FAS |
Secrecy |
Other Gov Docs ||
Search |
Join FAS
 |
|
|
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies
The purpose of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies -- formerly published by the Department of Energy -- was to enhance communication between the technologists in the DOE community who develop means to verify compliance with agreements and the policy makers who negotiate agreements.
Focus on Transparency: Arms control treaties and agreements directly influence the national security of the United States. Security decisions made today are based on that influence. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I began a reduction of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, START I is easily verified using straightforward methods—literally tape measures and plumb bobs coupled with National Technical Means and direct observation. As we enter into new negotiations, there is a desire to expand the traditional approach by focusing on the warheads themselves rather than on their delivery systems. More modern treaties, involving both nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, are not as simple to verify. Within the last few years, and in the foreseeable future, emphasis has increased on "transparency measures" that will open "windows" on the nuclear-weapons activities of the signatories to such agreements—including the U.S. These transparency measures cannot be verified in the strict START I sense, but all of the proposed initiatives are based on high-technology measurements to provide the necessary windows.
This issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies covers an exciting new area for the Department of Energy, and we
believe our usual readers will find the information to be of interest. DOE formally added support of law enforcement to its general R&D tasks in 1998. It is an important area, and DOE is enlarging the distribution of this particular issue to cover a new audience, the law enforcement and forensic sciences communities.
On July 12, 1996, the United States Department of Energy, in partnership with Earth Search Sciences, Inc., signed an accord with
the Kazakhstan Ministry of Science to use remote-sensing technology developed by the U.S. in the Republic of Kazakhstan. This mutually beneficial agreement supported U.S. goals for nuclear nonproliferation and Kazakhstan’s goals for infrastructure and economic development. This issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies highlights this cooperative venture, providing examples of the data collected during the June–July 1997 mission.
The Department of Energy's Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE's objectives in arms control and nonproliferation.
This issue of ACNT focuses on several technology-development projects under the Effluent Research Program, sponsored by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, DOE. Research efforts are aimed toward more sensitive and portable instruments for the field and faster, more accurate analysis methods and equipment for the laboratory.
During the past few years, many individuals from the DOE national laboratories have collaborated on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) Program. Its primary mission is to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of this research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management.
The SBIR program is managed by the DOE's Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE.
This issue contains reprinted papers discussing technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These papers were presented to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May and June 1994. The purpose of this edition of Arms Control and Nonprofiferation Technologies is to share these papers with the broad base of stakeholders in a CTBT and to facilitate future technology discussions. The papers in the first group discuss possible technology options for monitoring a CTBT in all environments (underground, underwater, atmosphere, and space). These technologies, along with on-site inspections, would facilitate CTBT monitoring by treaty participants. The papers in the second group present possible associated measures, e.g., information exchanges and transparency measures, that would build confidence among states participating in a CTBT.
In this issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies we present the initial findings of the recent Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), conducted by the Department of Energy at the Nevada Test Site. Through an introduction and pictorial walk-through, Maw Denny and Jay Zucca of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory describe the overall experiment. This is followed by scientific and technical abstracts of the complex suite of experiments and analyses, which were presented at the Symposium on Non-Proliferation Experiment Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, April 19-21, 1994.
This issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is another in a series of issues about specific means for detecting and identifying proliferation and other suspect activities outside the realm of arms control treaties. All the projects discussed are funded by the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.
In June 1993, the Department of Energy conducted a demonstration of the ability to tag and seal potential nuclear material containers appropriate for the U.S.-Russian conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU). Begun in the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the task was carried out after DOE's reorganization by the Qffice of Research and Development. Tags and seals that were previously developed at the DOE national laboratories and under the sponsorship of the Defense Nuclear Agency were demonstrated on three possible containers: the Department of Transportation Specification 6M HEU container, the AT-400R HEU container, and the Type 30B uranium hexafluoride cylinder.
FAS |
Secrecy |
Other Gov Docs ||
Search |
Join FAS
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/acnt/index.html
Maintained by Steven Aftergood