Department of Defense
ANNUAL POLYGRAPH REPORT TO CONGRESS
Fiscal Year 1997 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I DOD Use of Polygraph Examinations II Fiscal Year 1997 Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Examinations CSP Refusals Specific CSP Examination Results Significant Information Developed III Utility of the Investigative Polygraph IV Training and Qualification Standards for Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners) V Polygraph Research
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Department of Defense (DoD) uses the polygraph in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and exculpation requests. This report contains numerous examples of polygraph utility in resolving counterintelligence and security issues as well as criminal investigations. The polygraph is clearly one of our most effective investigative tools.
About 67 percent of our polygraph examinations are conducted as a condition for access to certain positions or information under the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect activity involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Department implemented changes to the CSP Program to reduce the intrusiveness of polygraph screening examinations while providing maximum standardization and ensuring reciprocity within the Intelligence Community. The Department also implemented some new initiatives increasing the continuing education requirement for polygraph examiners, providing a quality control assurance program, expanding our information database and increasing our use of computer based and off-site training to reduce travel costs.
The Department conducts CSP examinations on military personnel, DOD civilian employees, and DOD contractor personnel. Of the 7,616 individuals examined under the CSP Program in Fiscal Year 1997, 7,440 showed no significant physiological response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive) and provided no substantive information. The remaining 176 individuals yielded significant physiological responses, or were evaluated as inconclusive and/or provided substantive information. Of these 176 individuals, 154 received a favorable adjudication, two are still pending adjudication, 14 are pending investigation, and six individuals received adverse action denying or withholding access.
The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) trains all federal polygraph examiners. The basic polygraph courses are taught at the Masters Degree level. The Institute also offers specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology through their continuing education program. In addition, the Institute conducts on-going evaluations of the validity of polygraph techniques used by the Department as well as research on new polygraph techniques, instrumentation, analytic methods, and polygraph countermeasures. The DOD research program is authorized by Public Law 100-180
IThe Department of Defense has used the polygraph for almost half a century. It is used in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, exculpation requests, and as a condition for access to certain positions or information. The polygraph is a tool that enhances the interview and interrogation process. Often it is the only investigative technique capable of providing essential information to resolve national security issues and criminal investigations. The use of the polygraph as a condition for access is limited by a statutory quota for Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) examinations.
DOD USE OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
The following table reflects Department of Defense Polygraph Program statistics for Fiscal Year 1997.
Criminal 2,338 20,6% Exculpatory 565 5.0% Cl Scope 7,616 67.2% All Others* 812 7.2% Total** 11,331 100%
* Includes examinations conducted in support of personnel security investigations, counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and polygraph assistance to non-DOD federal agencies.
** Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) . A breakout of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified table submitted with this report. Nor does it include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office, which are conducted under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
IISection 1121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180, December 4, 1987; 101 Stat. at 1147) authorizes the Department of Defense to conduct CSP examinations as a condition for access to certain information.
Fiscal Year 1997 Counterintelligence-Scope
The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. The following topics are covered during the CSP examination: (1) Involvement with a foreign intelligence/security service, involvement in espionage; (2) Involvement in terrorism; (3) Unauthorized foreign contacts; (4) Deliberate failure to protect classified information; and (5) Damaging/sabotaging government information systems, clandestine collection, or defense systems. These CSP topics meet the needs of both DOD and the Intelligence Community facilitating the transfer of security clearances.
In Fiscal Year 1997, the Department modified the procedures for conducting CSP examinations to reduce the intrusiveness of CSP examinations, increase their standardization, and maximize reciprocity within the Intellignce Community. Also, there is increased emphasis on aperiodic, rather than periodic, examinations, which provide a greater deterrent. In addition, the Department has implemented new initiatives increasing the continuing education requirements for polygraph examiners, providing a quality control assurance program, expanding our information data base, and increasing our use of computer based and off-site training to reduce travel costs.
Public Law 100-180 authorizes DoD to administer CSP examinations to persons whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program under section 4.2(a) of Executive Order 12356 (superseded by Executive Order 12958). This includes military and civilian personnel of the Department and personnel of defense contractors. The number of CSP examinations has been limited to 5,000 per fiscal year since Fiscal Year 1991. For Fiscal Years 1988 through 1990 the ceiling was 10,000. The quota reduction took place two years after new exemptions for cryptographic and reconnaissance programs were adopted. Public Law 100-180 exempts certain intelligence agencies and functions from the 5,000 quota: (1) individuals assigned, detailed or under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (2) persons employed, assigned, detailed, under contract or applying for a position in the National Security Agency, (3) persons assigned to a space where sensitive cryptographic information is produced, processed, or stored, and (4) persons employed by, assigned or detailed to, an office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs or a contractor of such an office.The following table reflects CSP examinations conducted by the Department of Defense in accordance with Public Law 100-180.
(1) Special Access Programs 1,670 (2) DIA Critical Intelligence Positions 994 (3) TOP SECRET 0 (4) Examinations for Interim Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 2 Total Examinations Conducted Under the Congressional Ceiling 2,666 Exempted Examinations* 4,950 DOD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program TOTAL** 7,616
*NOTE: Includes detailees to CIA and NSA; assignees to cryptographic information processing spaces; persons in non-NRO reconnaissance programs.
**NOTE: Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by NSA. A table of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified annex to this report. Nor does it include examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which are conducted under the authority of the DCI.
In Fiscal Year 1997, nobody declined CSP testing required as a condition of access to certain information. Department of Defense policy states those persons who decline to take the examination are denied access to the classified material in question, but are retained in their position or transferred to other positions in the organization of equal pay and responsibility, commensurate with the clearance level held before the declination.
Specific CSP Examination ResultsThe polygraph examination results for the 7,616 individuals tested under the Department of Defense Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program are as follows:
Three hundred and twenty six individuals required more than two series (a series is defined as the collection of at least two polygraph charts on an examinee). A total of 107 examinations required more than one day to complete.
There were 7,440 individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as no significant physiological response (non-deceptive).
An additional 159 individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested, and through further testing, the examiner was able to resolve all relevant issues favorably to the subject.
After reviewing the psychological data, the polygraph examiner was unable to render an opinion for four individuals. One of these individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested.
There were two individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as significant physiological response (deceptive) and who made no admissions to the relevant issues.
Eleven individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested but continued to be evaluated as significant psychological response (deceptive) during further testing.
Of the 176 individuals whose examination results were evaluated as yielding significant physiological responses, or evaluated as inconclusive and/or provided substantive information, 154 received a favorable adjudication, two are still pending adjudication, 14 are pending investigation, and six individuals received adverse action denying or withholding access.
Significant Information Developed
The following cases indicate the most significant information developed during DOD counterintelligence-scope polygraph examinations covered by this report. It should be noted that all these individuals had been interviewed previously by security professionals and investigated by other means without any discovery of the information obtained by the polygraph examination procedure. In most cases the information was elicited from the subject in discussion with the examiner.
During CSP testing in which the results of the polygraph examination were evaluated as inconclusive, the examinee subsequently related that while stationed in the Combined Air Operations Center, Bosnia, it was suspected that one of the Turkish Watch Officers, who worked in the facility, was passing classified information to a Moslem terrorist organization operating within Bosnia. The examinee claimed he was not directly involved and could provide no additional details. Further investigation of this matter is pending.
During CSP testing in which the results of the polygraph examination indicated a significant physiological response to the relevant questions, the examinee admitted that on several occasions he confirmed information he obtained from classified sources to his wife and his father. Some of this classified information came from messages classified SECRET. This matter was referred for adjudication.
During CSP testing in which the examination results were evaluated as inconclusive, the individual related that during 1995 while stationed in Germany, he removed a document classified SECRET from a secured area to his barracks. He forgot about the document until he was transferred back to the United States. At which time he carried the document to his parent's home where it was placed in a closet. The document was retrieved from the parent's home and returned to U.S. Government control. This matter was referred for adjudication and was subsequently favorably resolved.
During CSP testing, a Navy enlisted member exhibited significant responses to the relevant issues. He subsequently advised that he had been asked to join a white supremacist group, but he had declined. He described himself as a survivalist and he expressed he would commit sabotage of defense weapons systems if these systems would be used against U.S. citizens. He also admitted disclosure of ship movements to his spouse. During further polygraph testing, he continued to exhibit significant responses to questions regarding unauthorized disclosures and subsequently terminated the polygraph examination. He was eventually separated from the U.S. Navy.
During CSP testing, a military officer exhibited a significant response to the relevant questions. The officer admitted to having classified documents at his residence. He further stated that he burned the classified material in his backyard and flushed the ashes down the toilet. This matter was referred for investigation. During the investigation, a four to five inch stack of classified documents was recovered from the officer's residence. The investigation is completed and is pending adjudicative or punitive action.
During CSP testing in which the polygraph examination results indicated a significant response to the relevant questions, the individual admitted that he disclosed classified information to his family and a Korean friend. The classified information pertained to the intercept of Russian communications. The matter was referred for adjudication.
During CSP testing, a senior enlisted member of the U.S. Navy admitted to wrongful disclosure of SECRET CODEWORD information to family members and a foreign national. The sailor further admitted that the disclosure to the foreign national occurred in another country. The sailor and several shipmates had previously reported the contact with this foreign national; however, the unauthorized disclosures of classified information were not reported. The matter was referred for further investigation.
IIIDuring Fiscal Year 1997, DoD investigations obtained unique and significant information from interviews conducted with the aid of the polygraph. In all illustrated instances, the polygraph examination process produced significant security or criminal information which would not otherwise have been secured for the specific investigation. The polygraph examination process was also valuable in helping to establish the innocence of persons charged with serious infractions.
Utility Of The Investigative Polygraph
An investigation was initiated when a soldier and his wife admitted their nine month old daughter to a German hospital in a comatose state. The child died a short time later. An autopsy revealed a fracture to the left side of the child's skull and several broken ribs. The father alleged the child was injured when she fell, striking her head on the toilet in the bathroom. The soldier agreed to undergo a polygraph examination and subsequently admitted, that in a fit of anger, he swung the child by the feet, throwing the child across the room where her head struck the wall, causing the injury and subsequent death. Final disposition of this matter is pending.
An applicant, requiring access to highly classified information for civilian employment with a government agency, was administered a polygraph examination. During the examination, he reported that he had been involved with the International Socialist Organization and considered himself to be a "classical leftist" The applicant was not selected.
An investigation was initiated based on information that someone had stolen a one and one half pound block of C-4 (plastic explosives), a half pound block of TNT, and six non-electric blasting caps/detonators from the munitions area on a U.S. Air Force Base. The investigation developed 15 military suspects. All of the suspects were interviewed and denied any knowledge of who stole the explosives. All agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The first suspect was evaluated as non-deceptive during the polygraph examination. The second suspect was evaluated as deceptive and admitted stealing the explosives to give to gang members. As a result of a court-martial, the individual received 15 months confinement, a Bad Conduct Discharge, and reduction in grade.
An investigation was initiated when an Army community club reported the theft of over $1,100.00 from the change fund. An employee who was on duty at the time was suspected of the theft but denied complicity. The employee agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph examination indicated deception. Subsequently, the employee admitted that he had stolen $1,200.00 from the fund which he used to pay outstanding financial obligations he had incurred. Final disposition of this matter is pending.
An investigation was initiated regarding the wrongful disclosure of DOD classified information to the news media. A DOD civilian employee was identified as improperly accessing classified information relating to a sensitive program. The employee denied wrongfully providing the classified information to unauthorized persons and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination in which he was evaluated as deceptive. The employee subsequently admitted to numerous security violations regarding the security controls for the program to include discussing specific details with unauthorized persons. The civilian employee terminated his federal employment.
A DOD depot facility police officer discovered a bomb-like device in some leaves beside the Child Development Center. The device was removed by a police bomb squad. About one month later, this same officer returned to his patrol car and discovered a note on the dash which said "Don't move or boom". The officer summoned help and a search disclosed a suspicious box under the front seat of the car. The police bomb squad was called in again. Between these incidents, the facility switchboard had received an anonymous telephone bomb threat against the facility police officers. The officer denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, the bomb hoax or threat and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. During the polygraph examination, the officer admitted that he had planted the devices and that he had made the anonymous bomb threat. The officer agreed to undergo a mental evaluation. The officer was subsequently convicted on the false bomb threats and was removed from the police force.
An applicant, requiring access to highly classified information for civilian employment with a government agency, was administered a polygraph examination and reported that he was holding dual citizenship and claimed loyalty to both the United States and the other country. He further admitted that if requested by the other country to do something which would be harmful to the United States, he would have difficulty not complying with this request. The applicant was not selected.
During a background investigation of a DOD civilian contractor employee, record information disclosed that he admitted smoking marijuana monthly from 1980 to 1995. He was interviewed during the current background investigation and denied using any illegal drug subsequent to 1988 and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. During the polygraph examination, he admitted to the continual purchase and use of marijuana from 1990 to as recently as the night before the polygraph examination. He also admitted to frequent and recent involvement with crack cocaine. Adjudication is pending.
A naturalized U.S. citizen was suspected of involvement in the killing of her husband, who was on active duty in the Marine Corps. The homicide occurred in Mexico. The wife reported to Mexican authorities that she and her husband were stopped along the roadside when the occupants of a passing car, opened fire on them, killing her husband. The wife was uninjured during the shooting incident. The wife agreed to undergo a polygraph examination administered by U.S. investigators. The results of the polygraph examination indicated deception and the wife confessed to shooting her husband six times. The matter is pending adjudication by Mexican authorities.
An investigation was initiated following the discovery that damage had been done to a SH3-3M helicopter belonging to, and located at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. The rear wheel locking cable on the helicopter had been cut and a transformer cable had been broken. Several similar incidents had been reported during the previous six months. Two potential suspects were developed. Both denied any involvement in the incident and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. One of the suspects was evaluated as nondeceptive during the polygraph examination. The other suspect was evaluated as deceptive during his polygraph examination and subsequently confessed to having committed the wrongful destruction on all the helicopters. The matter is pending adjudication.
An applicant requiring access to highly classified information for civilian employment with a government agency, was administered a polygraph examination and reported that she maintains a friendship with several Ukrainian government officials. She further reported that the Ukrainian officials asked her to obtain employment with the U.S. Congress. It was later developed that the applicant's friends were intelligence officers with the Ukrainian Intelligence Service. This matter has been referred to another government agency for further investigation.
During a background investigation of a DOD civilian contractor employee, information was developed, that while serving on active military duty in 1993 as a diplomatic courier detailed to the State Department, he had sexual relations with two Russian women and one Finnish woman. Allegedly, he revealed his courier status to one of the Russian females, and numerous telephone calls were placed to Russia from his Helsinki, Finland apartment. When interviewed, he denied revealing his courier status; ever placing or allowing anyone to place telephone calls to Russia from his apartment and ever providing classified information to unauthorized persons. He agreed to undergo a polygraph examination to support his denials. During the polygraph examination, he admitted to revealing his courier status to the Russian female; to making telephone calls to Russia and allowing the Russian female to make calls to Russia. He further admitted to withholding this information from other federal agencies when questioned about his activities. This matter has been referred to other federal agencies for further investigation.
The partners in two aircraft parts companies, that are Department of Defense subcontractors, were implicated in paying kickbacks. As part of a proffer, in conjunction with their plea agreements, these men agreed to undergo polygraph testing to verify the truthfulness of their statements. During the polygraph examinations of these men, it was learned that they had paid millions of dollars in kickbacks to numerous foreign air carriers, foreign government officials, and numerous domestic companies. They also admitted passing proprietary drawings, obtained from a major aircraft manufacturer, to third parties for the purpose of counterfeiting critical aircraft parts. One of the partners told of a prospective deal with an agent of a foreign "postal airline" in which the agent was to receive $15,000.00 per month in return for aircraft parts orders. Each of these companies was subsequently fined $500,000.00 plus each of the partners was fined $200,000.00 and given two years probation.
Someone, using cans of government spray paint, sprayed 10 swastika symbols on various walls within the government barracks. A soldier assigned to the barracks implicated a fellow soldier in the offense by saying he observed the suspect with spray paint on his arms. The investigation determined that the suspect did have paint on his arms. The suspect denied any involvement in the incident and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination resulted in a determination of no deception. The first soldier was re-interviewed and denied that he had wrongfully implicated the other soldier and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination resulted in a determination of deception. The soldier confessed to spray painting the swastika symbols and admitted he wrongfully implicated the other soldier. Final disposition is pending.
A U.S. Marine Corps member reported that weapons and parts were being stolen and then sold at gun shops throughout the Southeastern United States. The member was administered a series of polygraph examinations to substantiate the veracity of his allegations. The member successfully completed the polygraph examination process and became a cooperating witness. An undercover operation was initiated which resulted in the arrest of eight civilians and six active duty Marines.
An explosive device detonated in a trash can inside a mail room located at an Army installation. An anonymous letter implicated a soldier in the incident. The soldier denied the allegations and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination resulted in a determination of deception. The soldier confessed to detonating the device saying he did it to show there was a lack of security on the installation. Final disposition is pending.
An individual was suspected of raping a female subordinate inside his on-base quarters. The victim alleged the incident occurred when she baby sat the man's son while the man's wife was away on temporary duty. The man stated the sexual encounter was consensual and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination indicated no deception. The victim was re-interviewed and confessed that she fabricated the alleged rape and that the sexual encounter was consensual.
A U.S. Marine Corps member was suspected of facilitating the transfer of narcotics from Mexico into the United States. The member denied the allegation and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph examination indicated deception. The member confessed to his involvement and provided valuable information regarding the method of operation the drug traffickers were using to recruit members of the military. The matter is pending adjudication.
IVThe Department of Defense maintains very stringent standards for polygraph examiners. The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute's (DODPI) basic polygraph program is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study. Candidates selected for DOD polygraph positions must meet the following minimum requirements:
Training and Qualification Standards for
Department of Defense Forensic
Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners)
1. Be a United States citizen.All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph training at DODPI. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Institute trained 59 new polygraph examiners. After completing the basic polygraph training, DOD personnel must serve an internship consisting of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training and the conduct of at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before being certified as a DOD polygraph examiner. In addition, DOD polygraph examiners are required to complete 80 hours of continuing education every two years. To help meet this requirement, the Institute offers 19 different specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology. In Fiscal Year 1997, approximately 550 students attended the specialized courses.
2. Be at least 25 years of age.
3. Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college or have equivalent experience that demonstrates the ability to master graduate-level academic courses.
4. Have two years of experience as an investigator with a federal or other law enforcement agency. Two years of comparable experience may be substituted for the requirement of investigative experience with a Federal or other law enforcement agency.
5. Be of high moral character and sound emotional temperament, as confirmed by a background investigation.
6. Complete a DOD-approved course of polygraph instruction.
7. Be adjudged suitable for the position after being administered a polygraph examination designed to ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the personal impact of such examinations.
Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologists
(Polygraph Examiners)Average Number Fiscal Year Of Examiners Attrition Rate 1994 192 19.3% 1995 176 18.2% 1996 164 18.9% 1997 153 18.3%
VMandated by Congress, the research program at the Institute is focused on: (1) developing new psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD) techniques, instrumentation and analytic methods to improve PDD technology; (2) conducting research on PDD countermeasures; and (3) evaluating the validity of PDD techniques.
Polygraph (Forensic Psychophysiology) Research
To facilitate the research, a small grant program was established in Fiscal Year 1992. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Institute received seven proposals from academic and institutional researchers. Two of the proposals were funded through the grant program and two were rejected. Three proposals are being held for future consideration.
During Fiscal Year 1997, the Institute developed a prioritized research plan at the request of the Security Policy Board. This plan describes a series of projects to be completed in support of PDD research. Its successful completion is dependent on the availability of resources. The plan has been approved in its entirety by the Personnel Security Research Subcommittee and will be presented to the Personnel Security Committee for consideration during Fiscal Year 1998.
Research Projects0culomotor and Pupil Analysis for PDD. A grant has been awarded to Eye Dynamics, Inc. of Torrance, California, to examine changes in pupil size and eye movement during a PDD examination. They will use a research plan designed by Institute personnel to determine if oculomotor changes are indicative of deception. The first phase of testing has been completed and the data are being evaluated.
Improvement of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Automated PDD Examination Scoring System (POLYSCORE). The Institute has contracted with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to update and improve their POLYSCORE computer program. POLYSCORE is a computer program designed to evaluate data collected during a PDD examination. Several data analysis techniques have been evaluated and those which improve POLYSCORE's accuracy have been incorporated into a new version of the computer program. The updated version of POLYSCORE was developed using confirmed PDD examination data provided to DODPI by federal and state examiners.
Artificial Neural Network Signal Processing Techniques for PDD: Single Test Format. The Claremont Graduate School has completed their research to develop a computer program based on neural network technology (a computer program designed to model the biological human decision making process). This technology will be used to evaluate test results of security screening PDD examinations.
The Detection of Deception with Event Related Potentials. A grant has been awarded to the University of Ottawa to replicate their earlier studies using event related potentials (electrical signals generated in the brain) to measure deception. A unique test procedure which provided promising results during two preliminary studies will be used. The earlier studies will be replicated using a larger number of subjects and more sophisticated analyses techniques to evaluate the obtained data.
Detecting Stress in the Voice. The Institute, in collaboration with the Chief, Department of Neuroendocrinology and Neurochemistry, Division of the Neuroscience's, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, is measuring the human voice during stressful circumstances to determine if there are characteristic changes associated with stress. If stress induced changes are found, further research will be conducted to determine if voice stress can be used to predict deception.
Vagal Tone Monitor/ARIS. This project was designed to investigate the feasibility of using a Vagal Tone Monitor and Autonomic Response Indicator System (ARIS) software to monitor changes in cardiovascular activity during a PDD examination. The Vagal Tone Monitor and ARIS software measure the direct influence of the vagal nerve on heart rate. Testing has been completed and the data are being evaluated.
A Field Study to Test the Validity and Comparative Accuracy of Voice Stress Analysis as Measured by the Computerized Voice Stress Analyzer: In A Psychological Context. This project will be completed by the Michigan State Police Polygraph Unit under a grant from DODPI. The study is designed to assess the validity of the computerized voice stress analyzer using subjects who are being tested for actual crimes. The voice stress analysis results will be compared to those obtained using traditional PDD techniques.
Thermal Imaging During a PDD Examination. This project is designed to examine the efficacy of thermal imaging technology as a measure of deception. Infrared thermal imaging, a non-intrusive and non-invasive technology, will be used to determine if facial and peripheral changes in temperature occur during a PDD examination, and if such changes are indicative of deception.
Countermeasure-3 (CM-3). This study was designed to assess the effect of countermeasure training on the accuracy of PDD examination results. Subjects who committed acts of mock espionage or sabotage were given a security screening PDD examination. Half of the subjects received training in the use of a countermeasure prior to the PDD examination and the remaining subjects did not receive countermeasure training. A classified report will be published in Fiscal Year 1998.
Effects of Misinformation on the Concealed Knowledge Test (CKT). This study, completed under contract with the University of North Dakota, was designed to examine the effect of misinformation on subjects undergoing a CKT PDD examination. The CKT is used when subjects deny knowing specific details about a crime, which only a guilty person would know, such as the type of weapon used. Subjects were given false information concerning a videotaped crime they observed a week earlier. Those who remembered the false information were less likely to be detected, when deceptive, during a PDD examination than those who did not remember the false information. A final report has been completed and is available through the Defense Technical Information Center.
POLYSCORE: A Comparison of Accuracy. The accuracy of four versions of the PDD examination evaluation computer program, POLYSCORE, was assessed. Accuracy was found to vary among the four versions, usually improving somewhat with successive releases of the software. A final report has been completed and is available through the Defense Technical Information Center.
Effectiveness of Detection of Deception Examinations Using the Computer Voice Stress Analyzer (CVSA). The accuracy of the CVSA instrument in detection of deception was assessed using a mock theft scenario. One hundred nine subjects were tested by four CVSA examiners. Results indicate that examiners correctly identified 49% of the subjects as deceptive or non-deceptive. A final report has been completed and is available through the Defense Technical Information Center.
POLYSCORE and PDD Human Examiner Accuracy Rates when Scoring Examinations from Actual Criminal Investigations. A previous report documented the PDD examination accuracy of the computer program, POLYSCORE, relative to that of human examiners. The data used for the comparison were, however, collected during a laboratory study. This study was designed to examine POLYSCORE and human examiner accuracy rates using data collected during actual criminal investigations. The data has been collected and a final report is being written.
A Compilation of Studies on the Effectiveness of Event-Related Stimuli as a Control Procedure in the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD). A typical PDD examination involves the use of different types of questions. Generally speaking, there are questions relevant to the issue being examined and non-relevant or control questions used for comparison purposes. The comparison questions have been considered too intrusive by some individuals. The event-related test, developed by the Institute, is designed to use only relevant questions. The data collected during this study is being evaluated.
Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD) Accuracy Rates Obtained Using the Test for Espionage and Sabotage: A Replication. The Institute developed a new security screening procedure, the Test for Espionage and Sabotage, during the early 1990s. While high accuracy rates were obtained with the procedure, the number of examinees sampled was relatively small. A study replicating the original study was undertaken using a larger subject population to ensure the validity of the conclusions has been completed and a report is being written.
Test of a Mock Theft Scenario for Use in the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception PDD. Further projects will be completed which can be reliably used to obtain relatively high accuracy rates in the laboratory. Procedures which are developed will be further tested to ensure reliability.
Validation of the Relevant/Irrelevant Question Format. The Relevant/Irrelevant test is a PDD format that is used by some federal agencies for initial and periodic employee screening. There have only been two studies of its validity. A third study will be conducted to provide validity information to those agencies that use the technique.
Other ResearchInternational Use of PDD. The Institute maintains contact with PDD examiners in other countries to keep abreast of polygraph development around the world. The Institute issues periodic reports summarizing international polygraph activity.
Espionage Database, Annotated Bibliography, and Library Acquisitions. The Institute is developing a database and bibliography in support of research and education. Two hundred and thirty eight books relating to espionage have been obtained to date.
Information Consolidation. Research files from the National Security Agency have been transferred to the DODPI Learning Resource Center.