targeting
2. nuclear alert posture
3. force structure
4. arms control among the nuclear weapons states
5. near and new nuclear nations
6. strategic defense
7. tactical nuclear weapons
8. negative and positive security assurances
9. nuclear weapon system R&D and manufacturing base

11/25/96

DRAFT

NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW:
TERMS OF REFERENCE

In order to permit the President to consider a full range of options on all policy issues relating to nuclear weapons, a Nuclear Policy Review will be conducted. This effort should be completed in three months' time and organized as follows:

• The National Security Advisor is responsible for insuring that the review is conducted pursuant to these terms of reference and that the steps specified herein are carried out as intended.

• A study in response to these terms of reference shall be conducted by an inter-agency task force chaired by a senior representative of the National Security Adviser and involving senior officials from other agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense and Energy, the Joint Staff, ACDA, CIA, Science Advisor to the President, OMB, as well as the NSC. At the conclusion of the study, the task force will issue a Report.

• The task force shall have an associated staff composed of personnel detailed full-time from the aforementioned agencies for three months (or until the study's completion). These staff members, as well as the task force personnel, shall be issued all appropriate clearances, to include those for the SIOP, consistent with the needs of this study.

• The task force should consult throughout the course of its work with outside experts, including retired senior military officers. It should also review reports by private groups including the Canberra Commission, which was sponsored by the Australian government.

• The Report of the task force will present all options that it believes are serious alternatives meriting the consideration of the President and his principal advisors. The range of options presented should include: 1) current policy and the other options described below; 2) options endorsed by any participating agency; and 3) options suggested by the experts groups and private reports even if no government agency supports them. The costs and gains of implementing each option, as perceived by the concerned agencies, should be presented, but no formal statements of agency positions should be included in the Report.

• The NSC will assemble an outside group of experts who shall be grouped into teams supporting the nuclear postures outlined below. Each team shall produce a report making the case for the posture that it favors and explaining the drawbacks, as it sees them, of the other postures.

• The completed Report, along with the advocacy documents prepared by the experts teams, should be vetted by the Deputies Committee of the NSC to insure that it includes a full range of issues and options with a fair and complete statement of the pros and cons of each alternative.

• After the Report is viewed by the Deputies, but before it is presented to the Principals and to the President, an unclassified version should be prepared and released so that the President can have the benefit of congressional and public views as well as the view of other governments in considering the alternatives presented.

In order to permit the President and his principal advisers to address nuclear policy issues in a comprehensive way, the proposed study should examine each of the following questions and any others that the task force believes needs to be considered. In each case the Report should provide background on the issues and then present a series of options with a statement of the pros and cons of each.

A. Alternative Nuclear Postures

1. Describe the basic alternative options for overall U.S. nuclear policy. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a role of nuclear weapons

b optimum number of strategic nuclear warheads (if any) for the United States and other nuclear weapons states

c. alert status of nuclear delivery systems

d. limits, if any, on other warheads and fissionable material in terms of numbers and location for nuclear weapons states

e. nature of positive and negative security assurances

2. The options to be discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. elimination of nuclear weapons

c. reduction to 1000 strategic nuclear warheads

d. reduction to 100 nuclear weapons

3. Background information to be provided:

a. international commitments of the United States to negotiate in good faith on the elimination of nuclear weapons

b. views of the other nuclear weapons states on the elimination or substantial reduction of nuclear weapons and means by which these views might be altered

c. views of other U.S. allies and states that cooperated with the USG on the NPT and CBT on substantial reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and means by which these views might be altered

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. implications for the United States' ability to meet its security commitments to allies and other states

b. impact on the likelihood of deliberate or inadvertent nuclear attacks on the United States

c. impact on prospects for preventing the further spread or use of nuclear weapons

d. likelihood of reaching necessary agreements to implement the option

B. Specific Issues

In addition to analyzing basic options, the study should examine a number of specific issues and provide options for each. The issues to be discussed should include:

I. Nuclear Targeting

1. Describe options relating to the targeting of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a. degree to which nuclear targeting is to be preplanned, or adaptively planned

b. criteria the USG should use to set the size of the force

c. categories of targets, damage expectancy standards, and operational restrictions

d. need to pre-delegate authority to use nuclear weapons, if any

e. prospects for agreements with Russia and other nuclear weapons states on targeting doctrine and control of nuclear forces

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. a nuclear targeting plan emphasizing flexibility and rapid, adaptive planning whose size is set by international negotiation

3. Background information to be provided:

a. for current targeting plans, the categories, damage expectancy criteria, restrictions, and interdependencies which exist among all preplanned attack options

b. the current capacity for adaptive planning, including the time and information required, and the capacities of the various national command facilities to perform this function

c. for current targeting plans, the objectives and supporting reasoning which determine numerical "requirements"

d. the current planning cycle for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), including the information needed and time required to plan for targets not currently in the SIOP

e. the current capabilities to target hardened and mobile targets

f. the techniques of nodal/system analysis being used with respect to both economic and military systems

g. the criteria and provisions of the nuclear reserve force

h. the current arrangements between STRATCOM and the CINCs regarding the targeting of theater targets

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. the flexibility accorded to the President by preplanned options

b. the ability of the President to rapidly plan ad-hoc, limited strikes and to modify existing preplanned options

c. the retaliatory capability (in expected damage) of preplanned options

d. the rationale for all target categories, classes, and restrictions

e. the implications for deterrence and operational capabilities

f. the implications for arms control

g. the implications for reducing the risk of inadvertent and unauthorized attacks

II. Nuclear Alert Posture

1. Describe options relating to the alert posture of U.S. nuclear forces. Options discussed should combine three elements:

a. the dependence of U.S. forces on warning, basing synergies, and rapid decision making for survival

b. the viability of non-operational postures

c. effect of U.S. readiness levels on Russian forces, and the attendant operationally induced risks

2. The options to be discussed should include:

a. status quo

b. an alert posture which maximizes survivability and ensures the capacity for a deliberate, controlled, retaliatory attack

c. a non-operational posture which maximizes the safety, surety, and transparency of U.S. nuclear options in a cooperative, negotiated, verifiable international regime and which takes all nuclear forces off alert and separates weapons from their delivery systems to the degree possible

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current operational practices, including the time to reinstate a combat-ready posture from the day-to-day "de-targeted" condition

b. the types and quantities of warning necessary to ensure the survival of U.S. forces

c. the time needed to re-mate weapons to their launchers if weapons are physically separated from the launchers

d. estimates of the operational readiness and safety of Russian nuclear forces

e. for each strategic system, the problems and steps that can be taken to overcome them which would permit the system to be maintained in a non-alert status and to have the warheads separated from the delivery systems

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. the implications for deterrence and operational capabilities

b. the impact on the ability of the President to order a use of nuclear weapons, and to retain flexibility of action

c. the impact on the risk of nuclear accidents and other dangers, including unauthorized or preemptive attacks for the United States and other operators of nuclear weapons. (Discuss likely Russian responses in terms of the operational status of Russian nuclear forces.)

d. the implications for arms control, including the verifiability, transparency, and feasibility of alternatives

e. the implications for proliferation

III. Force Structure

1. Describe options relating to the force structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Options discussed should combine three elements:

a. for each specified number of delivery vehicles, the combinations of basing modes and launchers that should be maintained

b. operations, maintenance and eventual modernization costs

c. implications of U.S. force structure for arms control

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. a dyad of land-based bombers and submarine-launched missiles

c. a monad of submarine-launched missiles

d. a monad of land-based missiles

e. a dyad of land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles

f. a force of 1,000 warheads in alternative configurations

g. a force of 100 warheads in alternative configurations

3. Background information to be provided:

a. estimates of the costs and operational impacts of eliminating either, or both, of the land-based legs of the triad

b. program information (time lines and costs) on technology sustainment and modernization programs

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. consequences for deterrence and operational capabilities

b. implications for arms control

c. implications for the ability to reconstitute forces

d. costs

IV. Arms Control Among the Nuclear Weapons States

1. Describe options relating to negotiations on force size, deployments, and total arsenals of nuclear weapons and fissionable material, first with Russia and then with all of the nuclear weapons states. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a. USG statement about its objectives in arms control for the nuclear weapons states

b. timing of USG statement and willingness to negotiate in relation to Russian ratification of START II

c. if, when, and under what conditions the other nuclear weapons states should be brought into the negotiations

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. immediate negotiation (i.e., prior to START II ratification by Duma) of a framework agreement for START III - which would provide for a reduction to 1,000 missiles with limits on warheads and fissionable material - and prompt negotiation of such a treaty as soon as START II is ratified

c. negotiations among the five nuclear weapons states to end production of weapons-grade fissionable material, to store nuclear warheads only on their own territory, and to reduce weapons to no more than 100 for each nuclear weapons state

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current USG position on negotiating further reductions and rationale for this position

b. position of the Russian government and the other nuclear weapons states

c. difficulties the Russians face in adhering to START II limitations with no further reductions in U.S. strategic forces

d. the status of other international arms control agreements (NPT, CTBT, MTCR, CWC, BWC, Australia Group)

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. implications for deterrence of deliberate and inadvertent nuclear attacks

b. consequences for overall U.S. relations with Russia and other nuclear weapons states

c. effects on non-proliferation efforts

d. costs

e. relationship between any contemplated new agreement and existing international arms control efforts

V. Near and New Nuclear Nations

1. Describe options relating to states which have or might seek to acquire nuclear weapons including states that have not signed the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan), current aspiring states (Iraq, Iran, North Korea), and states that might decide in the future to acquire nuclear weapons. Options discussed should be limited to comprehensive measures aimed at all such states (policies and programs directed at specific states are beyond the scope of this Nuclear Policy Review).

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. a comprehensive set of additional arms control measures aimed at strengthening the international norm against non-proliferation

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current status and likely developments in the nuclear weapons program of all potential nuclear states

b. current USG objectives regarding the nuclear program of each potential nuclear state and programs to pursue those objectives

c. views of the other nuclear weapons states on what should be done to deal with this set of states

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. the likelihood of success in gaining the necessary international support for the option

b. the likely impact on the nuclear weapons program of each undeclared and potential nuclear weapons state

c. implications for other U.S. foreign policy objectives

d. costs

VI. Strategic Defense

1. Describe options relating to the deployment of strategic defenses. Options discussed should combine three elements:

a. the threat that the defenses would counter

b. the level of technology that should be incorporated, i.e., the effectiveness of the defenses, the basing mode, and the inherent, "breakout" capability

c. the tradeoff between defenses and deterrence that the USG should seek and which arms control agreements are consistent with that strategy

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo (research with deployment option)

b. abandonment of strategic defenses

c. deployment of a limited strategic defense

3. Background information to be provided:

a. the current program (3 + 3), as well as the demarcation agreement

b. the potential of current theater missile defense programs to include their "breakout" capability

c. the view of U.S. allies toward strategic defenses, as well as the impact of strategic defenses on U.S. alliances, particularly NATO

d. threat assessment to include estimates of current and projected missile capabilities and technology diffusion

e. an assessment of the effectiveness and continued viability of supply-side curbs, such as MTCR

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. consequences for deterrence and for further disarmament

b. impact on arms control and the ABM Treaty

c. cost effectiveness of various technical solutions

d. reaction of allies and of other nuclear weapons states

e. the effect on proliferation

VII. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

1. Describe options relating to the U.S. arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a. what stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons should be maintained

b. what the USG should say about its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and its use of such weapons

c. what nuclear weapons, if any, would be stored outside of U.S. territory

d. what arms control agreements bilaterally with Russia or with the other four nuclear weapons states the USG should seek to negotiate regarding stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons and their storage only on the territory of the particular nuclear weapons state

2. The options to be discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. substantial reductions of tactical nuclear weapons coupled with a public announcement and an offer to the Russians to negotiate an agreement to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from the arsenals of both nations

c. withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and negotiation of an agreement among the nuclear weapons states to store nuclear weapons only on their own territory

d. options c and d combined

3. Background information to be provided:

a. the current status of the tactical nuclear arsenal of the United States, including the number of weapons, where they are stored, and plans for their use

b. the current tactical nuclear arsenal of Russia

c. verification issues relating to any agreement to limit or abolish tactical nuclear weapons or to limit their storage to designated areas

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option, assess:

a. the consequences for deterrence of nuclear attacks on U.S. military forces stationed or conducting military operations abroad

b. the consequences for deterrence of nuclear attacks on U.S. allies

c. consequences for deterrence of biological or chemical attacks and the degree to which strategic nuclear forces can play a role if the United States decides to rely in whole or in part on nuclear threats to deter CB attacks

d. implications for arms control

VIII. Negative and Positive Security Assurances

1. Describe options relating to assurances by the five nuclear weapons states - acting through the Security Council - to states that adhere to the NPT that the nuclear weapons states will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against them, and that the international community will come to their assistance if such threats are used by one of the nuclear weapons states or by any other state. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a. specific terms of additional negative assurance to be provided

b. specific terms of additional positive assurances to be provided

c. steps to be taken to increase the credibility of the assurances and the likelihood that commitments will be honored

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. unequivocal assurances by the five nuclear weapons states that they will not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against any state that is a party to the NPT unless that state uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, and that any state party to the NPT threatened with the use of nuclear weapons by any other state will receive the support of the international community in deterring such threats and responding to any use of nuclear weapons against their territory

c. no first use declaration by the United States combined with an effort to negotiate such an agreement among the five nuclear weapons states

3. Background information to be provided:

a. current collective negative and positive assurances provided by the nuclear weapons states or by the Security Council

b. precise terms of current USG negative and positive security assurances and a chronology of such assurances by successive administrations beginning with the Johnson administration, as well as assurances offered bilaterally to particular states (e.g. Ukraine)

c. precise terms of assurances offered by the other nuclear weapons states

d. requests for such assurances from potential nuclear weapons states

e. current U.S. planning for the initiation of tactical nuclear weapons

4. In describing the pros and cons of each option assess:

a. consequences for deterrence of conventional attacks by countries receiving such assurances

b. the impact on proliferation, including assessment of impact on each near or new nuclear nation

c. the impact on overall relations with Russia and China as well as with France and the United Kingdom

d. the effect on the likelihood of threats or use of nuclear weapons by the other four nuclear weapons states or other undeclared nuclear weapons states

IX. Nuclear Weapon System R&D and Manufacturing Base

1. Describe options relating to the type, scale, cost, and capability of research, design and engineering establishments necessary to support future nuclear policy. Options discussed should combine these elements:

a cost-effectiveness of maintaining a dedicated nuclear weapon R&D complex versus mobilization and reconstitution

b. effects on stockpile stewardship, reliability, sustainablility, and maintainability

c. effects on the human capital necessary for nuclear weapon design, engineering, and development

2. The options discussed should include the following:

a. status quo

b. a nuclear establishment that concentrates on maintaining "core" capabilities in an active establishment while depending on the wider defense industrial base to provide non-"core" technologies

c. a nuclear establishment that, while maintaining adequate stockpile stewardship, depends on reconstitution for the design, test, manufacture, and engineering of nuclear weapons

d. a nuclear establishment that is essentially dormant and open to international inspection for verification of that status

3. Background information to be provided:

a. an inventory of current capabilities in nuclear R&D, design, test and manufacturing

b. a survey which lays out which technologies are generic to the wider defense industrial base, and which are specifically nuclear related

4. In describing pros and cons of each option, assess:

a. for given program activities and levels proposed, the nonproliferation and arms control impacts, if any

b. impacts on declaratory and possible unilateral policy commitments

c. impacts on budgets

d. impact on deterrent capabilities, including reconstitution time lines and capabilities