A portion of the preceding chapter examined the advantages aircraft present over ballistic missiles in delivering conventional munitions. The significance of one particular aircraft munition, cruise missiles, warrants closer examination.

Cruise missiles merit a closer inspection for a number of reasons. First, cruise missiles make a unique contribution to aircraft effectiveness and survivability. For example, the long range, accuracy, and autonomous guidance of the Russian AS-15 cruise missile transforms the Bear-H; a lumbering, turbo-prop powered bomber into a first-class strategic threat. In Operation Desert Storm, coordinating aircraft and cruise missile attacks increased the effectiveness of both systems considerably. Cruise missiles freed allied aircraft to pursue other missions which could be better executed by manned aviation, attacked several different objectives during weather conditions that precluded the use of other precision-guided munitions, and made possible daylight attacks on Baghdad without endangering pilots or requiring large support efforts.(1) Thus it appears that even when not launched from an aircraft, an important synergy exists between manned and unmanned aviation. Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, are absent from this equation. (Aircraft/cruise missile synergy in the Persian Gulf will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter.)

It is also useful to examine cruise missiles because the systems and technologies are proliferating widely. Unlike most technologies found in ballistic missiles, those contributing to the development and production of cruise missiles are usually "off the shelf" components with commercial applications.

Third, cruise missiles share many attack aircraft attributes. They exhibit similar capabilities, and ergo, the solutions to countering cruise missile threats and proliferation may apply to managing the proliferation and threat of attack aircraft. Finally, as this chapter will illustrate, cruise missiles are uniquely effective weapons.

Operational Characteristics

At this stage, examining the contribution of cruise missiles, and their relationship to aircraft effectiveness is instructive. A number of general comparisons between aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles can be made which have important implications for targeting and defense. Cruise missiles are similar to aircraft in many ways. Because they are both air breathing platforms, aircraft and cruise missiles travel at approximately the same speed and can fly in unpredictable paths to optimize surprise, range, or dodge defenses. Once fired, a ballistic missile's course does not vary. The ballistic missile's only defense is raw speed. The ballistic missiles currently proliferating are brute force weapons. Compared to ballistic missiles, aircraft and cruise missiles are very accurate. On the other hand, a cruise missile is still a missile. Most importantly, like a ballistic missile, a cruise missile is inherently expendable. No human life need necessarily be risked to accomplish its mission. While an aircraft can deliver tens of thousands of pounds of ordnance, a cruise missile can only deliver a tenth of that payload. Especially with aerial refueling, aircraft exhibit extreme ranges. Cruise missiles are more similar to ballistic missiles in this area. While some have intercontinental ranges, most travel less than 500 km. Unlike both cruise and ballistic missiles, aircraft require extensive and sophisticated infrastructures to train pilots and build, repair and maintain the weapon. Cruise and ballistic missiles differ from aircraft in that they require a much less advanced and comprehensive supporting technological infrastructure.

All three platforms can trade payload for range, or vice versa. The Iraqis, for example, increased the range of their Al-Abbas Scuds considerably, but at the expense of payload mass. This said, there is a difference in the ratio of the trade-off between platforms. A cursory examination of the various weapons will indicate that in general, cruise missiles suffer the most extreme trade-off between payload and range. The longest range attack aircraft carry moderate payloads, and the attack aircraft with the heaviest payloads travel at least moderate un-refueled distances. In general, long range cruise missiles, on the other hand, carry very small payloads, and short range cruise missiles, carry much larger payloads. The French, for example are developing two new advanced cruise missiles. The Apache will have a range of approximately 150 Km and a payload of 780 Kg. The Super Apache, on the other hand, will have a range of 800 Km, but trim its payload by one half of the Apache's. (2)


As noted before, ballistic missiles are inaccurate delivery systems, and this greatly limits their conventional military utility. Because of the operational characteristics inherent in the system -- a ballistic flight path -- increasing accuracy significantly is very technologically complicated. When re-entering the atmosphere, ballistic warheads travel several times the speed of sound, and usually at a great distance from the launch point. To guide this object by radar terrain comparison, or some type of correctional update is a challenge only the United States has succeeded in meeting.

In contrast to ballistic missiles, improving cruise missile guidance, and accuracy, is becoming increasingly easier. Outside of launching satellites into orbit, there are very few civilian uses for a ballistic missile. Since cruise missiles are similar to aircraft in propulsion, guidance, and aerodynamics, designers and engineers can readily apply commercially available technologies and techniques to the manufacture of cruise missiles.

Inertial navigation systems technology, for example, are benefiting from dramatic reductions is size, which enhance design, range and flexibility. Traditional gyroscopes, used to stabilize aircraft and helicopters, have between 100 and 300 moving parts. New gyroscopes, however, are being produced that have now moving parts, and contrary to traditional gyros that wear out after as few as 200 hours of use, these "chip" gyros will not deteriorate.(3) In addition to the obvious increase in reliability and savings in maintenance, new gyros are also much smaller, and thus generate benefits in airframe design. When combined with the electronics package that powers the gyro, new models are smaller than one cubic inch.(4)

Inertial navigation systems, while key to many guidance systems, are not perfect. Similar to problems incurred in ballistic missiles, the navigation systems "drifts" and reports locations incrementally more distant from the real location. To periodically correct this "drift," cruise missile manufacturers are increasingly turning toward satellite navigation systems. The Global Positioning System (NAVSTAR) constellation of 24 satellites makes location information -- latitude, longitude and altitude -- accurate between 50 and 100 meters available to anyone for free. All one has to do is purchase a "Pyxis" receiver from Sony for approximately $1,400.(5) There are currently approximately one hundred firms in the United States selling GPS receivers.(6) The approximate size of a "Walkman," GPS receivers are attractive devices for correcting the flaws in inertial guidance systems, through a frequently broadcasted update. If a cruise missile manufacturer desires a system with accuracy greater than 50 meters, a process known as differential GPS can be tapped to refine the accuracy to a few meters.(7)

Although GPS can broadcast signals that are as precise as 1 meter, the US Department of Defense purposefully degrades the accuracy to the 50-100 meter range. This process, called "selective availability," is used to deny potential adversaries militarily useful guidance information.(8) The 100 meter accuracy is adequate for a plethora of legitimate civilian uses such as hiking, farming, and shipping and road navigation, but would not add meaningfully to an opponents guidance or navigational capabilities in most cases.

Other commercial users, such as surveyors, require greater accuracy. Thus, there is a burgeoning Differential GPS (DGPS) market.(9) Instead of relying on the signals broadcast by the NAVSTAR constellation, DGPS users make use of independent transponders located on surveyed sites to measure errors in the GPS navigational signals due to the intentional "selective availability", satellite clock error, ephemeris errors and local atmospheric interference and computes "pseudorange" correction factors to correct those errors. The Differential signal can be broadcast via numerous media. Today, hundreds of DGPS beacons can be found in coastal waters globally. These beacons can transmit a usable signal over 300 nautical miles.(10)

Satellite navigation systems merit a rigorous investigation because in addition to the precision that makes them attractive guidance systems for weapons such as long-range cruise missiles, the technology is proliferating to the extent that governments may exercise little control in the future. Today, both GPS and DGPS receivers are general export items, and thus do not have to file for an export license with the Department of Commerce.(11) Hundreds of firms world-wide are competing to build DGPS ground stations in several countries. The US Coast Guard, for example, is an ardent advocate of using DGPS for harbor navigation during inclement weather.(12) The satellite systems that might safely guide a ship into harbor might also guide a weapon to its target.

One firm -- John E. Chance & Associates -- which has erected a DGPS system, and its own satellite navigation constellation which is independent of GPS, advertises "Why risk selective availability? Depend on Chance." (13) This advertisement highlights an important national security policy issue. The proliferation of GPS, DGPS and independent navigation assets has significantly reduced the Department of Defenses' ability to control of the satellite constellation. If the Pentagon degrades the precision of commercially available signals during a conflict to deny an adversary a military significant asset, that asset will continue to be provided by several domestic and foreign commercial companies. The ability of the United States to control the operations of foreign and commercial satellite navigation systems, which can be used for militarily significant applications against CONUS, is limited.


The cruise missile threat is downgraded by some because the perceived short range of cruise missiles would limit their military utility. At second glance, however, because of advances in turbojet propulsion technology, cruise missile range is increasing. Since air breathing engines don't need to carry their own oxygen supply, they are more efficient means of propulsion than solid propellants. Contrary to ballistic missiles, cruise missile range can be extended through air launch.(14) While extending the range through reduction in payload does reduce military utility, the cruise missile's accuracy makes a large payload less important. Because they are small, and require little supporting equipment, cruise missiles don't always require the long range of a ballistic missile or an aircraft since they can often be surreptitiously launched from a shorter distance. One must also ask, "how much range do I need?" Just because a platform doesn't travel 3,000 km doesn't mean it isn't necessarily "strategic." In regional conflicts such as the Middle East, Korea or the Indian Subcontinent, 50 km may be more than sufficient to achieve important military objectives. Finally, "long-range" cruise missiles do exist outside of the superpowers. The subsequent chart identifies over 20 cruise missiles or cruise missile development projects with ranges over 100 km.


As noted above, their precise accuracy makes cruise missiles effective delivery systems for conventional payloads. Cruise missiles may also be very effective distributors of unconventional weapons. Because they travel at relatively slow speeds, cruise missiles could disseminate chemical agents very efficiently either through submunitions, or a spraying method. In contrast, coordinating the dispersal of chemical or biological agents from a ballistic warhead traveling many times the speed of sound is very complicated. It is likely that the technological complexities of delivering unconventional weapons via ballistic missiles were as daunting to the Iraqis as the political manifestos the Coalition governments made. Finally, several cruise missiles are, and more are likely to become, nuclear capable. If one uses the MTCR payload of 500kg as the nuclear-capable threshold, 10 of the cruise missiles in the following database can accommodate nuclear payloads.


Similarly to aircraft, cruise missiles are very flexible weapons. They can attack more than one target. Improvements in sensors will enable future cruise missiles to attack mobile targets. Cruise missiles, such as the US' canceled Tacit Rainbow, the Israeli Star-1 or the German KDAR, can loiter above a battlefield for a considerable time searching for a target. Cruise missiles can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, trucks, and "Humvees." This flexibility makes cruise missiles applicable to numerous missions.


The range, payload, accuracy, flexibility, and expendability of cruise missiles have important implications for targeting and defense. These characteristics suggest, and Operation Desert Storm experience confirms, that cruise missiles are the weapon of choice to attack high value, heavily defended targets. While a $40 million aircraft can deliver several tons of weapons per sortie, and fly several sorties, a $.75 million cruise missile usually delivers .5 tons on its only sortie. To deliver several tons of ordnance via cruise missiles under this scenario would be very expensive. However as an earlier chapter illustrated, in conditions of even moderate attrition, this cost effectiveness ratio may be reversed. Losing aircraft at $40 million a pop is not cheap. For example, a 5 percent per sortie aircraft attrition rate would reduce 100 combat aircraft to 60 in 10 days if one sortie was flown per day. If the aircraft cost $40 million each losing 40 aircraft would total $1.6 billion, not including the "costs" engendered in losing and replacing pilots. If the battle was more protracted, say 35 days, even a one percent attrition rate would reduce the 100 aircraft to 70. In these instances, cruise missiles would probably become more attractive. During Operation Desert Storm, the vast majority of cruise missiles were fired in the first two days, before target defenses were reduced, to eliminate the heavily defended targets that posed the highest risk to tactical air.(15) Complimentary cruise missile/tactical aircraft application has been cited as one explanation for the minimal loss of Coalition aircraft.(16)




PLS					1.0		1.0		1.0		

R					.95		.80		.80

PP					.95		1.0		1.0

W					3 tons		1 ton		.5 ton

Tav=PLS*R*PP*W				2.7 tons	.80 ton		.4 ton

C					$40 M		$1 M		$.5 M

L					.05		1.0		1.0

CE=(C*L)/Tav				$.74 M		$1.24 M		$1.25 M

(cost/delivered ton)

PLS:  				pre-launch survivability
R:				reliability
PP:				probability of penetration
W:				weapon payload
C: 				cost
L:				delivery vehicle loss rate per sortie
Tav=PLS*R*PP*W: 	Average number of tons delivered per sortie 

CE=(C*L)/Tav: Cost effectiveness measured in $M per delivered ton of ordnance per sortie

Employing cruise missiles also risks several disadvantages. Although applicable to several missions, cruise missiles do appear less flexible than aircraft. They cannot be recalled once launched. Cruise missiles cannot engage targets of opportunity, nor can they fall back on a pilot's judgement to evaluate a changed targeting situation.

The proliferation of cruise missiles has important ramifications for crisis stability, because they appear to rival -- or complement -- aircraft as pre-emption weapons. An initial wave of conventional cruise missile strikes against C3I targets, and airfields would be an efficient precursor to a larger attack. Destroying ATBMs with cruise missiles also appears to be a likely application for precursor attacks. Cruise missile's concealability, minute radar cross section, unpredictable flight path and lack of conspicuous pre-attack preparation, make them very likely to succeed in achieving surprise.


While Desert Storm/Desert Shield illustrated BM's potential vulnerability to defenses, the attributes detailed above will make defense against increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles difficult. If the weapons have nuclear warheads, deterrence might apply, but as the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf, and numerous previous conflicts illustrate, deterrence below the nuclear threshold is rare.

Cruise missiles are less vulnerable to defenses than ballistic missiles for several reasons. First, cruise missiles can fly low. This makes it difficult to detect and track the target because the missile is masked from radar by ground clutter, tall objects such as hills and buildings block radar signals, and the curvature of Earth reduces radar horizon and the range at which it can detect the incoming target. Second, similar to aircraft and contrary to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can fly around air defenses and avoid them entirely. Third, cruise missiles have a very small radar cross section (RCS) which makes surveillance, tracking and intercept difficult under the best conditions. The cruise missiles' small airframe is the fundamental contributor to its small RCS. Cruise missiles also lack the hot rocket plume that makes ballistic missiles' IR signature so great. A host of low observable techniques can be easily applied to enhance a cruise missile's already small RCS. While tactical aircraft typically have RCS' between 20 and 100 m2, the most advanced cruise missiles are estimated to have RCS's near .001 m2.(18) In addition to these operational characteristics, cruise missile flexibility makes defense difficult as well.

Since they are easily transported and hidden, and launched from a number of platforms, cruise missiles can be launched closer to the target than other platforms. The surprise engendered by these conditions increases survivability versus defenses. Destroying the cruise missile launch platform is also difficult since it could be a nondescript vehicle, or aircraft that could return to shelter.

Because they can maneuver through flight without degrading accuracy, cruise missiles cause problems of detection, identification and tracking. They defy impact point and intercept point prediction. It is difficult to define the threat axis and "vector" cruise missiles. For example, since the traditional Soviet ICBM or bomber threat to CONUS would come from over the North Pole, strategic radars are pointed in that direction, while leaving the East, West and South almost entirely un-covered. This maximized the radar's effectiveness. Since cruise missile flexibility and maneuverability make them "all azimuth" weapons, it is difficult to optimize the defensive assets in one direction.

To address such a wily threat, defenders would find it useful to mirror naval defenses, since Aircraft Carrier battle groups have needed to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles such as the Exocet for years. Anti-ship cruise missile defense is somewhat less challenging than land defense, however, since anti-ship cruise missiles generally don't maneuver much, and are easier to identify and track against the featureless sea. That said, something akin to the CVBG's mutually supporting, overlapping anti air war system appears the best defense against cruise missiles. By layering defenses, no layer need achieve a 100 percent probability of kill; if one layer fails, the other can pick up the slack; the outer layers provide warning for the inner layers; and threats that prove problematic for one layer probably will not for others.(19) NATO air defense schemes are also based on similar principles.

This type of defense means that the cost effectiveness exchange ratio between attacker and defender is definitely in the cruise missile's favor. Even a high-end cruise missile only costs about $1 million, which is a very cheap weapon compared to the cost of the system required to shoot it down. Presently, only the superpowers have air defense systems with even marginal capability against land-attack cruise missiles.

Proliferation Issues

While the prospects for attack aircraft and aircraft technology proliferation appear great, large-scale cruise missile

proliferation appears even more likely for several reasons. First, because a cruise missile is essentially nothing more than an unmanned aircraft, those interested in designing and building such a weapon benefit from advances in aerospace technology and design in general. Thus, secondly, since aircraft industries are proliferating, the technical and industrial infrastructure required for cruise missile design and manufacture exists, and components are "off the shelf." Third, more modest systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), target drones and anti-ship cruise missiles exist in abundance, and are often easily adapted to a more militarily significant role. Finally, cruise missiles are attractive because in addition to the capabilities outlined in the previous section, they are relatively inexpensive.


A simple comparison to make between aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles is unit cost. On the high end, a first class attack aircraft costs somewhere between $30 and 40 million. Granted it is a more efficient and flexible weapon system, but it still costs $40 million. A crude ballistic missile of the type currently proliferating, costs approximately $1 million.(20) On average, cruise missiles appear to be the cheapest weapon of the three. Congressional Research Service experts assert that "cruise missiles are much cheaper than ballistic missiles..."(21) For comparison, the US AGM-142 Have Nap will cost less than a Scud-B ballistic missile. One of the most sophisticated cruise missile's the US Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile (TSSAM) is projected to cost approximately $1.7 million.(22) This system, however, is unrepresentative of current systems, or most in the foreseeable future. It will have an extremely low IR and radar cross section, long range, reasonable payload, and precise accuracy. Most cruise missiles cost less than $.75 million. By using satellite navigation in lieu of the much more sophisticated TERCOM technique, cruise missiles should become much less expensive than they already are. One analyst estimates that by using GPS or a similar system, unmanned system with the same range and payload as the US Navy's $1.5 million SLCM for less than $250,000.(23)

In addition to a much lower unit cost, it appears that cruise missile development costs are similarly low. While the winner of the US Navy's A-X aircraft contract will bring home $50 billion, the development of the French Apache -- a long-range turbo-jet powered missile with a 1 meter CEP -- will cost approximately $300 million.(24) While most consumers would prefer to drive a Rolls Royce or Mercedes, economics necessitate that the majority drive Honda Civics. The same may be true when it comes to long-range weapons. Cruise missiles appear to be the Hondas of the aerospace world; relatively inexpensive, reliable, and effective. To push the analogy even farther, if one can afford a Rolls, one can also buy several Hondas that can be used to reduce the wear and tear on the more expensive vehicle.


Anti-ship cruise missiles have been used by the world's navies for decades. There is no more cost effective way to increase the offense of naval forces than by purchasing reams of sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles. The Soviet 1950s generation Styx missile, and the Chinese Silkworm derivative can be found in scores of navies. The simple Exocet proved itself in the Falklands and against the US Stark in the Persian Gulf.

Unmanned aerial vehicles -- usually, but not always powered by reciprocating engines -- and target drones -- often with solid rockets or turbojets -- are also widely proliferated. The Israeli's, for instance, have been strong UAV proponents; using them effectively for surveillance, attack, and anti-radiation missions in Lebanon.

What is noteworthy about these technologies is that they represent "high chairs" or a "leg-up" to a land-attack cruise missile capability. If able to manufacture and efficiently use a UAV or anti-ship cruise missile, a given country probably has the technology and the expertise to produce a more threatening and militarily useful land-attack cruise missile. The Italian Mirach series of UAVs, for example appears to be a favorite conversion package for cruise missiles. The Argentines have reportedly based their MQ2-Bigua cruise missile on the Italian "Mirach", and the Iraqi "Ababil" cruise missile bears a striking resemblance to the Italian UAV. The Israeli's recently announced that they were turning their Delilah UAV into a cruise missile similar to what was envisioned in the Tacit Rainbow, and the Norwegians turned the Aerospatiale C.22 target drone into an anti-ship cruise missile. The only real difference between a UAV and a cruise missile -- depending on your definition of either -- may be that one has a warhead and the other doesn't.

While cruise missiles programs often spring-up from less technologically ambitious aerospace systems, they also can benefit from advances in a more advanced or complex endeavor: namely manned aviation. In some respects, the only difference between an aircraft and a cruise missile is that one has a human pilot. Thus, expertise and advances in areas such as aircraft airframe, guidance, and propulsion are easily applied to unmanned platforms. The rampant attack aircraft proliferation outlined in this study thus has dual implications. Dangerous in and of itself, unchecked aircraft proliferation is also likely to contribute to the spread of cruise missiles.

There are historical examples to support this inference. The very first cruise missile, for instance, was little more than a converted aircraft. In contrast to the complicated V2, the German V1 was inexpensive, was rapidly produced, and relied upon easily obtainable materials and established aircraft techniques wherever possible.(25)

All of the early US cruise missiles, the "Snark, the Navaho," and the "Hound Dog" relied upon contemporary aircraft airframe and guidance techniques. The Matador, the Air Force's first operational guided missile, was built around a widely used aircraft jet engine and closely resembled the fighter aircraft of that time.(26) The Soviets also borrowed heavily from their aircraft expertise in developing early cruise missiles. The 1950s era SSC-2b Samlet, a coastal defense cruise missile, was derived from the MiG-15 aircraft and powered by turbojet engines stripped from retired aircraft.(27)

It should be evident that if a country can produce an aircraft it can produce a credible cruise missile. As Table 3 on page xxx indicates, 91 countries operate aircraft. 45 of these countries presently have an indigenous aviation industry of some kind. 18 countries build aircraft under license, and 21 countries design their own aircraft. One can infer that the scope of potential cruise missile builders is at least equal to the distribution of aircraft capabilities. (By contrast, only 21 countries have ballistic missile programs.)

Perhaps the easiest technology to "cross-over" from aircraft to cruise missile manufacture is airframe design. Since both depend on aerodynamic forces to sustain flight, aircraft airframe design and wind tunnel testing expertise and can be directly applied to a unmanned vehicle. Furthermore, advanced airframe materials are also easily procured. High strength composites for airframes can be accessed by purchasing carbon fiber or kevlar from any boat yard that builds competitive yachts.(28) Many "exotic" materials useful in airframe manufacture can be acquired by purchasing such pedestrian items as fly rods in commercial sporting goods stores.(29)

Another important element in the manned/unmanned aviation technological cross-over, is guidance technology. Commercial airlines boast state-of-the-art or at least near state-of-the-art navigational systems, including inertial navigation systems and other types of "auto-pilots." If a country or foreign firm assembles or co-produces first-class commercial airliners, they obviously have exposure to both the technology and the expertise required to accurately guide an unmanned vehicle.

Traditionally, guidance has been the primary barrier to cruise missile development. Only the most advanced countries could master the complicated digital terrain and image matching techniques to accurately guide unmanned systems. Today, TERCOM is largely "old think" technology that has been overtaken by events. Improved and miniaturized INS, GPS, Differential GPS, GLONASS, and other navigational satellite constellations are accessible to any country as technologically advanced as Mongolia. The United States is upgrading its TERCOM guided Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) -- easily one of the world's most accurate unmanned systems -- with a GPS navigator.(30)

Continued advances in guidance can be expected because control subsystems consist primarily of microelectronics. Computers, inertial measurement units, seekers, altimeters and other components all benefit from advances in, and miniaturization of, generic commercial technology such as integrated circuits. While integrated circuit R&D and manufacture were primarily government subsidized and controlled in technologies early years, today, it is almost entirely a commercial activity.

Because navigational, and other technologies contributing to cruise missile development are now "off the shelf," little or no specialized infrastructure is required. Cruise missile development will require no specialized fuel, support, manufacturing techniques, materials or precision instruments. Not only will it become easier to acquire the technological elements of a cruise missile, it will become extremely difficult to monitor a particular country to determine if it has embarked on a cruise missile program. Rather than being able to focus on the movement of key technologies, investigators will have to make heroic inferences about the status and application of broadly dedicated technologies such as integrated circuits.

Ballistic missiles present a useful contrast. Leaving the Earth's atmosphere, travelling at Mach 20, operating in the harsh environment of space, and returning to Earth is an unusual activity. It requires specialized techniques, designs and a conspicuous supporting infrastructure. Ballistic missile tests are difficult events not to notice. While UN investigators are well aware of Iraq's ballistic missile programs and keep a close watch on missile destructions consistent with UN Resolution 687, no one appears to have a clue about the status of Iraq's long-range cruise missile; the "Ababil."(31)

While cruise missile guidance is increasingly within the reach of developing countries, propulsion continues to pose challenges. Using solid rockets for propulsion is within the reach of most countries, but rockets do not provide much flexibility, and are inherently shorter range. Internal combustion engines are also similarly easy but limited means of propulsion. Turbojets, ramjets, or some combination of the two are operationally the most attractive unmanned propulsion systems. This technology has proven beyond the ability of several countries to master. After years of work, India, for example, gave up on an indigenous engine for its Light Combat Aircraft in favor of purchasing one from General Electric. (More on this in subsequent chapters.) Developing turbojet propulsion systems for cruise missiles is more difficult than producing them for manned aircraft because of more challenging size and weight restrictions. On the other hand, since a cruise missile is expendable, it doesn't have to fly Mach 2, nor last for 10 years. Making something that is used only once reduced performance requirements and takes some of the stress off designers.

In conclusion, there are more than technological motivations for developing cruise missiles in the near future. Effectiveness of US cruise missiles and ineffectiveness of Iraqi ballistic missiles in Desert Shield/Desert Storm may encourage countries to develop these systems. Weather it worked in the Persian Gulf or not, ballistic missile producers must now consider that Patriot, or systems like it, may reduce the chances of ballistic missiles finding their targets. It appears that in addition to the United States and the former Soviet Union, the suppliers of ATBMs is likely to grow. France, Taiwan, Israel, and Iraq are either developing, or have expressed interest in developing their own ATBMs. Finally, outside of NATO countries, China, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, Iraq, and North Korea produce cruise missiles. All are aggressive arms exporters and can be counted on to show as little restraint selling unmanned technologies as other weapons systems.



China			HY2			95		513
			HY4			135		500
			C601			100		513
			C201			135		500
			C801			40		165
			C611			100		513

France			Exocet			65		165
			ASMP			350		?
			Armat			120		180

G. Britain		Sea Eagle		110		230

Israel			Popeye			100		895
			Gabriel I, II		40		180
			Gabriel III		36		150

Iraq			Faw 70			70		500

Italy			Otomat			180		210

Japan			ASM 1			50		250
			SSM 1			150		250

N. Korea		HY2			95		513

Norway			Penguin MK3		402		120

Sweden			RB O8A			250		250
			RBS 15			70		250

Taiwan			HF I			40		70
			HF II			180		70



Argentina		Bigua			900		70

Brazil			Barracuda		70		150

China			HY3C			40		500

			C802			120		165

France			ASLP			1300		300
			ANS			180		180
			Apache			150		780
			S. Apache		800		400

Germany			Kormoran 2		55		220
			KDAR			100		?

Israel			Gabriel IV		200		240

Iraq			Ababil			500		200

Italy			Skyshark		200		?

Japan			ASM 2			150		150

S. Africa		Skorpioen		?		?


				AC		BM		CM


Argentina			S		D		D
Brazil				S		D		D
China				S		S		S
DPRK						S
Egypt				S
France				S		S		S
FRG				S				S
Great Britain			S				S
India				S		D
Israel				S		S		S
Iran						S
Iraq						S		S
Italy				S				S
Japan				S				S
Norway								S
Pakistan					D
ROK				S		S
S. Africa					D		D
Sweden				S				S
Taiwan				S		D		S

D = weapon under development
S = weapon in service (others may be under development)


1. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, p.6-8.

2. Lennox, Duncan, "Stand-off delivery comes of age," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 March 1991, p.390.

3. Polsky, Debra, "Chip Gyroscope Attracts Wide Interest," Defense News, 10 February 1992, p.28.

4. Polsky, Debra, "Chip Gyroscope Attracts Wide Interest," Defense News, 10 February 1992, p.29.

5. Arradondo-Perry, Jackie, "Receiver Survey," GPS World, January 1992, p.55.

6. Kieth D. McDonald, GPS Receivers: Survey of Equipment Characteristics and Performance, Navtech Seminars, Inc., 31 October 1991.

7. GPS: A Guide To The Next Utility, (Trimble Navigation, Sunnyvale, CA, 1989)

8. Proteous, Holly, "GPS: Waiting for a clear signal," Jane's Defense Weekly, 16 November 1991, p.949.

9. Kalafus, Rudolph, "Differential GPS Standards," Sea Technology, March 1985, p.52.

10. Trygo, BP and Backstrom, Rolf, "Threading the Needle: Differential GPS on the Baltic Sea," GPS World, September 1991, p.22.

11. Telephone conversation with Mike Swiek of the US Global Positioning System Industry Council, 28 January 1992.

12. Telephone conversation with Mike Swiek of the US Global Positioning System Industry Council, 28 January 1992.

13. GPS World, September 1991.

14. Air-launched ballistic missiles do exist, but are uncommon.

15. Froggett, Cmdr. Steve, "Tomahawk In The Desert," Proceedings, January 1992, p.72.

16. Froggett, Cmdr. Steve, "Tomahawk In The Desert," Proceedings, January 1992, p.71.

17. Formula and AC/BM data and assumptions found in: Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford, CA November 1991, p.46. CM data from sources contributing to database.

18. Doug Richardson, Stealth, (New York: Orion Books, 1989), p.150.

19. O'Rourke, Ronald, "Defending against the cruise missile," Military Technology, September 1986, p.65.

20. Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control, Center For International Security and Arms Control, Stanford, CA, November 1991, p.45. "A missile such as a Scud or an SS-21 costs roughly $1 million, which includes the cost of operations and support for several years..."

21. Shuey et al, "Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces," CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 9 February 1989, p.7.

22. Gellman, Barton, "Pentagon Unveils a Stealthy Cruise Missile," The Washington Post" Development costs for program $15.1 B.

23. Fetter, Steve, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, Summer 1991, p.11.

24. "Limits on stealth," Jane's Defense Weekly, 1991, p.397.

25. Nels Parson, Missiles and the Revolution in Warfare, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962, p.26.) and "Hitler's Rocket Sites," p.208

26. Ronald Huisken, The Origins of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, p.22.

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